Statute Annotations › California › Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

Unfair competition law: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
California
Case notes
1,170
Cited in passing
1,315
Citing cases indexed
2,554
Case dates
1979–2026
Screened through
2026-04-30
Checked for later law changes
2026-09-30
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

2,485 citing cases reviewed of 2,554 in the citation index: 1,170 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,315 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-04-30 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1992 Section 17200 was amended to cover an unlawful business “act or practice,” permitting a claim based on a single act rather than requiring a course of conduct. Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp. explains the change. Source
  • 2004-11-02 Proposition 64 amended §§ 17203 and 17204, limiting private UCL standing to people who suffered injury in fact and lost money or property because of unfair competition, and requiring representative claims to meet class-action rules. Source
  • 2008-02-11 Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 42 Cal. 4th 1077, reversed the 2006 Court of Appeal preemption ruling and held that the FDCA does not impliedly preempt private UCL suits based on parallel state food-labeling laws. Source
  • 2013-01-24 Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, reversed the Court of Appeal’s rule that recurring UCL claims accrue only at the initial act; continuous accrual can preserve claims for later recurring wrongs. Source
  • 2020-06-17 Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, held that federal courts must apply traditional equitable limits, including the absence of an adequate legal remedy, before awarding UCL restitution. Source
  • 2022-01-01 SB 461 (2021 Cal. Stats. ch. 140) expanded § 17204 enforcement authority to county counsel in counties containing a city with more than 750,000 residents. Source

Standing

The UCL permits a private plaintiff with injury in fact and lost money or property to seek generally limited injunctive and restitutionary relief.

Tarpon Bay Partners LLC v. Zerez Holdings Corporation · filed 2021-07-07

The UCL embodies the remedial purposes of “promoting fair competition and consumer protection.”
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A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under section 17200 must show injury in fact and lost money or property resulting from the unfair competition.

LegalForce RAPC Worldwide P.C. v. Swyers · filed 2019-12-17

In addition, even assuming defendant has engaged in conduct subject to regulation under California law, specifically, the unauthorized practice of law in a manner connected to California, plaintiff has failed to offer evidence to demonstrate it has lost money or property as a result thereof, and, consequently, has failed to show it is entitled to relief under § 17200.
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Section 17200 does not require competition between the parties for relief.

Agarwal v. Pomona Valley Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2007-01-16

the unfair competition statute is not limited to “conduct that is unfair to competitors.”
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A plaintiff who retains an interest in the allegedly misused property has standing to bring a state unfair-competition claim under section 17200.

Halicki Films, LLC. v. Carroll Shelby International, Inc. · filed 2008-11-12

As we have now concluded otherwise, we reverse the District Court’s ruling on this issue and hold that Halicki has standing to bring her state unfair competition claim.
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Section 17200 broadly reaches unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices but gives an individual litigant only injunctive and restitutionary relief, not damages.

Cort v. St. Paul Fire And Marine Insurance Companies, Inc. · filed 2002-11-25

Section 17200, however, entitles an individual litigant only to injunctive and restitutionary relief; it does not provide for damages. See Bank of the West, 2 Cal.4th at 1266, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545; see also Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17203; Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 179, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527. The artists sought damages under VARA and CAPA, and injunctive relief under § 17200. Because the policy only covers payment of damages (and certain associated legal fees), the artists' § 17200 claim did not give rise to a duty to defend. See La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, 9 Cal.4th at 39, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048.
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Section 17200 gives individual consumers a cause of action to enforce incorporated unfair-advertising prohibitions, subject to injury-in-fact and lost-money-or-property standing.

Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp. · filed 2013-05-21

The UCL expressly incorporates the FAL’s prohibition on unfair advertising as one form of unfair competition.
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A consumer has standing to pursue a UCL claim challenging a product-label misrepresentation by alleging reliance and that the product would not have been purchased without the misrepresentation.

Hawkins v. the Kroger Co. · filed 2018-10-04

“A consumer who relies on a product label and challenges a misrepresentation contained therein can satisfy the standing requirement of section 17204 by alleging . . . that he or she would not have bought the product but for the misrepresentation.”
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A UCL plaintiff adequately alleges economic injury by alleging lost money and time resulting from the defendant’s conduct.

In re Hudson's Bay Company Data Security Incident Consumer Litigation · filed 2019-05-07

Because the Complaint has identified injury based on the time and expense that Rudolph incurred as a result of the alleged data breach, she has adequately alleged injury under the UCL.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and a UCL plaintiff must show direct injury and lost money or property caused by the alleged unfair competition.

Pinnacle Ventures LLC v. Bertelsmann Education Services · filed 2020-03-06

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... To establish standing under the UCL, a plaintiff must establish that it suffered direct injury and lost money or property as a result of the alleged unfair competition. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 325 (2011). ... While BES chose to lend HotChalk the funds that HotChalk subsequently used to pay off Pinnacle, BES is entitled to repayment of its loan to HotChalk and therefore BES has not established that it lost any money or property. Pinnacle’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fourth counterclaim under California’s UCL.
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A private UCL plaintiff must show injury in fact and lost money or property caused by the unfair competition.

Townsend v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-12-16

The district court properly dismissed the Townsends’ claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) because the Townsends failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate the requisite causal connection between defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s alleged improper credit reporting and the Townsends’ diminished credit rating.
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Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, and when a claim is based on consumer misrepresentations, the plaintiff must show actual reliance to establish standing under the statute.

Greenpeace, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2021-09-20

Section 17200 prohibits "unfair competition," which includes "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent" business acts or practices. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. An action under § 17200, however, cannot be brought unless the plaintiff satisfies the "standing requirement" set forth in § 17204, see In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 325 (2009), specifically, that the plaintiff "has suffered an injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition," see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. The term "as a result of," as set forth in § 17204, means "caused by," see Kwikset v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 326 (2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted), and where, as here, the challenged conduct consists of alleged misrepresentations to consumers, the "causation requirement" is met only where the plaintiff "demonstrate[s] actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading statements." See id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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Section 17200 creates a cause of action for unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices.

UMG RECORDINGS,INC. v. RCN TELECOM SERVICES, LLC · filed 2022-04-29

The UCL provides a cause of action for “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices that cause the plaintiff to suffer injury in fact and lose money or property.

Mewawalla v. Middleman · filed 2022-05-02

The UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s]” that cause the plaintiff asserting a claim to have “suffered injury in fact” and “lost money or property.”
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A UCL plaintiff must show potential deception of a reasonable consumer, satisfy an injury requirement no greater than Article III’s, and allege that she saw and read the deceptive statement.

Glassman v. Edgewell Personal Care, LLC · filed 2022-08-02

The UCL, FAL, and CLRA all utilize the reasonable consumer standard, Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC, 44 Cal. App. 5th 1125, 1136 (2020), “which requires a plaintiff to show potential deception of consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances-not just any consumers.” Hill v. Roll Internat. Corp., 195 Cal. App. 4th 1295, 1304 (2011). ... Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not meet the injury requirement of the California statutes. The California statutes she pleads, however, “demand[] no more than the corresponding requirement under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.” Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the injury requirement of statutory standing. ... Plaintiff has also adequately alleged reliance on the “Reef Friendly” claim. Reliance under the FAL, CLRA, and UCL “requires that a plaintiff allege she saw and read deceptive statements.” Cohen v. E. W. Tea Co., LLC, No. 17-CV-2339-JLS (BLM), 2018 WL 3656112, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). Plaintiff here alleges that she saw and read the allegedly deceptive statements on the label, and thus has adequately alleged reliance.
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A UCL claim based only on substantive claims that fail also fails, and a private plaintiff must allege injury in fact and lost money or property caused by the unfair competition.

Majano v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2023-04-12

First, to the extent Majano bases his UCL claim on the conduct alleged in the substantive causes of action addressed above, the UCL claim fails along with those causes of action. See Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 178 (2001), as modified (May 22, 2001) (holding that derivative UCL claims “stand or fall depending on the fate of the antecedent substantive causes of action”). Moreover, Majano fails to establish standing under the UCL. The UCL provides a private right of action only for those “persons who have ‘suffered injury in fact and [have] lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.’” Do v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-00324-JST (JCGx), 2011 WL 5593935, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204). Here, Majano alleges he suffered an injury with “the loss of the equity in the value of the Subject Property, and the costs of seeking a remedy.” (Compl. ¶ 79.) However, it is not clear from the Complaint what acts by Defendants led to the loss of equity in the Subject Property. Majano fails to allege facts that sufficiently describe his loss and connect that loss to Defendants’ unfair competition. Thus, Majano lacks standing to pursue his UCL claim as currently pleaded.
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Section 17200 requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact from unfair competition, and assigning a § 17200 claim does not give standing to an uninjured assignee.

Sanchez v. Nintendo of America Inc. · filed 2022-11-22

To have standing under Sections 17200 and 17500, the plaintiff must be the one who has suffered an injury in fact as a result of unfair competition or false advertising. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17204, 17535. Additionally, the assignment of rights arising under Sections 17200 and 17500 does not confer standing on an uninjured assignee.
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Section 17200 permits a private UCL claim only when the alleged unfair competition has a California connection, and the plaintiff must show economic injury—lost money or property—to obtain relief.

Zamfir v. Casperlabs, LLC · filed 2023-03-08

Yet, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails for two reasons: (1) it is based on trademark infringement, not fraudulent misrepresentation and (2) it does not allege that the trademark infringement occurred in California or caused economic injury. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Unfair Competition claim under California Business and Professions Code § 17200.
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The UCL requires a private plaintiff to have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property to establish statutory standing.

Cittadino v. BrandSafway Services, LLC · filed 2023-08-08

“An individual suing under the UCL must have “suffered injury in fact” and “lost money or property.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. ... Plaintiff has therefore failed to cure the defects the court identified in its previous order. Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s second claim for violation of the UCL for the same reasons explained in the court’s prior order.”
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A competitor may sue under the UCL without direct dealings with the defendant, but it lacks standing when its claim is based solely on contracts to which it is not a party; it must allege economic loss caused by the unfair competition.

Olson v. World Financial Group Insurance Agency, LLC · filed 2024-07-19

California’s UCL prohibits unfair competition by means of any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice. ... To have standing under California’s UCL, as amended by California’s Proposition 64, plaintiffs must establish that they (1) suffered an injury in fact and (2) lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition. ... The parties agree that a business competitor may have standing to assert a UCL claim even if there were no “direct dealings” between the two competitors. ... Accordingly, the Court agrees with the reasoning in Western Air Charter and finds that GFI lacks standing to bring its UCL claim to the extent it is based solely on WFG’s agreements with third parties. ... To establish statutory standing under the UCL, a party must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.”
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Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, but a large, sophisticated corporation generally lacks UCL standing for a privately negotiated business-to-business contract lacking public or consumer interest.

Grocery Outlet, Inc. v. Naftali, Inc. · filed 2024-07-24

The UCL broadly prohibits “unfair competition,” which is defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... In sum, because Grocery Outlet is a “large” and “sophisticated corporate plaintiff, and its claims are based on a privately negotiated contract without “the requisite public or individual consumer interest as required under California law,” Grocery Outlet lacks standing to assert its UCL claim.
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Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, and the UCL permits relief only when the plaintiff has suffered a causally related economic injury; its remedies are restitution and injunctive relief rather than damages, with equitable restitution requiring no adequate legal remedy.

ROMA v. PROSPECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS, INC. · filed 2024-08-06

The last count to be addressed is Plaintiffs’ allegation that Prospect violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), which “prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” ... “Unlawful,” “unfair” and “fraudulent” conduct are “three varieties of unfair competition.” ... The private right of action to enforce the UCL has been “limited to any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of unfair competition.” ... That means that, to have standing, a plaintiff must: “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” ... Thus, Plaintiffs have standing to sue under the UCL, and Prospect’s Motion will not be granted on this ground. ... But “[r]emedies under the UCL are limited to restitution and injunctive relief, and do not include damages.” ... Thus, “[a] plaintiff ‘must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL.’” ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim will be dismissed without prejudice with opportunity to plead that they lack an adequate remedy at law.
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The UCL requires a plaintiff to plead an economic injury caused by the challenged conduct to establish statutory standing.

Ramos v. The GAP, Inc. · filed 2024-09-30

In addition to the requirements of Article III standing, the UCL has additional standing requirements that require plaintiffs to (1) plead an economic injury and (2) show that the injury was caused by the challenged conduct. ... But as already discussed, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged exactly what data was intercepted here. ... But such conclusory allegations are obviously insufficient.
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Section 17200 requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged misrepresentation was an immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct, but it need not be the only cause.

Flodin v. Central Garden & Pet Company · filed 2024-10-23

Defendants also argue that Brand “lacks statutory standing because he made clear that he was not relying on the Alleged Avocado Misrepresentations when he purchased AvoDerm,” citing deposition testimony where Brand stated that he purchased the AvoDerm products for reasons unrelated to the Avocado Representations—independent research about the health benefits of avocados and the attractive AvoDerm packaging. ... But “[w]hile a plaintiff must show that the misrepresentation was an immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct, the plaintiff need not demonstrate it was the only cause.” ... Brand has thus sufficiently shown that the Avocado Representations were an immediate cause for his injury in purchasing the AvoDerm product. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims.
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Section 17200 reaches unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, but a corporate plaintiff generally cannot use it to pursue a private contractual dispute lacking public or consumer harm, and private remedies are limited to injunction and restitution.

AWI Builders, Inc. v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corporation · filed 2025-01-16

California’s Unfair Competition Law, or UCL, defines unfair competition to “include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This “sweeping language” applies to “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ... The UCL generally does not apply to disputes over contracts between private entities. ... The only remedies available to a private plaintiff for a UCL claim are equitable remedies of “injunctive relief and restitution.”
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A UCL plaintiff must plead an economic injury and show that the challenged conduct caused it to establish statutory standing.

Lazares v. Shopify (USA), Inc. · filed 2025-02-04

the UCL has additional standing requirements that require a plaintiff to (1) plead an economic injury and (2) show that the injury was caused by the challenged conduct.
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The UCL requires a private plaintiff to plead an economic injury caused by the challenged conduct to establish statutory standing, in addition to Article III standing.

Lazares v. Shopify (USA), Inc. · filed 2025-05-14

the UCL has additional standing requirements that require a plaintiff to (1) plead an economic injury and (2) show that the injury was caused by the challenged conduct.
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Section 17200 requires a private plaintiff to show economic injury caused by the alleged unfair business practice to establish standing.

Flynn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-08-29

A private person has standing to sue under California’s Unfair Competition Law if she can “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” ... “A plaintiff cannot show causation if she would have suffered ‘the same harm whether or not a defendant complied with the law.’” ... Like plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim, plaintiff’s UCL claim plausibly alleges that her injuries were caused by defendant’s unfair business practices. The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that had defendant not engaged in various practices such as failing to process documents, failing to provide a single point of contact, failing to use improper income figures, and illegally dual tracking, plaintiff could have pursued private money loans and prevented her foreclosure. (See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 160-163.) Accordingly, the court will deny the Motion to Dismiss the UCL claim.
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A private plaintiff must allege injury in fact and loss of money or property from unfair competition to have standing under section 17200.

Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America · filed 2007-05-14

CAG did not allege that it suffered injury in fact or lost money as a result of the alleged violation of Business and Professions Code section 1720,0. Therefore it does not have standing to pursue its section 17200 claims.
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Remedies

A finding of unfair competition under section 17200 can independently support a permanent injunction against continued use of a service mark and similar marks.

Thompson v. Asimos · filed 2016-12-15

Asimos does not challenge the court’s finding of unfair competition under section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code. That finding supplies an independent basis for the court’s permanent injunction barring him from further use of the WREG mark and similar marks.
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Section 17200 does not itself authorize attorney fees for a successful plaintiff.

Harper v. 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. · filed 2008-10-22

Moreover, even before adoption of Proposition 64, there was no statutory authorization for an award of attorney fees to counsel for a successful plaintiff asserting UCL claims under section 17200.
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Section 17200 provides private plaintiffs with injunctive and restitution remedies; a class action is required to obtain restitution for other consumers, but not to seek a statewide injunction.

Miller v. Peter Thomas Roth, LLC · filed 2020-01-22

Simply put, § 17200 provides for injunction and restitution. A private plaintiff may request a statewide injunction without a class, but must file a class action to obtain restitution for a class of consumers. Thus, plaintiffs’ present goals can be achieved without class certification. The requested liability finding and injunction are “for the benefit of the general public” and require no class. Class certification will be needed only if plaintiffs win and seek restitution “on behalf of” others, i.e. a class of consumers. See ibid.
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Section 17200 provides equitable relief rather than damages; private plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.

In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation · filed 2005-02-03

As plaintiffs correctly observe, an unfair competition action is equitable in nature, and thus damages are not available to private plaintiffs who bring section 17200 claims. ... Consequently, "prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution." ... Accordingly, the court holds that Hummer has failed to allege any set of facts that would entitle it to restitutionary or injunctive relief under California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17203. The court therefore grants plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Hummer's unfair competition counterclaim.
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Section 17200's Unfair Competition Law does not allow a private plaintiff to recover compensatory damages; available relief is generally limited to restitution and injunctive relief.

Somers v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2013-09-03

We reject Somers’ argument that she can assert a damage claim under California’s UCL. Somers only seeks compensatory damages, which are not recoverable under the UCL. Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925, 933 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Under the UCL, [p]revailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.” (citation and quotes omitted)); Cacique, Inc. v. Robert Reiser & Co., Inc., 169 F.3d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 1999) (“California law is clear that §§ 17200 et seq. do not authorize a suit by a private party for damages.”); Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (“A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.”).
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Section 17200 claims provide only equitable remedies; correction of the challenged information can moot requests for injunctive or declaratory relief, while restitution remains potentially available if requested.

Noori v. Bank of America · filed 2018-02-01

Only equitable remedies are available for UCL claims, Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 962 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013), and when Bank of America finally corrected Noori’s information with the credit reporting agencies, it mooted her need for injunctive or declaratory relief. Although restitution may be available for violations of the UCL, id., Noori has not requested such relief.
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Only a public prosecutor may pursue civil penalties under the UCL; private parties may seek injunctive relief and restitution.

American Bankers Management Co v. Heryford · filed 2018-03-15

Although private parties may seek injunctive relief and restitution under the UCL, only a public prosecutor such as Heryford may pursue civil penalties.
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The UCL provides only equitable relief: statutory Labor Code penalties are not recoverable, while injunctive relief and restitution may be available.

Eason v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego · filed 2019-10-04

Recovery under the UCL is limited to injunctive relief and restitution.
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Section 17200 provides equitable UCL remedies, including injunctive relief for ongoing conduct, but not damages; restitution requires that the plaintiff have paid money or have an ownership interest in money obtained through the unfair practice.

Bogosian Chose v. Accor Management US Inc. · filed 2020-02-14

Although monetary damages may compensate Plaintiff for her prior visits, there is ongoing conduct for the Court to enjoin should Plaintiff prevail on her claims. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff may therefore seek injunctive relief. ... Thus, “[u]nder the UCL, an individual may recover profits unfairly obtained to the extent that these profits represent monies given to the defendant or benefits in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.” ... Critically, Plaintiff does not allege that she—or any other members of the putative class—actually paid Defendant any money or otherwise has an ownership interest in money from Defendant such that she is entitled to restitution. The Court therefore grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for restitution under the UCL.
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Section 17200 permits a plaintiff to seek only injunctive relief and/or restitution, so a claim lacking facts supporting either remedy cannot proceed.

Thomas v. Kimpton Hotel & Restaurant Group, LLC · filed 2020-06-30

The remedies available to a plaintiff under § 17200 are "limited"; specifically, a plaintiff may only seek injunctive relief and/or restitution. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1152 (2003). Kimpton argues plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts to support either a claim for injunctive relief or a claim for restitution. As set forth below, the Court agrees.
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Section 17200 does not allow punitive damages; private UCL remedies are not punitive damages.

Carter v. JAI-PUT Enterprise Inc. · filed 2020-06-30

Similarly, it is well-established that punitive damages are not available for a violation of the UCL. Cleveland, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 964; In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 620 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[I]t is settled law that punitive damages are not available under section 17200.”).
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Section 17200's UCL provides separate unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent theories, but its remedies are limited to restitution and injunctive relief, not compensatory damages.

Najarian Holdings LLC v. CoreVest American Finance Lender LLC · filed 2020-10-09

The UCL limits the remedies available for UCL violations to restitution and injunctive relief . . . . ... Under California law, however, a UCL claim does not lie where the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. ... But this does not mean that a restitution order is also available under the UCL, where compensatory damages are sufficient.
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Private § 17200 plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief and restitution, and a claim based on unauthorized practice of law is preempted when it rests on state licensing requirements governing federal PTO practice.

LegalForce RAPC Worldwide P.C. v. Demassa · filed 2020-08-17

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's § 17200 claim, other than to the extent plaintiff seeks injunctive relief thereunder on the basis of defendant's alleged violation of § 11.14.
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Section 17200 provides equitable injunctive and restitutionary relief, not damages, and restitution requires money or property in which the plaintiff has a vested ownership interest.

City of Long Beach v. Total Gas & Power North America · filed 2021-12-03

That law provides for only two types of relief: injunctive and restitution. Id. at § 17203. It does not provide for the recovery of damages. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1148 (Cal. 2003). “The object of restitution is to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.” Id. at 1149. “Restitution, as used in the UCL, is not limited only to the return of money or property that was once in the possession of that person.” People ex rel. Harris v. Aguayo, 11 Cal. App. 5th 1150, 1168–69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Instead, restitution is broad enough to allow a plaintiff to recover money or property in which he or she has a vested interest.” Id. Assuming arguendo that Long Beach has standing, its claim fails because it cannot plead a claim for restitution. There is no indication in the complaint that Long Beach paid inflated prices to Total Gas, or to any entity that would then send funds to Total Gas. Absent any allegation that Total Gas received from Long Beach, either directly or indirectly, any monies in which Long Beach had a vested interest, Long Beach is not entitled to restitution.
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The UCL permits plaintiffs at the pleading stage to seek restitution in the alternative to legal remedies, and permits recovery of Labor Code § 226.7 premium pay as restitution.

Yeomans v. World Financial Group · filed 2022-03-22

Consistent with Nacarino, the Court concludes Sonner does not preclude a plaintiff from pleading equitable remedies in the alternative. Id.1 Thus, Plaintiffs’ request for restitution under the UCL as a remedy in the alternative to legal remedies under the labor code is both sufficient and permissible at the pleading stage. ... The Court agrees with Judge White’s analysis, and rejects Defendants’ arguments. 2 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ request to dismiss UCL claim for restitution as to pay under § 226.7.
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The UCL provides only equitable remedies, not actual or punitive damages.

Beatty v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2021-12-27

“Equitable remedies (injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties) are the only remedies available” under the UCL. ... Actual and punitive damages are not available. ... Because none of his requested remedies are cognizable under the UCL, summary judgment is granted to Defendants on the UCL claim.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and relief on a claim under it is limited to restitution and injunctive relief.

Fraser v. Mint Mobile, LLC · filed 2022-04-27

First, California’s unfair competition law prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Although a plaintiff must allege a loss of money or property caused by the purported unfair competition to qualify for relief, the remedies available under a Section 17200 claim are limited to restitution and injunctive relief. Id. § 17204; Clark v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. 4th 605, 610 (2010). This order consequently DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the remedies sought in the “Wherefore” paragraphs contained within Counts IV–VI to the extent they seek relief beyond restitution and injunctive relief for violations of Section 17200.
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A plaintiff seeking equitable restitution under the UCL must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law.

Nacarino v. KSF Acquisition Corporation · filed 2022-11-23

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he traditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity action.” ... Thus, in order to state a claim under California’s consumer fraud statutes, a plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm[.]” ... Accordingly, to the extent Nacarino seeks restitution under the CLRA, FAL, and UCL, her First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and permits restitution or injunctive relief, but equitable restitution for past harm requires showing no adequate legal remedy.

Benyamin v. TopGolf Payroll Services, LLC · filed 2023-06-16

The UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. UCL claims, as a result, can be based on state or federal law violations and used to secure restitution or injunctive relief—other remedies are unavailable. See Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 130 Cal. App. 4th 440, 452 (2005) (“The UCL limits the remedies available for UCL violations to restitution and injunctive relief.”). However, a plaintiff must demonstrate he “lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL. . . .” Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). If such a showing is absent, the UCL claim cannot survive.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, but UCL relief is equitable and equitable restitution requires showing that no adequate legal remedy exists.

Ramos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-08-17

California’s UCL is a broad statute that prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Important here, “the UCL provides only for equitable remedies.” ... Plaintiff “must establish that [he] lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL.” ... Under binding precedent, the answer is no. See Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844 (holding that a district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s UCL claim where the operative complaint did not allege that the plaintiff lacked an adequate legal remedy).
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Section 17200 generally limits UCL remedies to injunctive relief and restitution, and prospective future earnings are insufficient to support restitution.

Zuniga v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-10-31

Despite the broad scope of the UCL, a plaintiff's remedies under the statute “are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.”” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144 (2003). Restitution requires “a UCL defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken, that is, to persons who had an ownership interest in the property or those claiming through that person.” /d. at 1144-45 (quoting Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 23 Cal. 4th 116, 126—27 (2000)). Here, Plaintiff appears to allege that he was deprived of the opportunity of future employment. But the prospect of future earnings is insufficient to establish entitlement to restitution. See id. at 1149— 50 (reasoning that a plaintiff would be entitled to restitution for unpaid earned wages, but that restitution would not be proper if a plaintiff had a mere “expectancy” in future profits). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to plead that he is entitled to restitution under the UCL.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, but a prevailing UCL plaintiff may obtain only injunctive relief or restitution and must satisfy the requirements for equitable relief.

Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2024-02-13

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... “While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 (2003). Because “[a] UCL action is equitable in nature,” the only relief available to a prevailing plaintiff is injunctive relief or restitution. Id. ... Therefore, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” ... Accordingly, AliveCor has not met its burden of production on this point.
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Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and private plaintiffs generally may obtain only injunctive relief or restitution.

Albert D. Seeno Construction Co., Inc. v. AIG Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2024-01-25

Lastly, both ASIC and ICSOP move for summary judgment on Seeno’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) claims which prohibits “unfair competition” as defined as “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Remedies available to private plaintiffs under the UCL “are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.”
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Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, with each prong independently supporting liability.

Gieser v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation · filed 2024-02-22

The UCL defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200. Because the statute “is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition” and each is a basis for liability. Cel-Tech Comm’n, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) (citation omitted).
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Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, misleading advertising, and acts prohibited by specified provisions.

ZAMFIROVA v. AMAG PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. · filed 2024-03-28

The UCL defines “unfair competition” as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and “any act prohibited by Chapter 1” of “Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professional Code.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Plaintiffs’ allegations against AMAG’s representations fall within the UCL’s terms and, therefore, are not precluded by a safe harbor provision.
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Section 17200 does not permit punitive damages for a UCL claim.

Dardashti v. State Farm General Insurance Company · filed 2024-07-02

Punitive damages are not available for Dardashti’s UCL claim because the UCL does not permit punitive damages.
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The UCL’s remedies are equitable and generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution, not damages; in federal court, equitable relief also requires an inadequate remedy at law.

Guzman v. Graham Packaging Co., L.P. · filed 2024-09-25

A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered. ... Prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution. ... Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate she has an inadequate remedy at law and therefore may not proceed on her equitable claim in federal court.
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Section 17200 generally provides only equitable remedies—injunctive relief and restitution—for prevailing plaintiffs.

Hendrickson v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2024-11-26

“[T]he UCL provides only for equitable remedies. Prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.”
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UCL relief is limited to restitution or injunctive relief, and injunctive relief requires an allegation that the misconduct will recur.

Damavandi v. Michael J. Tisdale Construction CA2/7 · filed 2025-02-14

A plaintiff may obtain only restitution or injunctive relief. ... it will not justify injunctive relief absent an allegation the misconduct will recur.
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UCL relief is available only when legal remedies are inadequate.

Radus Tek Services, Inc. v. IDC Technologies · filed 2025-02-24

Relief under the UCL, however, is only available where legal remedies are inadequate, ... Radus Tek has not shown that its contractual claim against IDC is legally tnadequate.
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Section 17200 provides only equitable remedies, so a UCL claim does not provide a legal damages remedy for purposes of equitable-jurisdiction analysis.

Madatovian v. Bayer Healthcare LLC · filed 2025-03-28

The only claims asserted in the Complaint were brought under the UCL, and remedies available under the UCL are equitable in nature. Hodge v. Superior Ct., 145 Cal. App. 4th 278, 284 (2006) (the UCL “provides only for equitable remedies”).
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Section 17200 allows injunctive relief for deceptive practices when members of the public are likely to be deceived, even if the plaintiff was not personally misled.

Perdue v. Crocker National Bank · filed 1985-07-18

It is, of course, clear that if plaintiff can show that the card or the manner in which it is presented to the customer is deceptive and misleading, he can prove a cause of action for unfair competition. Since he seeks only injunctive relief under this cause of action, he need not show that he himself was misled; he need only prove that “members of the public are likely to be deceived.”
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Section 17200 gives trial courts broad equitable power to remedy unlawful business practices.

People Ex Rel. Smith v. Parkmerced Co. · filed 1988-02-17

When this statement of legislative intent is read in connection with Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17203, by which the Legislature gave trial courts wide equitable powers to rectify unlawful business practices, it is clear the Legislature did not intend that the sole recourse of courts dealing with unclaimed property is to order it to escheat to the state.
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Section 17200 permits injunctive relief without allegations of actual deception, reliance, or damage.

Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co. · filed 1988-07-29

To state a cause of action for injunctive relief under section 17200, it is not necessary to make allegations of actual deception, reliance and damage.
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Section 17200 does not authorize monetary relief other than restitution in an individual unfair competition action.

Castillo v. Toll Bros., Inc. · filed 2011-07-28

The trial court granted summary adjudication of the claims for unfair competition on two grounds: the claims were premised on the unsuccessful claims under section 2810 and plaintiffs were not seeking the type of restitutionary remedy authorized by Business and Professions Code section 17200. ... Plaintiffs do not address the latter basis for summary adjudication. We find no error in the court’s reasoning on this ground and affirm summary adjudication of the unfair competition claims without regard to the success of the section 2810 claim.
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Governmental actions—law enforcement and public protection

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, creates separate claims under each prong, and applies to private entities contracting with government.

Solberg v. Victim Services, Inc. · filed 2019-11-20

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, which is defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This provision has been interpreted to create separate causes of action for unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent practices; the plaintiffs raise claims under each prong. Although Victim Services performs a law enforcement function for the counties, the diversion program is still subject to the UCL. The California Supreme Court has excluded governmental entities from these provisions, but private entities that contract with the government are bound to refrain from unfair competition. See Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, 39 Cal. 4th 1164, 1203–04 (2006).
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A governmental action under § 17200 is fundamentally a public-protection law-enforcement action, and its character is not changed by seeking restitution.

City & County of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp. · filed 2006-01-09

As the California Supreme Court has explained, a civil action brought by a governmental entity under section 17200 “is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties.” People v. Pacific Land Research Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 20, 24 (Cal. 1977). The character of a section 17200 action is not affected by the choice of restitution as a remedy.
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Reasonable consumer test

Section 17200 UCL and CLRA claims use the objective reasonable-consumer test, asking whether members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Olson v. FCA US LLC · filed 2020-02-18

In considering UCL and CLRA claims, courts rely on “the same objective test, that is, whether ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’”
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A UCL plaintiff must allege that members of the public are likely to be deceived by the alleged misrepresentation under the reasonable-consumer standard.

Miller v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc. · filed 2020-03-16

Under the reasonable consumer test, a plaintiff must allege that “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the alleged misrepresentation.
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Section 17200 claims are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test: liability may arise when members of the public are likely to be deceived by an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice.

Williams v. Gerber Products Co · filed 2008-04-21

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... Appellants’ claims under these California statutes are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test. ... Under the reasonable consumer standard, Appellants must “show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ” ... In conclusion, we find that, given the opportunity, Appellants have stated a claim and could plausibly prove that a reasonable consumer would be deceived by the Snacks packaging.
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Section 17200 claims involving deceptive advertising are governed by the reasonable-consumer test, which asks whether members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Williams v. Gerber · filed 2008-12-22

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200. ... Under the reasonable consumer standard, Appellants must “show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ”
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Section 17200 claims are governed by the reasonable-consumer standard, and a plaintiff must allege a plausible unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice.

Harmon v. Hilton Group, Plc · filed 2014-02-10

California’s UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17204.
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Section 17200 requires a consumer-fraud claim to plausibly allege conduct that could deceive a reasonable consumer.

Friend v. FGF Brands (USA), Inc. · filed 2019-06-12

Plaintiff states a claim under the consumer fraud laws. As did the parties in In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese, the parties here “cite precedents applying these laws interchangeably and agree that, while they differ in certain particulars, all share a common requirement: to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct that plausibly could deceive a reasonable consumer.” 275 F. Supp. 3d 910, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (discussing claims brought under the consumer protection laws of nine states). Thus, for plaintiff to state a claim under the consumer fraud laws, it must be plausible that the allegedly mislabeled naan products could deceive a reasonable consumer.
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Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and a claim may proceed when prominent product packaging could deceive a reasonable consumer even if the ingredient list is accurate.

Tucker v. Post Consumer Brands, LLC · filed 2020-04-21

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200. ... Under the reasonable consumer test, a plaintiff must “show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267 (1992)). ... Although the package does not make any objective representations about the amount of honey in the cereal, a reasonable consumer could see the prominent honey-related words and imagery and be deceived into thinking the cereal contained relatively less refined sugar and more honey. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims on the ground that no reasonable consumer would understand the Honey Bunches of Oats packaging to make a representation about the amount of honey in the cereal is denied.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices; under the fraud prong, the plaintiff must show deceptive conduct caused harm, which requires reliance.

Gilman v. Intel Corporation · filed 2020-03-27

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The FAL prohibits any “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. These statutes “rely on the same objective test, that is, whether ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 532 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009)). Plaintiffs in these cases must “show not only that a defendant’s conduct was deceptive but that the deception caused them harm,” which requires a showing of reliance. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1282, 1292 (2002), as modified on denial of reh’g (May 29, 2002).
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Under California's UCL, the reasonable consumer standard applies to an unlawful-prong claim only when deception is an element of the underlying predicate violation.

Silver v. BA Sports Nutrition, LLC · filed 2020-06-04

However, with respect to the “fortification” allegations (plaintiff Silver’s first cause of action under the UCL’s unlawful prong), because the predicate violation is based on FDA regulations which include no requirement that the public be likely to experience deception, the reasonable consumer standard does not apply. See Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., 703 Fed. App’x 468, 472 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he reasonable consumer test is a requirement under the UCL’s unlawful prong only when it is an element of the predicate violation.”).
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and applies the reasonable-consumer test, requiring a probability that a significant portion of consumers acting reasonably could be misled.

Cheslow v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Company · filed 2020-07-17

Plaintiffs bring three claims under three different California statutes: the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), False Advertising Law (“FAL”), and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... The Ninth Circuit has explained that “these [three] California statutes are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test.” ... “Under the reasonable consumer standard, [plaintiffs] must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... Rather, the test requires a probability “that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” Id.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and false-advertising claims under it are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test; private plaintiffs may not bring substantiation claims.

Cooper v. Curallux LLC · filed 2020-08-14

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... The Ninth Circuit has explained that “these [three] California statutes are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test.” ... “Under the reasonable consumer standard, [plaintiff] must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.”
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Section 17200’s deceptive-practices claims are evaluated under a reasonable-consumer test, and a plaintiff need not produce a consumer survey to show that the public is likely to be misled.

Price v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. · filed 2020-08-24

Claims brought under the UCL and FAL “are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test.” ... “[T]he reasonable consumer standard requires a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... “California courts have expressly rejected the view that a plaintiff must produce a consumer survey or similar extrinsic evidence to prevail on a claim that the public is likely to be misled by a representation.”
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A UCL claim based on allegedly deceptive product labeling requires a showing under the reasonable-consumer test that a significant portion of reasonable consumers would likely be deceived.

Gudgel v. The Clorox Company · filed 2021-01-21

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... The Ninth Circuit has explained that “these [three] California statutes are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test.” ... “Under the reasonable consumer standard, [plaintiffs] must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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Section 17200 claims are governed by an objective reasonable-consumer test; individualized reliance is unnecessary, but plaintiffs must prove injury and causation.

de Lacour v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 2021-04-23

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Claims pursuant to all three statutes are governed by an objective “reasonable consumer” test, which requires plaintiffs to “show that members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the business practice or advertising at issue. ... In addition, under the UCL and FAL, there is no requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate individualized proof of reliance. ... Rather, a “presumption, or at least an inference, of reliance arises under the UCL and FAL whenever there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material.” ... Plaintiffs are, however, required to demonstrate injury and causation.
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Section 17200 reaches deceptive business practices under the reasonable-consumer test—whether members of the public are likely to be deceived—and its unlawful prong treats violations of other laws as independently actionable unlawful business practices.

Rothman v. Equinox Holdings, Inc. · filed 2021-04-27

Misrepresentation claims brought pursuant to the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are each judged against the same “reasonable consumer” test, which asks whether “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the alleged misrepresentation. ... To state a claim alleging a deceptive or misleading business practice under these statutes, a plaintiff “must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... The UCL's unlawful prong “borrow|s| violations of other laws and treats” them as unlawful business practices “independently actionable under section 17200.”
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a UCL deception claim is evaluated under the reasonable-consumer standard.

Maisel v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. · filed 2021-05-05

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... To state a claim under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, Maisel must allege facts satisfying the “reasonable consumer” standard, i.e. that members of the public are likely to be deceived. ... Given the weight of authority finding plausible similar plant-based representations and analogous representations, such as “naturally derived,” the Court finds Maisel’s allegations plausible under the reasonable consumer test.
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Section 17200 does not make advertising in-person services deceptive when a reasonable consumer would not understand the advertising to promise uninterrupted in-person services during an unforeseen pandemic, especially where the terms allow the business to modify or discontinue its offerings.

Quintanilla v. WW International, Inc. · filed 2021-05-24

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Under that standard, a plaintiff must “show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived’” by any alleged misrepresentations. ... The Court holds with WW. ... no reasonable consumer could have understood such representations to mean that WW promised to keep offering such services even in the face of a deadly pandemic, and in defiance of dictates of the civil authorities. ... Thus, the Court dismisses Quintanilla’s claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL.
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Section 17200 deception claims are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test: a practice is actionable when a significant portion of consumers acting reasonably could be misled.

IN RE: S.C. JOHNSON & SON, INC. WINDEX NON-TOXIC LITIGATION · filed 2021-07-28

“Under the reasonable consumer test, [Plaintiffs] must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... “Likely to deceive” implies more than a mere possibility that the advertisement might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” ... Rather, the test is whether “it is probable that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... Here, the critical question is whether a reasonable consumer would be misled by the term “non-toxic” into thinking that the Products “[do] not pose any risks to humans or the environment, including household pets.” ... At this stage, the Court need not decide which party offers the better, more reasonable or more persuasive definition. It is enough that Plaintiffs’ interpretation is plausible under the lenient Williams standard. ... Accordingly, the Court cannot say at this stage that no reasonable consumer could be misled by the Products’ labels. The Court denies Defendant’s motion on this basis.
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Under § 17200’s UCL, product-labeling allegations are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test, which asks whether members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Cimoli v. Alacer Corp. · filed 2021-07-01

The reasonable consumer test requires Plaintiff show that “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by Defendant’s conduct.
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The UCL does not require proof of each class member’s individual reliance; an objective showing that the challenged claims were likely to deceive members of the public is sufficient.

Milan v. Clif Bar & Company · filed 2021-09-27

Questions of materiality and reliance also do not defeat predominance. As discussed, the UCL, FAL, and CLRA do not demand that plaintiffs prove the class members’ individual reliance on the challenged claims; they require only an objective showing that members of the public were likely to have been deceived by Clif’s product claims.
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Section 17200 requires a plaintiff to allege conduct that plausibly could deceive a reasonable consumer; an “up to” yield statement is not deceptive when it communicates a ceiling rather than a guarantee.

Brodsky v. ALDI Inc. · filed 2021-09-28

Plaintiffs bring claims under various state consumer protection statutes. While the statutes differ in certain particulars, “all share a common requirement: to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct that plausibly could deceive a reasonable consumer.” ... Here, no reasonable consumer would understand the “up to” language to be a guarantee. This language is not a promise that the cannister will make that amount, but just that it can under certain circumstances. Put another way, it is clearly a ceiling, not a floor. ... Defendants’ labeling, when viewed as a whole, thus is not deceptive.
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Section 17200 consumer-deception claims require a probability that a significant portion of consumers acting reasonably could be misled.

Puri v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2021-12-20

California’s UCL defines “unfair competition” as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Puri brings consumer deception claims under all three prongs. FAC ¶¶ 113-132. ... Consumer deception claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA must satisfy the “reasonable consumer” standard to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ... The reasonable consumer standard requires that “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the pertinent advertising. ... Rather, the reasonable consumer standard requires a probability ‘that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a deceptive-labeling claim requires allegations that a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived.

Steinberg v. Icelandic Provisions, Inc. · filed 2022-01-25

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... The reasonable consumer standard requires that “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the pertinent advertising. ... “Rather, the reasonable consumer standard requires a probability ‘that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’”
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Section 17200's fraudulent prong covers conduct likely to deceive a reasonable consumer, so misleading sweepstakes advertisements may state a UCL claim even though a UCL claim predicated on an alleged lottery violation failed when no Penal Code § 320 violation was shown.

Suski v. Coinbase Global, Inc. · filed 2022-01-11

Under the FAL, the CLRA, and the fraudulent prong of the UCL, conduct is considered deceptive or misleading if the conduct is “likely to deceive” a “reasonable consumer.” ... Upon review of Coinbase’s advertising materials as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs state a claim that the materials were likely to deceive a reasonable consumer that they needed to make a trade to participate in the sweepstakes. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts as to the remainder of their claims and DENIES Coinbase’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ second through seventh claims to the extent they are not premised on a violation of California Penal Code § 320.
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Section 17200 reaches deceptive business practices and advertising under the reasonable-consumer test, which asks whether a significant portion of consumers acting reasonably could be misled.

Walker v. Nestle USA, Inc. · filed 2022-03-28

Whether a business practice is deceptive or misleading under the CLRA or UCL is governed by the reasonable consumer test. ... Rather, the reasonable consumer standard requires a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.
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Section 17200 deceptive-labeling claims are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test, requiring a likelihood that consumers will be deceived.

Prescott v. Nestle USA, Inc · filed 2022-04-08

“Whether a business practice is deceptive or misleading under these California statutes [is] governed by the reasonable consumer test.” ... Under this standard, Plaintiffs “must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... However, “a plaintiff’s unreasonable assumptions about a product’s label will not suffice.”
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For deceptive-marketing claims, section 17200 requires showing that a reasonable consumer is likely to be misled.

In re: Nestle Boost Nutritional Drink Litigation · filed 2022-07-05

“Under the consumer protection laws of California [and] New York, . . . claims based on deceptive or misleading marketing must demonstrate that a ‘reasonable consumer’ is likely to be misled by the representation.” ... “However, in rare situations a court may determine, as a matter of law, that the alleged violations of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are simply not plausible.” ... In sum, it is not plausible that a reasonable consumer would be deceived by the Boost products labels. The court DISMISSES plaintiffs’ first five claims on this basis.
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Section 17200 subjects misleading-advertising claims to the reasonable-consumer test, and a claim is plausible when the product labeling could likely deceive reasonable consumers.

Lopez v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. · filed 2022-09-27

Under California law, Plaintiff’s claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL are subject to the reasonable consumer test. “Under the reasonable consumer standard, [Plaintiff] must ‘show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” ... Here, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the term “collagen” is associated with the skin-related benefits of the collagen molecule. ... It is wholly plausible that a reasonable consumer, shopping for cosmetics, saw a product named COLLAGEN MOISTURE FILLER, promising to “smooth wrinkles” and “restore skin’s cushion,” and associated this product with the cosmetic benefits of the collagen molecule.
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Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and a UCL deception claim may proceed at the pleading stage when product packaging plausibly could deceive a reasonable consumer.

Anderberg v. The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. · filed 2023-01-26

The UCL prohibits “unfair competition,” which includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... Claims made under the UCLA, CLRA, and FAL are governed by the “reasonable consumer” standard. ... Under this standard, a plaintiff must “show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” ... Here, the Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that a reasonable consumer would not be deceived by the “Reef Friendly” label on Defendant’s packaging. ... Accepting as true all allegations in the FAC, it is plausible that statements on the Products’ packaging could deceive a reasonable consumer. Accordingly, the Court concludes that this does not amount to the “rare situation” in which dismissing Plaintiff’s UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims is appropriate.
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Section 17200 claims are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test: a practice is deceptive when a significant portion of reasonable consumers would probably be misled.

Ary v. Target Corporation · filed 2023-03-23

The UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims are all governed by the “reasonable consumer” test. See Williams v. Gerber Prod. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). “Under the reasonable consumer test, [Plaintiff] must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id. (quotations omitted). “‘Likely to deceive’ implies more than a mere possibility that the advertisement might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Rather, the test is whether “it is probable that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” Id. “California courts . . . have recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact.” Williams, 552 F.3d at 938. It is thus a “rare situation” when “granting a motion to dismiss [a UCL, CLRA, or FAL claim] is appropriate.” Id. at 939.
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UCL claims based on consumer-protection statutes are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer standard.

In re: KIND LLC 'Healthy & All Natural' Litigation · filed 2023-04-03

Plaintiff’s causes of action under California’s consumer protection statutes are governed by the “reasonable consumer” standard.
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Section 17200 claims based on allegedly deceptive product labels survive a motion to dismiss when plaintiffs sufficiently allege that a reasonable consumer would be misled by the label.

Ashour v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC · filed 2022-10-24

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ deceptive labeling claims fail under the California and New York reasonable consumer tests. ... To state a claim for false advertising or deceptive business practices, the law of both states asks if a reasonable consumer, acting reasonably, would be misled by the “No Preservatives” statement on the labels. ... Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that a reasonable customer would believe that a label stating “No Preservatives” would mean that the product does not contain an ingredient that is a preservative, if used in sufficient quantities, such as citric acid, even if there is not a sufficient quantity for the citric acid to act as a preservative in the product. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ deceptive labeling claims is DENIED.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and deceptive or misleading practices are assessed under the reasonable-consumer test.

Carvalho v. HP, Inc. · filed 2022-12-20

California’s UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... “Whether a business practice is deceptive or misleading under these California statutes [is] governed by the reasonable consumer test.” ... The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived by the strikethrough prices. ... HP’s motion to dismiss the FAL, UCL, and CLRA claims is DENIED.
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For a UCL claim challenging advertising as deceptive, the plaintiff must plausibly allege conduct likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.

Bermudez v. Colgate-Palmolive Company · filed 2023-03-31

While the various state statutes differ in some ways, Plaintiffs’ claims under each statute require a deceptive or misleading act. See, e.g., In re Kind LLC “Healthy & All Nat.” Litig., 209 F. Supp. 3d 689, 697 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases as to New York GBL, California CLRA, FAL, UCL, and Illinois CFA); ... The parties agree that the “reasonable consumer” standard applies to these claims, under which Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that the deceptive conduct was “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.” ... Accordingly, accepting the well-pleaded allegations as true, considering the documents Plaintiffs reference in the FAC, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court concludes that the FAC does not plausibly allege a false, misleading, or deceptive act, and Plaintiffs’ statutory claims must therefore be dismissed.
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Section 17200 requires a plaintiff to plead that allegedly deceptive advertising was likely to mislead a significant number of reasonable consumers.

Eshelby v. LOreal USA, Inc. · filed 2023-03-27

To state a claim under the UCL, FAL, or CLRA, a plaintiff must plead that allegedly deceptive advertisements were likely to mislead a significant number of reasonable consumers. ... For these reasons, Eshelby’s claims under California law and her claims of breach of express warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment are DISMISSED.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, including deceptive advertising, and a claim may proceed when the challenged label is likely to deceive reasonable consumers.

Schleyer v. Starbucks Corporation · filed 2023-09-12

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the bagel’s “sprouted grain” label could mislead a significant portion of the general consuming public into believing that the bagel is made “solely” or “primarily” of sprouted grain. Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has held that manufacturers may not “mislead consumers and then rely on the ingredient list to correct those misinterpretations and provide a shield for liability for the deception.” Williams, 552 F.3d at 939. Thus, with Plaintiffs’ allegations taken as true, Starbucks’s ingredient list does not cure its misrepresentation.
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The UCL’s fraudulent and unfair prongs use the reasonable-consumer test, while its unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable.

Smith v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare Holdings (US) LLC · filed 2023-11-03

The sufficiency of false advertising claims under the CLRA, FAL, and fraudulent and unfair prongs of the UCL are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test. ... An action under the UCL’s unlawful prong ‘borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.’ ... Because Houser has failed to state a claim for any other violation of law, she has failed to state a claim under the UCL’s unlawful prong.
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Section 17200 requires a plaintiff alleging deceptive conduct to show a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or targeted consumers, acting reasonably, could be misled.

de Lacour v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 2024-01-03

Plaintiffs’ claims under all three statutes are governed by the “reasonable consumer” standard, which requires Plaintiffs to show a probability “that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495 (2003)); see also McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023).
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For a UCL claim based on false advertising or promotional practices, the objective reasonable-consumer test asks whether members of the public are likely to be deceived, and does not require individualized proof of deception, reliance, or injury.

Tan v. Quick Box, LLC · filed 2024-01-12

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... “To state a claim under the UCL or the FAL ‘based on false advertising or promotional practices, it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” ... This showing does not require “individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury.” ... Instead, the inquiry is based on an objective reasonable consumer “who is neither the most vigilant and suspicious of advertising claims nor the most unwary and unsophisticated, but instead is the ordinary consumer within the target population.”
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UCL deceptive-labeling claims are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test, and a claim fails when the label and context would not mislead a reasonable consumer.

Bryan v. Del Monte Foods, Inc. · filed 2023-10-10

Accordingly, the FAC is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
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Section 17200 bars unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and misleading advertising, and a UCL label claim may proceed when the marketing is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer.

Caldwell v. Nordic Naturals, Inc. · filed 2024-01-02

Specifically, the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business practices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Thus, “to state a viable claim under any of those statutes, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that the advertisement in question is misleading to a reasonable consumer.” ... The label at issue would plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer. ... Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CLRA, FAL and UCL Deceptive Label Claims.
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Under the unfair and fraudulent prongs of § 17200, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived under the reasonable-consumer test; isolated personal confusion is insufficient.

Peacock v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC · filed 2024-03-18

The UCL prohibits “. . . any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . .” with each of these providing a separate theory of liability. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s claims were brought under the “unfair” and “fraudulent” prongs of the UCL. (SAC ¶¶ 45–46.) Claims brought under these prongs are governed by a “reasonable consumer” test that requires that the plaintiff “show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted); ... Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s UCL claim as Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that would satisfy the reasonable consumer test, a required element of Plaintiff’s claim.
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UCL deceptive-labeling claims are governed by the reasonable-consumer test.

Hernandez v. The Coca-Cola Company · filed 2024-02-02

The CLRA, FAL, and UCL are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test.
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Section 17200's UCL claims require a plausible showing that reasonable consumers are likely to be deceived by the challenged representations.

Broussard v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC · filed 2024-04-08

Under this test, a plaintiff must “show that members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the challenged representations. ... Here, however, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the Representations mislead reasonable consumers as to the healthfulness of the product. ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and misleading advertising, applying a reasonable-consumer standard under which clarifying packaging language can defeat a deceptive-advertising claim.

La Rosa v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 2024-05-07

The UCL proscribes “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Even if on first blush a consumer is deceived into believing that a test kit tests for ovulation with 99% accuracy, the clarifying language on the side or back of the packaging dispels any confusion. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege that a reasonable consumer of these products would be deceived, and Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of GBL §§ 349 and 350, CLRA, UCL, FAL are dismissed.
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Section 17200 claims based on product labeling require showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived under the reasonable consumer standard.

Elliott v. Conagra Brands, Inc. · filed 2024-07-02

Each of Plaintiff’s causes of action requires that she meet a reasonable consumer standard. See Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that California’s consumer protection laws are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test); ... Under this standard, Plaintiff “must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Williams, 552 F.3d at 938 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Section 17200 claims are governed by the reasonable-consumer standard, requiring plaintiffs to plausibly show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Elseroad v. Boston Foundry, Inc. · filed 2024-07-10

Although Plaintiffs bring their claims under consumer protection laws of eight different states, each statute contains a common element: MIC must have made a misleading statement or made a statement that would deceive a reasonable consumer. ... Counts IV-VI - California UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims “are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ standard,” which requires that Plaintiffs plausibly “show that members of the public are likely to be deceived”
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Section 17200 claims based on alleged misrepresentations are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer test, requiring facts showing a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public acting reasonably could be misled.

Pearl v. Coinbase Global, Inc. · filed 2024-07-15

California prohibits any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice” under the UCL, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising” under the FAL, see id. § 17500, and “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” under the CLRA,” see Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. In the instant case, plaintiff’s claims under said statutes are predicated on alleged misrepresentations, and, as such, “are governed by the reasonable consumer test,” whereby a plaintiff must show “members of the public are likely to be deceived.”
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A UCL deceptive-label claim may be dismissed when the front label is ambiguous and the back label clarifies the challenged representation.

Prescott v. Ricola USA, Inc. · filed 2024-04-30

Accordingly, the Court finds the front label is, at most, ambiguous.
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For California UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims, conduct is deceptive or misleading when it is likely to deceive an ordinary consumer.

Platt v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2024-05-02

Under these California statutes, conduct is deceptive or misleading if it is likely to deceive an ordinary consumer.
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A UCL deceptive-marketing claim requires plausible allegations that a reasonable consumer would likely be misled; generalized health-related statements and a “filtered water” label did not meet that standard, and the omission theory failed without facts showing the defendant’s exclusive knowledge.

Castillo v. Prime Hydration LLC · filed 2024-09-09

“Under the consumer protection laws of California, . . . claims based on deceptive or misleading marketing must demonstrate that a ‘reasonable consumer’ is likely to be misled by the representation.” ... “However, in rare situations a court may determine, as a matter of law, that the alleged violations of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are simply not plausible.” ... “Accordingly, Castillo has not plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer would be misled by the representations on the label of Grape Sports Drink, and her claims cannot proceed on this theory.”
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Section 17200 requires UCL plaintiffs challenging product labels to plausibly allege that representations or material omissions are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer, and an omissions theory requires a duty to disclose.

In Re Theos Dark Chocolate Litigation · filed 2024-09-27

Defendant is correct that to state a claim under California’s UCL, FAL, and CLRA provisions, Plaintiffs must allege that representations or material omissions on Defendant’s product labels are likely to deceive a “reasonable consumer.” ... Rather, it must be “probable that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... Generally, the question of whether a label is deceptive is a question of fact, not appropriate for resolution at the motion to dismiss phase. ... The Court agrees. ... Since Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to establish that Defendant had a duty to disclose the presence of Heavy Metals in the Products, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims arising under an omissions theory.
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Section 17200 uses an objective reasonable-consumer test requiring proof that members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Rusoff v. The Happy Group, Inc. · filed 2024-09-27

The claims under the CLRA, FAL, UCL, and GBL are governed by the same objective test – the reasonable consumer test – which requires the plaintiff to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.
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A UCL claim challenging advertising must satisfy the reasonable-consumer standard: the challenged practice must be likely to deceive a significant portion of reasonable consumers.

LeGrand v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 2025-03-14

To state a claim under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, LeGrand must allege facts satisfying the “reasonable consumer” standard, i.e., “show[ing] that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” See Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).
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Section 17200 treats unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, or misleading business practices and advertising as unfair competition, and a deceptive-practices claim may proceed when the challenged representation is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

James v. Chocmod USA Inc. · filed 2025-03-28

The UCL also prohibits unfair competition, which “mean[s] and include[s] any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the FAL].” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... To state a cognizable claim under these statutes, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant’s representations “are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.” ... Here, the brand name “Truffettes de France,” or “Truffles from France,” is not ambiguous; this affirmative representation would plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer to conclude, without more information, that the truffles are, indeed, from France. ... Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as to its “reasonable consumer” challenge to Plaintiffs’ CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims.
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Section 17200’s UCL labeling claims are evaluated under a reasonable-consumer test requiring a showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Elliott v. Conagra Brands, Inc. · filed 2025-03-28

California consumer protection claims are assessed under a reasonable consumer standard. ... Under the reasonable consumer standard, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived by Defendant’s actions. ... Here, as originally decided by Judge England, Plaintiff cannot show that she was deceived by the Smart Balance Original spread’s labeling. That is because the labeling was neither false in its description of the ingredients nor was it misleading: it told the consumer exactly what the oil, water, and Omega 3 content in the product was.
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A section 17200 claim based on deceptive statements requires showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived; at the pleading stage, dismissal is appropriate only when it is impossible for a reasonable consumer to have been deceived.

Sneed v. The Procter & Gamble Company · filed 2025-04-04

To succeed on their state law claims, Plaintiffs must prove that P&G made false or deceptive statements. See McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA “require[] that [plaintiffs] ‘show that members of the public are likely to be deceived’” (citation omitted)). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that granting a motion to dismiss is appropriate only in “the rare situation” where the facts make “it impossible for the plaintiff to prove that a reasonable consumer was likely to be deceived.”
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Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, deceptive, untrue, and misleading business practices or advertising, and an advertising-based UCL claim turns on whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived.

Evans v. Sleep Number Corporation · filed 2025-04-11

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice,” as well as any “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and any act prohibited by the FAL. Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 17200. The California Supreme Court has held that “any violation of the false advertising law necessarily violates the UCL.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 950, 45 P.3d 243 (2002) (cleaned up). Claims under the FAL and UCL “are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test.” Williams, 552 F.3d at 938. Importantly, the UCL and FAL “prohibit not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which, although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 951. Therefore, “to state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law, based on false advertising or promotional practices, it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a UCL deception claim is judged by whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be misled.

Whiteside v. Chosen Foods, LLC · filed 2025-08-26

Appellants’ claims under these California statutes are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test. ... Under the reasonable consumer standard, Plaintiff must “show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” ... As a matter of law, the reasonable consumer and purchaser of the Products would understand that the Non-GMO Project Verified label means that the Products are certified by the Non-GMO Project. ... The Court does not find that the front label deceives the reasonable consumer. ... After considering Defendant’s GMO statements on the side label, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly state a claim that Defendant has misled the reasonable consumer. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claim.
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UCL and FAL claims are evaluated under the objective reasonable-consumer standard, requiring a showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Chancy · filed 2025-11-21

UCL and FAL claims are governed by the reasonable consumer standard. ... Under the reasonable consumer test, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.
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For deceptive-misrepresentation claims, § 17200 applies the reasonable-consumer test: the plaintiff must show that a significant portion of consumers could be misled.

Rothman v. Equinox Holdings · filed 2026-01-26

Misrepresentation claims brought pursuant to the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are each judged against the same “reasonable consumer” test, which asks whether “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the alleged misrepresentation. ? Williams v. Gerber Prod. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir.1995)).
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Section 17200 claims use the reasonable-consumer test: advertising is actionable when it is likely to deceive a significant portion of reasonable consumers, but merely labeling a product with an actual ingredient was insufficient to state a claim here.

Adler · filed 2026-01-26

California law prohibits advertising which “although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” ... Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test. ... “Under the reasonable consumer test, [Plaintiffs] must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... Rather, the test is whether “it is probable that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... Because these sparse allegations “depend[] on the argument that labeling a product with the name of one of its ingredients is, by itself, an actionable misdescription of a product characteristic,” Reply at 10, the Court finds that this is “the rare situation in which granting a motion to dismiss is appropriate,” Williams, 552 F.3d at 939. ... Here, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that “a reasonable consumer is [] likely to engage in [the] inferential leaps” they describe solely from the prominence of the word “retinol” in the label. ... Court DISMISSES Counts I, IV, and V.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising, and a claim under it must satisfy the reasonable-consumer standard.

Brown v. the Brita Products Company · filed 2026-04-16

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Accordingly, we hold that a reasonable consumer would not have attached importance to the fact that Brita’s Products do not “remove or reduce common contaminants hazardous to health, including the Common Hazardous Contaminants, to below lab detectable limits.” Indeed, knowledge of the Products’ limitations is consistent with the disclosures Brita did make. Because a reasonable consumer has been made aware of the Products’ limitations, we cannot say that a reasonable consumer would have been misled by Brita’s omission of these limitations on its Products’ packaging. ... Because the complaint fails to meet the reasonable consumer standard, the district court did not err by holding that Brown’s material omission claim fails as a matter of law.
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Section 17200 claims are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer standard: a significant portion of the general consuming public or targeted consumers, acting reasonably, must be capable of being misled.

Orshan v. Apple Inc. · filed 2020-05-05

Claims under the California consumer protection statutes here at issue are governed by a “reasonable consumer” standard.
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Unfair competition—balancing impact and justification

A claim that a surcharge is unfair under section 17200 cannot survive summary judgment without evidence disputing the defendant’s showing that its expenses justify the charge.

Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court · filed 2009-11-10

We conclude the trial court erred in finding that there was a factual issue whether petitioner’s surcharges added to the price of onshore excursions are unfair because there is no evidence to contradict Krumrine’s declaration that the surcharges are justified by petitioner’s expenses.
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The UCL's unfair prong in a competitor case requires a threat to competition, not harm only to the plaintiff.

RingCentral, Inc. v. Nextiva, Inc. · filed 2020-02-28

To state a claim under the “unfair” prong of the UCL, RingCentral must show that Defendants’ conduct “threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws . . . , or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.”
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Under the UCL's unfairness prong, unusually high prices, steep profit margins, and nondisclosure of a disclosed price's basis are generally not actionable when the buyer agrees to the actual price.

Quezada v. Franklin Madison Group, LLC · filed 2020-09-29

As long as the actual price is disclosed and plaintiffs agreed to pay it, failure to disclose the basis or nature of markups is not actionable under California’s UCL in this case.
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Under the UCL's unfairness prong, conduct between competing businesses is not actionable unless it amounts to an incipient violation of antitrust laws.

Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. CH2M Hill Inc. · filed 2022-01-27

For purposes of the unfairness prong of the UCL -- which is the only prong Tetra Tech has invoked in its FAC -- this means that conduct short of a violation of the spirit of the antitrust laws is not actionable.
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Section 17200’s unfair-practices prong is evaluated by balancing the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.

Gomez v. Intel Corporation · filed 2023-11-02

California’s “balancing test,” applicable to Plaintiffs’ unfair conduct claims, “weigh[s] the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” ... Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Intel’s conduct after September 1, 2017, fare no better. ... Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the utility of the patches (that is, at least partial protection from security attacks) was outweighed by the alleged harm to Plaintiffs by way of reduced processor performance. ... Taken in their totality, none of Plaintiffs’ allegations state a plausible claim that Intel engaged in unfair business practices.
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Section 17200 treats a practice as unfair to consumers when it causes substantial injury that consumers could not reasonably avoid and that countervailing benefits to consumers or competition do not outweigh.

Camacho v. AUTO. CLUB OF SO. CALIFORNIA · filed 2006-09-14

Since 1980, the factors that define unfairness under section 5 are: (1) The consumer injury must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. ... This definition of “unfair” is on its face geared to consumers and is for that reason appropriate in consumer cases.
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Section 17200 assesses an allegedly unfair business practice by balancing its impact on the claimant against the reasons for the practice.

Family Home and v. Federal Home Loan · filed 2008-05-07

Furthermore, the utility of the Exclusionary List to Freddie Mac signifi- cantly outweighed the impact upon Park Place — that it was denied access to a market that didn’t want to buy its loans.
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Fraudulent or unfair business practices

Section 17200 permits an unfair business practices claim based on alleged misrepresentation and fraud in business dealings.

Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California · filed 2016-03-17

Hospital's cause of action for unfair business practices is based on a variety of alleged conduct, including that defendants "engaged in misrepresentation [and] fraud" in their business practices with Hospital based on the same conduct underlying the other deceit-based causes of action. We therefore conclude that Hospital has sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim for unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200.
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Section 17200 covers unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices; a concealed fact is fraudulently actionable only when material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer, while nondisclosure of a defect that functions as warranted through the express-warranty period is not unfair without substantial consumer injury.

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2008-06-19

The UCL statute allows claims for unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Generally, to be actionable under the UCL, a concealed fact must be material in the sense that it is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. ... Unlike a common law fraud claim, a UCL fraud claim requires no proof that the plaintiff was actually deceived. ... Instead, the plaintiff must produce evidence showing “a likelihood of confounding an appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care.” ... “[T]he failure to disclose a defect that might, or might not, shorten the effective life span of an automobile part that functions precisely as warranted throughout the term of its express warranty cannot be characterized as causing a substantial injury to consumers, and accordingly does not constitute an unfair practice under the UCL.”
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Section 17200 covers unlawful practices borrowed from other laws and independently unfair practices, but the UCL does not permit non-restitutionary disgorgement.

Theme Promotions v. News America · filed 2008-10-09

The UCL prohibits unlawful and unfair business practices. ... Section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices. ... In addition, a practice may be proscribed under section 17200 as “unfair” even if it is not specifically proscribed by some other law. ... While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, the remedies are limited.
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Under section 17200, a concealed fact is actionable as fraudulent when it is material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer, without proof of actual deception.

Clemens v. Daimlerchrysler · filed 2008-07-23

Unlike a common law fraud claim, a UCL fraud claim requires no proof that the plaintiff was actually deceived.
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Section 17200 separately prohibits unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, and its unlawful prong incorporates violations of other laws as independently actionable UCL claims.

Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home · filed 2010-03-09

California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., prohibits business acts or practices that are “unlawful,” “unfair,” or “fraudulent.” Id. § 17200. Each of these three prongs constitutes a separate and independent cause of action. ... The UCL’s “unlawful” prong is essentially an incorporate-by-reference provision. ... “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.”
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices; the court held that these consumer claims failed under the applicable fraudulent, unlawful, and unfairness standards.

Janda v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. · filed 2010-05-10

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Because plaintiffs have not demonstrated above a speculative level that any of T-Mobile’s “advertising” is likely to deceive members of the public, they have not stated a claim for a fraudulent business practice under the UCL or FAL. ... Plaintiffs therefore have failed to state a claim for an unlawful practice. ... Plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim for an “unfair” practice under the UCL. In the context of a UCL consumer claim it is unclear whether a plaintiff must (1) show that the harm to the consumer of a particular practice outweighs its utility to defendant, ...; or (2) allege unfairness that is “tethered to some legislatively declared policy,” ... . Plaintiffs’ claims, however, fail both standards. ... The district court therefore properly dismissed plaintiffs’ UCL and FAL claims.
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Under the UCL, alleging that contractual forfeiture clauses are unconscionable can support an unfair-business-practices claim.

Nick Zanze v. Snelling Services, LLC · filed 2011-01-28

Zanze’s allegation that the forfeiture clauses were unconscionable provides an adequate basis for an unfair practices claim under the UCL. Conduct that is deemed lawful cannot be the basis of a UCL claim, even if that conduct might otherwise be considered unfair. Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 805 (Ct. App. 2003). Forfeiture clauses like the ones at issue have been found lawful. Nein v. HostPRO, Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 52 (Ct. App. 2009). However, as Zanze argued in his response to Snelling’s Motion to Dismiss, such forfeiture clauses have not been held lawful where they are unconscionable. Ellis v. McKinnon Broad. Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 85 (Ct. App. 1993). Because Zanze specifically alleged that the forfeiture clauses at issue were unconscionable, he has stated a claim for unfair business practices.
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Section 17200 claims use the reasonable consumer standard for alleged fraudulent practices, and an advertised speed qualified by “up to” and disclosed customer-specific limitations was not misleading; charging the same fee for a range of speeds was not unfair on these facts.

Maloney v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc · filed 2011-02-16

The district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants engaged in a "fraudulent business act or practice" under the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The "reasonable consumer" standard applies to that claim. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). "Under the reasonable consumer standard, [Plaintiff] must show ... that members of the public are likely to be deceived." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable consumer would not have been deceived by Defendants’ statements, which included the qualifier "up to" (meaning the same or less than) and an explanation that each consumer’s maximum speed would vary depending on several listed customer-specific factors, including factors that applied to Plaintiff. ... For similar reasons, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants engaged in an "unfair . . . business act or practice" under the UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Because Defendants’ statements were not misleading and because it is reasonable to charge the same fee to customers receiving a range of speeds, no unfairness occurred.
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Section 17200 broadly covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices.

Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. · filed 2006-12-08

The statute prohibits wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur. The standard is intentionally broad and allows courts maximum discretion to prohibit new schemes to defraud.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, but it does not support claims based on lawful conduct or claims duplicative of other causes of action.

Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. All Professional Realty, Inc. · filed 2015-01-15

Even if the court found a California unfair competition claim viable here, it would fail on the merits. California prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. To the extent that the Wrights’ unfair competition claims are duplicative of their breach of contract and other claims, they fail, as discussed. The Wrights also contend that Century 21 unfairly terminated their access to the Century 21 database on the same day the Sacramento and Hawaii franchises were terminated. Because the agreements were terminated lawfully, there is no triable issue that Century 21 unlawfully, unfairly or fraudulently terminated access to the database.
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and a UCL claim fails when its alleged unlawful conduct depends on a failed FDCPA violation or its unfair and fraudulent theories depend on failed allegations that defendants lacked authority to collect the debt.

Christie v. the Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2015-06-11

The district court properly dismissed Christie's Unfair Competition Law claim. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (prohibiting unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices). Christie bases her theory of "unlawful" conduct on the Appellees' alleged violation of the FDCPA. But as discussed in section 3, supra, that argument fails. Nor can she support her Unfair Competition Law claim on the "unfair" or "fraudulent" prongs of the statute. Christie's allegations of "unfair" or "fraudulent" business practices derive from the allegation that Appellees did not have the legal authority to demand loan payments. But as discussed in section 1, supra, Christie's challenges to Appellees' authority to collect her debt fail.
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Section 17200 et seq. requires a plausible allegation that the defendant violated another law or engaged in fraudulent or unfair business practices to state a claim under California's Unfair Competition Law.

Jones v. Citimortgage · filed 2015-06-12

The FAC did not state a claim under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., because it failed to plausibly allege that Citi violated any other laws, see Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014), or engaged in fraudulent or unfair business practices, see Davis, 691 F.3d at 1169-70; Cel-Tech Comms., Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999).
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Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a plaintiff must allege such conduct to state a UCL claim.

Beau Hodges v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2016-02-22

In addition, because Hodges fails to allege that Apple engaged in any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,” he also fails to state a claim for relief under any prong of the UCL.
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Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business conduct, but a claim fails when the plaintiff does not plead unlawful or unfair conduct and the alleged fraud is defeated by the plaintiff's consent.

Williams Hicks v. Pga Tour, Inc. · filed 2018-07-27

The Caddies failed to plead that any of the Tour’s conduct was unlawful or unfair. ... Their allegations that the Tour “misled bib sponsors into believing that Plaintiffs voluntarily consented to wearing the bibs without compensation” also fail under the fraud prong because the Caddies did consent to wearing the bibs.
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Notes 1–150 of 1,170, oldest cases first.

1,315 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Communications Company, filed 2004-07-27 — The opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify one of Verizon's claims in the procedural history. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Klay v. Humana, Inc., the court held that the defendants waived their challenge to predominance of the § 17200 subclass and expressly declined to decide whether the subclass should have been certified; it did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lockyer, the court was describing a union's theory of liability in a separate lawsuit and did not decide whether the alleged misuse of funds violated § 17200 or otherwise construe or apply that statute. opinion →
Daewoo Motor America, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., Incidental: the court mentions § 17200 as the statutory basis for the pleaded unfair-competition claim and recites general UCL definitions, but it does not apply or construe the statute; it treats the claim as derivative and insufficient because the underlying claims fail. opinion →
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Service, the opinion mentions § 17200 only in describing one of the plaintiff's pleaded causes of action in the procedural and factual background. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200; it decides whether the class-arbitration waiver is unconscionable and whether the FAA preempts that ruling. opinion →
Barbara's Sales v. Intel, the court mentioned § 17200 only to contrast California and Illinois law in its choice-of-law analysis; it selected Illinois law and did not apply or adjudicate the California statute. opinion →
Ramkissoon v. Aol LLC, section 17200 et seq. is mentioned only as one of the California causes of action alleged by the plaintiffs. The court decided the enforceability and interpretation of the forum-selection clause and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Sullivan v. Oracle Corporation, this is a certification order that poses unresolved § 17200 questions to the California Supreme Court and withdraws the Ninth Circuit’s prior panel opinion pending that decision; it does not itself decide what § 17200 means or how it applies. opinion →
Davis v. HSBC Bank, section 17200 appears only in the description of claims alleged in the complaint. The court decided the federal jurisdiction and principal-place-of-business issue, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc., the opinion mentions the UCL only in a footnote describing claims dismissed by the district court; it does not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and Ojo did not appeal that dismissal. opinion →
Mevorah v. Wells Fargo, the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim in the procedural background; the court decided the Rule 23 class-certification issue and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
One Industries, LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distributing, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote reporting that the state-law claims follow directly from the federal trademark claims and quoting another decision; this court did not construe or independently apply § 17200. opinion →
One Industries, LLC v. Distribut, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as authority for the proposition that the state-law unfair-competition claims follow the federal trademark claims. The court did not construe § 17200 or independently analyze its requirements or application; the disposition rested on the trademark-infringement analysis. opinion →
Carr v. Gateway, Inc., the opinion mentions section 17200 only to identify one of the claims pleaded below. The court decided the validity of the arbitration provision and did not interpret, apply, or rule on the requirements or scope of section 17200. opinion →
Dejohnn Porch v. Masterfoods USA, Inc., the court mentions § 17200 only to report that Porch’s unfair-competition claim failed derivatively with his underlying Labor Code claims; it does not interpret or independently apply the statute. opinion →
HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co., the court cited § 17200 only to identify the statutory category of unfair competition while deciding whether the claim depended on federal patent law; it did not construe, apply, or rule on the statute itself. opinion →
W3i Mobile, LLC v. Westchester Fire Insurance, the statute appears only as part of the opinion’s description of an underlying California lawsuit; the court decided insurance-coverage issues under Minnesota law and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 only in recounting the district court’s disposition of plaintiffs’ California unfair-competition claim. The appellate court does not construe or apply § 17200; its substantive analysis addresses the Lanham Act and Article III standing. opinion →
trafficschool.com.inc v. Edriver Inc., the citation to § 17200 reports the district court’s disposition of the state-law claim; this appellate opinion does not construe or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for one pleaded cause of action. The court's opinion decides personal jurisdiction and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about § 17200. opinion →
Grant v. Capital Management Services, L, the opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify one of the causes of action in the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
State of Nevada v. Bank of America Corporation, the Ninth Circuit mentions § 17200 only as an analogy to Nevada’s borrowing provision while deciding federal-question jurisdiction; it does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under California’s UCL. opinion →
In Re Apa Assessment Fee Litigation, section 17200 is cited only to identify the California causes of action. The court decided the choice-of-law issue by applying District of Columbia law and dismissing under the D.C. consumer-protection statute; it did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corporati, the concurrence mentions § 17200 et seq. only while describing a possible future standing challenge and expressly states that the district court and the appellate court did not decide standing. The opinion therefore does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., the statute appears only in the description of claims asserted in the initial complaint; the opinion does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
McCray v. Metropolitan Transit System CA4/1, the court quoted general UCL principles while addressing the appellant's reply argument, but it did not construe or decide the application of section 17200. It affirmed because McCray identified no authority showing that the alleged insurer conduct constituted the predicate federal mail-fraud offense. opinion →
Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions, the court merely cites § 17200 as one of the California state-law counterparts to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act claims. It does not interpret or apply § 17200; the decision addresses class representation and settlement approval. opinion →
Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions, the opinion mentions § 17200 only in the background description of the plaintiffs’ alleged California-law claims. The court decides the adequacy of the class representation and settlement, and does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Yau v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. Americas, Incidental: the court only describes the procedural history and abandonment of the plaintiffs’ UCL claim; it does not decide what § 17200 means, requires, covers, or how it substantively applies. opinion →
Simon Solotko, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., section 17200 is mentioned only in the background as one of the plaintiff’s asserted California-law claims. The court decided nationwide class-certification and choice-of-law issues, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G., the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Oracle's pleaded claims in the procedural background. The court decided which issues were subject to arbitration and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Edmundson v. the Procter & Gamble Company, the court merely identifies § 17200-10 as one of the statutes underlying plaintiff’s claim. It affirms dismissal based on the false-advertising/puffery analysis and does not interpret, explain, or independently apply § 17200. opinion →
Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Finance, section 17200 appears only in a footnote listing the statutes allegedly violated in the complaint; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
King v. Conde Nast Publications, the opinion mentions § 17200 only in the introductory string citation to the UCL. Its actual discussion and holding concern statutory standing under § 17204, not the meaning, requirements, or application of § 17200. opinion →
In Re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, section 17200 appears only in a citation identifying statutes alleged in the complaint. The court did not interpret or apply § 17200 specifically; it affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim for substantially the same reasons given by the District Court. opinion →
Oliver v. Sd-3c LLC, the court cites § 17200 only to identify the UCL claim among the plaintiffs’ claims; it does not construe the statute or decide any issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Grant v. Ccr, the court merely identified the UCL as one of the claims asserted; it decided the appeal on preclusion and Rooker-Feldman jurisdiction, without construing or applying § 17200. opinion →
Rezner v. Unicredit Bank Ag, the opinion identifies Rezner’s UCL claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., but it does not interpret or apply the statute. It only vacates the district court’s summary judgment and remands for reconsideration in light of Riverisland. opinion →
Mujica v. Airscan Inc., the majority only mentions the § 17200 claim as part of the procedural history, and the dissent reports that the claim was dismissed as time barred. The opinion does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Collegesource, Inc. v. Academyone, Inc., the court merely identifies § 17200 as one of the California-law claims alleged in the earlier California action; it does not interpret or apply the statute, and the opinion notes that those claims were omitted from the later Pennsylvania action. opinion →
Marcus v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court affirmed on federal preemption and expressly declined to decide the California safe-harbor doctrine; its description of the UCL was background to the claims, not a holding about § 17200. opinion →
Carson v. Bank of America, the court mentioned § 17200 only to explain that the Carsons waived that issue by failing to argue it on appeal; it did not decide what the statute means or how it applies. opinion →
Marino v. Countrywide Financial Corp, the opinion merely identifies the UCL as Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. Its holding concerns the four-year limitations rule in § 17208 and tolling of that limitations period, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200 itself. opinion →
Cabral v. Supple LLC, the opinion mentions § 17200 only in identifying Cabral’s UCL claim. The court decided whether the class was properly certified based on commonality and cohesion, and did not construe or decide what § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Yocupicio v. Pae Group, LLC, section 17200 appears only in a footnote as an example citation for a hypothetical false-representation claim; the court neither interprets nor applies the statute. opinion →
Gibbs-Squires v. Urban Settlement Services, the statute appears only in a footnote listing one of the plaintiffs’ additional causes of action. The appellate court does not interpret or analyze § 17200, and its general affirmance of dismissal of the statutory claims does not state a statute-specific rule or application. opinion →
Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Laboratories, Inc., the court did not decide whether a Stark or Anti-Kickback Statute violation can support a claim under § 17200. It described that possibility hypothetically and noted that the jury did not hear Ameritox’s § 17200 claim. opinion →
Alcantar v. Hobart Service, the opinion only mentions § 17200 et seq. in describing the complaint's derivative UCL claim and later notes that the parties stipulated to its dismissal; the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
JBR, Inc. v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., the court mentions the California Unfair Competition Law only as one of the claims asserted and expressly declines to address the merits of the antitrust and unfair competition claims. Its decision concerns only denial of preliminary injunctive relief for failure to show irreparable harm, so it does not hold what Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Tanedo v. Universal Placement Int'l, the court merely listed the UCL claim as one of the state-law claims within the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction. It did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning or requirements of § 17200. opinion →
Memory Lane, Inc. v. Classmates, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify one of Memory Lane’s claims. The court decides evidentiary issues, attorneys’ fees, and costs, but does not interpret or apply the California Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Utica Mutual Insurance v. Herbert H. Landy Insurance Agency, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim pleaded in the underlying California lawsuit. The court does not interpret § 17200, decide whether it was violated, or adopt any party's argument about it; the appeal concerns the insurer's duty to defend and policy exclusions. opinion →
Gisele Rogers v. Epson America, Inc., the court only identifies § 17200 as one of the statutes underlying Rogers’s UCL claim; it decides class certification based on predominance and whether class members received the alleged misrepresentation, without interpreting or applying § 17200’s elements. opinion →
Menjivar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Menjivar), the court mentioned § 17200 only to report that the complaint did not reference or plead a UCL claim. It affirmed dismissal on other grounds and did not construe or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Schramm v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Ninth Circuit merely identifies the statutory basis of the class claim in its procedural description. It does not interpret, explain, or apply the requirements or scope of § 17200; the appeal was resolved on waiver of a new theory and an alternative TILA/Regulation Z issue. opinion →
Bahr v. Canon USA, Inc., the court only rejected the UCL claim as derivative of the dismissed Song-Beverly and Cartwright claims; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any substantive issue under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Cantley v. Radiancy Inc., section 17200 appears only in the procedural history as one of the statutes underlying plaintiff’s claims. The court decided a motion to transfer venue and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about the statute’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
Max v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. CA5, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the causes of action pleaded in the prior federal complaint. This court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200; it resolves the appeal on res judicata, the litigation privilege, and section 1714.10. opinion →
Doyle v. Chrysler Group, LLC, the court mentions § 17200 only to identify one of the statutes underlying Doyle's lawsuit; the appeal decides standing and class-certification requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, without interpreting or applying § 17200. opinion →
Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Elkay Plastics Co., the court mentions the § 17200 claim only to say that the plaintiff's Lanham Act arguments fail for the same reasons; it does not construe or independently analyze § 17200. opinion →
Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Shannon Packaging, Co., the opinion merely identifies § 17200 as one of Caltex’s claims in describing the appeal; the court vacated and remanded based on exclusion of evidence and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, the court merely identifies the California Unfair Competition Law claim in describing the complaint and later reverses its dismissal as a claim dependent on the FDCPA claim. It does not interpret, apply, or decide what Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 requires. opinion →
Mia Mason v. Machine Zone, Inc., the opinion only mentions the California Unfair Competition Law in describing claims Mason asserted and claims the district court dismissed. The appeal addressed only Maryland's Loss Recovery Statute, so the court made no holding about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
De La Torre v. Cashcall, Inc., the Ninth Circuit merely described the plaintiffs’ UCL allegation while certifying a question about unconscionability under the California Finance Code; it did not decide what § 17200 means or whether the alleged conduct violated it. opinion →
Starlight Cinemas, Inc. v. Regal Entertainment Group, the court mentions § 17200 only in describing the claims asserted in the complaint. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Williams v. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, the opinion lists section 17200 among numerous consumer statutes in a footnote but does not construe or apply the UCL; its analysis concerns the pleading standard for defect-disclosure claims generally. opinion →
Wishnev v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., the statute appears only in a footnote listing claims the plaintiff asserted; the court neither analyzes § 17200 nor decides any issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Ventura Content v. Motherless, the court mentioned § 17200 while reviewing the discretionary refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. It did not decide the statute’s meaning, elements, requirements, or application; its ruling turned on the lack of a common nucleus of operative fact with the copyright claim. opinion →
Scott, Blane, and Darren Recovery, LLC v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, the court mentions § 17200 only to identify the California state-law claim and distinguish it from the Oregon claim when analyzing the insurance policy’s notice requirement. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Shoots v. iQor Holdings US, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural and factual background to identify a claim pleaded by the plaintiffs. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about section 17200. opinion →
Chuck Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify plaintiffs’ derivative Unfair Competition Law claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Omidi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court mentions the UCL and addresses standing for the plaintiff’s unlawful-prong claim, but expressly sets aside the legality of the alleged statutory violations and does not interpret, define, or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Container Store, Inc., section 17200 appears only in a footnote listing claims alleged in the complaint. The court addressed whether arbitration agreements were formed and enforceable, and did not interpret or apply the California Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Hall v. Bank of New York Mellon, the opinion mentions § 17200 only in a string citation with a parenthetical describing the statute while affirming dismissal of several claims. It does not construe the statute or independently analyze whether the alleged conduct violated it; the dismissal ruling is procedural and conclusory as to the unfair-competition claim. opinion →
Dachauer v. Nbty, Inc., the court identifies § 17200 as one of two statutes supporting the plaintiff’s false-advertising claims, but the quoted discussion is introductory and the decision turns on FDCA preemption and the evidentiary record; the court does not independently construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Curtis v. Irwin Industries, Inc., section 17200 appears only in a footnote listing a derivative claim. The court remanded that claim without deciding any issue about what § 17200 means or requires, so the mention is incidental. opinion →
Chess v. Romine, the court merely identifies § 17200 as one of plaintiffs’ claims; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue specific to the statute. opinion →
English v. Apple Inc., section 17200 appears only in a footnote identifying the Unfair Competition Law among the statutes underlying English’s claims. The court does not construe the statute or decide how it applies; its merits discussion addresses the grouped CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims without analysis specific to § 17200. opinion →
Rand v. Midland National Life Insurance, the statute appears only in a footnote listing the limitations periods for the pleaded claims. The court did not construe or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200 specifically; its dismissal rested on accrual and limitations principles applied to all claims. opinion →
Zhuravleva v. United States Polo Association, the statute is cited only to identify one of Plaintiff's state-law claims in the removal and jurisdictional discussion. The court decided federal-question jurisdiction and remand, without interpreting or applying the requirements or scope of § 17200. opinion →
Hiq Labs, Inc. v. Linkedin Corporation, the opinion cites California’s Unfair Competition Law and discusses possible unfair competition in explaining the tortious-interference analysis, but the court expressly states that it does not reach hiQ’s unfair competition claim. It therefore does not hold what Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Hawkins v. The Kroger Company, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background to identify claims alleged in the complaint. This discovery order does not decide what § 17200 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Stonehocker v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, LLC, the statute appears only in a list of claims included in a prior class-action settlement release. The court analyzed claim preclusion and the release’s factual scope, but did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Friend v. FGF Brands (USA), Inc., the opinion lists § 17200 among numerous state consumer-protection claims and applies a generalized reasonable-consumer discussion; it does not independently construe or decide the California statute. opinion →
Olson v. Becton, Dickinson and Company, the statute is mentioned only as the legal basis for a claim listed in the complaint. The court decided removal jurisdiction and the amount in controversy, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Stackla, Inc. v. Facebook Inc., section 17200 appears only in the complaint's list of asserted causes of action. The court did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the statute; it denied the temporary restraining order based on the injunction factors. opinion →
Yee v. ClubCorp Holdings, Inc., the court merely identifies § 17200 as one of the statutes underlying the related action; it does not interpret, construe, or decide how the Unfair Competition Law applies. The decision addresses federal-question jurisdiction and remands the cases based on the state-law Unclaimed Property Law claims. opinion →
Delisle v. Speedy Cash, the opinion mentions § 17200 et seq. only while recounting the claims pleaded in the complaint. The court decided whether to stay the proceedings pending an arbitration appeal and did not construe, explain, or apply the requirements of § 17200. opinion →
Dickey v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify one cause of action asserted in the complaint; the court decides preliminary approval of the class settlement and does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Azeveda v. Comcast Cable Communications Management LLC, the court mentioned and briefly defined the UCL only while deciding whether the complaint alleged an economic injury sufficient for Article III standing; it did not decide the merits, meaning, or application of a § 17200 claim. opinion →
Patterson v. RW Direct, INC, section 17200 appears only in the parties’ procedural recital listing the claims in the complaint. The court approved dismissal and did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
LegalForce RAPC Worldwide P.C. v. ITP Service, the court mentions § 17200 only in listing a cause of action alleged in the complaint. It dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and did not decide what § 17200 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
O'Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc., the court did not construe or apply any substantive requirement of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. It treated the UCL only as the procedural/remedial vehicle for the plaintiff’s Labor Code § 351 gratuity claim, while the court’s holding concerned whether a mandatory service charge could qualify as a gratuity and whether the complaint stated a claim under Labor Code §§ 350–351. opinion →
Cavada v. Inter-Continental Hotels Group, Inc., the statute appears only in the background description of Plaintiff’s pleaded causes of action. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Calsoft Labs, Inc. v. Panchumarthi, the opinion mentions § 17200 only in the procedural history to identify one claim asserted in the complaint. The court does not analyze, construe, or decide anything about the UCL or § 17200. opinion →
Lucero v. IRA Services, Inc., Incidental: the statute appears only in the introductory list of claims; the court does not analyze, interpret, or decide the § 17200 claim. opinion →
In re E-3 Systems Litigation, the court mentions the § 17200 claim only as one of the remaining state-law claims supporting supplemental jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
LegalForce RAPC Worldwide P.C. v. ITP Service, section 17200 is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the claims alleged. The court decided Article III standing and personal jurisdiction and expressly did not reach the merits of the statutory claim, so it did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Carlotti v. ASUS Computer International, the opinion merely identifies § 17200 et seq. as one of the claims asserted in the complaint. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Unfair Competition Law; the case settled before summary judgment or class certification briefing or hearing. opinion →
Vinh-Sanh Trading Corporation v. SFTC, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the claims Vinh-Sanh pleaded. The court decided the preliminary-injunction motion based on the federal and common-law trademark claims and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Davidson v. Apple, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the claims plaintiffs alleged; the opinion does not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Panini America, Inc. v. Kollectorsvault, LLC, the statute appears only in the opinion's procedural statement of the claims Panini brought. The court decided a motion authorizing service by email and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Becton, Dickinson and Company v. Cytek Biosciences Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify the UCL cause of action in the procedural history and in describing the amendment/dismissal motion; the court does not interpret or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Walters v. Target Corp., the court merely recounts that the First Amended Complaint asserted UCL claims under the unfair, fraudulent, and unlawful prongs as procedural background. It does not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, because the order addresses preliminary class certification and settlement approval. opinion →
Soto v. Tech Packaging, Inc., the court mentions the UCL and § 17200 only when summarizing the claims in the complaint. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200; the ruling concerns CAFA removal jurisdiction and amount in controversy. opinion →
Walters v. Target Corp., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the causes of action pleaded in the complaint. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Moreland Apartments Associates v. LP Equity LLC, the court cited § 17200 to describe the UCL generally, but the operative ruling dismissed the claim because plaintiffs failed to show the injury and lost money or property required for standing under § 17204. It did not construe or independently apply § 17200’s prohibition. opinion →
Euraupair International, Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Insurance, the statute appears only in EurAuPair’s unadopted argument, and the court expressly declined to consider that claim because it was not raised below. opinion →
Garay v. Southwest Airlines Co., the statute appears only as the label for a claim alleged in the complaint. The court decides the propriety of successive removal and remand, and does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Lusk v. Five Guys Enterprises LLC, the opinion mentions the UCL claim only as one of the claims inadequately addressed in the parties’ proposed class-action settlement analysis; it does not construe, explain, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Hunter v. Nature's Way Products, LLC, section 17200 is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court decides settlement approval, fees, and related matters, but does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Wonderful Real Estate Development LLC v. Laborers International Union of North America Local 220, the court merely identifies § 17200 as the statutory basis for Plaintiff’s UCL claim; it resolves the case under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Grace v. Apple, Inc., the court mentioned § 17200 in a footnote while ruling on the admissibility of evidence about Apple’s wealth. It did not decide the elements, scope, or application of § 17200; the statement that a UCL claim is equitable and decided by the court rather than a jury was ancillary to the evidentiary ruling. opinion →
Textron Aviation Inc. v. Superior Air Charter, LLC, the opinion merely recounts the court’s earlier dismissal of the § 17200 claim in procedural history and denies reconsideration on choice-of-law grounds; it does not itself decide what § 17200 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Willis v. Fitbit, Inc., the opinion merely identifies the UCL claim as one of six causes of action; it decides only whether the parties' arbitration agreement delegates arbitrability and unconscionability issues to an arbitrator, without interpreting or applying § 17200. opinion →
Martinez-Sanchez v. Anthony Vineyards, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural background as the cited basis for causes of action in the federal and earlier state complaints. The court decided whether to stay the case under the Colorado River doctrine, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., the court merely lists the Unfair Competition Law claim as one cause of action pleaded in the complaint while recounting the case background. It does not construe § 17200, decide its requirements, or apply it to the facts. opinion →
Lucero v. IRA Services, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 only as one claim alleged in the first amended complaint. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the UCL; its analysis and ruling address only the aiding-and-abetting claim against the IRA Defendants. opinion →
Corral v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, the court recited the UCL's statutory definition, but it did not construe or decide what § 17200 requires. It dismissed the UCL claim because the fraud-based allegations failed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s particularity requirement. opinion →
Dickey v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., the court merely listed § 17200 et seq. as one of the claims alleged in the complaint while describing the procedural history and approving a class-action settlement. It did not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Maldini v. Marriott International, Inc., Incidental: the court recites § 17200 while describing the pleaded UCL claims; its ruling addressed Rule 9(b) pleading and standing under § 17204, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Lugones v. Pete and Gerry's Organics, LLC, the court mentions Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 to 17210 only in its procedural-history description of the claims alleged in the SAC. It does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Williams v. Camden Old Creek, the court merely dismissed the pleaded UCL claim without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction when the federal claim was dismissed; it did not interpret or decide any substantive issue under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Ramos v. Moog, Inc., the opinion only identifies § 17200 as a cause of action pleaded in the complaint and as part of a putative subclass. The court decides federal CAFA jurisdiction and the amount in controversy, without interpreting or applying § 17200. opinion →
Garybo v. Leonardo Bros, section 17200 appears only in the complaint's list of asserted claims. The court did not analyze or decide the Unfair Competition Law claim; it expressly addressed only the rest-period, derivative wage, itemized-statement, and PAGA claims relevant to the default-judgment motion. opinion →
Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., the opinion merely recounts plaintiffs’ allegation under the UCL and reports that the district court dismissed the UCL claim. The Ninth Circuit did not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; it addressed standing and the fairness of the settlement. opinion →
Felipe Galvan, Jr. v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, the court only identifies § 17200 as one of Galvan’s claims and affirms dismissal as time-barred; it does not construe § 17200 or decide what it requires or covers. opinion →
Gant v. ALDI, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the list of causes of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint; the court does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Gonzalez v. Bryant, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the causes of action alleged in the complaint. The court decided remand and fraudulent joinder, and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about the requirements or scope of § 17200. opinion →
Moriarty v. American General Life Insurance Company, the court merely dismissed Bayside from the § 17200 claim because plaintiff’s counsel erroneously included it as a defendant; it did not construe or decide anything about what § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Olvera, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the claims alleged in the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Lee v. Monetary Management of California, Inc., the opinion merely identifies an Unfair Competition Act claim under § 17200 while discussing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Gray v. Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc., the opinion only identifies § 17200 as one of the claims asserted; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Vasquez v. Leprino Foods Company, the court merely treated unfair competition as a derivative claim and certified it for class treatment under Rule 23; it did not interpret, apply, or decide liability under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
AboveGEM, Inc. v. Organo Gold Management, Limited, the court merely identified the UCL claim in its summary of the causes of action; it did not interpret, state a rule about, or decide how Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 applies. opinion →
Freedline v. O Organics LLC, the opinion identifies the UCL claim and addresses the complaint's allegations generally, but does not construe or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Vazquez v. Kraft Heinz Foods Company, the opinion only identifies the Unfair Competition Law as one of the claims alleged in the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Goldsmith v. Garfield Beach CVS, LLC, the opinion only identifies § 17200 as the statutory basis for one of Plaintiff’s pleaded claims; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Franz v. Beiersdorf, Inc., section 17200 is cited only to identify the UCL claim and its private right of action; the court's decision concerns implied preemption under the FDCA, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Gomez v. J. Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc., the court merely identifies the unfair-business-practices cause of action pleaded under § 17200 et seq. and later certifies it as a derivative claim. Its holding concerns rest-break compensation and class certification, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Allbirds, Inc. v. AG, section 17200 is mentioned only as the statutory basis for Count 7 in the list of claims. The court analyzes the trademark fair-use defense and does not interpret or apply the Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Andrade v. Rehrig Pacific Company, section 17200 is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of the claims in the complaint. The court's remand ruling addresses LMRA preemption of the wage, meal-period, and rest-break claims and does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Simonyan v. BMW Financial Services, NA, LLC, the court merely listed the UCL claim as one of the claims in the removed complaint; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Michail v. Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan, the statute is mentioned only as one of the claims alleged in the complaint during the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Roe v. Jose Torres L.D. Latin Club Bar, Inc, the statute appears only in the procedural statement listing the claims asserted in the complaint. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 17200; it only preliminarily approved a settlement. opinion →
Tolton v. Jones Day, the opinion only identifies § 17200 as the statute underlying Count 9 in the procedural description of the complaint. It does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Sobaszkiewicz v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., section 17200 is mentioned only as the statutory basis listed for plaintiffs’ eleventh cause of action; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the statute. opinion →
Jones v. Invasix Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify one cause of action in the amended complaint and is not interpreted, applied, or otherwise addressed in the court’s holding. opinion →
Wanke v. Invasix Inc., the opinion only reports the plaintiff’s allegation that the California Unfair Competition Statute applies; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Neo4j, Inc. v. PureThink, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to describe UCL allegations; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Garybo v. Leonardo Bros, section 17200 appears only in the procedural-history list of claims plaintiffs asserted; the court did not analyze, interpret, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Stewart v. CamelBak Products, LLC, the statute appears only in the background as one of the claims asserted; the court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and expressly declined to address the remaining Rule 12(b)(6) arguments, so it did not decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Buhl v. Abbott Laboratories, the court mentions § 17200 only to identify one of Buhl’s claims; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Walker v. Nestle USA, Inc., section 17200 appears only in the background description of the claims pleaded. The court decided the anti-SLAPP motion under the commercial-speech exemption in California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.17(c), without construing or applying § 17200. opinion →
Carlotti v. ASUS Computer International, the court merely identifies § 17200 et seq. as one of the claims alleged in the complaint. It does not construe the statute, state its requirements, or apply it; the decision concerns final approval of a class-action settlement. opinion →
Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the background list of claims. The court did not address the merits of the Unfair Competition Law claim and expressly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. opinion →
In Re Pacific Fertility Center Litigation, the statute appears only in the procedural history listing a pleaded UCL claim; the court did not construe or decide Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify a counterclaim that a prior order dismissed; this opinion does not construe, explain, or independently apply § 17200. opinion →
La Fosse v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., the statute appears only in the background as one of the claims plaintiffs asserted; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Dominguez v. Stone Brewing Co., LLC, the opinion mentions § 17200 only in describing the claims pleaded in the complaint. The court decides arbitration, unconscionability, and dismissal, and does not interpret or apply the Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Hanson v. Welch Foods Inc., the court mentions the UCL as one of several consumer-protection claims and dismisses it for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements. It does not construe Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 or decide a statutory issue specific to that section. opinion →
California Beach Co., LLC v. Exqline, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the background to identify one of CBC’s pleaded claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Vizcarra v. Unilever United States, Inc., the court only recited the UCL's general definition and then denied dismissal of the unlawful-prong claim because the related CLRA damages claim was not dismissed; it did not construe or independently decide how § 17200 applies. opinion →
Gomez v. J. Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc., the statute is mentioned only as the basis of a pleaded unfair-business-competition claim and in the class claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 17200. opinion →
Monster Energy Company v. Integrated Supply Network, LLC, the court decided UCL standing under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 and explained what economic injury was sufficient for standing. Section 17200 was cited only to identify the UCL claim and was not construed or applied as the basis of the holding. opinion →
Nemecek v. Finger One, Inc., the opinion only identifies § 17200 as one of the statutes underlying a claim listed in the complaint. The court decides arbitration and motion-to-strike issues without interpreting, applying, or otherwise holding anything about § 17200. opinion →
Floyd v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., section 17200 et seq. appears only in a footnote listing one of the claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Dill v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify a claim Appleby alleged; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Saperstein v. Thomas P. Gohagan & Company, the court discussed the Unfair Competition Law and quoted § 17203 only in the context of the parties’ McGill arbitration argument. It expressly declined to decide whether the plaintiff actually sought public injunctive relief, deciding instead that the arbitration provision did not purport to preclude that relief. opinion →
Bautista v. Juul Labs, Inc., the opinion mentions Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 only as one claim in the plaintiffs’ allegations. The court decides whether the claims fall within the arbitration provision and does not construe, explain, or apply § 17200. opinion →
In re: AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company, the opinion mentions and applies the CUCL only in deciding whether California claims may proceed as a class under Rule 23, based on the predominance of individualized issues from an asserted STOLI/unclean-hands defense. It does not construe Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, state its elements, or decide a substantive requirement of the statute. opinion →
Hernandez v. FCA US LLC, section 17200 appears only in the procedural list of causes of action. The court's UCL analysis addresses statutory standing under § 17204 and causation/reliance, without construing or applying § 17200 itself. opinion →
Roe v. Jose Torres L.D. Latin Club Bar, Inc, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural description of the claims pleaded in the complaint. The court approved a settlement and did not construe, interpret, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Sobaszkiewicz v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., the court mentions § 17200 only to identify and distinguish the parties' UCL claims while deciding whether arbitration was waived; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Nasiri v. T.A.G. Security Protective Services Inc., the court recited the UCL’s general prohibition while addressing a derivative UCL claim, but did not construe or independently apply § 17200; it held only that the UCL claim failed because the underlying labor-code claims failed. opinion →
Maffick LLC v. Facebook Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify one of the claims for which plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order. The court denied relief because all four claims depended on proving the label false and plaintiff had not shown likely success; it did not interpret or decide any requirement of § 17200. opinion →
Lokey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., the court merely reports that the complaint asserted an unfair-competition claim under § 17200 et seq. in describing the procedural history. The order decides only the amount in controversy and federal jurisdiction, and does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Arnold v. Hearst Magazine Media, Inc., the opinion only identifies the UCL as one of the claims plaintiffs asserted and does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Rashid v. BMW of North America, LLC, the court merely identifies § 17200 et seq. as a claim alleged in the complaint while deciding federal removal jurisdiction; it does not interpret or apply the Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Denicolo v. Viking Client Services, Inc., section 17200 appears in the complaint’s claim list, and § 17204 appears in a footnote reporting Viking’s standing argument. The court did not decide what the UCL requires or adopt a legal rule; it only found disputed facts sufficient to deny summary judgment. opinion →
Vallarta v. United Airlines, Inc., the UCL is listed as a pleaded claim while the opinion resolves personal jurisdiction and pendent-jurisdiction issues; it does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Hender v. American Directions Workforce, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the claims pleaded in the state-court complaint. The court decided remand and amount in controversy under CAFA, and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Lusk v. Five Guys Enterprises LLC, the opinion merely identifies the plaintiff’s eleventh pleaded claim as a UCL claim and states in a footnote where the UCL is codified; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Fonseca v. Hewlett-Packard Company, the statute is mentioned only while assessing whether a Rule 54(b) appeal would narrow the issues in the case. The court does not construe § 17200, decide its elements, or apply it to the merits; the discussion is procedural and hypothetical. opinion →
DEFRANK v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., the UCL appears only in the court's description of the plaintiffs' claims; the opinion text provided does not construe § 17200 or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Morand-Doxzon v. Delaware North Companies Sportservice, Inc., the statute appears only in the court's description of a claim alleged in the complaint. The court decided the motion to remand based on CAFA jurisdiction and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Lembeck v. Arvest Central Mortgage Co., the court merely treated the alleged Rosenthal Act violation as an unlawful act for purposes of the plaintiff’s UCL claim. It did not interpret, explain, or independently apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., the court merely lists § 17200 et seq. as a cause of action in the complaint’s background. Its order decides settlement approval, attorneys’ fees, costs, and incentive awards, without interpreting or applying the Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Quiruz v. Specialty Commodities, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural description of the claims asserted in the complaint. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; it approves the overall settlement under class-action standards. opinion →
Krueger v. Wyeth Inc, the court mentions § 17200 only to identify an underlying statute and its general objectives when evaluating proposed cy pres beneficiaries; it does not construe or apply § 17200 to decide liability or any substantive statutory issue. opinion →
Ripple Labs Inc. v. YouTube LLC, the court mentions the UCL only as one of the state-law claims predicated on other claims and dismisses it under Communications Decency Act immunity; it does not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Shijin Vapor LLC v. Bolt USA, LLC, the statute is mentioned only as one of plaintiff's pleaded causes of action. The court decides venue and transfer motions and does not interpret or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Prescott v. Nestle USA, Inc, the opinion mentions section 17200 only in the background description of the claims plaintiffs alleged. The court decided a motion to stay and did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the UCL. opinion →
Prescott v. Nestle USA, Inc, the statute is mentioned only in the background to identify claims asserted in the complaint. The court decided a motion to stay and terminated the motion to dismiss without prejudice; it did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
HD Carrier LLC v. AT and T Corp, the statute appears only in the background as part of HD Carrier's alleged claims. The court did not construe or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; its rulings addressed federal subject-matter jurisdiction, primary jurisdiction, and a stay. opinion →
TI, Limited v. Vidanta, the statute is mentioned only in the Amended Complaint's list of causes of action. The court ruled on personal jurisdiction and did not construe, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation, the statute appears only in the court's description of the complaint's asserted causes of action. The court decided a motion to stay discovery and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Robinson v. Clear Recon Corp, the court mentions § 17200 only in describing the plaintiff’s UCL claim and in concluding that the claim was barred by res judicata; it does not decide what § 17200 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
HealthNOW Medical Center, Inc v. State Farm General Insurance Co., the court merely identifies the UCL claim among Plaintiff’s pleaded causes of action in the background section. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; the dismissal rests on the insurance policy’s virus exclusion and lack of coverage. opinion →
Dollaga v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, the court merely lists the plaintiff’s § 17200 claim among the state-law claims in describing the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Pacific Recovery Solutions v. United Behavioral Health, the opinion merely identifies the UCL claim as one of several state-law claims. Its ruling concerns ERISA preemption and pleading, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Alvarez v. YRC Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying Schroeder’s UCL claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Shroeder v. YRC Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying one of Schroeder’s claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning or requirements of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Gayakwad v. RSCR California, Inc., section 17200 et seq. appears only in the introductory list of claims alleged in the complaint. The court did not interpret or apply the statute; the mention is procedural background. opinion →
Perez v. Leprino Foods Company, the opinion mentions § 17200 only while evaluating whether derivative unfair-competition claims present common questions for class certification; it does not construe the statute or decide what it requires or how it applies on the merits. opinion →
Aguinaga v. First Student Inc., the court mentions § 17200 et seq. only in describing the causes of action alleged in the complaint. The ruling concerns removal jurisdiction and the amount in controversy under CAFA, and does not construe or apply the Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
City and County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., the opinion merely identifies a UCL claim under § 17200 while deciding that the claim requires a jury trial; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Greenberg v. Target Corporation, the opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify one of Greenberg’s state-law claims. The court decided FDCA preemption and the requirements for a federal dietary-supplement structure/function claim; it did not interpret or apply § 17200 itself. opinion →
Durham v. Sachs Electric Company, the opinion mentions the UCL, including § 17200, only to identify and certify the claims in a class-certification order; it does not interpret, define, or apply any requirement of § 17200. opinion →
Lobo v. Air-India Ltd., the opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify an unchallenged UCL cause of action and to describe the procedural disposition and amendment clarification. It does not interpret, explain, or decide what § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Hamilton v. JUUL Labs, Inc., the court merely identified the UCL claim and recounted that it survived based on the alleged Labor Code violation. It did not construe § 17200 or decide how its requirements applied. opinion →
Solorio v. ABC Phones of North Carolina, Inc., the court only identified § 17200 as one of the claims covered by the arbitration agreement when deciding the motion to compel arbitration. It did not construe, interpret, or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Price v. SEIU, United Healthcare Workers - West, section 17200 appears only as part of the UCL claim alleged by the plaintiff, and the court expressly declined to address the elements of that claim. opinion →
DZ Reserve v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 only while recounting an earlier ruling and uses that prior ruling as context for the Rule 9(b) analysis; it does not construe or decide what § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Gregg v. Providence St. Joseph Health, the statute is mentioned only in the opinion’s description of plaintiffs’ complaint. The court decided federal-question jurisdiction and remand, applying the California Hospital Lien Act and Medicare principles, without interpreting or deciding anything about § 17200. opinion →
Georges v. Bank of America, the court did not construe or independently apply § 17200; it merely described the derivative UCL claim and rejected it because the underlying Unruh Act claim failed. opinion →
Maharaj v. Charter Communications, Inc., the court merely identified the UCL claim under section 17200 as one of the causes of action alleged in the complaint and did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
In re: Charles L. Duff, the statute is mentioned only as the basis for one cause of action alleged in the complaint. The appellate court did not construe or apply § 17200; it affirmed dismissal because the complaint failed generally to plausibly allege causation and injury. opinion →
Callahan v. Ancestry.com Inc., the opinion mentions the UCL claim and reports a motion to strike the restitution request, but it does not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; the motion-to-strike ruling was otherwise moot. opinion →
Williams v. Ameriprise Financial CA4/3, the court did not interpret or independently apply Business and Professions Code section 17200; it rejected the unfair-competition claim only as a consequence of finding that the insurance policy was lawfully not renewed. opinion →
Enttech Media Group LLC v. Okularity, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote listing a claim asserted in the original complaint; the court did not analyze, construe, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Moore v. Addus Healthcare, Inc., the court treated the UCL claim as a derivative claim in deciding pleading and Rule 23 class-certification issues; it did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or substantive applicability of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Denicolo v. Viking Client Services, Inc., section 17200 appears only in the background list of claims asserted by Plaintiff Fox. The court did not interpret, apply, or rule on the UCL; its class-certification analysis and ruling concerned the FDCPA, Rosenthal Act, and Rule 23. opinion →
Barbizon School of San Francisco, Inc. INC. v. Sentinel Insurance Company Ltd, the court did not interpret or apply the requirements of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. It mentioned the UCL claims only as claims pleaded by the plaintiffs and dismissed them as derivative of the failed insurance-coverage claims, while separately finding the alternative UCL theories factually threadbare. opinion →
Pacific Recovery Solutions v. United Behavioral Health, the court merely identifies the UCL claim among the state-law claims and dismisses those claims as ERISA-preempted; it does not interpret or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Kinder v. Woodbolt Distribution, LLC, the court mentions § 17200 et seq. only in recounting the claims alleged in the complaint. The order decides attorneys’ fees, costs, expenses, and an incentive award, and does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
In Re: MacBook Keyboard Litigation, the opinion merely lists the UCL claim among the claims for which plaintiffs sought class certification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Schiller v. Ashley Distribution Services, LTD, the statute appears only in the procedural background as the label for one of the plaintiff’s claims. The court decided whether removal jurisdiction existed under CAFA and did not interpret or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Navarro v. Ski Data, Inc., the court merely listed § 17200 et seq. among the claims alleged in the complaint. Its decision concerned federal jurisdiction and remand under CAFA, and it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Mariscal v. Arizona Tile, LLC, the court merely identifies § 17200 et seq. as one of the claims in the complaint. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning the statute; the remand ruling analyzes other claims for the amount in controversy. opinion →
Brink Biologics Inc. v. Sanofi S.A., the court was deciding fraudulent joinder and subject-matter jurisdiction, not the merits or meaning of § 17200. Its discussion only found a potentially colorable UCL claim sufficient to support remand. opinion →
Precision Toxicology, LLC v. MacRory, the statute appears only in the introductory procedural history to identify one of Precision’s claims; the court does not interpret, analyze, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Stonehocker v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, LLC, the opinion only identifies § 17200 as the statutory basis of a pleaded UCL claim in the procedural history; the court decides settlement approval, class certification, notice, and fees, and does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Miguel-Sanchez v. Mesa Packing, LLC, the court merely identifies the UCL claim among plaintiffs’ pleaded claims in the background; it does not interpret, define, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY v. TRISTAR PRODUCTS, INC., the opinion merely identifies § 17200 as one of the causes of action pleaded in the underlying class action. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Magallon v. Transtar Industries, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify the plaintiff’s tenth claim in the background. The court decided remand based on CAFA jurisdiction and did not interpret, apply, or rule on Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Pacific Steel Group v. Commercial Metals Company, the opinion merely identifies § 17200 as the basis for the seventh cause of action. It does not interpret or apply the statute; instead, after dismissing the federal claims, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. opinion →
Golden Eye Media USA, Inc. v. Trolley Bags UK Ltd, the opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify a counterclaim that the parties stipulated to dismiss and in describing the procedural disposition. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any substantive issue under the statute. opinion →
Potts v. Johnson and Johnson Consumer Inc., the statute is cited only to identify the UCL claims in the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply § 17200 specifically; it resolved the grouped consumer-protection claims on generalized standing, failure-to-warn, and federal-preemption grounds. opinion →
Lusk v. Five Guys Enterprises LLC, the court merely discussed the pleaded UCL claim in evaluating whether the proposed class settlement was adequately supported and whether its release was fair. It did not interpret Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, state what the statute requires, or decide how it applies. opinion →
Hill v. BBVA Bank, N.A., section 17200 is mentioned only in the background description of Plaintiffs’ allegations. The Court decided the motion to compel arbitration and discussed public injunctive relief under § 17203 and McGill, but did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Cap Export, LLC v. Zinus, Inc., the court cited § 17200 only to identify the state-law claim over which it declined supplemental jurisdiction; it did not construe, explain, or decide how the statute applies. opinion →
Ahmad v. Panera Bread Company, the court merely identifies § 17200 as the basis of a pleaded UCL count while deciding federal CAFA jurisdiction and the amount in controversy; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the requirements or scope of § 17200. opinion →
Sanchez v. Law Office of Lance E. Armo, the opinion merely identifies the UCL claim in the complaint and reports the procedural disposition of that claim; it does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Santos v. United Parcel Service Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history as the statutory basis of a pleaded UCL cause of action. The court does not analyze, construe, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Irone v. Mohammed, the opinion merely identifies § 17200 as one of the statutes underlying the Trademark Claims. It dismisses those claims for lack of bankruptcy subject-matter jurisdiction and does not interpret, construe, or decide how § 17200 applies. opinion →
Landec Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of the claims in the complaint. The court addresses subject-matter jurisdiction and diversity pleading, and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Callahan v. Ancestry.com Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the introduction as the basis for one of plaintiffs’ claims. The court did not construe or apply § 17200; it dismissed the amended complaint for lack of Article III standing and, alternatively, Communications Decency Act immunity. opinion →
JACKSON v. ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC., a Delaware corporation, the statute is mentioned only to identify the plaintiff’s UCL claim. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing based on the absence of a plausible endorsement allegation and did not interpret or apply the requirements of § 17200. opinion →
Chinitz v. Intero Real Estate Services, the statute is mentioned only to identify the plaintiffs’ conceded Unfair Competition Law claim, which the court dismisses without interpreting or applying § 17200’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Philips North America LLC v. Advanced Imaging Services, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 et seq. only in listing the causes of action alleged in the complaint. The court decided expedited-discovery issues and did not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
YZ Productions, Inc. v. Redbubble, Inc., the court merely identifies the UCL claim and dismisses the unfair-competition claims based on Communications Decency Act immunity; it does not decide what Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Sanchez v. Abbott Laboratories, the statute appears only in the procedural background as one of the claims asserted in the state-court complaint. The court decided remand under CAFA and did not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Brumbach v. Hyatt Corporation, the statute appears only in the background as a claim pleaded in the separate Crump action; the court decided whether to stay this case under the first-to-file rule and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Dickinson v. Comerica Bank, the opinion merely identifies the UCL as one of the claims pleaded in the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Casey v. General Motors, LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify a proposed claim in the procedural history; the court grants leave to amend without deciding the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify the surviving claim and its procedural posture in an order approving a class settlement; the court does not interpret, define, or apply § 17200. opinion →
Cole-Parmer Instrument Company LLC v. Professional Laboratories, Inc., the court merely identifies the UCL claim and cites § 17200 et seq. in describing the causes of action. It decides personal jurisdiction and dismisses the complaint without reaching the substantive UCL arguments, so it holds nothing about what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Presley, the court only determined that the complaint, as pleaded, did not assert the UCL claim against the moving defendants and allowed amendment; it did not construe § 17200 or decide any substantive requirement or application of the statute. opinion →
Jones v. TireHub, LLC, the court dismissed the UCL claim as derivative of inadequately pleaded Labor Code claims; it did not interpret or decide what Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Guzman v. Peri & Sons Farms of California, LLC, the statute appears only in the background as one of the claims alleged in the complaint. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Facebook, Inc. v. Kokhtenko, the statute appears only in the complaint’s list of asserted causes of action. The court decided a motion for alternative service and did not interpret, apply, or rule on any requirement of § 17200. opinion →
Monarch Landscape Holdings, LLC v. Kapsch, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the claims alleged in the state-court complaint. The court dismissed the case after settlement and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Tapia v. Frontwave Credit Union, the opinion mentions § 17200 et seq. only when identifying one of the claims alleged in the action’s background and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute; the ruling concerns approval of a class settlement under Rule 23. opinion →
Tongsui LLC v. LeCocoLove LLC, the court cited the statute and quoted a precedent's description of its three prongs only to explain that defendants had not specified which prong supported their UCL counterclaim. It did not decide the meaning or application of § 17200, and denied the relevant motions without prejudice. opinion →
Brown v. Janus of Santa Cruz, section 17200 is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of Plaintiff's causes of action; the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Philips North America LLC v. Advanced Imaging Services, Inc., the statute appears only in the complaint's list of claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Durham v. Sachs Electric Company, the statute is identified as one of the claims in the class-certification motion, but the court decides only Rule 23 certification issues and does not construe or determine any substantive requirement or application of § 17200. opinion →
Vargas v. Facebook, Inc., the UCL is mentioned as one of the California laws asserted and in a footnote addressing standing. The court dismissed on lack of Article III injury and the Communications Decency Act, without construing or deciding what Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Cherry Creek Mortgage LLC v. Jarboe, the court only identified § 17200 as the basis of a counterclaim and dismissed that counterclaim because the contract’s Colorado choice-of-law provision made California law inapplicable. It did not construe § 17200 or decide what the statute requires or covers. opinion →
Scherer v. Pacific City Hotel, LLC, the statute appears only in the procedural history as a claim alleged in the First Amended Complaint. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning section 17200. opinion →
Health Club Marketing Specialist, Inc. v. Aken, the statute is mentioned only while describing the plaintiff’s state-law claim in the procedural history. The court decided remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and did not construe or decide the merits of § 17200. opinion →
Lew v. The City of Los Angeles, section 17200 is mentioned only in the list of causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff. The court resolved the state-law claims on Government Claims Act timeliness and expressly did not reach whether those claims, including the § 17200 claim, were sufficiently alleged. opinion →
Carrillo v. Merck and Co., Inc., the court cited § 17200 only in its federal-question-jurisdiction analysis to explain that a UCL claim need not depend on federal law. It did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or merits application of § 17200. opinion →
Ayon v. Zero Waste Solutions, Inc., the statute appears only in the complaint’s list of claims. The court decided remand based on LMRA preemption and California Labor Code § 227.3, without construing or applying § 17200. opinion →
Stanfield v. Tawkify, Inc., the court did not interpret or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; it merely noted that the UCL claim was based on alleged DSCA violations and dismissed it without addressing UCL standing. opinion →
Westfall v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., the court merely identifies § 17200 as one of the claims alleged in the operative complaint while recounting the procedural background. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Arreola v. Shamrock Foods Company, section 17200 is identified as one of the causes of action in the complaint, but the court does not interpret, explain, or apply the statute; it approves the class settlement on other grounds. opinion →
Lane Stoll v. JBS USA Food Co., the statute appears only in the opinion's procedural-background list of claims alleged in the complaint. The court decided remand based on the amount in controversy and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Jacobs v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation, the opinion only identifies a UCL claim in the background and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The court’s substantive analysis concerns insurance coverage, the duty to defend, and bad faith; the UCL claim is not adjudicated. opinion →
Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., the statute appears in the procedural history as one of Plaintiffs’ asserted claims. The court does not interpret or apply § 17200; its analysis concerns the ABC employment-classification test and related preemption defenses. opinion →
Gomez v. Rapid Pasadena Services, LLC, the statute appears only in the court's list of causes of action pleaded in the complaint. The court decided a motion to remand under CAFA and did not interpret, apply, or rule on the requirements of section 17200. opinion →
Card v. Ralph Lauren Corporation, the opinion reports Plaintiff's concession and then expressly focuses on the other claims; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Stromberg v. Qualcomm Inc., the court merely described the plaintiffs’ pleaded UCL claim and recited the statute’s general language while deciding a Rule 23 class-certification and choice-of-law appeal. It did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Price v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 only while recounting which claims were included in the previously certified California class. The court decides class decertification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Quidel Corporation v. Siemens Medical Solutions USA, the court mentioned section 17200 only as one of the state-law claims and expressly resolved those claims by following the Lanham Act analysis; it did not construe or independently apply section 17200. opinion →
Castellucci v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Castellucci’s claims. The court affirmed dismissal based on the settlement agreement’s waiver of further loss-mitigation rights and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Lawrence v. Moi, the statute appears only in the background as the label for one of Lawrence's pleaded claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 17200; it decided remand based on federal-question jurisdiction over the trademark claim. opinion →
Miguel-Sanchez v. Mesa Packing, LLC, section 17200 et seq. appears only in the court’s description of claims plaintiffs alleged. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute; it ruled on class-action settlement approval under Rule 23. opinion →
Ortega v. ITS Technologies and Logistics, LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim pleaded by the plaintiffs and to summarize their allegations; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about section 17200. opinion →
Hale v. Manna Pro Products, LLC, the court merely identifies § 17200 as one of the statutes underlying the plaintiff’s claims in the procedural background; it does not interpret or apply the statute, and its ruling concerns approval of the class settlement. opinion →
Monarrez v. Centerra Group, LLC, section 17200 appears only as a claim reported from the complaint; the court did not interpret or apply it and expressly declined to address the other claims. opinion →
Gurzenski v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the court merely identifies § 17200 as one of the claims pleaded in the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning that statute. opinion →
Rouze v. One World Technologies, Inc., the statute is cited only to identify the UCL claim among the causes of action. The court dismissed that claim based on the failure to plead fraud-related knowledge, without construing or deciding what § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
August Home, Inc. v. SHOPRIME Corp., the statute is mentioned only in the background as one of Plaintiff’s claims. The court decides the motion for service by publication under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.50 and does not construe or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Alaei v. Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), the court merely recited the UCL's statutory definition while addressing standing and mootness of the claim for injunctive relief; it did not interpret or decide what § 17200 requires or how the alleged conduct satisfies its elements. opinion →
Tee Turtle, LLC v. Abmask, the statute appears only in the Court's description of the causes of action asserted in the Verified Complaint. The Court does not construe § 17200, analyze its elements, or grant relief based on that claim; the order's merits discussion concerns copyright and Lanham Act claims. opinion →
Martinez-Sanchez v. Anthony Vineyards, Inc., the court recited the UCL’s general scope while describing plaintiffs’ proposed claim, but expressly said it need not address that claim for purposes of the class-certification order. It therefore made no ruling applying or construing § 17200 in this case. opinion →
Kudos Inc v. Kudoboard LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the background as the legal basis for one of the plaintiff’s claims. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 17200. opinion →
Atkinson v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the court merely mentioned § 17200 while comparing the proposed California claim to the Connecticut claim; it expressly declined to reach the California Unfair Competition Law claim’s merits because Section 230(c)(1) barred it. opinion →
Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history as the statutory basis for plaintiffs’ UCL claim. The court does not construe, explain, or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Ordaz v. McLane/Suneast, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for one of Ordaz's claims. The court decided removal timeliness and the amount in controversy, and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Mogan v. Sacks, Ricketts & Case LLP, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of the claims pleaded. The court did not analyze, interpret, or rule on the § 17200 claim; its dismissals were based on litigation privilege, issue preclusion, and anti-SLAPP grounds. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., the statute appears only in the court's description of the plaintiff's allegations. The court did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about § 17200; it approved a class-action settlement. opinion →
Seegert v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., the court merely identifies § 17200 as a statute underlying Seegert’s state-law claims. Its analysis addresses FDCA preemption and the substantiation of dietary-supplement structure/function claims, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
Sanchez v. National General Insurance Company, the court mentions § 17200 only to identify one cause of action pleaded in the amended complaint. The remand ruling concerns diversity jurisdiction and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Gerace v. Biotheranostics, Inc., the opinion merely recites the statute's definition while describing Gerace's claims; it does not construe or apply § 17200, and affirms dismissal on choice-of-law grounds because Ohio law governs. opinion →
Cienega v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify one claim in the operative complaint. The court resolved a venue-transfer motion and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Cienega v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., the statute appears only in the court's description of the claims pleaded in the operative complaint. The court transferred the case on forum-convenience grounds and did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Moniz v. Service King Paint & Body, LLC, the court mentioned § 17200 et seq. only while listing the claims pleaded in the operative complaint. It did not construe the statute, decide its requirements, or apply it to the merits. opinion →
Waltz v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., the order mentions § 17200 only in listing Waltz’s claims in the procedural background; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the statute. opinion →
Weeks v. Matrix Absence Management Incorporated, the court mentions § 17200 only while describing the California claim and preemption ruling in Wang. It does not interpret, define, or apply § 17200 itself; the holding concerns preemption of the plaintiff’s Oregon wage claim. opinion →
Gutierrez v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the court mentions § 17200 only as one of the claims Gutierrez asserted in his arbitration demand. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Tag v. i360, LLC, the court merely identifies a UCL claim as one of the causes of action alleged in the complaint while deciding a CAFA jurisdiction and remand issue; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Tee Turtle, LLC v. Anhui Leadershow Household Industrial Co., Ltd., the statute is mentioned only to identify a cause of action asserted in the Verified Complaint. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Barajas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the statute is mentioned only to identify one of the causes of action alleged in the complaint. The court decided removal, diversity jurisdiction, and a procedural filing issue, and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Tynan v. Perry, the statute appears only in the procedural list of claims asserted; the court did not construe or apply § 17200 and denied summary judgment on the remaining claims solely because a genuine dispute existed over plaintiff’s common-law trademark rights. opinion →
Doe v. Trinity Health Corporation, the court mentions § 17200 only while recounting the claims alleged in the complaint. It decides federal CAFA jurisdiction and remand, and does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
PUTIAN AUTHENTIC ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT CO., LTD v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the statute appears only in the complaint's list of asserted claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Duff v. Newrez, LLC, the court merely identifies the Unfair Competition Law claim among the claims being dismissed and analyzes the alleged fraud and other causes of action without interpreting, applying, or deciding anything about § 17200. opinion →
Blount v. Host Healthcare, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as a claim pleaded in the complaint. The court did not construe, explain, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Grunt Style LLC v. TWD, LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Grunt Style’s counterclaims. The court’s summary-judgment analysis and ruling address trademark rights, cancellation, Lanham Act claims, preemption, and unclean hands, but do not construe or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Hiq Labs, Inc. v. Linkedin Corporation, the opinion identifies Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. as the basis of hiQ’s unfair competition claim but expressly declines to reach that claim. Its references to possible unfair competition are hypothetical or describe the district court’s ruling, so the court did not decide what § 17200 means or requires. opinion →
Majo v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC, section 17200 appears in the procedural history as the statutory basis for a pleaded UCL claim. The court only dismisses the derivative UCL claim because the underlying claims fail; it does not construe or independently apply § 17200. opinion →
Philips North America LLC v. Advanced Imaging Services, Inc., the statute appears only in the background as one of plaintiff’s listed claims. This discovery order does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Audio-Technica Corporation v. Music Tribe Commercial NV Inc., the court mentioned § 17200 only to note the parties’ undisputed view that the claim is substantially congruent with the Lanham Act claim, then expressly focused its analysis on the Lanham Act claim. It did not independently construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Ruff v. Wilson Logistics, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural background as the statute underlying the plaintiff’s ninth claim. The court decided remand and transfer issues and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Johnson v. R and L Carriers Shared Services, LLC, the court only dismissed the UCL claim because the plaintiff conceded the motion and because it depended on other insufficiently pleaded claims. It did not decide what Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Philips North America LLC v. Advanced Imaging Services, Inc., the statute appears only in the background as one of several claims plaintiff asserted. The court decided a discovery motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and did not interpret, apply, or rule on any element or remedy under § 17200. opinion →
Loh v. Future Motion, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify one of the claims asserted in the two actions. It decides whether to order show-cause briefing regarding consolidation, and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Jacobson v. Future Motion, Inc., the order merely identifies § 17200 as one of the claims asserted in the two actions while ordering the parties to show cause regarding consolidation. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Riordan v. Western Digital Corporation, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Plaintiffs’ claims. The court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and expressly did not reach the alternative merits-based dismissal theory, so it made no ruling about § 17200. opinion →
Barbiero v. Charles Schwab Investment Advisory, Inc., the court mentions the UCL claim only to identify it as one of the state-law claims relevant to its SLUSA jurisdiction analysis. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Riley v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., the court cited § 17200 to identify the UCL claim, but did not interpret or apply any substantive requirement of § 17200; it disposed of the derivative claim because the underlying claims failed. opinion →
Robinson v. Clear Recon Corp, the court merely describes the plaintiff’s fourth claim and cites § 17200; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Crittenden v. Apple, Inc., the statute appears only in a list of claims alleged in the complaint; the court dismissed the claims under federal pleading standards without construing or applying Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Patterson v. Medical Review Institute of America, LLC, section 17200 appears only in the complaint's list of asserted claims. The court decided the case on Article III standing and did not interpret, construe, or apply § 17200. opinion →
(BK) Svenhard's Swedish Bakery v. United States Bakery, the court recited § 17200 and dismissed the claim because Oregon law governed; it did not construe, interpret, or apply the elements of California’s statute. opinion →
Kelley v. Applus Technologies, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 et seq. only to identify one cause of action in the complaint. The court decides remand based on the FCRA claim and Article III standing, and does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Reade v. New York Times Company, the court mentions § 17200 only to identify the legal vehicle for a prior Attorney General enforcement action involving § 1798.85. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Cheng v. Speier, the court only recounts plaintiff's § 17200 claims and declines supplemental jurisdiction over them after dismissing the federal TCPA claim; it does not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
McCollum v. TGI Fridays Inc., the court only recites § 17200 as the basis of a claim in the complaint's background. It does not interpret or apply the statute; the decision concerns CAFA jurisdiction and the court expressly excluded any UCL relief from its amount-in-controversy calculations. opinion →
Whitney v. Suburban Propane, L.P., the statute appears only in the complaint's list of causes of action. The court decided a motion to compel arbitration and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
Fuks v. Vanetik, the opinion mentions § 17200 only to identify a claim in the complaint and reports that Plaintiff dismissed that claim; the court did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Utne v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., section 17200 et seq. appears in the description of the claims and in a discussion of another court’s UCL tolling analysis, but this opinion decides standing and limitations only for the Labor Code § 203 waiting-time claim and does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Brooks v. Bank of America, NA, the opinion identifies the UCL as one of the asserted claims and declines supplemental jurisdiction over absent class members’ state-law claims; it does not construe or decide anything about the substantive meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
LeMasters v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the statute appears only as one claim listed in LeMasters’s arbitration demand, which is procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Reasner v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the statute appears only in the background as one of the claims Reasner asserted in arbitration. The court did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200. opinion →
California Crane School, Inc. v. Google LLC, section 17200 appears only in a string citation describing statutes associated with public injunctive relief and the McGill rule. The court decided arbitration of federal antitrust claims, not a claim under the UCL, and did not independently interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Dopp v. Now Optics, LLC, the statute appears only in a list describing one of Plaintiff’s claims. The court decided the motion to remand based on fraudulent joinder and the possibility of individual liability under the Labor Code, and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Johannessohn v. Polaris Industries Inc., the court mentions § 17200 only to identify one of the California claims in the proposed amendment. It does not interpret or apply the statute; its punitive-damages analysis concerns the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act and Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. opinion →
Garcia v. Nabors Completion and Production Services, the statute appears only in the procedural background as one claim Garcia asserted in arbitration. The court did not construe or apply § 17200 and its confirmation ruling addressed arbitration review and attorneys’ fees under other statutes. opinion →
Arias v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the statute is mentioned only as one of the claims Arias asserted in the arbitration demand. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 17200; its ruling concerned confirmation of the arbitration award and attorneys’ fees. opinion →
Ramos v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the opinion mentions § 17200 only to recount that Ramos asserted an unfair-competition claim in arbitration. The court confirmed the arbitration award and addressed attorneys’ fees, but did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Patterson v. Medical Review Institute of America, LLC, the court merely identifies § 17200 as the statutory basis for one of the plaintiff’s claims; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute, and it dismisses the complaint for lack of Article III standing without reaching the alternative failure-to-state-a-claim arguments. opinion →
Mellon v. Universal City Studios LLC, section 17200 appears only as the statutory basis for the fourth cause of action in the background. The court did not construe or apply the Unfair Competition Law; its ruling concerning that claim was derivative and rested on LMRA § 301 preemption and interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. opinion →
Negrete v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the court mentions § 17200 only as one claim Negrete asserted in his arbitration demand. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning the statute; the case instead confirms the arbitration award. opinion →
Wilson v. Wells Fargo & Co., the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court did not interpret or apply § 17200; it lifted the stay and confirmed the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act. opinion →
Paschoal v. Plum, PBC, the court merely lists the Unfair Competition Law claim among the causes of action; it does not interpret or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and the motion-to-dismiss discussion does not separately address that statute. opinion →
Franklin v. Scripps Health, the court merely identifies § 17200 as one of the plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action while describing the pleadings and parallel litigation. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning the statute; the ruling is limited to staying the case under Colorado River and Landis. opinion →
In Re Amazon Service Fee Litigation, the statute appears only in the background as one of the causes of action pleaded in the complaint. The court decided consolidation, dismissal/stay, and interim class counsel issues, and did not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Griffith v. Amazon.com Inc, the opinion merely reports that Griffith's complaint included a cause of action under California's Unfair Competition Law. The court decided consolidation, first-to-file, and interim class-counsel issues, and did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Fitzgerald v. GEM Funding, LLC, section 17200 appears only in the complaint’s list of claims and in defendants’ argument that the unfair-competition claim should be dismissed; the court expressly declined to assess claim sufficiency and did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Huerta v. Covina Care Center, Inc., the opinion mentions § 17200 et seq. only to identify one cause of action in the procedural background. The court decided remand and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about the UCL. opinion →
Lusk v. Five Guys Enterprises LLC, the court merely reports the motion’s assumptions about UCL limitations, restitution, and derivative liability, and finds that the settlement motion adequately addresses the claim’s value. It does not construe Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 or decide UCL liability, elements, coverage, or remedies. opinion →
Emergy, Inc. v. Better Meat Company, the opinion lists Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 only as the statutory basis for claim 3. Its substantive ruling addresses CUTSA preemption of the unfair-competition claim and does not interpret, apply, or analyze § 17200 itself. opinion →
Faizi v. Temori, the court mentions Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 only as the legal basis for claim 14 in its procedural summary of the complaint. It does not analyze, construe, or rule on the statute or the unfair-competition claim. opinion →
Miguel-Sanchez v. Mesa Packing, LLC, the opinion merely identifies the UCL as one of the statutes underlying the settled claims while evaluating the cy pres recipient's connection to the objectives of the underlying statutes. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 17200. opinion →
Martinez v. Semi-Tropic Cooperative Gin & Almond Huller, Inc., the court merely lists § 17200 as a cause of action asserted in the complaint and references it in the settlement release; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Strojnik v. Carte Hotel Ventures, LP, the court mentioned § 17200 and recited UCL limits on remedies only to calculate the amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction; it did not construe or decide the merits of the UCL claim. opinion →
Brooks v. Bank of America, NA, the opinion merely identifies the UCL claim in the complaint and describes the procedural disposition of absent class members’ claims. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement or meaning of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Sliwa v. Sezzle, Inc., the opinion only reports § 17200 as a claim alleged in the complaint during the procedural background; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Margarita Erguera v. CMG CIT Acquisition, LLC, the opinion merely identifies § 17200 as one of the causes of action alleged in the complaint and mentions it in the settlement release. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Vianu v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of the claims alleged in the lawsuit's procedural history. The court approved a class-action settlement and did not construe, interpret, or decide any issue about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Good Times Restaurants, LLC v. Shindig Hospitality Group, LLC, section 17200 is identified only as the statutory basis of a pleaded UCL claim. The court did not interpret or apply the UCL; it denied dismissal by extending its CFIL/franchise-definition reasoning to other franchise claims. The later discussion of attorneys’ fees likewise only holds that the request cannot be stricken under Rule 12(f), without deciding whether fees are recoverable under § 17200. opinion →
Gibson v. Al Jazeera International (USA) LLC, section 17200 is mentioned only as the statutory basis for a claim listed in the plaintiff’s complaint. The court did not analyze, interpret, or decide that claim. opinion →
Ditech Holding Corporation, the opinion merely recounts that the prior California complaint included an unfair-business-practices claim and refers to it in deciding res judicata and a declaratory-judgment exception. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Davis v. Rebel Creamery LLC, the court merely lists § 17200 as a claim plaintiffs asserted in the procedural background. The ruling addresses alternative service and interprets California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 415.40 and 416.10, not the Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
McBurnie v. Acceptance Now, LLC, section 17200 appears only in the introductory description of plaintiffs’ claims. The court decided whether the defendant waived arbitration and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about the UCL. opinion →
Ellis v. Government Employee Ins. Co., the statute appears only as the statutory basis of an unfair-competition claim that plaintiff stipulated to dismiss; the court decided only the breach-of-contract claim and construed no part of § 17200. opinion →
Tinnin v. Sutter Valley Medical Foundation, the statute is mentioned only in the introduction as one of plaintiff’s asserted causes of action; the court does not construe, explain, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
IQVIA INC.et al v. VEEVA SYSTEMS, INC., the statute appears only in the procedural background as one of Veeva’s counterclaims; the court did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Johnson v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., the statute appears only in the background as one of the claims asserted in the complaint. The court decided a motion to remand under CAFA and did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about section 17200. opinion →
Stuve v. Kraft Heinz Company, The, section 17200 appears only in a footnote listing the statutes plaintiffs alleged were violated; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the California Unfair Competition Law. opinion →
Strojnik v. Starbucks Corporation, the statute appears only in the opinion's procedural-history summary of a claim pleaded in the initial complaint. The court did not interpret § 17200, state its requirements, or apply it to decide the case; dismissal was based on the vexatious-litigant prefiling order and inadequate service. opinion →
Jolene Peters v. TA Operating, LLC, the opinion mentions the § 17200 claim only as the complaint’s seventh cause of action and states that it was not at issue in the CAFA amount-in-controversy analysis; the court did not interpret or apply § 17200. opinion →
Dr. Stewart Lucas Murrey v. Brandyourself.com Inc, the opinion merely identifies § 17200 et seq. as one of Plaintiff’s alleged claims. It adopts the recommendation denying leave to amend and dismissing Defendants with prejudice without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
Batis v. Dun & Bradstreet Holdings, Inc., section 17200 is identified as one of Batis’s causes of action, but the court does not interpret or apply the statute’s requirements; it merely rejects defendant’s unsupported request to dismiss the UCL claim on the same grounds as the other claims. opinion →
MLW Media LLC v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., the opinion identifies the UCL claim and dismisses it for lack of supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction after dismissing the federal Sherman Act claim. It does not interpret, construe, or apply Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Smith v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., the statute is mentioned only as one of the causes of action asserted in the complaint. The court decides whether to approve a class-action settlement and does not construe or apply § 17200. opinion →
Syngenta Seeds, LLC v. Warner, section 17200 appears only in the procedural history, first as a claim Syngenta asserted and then in a report that the claim was dismissed on an earlier Rule 12(b)(6) motion; the opinion does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Peter Marco, LLC v. Banc of America Merchant Services, LLC, the opinion merely identifies the plaintiffs’ § 17200 claim and reports the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss it; the plaintiffs did not object, and the court does not analyze or construe § 17200. opinion →
Barefield v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., the statute appears only in a procedural-history list of claims pleaded in the earlier Barefield II action; this court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Rosales v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the opinion mentions § 17200 only as one claim asserted in Rosales's arbitration demand. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute; it addresses confirmation of the arbitration award and attorneys' fees. opinion →
Hollins v. Nabors Completion and Production Services Co., the statute is mentioned only in the background as one claim Hollins asserted in arbitration; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about section 17200. opinion →
Salaiz v. Ehealthinsurance Services, Inc., the opinion identifies § 17200 only as the statutory basis for one pleaded cause of action; the court analyzes the TCPA claims, agency theories, and class allegations without construing or applying the UCL. opinion →
K. v. Google LLC, the opinion only recounts that the plaintiff asserted a UCL claim under section 17200 against Google; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the statute. opinion →
Vida Enterprise Corporation v. Angelina Swan Collection, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying one of Vida’s pleaded claims. The court did not analyze, interpret, or decide anything about Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. opinion →
Wagner v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., the court only lists § 17200 as one of the plaintiff’s causes of action in the procedural background. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Miller v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., the statute appears only in the court's procedural summary listing a count in the amended complaint; the court decided arbitration and venue, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 17200. opinion →
…and 915 more.

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