50-State Surveys › Statute of Limitations on Debt Collection by State
Statute of Limitations on Debt Collection by State
How long does a creditor or debt collector have to sue over an unpaid debt in this state before the claim is time-barred, and what can restart or shorten that clock?
51 of 51 jurisdictions verified
every entry statute-checked, oldest 2026-07-09
What this survey covers
Getting sued, or threatened with a lawsuit, over an old debt is one of the most common ways people first encounter civil litigation, and one of the most common defenses is also one of the most misunderstood: every state puts a deadline on how long a creditor has to sue over an unpaid debt before the claim is time-barred. Miss it, and a court can no longer force payment through a lawsuit, but the deadline itself varies by state, by whether the debt is backed by a signed writing, and sometimes by whether it's a consumer credit debt at all, and a single payment or written acknowledgment can reset the clock in some states while doing nothing at all in others. This survey answers one question, state by state: how long does a creditor have to sue on an original, not-yet-sued debt, what can restart that clock, and what does it actually mean once the deadline passes? Each state's page states the rule in plain English, quotes the statute it comes from, and shows the date we last verified the statutory text.
How to read the table
Each column is one feature of the state's debt-collection deadline, answered the same way for every state, with the statutory citation compressed into the cell. Read the written-contract and oral-contract columns together, but don't assume they're always different numbers: across the finished table, a genuine written-versus-oral split (California, Ohio, Florida, Wyoming, Illinois, Montana) turns out to sit alongside a large cluster of states that collapse the distinction entirely and put ordinary written and oral contract debt in the very same bucket (Texas, New York, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, South Dakota, North Dakota, Delaware, Maine, Rhode Island, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Vermont, Alaska, DC, among others), a "no split" answer is a real, correct value for this dimension, not a gap in the research. The "can a payment restart the clock" column is the one most likely to surprise a reader: it is not a uniform yes-or-no across the country, and getting it wrong is exactly how someone accidentally revives a debt they thought was already time-barred. Click a state for the full plain-English page: the rule dimension by dimension, the practical traps people actually hit, and the verbatim statutory text with official source links.
The patterns across all 51 jurisdictions
The survey reached 51/51 on 2026-07-09. A few real patterns emerge from the finished table. First, the written-versus-oral split assumed by this survey's own California exemplar turns out to be closer to a minority pattern than a majority one: a large share of states, many tracing to shared 19th-century code lineages (the Dakotas' near-identical statutes; several New England states), fold ordinary written and oral contract debt into a single general period, and reserve a genuinely LONGER period for a narrower category like a sealed instrument, a witnessed note, or a judgment, rather than splitting written-versus-oral at all. Second, the "can a payment restart the clock" question is a near-universal "yes, but only within limits": the dominant shape (South Dakota, North Dakota, Alaska, DC, Vermont, Wyoming, and California's own note-specific carve-out) lets a bare, unsigned payment of principal or interest restart the clock on its own, while reserving a signed-writing requirement for any other kind of acknowledgment or promise, but a handful of states go further in either direction: New York's 2022 Consumer Credit Fairness Act and DC's 2021 debt-collection-law amendment both flatly BAN reviving an already-EXPIRED consumer debt by any means, while Delaware and DC (for non-consumer debt) require a signed writing even for revival generally. Third, a borrowing statute (importing a shorter out-of-state period) is common but far from universal, and comes in genuinely different shapes: a basic no-exception version (Wyoming, Florida), a resident-carve-out version (California, Delaware, New York), a rare "exotic" version reaching only claims between two nonresidents (Alaska), and outright absence (the Dakotas, Vermont, which instead narrows only its own absence-tolling rule for foreign-accrued claims, and others). Wyoming uniquely layers a classic borrowing statute together with a SEPARATE 5-year cap measured from when a debtor establishes Wyoming residency for a foreign debt that predates the move. Fourth, a consumer-debt-specific carve-out is a live, fast-moving reform area rather than settled law: New York's 2022 change, Ohio's 2021 rewrite, and DC's 2021 amendment (which overrides even DC's general 12-year sealed-instrument period down to 3 years for consumer debt specifically) all happened within the last five years, meaning secondary sources written even a few years ago can already describe superseded numbers. Finally, the "what does expiration actually do" dimension is overwhelmingly the ordinary affirmative-defense default, but a few states go further: California bars even attempting to sue or arbitrate a time-barred debt outright, while DC makes suing a consumer debt a collector knows or should know is time-barred an unlawful trade practice in its own right, a real, if narrower, statutory consequence beyond the bare defense.
Get this answered for your state
This survey compares every state side by side. Ezel applies your state's law to your specific situation and answers with citations to the statutes.
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| State | Governing law | Written contract/debt deadline | Oral contract/open account deadline | When the clock starts | Can a payment or promise restart the clock? | Special rule for consumer debt | Out-of-state debt | What expiration actually does |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama verified 2026-07-09 | Ala. Code §§ 6-2-33, 6-2-34, 6-2-37, 7-2-725 |
6 years, same as oral debt, for an ordinary written promise not under seal (§ 6-2-34(4)) or a stated/liquidated account (§ 6-2-34(5)); a signed writing alone changes nothing: sealed instruments get 10 years instead (§ 6-2-33(1)), and goods-sale debt gets its own 4 years (§ 7-2-725) |
Same 6 years as written debt for an ordinary oral promise (§ 6-2-34(9)); but an open or unliquidated running account, written or not, and where most credit card debt actually lands, gets only 3 years (§ 6-2-37(1)) |
Date of breach/default; an open or unliquidated account runs from the date of the last item or when it becomes due by contract or usage (§ 6-2-37(1)); goods-sale debt accrues at breach regardless of discovery (§ 7-2-725(2)) |
A signed written promise restarts the clock, and so does a partial payment, but the payment must be made before the bar is complete; courts have held a payment made after the deadline already passed does not revive the debt (§ 6-2-16) |
None: the same periods apply equally to consumer and commercial debt |
Applies the shorter out-of-state period, but only if the debtor was a resident of that other state when the debt arose (§ 6-2-17): a debtor-residency test, not an accrual-location test |
Ordinary affirmative defense only (Ala. R. Civ. P. 8(c)): no Alabama statute bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt |
| Alaska verified 2026-07-09 | AS 09.10.053 (general 3-year period for 'a contract or liability, express or implied,' covering written and oral alike, waivable by contract, subject to AS 09.10.040); AS 09.10.040 (10-year period for a judgment or a sealed instrument); AS 09.10.110 (accrual on an open, mutual account); AS 09.10.200 (signed writing required for an acknowledgment or promise to restart the clock, but doesn't alter the effect of a payment); AS 09.10.210 (a past-due payment of principal or interest restarts the clock from the payment date) |
3 years, AS 09.10.053 covers 'an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied,' with no separate, longer period for a signed writing. The one real exception: a judgment or a sealed instrument gets 10 years instead (AS 09.10.040). A genuinely unusual feature: AS 09.10.053 itself says its 3-year period applies 'except if the provisions of this section are waived by contract', Alaska lets the parties to a contract agree in advance to lengthen or eliminate the statute's own deadline, something most states don't allow for an ordinary debt |
Also 3 years: the identical period AS 09.10.053 applies to a written contract or liability. Alaska draws no written-versus-oral line for ordinary contract debt; both fall in the same 3-year bucket |
AS 09.10.053 doesn't itself define when a contract claim accrues (the general default is the date of breach or default). AS 09.10.110 supplies a specific rule for a mutual, open, and current account with reciprocal demands between the parties: the cause of action accrues 'from the date of the last item proved in the account on either side,' but items separated by a gap of more than one year are excluded from that same running account: meaning a long-dormant account can't be pulled back in by a much later item |
Alaska splits this the same way South Dakota's and North Dakota's cells in this survey describe, but says so more explicitly: AS 09.10.200 requires any acknowledgment or promise of a new or continuing contract to be 'contained in writing, signed by the party to be charged' (and, for an instrument affecting real estate, also recorded), but the same section preserves the effect of a payment: it 'does not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest.' AS 09.10.210 spells out exactly what that effect is: 'the running of the time within which an action may be commenced starts from the time the last payment is made,' meaning a bare payment restarts the clock automatically, with no writing or signature required at all |
None found: Alaska's Retail Installment Sales Act (AS 45.10) regulates the required contents and disclosures of a consumer installment contract, but sets no distinct limitations PERIOD of its own; the general 3-year period in AS 09.10.053 applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
AS 09.10.220 is a narrow, 'exotic' borrowing statute limited to a specific fact pattern: it applies only 'between nonresidents of this state': when a cause of action arose in another state, territory, or foreign country between two people who are BOTH nonresidents of Alaska, and the claim is already time-barred there, the action can't be maintained in Alaska either. It does not apply, and doesn't import any shorter period, whenever either party is an Alaska resident |
Ordinary affirmative defense: Alaska's Rules of Civil Procedure treat an expired limitations period as a defense the defendant must plead, not a rule Chapter 9.10 itself uses to block a filing; nothing in the chapter bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt outright |
| Arizona verified 2026-07-09 | A.R.S. § 12-548 (written contracts executed in AZ, and credit cards); § 12-543 (oral debt/open accounts); § 12-544(3) (written instruments executed outside AZ) |
6 years from breach for a written contract executed IN Arizona, or for a credit card debt regardless of a signed writing (§ 12-548); only 4 years if the written contract was executed OUTSIDE Arizona (§ 12-544(3)) |
3 years from breach (§ 12-543(1)); stated/open accounts get the same 3 years unless between merchants (§ 12-543(2)) |
Date of breach/default, for an installment note, each missed installment accrues separately on its own due date, or on the date the creditor exercises an optional acceleration clause (Mertola, LLC v. Santos, 244 Ariz. 488 (2018); Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Jones, 187 Ariz. 493 (App. 1996)) |
A bare payment does NOT restart or revive the clock by itself (Cheatham v. Sahuaro Collection Serv., Inc., 118 Ariz. 452 (App. 1978)); only a signed written acknowledgment can take a claim out of the limitation bar, and it can even revive an ALREADY-expired claim (§ 12-508) |
A carve-IN, not a carve-out: § 12-548(A)(2) pulls credit card debt into the longer 6-year written-contract bucket even with no proof of a signed writing, rather than shortening consumer debt the way some states do |
Debtor-focused, not creditor-focused: § 12-506(A) bars suing a person who moved to Arizona from another state or country on a debt that was already time-barred where they came from |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: no Arizona statute bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt the way some states' statutes do |
| Arkansas verified 2026-07-09 | Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-56-105, 16-56-106, 16-56-111, 16-56-122, 16-56-127 |
5 years from accrual (§ 16-56-111(a)) |
3 years from accrual (§ 16-56-105(1), (3)) |
Date the cause of action accrues (ordinarily the breach/default); a mutual open account runs from the date of the last item proved in the account (§ 16-56-127) |
For a written obligation, either a partial payment (no writing required) or a written acknowledgment of default restarts the clock (§ 16-56-111(b)); for an unwritten ("simple contract") debt, a verbal promise or acknowledgment does not (§ 16-56-122) |
None for consumer credit generally, but medical-service debt gets its own separate 2-year period running from service or last partial payment, whichever is later (§ 16-56-106) |
None: Arkansas's limitations chapter has no borrowing statute; its own periods apply regardless of where the debt arose |
Ordinary affirmative-defense default: no Arkansas statute bars a creditor or collector from merely suing or threatening suit on a time-barred debt |
| California verified 2026-07-09 | Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 337, 339, 360, 361 |
4 years from breach (CCP § 337(a)); written/book accounts also run 4 years |
2 years from breach (CCP § 339(1)) |
Date of breach/default; a multi-item written account runs from the date of the last item (§ 337(b)) |
General acknowledgment must be a signed writing; a payment on a promissory note alone restarts a still-running clock, but can't revive one already expired (§ 360) |
None: the general written/oral periods apply equally to consumer and commercial debt |
Applies the shorter out-of-state period unless the creditor has been a CA resident the whole time the claim existed (§ 361) |
Bars suit or arbitration outright once the period runs, not just an affirmative defense a debtor must raise (§ 337(d)) |
| Colorado verified 2026-07-09 | Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-80-101(1)(a) (3yr, general contract) and 13-80-103.5(1)(a) (6yr, liquidated debt): the real axis is liquidated-vs-unliquidated, not written-vs-oral |
Not the deciding factor in CO: most written debt (credit cards, notes, itemized invoices) is 'liquidated' and gets 6 years (§ 13-80-103.5(1)(a)); a written contract claim for a genuinely unliquidated amount gets only 3 years (§ 13-80-101(1)(a)) |
Same liquidated/unliquidated axis as written debt, not a separate oral rule: an oral debt for a fixed, ascertainable amount also gets 6 years (§ 13-80-103.5(1)(a)); only a genuinely unliquidated oral claim gets 3 years |
For debt/money owed specifically: the date the debt 'becomes due' (§ 13-80-108(4)): not a discovery rule; a separate discovery-rule accrual applies only to breach-of-contract-performance claims (§ 13-80-108(6)) |
A general acknowledgment or promise must be a signed writing (§ 13-80-113); a payment of principal or interest has its own separately preserved effect and stops the clock with no writing needed (§ 13-80-115); case law allows an express new promise to revive an ALREADY-barred debt, not just extend a still-running one (Thomas v. Carey, 1899) |
None specific to a creditor's deadline to sue: Uniform Consumer Credit Code claims get the same 3-year default (§ 13-80-101(1)(g)), and most actual consumer debt already qualifies as 'liquidated' and gets the longer 6-year period regardless |
A narrow version embedded directly in the 3-year general-contract statute (§ 13-80-101(1)(k)): caps a foreign cause of action at Colorado's period if the foreign period is longer; the separate 6-year liquidated-debt statute has no parallel clause, so its reach to most actual debt claims isn't resolved by the statute's own text |
The ordinary default: bars the remedy, not the underlying right: Colorado case law confirms the running of the statute does not extinguish the debt itself (Estate of Ramsey v. Dept. of Rev., 1979) |
| Connecticut verified 2026-07-09 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-576 (6yr for an account, a simple/implied contract, or a contract in writing: also covers an EXECUTED oral contract); § 52-581 (3yr, but only for an EXECUTORY oral contract); § 42a-2-725 (4yr, UCC sale-of-goods debt, carved out of both § 52-576 and § 52-581); § 52-176 (signed-writing acknowledgment rule, but only for a claim against a deceased debtor's estate); common-law acknowledgment/payment revival for a living debtor; § 36a-805(a)(14) (consumer collection agency time-barred-debt disclosure duty) |
6 years, § 52-576(a) covers 'an account, or any simple or implied contract, or any contract in writing.' Connecticut courts have repeatedly held this section, not § 52-581, also governs an EXECUTED oral contract, one where the creditor's side is fully performed and only payment remains, so most real debt-collection scenarios (a loan already disbursed, services already rendered, goods already delivered) land in this 6-year bucket even without a signed writing. A UCC sale-of-goods debt is expressly carved out of this section (§ 52-576(c)) and gets its own shorter 4-year period instead (§ 42a-2-725) |
3 years, but only for an oral contract that remains EXECUTORY (something still to be performed by one or both sides), § 52-581(a) covers 'any express contract or agreement which is not reduced to writing.' Connecticut's own courts distinguish this sharply from § 52-576: 'this section is restricted to executory contracts,' and when a plaintiff's performance on an oral contract has been completely executed, § 52-576, not this section, sets the applicable period. In practice this makes the 3-year period narrower than it looks for ordinary debt collection, since most debts arise after the creditor has already performed |
Date of breach, the ordinary rule for both § 52-576 and § 52-581 claims ('statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues'). For a UCC sale-of-goods claim under § 42a-2-725, the breach/tender-of-delivery rule applies regardless of the aggrieved party's knowledge, with a narrow exception for a warranty explicitly extending to future performance |
For an ordinary LIVING debtor, this is common law, not statute, Connecticut's official case annotations to § 52-576 itself confirm that 'the defense can be lost by an unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of debt or payment on account,' with no signed-writing requirement: even a spoken acknowledgment ('I will take care of it as soon as I can') has been held sufficient to take a debt out of the statute. The ONE statutory signed-writing requirement, § 52-176, applies only 'in any action against the representatives of a deceased person', for that narrower estate context, an acknowledgment or promise must be in a writing signed by the party to be charged, though that statute expressly preserves the separate effect of a bare payment of principal or interest even then |
None found. The same § 52-576/§ 52-581 periods apply to consumer and commercial debt alike; Connecticut has no separate limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt. The Creditors' Collection Practices Act and Consumer Collection Agency statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 36a-645 to 36a-648, 36a-800 to 36a-814) regulate collection CONDUCT (licensing, harassment, required disclosures) rather than setting a different deadline to sue |
None. Connecticut has no borrowing statute reaching contract debt at all, a law-review 50-state survey of the Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act lists Connecticut among the states with no borrowing legislation whatsoever, joining Georgia, Maryland, and New Jersey elsewhere in this survey. Without a borrowing statute, Connecticut courts instead apply the state's own common-law choice-of-law rules to decide which state's substantive law, and by extension, which limitations period, governs the claim |
Ordinarily just an affirmative defense a debtor must raise, the common default. But for a licensed consumer collection agency specifically, § 36a-805(a)(14) goes further: it is a prohibited practice for the agency to fail to disclose, in its initial communication and in at least 10-point type, that 'the law limits how long you can be sued on a debt' and that, because of the debt's age, the agency 'will not sue you for it': a disclosure that functions as an affirmative representation the agency won't sue, not merely a warning. This duty is specific to a licensed consumer collection agency (which under Connecticut law includes a debt buyer); it does not reach an original creditor collecting its own debt directly, who remains subject only to the ordinary affirmative-defense default and the Creditors' Collection Practices Act's general ban on abusive or deceptive conduct |
| Delaware verified 2026-07-09 | 10 Del. C. § 8106 (general 3-year catch-all for unsealed debt, plus a 2014-added exception letting large written contracts set their own period); § 8107 (mutual/open account accrual); § 8108 (6-year period for a promissory note, bill of exchange, or signed acknowledgment of a subsisting demand); § 8119 (borrowing statute); 6 Del. C. § 2-725 (UCC 4-year period for a contract for the sale of goods); the 20-year common-law period for debts under seal (not itself codified, but recognized by Delaware courts) |
3 years for an ordinary written debt, the same as an oral one, § 8106(a)'s catch-all excludes only 'a debt not evidenced by a record or by an instrument under seal,' so an ordinary written promise stays on the 3-year clock just like an oral one. Three real exceptions run LONGER: a promissory note or bill of exchange gets 6 years (§ 8108); a written contract, agreement, or undertaking worth at least $100,000 may specify its OWN limitations period in the writing itself, up to 20 years (§ 8106(c), added in 2014, overriding even the UCC's 4-year period for a sale of goods); and a contract or instrument under seal is governed by the 20-year common-law period, since neither § 8106 nor any other Delaware statute assigns sealed debts a specific number, Delaware courts have held the common law fills that gap (Ryland Group, Inc. v. Santos Carpentry Co., Del. Super. 2004) |
3 years, the identical period § 8106(a) applies to an ordinary written (non-sealed) debt: Delaware draws no distinction based on whether the debt is in writing, apart from the promissory-note, large-contract, and sealed-instrument exceptions above |
§ 8106(a) runs the 3-year period from 'the accruing of the cause of such action,' without itself defining accrual for an ordinary contract or debt claim. § 8107 supplies a specific rule for a mutual and running account between parties: the 3-year limitation in § 8106 does not begin to run at all while the account remains open and current |
A debtor's signed acknowledgment of a subsisting (still-valid, not-yet-expired) demand gives the creditor a fresh 6-year period from the date of that acknowledgment (§ 8108: 'an acknowledgment under the hand of the party of a subsisting demand'). The statute's text names only a signed acknowledgment, not a bare payment, as the qualifying event: unlike some states, Delaware's statute doesn't separately list a payment of principal or interest as sufficient on its own. Because the acknowledgment must be of a 'subsisting' demand, the text doesn't authorize reviving a debt whose clock has ALREADY fully run, only extending one that's still active |
None found for a distinct limitations PERIOD: § 8106's general 3-year period applies to consumer and commercial debt alike; no separate statute sets a different number of years specifically for a consumer-credit-transaction debt |
§ 8119 is a classic shorter-of-two-periods borrowing statute with a resident carve-out: where a cause of action arises outside Delaware, a Delaware court can't enforce it after the SHORTER of Delaware's own period or the period of the state or country where it arose: except that if the claim originally accrued in favor of a person who was a Delaware resident at the time, Delaware's own (potentially longer) period applies instead |
Ordinary affirmative defense: Chapter 81 doesn't bar a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred claim outright; the debtor must raise the expired deadline |
| District of Columbia verified 2026-07-09 | D.C. Code § 12-301(7) (general 3-year period for 'a simple contract, express or implied,' covering written and oral alike); § 12-301(6) (12-year period for a bond or other instrument under seal); § 28-3504 (signed writing required for an acknowledgment or promise to restart the clock, doesn't alter the effect of a payment); § 28-3814(o) (a 2021 law setting a hard 3-year cap specifically for CONSUMER debt, overriding even the seal exception, effective for actions commenced on or after 2021-09-01); § 28-3814(l) (bars reviving an already-expired consumer debt by payment or affirmation); § 28:2-725 (separate UCC 4-year period for a contract for the sale of goods); § 28:3-118 (separate periods, mostly 6 years, for negotiable instruments like notes) |
3 years, D.C. Code § 12-301(7) covers 'a simple contract, express or implied,' with no separate, longer period for a signed writing. The general exception runs longer: a bond or other instrument under seal gets 12 years (§ 12-301(6)), but § 28-3814(o) specifically overrides that longer period for CONSUMER debt, capping it at 3 years 'notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute of limitations unless that statute provides for a shorter limitations period,' and its text says explicitly 'this time period also applies to contracts under seal.' A contract for the sale of goods instead follows the UCC's own 4-year period (§ 28:2-725), and a promissory note generally follows Article 3's 6-year period (§ 28:3-118(a)) |
Also 3 years: the identical period § 12-301(7) applies to a written simple contract. DC draws no written-versus-oral line for ordinary contract debt; both fall in the same 3-year bucket |
§ 12-301(7) runs the 3-year period 'from the time the right to maintain the action accrues,' without itself defining accrual for an ordinary contract claim (the general common-law default is the date of breach or default). No separate DC statute was found supplying a special accrual rule for a running or open account, unlike some states' codes |
DC splits this two ways depending on whether the debt is consumer debt. For ordinary (non-consumer) debt, § 28-3504 requires any acknowledgment or promise to be 'in writing, signed by the party chargeable thereby' to restart a still-running clock, but that section 'does not alter or take away, or lessen the effect of a payment of principal or interest', so a bare payment restarts the clock on its own, with no writing needed. But for CONSUMER debt specifically, § 28-3814(l) cuts the other way once the period has fully run: 'when the applicable limitations period... has expired, any subsequent payment toward or written or oral affirmation of such consumer debt shall not extend the limitations period', a flat ban on reviving an already-expired consumer debt by any means, similar to New York's approach for consumer credit debt |
Yes, and it's a significant one. § 28-3814(o), added in 2021, sets a hard 3-year period specifically for consumer debt (money owed from a purchase, lease, or loan of goods, services, or property for personal, family, medical, or household purposes) that applies 'whether the legal basis of the claim sounds in contract, account stated, open account, or other cause, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute of limitations unless that statute provides for a shorter limitations period', and its text specifically extends that 3-year cap to 'contracts under seal,' overriding the general 12-year seal period whenever the underlying debt is consumer debt. It applies to actions commenced on or after 2021-09-01 |
None found: D.C. Code Title 12, Chapter 3 (the general limitations chapter, §§ 12-301 through 12-311) contains no provision importing a shorter out-of-state limitations period for a cause of action that arose elsewhere. DC's own 3-year period governs a qualifying contract claim regardless of where the debt originated |
Depends on whether the debt is consumer debt. For debt outside § 28-3814's consumer-debt-collection scope, the ordinary default applies: expiration is an affirmative defense the debtor must raise, not an independent bar on filing. But for CONSUMER debt, § 28-3814(f)(10) makes it an unlawful, unfair trade practice for a debt collector to initiate a lawsuit 'when the debt collector knows or reasonably should know that the applicable statute of limitations period has expired': a real, though knowledge-based (not automatic), statutory consequence beyond the bare affirmative-defense default, enforceable separately under DC's Consumer Protection Procedures Act |
| Florida verified 2026-07-09 | Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11, 95.04, 95.051, 95.10 |
5 years from breach (§ 95.11(2)(b)) |
4 years from breach (§ 95.11(3)(j)): also covers open accounts and store accounts without a signed instrument |
Date of breach (the last element of the cause of action, § 95.031(1)); no delayed-discovery rule for ordinary contract/debt claims |
A partial payment on a WRITTEN obligation tolls (pauses) a still-running clock (§ 95.051(1)(f)); reviving an ALREADY time-barred debt requires a separate signed written acknowledgment or promise (§ 95.04) |
None: the same written/oral split applies to consumer and commercial debt alike; the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (§ 559.72) regulates collector conduct, not the filing deadline |
A basic borrowing statute with no resident exception (§ 95.10): if a debt is already time-barred in the state where it arose, Florida courts won't hear it either, regardless of who's suing |
Ordinary affirmative defense the debtor must plead; not automatic, and a default judgment can still be entered on a time-barred debt if the debtor doesn't respond |
| Georgia verified 2026-07-09 | O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-24 (simple written contracts), 9-3-25 (open accounts and unsigned contracts), 9-3-26 (residual catch-all), 9-3-112 (revival) |
6 years after the debt becomes due and payable (§ 9-3-24): covers a 'simple contract in writing,' not sale-of-goods or negotiable-instrument debt, which follow their own UCC periods |
4 years from accrual (§ 9-3-25): covers 'open account, or ... any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged,' i.e. not signed by the debtor; a residual 4-year catch-all (§ 9-3-26) covers anything not otherwise addressed |
The date the debt becomes due and payable / the date of breach; for an installment or running account, courts look to when each item or installment became due |
Strict writing requirement for both routes: a payment must be entered upon a written evidence of debt by the debtor, OR there must be a separate written acknowledgment of the existing liability: either revives even an already time-barred debt as a 'new promise to pay' (§ 9-3-112), but a bare unwritten payment alone does not |
None: no separate statutory period for consumer credit debt; consumer debt is classified the same way as any other debt, under the written/open-account split above |
None: Georgia has no borrowing statute; Georgia's own limitations periods apply to a suit filed in a Georgia court regardless of where the debt was incurred or which state's law otherwise governs the contract |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: must be pleaded affirmatively under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(c) or it is waived; no independent Georgia statute bars a collector from suing or continuing to seek payment on a time-barred debt |
| Hawaii verified 2026-07-09 | Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-1(1) (contract debt generally), § 657-6 (debt arising in another jurisdiction), § 657-9 (borrowing statute), § 490:2-725 (UCC goods-sale contracts); revival by acknowledgment or payment is common law, not a codified section |
6 years: Hawaii does not give a written debt a longer period than an unwritten one; § 657-1(1) covers 'any debt founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability' regardless of whether it's in writing or signed |
Also 6 years, the same § 657-1(1) period as a written debt: Hawaii draws no written/oral distinction for ordinary contract debt; a contract for the sale of goods is the one exception, following the separate 4-year UCC period in § 490:2-725(1) instead |
The date the cause of action accrues: ordinarily the date of breach or default under the contract's own terms, per § 657-1's own 'next after the cause of action accrued' language; no special account-stated or discovery rule appears in the statute itself for ordinary contract debt |
No Hawaii statute governs this, it's entirely judge-made: a new promise to pay, whether the debt is already time-barred or not, binds the debtor for a fresh limitations period; the promise can be express or implied from an acknowledgment of the debt or from a part payment, but an acknowledgment or part payment is only PRIMA FACIE evidence of a new promise, rebuttable by other evidence and the circumstances, a fact question for the jury, not an automatic reset (First Hawaiian Bank v. Zukerkorn, 1981) |
None for ordinary consumer debt, the same single 6-year period applies to a credit-card balance as to a commercial contract; a narrow, unrelated carve-out exists for a debt a MINOR incurred by consenting to their own medical care under HRS chapter 577A (STI treatment, family planning), that debt's clock doesn't even start until the minor turns 18, then runs 2 years (§ 577A-5) |
A debt already time-barred where it arose cannot be revived by suing in Hawaii instead, except in favor of a domiciled Hawaii resident who has held the claim since it accrued (§ 657-9); separately, § 657-6 sets a 4-year period (shorter than Hawaii's own 6-year period) for a debt where the cause of action itself arose in another jurisdiction, subject to § 657-9 |
Ordinary affirmative defense only, which the debtor must plead (Haw. R. Civ. P. 8(c) lists 'statute of limitations' among the enumerated affirmative defenses); Hawaii has no statute barring a collector from merely attempting to sue on a time-barred debt |
| Idaho verified 2026-07-09 | Idaho Code § 5-216 (written contracts), § 5-217 (oral contracts), § 5-238 (revival by acknowledgment or payment), § 5-239 (borrowing statute for out-of-state debt), § 5-201 (general accrual rule) |
5 years for an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing (§ 5-216) |
4 years for a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing (§ 5-217) |
The date the cause of action exists: ordinarily the date of breach or default under the contract's own terms (§ 5-201; Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc., 2017); for an installment note, Idaho courts have treated the final scheduled payment date as the accrual point absent an earlier acceleration |
Two tracks: an acknowledgment or promise needs a signed writing that is distinct and unequivocal (a debtor who expresses any hesitancy about paying the full debt doesn't qualify); but ANY payment of principal or interest, monetary or in-kind, no writing required, is treated as a new promise and, per the Idaho Supreme Court's 2023 Montierth v. Dorssers decision, can revive a debt even after its original 5- or 4-year period has already fully expired, not just extend one still running (§ 5-238) |
None: the same written/oral framework applies to consumer and commercial debt alike; Idaho has no state fair-debt-collection-practices statute of its own (collector conduct runs on the federal FDCPA and the separate Idaho Collection Agency Act, a licensing law, not a limitations statute) |
A debt already time-barred where it arose cannot be revived by suing in Idaho instead, except in favor of someone who has been an Idaho citizen the whole time the claim has been held (§ 5-239) |
Ordinary affirmative defense only, which the debtor must plead: Idaho courts have long held the statute of limitations 'acts upon the remedy, and not upon the debt' and does not extinguish the debt itself (McLeod v. Rogers, 1916); Idaho has no statute barring a collector from merely attempting to sue on a time-barred debt |
| Illinois verified 2026-07-09 | 735 ILCS 5/13-206 (ten-year limitation), 5/13-205 (five-year limitation), 5/13-210 (foreign limitation) |
10 years from accrual (735 ILCS 5/13-206), but only for a writing whose essential terms, including the amount owed, are ascertainable without outside evidence |
5 years from accrual (735 ILCS 5/13-205): also covers a 'written' debt whose essential terms require parol evidence to prove, including most credit card debt |
Date of breach/default generally; each missed installment on an installment debt starts its own clock (the 'installment rule'); a promissory note payable at a definite date accrues on that date or on acceleration, and a demand note accrues on demand (§ 13-206) |
Codified only for written debt: a payment or new promise made in writing restarts the 10-year clock, even reviving an already-expired claim (§ 13-206); § 13-205's oral-contract statute has no revival language of its own, and Illinois authorities disagree on whether the same rule extends to oral debt |
No separate statutory period, but case law effectively shortens most consumer credit-card and open-account debt to the 5-year 'unwritten contract' bucket rather than the 10-year written one (Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 391 Ill. App. 3d 642 (2009)) |
One-directional: if a claim is already time-barred where it arose, Illinois won't allow it either (§ 13-210); otherwise Illinois treats its own limitations periods as procedural and applies them regardless of where the debt originated |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: must be 'plainly set forth in the answer or reply' or it's waived (735 ILCS 5/2-613(d)); no independent Illinois statute bars a collector from suing or continuing to seek payment on a time-barred debt |
| Indiana verified 2026-07-09 | IC 34-11-2-9 (promissory notes/written money contracts); IC 34-11-2-7 (accounts and contracts not in writing) |
6 years from accrual for instruments executed after 8/31/1982 (IC 34-11-2-9(b)); a deposit-account claim gets only 2 years (§9(c)) |
6 years: the SAME period as written debt (IC 34-11-2-7(1)); Indiana does not shorten the period for an unwritten account or contract |
Ordinary breach/default date; for a running mutual, open, and current account, the date of the last item proved on either side (IC 34-11-3-1); Indiana courts also apply a discovery-rule gloss (Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Ind. Ct. App. 2003) |
A signed, written acknowledgment or new promise restarts the clock (IC 34-11-9-1); a bare, unsigned payment has its own separately-preserved effect (IC 34-11-9-3), and Indiana case law treats a voluntary partial payment alone as reviving the debt through an implied new promise (Barrett v. Sipp, 1912) |
None: the same 6-year period applies to consumer credit-card and personal-loan debt as to commercial debt |
Narrow, defense-only version: if a claim against a nonresident defendant with no Indiana service agent arose elsewhere and is already barred under BOTH the defendant's home state's law and the state where it arose, that bar is available as a defense (IC 34-11-4-1, -2) |
Ordinary common-law affirmative defense only: Indiana has no statute barring a creditor or licensed collector from suing or threatening suit on a time-barred debt |
| Iowa verified 2026-07-09 | Iowa Code § 614.1 (Limitations of Actions), as amended 2026 by SF 512 |
10 years from accrual (§ 614.1(5)(a)) |
5 years from accrual (§ 614.1(4)) |
Date the cause of action accrues (ordinarily the breach/default); a continuous open account runs from the date of the last item on it (§ 614.5) |
Only a signed written admission that the debt is unpaid, or a like written new promise, revives the claim (§ 614.11); a bare unwritten payment or oral promise does not |
None: the general 10-year written / 5-year unwritten split applies equally to consumer and commercial debt |
Applies a bar that arose where the defendant previously (or currently) resided, but only for claims arising outside Iowa (§ 614.7) |
Ordinary common-law default: expiration is an affirmative defense the debtor must raise; no Iowa statute bars a creditor from merely attempting to sue or threatening suit on a time-barred debt |
| Kansas verified 2026-07-09 | K.S.A. §§ 60-511, 60-512 (general written/oral contract periods), 60-516 (borrowing statute), 60-520 (revival), 84-3-118 (UCC period for negotiable notes) |
5 years for a written agreement, contract, or promise (§ 60-511(1)); a negotiable promissory note payable at a definite time instead gets 6 years under the UCC (§ 84-3-118(a)) |
3 years for a contract, obligation, or liability that is express or implied but not in writing (§ 60-512(1)) |
Ordinarily the date of breach/default; a note with a stated due date runs from that date, or from a validly and unequivocally exercised acceleration; an open/running account's items are combined into one last-item accrual only if the account is genuinely mutual and ongoing under a multi-factor case-law test, otherwise each transaction accrues on its own |
A bare partial payment of principal or interest, no writing required, revives even an ALREADY-EXPIRED debt and restarts the full period, though the debtor's own qualifying words at the time of payment can limit revival to only part of the debt; any other acknowledgment or promise must be in a signed writing (§ 60-520(a)) |
None: the same 5-year/3-year framework applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
Applies the shorter out-of-state period, except in favor of a plaintiff who has been a Kansas resident continuously since the claim accrued (§ 60-516) |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: it must be pleaded or it is waived (§ 60-208(c)(1)(P)); Kansas has no statute barring a collector from merely attempting to sue or collect on a time-barred debt |
| Kentucky verified 2026-07-28 | KRS § 413.090 (15yr, written contracts executed on or before July 15, 2014, plus specified bonds and judgments); § 413.160 (10yr, written contracts executed after that date); § 413.120(1) (5yr, oral/unwritten contracts); KRS § 355.3-118 (6yr, negotiable instruments, including many promissory notes); § 413.320 (borrowing statute) |
15 years if the written contract was executed on or before July 15, 2014 (§ 413.090(2)); 10 years if executed after that date (§ 413.160). But a note that qualifies as a negotiable instrument gets only 6 years under the UCC (§ 355.3-118(1)) instead of either period: the Kentucky Supreme Court held in Cmty. Fin. Servs. Bank v. Stamper (2019) that a note merely referencing (not made subject to) a separate security agreement still counts as negotiable, so the shorter 6-year period controlled even though everyone had assumed the 15-year period applied |
5 years for an ordinary oral or unwritten contract (§ 413.120(1)), and the same 5 years applies to a merchant's account for goods sold and delivered or a mutual open account between merchants (§ 413.120(9)-(10)). Federal courts applying Kentucky law have held an unsigned credit card agreement is not a 'written contract,' landing typical credit-card debt in this 5-year bucket rather than the 10/15-year written-contract periods |
Date of breach/default generally; for a note payable at a definite time, the due date stated in the note or, if accelerated, the accelerated due date (§ 355.3-118(1)); for a merchant's account, from January 1 of the year following the delivery dates of the items charged (§ 413.130(1)) |
The cited Chapter 413 statutes contain no debt-revival procedure, so the operative rules come from case law. City of Louisa v. Horton, 263 Ky. 739, 93 S.W.2d 620, 622-23 (1935), says a partial payment made BEFORE the obligation is barred is prima facie acknowledgment of continuing liability and starts the limitation period from the payment date. A clear, absolute, unconditional promise made before the bar cuts off antecedent time and leaves suit on the original obligation. If the debt is already barred when the new promise is made, suit must instead be brought on that new promise. An unqualified acknowledgment that the debt remains due can suffice without an express promise to pay, but the acknowledgment or promise must be made to the creditor or an authorized agent |
None: Kentucky has no separate limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt; the same execution-date and writing rules above apply equally to a personal credit card balance and a commercial account. (The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act's own 2-year period, KRS § 367.220, governs a KCPA violation claim, a different cause of action from the deadline to sue on the underlying debt.) |
Applies the shorter out-of-state period with no residency exception at all (§ 413.320): unlike California's or New York's carve-out for a forum resident, Kentucky's borrowing statute reaches every claim that accrued in another state or country regardless of either party's residency |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.03 lists the statute of limitations among the defenses a party must raise affirmatively in an answer or risk waiving it; no Kentucky statute bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt |
| Louisiana verified 2026-07-09 | La. Civ. Code arts. 3494, 3498, 3499; La. R.S. 10:2-725 |
No separate written category: the real axis is the debt's nature: money lent, an open account, or services rendered gets 3 years (art. 3494); a promissory note or other instrument gets 5 years (art. 3498); goods-sale debt gets 4 years (La. R.S. 10:2-725); any other ordinary contract claim gets a residual 10 years (art. 3499) |
Identical to written debt: Louisiana draws no distinction based on whether the debt was ever put in writing; whichever category above the debt falls into controls regardless |
Generally the date the obligation becomes due; a promissory note's 5-year period runs explicitly from the day payment is exigible (art. 3498); goods-sale debt accrues at breach |
Any acknowledgment, no signed writing required, interrupts (restarts) a still-running prescriptive period (art. 3464); once prescription has fully run, the debt becomes an unenforceable 'natural obligation' (art. 1762(1)) that can't be sued on, though a voluntary payment can't be reclaimed and a fresh promise to pay creates a new, separately enforceable obligation (art. 1761) |
None found: the same prescriptive periods apply to consumer and commercial debt alike |
Not a simple shorter-of rule: Louisiana's own prescription law generally applies even when another state's law governs the merits, subject to a multi-factor remedial-justice exception, but a nonresident plaintiff's claim is barred if it's barred under the other state's law where that state treats its own deadline as substantive (art. 3549) |
Ordinary defense only: prescription must be pleaded; Louisiana has no statute barring a creditor from attempting to sue on a prescribed debt |
| Maine verified 2026-07-09 | 14 M.R.S. § 752 (general 6-year catch-all, written and oral alike), § 751 (20-year period for sealed contracts, witnessed promissory notes, and bank-issued debt instruments), § 852 (open/mutual accounts), §§ 860/863 (acknowledgment and payment), § 866 (borrowing statute); 11 M.R.S. §§ 2-725 and 3-1118 (UCC periods for goods-sale contracts and negotiable instruments) |
6 years for an ordinary written contract, the same as an oral one, § 752's catch-all reaches 'all civil actions' with no separate written-contract bucket. The real exception is § 751's 20-year period for a contract under seal or a bank-issued debt instrument; a promissory note signed before an attesting witness is only eligible for that 20 years if it is also a NEGOTIABLE note (Chapman v. Wight, 1887; confirmed in Tornesello v. Tisdale, 2008 ME 84), a non-negotiable witnessed note stays on the 6-year clock. Even a negotiable, witnessed note ends up governed by the UCC's own 6-year period (11 M.R.S. § 3-1118(1)) rather than § 751's 20 years, because § 751's text itself yields to § 3-1118(1) whenever it applies |
6 years, the identical period § 752 applies to an ordinary written (non-sealed, non-negotiable-note) debt: Maine draws no distinction based on whether the debt is in writing |
The date of breach or default: Maine courts hold that 'a contract cause of action accrues at the time of breach' (Dunelawn Owners' Ass'n v. Gendreau, 2000 ME 94, applied to the general 6-year period in Tornesello v. Tisdale, 2008 ME 84). For a mutual or open account with unsettled items, § 852 instead runs the clock from 'the last item proved in such account' |
A bare acknowledgment or promise only restarts the clock if it is express, in writing, and signed by the debtor (§ 860); an acknowledgment by one of several joint contractors doesn't bind the others. An actual payment of principal or interest is treated separately: § 863 preserves the effect of a real payment without requiring a signed writing, but a creditor's own indorsement or memorandum recording that a payment was made is, by itself, not sufficient proof that it happened: independent proof of the payment is still needed |
No separate limitations PERIOD for consumer-credit debt: Maine's Consumer Credit Code doesn't shorten or lengthen the 6-year general period for a consumer transaction. It does add a conduct rule: 9-A M.R.S. § 5-116(1)(G) makes it illegal for a collector to 'claim, or attempt or threaten to enforce' a right on a consumer credit sale, lease, or loan that has already been barred by statute |
Maine's borrowing statute (14 M.R.S. § 866) bars a claim already time-barred under another state's law only if ALL the parties resided in that other state at the same time; the Law Court has repeatedly held it doesn't apply when the parties never shared residence there (Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 1983; Hossler v. Barry, 1979; Tornesello v. Tisdale, 2008 ME 84): narrower than a typical resident-carve-out borrowing statute, since it turns on shared residence, not on where the debt arose |
Ordinary affirmative defense for most debt, the debtor must raise it, and Chapter 205 itself doesn't bar a creditor from merely filing suit on any time-barred claim. For consumer credit debt specifically, though, 9-A M.R.S. § 5-116(1)(G) (part of Maine's Consumer Credit Code) makes it an illegal collection practice to claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right already barred by statute, a real statutory prohibition, but limited to consumer credit sales, leases, and loans rather than debt generally |
| Maryland verified 2026-07-09 | CJP § 5-101 (general 3-year period, covers written and oral debt alike); § 5-102 (12-year period for sealed "specialty" instruments only); Com. Law § 2-725 (UCC 4-year period for sale-of-goods debt); CJP §§ 5-1201 to -1204 (consumer-debt-specific suit-bar and proof rules) |
3 years: the SAME as oral debt (§5-101), unless the instrument is a formal sealed "specialty" (a promissory note, bond, or contract under seal), which gets 12 years instead (§5-102); a debt for the sale of goods gets its own 4-year UCC period (Com. Law §2-725) |
3 years: identical to ordinary written debt (§5-101); Maryland does not distinguish written from oral contract debt outside the narrow sealed-instrument and sale-of-goods categories |
Generally the date of breach for an ordinary contract claim (Himmelfarb v. American Express Co., 1984), but Maryland's discovery rule, inquiry notice, i.e. when the creditor knew or reasonably should have known of the breach, applies to ALL civil actions under §5-101 as a backstop (Poffenberger v. Risser, 1981); a negotiable instrument payable on demand is a narrow carve-out with NO discovery-rule tolling absent fraudulent concealment (Fitzgerald v. Bell, 2020) |
None recognized. For consumer debt, §5-1202(b) flatly bars any post-expiration payment, written or oral affirmation, or other activity from reviving or extending the clock; separately, a federal court applying Maryland's own general (non-consumer) law found Maryland does not recognize acknowledgment- or payment-based revival at all, unlike states such as Delaware (Jennings v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, D. Md. 2020) |
Not a different NUMBER of years, but a distinct legal regime: CJP §§5-1201 to -1204 layers a flat suit-bar (§5-1202(a)) and total anti-revival rule (§5-1202(b)) on top of the same general 3-year period, plus detailed documentary proof requirements specifically for debt buyers (§5-1203) |
None. Maryland has no borrowing statute at all; Maryland courts treat the statute of limitations as strictly procedural and always apply Maryland's own limitations period as the forum state, regardless of where the debt originated or which state's substantive contract law otherwise governs (Lewis v. Waletzky, 2011) |
Beyond the ordinary affirmative-defense default, Maryland statutorily bars a creditor or collector from even INITIATING a consumer debt collection action after the deadline (§5-1202(a)); the separate Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act's general ban on "claim[ing], attempt[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist" (Com. Law §14-202(8)) provides an additional hook reaching collectors and original creditors alike |
| Massachusetts verified 2026-07-09 | M.G.L. c. 260, § 2 (six-year unified contract period); § 1 (twenty years for sealed/bank/witnessed-note debt); §§ 13-14 (acknowledgment and part payment) |
6 years from breach (§ 2): the SAME period as an oral debt; 20 years instead for a contract under seal, a bank-issued note, or a promissory note signed before an attesting witness where the original payee is suing (§ 1); a UCC sale-of-goods contract gets only 4 years (G.L. c. 106, § 2-725(1)) |
6 years from breach (§ 2): Massachusetts does not distinguish oral from written contract debt at all; this value equals the written_contract_period figure |
Date of breach/default under the ordinary common-law rule; a stated account runs from the date of the statement of account (King v. Davis, 1897; Zelby Holdings, Inc. v. Videogenix, Inc., 2017) |
A signed writing can take a claim out of the statute's bar (§ 13); separately, and without needing any writing, a payment of principal or interest by the debtor has the same effect on its own (§ 14): though a mere creditor-side endorsement of a payment, unsigned by the debtor, is NOT by itself sufficient proof |
None: the general 6-year period covers credit card and other consumer debt the same as any other contract debt (confirmed by Mass.gov's own debt-collection guidance) |
Structurally different from most states: § 9 primarily TOLLS (pauses) the Massachusetts clock while a defendant resides outside the Commonwealth, but its final clause also bars reviving a claim that was already time-barred where the defendant resided at the time |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: no Massachusetts limitations statute bars suing on a time-barred debt; separately, a state debt-collection regulation (940 CMR 7.07) requires a specific disclosure when collecting a time-barred debt, but does not bar the collection or the lawsuit itself |
| Michigan verified 2026-07-09 | MCL 600.5807(9) (general contract debt, 6 years), 600.5827 (accrual), 600.5866 (revival), 600.5861 (borrowing statute), 440.2725 (UCC sale-of-goods contracts, 4 years) |
6 years (MCL 600.5807(9)) for an ordinary written contract: Michigan does NOT give written debt a longer period than oral debt; the same 6 years applies to both. The one real exception is a contract for the sale of goods (e.g., many retail installment purchases), which follows the UCC's separate 4-year period under MCL 440.2725 instead |
Same 6 years as written debt (MCL 600.5807(9)): Michigan draws no distinction between a signed contract and an oral or informal one; both fall under the identical 'action to recover damages or money due for breach of contract' language |
The date of the breach itself, regardless of when the creditor discovered it. MCL 600.5827 sets Michigan's default accrual rule as 'the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results': a strict date-of-breach standard, not a discovery rule, for ordinary contract claims. A narrow discovery-based exception exists only for fraudulent concealment of the claim (MCL 600.5855, 2 years from discovery), not for general contract accrual. UCC sale-of-goods claims accrue the same way under MCL 440.2725(2): 'when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge' |
A signed written acknowledgment or promise can revive a debt already barred by the running of the limitations period (MCL 600.5866), but Michigan requires that writing for the revival to count at all: 'no acknowledgment or promise shall be recognized as effective ... unless the acknowledgment is made by or the promise is contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged.' Unlike some states, Michigan's statute carves out no exception for a bare, unwritten payment alone |
None: no separate statutory limitations period specifically for consumer credit debt; a credit card balance or personal loan is timed under the same general 6-year rule as any other debt. The 4-year UCC period for sale-of-goods contracts (MCL 440.2725) applies based on whether the debt is for goods, not because the debtor is a consumer, so it reaches commercial goods sales too |
Yes, with a resident carve-out (MCL 600.5861): an action on a cause accruing outside Michigan can't be brought here after the limitations period of either Michigan or the place it arose has run, 'except that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of this state the statute of limitations of this state shall apply' |
The ordinary affirmative defense only. Michigan Court Rule 2.111(F)(3)(a) lists 'statute of limitations' among the affirmative defenses a party must plead in a responsive pleading or it is waived. No additional Michigan statute was found that independently bars an original creditor or a licensed collection agency from suing on, or merely attempting to collect, a debt after the deadline passes, unlike some states' debt-buyer-specific bars |
| Minnesota verified 2026-07-09 | Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), one 6-year period for 'a contract or other obligation, express or implied': no written/oral split; consumer debt gets its own dedicated statute, § 541.053 |
6 years from breach (§ 541.05, subd. 1(1)) |
6 years: the SAME period as written debt; Minnesota does not shorten it for an oral obligation (§ 541.05, subd. 1(1)) |
Date of breach/default; Minnesota's statutory discovery rule (§ 541.05, subd. 1(6)) is limited to fraud claims, not ordinary contract or debt accrual |
General rule (§ 541.17): a signed writing is required for an acknowledgment or new promise, but a bare payment's effect is separately preserved and can restart a still-running clock without one. For CONSUMER debt specifically, § 541.053 (2013) flatly bars a payment, bankruptcy discharge, or oral/written reaffirmation from reviving a debt that has ALREADY expired: stronger than the general rule |
Same 6-year period (§ 541.053), but two real, enacted add-ons: no revival of an already-expired consumer debt by payment, bankruptcy discharge, or reaffirmation, and an express exemption from the general borrowing-statute framework: Minnesota's own 6 years always applies to consumer debt regardless of where it originated |
§ 541.31 (adopted 2004, the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act) treats limitations periods as substantive and applies the OTHER state's period when a claim is substantively governed by that state's law, with a Minnesota-resident-since-accrual exception and a discretionary 'unfair opportunity to sue' escape clause (§ 541.33): not a simple shorter-of-two-periods rule; consumer debt is expressly exempted and always gets Minnesota's own period (§ 541.053) |
The ordinary default: bars the remedy, not the underlying debt (In re Marriage of Chaignot v. Chapin, Minn. Ct. App. 2006, unpublished, quoting the general rule that a time-barred debt is not extinguished) |
| Mississippi verified 2026-07-09 | Miss. Code Ann. §§ 15-1-29, 15-1-31, 15-1-49, 15-1-3, 15-1-73, 15-1-65 |
No separate written-contract period exists: the residual 3-year catch-all statute (§ 15-1-49) governs a written contract debt just as it does an unwritten one |
3 years from accrual (§ 15-1-29, open accounts/accounts stated not acknowledged in writing, and unwritten contracts generally) |
Date the cause of action accrues (ordinarily the breach/default); a mutual open account between merchants or traders runs from the last item, but an ordinary (non-merchant) open account runs separately from the due date of EACH item (§ 15-1-31) |
A partial payment, a written or verbal acknowledgment of liability, or a promise to pay restarts a STILL-RUNNING clock (§ 15-1-3(2)); once the period has fully run, only a signed written acknowledgment or new promise revives the claim (§ 15-1-73), and expiration otherwise extinguishes the underlying right, not just the remedy (§ 15-1-3(1)) |
None: the same residual 3-year period applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
Applies the shorter out-of-state period unless the claim accrued in favor of a Mississippi resident (§ 15-1-65) |
Beyond the ordinary affirmative-defense default: Mississippi's own statute says expiration "defeat[s] and extinguish[es] the right as well as the remedy" (§ 15-1-3(1)) |
| Missouri verified 2026-07-09 | RSMo § 516.110(1) (written, for the payment of money or property); § 516.120(1) (all other contracts, obligations, or liabilities, express or implied) |
10 years from accrual (§516.110(1)): covers any writing, sealed or unsealed, for the payment of money or property |
5 years (§516.120(1)): the catch-all for contracts/obligations/liabilities, express or implied, not covered by the 10-year written rule; credit-card debt is frequently litigated over which bucket it falls in |
NOT the date of breach: Missouri's own accrual statute (§516.100) starts the clock only when 'the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment,' a delayed-ascertainment rule written directly into the general limitations statute |
A signed written acknowledgment or new promise restarts the clock (§516.320); §516.340 separately preserves the effect of a bare, unwritten payment of principal or interest, and the Missouri Supreme Court (Caneer v. Kent, 1938) held a payment made even AFTER a note is already barred can revive it if made at the debtor's direction or with the debtor's knowledge and consent |
None currently: Missouri has no separate statutory period for consumer credit debt; two consecutive legislative sessions' bills (2025 HB 1509, 2026 HB 2793) that would have cut the written period to 5yr and added a dedicated 2yr credit-card period both died in committee without a floor vote |
One-directional, no resident exception: if a cause of action has been 'fully barred' by the law of the state, territory, or country where it originated, that bar is a complete defense in Missouri regardless of either party's residency (§516.190) |
For CONSUMER debt specifically, a Missouri Attorney General regulation under the Merchandising Practices Act makes it an unfair practice to even threaten or file suit on a debt whose limitations period has already expired (15 CSR 60-8.100); no comparable rule reaches non-consumer/commercial debt, which follows the ordinary affirmative-defense default |
| Montana verified 2026-07-09 | 27-2-202, MCA (contract-debt periods: 6 years written, 5 years oral/account/promise, 3 years other non-written obligation); 27-2-102 (accrual); 27-2-302 (mutual/open accounts); 27-2-409 (acknowledgment and part payment); 27-2-502 to 27-2-505 (Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act, Montana's borrowing-statute equivalent) |
6 years for a contract, covenant, obligation, or liability founded on an instrument in writing (27-2-202(1), MCA): shortened from 8 years by 2025 Senate Bill 143 (Ch. 174, L. 2025), which applies to an action on a written-instrument debt filed on or after October 1, 2025; a suit filed before that date on an already-accruing written debt could still fall under the old 8-year period |
5 years for a contract, account, or promise not founded on an instrument in writing (27-2-202(2), MCA): unchanged by the 2025 amendment, which only shortened the written-instrument period. Montana actually splits non-written debt further: a THIRD, 3-year period (27-2-202(3)) applies to a non-written obligation or liability that isn't itself a contract, account, or promise |
A claim accrues once 'all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred' and the right to sue is complete (27-2-102(1)(a), MCA): an objective, breach-based trigger for ordinary debt, with no discovery-rule exception: 27-2-102(2) expressly says a party's lack of knowledge of the claim or its accrual does not postpone the clock (the statute's only discovery-rule carve-out is for concealed personal-injury/property claims, not contract debt). A mutual, open, and current account with reciprocal demands between the parties instead accrues from the date of 'the last item proved in the account on either side' (27-2-302, MCA) |
Either an acknowledgment or a part payment of a debt is independently sufficient to restart the clock (27-2-409(1), MCA: 'sufficient evidence to cause the relevant statute of limitations to begin running anew'). An acknowledgment must be in a writing signed by the debtor (27-2-409(2)); a 'part payment', defined as any payment of principal or interest (27-2-409(3)), needs no writing at all. Unlike some states' revival statutes, § 27-2-409's text does not expressly limit this to a still-running clock, so it isn't clear on its face whether the same rule can revive an ALREADY-expired debt or only extend one still running |
None found: 27-2-202 sets one set of periods that applies to consumer and commercial debt alike, with no separate limitations period specifically for a consumer-credit transaction |
Montana uses the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act rather than a typical shorter-of-two-periods borrowing statute: if a claim is substantively governed by another state's law, that OTHER state's limitation period applies (27-2-503(1)(a), MCA): not automatically the shorter of the two. Montana's own period applies only to a claim substantively governed by Montana law (27-2-503(2)). A fairness override (27-2-505) reverts to Montana's period if the otherwise-applicable other state's period is substantially different from Montana's AND either didn't give a fair opportunity to sue or would impose an unfair burden to defend |
Ordinary affirmative defense: Chapter 2 doesn't bar a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred claim outright; the debtor must raise the expired deadline. No Montana statute in this chapter makes merely attempting to sue or collect on expired debt independently unlawful |
| Nebraska verified 2026-07-09 | Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-205 (written contracts), § 25-206 (oral contracts/open accounts/statutory liabilities), § 25-216 (revival by payment or written acknowledgment), §§ 25-3201 to 25-3207 (Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act: the current borrowing-statute replacement) |
5 years for an action on a specialty or any agreement, contract, or promise in writing (§ 25-205(1)) |
4 years for a contract not in writing (express or implied) or a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty (§ 25-206) |
Ordinarily the date of breach/default; an account-stated claim instead runs from the date the account was stated, not the date the original debt was incurred, and a note with an acceleration clause runs from the creditor's positive act of accelerating, not the original default date |
A voluntary partial payment of principal or interest alone, no writing needed, restarts the clock and can revive a debt that is ALREADY fully time-barred, as long as the payment is made under circumstances showing the debtor recognizes the whole debt as an existing liability; an acknowledgment or promise made without an accompanying payment instead must be in writing (§ 25-216) |
None: the same written/oral framework applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
Applies whichever state's law substantively governs the claim (not a simple shorter-of-two-periods rule), with a carve-out letting a Nebraska-resident plaintiff who has owned the claim since it accrued sue here even if the claim is barred where it arose, so long as it isn't barred under Nebraska's own period (Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act, §§ 25-3201 to 25-3207, replacing the repealed § 25-215 in 2006) |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: it must be pleaded by the debtor and can be waived if not raised; Nebraska has no statute barring a collector from merely attempting to sue or collect on a time-barred debt |
| Nevada verified 2026-07-09 | Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.190, 11.200, 11.020; NRS 649.375(1)(j) |
6 years from accrual (NRS 11.190(1)(b)) |
4 years from accrual (NRS 11.190(2)(c)); open accounts and store charge accounts also 4 years (NRS 11.190(2)(a)-(b)) |
Date the cause of action accrues (ordinarily the breach/default); a mutual open account runs from the date of the last item on either side (NRS 11.210); a payment made while the debt is still due restarts the clock (NRS 11.200(1)) |
A signed writing is required for a general acknowledgment/promise (NRS 11.390), but a bare payment on principal/interest restarts a still-running clock with no writing (NRS 11.200(1)); once the period has fully expired, no payment, affirmation, or other activity revives it (NRS 11.200(2)) |
None: the general 6-year written / 4-year unwritten split applies equally to consumer and commercial debt |
Applies the shorter out-of-state period unless the creditor has been a Nevada resident/citizen the whole time the claim existed (NRS 11.020) |
Ordinary affirmative-defense default for an original creditor, but a licensed collection agency is separately barred by statute from filing suit once it knows or should know the period has expired (NRS 649.375(1)(j)) |
| New Hampshire verified 2026-07-09 | RSA 508:4 (general 3-year catch-all for personal actions), RSA 508:5 (20-year period for specialties and contracts under seal), RSA 382-A:3-118 (UCC, 6-year period for a negotiable promissory note), RSA 382-A:2-725 (UCC, 4-year period for a goods-sale contract); revival by acknowledgment or payment is common law, not a codified statute |
3 years for an ordinary written debt, the same as an oral one: RSA 508:4, I's catch-all covers 'all personal actions... not otherwise provided by law,' with no separate longer period just for being in writing; a written contract UNDER SEAL is the exception, getting 20 years instead (RSA 508:5), and a negotiable promissory note gets its own separate 6-year UCC period (RSA 382-A:3-118) |
3 years, the identical period RSA 508:4 applies to a written (non-sealed, non-negotiable-instrument) debt: New Hampshire draws no distinction based on whether the debt is in writing |
Ordinarily the date of the breach or default: RSA 508:4's own text runs the 3-year period from 'the act or omission complained of'; for a negotiable note payable at a definite time, the current UCC rule runs from the stated due date (or the accelerated due date if accelerated); for a demand note, from the date demand is made, or after 10 years of no demand and no payment on the note at all (RSA 382-A:3-118) |
No New Hampshire statute governs this, it comes entirely from case law: a partial payment or other acknowledgment of liability can toll the limitations period if it implies a renewed promise to pay, but the acknowledgment must be more than a bare recognition that a debt exists, it must show an admission of liability for an unpaid debt that the debtor is THEN willing to pay (Premier Capital, Inc. v. Gallagher, 1999); a statement merely recognizing debt without expressing willingness to pay it does not toll the clock |
None: the same 3-year catch-all applies to consumer and commercial debt alike; New Hampshire has no separate, shorter (or longer) limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt |
New Hampshire has no borrowing statute at all, one of a small number of states without one, so New Hampshire's own limitations periods generally apply to an action brought there even if the underlying debt arose in another state, without regard to whether the claim would already be time-barred where it arose |
Ordinary affirmative defense only, which the debtor must plead; New Hampshire has no statute barring a collector from merely attempting to sue or otherwise collect on a time-barred debt |
| New Jersey verified 2026-07-09 | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 (general contract debt, 6 years), 2A:14-4 (sealed instruments, 16 years, with a 6-year carve-back for merchants/banks/finance companies), 2A:14-24 (revival), 12A:2-725 (UCC sale-of-goods contracts, 4 years); no separate statutory borrowing statute (see below) |
6 years (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1) for an ordinary written contract 'not under seal': New Jersey does NOT give written debt a longer period than oral debt. A contract under seal instead gets 16 years under § 2A:14-4, UNLESS it's held by 'a merchant or bank, finance company, or other financial institution,' in which case that same 6-year period applies even to a sealed instrument. A contract for the sale of goods follows the UCC's separate 4-year period (§ 12A:2-725) instead of either |
Same 6 years as written debt (§ 2A:14-1): New Jersey draws no line between a signed contract and an oral one; both fall under the identical 'contractual claim or liability, express or implied' language |
The date of the breach itself for an ordinary contract claim: New Jersey courts are reluctant to apply a discovery rule to ordinary commercial cases, reserving it mainly for professional malpractice and fraud claims. A UCC sale-of-goods claim accrues the same date-of-breach way under § 12A:2-725(2): 'when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach,' with a narrow exception for a warranty explicitly extending to future performance |
A signed written acknowledgment or promise can take a claim out of the statute's operation (§ 2A:14-24), but a bare oral acknowledgment or promise does not count: New Jersey courts have rejected an unwritten oral promise to repay an old debt as insufficient. The same section separately preserves 'the effect of any payment of principal or interest' regardless of writing, and New Jersey courts have applied a payment on account as capable of reviving a debtor's obligation for a fresh six years even after the original deadline passed |
None as a general statutory matter: credit card and personal loan debt fall under the same 6-year rule in § 2A:14-1 as any other debt. But a real classification trap exists: New Jersey's Appellate Division has held that a store-branded credit card limited to purchases at one retailer is a 'sale of goods' financing arrangement, not an ordinary loan, pulling that debt into the UCC's shorter 4-year period instead of the general 6-year rule, even though a separate bank or finance company issued the actual credit |
No traditional statutory borrowing statute. New Jersey courts instead apply a common-law choice-of-law framework, Section 142 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, adopted in McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche (2017), under which New Jersey's own limitations period presumptively applies to a claim filed in a New Jersey court unless New Jersey has 'no substantial interest' in the claim and another state with a 'more significant relationship' to the parties would bar it. In practice this often lets New Jersey's own period control even for an out-of-state debt, a case-by-case analysis, not a fixed statutory rule |
Ordinary affirmative defense only. New Jersey Court Rule 4:5-4 requires a defendant to plead the statute of limitations specifically and separately in the answer or risk waiving it. No New Jersey statute independently bars a creditor or collection agency from suing on, or merely attempting to collect, a time-barred debt; a collector who sues on an expired debt instead risks a separate federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim |
| New Mexico verified 2026-07-09 | NMSA 1978 § 37-1-3 (written contracts, notes), § 37-1-4 (oral contracts, open accounts, catch-all), § 37-1-6 (open-account accrual), § 37-1-16 (revival), § 37-1-17 (yields to any more specific statute, e.g. the UCC's sale-of-goods period) |
6 years for a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, or other contract in writing (§ 37-1-3(A)); a debt from a sale of goods (a financed vehicle or retail installment purchase) instead follows the UCC's separate 4-year period (§ 55-2-725(1)), which controls over § 37-1-3 by operation of § 37-1-17 |
4 years for an account, an unwritten contract, or any action not otherwise specified (§ 37-1-4) |
Ordinarily the date of breach or default; an open current account instead accrues from the date of the last item on the account (§ 37-1-6) |
A bare partial or installment payment, no writing needed, revives the debt and resets the clock to the payment date, and works even after the ORIGINAL period has already expired; a bare acknowledgment or new promise without a payment instead needs a signed writing (§ 37-1-16). This revival rule does NOT apply at all to a debt governed by a different, more specific limitations statute (like the UCC's sale-of-goods period), New Mexico's Supreme Court held a payment cannot revive a debt already barred under that separate statute |
None: the same written/oral framework applies to consumer and commercial debt; the Unfair Practices Act layers a disclosure DUTY on collectors of known time-barred debt, not a different deadline |
None: New Mexico has no borrowing statute; its own limitations periods always govern as the law of the forum, regardless of where the debt arose |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: expiration bars the remedy, not the underlying debt, and the debtor must raise it; New Mexico's limitations statute itself does not bar merely attempting to sue on a time-barred debt |
| New York verified 2026-07-09 | CPLR §§ 213, 213-d, 214-i, 202; General Obligations Law § 17-101 |
6 years from breach (CPLR § 213(2)) |
Also 6 years: New York does not distinguish written from oral contract debt at all (CPLR § 213(2) covers a "contractual obligation or liability, express or implied") |
Date of breach/default for ordinary contract debt; medical debt runs instead from the date of TREATMENT, not default (CPLR § 213-d) |
General rule: a signed written acknowledgment revives even an already time-barred debt, and a payment of principal/interest independently has that effect too (GOL § 17-101), but for consumer credit transaction debt specifically, CPLR § 214-i bans ALL revival once the period expires, even by a signed writing |
Consumer credit transactions: 3 years, down from 6, with the total revival ban above (CPLR § 214-i, 2022 Consumer Credit Fairness Act); medical debt: separately 3 years from treatment (CPLR § 213-d, 2020) |
Applies the shorter out-of-state period unless the cause of action accrued in favor of a New York resident (CPLR § 202) |
Ordinary affirmative defense the debtor must plead; no independent statutory suit-bar, but the 2022 CCFA added heightened pleading, chain-of-title, and default-judgment-affidavit requirements specific to consumer credit transaction actions |
| North Carolina verified 2026-07-09 | N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52(1) (general contract debt, 3 years), 1-47(2) (sealed instruments, 10 years), 1-26 (revival), 1-21 (borrowing statute/tolling), 25-2-725 (UCC sale-of-goods contracts, 4 years) |
3 years (§ 1-52(1)) for an ordinary signed written contract: North Carolina does NOT give written debt a longer period than oral debt; the same 3 years applies to both unless the instrument is under seal (10 years, § 1-47(2)) or is a UCC Article 2 sale-of-goods contract (4 years, § 25-2-725) |
Same 3 years as written debt (§ 1-52(1)): North Carolina's real dividing line is seal status and instrument type, not whether the agreement was written down; an oral or informal debt gets the identical period as an ordinary signed writing |
The date the creditor knew or reasonably should have known of the breach (the 'discovery rule'), per the North Carolina Supreme Court's 2021 Chisum v. Campagna decision, which overturned roughly 40 years of date-of-breach precedent; a UCC sale-of-goods claim under § 25-2-725 instead accrues strictly on the date of breach 'regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge,' with a narrow exception for warranties explicitly extending to future performance |
A signed written acknowledgment or new promise restarts the clock under § 1-26, but the same section separately preserves a payment-only route: a bare, unwritten payment of principal or interest by itself also restarts the clock with no writing required, and this can revive a debt whose deadline has already passed, not just extend one still running |
None: no separate statutory limitations period for consumer credit debt; a credit card balance or personal loan is timed the same as any other debt under the general 3-year rule. North Carolina's Collection Agency Act adds consumer-specific procedural protections around suing on old debt (see 'what expiration does' below), but it does not shorten or lengthen the limitations period itself |
Yes, with a resident carve-out (§ 1-21): if a debt is already time-barred under the law of the state where it arose, North Carolina courts won't let a suit on it proceed here either: 'except where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident of this State' |
Ordinarily just the standard affirmative defense a debtor must plead under N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(c) or it is waived. North Carolina's Collection Agency Act goes further for third-party collectors: § 58-70-115(4) makes it an unfair practice for a debt buyer or collection agency to sue, or initiate arbitration, on a debt it knows or reasonably should know is time-barred: a real statutory bar, though narrower than some states' since it reaches only debt buyers and collection agencies, not an original creditor suing in its own name |
| North Dakota verified 2026-07-09 | N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) (general 6-year period for 'a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied,' covering written and oral alike, subject to §§ 28-01-15 and 41-02-104); § 28-01-15 (10-year period for a judgment, a contract in a real-estate conveyance/mortgage, and mortgage foreclosure); § 28-01-37 (accrual on an open, mutual account); § 28-01-36 (writing required for an acknowledgment or promise to restart the clock, except a payment of principal or interest); § 41-02-104 (separate UCC 4-year period for a contract for the sale of goods) |
6 years: N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) covers 'an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied,' with no separate, longer period for a signed writing. The real exceptions run the other way: a contract contained in a conveyance or mortgage of real property gets 10 years instead (§ 28-01-15(2)), and a contract for the sale of goods under the UCC gets its own 4-year period (§ 41-02-104) rather than the general 6-year rule |
6 years: the identical period § 28-01-16(1) applies to a written contract, obligation, or liability. North Dakota draws no written-versus-oral line for ordinary contract debt; both fall in the same 6-year bucket |
§ 28-01-16(1) runs the 6-year period from when 'the claim for relief has accrued,' without itself defining accrual for an ordinary contract claim (the general common-law default is the date of breach or default). § 28-01-37 supplies a specific rule for a mutual, open, and current account with reciprocal demands between the parties: the claim for relief accrues 'from the time of the last item proved in the account on either side,' not from any single earlier charge |
North Dakota splits this the same way South Dakota's cell in this survey describes (the two statutes share nearly identical text): § 28-01-36 requires any acknowledgment or promise of a new or continuing contract to be 'contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged,' or it doesn't count to restart the clock, but the same section then separately preserves the effect of a payment: it 'does not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest,' meaning a bare payment restarts the clock on its own, with no signed writing needed at all |
None found: no North Dakota statute sets a distinct, shorter or longer, limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt; the general 6-year period in § 28-01-16(1) applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
None found: N.D.C.C. Chapter 28-01 (the state's general limitations chapter, §§ 28-01-01 through 28-01-48) contains no provision importing a shorter out-of-state limitations period for a cause of action that arose elsewhere. Its one out-of-state-related rule, § 28-01-32, runs the opposite direction: it TOLLS (pauses) North Dakota's own limitations clock while a defendant is absent from the state, rather than borrowing a shorter foreign period. North Dakota's own 6-year period governs a qualifying contract claim regardless of where the debt originated |
Ordinary affirmative defense: § 28-01-39 states that 'the objection that an action was not commenced within the time limited by law can only be taken by answer,' meaning the debtor must raise it; nothing in Chapter 28-01 bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt outright |
| Ohio verified 2026-07-09 | Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2305.06 (written contracts), 2305.07 (oral contracts and consumer transactions), 2305.08 (payment/acknowledgment revival), 2305.03 (foreign-claim limitation) |
6 years from accrual (§ 2305.06): shortened from 8 years by 2021 S.B. 13, effective 2021-06-14, for claims accruing on or after that date |
4 years from accrual (§ 2305.07(A)): shortened from 6 years by the same 2021 law |
Date of breach/default generally; a consumer-transaction claim under § 2305.07(C) accrues 30 calendar days after the date of the last charge or payment by (or on behalf of) the consumer, whichever is later |
Codified for BOTH written and oral debt: a payment (no writing required), a written acknowledgment, or a signed promise to pay starts a fresh full period from that event, even reviving an already-expired claim (§ 2305.08) |
A dedicated 6-year period for debt arising from a consumer transaction, written or not (§ 2305.07(C)): longer than the 4-year general oral period, effectively pulling consumer open-account debt up to the written-contract number rather than shortening it |
Narrowed by 2021 S.B. 13 to TORT actions only (§ 2305.03(B)); it no longer reaches contract or debt claims at all, so Ohio's own written/oral/consumer periods apply regardless of where the debt originated |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: must be affirmatively pleaded under Ohio R. Civ. P. 8(C) or it is waived; no independent Ohio statute bars a collector from suing or continuing to seek payment on a time-barred debt |
| Oklahoma verified 2026-07-09 | 12 O.S. § 95(A)(1)-(2) (5yr written / 3yr oral contract debt); 12A O.S. § 2-725 (5yr UCC sale-of-goods debt); 12 O.S. § 101 (part-payment/acknowledgment revival); 12 O.S. § 102 (statutory bar absolute); 12 O.S. § 105 (borrowing statute, Uniform Statute of Limitation on Foreign Claims Act) |
5 years: 12 O.S. § 95(A)(1), 'an action upon any contract, agreement, or promise in writing.' A UCC sale-of-goods contract gets its own 5-year period (12A O.S. § 2-725), the same length, so goods-sale debt doesn't get a shorter period the way it does in many other states. Oklahoma courts have not resolved whether a credit-card/cardmember agreement counts as 'written' for this purpose (Discover Bank v. Worsham, 2007 OK CIV APP 11, 176 P.3d 366); a related statute, 15 O.S. § 140(C)(2), treats a card or revolving account's written terms as enforceable without the borrower's signature, which supports treating that debt as written, but the classification remains genuinely unsettled |
3 years: 12 O.S. § 95(A)(2), 'a contract express or implied not in writing.' The same subsection also sets a 3-year period for 'a liability created by statute' and for an action on a foreign judgment |
Date of breach, with no discovery rule. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held directly in Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2021 OK 27: an action for breach of contract accrues when the contract is breached, not when damages result, and the discovery rule does not apply: the claim accrues 'regardless of whether the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the breach.' The period can still be tolled if the creditor fraudulently concealed the claim |
Two routes, only one needing a writing. 12 O.S. § 101 lets a part payment of principal/interest OR a written acknowledgment/promise restart the clock, but only requires a signed writing for the acknowledgment/promise route, a bare payment needs no writing at all. Oklahoma case law treats that bare payment as unusually strong: Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stettnisch, 821 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Okla. Civ. App. 1987), holds the payment 'by its own vigor, revives the debt, no matter how old the debt may be', meaning it can revive a debt that is ALREADY fully time-barred, not just extend one still running, confirmed applied in Douglas v. NCC Bus. Servs., Inc., No. CIV-18-0005-F (W.D. Okla. 2018) |
None found. The same 5-year/3-year periods in § 95 apply to consumer debt and ordinary commercial debt alike; Oklahoma has no separate limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code's 'Limitations on Creditors' Remedies' part (14A O.S. §§ 5-101 to 5-108) restricts specific creditor remedies (deficiency judgments, pre-judgment garnishment, unconscionable terms) but does not set its own separate limitations-of-action period |
Runs the opposite direction from the common shorter-of rule. 12 O.S. § 105 applies whichever period, Oklahoma's own, or the law of the place the claim accrued, 'last bars the claim,' meaning the LONGER of the two periods controls, not the shorter, as confirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's own description of the statute in Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Structural Systems, Inc., 2009 OK 14, 212 P.3d 1168 (also holding the phrase 'period of limitation' in § 105 does not reach a substantive statute of repose) |
Ordinarily just an affirmative defense a debtor must raise. Oklahoma courts describe an expired limitations period as 'an affirmative defense that may be waived by failure to assert it; it is a procedural law that operates only on the remedy' (Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Structural Systems, Inc., 2009 OK 14, ¶ 11, citing Reynolds v. Porter). Separately, 12 O.S. § 102 provides that once a right of action IS barred by any Oklahoma limitations statute, it becomes unavailable either as a cause of action or as a ground of defense, except when used as a counterclaim or setoff. No Oklahoma statute specifically bars a third-party debt collector from suing on a time-barred debt the way some states do; the same ordinary affirmative-defense default applies no matter who is suing |
| Oregon verified 2026-07-09 | ORS 12.080(1) (6yr, contract or liability, express or implied, no written/oral split); ORS 12.070 (10yr, judgments and pre-Aug.-13-1965 sealed instruments); ORS 72.7250 (4yr, sale-of-goods contracts, carved out of 12.080); ORS 12.230/12.240 (revival); ORS 12.410-12.480 (Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act, borrowing); ORS 646.639 (Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act, bars a debt collector or debt buyer from suing on a time-barred debt) |
Same 6 years as an oral debt: ORS 12.080(1) draws no distinction based on a signature at all, covering 'a contract or liability, express or implied.' The real carve-outs run the other way: a debt for the sale of goods gets only 4 years under Oregon's UCC enactment, § 72.7250 (and courts apply that shorter period even to an account-stated claim if the underlying transaction was a sale of goods), and a judgment or a sealed instrument executed before August 13, 1965 gets 10 years under § 12.070 |
The same 6 years as written debt; Oregon draws no distinction at all based on whether the agreement was ever put in writing (§ 12.080(1)) |
Date of breach/default, with no discovery rule: Oregon courts have specifically held there is no discovery rule for an ordinary breach-of-contract claim under § 12.080(1) (Romero v. Amburn, 323 Or. App. 410 (2022)), even though a companion subsection covering injury to a property interest does carry a discovery rule (Rice v. Rabb, 354 Or. 721 (2014)). For a running account, § 12.090 starts the clock 'from the time of the last charge or payment proved in the account.' A sale-of-goods claim under § 72.7250 accrues at breach/tender of delivery regardless of the buyer's knowledge, with a narrow exception for a warranty explicitly extending to future performance |
Two separate tracks. A general acknowledgment or promise needs a signed writing to take a debt out of the statute (§ 12.230). But § 12.230 expressly carves out a second, broader route with no writing requirement at all: 'this section shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest', and § 12.240 spells that route out, restarting the clock from the date of any payment of principal or interest made 'after it has become due,' on any contract, note, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness. Unlike California's cap on this kind of rule, Oregon's text has no language limiting it to a still-running (not-yet-expired) clock, and Oregon's own consumer-facing guidance treats even an old, apparently time-barred debt as revivable by a later payment |
None: the same 6-year period under § 12.080(1) applies to consumer and commercial debt alike; Oregon has no separate, shorter limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt. (The Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act's bar on suing after the deadline, covered below, is a collection-conduct rule tied to the existing period, not a different period.) |
Not a simple shorter-of comparison. Oregon adopted the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act (§§ 12.410-12.480, 1987): if a claim is substantively based on another state's law, that state's limitations period applies instead of Oregon's (§ 12.430), including that state's own tolling and accrual rules (§ 12.440), but Oregon's own period applies instead if the other state's period is 'substantially different' from Oregon's and either does not give a fair opportunity to sue or imposes an unfair burden in defending against the claim (§ 12.450) |
Ordinarily just an ordinary affirmative defense a debtor must plead (ORCP 19 B). But Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act goes further for a third-party debt collector or a debt buyer specifically: § 646.639(2)(r) and (4)(a) make it an unlawful collection practice for either one to file, or attempt to file, a legal action on a debt it knows or should know is barred by the statute of limitations: a real statutory suit-ban, though narrower than California's, since it does not reach an original creditor suing on its own debt directly |
| Pennsylvania verified 2026-07-09 | 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5525 (four-year limitation), 5521 (borrowing statute) |
4 years from breach (§ 5525(a)(8)): the same period as an oral contract |
4 years from breach (§ 5525(a)(3)): Pennsylvania does not shorten the period for an unwritten contract |
Date of breach/default generally; a demand note runs from the later of demand or any payment of principal or interest on it (§ 5525(a)(7)) |
No statute addresses this: Pennsylvania's common-law 'acknowledgment doctrine' lets a clear, distinct, unequivocal acknowledgment of the debt (including a payment) toll or restart the clock (Huntingdon Finance Corp. v. Newtown Artesian Water Co., 442 Pa. Super. 406 (1995)) |
None currently: the same 4-year period applies to consumer and commercial debt alike; a pending bill (HB 1731) would add a 3-year consumer-debt period |
Applies the shorter of Pennsylvania's period or the period of the state where the claim accrued, with no residency exception for the creditor (§ 5521, the Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act) |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: must be pleaded as 'New Matter' under Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a) or it is waived; no independent statute bars a collector from suing or continuing to seek payment on a time-barred debt |
| Rhode Island verified 2026-07-09 | § 9-1-13 (general 10-year catch-all for 'all civil actions,' written and oral alike); § 9-1-17 (20-year period for contracts/liabilities under seal and for judgments); 6A-3-118 (UCC negotiable-instrument periods, generally 6 years for a note); § 9-1-18 (tolling for absence from the state, and a borrowing-statute proviso for a claim already barred elsewhere) |
10 years for an ordinary written debt, the same as an oral one, § 9-1-13(a)'s catch-all reaches 'all civil actions' with no separate written-contract bucket. The exceptions run in OPPOSITE directions: a contract or liability under seal gets MORE time, 20 years (§ 9-1-17), while a negotiable promissory note gets LESS time, 6 years under the Uniform Commercial Code (6A-3-118(a)), shorter than the general 10-year period that otherwise covers written debt |
10 years, the identical period § 9-1-13(a) applies to a written (non-sealed, non-negotiable-instrument) debt: Rhode Island draws no distinction based on whether the debt is in writing |
§ 9-1-13(a) runs the 10-year period from when 'the cause of action shall accrue,' without itself defining accrual for an ordinary contract or debt claim (unlike some of its own subsections for other claim types, this section has no discovery-rule language). In practice, Rhode Island's courts have applied the period from a loan's default date: in Webster Bank, N.A. v. Rosenbaum (R.I. 2022), the 10-year clock ran from the borrowers' 2007 payment default on a loan agreement, not from a later demand or acceleration |
No Rhode Island statute addresses this. Chapter 9-1 ('Causes of Action'), which contains every other limitations rule surveyed here, has no acknowledgment-or-part-payment revival provision at all, confirmed by reviewing every section in the chapter. (A debt-collection letter template in circulation for Rhode Island cites 'R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-19' as governing 'new promise/acknowledgment,' but § 9-1-19's actual text is an unrelated disability-tolling provision for minors, people of unsound mind, or people outside the United States, it says nothing about acknowledgment or payment.) |
None found: § 9-1-13's general 10-year period applies to consumer and commercial debt alike; no separate limitations period specifically for a consumer-credit-transaction debt appears in Rhode Island law |
§ 9-1-18's proviso bars a Rhode Island suit only if the claim accrued outside Rhode Island, was already barred by the law of that other state, territory, or country, AND the person bringing the claim resided there at the time, narrower than a typical shorter-of-two-periods borrowing statute. Separately, Rhode Island treats a statute of limitations as PROCEDURAL rather than substantive, so its own forum-state period can still control even when a contract's own choice-of-law clause names another state's law as governing the agreement (Webster Bank, N.A. v. Rosenbaum, R.I. 2022, applying Rhode Island's 10-year period over a loan agreement's Connecticut choice-of-law clause), though that case didn't resolve how § 9-1-18's borrowing-statute proviso interacts with such a clause, since the borrower's borrowing-statute argument was deemed waived on appeal |
Ordinary affirmative defense: Chapter 9-1 doesn't bar a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred claim outright; the debtor must raise the expired deadline |
| South Carolina verified 2026-07-09 | S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530(1), 15-3-520, 36-2-725 |
3 years from breach, same as oral debt (§ 15-3-530(1)): no written/oral split; sealed instruments and mortgage-secured contracts get 20 years instead (§ 15-3-520), sale-of-goods debt gets 6 years (§ 36-2-725) |
Same 3 years as written debt: South Carolina draws no written/oral distinction (§ 15-3-530(1)) |
Date of breach/default; a mutual open account with reciprocal demands runs from the date of the last item proved on either side (§ 15-3-610); goods-sale debt accrues at breach regardless of discovery (§ 36-2-725(2)) |
A signed writing revives, but a bare part payment of principal or interest is itself equivalent to a written promise, no separate writing needed (§ 15-3-120), and can revive a debt already time-barred, not just extend one still running (§ 15-3-130) |
None: the same 3-year period applies equally to consumer and commercial debt |
None: South Carolina has no borrowing statute at all; its own periods apply regardless of where the debt arose |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: a debtor must raise the statute of limitations or lose by default; no South Carolina statute bars a creditor from attempting to sue on a time-barred debt |
| South Dakota verified 2026-07-09 | SDCL § 15-2-13(1) (general 6-year period for 'a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied,' covering written and oral alike); § 15-2-6(2) (20-year period for a sealed instrument); § 15-2-4 (accrual on an open, mutual account); § 15-2-29 (writing required for an acknowledgment or promise to restart the clock, except a payment of principal or interest); 57A-2-725 (separate UCC 4-year period for a contract for the sale of goods) |
6 years: SDCL § 15-2-13(1) covers 'an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied,' with no separate, longer period for a signed writing. The one real exception: a debt on a sealed instrument gets 20 years instead (§ 15-2-6(2)), and a contract for the sale of goods under the UCC gets its own 4-year period (§ 57A-2-725) instead of the general 6-year rule |
6 years: the identical period § 15-2-13(1) applies to a written contract, obligation, or liability. South Dakota draws no written-versus-oral line for ordinary contract debt; both fall in the same 6-year bucket |
§ 15-2-13(1) runs the 6-year period from when 'the cause of action shall have accrued,' without itself defining accrual for an ordinary contract claim (the general common-law default is the date of breach or default). § 15-2-4 supplies a specific rule for a mutual, open, and current account with reciprocal demands between the parties: the cause of action accrues 'from the time of the last item proved in the account on either side,' not from any single earlier charge |
South Dakota draws the same kind of two-way split California's exemplar cell describes, just phrased the other way around: § 15-2-29 requires any acknowledgment or promise of a new or continuing contract to be 'contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged,' or it doesn't count, but the same section then carves out payment specifically: 'this section shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest,' meaning a bare payment restarts the clock on its own, with no signed writing needed at all |
None found: SDCL Title 54 (Debtor and Creditor) regulates consumer installment sales and lending licenses, but no section there or elsewhere sets a distinct, separate limitations PERIOD specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt; the general 6-year period in § 15-2-13(1) applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
None found: SDCL Chapter 15-2 (the state's general limitations chapter, §§ 15-2-1 through 15-2-36) contains no provision importing a shorter out-of-state limitations period for a cause of action that arose elsewhere. South Dakota's own 6-year period governs a qualifying contract claim regardless of where the debt originated |
Ordinary affirmative defense: § 15-2-1 states the objection that an action wasn't commenced in time 'can only be taken by answer or other responsive pleading,' meaning the debtor must raise it; nothing in Chapter 15-2 bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt outright |
| Tennessee verified 2026-07-09 | T.C.A. § 28-3-109(a)(3) (six-year catch-all for contract actions, no written/oral split); § 47-3-118 (UCC negotiable instruments); § 28-1-112 (borrowing statute) |
6 years from breach (§ 28-3-109(a)(3), "actions on contracts not otherwise expressly provided for"): the SAME period as an oral debt; demand notes get 10 years instead (§ 28-3-109(c)) |
6 years from breach (§ 28-3-109(a)(3)): Tennessee does not distinguish oral from written contract debt at all; this value equals the written_contract_period figure |
Date of breach/default under the ordinary common-law rule (Wilson v. Harris, Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); a note payable on demand accrues at the date of the note itself, not the date demand is later made (Jenkins v. Dewar, 1904) |
Common-law only, not a standalone Tennessee statute: a debtor's acknowledgment of the debt or a new promise to pay can take a claim out of the statute's bar (Wilson v. Harris, 2009, and 20th-century case annotations to § 28-1-102); Tennessee's statutes don't spell out a signed-writing requirement the way most other states' do |
None found: the general 6-year catch-all period covers consumer, credit card, and commercial contract debt alike; a 2017 bill (HB 1413/SB 1419) that would have added debt-buyer-specific SOL disclosure and anti-revival rules died in Senate committee and was never enacted |
Basic borrowing statute keyed to the defendant's residency where the claim arose: § 28-1-112 bars a claim in Tennessee if it was already barred by the law of the state or country where the defendant resided when the cause of action accrued |
Ordinary affirmative defense only: no Tennessee statute bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt |
| Texas verified 2026-07-09 | Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 16.004, 16.051, 16.065, 16.067; Tex. Fin. Code § 392.307 |
4 years from breach/default (§ 16.004(a)(3), "debt") |
Also 4 years: no separate, shorter period for an unwritten debt (§ 16.004(a)(3) or the § 16.051 residual 4-year catch-all) |
Date of breach/default |
A signed written acknowledgment can revive even an ALREADY time-barred debt (§ 16.065), but for consumer debt collected by a debt buyer specifically, § 392.307(d) bans revival entirely once the period has run |
Same 4-year number, but Fin. Code § 392.307 adds a debt-buyer-specific suit bar, anti-revival rule, and mandatory disclosure notice once the period expires |
§ 16.067: bars a claim against someone who moved to Texas if already time-barred where they came from, but also gives a newly-arrived debtor a 12-month grace period |
Ordinarily just an affirmative defense the debtor must plead (Tex. R. Civ. P. 94): except a debt buyer collecting consumer debt is flatly barred from suing or arbitrating at all once expired (Fin. Code § 392.307(c)) |
| Utah verified 2026-07-09 | Utah Code § 78B-2-309 (6yr, written contract/obligation/liability); § 78B-2-307 (4yr, unwritten contract/obligation/liability, open store account, or open account for services); § 70A-2-725 (4yr, UCC sale-of-goods debt); § 78B-2-113 (payment/acknowledgment revival, and the general statutory-bar-absolute rule); § 78B-2-103 (borrowing statute for a claim arising in another state) |
6 years: § 78B-2-309(1)(b) covers 'any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing.' The Utah Supreme Court's own test for what counts as 'founded upon an instrument in writing' asks whether 'the fact of liability arises or is assumed or imposed from the instrument itself, or its recitals' (Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 1938, applied in Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987)). For a 'credit agreement' specifically (a financial institution's loan, credit extension, or financial accommodation, as defined in § 25-5-4), § 78B-2-309(2) sets a special accrual rule: the 6-year period begins on the LATEST of the day the debt arose, a written acknowledgment/promise, or a payment by the debtor OR a third party |
4 years, § 78B-2-307(1)(a) covers 'a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing,' running 'after the last charge is made or the last payment is received.' The same 4-year period and last-charge-or-payment trigger also covers an open store account for goods and an open account for work, labor, services, or materials (§ 78B-2-307(1)(b)-(c)), these open-account categories are grouped with the oral/unwritten bucket rather than getting a separate rule of their own |
Date of breach is the default, and Utah courts have declined to read in a general discovery rule for an ordinary contract claim: in Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., the Utah Supreme Court applied the 6-year written-contract period but expressly 'decline[d] to hold that the statute was tolled pending [the plaintiff's] discovery of the defective [condition].' For an unwritten/open-account claim under § 78B-2-307(1), the trigger is explicitly 'the last charge... or the last payment... received,' not the date of the original charge |
§ 78B-2-113(1) provides generally that 'an action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute of limitations from the date: (a) the debt arose; (b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by the debtor; or (c) a payment is made on the debt by the debtor': whichever of these three dates is used, the clock is computed from that date forward, with no textual cap limiting this to a still-running (not-yet-expired) claim. A Utah Court of Appeals case, Daniels v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust (2021), applied this rule concretely: the last payment date, not the original default date, controlled when the 6-year period actually expired. For a 'credit agreement' specifically, § 78B-2-309(2) goes further than § 78B-2-113's general debtor-only payment rule, letting a payment by A THIRD PARTY (not just the debtor) also serve as the new starting date |
None found. The same § 78B-2-307/§ 78B-2-309 periods apply to consumer and commercial debt alike; Utah has no separate limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt. The Utah Consumer Credit Code (Title 70C) sets its own one-year period for an action alleging a CREDITOR's violation of that Code's disclosure and rate rules: a different kind of claim (a statutory-violation claim against the creditor) than the deadline to sue ON the debt itself, which this survey covers |
A classic 'basic borrowing statute with a resident-plaintiff exception,' the same shape as California's and New York's. § 78B-2-103: 'A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued' |
§ 78B-2-113(2) states that once 'a right of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground for defense': a real statutory bar, applying across all of Chapter 2's limitations periods, not just a bare affirmative-defense default. No Utah statute specific to debt collectors was found that separately bars a THIRD-PARTY collector from suing on a time-barred debt; a 2023 law (H.B. 20) instead repealed several older debt-collection-agency registration and bonding statutes as redundant, leaving Title 12's collection-fee limitation as the main surviving debt-collector-specific statute outside the ordinary limitations chapter |
| Vermont verified 2026-07-09 | 12 V.S.A. § 511 (general 6-year catch-all for a civil action, covering ordinary written and oral contracts alike); § 507 ('specialties,' i.e. contracts under seal, 8 years); § 508 (a promissory note signed before an attesting witness, 14 years); § 506 (judgments, 8 years, enforced by filing a brand-new action); § 465 (voids any contract clause that limits or waives the statute of limitations); § 591 (signed writing required for an acknowledgment or promise to restart the clock); § 592 (preserves the effect of a payment, with a stricter evidentiary rule for a collector's own payment notation) |
6 years for an ordinary written contract, § 511's general catch-all covers it, the same as an oral promise, since Vermont courts have repeatedly held that economic-loss/contract claims fall under § 511 rather than any shorter category (Egri v. U.S. Airways; Fitzgerald v. Congleton). The real exceptions run LONGER: a 'specialty', a formal contract executed under seal, gets 8 years (§ 507), and a promissory note signed before an attesting witness gets an unusually long 14 years (§ 508). A contract for the sale of goods instead follows the UCC's own 4-year period (9A V.S.A. § 2-725) |
Also 6 years: the identical period § 511 applies to an ordinary written contract. Vermont draws no written-versus-oral line for ordinary contract debt; both fall in the same general catch-all |
§ 511 runs the 6-year period from when 'the cause of action accrues,' without itself defining that moment for an ordinary contract claim (the general default recognized in Vermont case law is the date of breach or default). No separate Vermont statute was found supplying a special accrual rule for a running or open account |
Vermont splits this the same general way as several other states in this survey, but with an added evidentiary wrinkle. Section 591 requires any acknowledgment or promise to be 'in writing signed by the party affected thereby' to restart a still-running clock. Section 592 separately preserves the effect of an actual payment: the chapter 'shall not alter or take away the effect of the payment of any principal or interest,' so a bare payment restarts the clock even without a signed acknowledgment. But that same section adds a real proof requirement most states' versions don't have: a collector's OWN 'indorsement or memorandum of such payment made upon a promissory note, bill of exchange, or other writing, unless in the handwriting of the party making the payment, shall not be proof of the payment sufficient' to restart the clock: meaning the payee can't just write down that a payment occurred; it has to be documented in the paying debtor's own hand (or otherwise proven) to count |
None found: no Vermont statute sets a distinct, shorter or longer, limitations period specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt; the general 6-year period in § 511 applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
No true borrowing statute. Vermont's absence-tolling statute, § 552, pauses the limitations clock while a defendant is out of Vermont and owns no attachable property here, but its own text carves out the opposite scenario: that tolling extension 'shall not extend to a cause of action accruing in another state or government, when the parties thereto at the time of the accruing of such cause of action are residents of such other state or government.' Vermont courts have applied this carve-out (Marine Midland Bank v. Bicknell, 2004 VT 25) to deny a plaintiff the benefit of absence-based tolling when the claim and both parties originated entirely in another state. This narrows Vermont's OWN tolling extension in that narrow circumstance; it does not import a shorter out-of-state limitations period the way a classic borrowing statute does |
Ordinary affirmative defense: Vermont courts treat an expired limitations period as a defense the debtor must raise (a motion to dismiss, or the court acting on its own), not a rule that independently bars a creditor's filing; nothing in chapter 23 stops a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt outright |
| Virginia verified 2026-07-09 | Va. Code §§ 8.01-246 (general contract debt: 5yr signed writing, 3yr unsigned writing or oral, plus a 2024-added 3yr medical-debt carve-out), 8.01-230 (accrual), 8.01-229(G) (new promises), 8.01-247 (borrowing statute), 8.2-725 (UCC sale-of-goods contracts, 4 years), 8.01-235 (affirmative-defense-only bar) |
5 years (§ 8.01-246(2)), but ONLY if the writing is signed by the party to be charged (the debtor) or the debtor's agent: a written contract the debtor never signed instead falls into the shorter 3-year bucket under § 8.01-246(4)(i), the same as an oral debt. A contract for the sale of goods follows the UCC's separate 4-year period (§ 8.2-725) instead of either |
3 years (§ 8.01-246(4)(ii)): the same bucket as a written-but-unsigned-by-the-debtor contract. Virginia's real dividing line for the longer period is whether the debtor personally signed the writing, not whether a writing exists at all |
The date of the breach itself. Virginia's general accrual statute, § 8.01-230, expressly states the limitations period begins running 'when the breach of contract occurs in actions ex contractu and not when the resulting damage is discovered': a direct statutory rejection of a discovery rule for ordinary contract claims. A UCC sale-of-goods claim accrues the identical date-of-breach way under § 8.2-725(2), 'regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach' |
A new promise or written acknowledgment can extend the clock, but only if made 'by writing signed by him or his agent' (§ 8.01-229(G)); the statute has no exception for a bare unwritten payment or an oral promise alone. Timing matters: per the Virginia Supreme Court's Ingram v. Harris (1939), a qualifying written promise made BEFORE the original deadline runs simply extends that same debt's clock for a fresh period, but a promise made AFTER the deadline has already passed does not revive the original debt: it instead creates a wholly new, separate cause of action on the promise itself, with the old time-barred debt serving only as consideration |
Yes, and recently added: a 2024 amendment (HB 34, eff. July 1, 2024) added subsection B to § 8.01-246 setting a distinct 3-year period specifically for medical debt, running from the due date on the final invoice for the health care service, not from the date of breach the way ordinary debt works, unless the provider offers a payment plan, in which case a breach of that plan gets its own 3-year period from the date of breach. This applies even to actions brought by the Commonwealth itself |
Yes, and unlike many states, with no resident exception at all: § 8.01-247 bars an action on a contract governed by another state's law 'if the right of action thereon is barred either by the laws of such state or country or of this Commonwealth': the shorter of Virginia's period or the other state's period controls, full stop, regardless of whether either party is a Virginia resident |
Ordinary affirmative defense only, and Virginia is explicit about the mechanism: § 8.01-235 provides that the bar of an expired limitation period cannot be raised by demurrer and may be raised only as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading: a debtor who doesn't plead it that way loses the defense. No separate Virginia statute independently bars a creditor or collection agency from suing on, or merely continuing to seek, a time-barred debt |
| Washington verified 2026-07-09 | RCW 4.16.040(1) (written contracts); RCW 4.16.080(3) (oral/unwritten) |
6 years from breach (RCW 4.16.040(1)); an account receivable is also 6 years (§ 4.16.040(2)) |
3 years from breach (RCW 4.16.080(3)) |
Date of breach/default (the missed payment), not the date of the last payment: confirmed by the WA Supreme Court in Merritt v. USAA Federal Savings Bank (2023) |
A payment made before the clock expires restarts it automatically, no writing needed (§ 4.16.270); a general acknowledgment or promise needs a signed writing (§ 4.16.280); neither can revive a claim that already expired |
None: the same 6-year/3-year periods apply to consumer and commercial debt alike |
Narrow: applies only when the claim arose in another state or country AND both parties were nonresidents of Washington the whole time (§ 4.16.290): doesn't reach a claim involving a current or former Washington resident |
Ordinary affirmative defense for most creditors; but a licensed collection agency that knows or should know a claim is time-barred is barred by statute from suing or arbitrating it (§ 19.16.250(23)) |
| West Virginia verified 2026-07-09 | W. Va. Code § 55-2-6 (contract debt generally), § 55-2-8 (revival by new written promise), §§ 55-2A-1 to -2A-4 (Uniform Limitation on Foreign Claims Act, the borrowing statute), § 46-2-725 (UCC goods-sale contracts) |
10 years for a contract under seal, or for an award or a contract in writing signed by the party to be charged (or the party's agent) but not under seal (§ 55-2-6) |
5 years for any other contract, express or implied: covering both an unwritten (oral) obligation and a writing that is not signed by the party to be charged (§ 55-2-6); a contract for the sale of goods under the UCC instead gets its own 4-year period regardless of whether it's written or oral (§ 46-2-725(1)) |
Ordinarily the date the breach or default occurs; West Virginia's Supreme Court has held the clock begins running when the breach takes place OR when it is first known or reasonably should have been known, whichever is LATER (Harris v. County Comm'n of Calhoun County, 2017): a built-in discovery backstop, not just a pure default-date rule |
Only a NEW promise contained in a writing signed by the debtor (or the debtor's agent) restarts the clock; § 55-2-8 states expressly that 'no promise, except by writing as aforesaid, shall take any case out of the operation' of the limitations statute: a bare, unsigned partial payment alone, without an accompanying signed writing, does not revive or extend the period |
None for the deadline to sue on the underlying debt itself: the same § 55-2-6 written/oral framework applies to consumer and commercial debt alike (separately, West Virginia's Consumer Credit and Protection Act sets its own 4-year period for a CONSUMER's own claim against a debt collector for violating that Act, a different right of action from a creditor's suit to collect) |
Applies whichever period, West Virginia's own, or the period of the state where the claim accrued, bars the claim first, with no exception for a West Virginia resident (§ 55-2A-2, the Uniform Limitation on Foreign Claims Act) |
Ordinary affirmative defense only, which the debtor must raise; West Virginia has no statute barring a collector from merely attempting to sue or otherwise collect on a time-barred debt |
| Wisconsin verified 2026-07-09 | Wis. Stat. § 893.43(1), one 6-year period for 'any contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied': no written/oral split |
6 years from breach (§ 893.43(1)) |
6 years: the SAME period as written debt; Wisconsin does not shorten it for an oral or open-account debt (§ 893.43(1)) |
Date of breach/default; no discovery rule for ordinary contract debt (CLL Associates v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 1993) |
A general acknowledgment or new promise must be a signed writing (§ 893.45); a bare payment of principal or interest has its own separately preserved effect and restarts the clock without any writing (§ 893.48; case law) |
None: the same 6-year period applies to consumer credit-card and personal-loan debt as to commercial debt |
Yes, § 893.07: applies whichever of Wisconsin's or the foreign state's period is shorter, with NO resident exception |
Goes beyond an ordinary affirmative defense: by statute, expiration extinguishes the underlying right itself, not just the remedy (§ 893.05) |
| Wyoming verified 2026-07-09 | W.S. § 1-3-105(a)(i) (10-year period for a specialty or any contract, agreement, or promise in writing); § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(A) (8-year period for a contract not in writing, express or implied); § 1-3-105(a)(iii) (a 5-year period, measured from Wyoming residency, for a foreign claim or contract that accrued before the debtor moved to Wyoming); § 1-3-117 (borrowing statute: a claim already barred where it arose is barred in Wyoming too); § 1-3-119 (payment or signed written promise restarts the clock) |
10 years: W.S. § 1-3-105(a)(i) covers 'a specialty or any contract, agreement or promise in writing.' Wyoming is a genuine written-versus-oral-split state, unlike many of the states already built in this survey. A contract for the sale of goods instead follows the UCC's own 4-year period (W.S. § 34.1-2-725), and a negotiable instrument like a promissory note generally follows Article 3's own periods (mostly 6 years, W.S. § 34.1-3-118) |
8 years: W.S. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(A) sets a separate, shorter period for 'a contract not in writing, either express or implied.' This is a real 2-year gap from the 10-year written-contract period, a sharper written/oral distinction than most states surveyed so far |
§ 1-3-102 runs the period from when 'the cause of action accrues,' without itself defining that moment for an ordinary contract claim (Wyoming's general default is the date of breach or default). § 1-3-106 supplies a discovery-based accrual rule for two specific claim types, wrongful taking of personal property, and fraud, neither of which is the default rule for an ordinary contract or account debt |
W.S. § 1-3-119 covers both mechanisms in one sentence: 'When payment has been made upon any demand founded on contract or a written acknowledgment thereof, or promise to pay the same has been made and signed by the party to be charged, the time for commencing an action runs from the date of such payment, acknowledgment or promise.' A bare payment restarts the clock on its own (no signature needed), while an acknowledgment or promise must be signed by the debtor to count: the same general shape as several other states in this survey, stated in a single unified section rather than two separate ones |
None found: the Wyoming Uniform Consumer Credit Code (W.S. Title 40, Chapter 14) regulates consumer credit sales, loans, and insurance charges in detail, but no section sets a distinct limitations PERIOD specifically for consumer-credit-transaction debt; the general written/oral split in § 1-3-105 applies to consumer and commercial debt alike |
Wyoming layers two separate provisions here, unlike most states' single rule. First, § 1-3-117 is a classic, unqualified borrowing statute with NO resident exception: 'If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this state.' Second, and separately, § 1-3-105(a)(iii) sets its own 5-year period, but measured from when 'the debtor establishes residence in Wyoming', for 'an action on a foreign claim, judgment or contract... contracted or incurred and accrued before the debtor became a resident of Wyoming.' That second rule isn't a borrowing statute in the usual sense (it doesn't import a shorter foreign period); it's an independent Wyoming-law deadline pegged to the date someone who owes an out-of-state debt moves to Wyoming |
Ordinary affirmative defense: Wyoming treats an expired limitations period as a defense the debtor must raise; nothing in chapter 3 independently bars a creditor from filing suit on a time-barred debt |
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