Kentucky: Statute of Limitations on Debt Collection

Requirements one by one

Governing law

Kentucky's contract-debt deadlines live in KRS Chapter 413 ("Limitation of
Actions"), principally § 413.090 (15 years, for written contracts and bonds
executed on or before July 15, 2014, plus judgments) and § 413.160 (10 years, for
written contracts executed after that date), plus § 413.120(1) (5
years, for oral or unwritten contracts). A separate statute entirely, KRS §
355.3-118 (part of Kentucky's enactment of UCC Article 3), sets its own 6-year
period for negotiable instruments, which can override the written-contract
periods for many promissory notes. KRS § 413.320 is Kentucky's borrowing
statute.

How long you have on a written debt

It depends on the date the contract was signed. Kentucky shortened its
written-contract period in 2014: a written contract executed on or before July
15, 2014 still gets the old 15-year period under § 413.090(2), while one executed
after that date gets only 10 years under § 413.160. Either way, there's
an important exception for notes: if the writing qualifies as a negotiable
instrument, generally, an unconditional written promise to pay a fixed
amount of money, Kentucky's commercial code gives it only 6 years instead,
under § 355.3-118(1), regardless of which written-contract period would
otherwise apply. The Kentucky Supreme Court confirmed this in Cmty. Fin.
Servs. Bank v. Stamper (2019): a bank assumed its 1997 promissory note got
the (then-applicable) 15-year period because it was "a written contract," but
the court held the note was still a negotiable instrument, merely
referencing a separate security agreement doesn't destroy negotiability,
only being made expressly subject to one does, so the 6-year UCC period
controlled instead, and the bank's 2016 lawsuit on a note that matured in 2002
was too late.

How long you have on an oral or unwritten debt

Five years, under § 413.120(1), for an ordinary oral contract or any
obligation not founded on a signed writing. The same 5-year period applies to
a merchant's account for goods sold and delivered and to a mutual open account
between merchants, under § 413.120(9) and (10). This matters for credit card
debt specifically: two federal courts applying Kentucky law (Conway v.
Portfolio Recovery Associates, E.D. Ky. 2014, and Fulk v. LVNV Funding LLC,
E.D. Ky. 2014) have held that a credit card agreement is not a "written
contract" for limitations purposes unless the consumer actually signed it, meaning typical unsigned credit card debt often falls into this 5-year bucket
rather than the longer 10/15-year written-contract periods banks might assume
apply.

When the clock starts

The general rule is the date of breach or default. For a note payable at a
definite time, § 355.3-118(1) starts the 6-year UCC clock at "the due date or
dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, ... the
accelerated due date." For a merchant's store account, § 413.130(1) sets a
different trigger: the limitation is "computed from January 1 next succeeding
the respective dates of the delivery of the several articles charged in the
account," not the date of each individual purchase.

Can a payment or promise restart the clock?

Yes. The cited KRS Chapter 413 provisions do not supply a debt-revival
procedure, so the rule comes from case law. In City of Louisa v. Horton, 263
Ky. 739, 93 S.W.2d 620, 622-23 (1935), the court explained that a payment made before a
debt is barred "suspends the operation of the statute between the accrual of
the cause of action and the date of that payment", in other words, it
restarts the clock, and a lawsuit on the debt still proceeds on the original
obligation. But Kentucky goes further than most states: if the promise or
acknowledgment comes after the debt is already time-barred, revival is still
possible, the court held "if, however, the debt is barred at the time of the
new promise, it must be brought on the new promise" itself, a distinct cause
of action rather than a revival of the old one. The opinion also says a promise
must be "clear, absolute, and unconditional," while an unqualified
acknowledgment that the debt remains due may suffice without an express promise
to pay; it must be made to the creditor or an authorized agent.

Is there a special rule for consumer debt?

No. The same execution-date and writing rules above apply whether the debt is
a business contract or a personal credit card balance. The Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act does have its own 2-year limitations period (KRS § 367.220), but
that governs a claim that a collector or creditor violated the Act itself, a different lawsuit from the deadline to sue on the underlying debt covered by
this page.

What if the debt originated in another state?

Kentucky's borrowing statute, § 413.320, applies without any exception for
Kentucky residents. If a debt would already be time-barred under the law of
the state or country where it accrued, Kentucky courts apply that shorter,
already-expired bar here too, regardless of whether the creditor, the
debtor, or neither one has ever lived in Kentucky. This is a stricter,
broader-reaching borrowing statute than California's or New York's, both of
which exempt a claim from borrowing if the plaintiff has always been a
resident of the forum state.

What actually happens once the deadline passes?

Nothing automatic. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 8.03 lists the statute of
limitations among the affirmative defenses a party must plead in an answer,
alongside things like payment, release, and accord and satisfaction, meaning a debtor who doesn't raise it can still lose by default even on a
genuinely time-barred debt. Kentucky has no statute like California's that
flatly bars a creditor from even attempting to sue on an expired debt.

What trips people up

People often assume a bank loan or promissory note automatically gets
Kentucky's long written-contract period (15 or 10 years), but if the note
qualifies as a negotiable instrument, the real deadline can be the much
shorter 6-year UCC period instead, a distinction that has cost at least one
Kentucky lender its entire claim. On the revival side, Kentucky is more
creditor-friendly than many states: making a "goodwill" payment or verbally
acknowledging an already-expired debt can create fresh exposure to a lawsuit
on that new promise, even though the original debt is long gone. And because
Kentucky's borrowing statute has no residency exception at all, a Kentucky
resident being sued on an old out-of-state debt can't assume Kentucky's own
(often longer) periods will apply just because they've always lived here.

Common questions

Does my old credit card debt get 10 or 15 years, or only 5?
Often just 5. Kentucky courts have generally treated an unsigned credit card
agreement as an unwritten contract, which gets the shorter 5-year period under
§ 413.120(1) rather than the 10 or 15-year period for a written contract.

I have an old promissory note, how long does the lender have to sue?
It depends on whether the note counts as a negotiable instrument. If it does,
Kentucky's UCC gives the lender only 6 years from the note's due date (or
accelerated due date), even if the note itself would otherwise look like a
15-year or 10-year written contract.

I made a payment on a debt I thought was already too old to be sued on, did that restart the clock?
Yes, potentially. Kentucky allows a payment or a clear oral acknowledgment to
revive even an already-expired debt, though the creditor would have to sue on
that new promise rather than the original debt. This is different from many
states, where a payment made after expiration does nothing.

Can a debt collector still sue me in Kentucky after the deadline passes?
Nothing in Kentucky law stops them from filing. If you don't raise the statute
of limitations as a defense in your answer, a court can still enter judgment
against you even on a time-barred debt.

Statutes and sources

• KRS § 413.090, "the following actions shall be commenced within fifteen
  (15) years after the cause of action first accrued: ... (2) An action upon
  a recognizance, bond, or written contract, except that actions upon written
  contracts executed after July 15, 2014, shall be governed by KRS 413.160", https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=43545
  (accessed 2026-07-28)
• KRS § 413.160, "An action upon a written contract executed after July 15,
  2014, unless otherwise provided by statute, ... can only be commenced within
  ten (10) years after the cause of action accrued.", https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=43544
  (accessed 2026-07-28)
• KRS § 413.120, "The following actions shall be commenced within five (5)
  years after the cause of action accrued: (1) An action upon a contract not
  in writing, express or implied. ... (9) An action upon a merchant's account
  for goods sold and delivered ... (10) An action upon an account concerning
  the trade of merchandise, between merchant and merchant ...", https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=44670
  (accessed 2026-07-28)
• KRS § 413.130, "In every action upon a merchants' account ..., the
  limitation shall be computed from January 1 next succeeding the respective
  dates of the delivery of the several articles charged in the account.", https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=44671
  (accessed 2026-07-28)
• KRS § 355.3-118, "an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a
  note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six (6) years
  after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is
  accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date.", https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=33446
  (accessed 2026-07-28)
• KRS § 413.320, "When a cause of action has arisen in another state or
  country, and ... the time for the commencement of an action thereon is
  limited to a shorter period of time than ... the laws of this state ...,
  then said action shall be barred in this state at the expiration of said
  shorter period.", https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=17897
  (accessed 2026-07-28)
• City of Louisa v. Horton, 263 Ky. 739, 93 S.W.2d 620, 622-23
  (1935), a pre-bar partial payment restarts the period; a pre-bar promise
  leaves suit on the original obligation; a post-bar promise must be sued on
  as the new promise; and an unqualified acknowledgment of a subsisting debt
  may suffice. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3451516/ (accessed
  2026-07-28)