Indiana: Statute of Limitations on Debt Collection

Requirements one by one

Governing law

Indiana's contract-debt deadlines sit in Title 34's Article 11 on limitation
of actions: IC 34-11-2-9 sets the period for promissory notes, bills of
exchange, and other written contracts for the payment of money, while IC
34-11-2-7(1) sets the period for accounts and contracts not in writing. IC
34-11-3-1 fixes the accrual date for a running mutual, open, and current
account, and IC 34-11-9-1 and -9-3 (a separate chapter titled
"Acknowledgment, New Promise, and Partial Payment") govern what restarts the
clock.

How long you have on a written debt

Six years from accrual, for a promissory note, bill of exchange, or other
written contract for the payment of money executed after August 31, 1982 (IC
34-11-2-9(b)). Older instruments get longer periods under transition rules in
the same subsection. One narrower carve-out sits in the same section: a claim
on a bank deposit account, brought by either the depositor or the bank, gets only 2 years (§9(c)), regardless of who sues whom.

How long you have on an oral or unwritten debt

Also six years. IC 34-11-2-7(1) covers "actions on accounts and contracts not
in writing" and sets the same 6-year period as the written-contract statute.
Indiana is one of a minority of states that does not shorten the clock for an
unwritten debt, an informal loan, a verbal agreement, or an open account
with no signed writing behind it gets exactly as much time as a signed
promissory note.

When the clock starts

Ordinarily, the date of breach or default. For a running mutual, open, and
current account between two parties, IC 34-11-3-1 sets a specific rule: the
claim accrues "from the date of the last item proved in the account on either
side," not from the date of the first missed payment. Separately, Indiana
courts have read a discovery-rule gloss into the general written-contract
statute: in Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), extending Habig v. Bruning, 613 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993),
the Indiana Court of Appeals held the clock can instead start when the
creditor "knew, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have
discovered," the breach, relevant mainly where a breach isn't obvious on
its face, which is unusual for an ordinary missed-payment debt.

Can a payment or promise restart the clock?

Yes, in two different ways. A written, signed acknowledgment or new promise
restarts the clock under IC 34-11-9-1, which requires it to be "in writing"
and "signed by the party to be charged." Separately, IC 34-11-9-3 preserves
the independent effect of an actual payment: "This chapter does not take away
or lessen the effect of any payment made by any person." Indiana case law
gives that preserved payment-effect real teeth: quoting the 1912 Indiana
Court of Appeals decision Barrett v. Sipp, a later court explained that "a
voluntary part payment upon an existing debt is prima facie sufficient to
revive such debt and start anew the statute of limitation," because the
payment itself implies "a new promise on [the debtor's] part to pay the
remainder of the debt." In other words, Indiana doesn't require a signed
writing to restart the clock the way some states do, a bare payment can do
it on its own. Unlike some other states' statutes, Indiana's payment-revival
rule as codified in IC 34-11-9-3 carries no express textual limit confining
it to a still-running (not-yet-expired) clock.

Is there a special rule for consumer debt?

No. Indiana does not carve out a separate limitations period for
consumer-credit-transaction debt. The same 6-year period under IC
34-11-2-9(b) or IC 34-11-2-7(1) applies whether the debt is a personal credit
card balance or a commercial account.

What if the debt originated in another state?

Indiana's version of a borrowing statute is narrower than the common shape
and works as a defense rather than an automatic import of a shorter foreign
period. IC 34-11-4-1 tolls (pauses) Indiana's own limitations period while a
defendant is a nonresident with no Indiana service agent. IC 34-11-4-2 then
provides that if a claim arose outside Indiana against such a nonresident
defendant, and the claim is already time-barred under both the law of
the state where the defendant resides and the law of the state where the
claim arose, that double bar is available "as a defense" in an Indiana
lawsuit. Unlike California's or New York's borrowing statutes, Indiana's
version doesn't simply substitute a shorter out-of-state period for its own;
it requires the claim to already be dead in two other places at once before
it can be raised as a defense here.

What actually happens once the deadline passes?

The ordinary common-law default: expiration is an affirmative defense the
debtor has to raise, not an automatic bar to filing suit. Indiana has no
statute, comparable to what some other states have enacted for licensed
collectors, that independently prohibits a creditor or collection agency
from suing, threatening suit, or arbitrating a claim it knows is time-barred.

What trips people up

Indiana's payment-revival rule is unusually easy to trigger by accident: a
"goodwill" payment on an old account can revive the debt with no writing, no
intent to waive anything, and no acknowledgment beyond the payment itself,
because Indiana case law treats the act of paying as implying a promise to
pay the rest. And because Indiana doesn't shorten the deadline for oral or
open-account debt the way many states do, assuming a verbal loan or informal
tab has a shorter clock than a signed note is a mistake in Indiana, both
get the same six years. The borrowing statute is also easy to misread: it
doesn't help a debtor whose out-of-state debt would already be time-barred
back home unless it's also barred where the debt originally arose.

Common questions

Does the 6-year period apply to my credit card debt?
Yes. A credit card balance backed by a cardholder agreement falls under IC
34-11-2-9(b)'s written-contract period, and even if a specific credit
transaction weren't reduced to a signed writing, IC 34-11-2-7(1) sets the
same 6-year period for unwritten accounts and contracts.

I made a small payment on an old debt, did that restart the clock?
Very likely yes. Indiana case law treats a voluntary partial payment, on its
own, as reviving the debt and restarting the limitations period, without
requiring any signed writing.

Can a debt collector still sue me after the statute of limitations runs?
Yes, unless you raise the expired deadline yourself as a defense. Indiana has
no statute independently barring a creditor or a licensed collection agency
from filing suit, or even threatening to, once the state limitations
period has run; it's on the debtor to plead the defense.

Does the debt just disappear once the time limit passes?
No. The underlying obligation still exists and can still be paid voluntarily
or reported; what expires is a creditor's ability to force payment through a
lawsuit unless the debtor fails to raise the defense.

Statutes and sources

• IC 34-11-2-9, "an action upon promissory notes, bills of exchange, or
  other written contracts for the payment of money executed after August 31,
  1982, must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action
  accrues ... An action upon a deposit account must be commenced not later
  than two (2) years after the cause of action accrues ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2025/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_2.pdf (accessed
  2026-07-09)
• IC 34-11-2-7, "The following actions must be commenced within six (6)
  years after the cause of action accrues: (1) Actions on accounts and
  contracts not in writing ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2025/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_2.pdf (accessed
  2026-07-09)
• IC 34-11-3-1, "In an action brought to recover a balance due upon a
  mutual, open, and current account between the parties, the cause of action
  is considered to have accrued from the date of the last item proved in the
  account on either side.", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2025/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_3.pdf (accessed
  2026-07-09)
• IC 34-11-9-1, "An acknowledgment or promise is not evidence of a new or
  continuing contract ... unless the acknowledgment or promise is: (1) in
  writing; and (2) signed by the party to be charged ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2025/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_9.pdf (accessed
  2026-07-09)
• IC 34-11-9-3, "This chapter does not take away or lessen the effect of
  any payment made by any person ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2025/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_9.pdf (accessed
  2026-07-09)
• IC 34-11-4-1, "The time during which the defendant is a nonresident of
  the state is not computed in any of the periods of limitation except
  during such time as the defendant by law maintains in Indiana an agent for
  service of process ...", https://law.justia.com/codes/indiana/title-34/article-11/chapter-4/section-34-11-4-1/
  (accessed 2026-07-09)
• IC 34-11-4-2, "When: (1) a cause of action arose outside of Indiana
  against a nonresident defendant ... and (3) the cause is fully barred by
  the laws both of the place where the defendant resides and of the place
  where the cause of action arose; the bar of the cause of action under
  subdivision (3) is a defense.", https://law.justia.com/codes/indiana/title-34/article-11/chapter-4/section-34-11-4-2/
  (accessed 2026-07-09)
• Barrett v. Sipp, 50 Ind. App. 304, 314, 98 N.E. 310, 314 (1912), a
  voluntary part payment on an existing debt is "prima facie sufficient to
  revive such debt and start anew the statute of limitation," as quoted and
  applied in Bartle v. Jackson St. Investors, LLC, No. 29A05-1205-CC-246
  (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2012).
• Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), discovery-rule accrual gloss on the written-contract limitations
  statute.