Statute of Limitations on Debt Collection in Indiana

At a glance

Requirements one by one

Governing law

Indiana's contract-debt deadlines sit in Title 34's Article 11 on limitation of actions: IC 34-11-2-9 sets the period for promissory notes, bills of exchange, and other written contracts for the payment of money, while IC 34-11-2-7(1) sets the period for accounts and contracts not in writing. IC 34-11-3-1 fixes the accrual date for a running mutual, open, and current account, and IC 34-11-9-1 and -9-3 (a separate chapter titled "Acknowledgment, New Promise, and Partial Payment") govern what restarts the clock.

How long you have on a written debt

Six years from accrual, for a promissory note, bill of exchange, or other written contract for the payment of money executed after August 31, 1982 (IC 34-11-2-9(b)). Older instruments get longer periods under transition rules in the same subsection. One narrower carve-out sits in the same section: a claim on a bank deposit account, brought by either the depositor or the bank, gets only 2 years (§9(c)), regardless of who sues whom.

How long you have on an oral or unwritten debt

Also six years. IC 34-11-2-7(1) covers "actions on accounts and contracts not in writing" and sets the same 6-year period as the written-contract statute. Indiana is one of a minority of states that does not shorten the clock for an unwritten debt, an informal loan, a verbal agreement, or an open account with no signed writing behind it gets exactly as much time as a signed promissory note.

When the clock starts

Ordinarily, the date of breach or default. For a running mutual, open, and current account between two parties, IC 34-11-3-1 sets a specific rule: the claim accrues "from the date of the last item proved in the account on either side," not from the date of the first missed payment. Separately, Indiana courts have read a discovery-rule gloss into the general written-contract statute: in Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), extending Habig v. Bruning, 613 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), the Indiana Court of Appeals applied a discovery rule under which the clock can start when the creditor knew, or through ordinary diligence could have discovered, the breach, relevant mainly where a breach isn't obvious on its face, which is unusual for an ordinary missed-payment debt.

Can a payment or promise restart the clock?

Yes, in two different ways. A written, signed acknowledgment or new promise restarts the clock under IC 34-11-9-1, which requires it to be "in writing" and "signed by the party to be charged." Separately, IC 34-11-9-3 preserves the independent effect of an actual payment: "This chapter does not take away or lessen the effect of any payment made by any person." Indiana case law gives that preserved payment effect real force. In Barrett v. Sipp, 50 Ind. App. 304, 98 N.E. 310 (1912), the Court of Appeals treated a voluntary part payment as prima facie evidence that revives the debt and starts the limitations period anew because the payment implies a new promise to pay the balance. In other words, Indiana doesn't require a signed writing to restart the clock the way some states do, a bare payment can do it on its own. Unlike some other states' statutes, Indiana's payment-revival rule as codified in IC 34-11-9-3 carries no express textual limit confining it to a still-running (not-yet-expired) clock.

Is there a special rule for consumer debt?

No. Indiana does not carve out a separate limitations period for consumer-credit-transaction debt. The same 6-year period under IC 34-11-2-9(b) or IC 34-11-2-7(1) applies whether the debt is a personal credit card balance or a commercial account.

What if the debt originated in another state?

Indiana's version of a borrowing statute is narrower than the common shape and works as a defense rather than an automatic import of a shorter foreign period. IC 34-11-4-1 tolls (pauses) Indiana's own limitations period while a defendant is a nonresident with no Indiana service agent. IC 34-11-4-2 then provides that if a claim arose outside Indiana against such a nonresident defendant, and the claim is already time-barred under both the law of the state where the defendant resides and the law of the state where the claim arose, that double bar is available "as a defense" in an Indiana lawsuit. Unlike California's or New York's borrowing statutes, Indiana's version doesn't simply substitute a shorter out-of-state period for its own; it requires the claim to already be dead in two other places at once before it can be raised as a defense here.

What actually happens once the deadline passes?

The ordinary common-law default: expiration is an affirmative defense the debtor has to raise, not an automatic bar to filing suit. Indiana has no statute, comparable to what some other states have enacted for licensed collectors, that independently prohibits a creditor or collection agency from suing, threatening suit, or arbitrating a claim it knows is time-barred.

What trips people up

Indiana's payment-revival rule is unusually easy to trigger by accident: a "goodwill" payment on an old account can revive the debt with no writing, no intent to waive anything, and no acknowledgment beyond the payment itself, because Indiana case law treats the act of paying as implying a promise to pay the rest. And because Indiana doesn't shorten the deadline for oral or open-account debt the way many states do, assuming a verbal loan or informal tab has a shorter clock than a signed note is a mistake in Indiana, both get the same six years. The borrowing statute is also easy to misread: it doesn't help a debtor whose out-of-state debt would already be time-barred back home unless it's also barred where the debt originally arose.

Common questions

Does the 6-year period apply to my credit card debt? Yes. A credit card balance backed by a cardholder agreement falls under IC 34-11-2-9(b)'s written-contract period, and even if a specific credit transaction weren't reduced to a signed writing, IC 34-11-2-7(1) sets the same 6-year period for unwritten accounts and contracts.

I made a small payment on an old debt, did that restart the clock? Very likely yes. Indiana case law treats a voluntary partial payment, on its own, as reviving the debt and restarting the limitations period, without requiring any signed writing.

Can a debt collector still sue me after the statute of limitations runs? Yes, unless you raise the expired deadline yourself as a defense. Indiana has no statute independently barring a creditor or a licensed collection agency from filing suit, or even threatening to, once the state limitations period has run; it's on the debtor to plead the defense.

Does the debt just disappear once the time limit passes? No. The underlying obligation still exists and can still be paid voluntarily or reported; what expires is a creditor's ability to force payment through a lawsuit unless the debtor fails to raise the defense.

Statutes and sources

• IC 34-11-2-9, "an action upon promissory notes, bills of exchange, or other written contracts for the payment of money executed after August 31, 1982, must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action accrues ... An action upon a deposit account must be commenced not later than two (2) years after the cause of action accrues ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2026/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_2.pdf (accessed 2026-08-23)
• IC 34-11-2-7, "The following actions must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action accrues: (1) Actions on accounts and contracts not in writing ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2026/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_2.pdf (accessed 2026-08-23)
• IC 34-11-3-1, "In an action brought to recover a balance due upon a mutual, open, and current account between the parties, the cause of action is considered to have accrued from the date of the last item proved in the account on either side.", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2026/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_3.pdf (accessed 2026-08-23)
• IC 34-11-9-1, "An acknowledgment or promise is not evidence of a new or continuing contract ... unless the acknowledgment or promise is: (1) in writing; and (2) signed by the party to be charged ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2026/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_9.pdf (accessed 2026-08-23)
• IC 34-11-9-3, "This chapter does not take away or lessen the effect of any payment made by any person ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2026/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_9.pdf (accessed 2026-08-23)
• IC 34-11-4-1, "The time during which the defendant is a nonresident of the state is not computed in any of the periods of limitation except during such time as the defendant by law maintains in Indiana an agent for service of process ...", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2026/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_4.pdf (accessed 2026-08-23)
• IC 34-11-4-2, "When: (1) a cause of action arose outside of Indiana against a nonresident defendant ... and (3) the cause is fully barred by the laws both of the place where the defendant resides and of the place where the cause of action arose; the bar of the cause of action under subdivision (3) is a defense.", https://iga.in.gov/ic/2026/Title_34/Article_11/Chapter_4.pdf (accessed 2026-08-23)
• Barrett v. Sipp, 50 Ind. App. 304, 314, 98 N.E. 310, 314 (1912), holds that voluntary part payment can revive an existing debt and begin the limitations period anew; later quoted in Bartle v. Jackson St. Investors, LLC, No. 29A05-1205-CC-246 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2012).
• Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), discovery-rule accrual gloss on the written-contract limitations statute.