Statute of Limitations on Debt Collection in Illinois

At a glance

Requirements one by one

Governing law

Illinois's contract-debt deadlines live in the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5, in the limitations article, §§ 13-115 and 13-206 (the ten-year rules, including the new mortgage-secured-debt language), § 13-205 (the five-year period for unwritten debt and everything else), and § 13-210 (the borrowing statute for debt that arose elsewhere). Public Act 104-0842 added the mortgage language effective August 21, 2026.

How long you have on a written debt

Ten years, running from accrual, under § 13-206, which covers "bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, any indebtedness of any kind that is secured by a mortgage, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing." But Illinois courts read "written contract" narrowly: a debt only qualifies for the 10-year period if its essential terms, including the specific amount owed, can be determined from the writing itself, with no outside evidence needed. A 2025 Illinois Appellate Court decision put the test plainly: "all the essential terms of the contract are in writing and are ascertainable from the instrument itself."

Public Act 104-0842 now adds another route to 10 years. The amended § 13-206 expressly covers "any indebtedness of any kind that is secured by a mortgage," and § 13-115 says such mortgage-secured indebtedness "shall also have a 10-year period to commence an action." That language applies even if the obligation otherwise would not satisfy the narrow written-contract test.

How long you have on an oral or unwritten debt

Five years under § 13-205, and this bucket is broader than its name suggests. It covers not just debt with no writing at all, but also a supposedly "written" debt where proving an essential term, again, usually the amount owed, requires evidence outside the document. Mortgage-secured debt is now the statutory exception. For unsecured debt, this is where most credit card debt lands: because the balance typically has to be shown through account statements rather than the cardholder agreement alone, Illinois courts have found "the five-year statute of limitations for oral contracts applicable where parol evidence is required to establish all of the essential terms and conditions of the contract." A revolving credit line was treated the same way before the new mortgage-secured-debt amendment when the agreement itself did not specify how much was actually borrowed.

When the clock starts

Generally, the date of breach or default. For a debt payable in installments, Illinois follows the "installment rule": a separate cause of action arises on each missed installment, and the clock starts running on each one as it comes due, rather than all at once, unless the creditor actually exercises an acceleration clause to declare the whole balance due immediately. A promissory note payable on a definite date accrues on that date (or on acceleration); a demand note accrues once a demand for payment is actually made.

Can a payment or promise restart the clock?

For written debt, yes, and dramatically so. Section 13-206 says that "if any payment or new promise to pay has been made, in writing," on a written debt, "within or after the period of 10 years, then an action may be commenced thereon at any time within 10 years after the time of such payment or promise to pay", meaning a written acknowledgment can revive a claim even after the original 10 years has already run out, not just extend one still running. Section 13-205's oral-contract statute contains no equivalent language at all, and Illinois authorities are genuinely split on whether courts should extend the same payment-revival concept to oral debt by analogy, since the legislature wrote the revival rule into only one of the two sections.

Is there a special rule for consumer debt?

Not by statute, but effectively yes through the written/oral classification rule above. Because most consumer credit-card and open-account debt fails the "essential terms ascertainable from the writing alone" test, it typically lands in the shorter 5-year bucket rather than the 10-year one. There is no dedicated consumer-debt period. A mortgage-secured consumer debt, however, now receives 10 years under Public Act 104-0842.

What if the debt originated in another state?

Illinois's borrowing statute, § 13-210, works in only one direction: if a claim is already time-barred under the law of the state or country where it arose, Illinois won't let a creditor revive it by suing here instead. But Illinois treats its own statute of limitations as a procedural matter, so absent that one-way bar, Illinois applies its own periods regardless of where the debt originated, there's no "whichever period is shorter" balancing test and no residency exception the way some other states have.

What actually happens once the deadline passes?

The ordinary default. Illinois's pleading rule, § 2-613(d), lists the statute of limitations among the "affirmative defense[s]" that "must be plainly set forth in the answer or reply" or they're lost. There's no Illinois statute that independently prohibits a creditor from suing on, or simply asking a debtor to voluntarily pay, a time-barred debt, the debtor has to actually raise the defense in court.

What trips people up

The written-versus-oral line isn't about whether a piece of paper exists, it's about whether that paper, by itself, proves what's owed. A cardholder agreement obviously exists in writing, but if you need a monthly statement to show the actual balance, Illinois courts have said that's enough to pull an unsecured claim into the shorter 5-year period. Mortgage security is now an independent route to 10 years, so do not apply the ordinary card-debt rule to a home-equity or other mortgage-secured obligation. On the flip side, a written payment or promise on an old written debt is a real trap: because § 13-206 lets this revive even an already-time-barred debt, a signed payment plan or written promise made years after the original deadline passed can hand a creditor a brand-new 10-year window.

Common questions

Does my credit card debt get 10 years or 5? Usually 5 if it is unsecured. Illinois courts generally treat credit card debt as governed by the shorter oral-contract period because proving the balance typically requires account statements beyond the cardholder agreement itself. If the debt is secured by a mortgage, the 2026 amendment instead supplies a 10-year period.

I signed a payment plan on an old, already-expired debt, did that restart the clock? For written debt, yes. Illinois's revival rule for written debt applies even to a claim that's already past its original deadline, reviving it for another 10 years from the date of the new written payment or promise.

Can a debt collector still contact me after the deadline passes? The Illinois statute of limitations itself only bars a lawsuit; it doesn't independently prohibit contact. Whether a specific contact about a time-barred debt is lawful is a separate question under federal and state debt-collection-conduct law, outside this survey's scope.

Does the debt disappear once the deadline passes? No. The underlying debt still exists; what expires is the ability to force payment through a lawsuit, and even then only if the debtor raises the defense.

Statutes and sources

• 735 ILCS 5/13-115, mortgage foreclosure must begin within 10 years, and "[a]ny indebtedness of any kind that is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage shall also have a 10-year period to commence an action.", https://ilga.gov/legislation/PublicActs/View/104-0842 (accessed 2026-08-23)
• 735 ILCS 5/13-206, "actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, any indebtedness of any kind that is secured by a mortgage, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing ... shall be commenced within 10 years next after the cause of action accrued; but if any payment or new promise to pay has been made, in writing, ... then an action may be commenced thereon at any time within 10 years after the time of such payment or promise to pay.", https://ilga.gov/legislation/PublicActs/View/104-0842 (accessed 2026-08-23)
• 735 ILCS 5/13-205, "actions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, ... and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued.", https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/073500050k13-205.htm (accessed 2026-07-09)
• 735 ILCS 5/13-210, "When a cause of action has arisen in a state or territory out of this State ... and, by the laws thereof, an action thereon cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained in this State.", https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/073500050k13-210.htm (accessed 2026-07-09)
• 735 ILCS 5/2-613(d), "The facts constituting any affirmative defense ... must be plainly set forth in the answer or reply.", https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/073500050K2-613.htm (accessed 2026-07-09)
• BMO Bank N.A. v. Zbroszczyk, 2025 IL App (1st) 241333, "all the essential terms of the contract are in writing and are ascertainable from the instrument itself.", https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/58eb8e2b-49c2-497f-80c5-02b1b9626b30/file (accessed 2026-08-23)