Prejudgment Interest Rules by State
Does this state award prejudgment interest on a civil judgment, at what rate, and from what date does it start running?
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Every entry, oldest check July 5, 2026
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What this survey covers
When a lawsuit takes years to resolve, the money at stake keeps losing value the whole time it sits unpaid. Prejudgment interest is how the law compensates for that: an amount added to a money judgment for the period BEFORE the judgment was entered, covering the time the plaintiff was owed money but didn't have it. Get the rate and the start date right and it can change a judgment's value substantially — sometimes by tens of percent, in a state with a high fixed rate and a claim that took years to resolve.
Every state answers this differently, and the differences are not small. Some states set one flat rate for everything; others peg the rate to a market benchmark that moves monthly. Some states start the clock on the date a debt became due; others wait until a lawsuit is filed. Most states treat a contract claim and a personal-injury or property-damage claim differently — sometimes with a different rate, sometimes with a different trigger date, sometimes with one available as of right and the other left to a court's discretion. This survey answers one question, state by state: what's the rate, when does it start, and does a contract claim get treated differently than a tort claim? Each state's page states the rule in plain English, quotes the statute it comes from, and shows the date we last verified the statutory text.
How to read the table
Each column is one feature of the state's prejudgment interest rule, answered the same way for every state, with the statutory citation compressed into the cell. Where a state's rule genuinely differs for contract versus tort claims, the cell says so rather than picking one and ignoring the other. Click a state for the full plain-English page: the rule dimension by dimension, the practical traps people actually hit, and the verbatim statutory text with official source links.
The patterns across all 51 pages
A contract-versus-tort split is the most common axis, but it isn't the only one. A large group of states (Washington, Arizona, Maryland, Wisconsin, Colorado, Kentucky, Oregon, Idaho, Vermont, Wyoming, Mississippi, Arkansas, and South Carolina among them) instead split by whether the damages are liquidated or ascertainable, a line that cuts across claim type: a fixed medical bill in a tort case and a fixed contract debt are treated the same way, while pain-and-suffering damages and an unliquidated contract claim are treated the same way too, usually left to a court's discretion. A smaller cluster of states (Hawaii, Minnesota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Alaska, and D.C.'s liquidated-debt track) go further and drop the contract/tort distinction entirely, applying one statute and one mechanism no matter what kind of claim it is.
Government defendants are a real fault line of their own, independent of the contract/tort or liquidated/unliquidated axis: some states bar prejudgment interest against the government outright (Wyoming, Iowa on tort claims, South Carolina), some fold it inside an existing damages cap (Maine), some exclude it from the cap (New Hampshire), and several simply never resolved the question in any reported case (Nevada, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, D.C.). A handful of states also gate an entire claim type on a procedural precondition rather than a substantive test: a settlement demand that must beat the eventual verdict (Delaware, Missouri, Utah, Nebraska), or a jury-fact-finding step that can be waived by omission (South Dakota's June 2026 Fischer v. Fischer-Olson decision is the sharpest example: a mandatory right lost entirely because nobody asked the jury to fix a disputed date). The rate itself ranges from a fixed low single digit to double digits, and a few states (Colorado, and Vermont's borrowed general rate) compound annually rather than running simple interest, which was the default everywhere else this survey could confirm one way or the other.
State by state
Every column answered the same way for each jurisdiction. Open a state for the full page, with the statute text and the date it was checked.
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| State | Governing law | Interest rate | When interest starts running | Contract vs. tort claims | Mandatory or discretionary | Simple or compound | Claims against the government | Other exceptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama verified 2026-08-13 | Contract claims: Ala. Code § 8-8-8 (interest accrues on breach of contract), read together with § 8-8-1 (the general legal/maximum interest rate). Tort claims: NO statute: the right comes entirely from Alabama common law (Nelson v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 622 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1993); Lapeyrouse Grain Corp. v. Tallant, 439 So. 2d 105 (Ala. 1983)), borrowing the same § 8-8-1 legal rate |
6% a year in the absence of a written contract; a written contract can set its own rate up to a statutory cap of $8 per $100 per year (8%). The 6% "legal rate" is the same rate courts apply to a qualifying tort claim's prejudgment interest by common law, since no separate tort rate exists |
Contract: from the day the money (or thing, valued in money) should have been paid or the act performed, per § 8-8-8's own text. Tort: from whenever the loss became fixed and ascertainable by a known standard of value or by mathematical computation, for example, the date of injury to property with a market value, or the date a legal determination fixed a previously-disputed share of a fund, not automatically from the date of injury or the date suit was filed |
Genuinely different mechanisms, not just different rates: contract prejudgment interest is a statutory entitlement running from the day payment was due, full stop. Tort prejudgment interest doesn't exist by statute at all: it's a common-law rule that applies only where the damages themselves are provably certain or reducible to certainty by computation or known valuation standards; the Alabama Supreme Court has been explicit that § 8-8-8 does not apply to tort claims (Nelson v. AmSouth Bank) |
Contract: effectively automatic once a payment date passed, the statute says such contracts "bear interest," not that a court may award it. Tort: not discretionary once the ascertainability test is met, the Alabama Supreme Court has REVERSED a trial court's denial of prejudgment interest where the damages were in fact fixed and calculable, treating it as something a qualifying tort plaintiff is entitled to, not a favor a court can withhold |
Neither statute nor the common-law tort rule mentions compounding; Alabama's interest and usury statutes speak throughout in terms of a flat rate "per annum," consistent with simple interest, and no case was located describing Alabama prejudgment interest as compounding |
The State of Alabama itself cannot be sued in any court at all (Ala. Const. art. I, § 14), so a judgment against the State, and therefore prejudgment interest on one, generally cannot arise in the first place. Counties and municipalities are not shielded by that same absolute immunity and can be sued in ordinary negligence (Ala. Code § 11-47-190 for municipalities), but any judgment against a governmental entity is capped at $100,000 per person (or $300,000 in the aggregate when more than two people are injured in one occurrence) and $100,000 for property damage under § 11-93-2, a statute that caps damages but does not itself mention prejudgment interest either way, and no case was located resolving whether interest counts toward that cap |
Punitive damages against a governmental entity are barred outright (Ala. Code § 6-11-26). A written contract's own interest rate controls over the 6% default, up to the 8% statutory ceiling; a rate above that ceiling risks the separate consequences of Alabama's usury law |
| Alaska verified 2026-07-28 | One statute, AS 09.30.070 ('Interest on judgments; prejudgment interest'), covers both contract and tort claims: Alaska doesn't split this into separate mandatory and discretionary tracks the way many other states do. A companion provision, AS 09.50.280, applies the same § 09.30.070 rate to a judgment against the State specifically, while barring punitive damages against the State outright |
A floating rate, but fixed for the life of a given judgment rather than reset annually as it accrues: 3 percentage points above the 12th Federal Reserve District discount rate in effect on January 2 of the year the judgment or decree is entered (6.75% for a judgment entered in 2026, per the Alaska Court System's own published table). If the parties have a written contract specifying its own interest rate, up to the legal ceiling for that type of contract, the contract rate controls instead and is written into the judgment |
From whichever happens first: the day process was served on the defendant, or the day the defendant received written notification that an injury occurred and that a claim might be brought over it: unless the court finds the parties agreed to a different date. The written notification must be of a kind that would lead a prudent person to expect a claim for personal injury, death, or property damage |
Genuinely unified, like Hawaii, Rhode Island, and a handful of other states in this survey: Alaska doesn't use separate statutes, separate rates, or a mandatory-vs-discretionary split for contract versus tort claims. One section, AS 09.30.070, applies the same floating rate and the same basic mechanism to both. The only real difference in practice is which accrual trigger tends to matter: a contract claim's interest more often runs from a demand or the date the debt was due (captured by the 'written notification' language), while a tort claim's interest typically runs from the date process was served or an earlier injury notice |
Framed as essentially automatic once the accrual date is established: the statute doesn't give the court discretion to decline interest once a money judgment is entered. The one place discretion enters is the accrual date itself: the default triggers (service of process or written injury notice) apply 'except when the court finds that the parties have agreed otherwise,' meaning the parties can contract around the default starting point |
Simple interest only. The Alaska Supreme Court has held directly that AS 09.30.070 'does not provide for compound interest on judgments,' rejecting a request for prejudgment interest compounded annually and instead affirming a simple-interest calculation from the date of the taking to judgment |
A judgment against the State of Alaska draws the same prejudgment interest as any other judgment, calculated under AS 09.30.070, but AS 09.50.280 expressly bars punitive damages against the State in the same breath, a rule the Alaska Supreme Court has enforced by reversing a punitive-damages award entered against a state corporation. Municipalities have no comparable blanket immunity: AS 09.65.070 lets an action be maintained against a municipality in its corporate capacity, subject to specific carve-outs (fire department employees performing department functions, certain property-inspection failures, and other listed exceptions). This survey found no separate prejudgment-interest rule or damages cap specific to municipalities, ordinary AS 09.30.070 rules appear to apply |
AS 09.30.070(c) states outright that 'prejudgment interest may not be awarded for future economic damages, future noneconomic damages, or punitive damages': three flat carve-outs from the statute's own text, applying regardless of claim type. Separately, subsection (b)'s accrual-date default can be displaced entirely if the court finds the parties agreed to a different starting point |
| Arizona verified 2026-08-12 | A.R.S. § 44-1201 is Arizona's single, comprehensive interest statute: covering ordinary debts, judgments generally, medical debt, and condemnation proceedings all in one section, and expressly barring prejudgment interest on unliquidated, future, punitive, or exemplary damages. A body of case law (Fleming v. Pima County; Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. McKeon) establishes that a LIQUIDATED claim draws prejudgment interest as a matter of right, regardless of whether it sounds in contract or in tort |
For an ordinary debt or obligation other than medical debt: 10% a year, unless a different rate is agreed to in writing. For a judgment on that kind of written agreement: the agreement's own rate. For any other judgment, including prejudgment interest on a liquidated claim with no contract rate: the lesser of 10% a year or 1% plus the prime rate (as published by the Federal Reserve), which is fixed at whatever it is once the judgment is entered and does not change afterward. Medical debt, and any judgment on medical debt, is capped separately at the lesser of a one-year Treasury constant-maturity yield or 3% |
For a liquidated claim, interest runs from the date the debt or obligation became due, typically the date of breach, demand, or when the amount was fixed, not from the date suit was filed or judgment entered. For an unliquidated claim, there is no prejudgment interest at all: the statute expressly forbids a court from awarding it |
Arizona's real dividing line is liquidated versus unliquidated damages, not contract versus tort. "Prejudgment interest is a matter of right on a liquidated claim regardless of whether the claim sounds in contract or in tort" (Fleming v. Pima County, as stated in Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. McKeon). A claim is liquidated if the evidence lets its amount be computed with exactness, without reliance on a judge's or jury's opinion or discretion: true of many contract debts and of some tort claims with an exactly fixed loss, but not of most personal-injury verdicts |
Mandatory once a claim is liquidated: "prejudgment interest on a liquidated claim is a matter of right and not a matter of discretion" (Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. McKeon). For an unliquidated claim, the statute goes further than leaving it to discretion: it affirmatively PROHIBITS a court from awarding prejudgment interest on it at all |
The statute never uses the word "compound"; it describes an annual rate applied to a principal sum, and Arizona courts and practitioners calculate it as simple interest |
Arizona doesn't bar or generally discount interest against the state or its agencies, the ordinary § 44-1201 rate structure applies, and courts have enforced the FULL, undiscounted rate against a state entity: when the Arizona State Retirement System had to refund an over-collected charge to Arizona State University, the Court of Appeals held the University was entitled to the full 10% rate for an "indebtedness" under subsection (A), not the lower prime-plus-1% "judgment" rate under subsection (B), because the debt existed independently of any judgment (Arizona State University Board of Regents v. Arizona State Retirement System). A condemnation judgment against a city, county, the state transportation department, or certain special districts uses a separate rate statute specific to that body (§ 44-1201(C)), outside this survey's scope, which excludes eminent-domain-specific rates |
No prejudgment interest is allowed on unliquidated damages, and no interest at all, pre- or post-judgment, is allowed on future damages, punitive damages, or exemplary damages found by the trier of fact; this is a categorical statutory bar, not a discretionary call. Medical debt and judgments on medical debt are carved out of the general 10%/prime-plus-1% framework entirely, capped instead at the lesser of a one-year Treasury constant-maturity yield or 3%. A condemnation judgment's rate depends on which government body brought the proceeding, each set by its own separate statute |
| Arkansas verified 2026-10-06 | Ark. Code Ann. § 16-65-114(a) sets judgment interest; Woodline supplies the fixed-damages test |
Contract action: contract rate or Federal Reserve primary credit rate + 2 points, whichever is greater; other action: Federal Reserve rate + 2 points (§ 16-65-114(a)(1)); subject to Amendment 89 ceiling |
When the loss was fixed in time and amount by a definite method (Woodline; Ozarks) |
The fixed-damages test applies to both; § 16-65-114(a)(1) uses different rate formulas |
Entitled as a matter of law once the fixed-damages test is met (Ozarks) |
§ 16-65-114 specifies the rate but does not prescribe a compounding method |
County-warrant and other county-debt judgments bear no interest (§ 16-65-114(b)); claims against the state follow the Claims Commission route (Ark. Const. art. 5, § 20; § 19-10-215) |
County-debt judgment bar (§ 16-65-114(b)); § 16-65-114(a)(2) incorporates Amendment 89's applicable rate ceiling |
| California verified 2026-10-06 | Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3287-3291; Cal. Const. art. XV, § 1 supplies the general default rate |
Contract: legal contract rate or 10%/yr after breach for an unspecified-rate post-1986 contract (§ 3289); noncontract: generally 7%/yr (Cal. Const. art. XV, § 1; Naranjo) |
Fixed damages: day right vested (§ 3287(a)); unliquidated contract: court-fixed date no earlier than filing (§ 3287(b)); § 3288 states no fixed date |
Fixed-damages route may apply to either; unliquidated contract and noncontract claims have distinct discretionary routes (§§ 3287-3288) |
Mandatory for certain or calculable damages (§ 3287(a)); court discretion for unliquidated contract (§ 3287(b)); jury discretion under § 3288 |
The cited interest statutes give annual rates but no general compounding schedule; contract terms or other applicable authority may matter |
§ 3287(a) reaches public debtors; tax or fee judgment against a public entity has a Treasury-yield rate capped at 7% (§ 3287(c)) |
Personal-injury plaintiff who beats a rejected § 998 offer receives 10% from first exceeded offer (§ 3291); no § 3291 charge against public entities or covered employees |
| Colorado verified 2026-10-06 | Personal-injury and fatal-injury tort damages: C.R.S. § 13-21-101; other qualifying debts or wrongfully withheld money or property: § 5-12-102. |
9% annually for personal-injury tort damages (§ 13-21-101(1)); generally 8% annually for § 5-12-102 claims when no rate is agreed, with an elective actual-gain measure for wrongful withholding; medical-debt interest capped at 3% (§ 5-12-102(5)). |
Personal injury: from claim accrual if claimed in the complaint (§ 13-21-101(1)); general claims: from wrongful withholding or when money becomes due, through payment or judgment entry under § 5-12-102(1). |
Personal-injury and fatal-injury tort claims have the 9% track (§ 13-21-101(1)); qualifying contract debts and other wrongfully withheld money or property use § 5-12-102, which also covers unliquidated amounts. |
For claimed personal-injury interest, adding it is the court’s duty (§ 13-21-101(1)); qualifying creditors shall receive or be allowed interest under § 5-12-102(1)-(3). |
Annual compounding under both statutes; § 13-21-101(1) specifies compounding from suit filing for actions filed since July 1, 1979. |
Governmental Immunity Act immunizes public entities from tort-type injury claims except listed waivers (§ 24-10-106(1)); certified limits for claims accruing 2026-2029 are $505,000 per person and $1,421,000 per occurrence, with a $505,000 individual ceiling (§ 24-10-114(1)). |
Medical-debt interest has a 3% ceiling, with administrator guidance due by December 31, 2026 (§ 5-12-102(5)); an appeal changes the personal-injury postjudgment rate (§ 13-21-101(1), (3)). |
| Connecticut verified 2026-10-06 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a governs discretionary detention-of-money interest; § 37-3b separately governs negligence injury claims; § 52-192a adds rejected-offer interest. |
Up to 10% yearly under § 37-3a(a), with a 5% ceiling for hospital-services debt (§ 37-3a(b)); up to 10% after the verdict/judgment trigger for negligence (§ 37-3b(a)); 8% for a qualifying rejected offer (§ 52-192a(c)). |
§ 37-3a: after money becomes payable; § 37-3b negligence interest: 20 days after judgment or 90 days after verdict, whichever earlier; § 52-192a: complaint filing if offer filed within 18 months, otherwise offer filing. |
A claim for payable detained money can qualify under § 37-3a, including contract claims; negligence personal-injury and property-damage actions use § 37-3b instead; rejected offers may trigger § 52-192a in money-damages actions. |
§ 37-3a says interest “may” be recovered; § 37-3b says negligence interest “shall” be recovered after its start trigger; § 52-192a(c) says the court “shall” add interest when the offer is beaten. |
The cited interest provisions state yearly rates but no general compounding instruction (§§ 37-3a, 37-3b, 52-192a); no universal compounding formula is stated here. |
State money claims ordinarily go through Claims Commissioner authorization (§ 4-160(a)); the official § 52-192a annotation says its offer-interest rule does not apply to the state absent an express immunity waiver. |
Hospital-services debt has a 5% cap (§ 37-3a(b)); qualifying rejected offers add 8% interest (§ 52-192a(c)); negligence interest starts after the statutory verdict/judgment trigger (§ 37-3b(a)). Condemnation uses a separate § 37-3c rule outside this topic. |
| Delaware verified 2026-08-11 | Two different sources, not one dedicated prejudgment-interest statute. 6 Del. C. § 2301(a) is a general legal-interest-rate statute that Delaware courts have read, through case law, as supplying the rate for an ordinary prejudgment-interest award on a law claim (contract or ascertainable-damages tort) once the common-law right attaches. Section 2301(d) is a separate, narrower, purpose-built provision covering only a tort action for compensatory bodily-injury, death, or property-damage claims in Superior Court or the Court of Common Pleas. The Court of Chancery draws on neither: interest there rests on the court's own inherent equitable discretion |
A floating rate: 5 percentage points over the Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge), fixed as of the date from which interest is due: not the date of judgment or trial. A written contract's own stated rate displaces this default. The Court of Chancery isn't bound by § 2301(a) at all; it has 'broad discretion, subject to principles of fairness,' including the discretion to select a rate higher than the statutory one |
For a common-law (contract or ascertainable-damages) claim: the date payment became due, generally the date of breach for a contract claim. For a § 2301(d) tort claim that meets its settlement-demand condition: the date of injury, by the statute's own text, a materially earlier date than the common-law rule would otherwise use |
A contract or other calculable pecuniary loss uses the common-law matter-of-right rule; the precise amount may remain disputed until verdict. Bodily-injury/death tort claims use § 2301(d), requiring a written demand open at least 30 days for less than the eventual award. A blended verdict may retain contract interest even when § 2301(d) bars the tort route |
In Superior Court and the Court of Common Pleas, prejudgment interest is 'awarded ... as a matter of right and not of judicial discretion' once the common-law ascertainability threshold is met, and § 2301(d) itself says interest 'shall be added' once its settlement-demand condition is satisfied: both mandatory, not discretionary. The Court of Chancery is the opposite: whether to award interest at all, and at what rate, is left to the court's own equitable discretion, and interest is less likely to be awarded pre-judgment where the underlying claim is equitable in nature |
Simple interest is the default and the near-universal outcome for law claims in Superior Court and the Court of Common Pleas. The Court of Chancery has separate, broader discretion of its own, including 'the lesser authority to award compounding', but Delaware's Chancery Court has said it will typically award simple interest instead when the underlying claim could have been brought in Superior Court, denying compound interest in that situation |
Delaware's Tort Claims Act broadly immunizes the State and its officers or employees from any 'judgment, damages, penalties, costs or other money entitlement' for a discretionary official act performed in good faith without gross or wanton negligence; § 4011(a) separately immunizes local governmental entities from tort-damages suits except for enumerated statutory categories, capped at $300,000 per occurrence absent excess insurance. Sovereign immunity is separately waived only 'as to any risk or loss covered by the state insurance coverage program.' This survey found no case addressing whether § 2301's ordinary rules, or § 2301(d)'s settlement-demand mechanism, apply differently once a claim against a Delaware governmental entity clears this immunity threshold: an open question, not a located rule |
Common-law interest requires a pecuniary loss whose value is calculable, but not a sum fixed before verdict; bodily harm, emotional distress, and reputation damages fall outside that rule and must fit § 2301(d) when it applies. Punitive damages do not draw prejudgment interest. The claimant must request interest in the pleadings or at trial |
| District of Columbia verified 2026-08-11 | Three provisions work together, not one dedicated statute. D.C. Code § 15-108 gives a near-mandatory right to interest on a liquidated debt (one on which interest is payable by contract, by law, or by usage), running from the date it became due. D.C. Code § 15-109 covers everything else: for a breach-of-contract claim, the judgment itself draws interest only 'from the date of the judgment,' but the statute expressly lets the court or jury include prejudgment interest as an element of the damages award if necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff: a judicially developed discretionary doctrine. For a tort ('a wrong') claim, § 15-109 says only that 'the judgment for the plaintiff shall bear interest,' which courts and practice guides read as a postjudgment-only rule. D.C. Code § 28-3302 supplies the actual rate for all of this |
6% a year under § 28-3302(a), 'the rate of interest in the District upon the loan or forbearance of money... in the absence of expressed contract', is the rate D.C.'s courts apply both to a § 15-108 liquidated-debt award and to a § 15-109 discretionary compensatory-interest award, rejecting a claimant's attempt to use a higher market rate of return instead. A written contract's own stated rate controls if there is one. A separate, lower rate applies specifically to a judgment against the District government or its officers or employees: § 28-3302(b) caps that rate at 'not exceeding 4% per annum' |
For a § 15-108 liquidated debt: from 'the time when it was due and payable.' For a § 15-109 discretionary contract award: courts look to when the plaintiff was actually deprived of the use of money owed: in the leading case, that meant the date the District finally accepted a contractor's completed work and the payment became due, not an earlier date of substantial performance. For an ordinary tort claim: there is no comparable prejudgment accrual date at all, because § 15-109's tort clause has been read as addressing only the postjudgment period |
A genuine three-way split, not just a difference in rate. A liquidated contract debt draws interest close to as a matter of right under § 15-108. A non-liquidated or general breach-of-contract claim draws interest only if a court or jury exercises discretion under § 15-109 to include it 'as an element of damages', and D.C.'s courts have held that this discretion doesn't turn on whether the debt was liquidated or unliquidated, only on whether the plaintiff was in fact deprived of the use of money owed. An ordinary tort ('wrong') claim is the outlier: § 15-109's own text gives that judgment interest only from the date of judgment, with no statutory or case-law doctrine importing the contract side's 'element of damages' theory into an ordinary personal-injury or property-damage tort claim |
A genuine three-way split. § 15-108's liquidated-debt interest is essentially mandatory: the judgment 'shall include' it. § 15-109's contract 'element of damages' interest is squarely discretionary: 'the decision whether to award prejudgment interest is confided to the discretion of the trial court,' though that discretion must rest on correct legal principles and a stated factual basis, not a bare, unexplained denial. An ordinary tort claim presents no prejudgment-interest decision to make at all under the statute's plain terms, mandatory or discretionary, because no mechanism reaches back before the date of judgment |
Ordinarily simple, not compounded, unless a contract provides otherwise (Bragdon v. Twenty-Five Twelve Associates, 856 A.2d 1165, 1173 n.7 (D.C. 2004)) |
A judgment against the District of Columbia government, or one of its officers or employees acting within the scope of employment, draws interest at a rate capped at 'not exceeding 4% per annum' under § 28-3302(b): a full 2 percentage points below the 6% rate that applies to every other judgment debtor. This survey found no case addressing whether this reduced 4% cap governs only the postjudgment period or also limits a § 15-109 discretionary prejudgment-interest award entered against the District specifically |
§ 15-109's contract clause is itself an exception to the ordinary rule that a judgment draws interest only from its own entry date, but that exception only opens the door to a compensatory-interest award if the fact-finder is persuaded the plaintiff was genuinely 'deprived of the use of money withheld' and should be made whole for that loss; a plaintiff who can't show that deprivation gets no more than ordinary postjudgment interest even on a contract claim. The reduced 4% rate for a judgment against the District government (§ 28-3302(b)) is itself the clearest carve-out in the rate structure |
| Florida verified 2026-10-06 | Florida Supreme Court loss theory (*Argonaut*; *Bosem*) governs entitlement; Fla. Stat. §§ 55.03(1) and 687.01 supply the statutory rate when no special contract rate applies. |
Quarterly rate set under § 55.03(1): preceding 12-month New York Fed discount-rate average plus 400 basis points; written contract rate preserved; § 687.01 cross-refers to § 55.03. |
From the date the pecuniary loss is fixed (*Argonaut*; *Bosem*); an equitable exception moved a county back-pay start to the first demand in *Broward County v. Finlayson*. |
Same loss-date principle may apply in contract and tort where the loss is pecuniary and fixed as of a definite date (*Argonaut*; *Bosem*). |
Interest is generally due as a matter of law once the pecuniary loss and date are fixed (*Argonaut*); *Finlayson* recognizes a narrow equity-based start-date exception. |
Neither §§ 55.03(1), 687.01 nor the cited loss-theory holdings specifies a general compounding method for prejudgment interest; check the judgment or applicable agreement. |
A county owed prejudgment interest on a contract-related back-pay claim, with the start adjusted to first demand on equitable grounds (*Finlayson*). |
No fixed past pecuniary loss, no loss-date award under *Argonaut*; equitable circumstances may alter the start or availability (*Finlayson*). |
| Georgia verified 2026-08-16 | Contract/liquidated debts: O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15, using the § 7-4-2 legal rate; tort/unliquidated damages: § 51-12-14, the 'Unliquidated Damages Interest Act,' a demand-notice-triggered mechanism; damages awarded under the Georgia Tort Claims Act cannot include prejudgment interest under § 50-21-30 |
Contract (liquidated demand): the § 7-4-2 legal rate, 7%/yr simple interest, unless the parties agreed to a different rate; tort (unliquidated demand under § 51-12-14): the Federal Reserve's prime rate (per its H.15 release) plus 3%, fixed as of the 30th day after the demand notice |
Contract: from the date the party became liable and bound to pay, or from the demand if payable on demand (§ 7-4-15); tort: only if a written demand is sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery and remains unpaid for 30 days: interest then runs 'from the thirtieth day following' the mailing or delivery until judgment, provided the judgment is not less than the amount demanded (§ 51-12-14(a), (c)) |
Two separate statutes: a liquidated contract debt follows § 7-4-15 without the special § 51-12-14 notice procedure (although a debt payable on demand accrues interest only from demand); an unliquidated tort claim gets no § 51-12-14 interest unless the plaintiff sends a written demand by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery and the statutory conditions are met |
Contract: mandatory, 'awarded by a judge as a matter of law' and 'not premised on bad faith' (Rivergate Corp. v. Atlanta Indoor Adv. Concepts, Inc.). Tort: mandatory once the demand-notice procedure is satisfied and the judgment meets or exceeds the amount demanded, but the plaintiff must take the affirmative step of sending a qualifying demand to trigger it at all |
Simple interest throughout: § 7-4-2 expressly defines the default legal rate as '7 percent per annum simple interest,' and neither § 51-12-14 nor the postjudgment-interest statute, § 7-4-12, authorizes compounding |
For damages awarded under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, § 50-21-30 states that 'No award for damages under this article shall include punitive or exemplary damages or interest prior to judgment.' The exclusion is categorical within that article; this survey does not extend it to every possible non-GTCA claim involving a state entity |
The § 51-12-14 demand mechanism is cut off if the defendant counters, within 30 days, with a written offer to pay the demand plus accrued interest through that date, and the plaintiff doesn't accept it within a further 30 days; evidence of the demand and the interest itself is kept away from the jury and added by the court only after judgment; a separate, narrower rate applies to certain open/commercial accounts under § 7-4-16, outside this survey's scope |
| Hawaii verified 2026-08-16 | Haw. Rev. Stat. § 636-16 gives the court discretion to award prejudgment interest and set its start date in any civil case; § 478-2 (the general 'legal rate' statute) supplies the rate once interest is awarded; a separate provision, § 478-3, sets 10% interest on the judgment itself after entry (the postjudgment companion) |
10% a year under § 478-2's general legal rate — the same rate used for a § 636-16 prejudgment award — except that an obligation of the State itself draws that calendar quarter's Wall Street Journal prime rate instead, capped at 10%; a written contract's own stated rate controls instead of either default |
Whatever date the judge finds fits the case's circumstances (§ 636-16), a discretionary standard meant to correct for how long a case took to reach judgment — except that the date can never be earlier than the date of injury for a tort claim or the date of breach for a contract claim |
Not split into separate statutes or rates: a single provision, § 636-16, covers civil cases generally, giving the court the same discretionary power over both the decision to award interest and the start date regardless of claim type. The only claim-type difference is which event (injury vs. breach) marks the earliest possible starting point |
Fully discretionary for every claim type: the statute says the judge 'is authorized to designate' a commencement date, and Hawaii courts routinely deny prejudgment interest where the case wasn't unreasonably delayed, reviewed only for abuse of discretion |
No statute addresses whether judgment interest compounds; case law and practice describe it as a flat rate 'per annum,' consistent with simple interest. The one Hawaii statute barring compound interest, § 478-7, is limited by its own text to consumer credit transactions and credit-card agreements, not general civil judgments |
The State is categorically immune from prejudgment interest on almost every claim against it. § 662-2 (State Tort Liability Act) says the State 'shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment,' confirmed as a deliberate, unwaived reservation of immunity in Taylor-Rice v. State, 105 Hawai'i 104, 94 P.3d 659 (2004). § 661-8 (general claims against the State) separately bars prejudgment interest on any claim against the State unless it's founded on a contract that expressly stipulates for interest, or a litigated-claims-fund refund, confirmed in Garner v. State, Dep't of Educ., 122 Hawai'i 150, 223 P.3d 215 (2009). Counties are not covered by the State Tort Liability Act, so this survey found no similar immunity for them |
§ 636-16's discretion is not limited to liquidated damages — an unliquidated tort claim can still draw prejudgment interest, unlike states that require a fixed or easily calculable sum. Conversely, a federal court applying Hawaii law has held there's no authority to award § 636-16 interest where the entire case was resolved through arbitration rather than litigated to judgment |
| Idaho verified 2026-10-06 | Idaho Code § 28-22-104(1) sets the legal interest rate for listed money obligations; Idaho decisions apply it to liquidated or mathematically ascertainable prejudgment claims (Bouten Construction Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756 (1999)). |
12% a year under § 28-22-104(1), unless an express written contract sets a different rate. Subsection (2) instead sets a floating rate for money due on a judgment. |
For a qualifying amount, interest runs when the money becomes due or, for a settled mutual account, when its balance is ascertained (§ 28-22-104(1)); the damages must be liquidated or calculable by mere mathematical process (Bouten). |
Section 28-22-104(1) lists types of money due rather than separate contract and tort rates. The claimant must meet the liquidated-or-mathematically-ascertainable threshold recognized in Bouten. |
Statutory interest is allowed on the listed money obligations once the amount qualifies; whether damages were liquidated or ascertainable is the decisive threshold (§ 28-22-104(1); Bouten). |
Prejudgment interest under § 28-22-104 is simple, as held in Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767 (Ct. App. 2006). That opinion considered a separate equitable claim for compounded gains. |
The Idaho Tort Claims Act (§ 6-901) caps combined governmental liability for damages, costs, and attorney fees at $500,000 per occurrence unless excess insurance applies (§ 6-926(1)); it also bars punitive damages (§ 6-918). These sections do not specify prejudgment interest’s treatment within the cap. |
A written contract setting a different interest rate displaces § 28-22-104(1)’s 12% default; an amount that is not liquidated or mathematically ascertainable fails the Bouten prejudgment-interest threshold. |
| Illinois verified 2026-10-06 | Qualifying overdue debts: 815 ILCS 205/2; personal-injury and wrongful-death judgments: 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c). |
5% annually on qualifying Interest Act debts (815 ILCS 205/2); 6% annually on covered personal-injury and wrongful-death judgment amounts (735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c)). |
Interest Act: after money becomes due or from its specified settlement/withholding event; injury and wrongful death: action filing, with a five-year accrual maximum and dismissal-to-refiling tolling (§ 2-1303(c)). |
815 ILCS 205/2 covers listed debt categories, including written instruments; § 2-1303(c) separately covers personal injury and wrongful death from negligent, intentional, or strict-liability conduct. |
Interest Act says creditors “shall be allowed” the listed interest; § 2-1303(c) says a qualifying tort plaintiff “shall recover” interest, subject to statutory exclusions and offer terms. |
Neither 815 ILCS 205/2 nor § 2-1303(c) states a compounding method; the five-year period limits accrual duration, without itself resolving compounding. |
§ 2-1303(c) expressly excludes the State, local government units, school and community college districts, and other governmental entities from its injury/wrongful-death prejudgment interest. |
§ 2-1303(c) excludes punitive damages, sanctions, statutory attorney fees and costs; its written-offer rule reduces interest to the judgment-minus-offer difference, or zero if judgment does not exceed the offer. |
| Indiana verified 2026-10-06 | Tort actions: IC 34-51-4-1 through -9; qualifying loans, written instruments and accounts: IC 24-4.6-1-102 through -104. |
Tort: court-set 6%-10% annually (§ 34-51-4-9); listed debt claims: 8% annually absent an agreed rate (§§ 24-4.6-1-102, -103). |
Tort: latest applicable statutory trigger, at most 48 months, excluding plaintiff-caused delay (§ 34-51-4-8); written instrument: settlement date; listed account: itemized bill plus demand (§ 24-4.6-1-103). |
Tort chapter applies to civil actions arising from tortious conduct (§ 34-51-4-1), with settlement-offer limits; the separate debt provisions cover their stated loans, instruments and accounts. |
Tort award discretionary (“may,” § 34-51-4-7); qualifying debt interest “shall” accrue at the specified rate under §§ 24-4.6-1-102, -103. |
Tort interest expressly simple (§ 34-51-4-9). For loans or forbearances, § 24-4.6-1-104(b)-(d) permits agreed methods and supplies a default that can add past-due interest installments to principal. |
Tort chapter does not impose prejudgment-interest liability on the state or political subdivisions (§ 34-51-4-4). |
Tort chapter excludes punitive damages and patient-compensation-fund claims (§§ 34-51-4-2, -3); qualifying defendant or plaintiff settlement offers can disapply the chapter (§§ 34-51-4-5, -6). |
| Iowa verified 2026-10-06 | Iowa Code § 535.3(1)(a) sets the general judgment-rate cross-reference; § 668.13 governs actions under the comparative-fault chapter; § 669.4(2) bars state-tort prejudgment interest |
One-year Treasury constant-maturity rate immediately before judgment plus 2 points (§§ 535.3, 668.13(3)); a qualifying contract-fixed rate controls under § 668.13(2) |
Chapter 668 actions: filing date, except future damages from judgment (§ 668.13(1), (4)). Contract and other non-chapter-668 claims require their own accrual analysis |
§ 535.3 borrows the rate; § 668.13 limits its filing-date accrual rule to chapter 668 actions. Wilson holds a contract-based underinsured motorist claim outside that chapter |
Interest on money judgments is directed by “shall” (§ 535.3); chapter 668 prejudgment interest is also directed by “shall” (§ 668.13), subject to its exceptions |
§ 668.13(5) requires daily computation through payment but does not expressly prescribe simple or compound interest |
State tort claims: no prejudgment interest or punitive damages under § 669.4(2); interest runs from judgment under Hook |
In chapter 668 actions, future-damage interest starts at judgment; a fixed contract rate is subject to the § 535.2 ceiling; structured judgments may use annuity principles (§ 668.13) |
| Kansas verified 2026-10-06 | K.S.A. 16-201(a) governs qualifying money due; subsection (b) supplies a separate court-awarded tort rate for civil actions filed on or after July 1, 2023. K.S.A. 16-204(e)(1) defines the referenced judgment rate, and § 75-6105(c)-(d) addresses governmental defendants. |
Money due: 10% a year absent an agreed rate (§ 16-201(a)); contract rate continues through judgment (§ 16-205(a)). Eligible tort suits: two points below the § 16-204(e)(1) judgment rate; 7.75% judgment rate for July 2026–June 2027 means 5.75% tort prejudgment rate (§ 16-201(b); Kansas Secretary of State rate table). |
For § 16-201(a) money due, from when the amount became due; for a settled account, from liquidation and ascertainment of its balance. Subsection (b) authorizes tort interest in eligible suits but does not give a universal injury-date trigger. |
Section 16-201(a) covers qualifying money due, including liquidated contract claims under Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; subsection (b) separately permits a court to award tort prejudgment interest in civil actions filed on or after July 1, 2023. |
For tort suits under § 16-201(b), the court decides whether to award interest. Section 16-201(a) says creditors shall be allowed interest on covered money due; Hamilton requires the claimed amount and due date to be fixed or mathematically ascertainable. |
Section 16-201 states annual rates without a periodic prejudgment compounding formula. Accrued prejudgment interest becomes part of the judgment on which postjudgment interest runs (Iola State Bank v. Bolan, 235 Kan. 175 (1984)). |
K.S.A. 75-6105(c) bars prejudgment interest against a governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of employment, except for an employee’s actual fraud or malice. Subsection (d) exempts childhood-sexual-abuse claims from § 75-6105. |
Civil tort actions filed before July 1, 2023 are outside § 16-201(b). An agreed contract rate displaces § 16-201(a)’s 10% default (§ 16-205(a)); § 75-6105(c)-(d) limits government claims as described above. |
| Kentucky verified 2026-10-06 | KRS 360.010(1), (3)-(4) sets the legal and written-contract rates; *Nucor Corp. v. General Electric Co.* supplies the liquidated/unliquidated entitlement rule; KRS 360.040 governs postjudgment interest. |
Legal rate 8% annually (§ 360.010(1)); a written obligation with its own rate uses that rate after default, while an eligible writing without one uses the legal rate (§ 360.010(3)-(4)). |
A liquidated contractual amount ordinarily runs from the due date (*Nucor*; § 360.010(4)); for unliquidated damages the court assesses interest equitably and fixes the period. |
The case-law distinction is liquidated versus unliquidated damages, which may cut across contract and tort claims (*Nucor*). |
Liquidated damages: interest follows as a matter of course; unliquidated damages: court decides in equity, rather than a jury (*Nucor*). |
Prejudgment compounding is not specified by § 360.010; an appellate court allowed it in a contract case as a matter of trial-court discretion (*Reliable Mechanical*). Postjudgment interest compounds annually (§ 360.040(1)). |
Board of Claims awards under KRS 49.040(1) are capped at $250,000 per claimant or $400,000 total for multiple claims from one negligent act; limits are exclusive of interest and costs. |
A written contract rate governs eligible after-default interest (§ 360.010(3)); *Unifund CCR Partners v. Harrell* disallowed fallback to 8% after a creditor had contracted above that rate and charged off the account. |
| Louisiana verified 2026-10-06 | Civil Code art. 2000 (damages for delay in paying a sum of money, i.e. the contract rule) and La. R.S. 13:4203 ("legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand" on tort/"ex delicto" judgments), both keyed to the annual rate set by La. R.S. 13:4202 and R.S. 9:3500. A separate statute, R.S. 13:5112(C), sets a distinct rate and trigger for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against the state or a political subdivision |
The same floating "judicial interest" rate for both contract and tort claims: the Commissioner of Financial Institutions recalculates it every October, at 3.25 percentage points above the Federal Reserve Board's published discount rate, effective the following calendar year: 7.5% for 2026 (was 8.25% for 2025, 8.75% for 2024). A written contract can instead set its own rate, which controls over the default judicial rate |
Contract: from the day the money was due, under Civil Code art. 2000's own text ("from the time it is due"). Tort: from the date of JUDICIAL DEMAND, meaning the date the lawsuit was filed, not the date of injury, under R.S. 13:4203; Louisiana's Supreme Court has confirmed this attaches automatically even where a signed judgment mistakenly recites a different date |
Same rate, different accrual trigger: the reverse pairing of most other states surveyed here, where the RATE usually differs but not always the trigger. A contract claim's interest runs from the date performance was due; a tort claim's interest can never start earlier than the date suit was filed, even if the injury happened years before, unless a separate statute (like the government-claim rule below) sets a different trigger |
Mandatory, not discretionary, once a claim qualifies. Civil Code art. 2000 lets an obligee recover contract delay-damages "without having to prove any loss." The Louisiana Supreme Court has held tort judicial interest "attaches automatically... as a matter of law" from the date of judicial demand regardless of what date a judgment happens to state (Bilalis v. Drennan, No. 2025-C-00453 (La. Dec. 18, 2025)) |
Simple interest. Neither Civil Code art. 2000 nor R.S. 13:4202-4203 describes any compounding mechanism; each simply fixes an annual rate applied to the principal owed for the relevant period |
For personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against the state or a political subdivision, the rate is the lesser of 6% or the R.S. 13:4202 judicial-interest rate (6% in 2026), from the date service is requested after judicial demand until the trial judge signs judgment; R.S. 13:5112(C), amended effective August 1, 2026. Later interest follows R.S. 9:3500 and 13:4202. |
A contract's agreed rate controls instead of the default judicial rate (Civil Code art. 2000). Construction payment claims have a distinct 1.5%-per-month late-payment penalty under R.S. 9:2784(D)(1), outside this general interest rule. |
| Maine verified 2026-10-06 | 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B governs prejudgment interest in civil and small claims actions; § 1602-C governs postjudgment interest separately. |
A contract or note containing an interest provision uses its stated rate (§ 1602-B(2)); other civil actions use the one-year U.S. Treasury bill rate plus 3 points (§ 1602-B(3)). Small claims have no prejudgment interest unless based on a contract or note rate (§ 1602-B(1)). |
From a sworn notice of claim served personally or by registered/certified mail; absent notice, from complaint filing. A prevailing party’s requested continuance longer than 30 days suspends interest during that continuance (§ 1602-B(5)). |
A rate-bearing contract or note follows § 1602-B(2); other civil claims, including rate-silent contracts and tort claims, follow the Treasury-plus-3-point formula in § 1602-B(3). |
Interest is allowed under § 1602-B(2)-(3), but on the losing party’s petition and good cause the court may waive it fully or partly (§ 1602-B(5)). |
Section 1602-B does not prescribe periodic prejudgment compounding; subsection (6) expressly prevents accrued prejudgment interest from being added to the base for postjudgment interest. |
Under the Maine Tort Claims Act, damages and costs against a governmental entity or employee are capped at $400,000 per occurrence (§ 8105(1)); prejudgment interest is inside that limit, while accrued postjudgment interest is outside (§ 8105(2)). |
Small claims cannot recover prejudgment interest without a contract or note rate (§ 1602-B(1)); a court may waive interest on petition and good cause (§ 1602-B(5)). |
| Maryland verified 2026-10-06 | No single statute governs. The RIGHT to prejudgment interest comes from case law, a "modified discretionary approach" (Buxton v. Buxton, building on I.W. Berman Properties v. Porter Bros.), while the RATE defaults to Md. Const. art. III, § 57's 6% "Legal Rate of Interest." Two narrow statutes cover specific mechanisms only: § 11-106 (a loan contract's own rate continues on a judgment through the loan's original maturity date) and § 11-301 (a discretionary, capped, delay-based interest award limited to motor-vehicle bodily-injury cases) |
6% a year, the constitutional default rate under Art. III, § 57, unless a written contract sets its own rate, which then controls (and, for a loan-of-money judgment, continues through the loan's originally scheduled maturity date under § 11-106). The narrow § 11-301 motor-vehicle delay-interest mechanism is separately capped at 10%. This 6% prejudgment default is a different, lower rate than Maryland's 10% POST-judgment rate under § 11-107, which only applies once a judgment is actually entered |
For a matter-of-right claim, from the specific date the debt became certain, definite, and due, a breach date, a note's maturity date, a date rent was owed, not the filing date. For the discretionary middle category of unliquidated contract claims, whatever date the trier of fact finds equitable; no statute fixes one. For a tort claim involving bodily harm, emotional distress, or similarly intangible damage, there is no true prejudgment accrual at all. The narrow § 11-301 delay-interest mechanism instead runs from a court-set date no earlier than when the action was filed |
Maryland sorts by whether damages are certain and liquidated, not simply by contract versus tort, but layers an absolute tort-specific bar on top. A LIQUIDATED claim of either kind, a contract debt due on a specific date, or a tort claim like conversion where the value taken is readily ascertainable, draws interest as a matter of right. An unliquidated CONTRACT claim falls into a broad middle zone left to discretion. A tort claim for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar intangible damage gets NO prejudgment interest at all, as a matter of law, not merely a discretionary denial |
Mandatory ("a matter of right") once a claim, contract or tort, is certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date before judgment. Discretionary, left to the judge or jury, for the broad middle category of unliquidated contract claims. Categorically UNAVAILABLE, not merely subject to discretion, for a tort claim recovering for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similarly intangible, unliquidated damage |
Simple interest under Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 653 (2001); a 2025 Maryland appellate opinion also calculated a disputed award at 6% simple interest. |
The State tort-claims waiver expressly excludes interest before judgment (Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(2)). The local-government cap excludes interest accrued on a judgment (§ 5-303(a)(2)); that text concerns interest on a judgment and does not itself establish prejudgment interest. Section 5-522(d) addresses punitive damages in State contract actions. |
The tort intangible-damage bar is itself the sharpest exception, Maryland doesn't merely leave tort personal-injury prejudgment interest to discretion the way it does unliquidated contract claims; it forbids it outright. A narrow carve-out partly offsets that: in a motor-vehicle bodily-injury case specifically, § 11-301 lets a court assess delay-based interest, capped at 10% and running from no earlier than the filing date, if the DEFENDANT (or the defendant's insurer or counsel) caused unnecessary delay getting the case to trial, a sanction for stalling, not classic prejudgment interest, and unavailable if the plaintiff caused the delay. A loan-of-money judgment keeps the loan's own contract rate through its original maturity date under § 11-106, rather than switching immediately to the general default |
| Massachusetts verified 2026-10-06 | G.L. c. 231, § 6B (tort) and § 6C (contract); § 6I sets a separate rate for contract judgments against the commonwealth |
12%/yr for both contract and tort claims (or the contract's own stated rate); a contract judgment against the commonwealth uses the established contract rate or the § 6I Treasury-yield rate, capped at 10%/yr |
Contract: date of breach or demand if established, otherwise the date the action was filed; Tort: always the date the action was filed |
Same 12% rate and same automatic mechanics under twin statutes, but different accrual triggers — breach/demand date for contract, filing date for tort |
Mandatory and automatic — the clerk of court adds it to the judgment by operation of law, with no discretion for the judge or jury to withhold it |
Neither § 6B nor § 6C expressly directs compounding; each states an annual rate |
A tort claim under the Tort Claims Act against a public employer gets no prejudgment interest; a contract claim against the commonwealth uses its established contract rate or § 6I’s capped Treasury-yield rate |
The Tort Claims Act's $100,000 damages cap and its bar on punitive damages apply on top of the interest bar for a tort claim against a public employer; 2025-2026 S.1149 and H.1795 proposed replacing the 12% default with a Treasury-yield formula; both received study-order dispositions |
| Michigan verified 2026-10-06 | MCL 600.6013 (Revised Judicature Act) governs interest on a money judgment in an ordinary civil action: one statute covering both the 'prejudgment' and 'postjudgment' period as a single continuous calculation; the parallel MCL 600.6455 applies the same mechanism to a judgment against the State of Michigan in the Court of Claims |
Ordinary rate: 1% plus the certified average yield at 5-year Treasury-note auctions, reset each January 1 and July 1 and compounded annually. The July 2026 yield component is 3.959%, making the July–December 2026 statutory rate 4.959%. A qualifying written indebtedness instrument uses its own legal rate, capped at 13% (MCL 600.6013(7)–(8)). |
From the date the COMPLAINT is filed (not the date of breach or injury) through the date the judgment is satisfied: one continuous period, not a prejudgment clock that stops at verdict. Exception: no interest accrues, for the period between filing and entry of judgment, on the 'future damages' portion of a personal-injury verdict |
Both claim types draw interest under the same base formula from filing to satisfaction, but two things differ: (1) a contract judgment on a written instrument with its own specified rate uses that rate instead of the Treasury-note formula; (2) only a tort judgment is subject to the statute's settlement-offer adjustment: interest can be cut off early if the defendant's bona fide written settlement offer is rejected by the plaintiff, or increased by 2 points if the plaintiff's bona fide offer is rejected by the defendant |
Mandatory. The statute says interest 'is allowed' and 'is calculated' on every qualifying money judgment; a court has no discretion to withhold it. The only judgment calls involved are factual, whether a settlement offer was 'bona fide' and 'reasonable', not whether to award interest at all |
Compounded annually: stated expressly in every rate provision of § 6013 and in the parallel Court of Claims section, § 6455 |
Court of Claims judgments against the State use MCL 600.6455(2): the same 1%-plus-Treasury-yield formula from complaint filing, compounded annually, with the separate tort-offer rules in subsections (4)–(6). |
No interest on the 'future damages' portion of a personal-injury judgment for the period between filing and entry of judgment (future medical costs, future lost earnings, etc., as defined in MCL 600.6301(a)); interest under § 6013(8) is computed on the ENTIRE judgment including awarded costs and attorney fees, except that medical-malpractice cost/fee awards draw no interest for any period before judgment; a tort defendant's bona fide settlement offer (at least 90% of the eventual recovery) that the plaintiff rejects and that is filed with the court cuts off further interest as of that filing, while a rejected bona fide plaintiff's offer (no more than 110% of the eventual recovery) triggers a 2-point rate increase from the date of rejection |
| Minnesota verified 2026-10-06 | Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1 (rate and mechanics) and subd. 2 (accrual): a single statute covers contract and tort pecuniary-damage claims alike |
Two tiers by judgment SIZE, not claim type: $50,000 or less (and any judgment for or against the state or a political subdivision, or in family court) draws simple interest at a rate the state court administrator sets each December from the 1-year Treasury yield, rounded to the nearest 1%, floored at 4% (4% for calendar year 2026); over $50,000, a flat 10%/yr applies regardless of the T-bill rate, except that a government or family-court judgment stays on the lower tier no matter how large |
The earliest of: commencement of the action or a demand for arbitration, a written notice of claim (only if suit is then filed within 2 years of that notice), or, for special damages, the date those special damages were incurred if later. A settlement-offer exchange can shorten the period: if the losing party's written offer was closer to the eventual verdict/award than the prevailing party's, the prevailing party's interest is capped at the settlement-offer amount and stops accruing as of the time that offer was made |
Minnesota does not split by claim type: the same statute, same rate tiers, and same accrual rule apply to "pecuniary damages" whether the claim sounds in contract or tort. The variable that matters here is judgment size ($50,000) and whether the defendant is the state or a political subdivision, not contract vs. tort |
Mandatory once damages are fixed by verdict, award, or report: the statute says interest "shall be computed," subject only to a contrary contract provision or, in a family-court action, the judge's discretion to order a lower rate or none at all on equitable grounds |
The lower tier is expressly simple interest (§ 549.09, subd. 1(c)(1)(i)). The text states 10% per year for the over-$50,000 tier without separately specifying compounding. |
A judgment for or against the state or a political subdivision draws the LOWER, Treasury-yield-based simple-interest rate regardless of the judgment's size: the flat 10% tier never applies to a government party |
No prejudgment interest on: workers' compensation judgments or awards (except third-party actions), future (not-yet-incurred) damages, punitive or other noncompensatory damages, a judgment or award that doesn't exceed the conciliation (small-claims) court's jurisdictional limit ($20,000 generally, $4,000 for a consumer-credit claim, under § 491A.01), or the portion of any award already made up of interest, costs, disbursements, or attorney fees. Child support judgments have drawn no interest at all since August 1, 2022 |
| Mississippi verified 2026-08-16 | Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (interest on judgments and decrees, covering both pre- and post-judgment interest); § 75-17-1(1) (8% default legal rate) |
Contract-founded judgment: the contract's own rate, or 8%/yr if the contract states none; any other judgment: a per-annum rate the judge picks, with no statutory number or ceiling stated |
Contract claims: from the date of breach, which can be before the complaint was filed; other claims: a date the judge picks, never earlier than the date the complaint was filed |
Two different tracks under one statute — a contract-rate/breach-date rule for contract judgments, a judge's-choice rate/no-earlier-than-filing rule for everything else — with a liquidated-damages-or-bad-faith gate layered onto the discretionary branch by case law |
Discretionary; reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Requires damages that were liquidated when the claim was made, or a showing the denial of the claim was frivolous or in bad faith; a bona fide dispute over the amount owed defeats an award even on an otherwise liquidated claim |
No statute or case located that authorizes compounding; every award reviewed applies a flat per-annum rate, so simple interest is the working assumption |
Barred entirely before judgment: no award against a governmental entity or its employee may include interest prior to judgment, exemplary damages, or (absent specific authorization) attorney's fees; the bar does not extend to post-judgment interest, and total liability is separately capped at $500,000 per occurrence |
A claim sounding in quantum meruit (rather than an actual contract) cannot draw prejudgment interest at all; a bona fide dispute over the amount owed defeats an award even on a liquidated claim |
| Missouri verified 2026-10-06 | RSMo § 408.020 (the general contract/debt interest statute) for nontort claims; RSMo § 408.040 (interest on judgments) for both the general postjudgment rule and a distinct, demand-triggered prejudgment mechanism for tort claims specifically |
Contract/debt: 9%/yr, or another agreed rate. Tort (only if the demand mechanism is triggered): the intended Federal Funds Rate plus 3%/yr, a lower rate than the 5%-over-Fed-Funds rate that applies once judgment is entered |
Contract/debt: from the date money became due on a written contract, or from the date of demand on an account. Tort: only if triggered by a qualifying written demand: interest then runs from 90 days after the demand was received (or from an earlier outright rejection), never from the date of injury itself |
Fundamentally different mechanisms, not just different rates: a contract/debt claim earns interest automatically once the amount is liquidated or ascertainable; a tort claim earns NO prejudgment interest unless the claimant follows a specific formal pre-suit demand procedure and the judgment ends up exceeding that demand |
Contract/debt: effectively automatic once the amount is liquidated or readily ascertainable by a recognized standard: courts have denied it only where the amount genuinely required judgment to fix (e.g., lost-profits damages). Tort: mandatory, not discretionary, once the demand requirements and the judgment-exceeds-demand condition are both met — the statute says interest 'shall be awarded' |
Simple interest on both tracks, per case law (Wallemann v. Wallemann); a court sitting in equity may allow compounding to serve justice, and the parties' own contract can call for compounding |
Missouri retains sovereign immunity for most tort claims against the state and political subdivisions (waived mainly for motor-vehicle negligence and dangerous-property conditions, or where liability insurance is purchased); damages against a public entity are capped at a periodically inflation-adjusted amount, exclude punitive damages entirely, and case law holds the cap does not limit at least postjudgment interest: no case located addresses prejudgment interest against the state specifically |
Missouri lets prejudgment interest reach the ENTIRE judgment, including any punitive-damages award, unlike most states (Werremeyer v. K.C. Auto Salvage); a tort claimant who doesn't sue within 120 days after the demand was received loses prejudgment-interest eligibility; medical malpractice claims are carved out of § 408.040's general tort mechanism entirely and governed by a separate chapter |
| Montana verified 2026-08-13 | Three statutes split the field. § 27-1-211, 'Right to interest,' is the general provision: a mandatory right to interest on any claim for damages certain or capable of being made certain by calculation, once the right to recover vests. § 27-1-210, 'Interest on torts,' is a more specific, later-enacted statute for any claim on an 'injury' (person or property) under § 27-1-106, with its own floating rate and its own accrual trigger. § 27-1-212, 'When award of interest discretionary,' adds a narrower, jury-discretionary layer for a non-contractual obligation or any case of oppression, fraud, or malice |
For a § 27-1-211 claim: the general legal rate under § 31-1-106, 10% a year, described by Montana courts as a '10% simple interest rate', unless the parties' own written contract fixes a different rate. For a § 27-1-210 tort claim: a floating rate equal to the prime rate published in the Federal Reserve's H.15 statistical release plus 3 percentage points, set as of January 1 and holding through December 31 each year. For a § 27-1-212 discretionary award: no rate is fixed by statute at all, the jury sets whatever amount it finds appropriate |
Differs by section. Under § 27-1-211: from the particular day the right to recover a certain or calculable sum vested, except for any period the debtor was prevented by law or by the creditor's own act from paying. Under § 27-1-210: from 30 days after the claimant presented the opposing party a written statement of the claim and how the specific sum was calculated: not from the date of injury or the date suit was filed |
A genuine claim-type split, with a third layer on top. § 27-1-211 (a vested, calculable-damages right, typically a contract or debt claim) is the general/default provision; § 27-1-210 displaces it for any 'injury' claim (personal injury or property-damage tort), imposing its own rate and a formal presentment-notice trigger, while excluding several damage categories entirely because they can't be calculated (pain and suffering, mental anguish, injury to credit/reputation, punitive damages, loss of consortium/established way of life, attorney fees). § 27-1-212 then adds a further, jury-discretionary layer available for a non-contractual obligation or any case of oppression, fraud, or malice |
Both § 27-1-211 and § 27-1-210 are entitlements ('is entitled to interest'), not something a court can decline once the statutory conditions are met: though § 27-1-210(3) has the court, not the jury, actually calculate the amount due. § 27-1-212, by contrast, is squarely discretionary: interest 'may be given, in the discretion of the jury,' for a non-contract obligation or a case of oppression, fraud, or malice |
Simple interest. Montana courts describe § 31-1-106's 10% rate, the rate that grounds a § 27-1-211 award, as a '10% simple interest rate.' A companion judgment-interest statute, § 25-9-205(1), states directly for judgments generally that 'the interest may not be compounded' |
No statute bars prejudgment interest against the State or a political subdivision outright, and the general tort damages cap ($750,000 per claim/$1.5 million per occurrence under § 2-9-108) doesn't say whether interest counts inside or outside that limit, this survey found no case resolving it either way. Two real limits do apply: § 27-1-212's discretionary jury-awarded interest (for a non-contract obligation or a case of oppression, fraud, or malice) expressly 'does not apply' to a claim against a governmental entity brought under the Montana Tort Claims Act; and § 2-9-317 gives a governmental entity a 2-year grace period after judgment is entered to pay without owing 'any penalty or interest', a postjudgment-focused rule, not a bar on the prejudgment interest already reflected in the judgment itself |
§ 27-1-210(2) excludes an entire list of damages from its tort-interest mechanism because they aren't 'capable of being made certain by calculation': pain and suffering, injury to credit/reputation/financial standing, mental anguish or suffering, exemplary or punitive damages, loss of established way of life, loss of consortium, and attorney fees: plus future damages until they're actually incurred. § 27-1-211 has its own built-in pause: no interest accrues for any period the debtor was prevented by law or by the creditor's own act from paying the debt |
| Nebraska verified 2026-08-10 | Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 45-103.02 (the general prejudgment-interest statute) and 45-104 (a separate, independent 12% basis for four contract-type claims), per Weyh v. Gottsch, 303 Neb. 280 (2019) |
12% per year (§ 45-104) for liquidated claims and for the four § 45-104 contract categories; the floating post-judgment rate under § 45-103 (2 points above the 26-week Treasury bill yield, reset quarterly — 5.970% as of the July 2026 auction) for an unliquidated claim that qualifies via the settlement-offer route |
Liquidated claims: the date the cause of action arose. Unliquidated claims: the date of the plaintiff's first qualifying written settlement offer that the eventual judgment exceeds — not the date of injury or filing |
Not split by label. The same statute (§ 45-103.02) covers both; what matters is whether the claim is liquidated. Most tort/personal-injury claims are unliquidated, so they can reach interest only through the settlement-offer mechanism; a liquidated claim of either type draws 12% from the date it arose. Four specific contract-type claims get 12% under § 45-104 independent of liquidated status |
Mandatory (a matter of right) once the statutory conditions are met, for a legal (money-damages) claim; a court has discretion to award or deny interest only on an equitable claim seeking something other than money damages |
Simple interest. No Nebraska statute authorizes compounding, and the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that absent a contract or statute providing otherwise, compound interest is not allowed on a debt |
Complete bar: no prejudgment interest accrues against the state, a political subdivision, or an employee of either for a negligent or wrongful act within the scope of employment |
Chapter 42 domestic-relations actions are excluded from § 45-103.02 entirely; a contract's own agreed interest rate displaces the statutory rate; the unliquidated-claim route requires strict compliance with all four of § 45-103.02(1)'s procedural conditions or no interest accrues at all |
| Nevada verified 2026-10-06 | NRS 17.130(2) for tort/noncontract judgments; NRS 99.040(1) for contract judgments; both point to the same rate formula |
Prime rate at Nevada's largest bank, ascertained each Jan. 1/Jul. 1, plus 2%; 8.75% for Jul. 1–Dec. 31, 2026 (NRS 17.130(2), 99.040(1)) |
Tort: from service of the summons and complaint (future damages only from judgment); Contract: from the date the debt became due |
Two separate statutes (NRS 99.040 contract, NRS 17.130 tort) with the same rate formula but different accrual triggers and different dates used to lock in the rate |
Statutes say judgment 'draws' interest and contract interest 'must be allowed' when their conditions apply (NRS 17.130(2), 99.040(1)) |
Contract parties may agree in writing to compounding; neither default-rate provision commands it (NRS 99.050(1)) |
Tort judgments against the State, a political subdivision, or a covered employee are capped at $200,000, exclusive only of interest computed from the date of judgment, and punitive damages are barred entirely (NRS 41.035(1)) |
An offeree who rejects an offer and fails to obtain a better judgment cannot recover interest between the offer and judgment (NRS 17.117(10)(a)) |
| New Hampshire verified 2026-10-06 | Two companion statutes govern when interest starts: RSA 524:1-a covers a debt, account stated, or liquidated-damages claim; RSA 524:1-b covers every other kind of civil damages claim (personal injury, wrongful death, consequential damages, property/business/reputation damage). The rate for both comes from a separate chapter, RSA 336:1, II, New Hampshire's general interest-and-usury statute |
A single floating rate applies to every prejudgment award: the 26-week U.S. Treasury bill discount rate as of the last auction before September 30 each year, plus 2 percentage points, rounded to the nearest tenth, reset annually by the state treasurer and published by the courts (5.7% for judgments in 2026). When the rate changes partway through a case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that each year's own then-current rate applies to its portion of the prejudgment period, rather than locking in a single rate for the whole span (Linteau v. Gauthier, 142 N.H. 460 (1997)) |
Differs by which statute applies. Under RSA 524:1-a (debt, account stated, liquidated damages): from suit filing if no pre-suit demand was made; the statute does not expressly fix the start date where a demand preceded suit. Under RSA 524:1-b (personal injury, wrongful death, consequential damages, and other loss types): from the date of the writ or the filing of the petition, with no earlier-demand option |
Not split by contract-vs-tort labels at all. The real dividing line is whether the claim is a debt, account stated, or liquidated sum (RSA 524:1-a) versus everything else (RSA 524:1-b) — a category that sweeps in most personal-injury and wrongful-death claims, but also any contract claim seeking unliquidated consequential damages rather than a fixed debt |
Mandatory, and unusually mechanical: RSA 524:1-b says interest 'shall be added forthwith by the clerk of court' to the damages — a ministerial calculation, not a judge's decision. RSA 524:1-a is equally mandatory ('interest shall commence to run'). Neither statute gives a court discretion to deny prejudgment interest once a qualifying verdict or finding is entered |
Simple interest only, by the rate statute's own express text: RSA 336:1, II sets 'the annual simple rate of interest on judgments, including prejudgment interest' |
Unlike most states in this survey, New Hampshire does not cut off or discount prejudgment interest against the government — it expressly extends ordinary interest rules to both levels of government. For a local governmental unit (a county, city, town, school district, and the like) sued under the bodily-injury liability chapter, RSA 507-B:4, III says 'interest and costs may be recovered as in any civil action, in addition to the limits prescribed in this section' — prejudgment interest doesn't even count against that chapter's $325,000-per-person/$1,000,000-per-incident damage caps. For a claim against the State itself under the Board of Claims chapter, RSA 541-B:14, III says interest 'shall be granted... at the rate provided in RSA 336:1 in the same manner as is provided for in civil actions generally.' Whether that state-claim interest sits inside or outside chapter 541-B's own damages cap isn't spelled out as explicitly as it is for local governmental units |
RSA 524:1-b interest keeps accruing 'even though such interest brings the amount of the judgment beyond the maximum liability imposed by law' — a statutory damages cap doesn't stop interest from pushing the final judgment above that cap. A pre-suit demand affects the debt/liquidated-damages track under RSA 524:1-a; that section also becomes inapplicable if the charged party pays money into court under superior-court rules. Section 524:1-b starts at the writ or petition |
| New Jersey verified 2026-07-05 | New Jersey is one of the few states that sets prejudgment interest by COURT RULE rather than legislative statute: N.J. Ct. R. 4:42-11(b) mandates it in tort actions. There is no equivalent rule or statute for contract claims: interest there rests on judge-made equitable doctrine (Bak-A-Lum Corp. of America v. Alcoa Building Products, Inc., 69 N.J. 123 (1976)). Two separate Title 59 provisions set harsher rules against the government: N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(a) (tort claims) and N.J.S.A. 59:13-8 (contract claims) |
Tort prejudgment interest uses the same formula as ordinary post-judgment interest under Rule 4:42-11(a): for a judgment at or under the Special Civil Part's monetary limit ($20,000), the annual rate resets every January 1 to the prior fiscal year's average return on New Jersey's Cash Management Fund, rounded to the nearest half-percent (4.5% for 2026); a judgment above that limit adds 2 points (6.5% for 2026). Contract prejudgment interest has no fixed rate at all: a court exercising its equitable discretion often borrows the Rule 4:42-11(a) rate as a benchmark but isn't bound to it |
Tort: from the date the lawsuit was instituted, or from a date 6 months after the cause of action arose, whichever is LATER: not from the date of injury itself. Contract: no fixed statutory start date; a court sets the accrual date (often the date of breach or demand) as part of its equitable analysis |
The line is sharper here than in most states: prejudgment interest is a mandatory entitlement in a tort action under Rule 4:42-11(b), but purely a matter of judicial discretion in a contract action, with no rule or statute requiring it at all. A court can decline interest on an otherwise-liquidated contract debt if the equities cut against it: in Bak-A-Lum, the state's highest court denied a defendant prejudgment interest on its own counterclaim because of its inequitable conduct in the underlying dispute |
Tort: mandatory. Rule 4:42-11(b) says the court "shall" include prejudgment interest in the judgment, subject only to a narrow power to suspend it "in exceptional cases." Contract: fully discretionary: awarded, if at all, "in accordance with principles of equity" rather than as a matter of course |
Simple interest only. Rule 4:42-11(a) states that judgments (and, by cross-reference, tort prejudgment interest calculated under the same rate formula) "shall bear simple interest" |
New Jersey bars prejudgment interest against a public entity or employee more broadly than most states, and does it twice: once per claim type. N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(a) (the Tort Claims Act) bars ANY interest before judgment on a tort claim against a public entity or public employee. N.J.S.A. 59:13-8 (the Contractual Liability Act) separately bars it for a contract claim against the State, with one narrow exception: a court may, in its discretion and "in accordance with principles of equity," award prejudgment interest on a claim for the construction or installation of improvements to real property |
Tort prejudgment interest never applies to future economic losses (Rule 4:42-11(b)); a court may suspend the running of tort prejudgment interest altogether "in exceptional cases"; the tort/post-judgment rate steps up by 2 points once a judgment exceeds the Special Civil Part's $20,000 monetary limit; and the New Jersey Prompt Payment Act, N.J.S.A. 52:32-39, separately confirms that no prejudgment interest accrues on a disputed public-contract claim proceeding under its notice-of-claim process, cross-referencing § 59:13-8's bar |
| New Mexico verified 2026-08-16 | NMSA 1978 § 56-8-3 supplies the default rate categories for contract money, retained money, and matured accounts; § 56-8-4(B) supplies the general discretionary prejudgment route; § 41-4-19(C)-(D) governs interest on covered government tort judgments |
Section 56-8-3: not more than 15% per year absent a written contract fixing a different rate. Section 56-8-4(B): up to 10%, selected by the court |
Section 56-8-4(B): service of the complaint. Section 56-8-3(C): matured-account interest from the day the balance is ascertained; § 56-8-3 states no single express start date for its other two categories |
Section 56-8-3 specifically covers money due by contract and two other listed money categories. Section 56-8-4(B) is a separate discretionary judgment-based route not textually limited to contract or tort |
Section 56-8-4(B) is expressly discretionary and permits up to 10% after listed considerations. Section 56-8-3 sets eligible categories and a rate ceiling but does not itself state a general court/jury discretion standard |
No prejudgment compounding method is stated in §§ 56-8-3 or 56-8-4(B); both express rates per year, and the cell does not assume interest-on-interest without separate authority |
For a tort with immunity waived under the Tort Claims Act, § 41-4-19(D) bars interest before judgment; subsection (C) instead supplies postjudgment interest at 2 points above prime, computed daily from judgment entry |
Section 56-8-4(B) does not apply to unpaid-child-support judgments; § 56-8-4(C) preserves interest otherwise permitted by statute or common law; written-contract rates displace § 56-8-3's default ceiling |
| New York verified 2026-08-09 | CPLR 5001 (contract & property-interference claims); EPTL § 5-4.3 is a separate wrongful-death carve-in; ordinary personal-injury tort falls outside both |
9%/yr (CPLR § 5004(a)), or 2%/yr for a judgment on a consumer debt against a natural person; a contract's own stated rate controls instead |
Contract/property: the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed (§ 5001(b)); wrongful death: the date of the decedent's death (EPTL § 5-4.3(a)) |
Ordinary personal-injury and other general tort claims get NO prejudgment interest at all before a verdict; wrongful death is an express, separate statutory exception that does get it |
Mandatory ("interest shall be recovered") for a claim within § 5001(a)'s scope; left to the court's discretion only in an "equitable" action; unavailable before verdict outside that scope entirely |
Simple interest; § 5001(c) directs a single clerk-computed calculation to the verdict date, not a compounding one |
No distinct rate or rule found; a claim against the State goes through the Court of Claims but uses the same CPLR interest framework |
Punitive damages don't earn prejudgment interest; a pending 2025-2026 bill would add bodily injury to § 5001(a)'s covered categories for the first time |
| North Carolina verified 2026-10-06 | One statute covers both: G.S. 24-5. Subsection (a) governs contract actions (interest from the date of breach); subsection (b) governs 'other actions' (tort and everything else), splitting compensatory damages (interest from the filing date) from any other portion of the award (interest only from judgment) |
G.S. 24-1 sets an 8% annual legal rate. G.S. 24-5(a) expressly permits an agreed contract rate after judgment; its consumer-credit clause uses the lower of the legal or contract rate. Noncontract awards use the legal rate (§ 24-5(b)). |
Contract: from the date of breach. Tort/other actions: the compensatory-damages portion of the award runs from the date the lawsuit was commenced (not the date of injury); any other portion of the award (e.g., punitive damages) runs only from the date judgment is entered |
A single statute handles both, but starts the clock at a different point: contract interest runs from the breach itself, a potentially much earlier date; tort (and other non-contract) compensatory damages instead run from the filing of the lawsuit, and any non-compensatory portion of a tort award, like punitive damages, gets no prejudgment interest at all |
Mandatory on both tracks: North Carolina's courts have held that where contract damages are ascertainable from the contract itself, the prevailing party 'is entitled as a matter of law to interest from the date of the breach' (Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall); G.S. 24-5(b) uses the same mandatory 'bears interest' language for the compensatory-damages portion of a tort award |
G.S. 24-1 states an 8% annual legal rate, and G.S. 24-5 sets the dates on which interest begins for each portion of an award; the cited terms do not prescribe a compounding schedule. |
State negligence claims under G.S. 143-291(e) have the Industrial Commission as their exclusive forum. That section defines the special remedy and forum but does not itself state a prejudgment-interest rate for Commission awards; the ordinary § 24-5 court-judgment rule should not be assumed to settle this separate question. |
For noncontract awards, only compensatory damages accrue interest before judgment; other portions start at judgment (§ 24-5(b)). Penal-bond awards start at judgment (§ 24-5(a1)). Consumer-credit contract awards use the lower of the legal and contract rates (§ 24-5(a)). |
| North Dakota verified 2026-08-13 | Two separate statutes divide the field. N.D.C.C. § 32-03-04, 'Interest on damages,' is the general, mandatory provision for damages 'certain or capable of being made certain by calculation': typically a contract or debt claim, reinforced by § 32-03-09's separate rule that contract damages aren't recoverable at all unless 'clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin.' Section 32-03-05 is a narrower provision covering a claim for breach of an obligation not arising from contract, or any case of oppression, fraud, or malice. Neither section states its own numeric rate; North Dakota's Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a § 32-03-04 award draws its rate from the state's general legal-interest statute, § 47-14-05 |
For a § 32-03-04 mandatory award: 6% a year, the general 'legal rate of interest' under § 47-14-05: unless the parties' own written contract sets a different rate (up to the usury ceiling in § 47-14-09). For a § 32-03-05 discretionary award: no rate is fixed by statute at all; the court or jury simply decides what amount of interest, if any, to add |
For § 32-03-04: from the particular day the right to recover the certain or calculable damages vested, typically the date of breach or the date a debt became due, except for any period the debtor was prevented by law or by the creditor's own act from paying. For § 32-03-05: no fixed accrual date is specified; the court or jury exercising its discretion sets both whether interest runs and, implicitly, from when |
A genuine split by claim type. § 32-03-04's mandatory track covers damages that are certain or calculable, ordinarily a contract or debt claim, and gated further by § 32-03-09's requirement that contract damages be 'clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin' before they're recoverable at all. § 32-03-05 takes over for 'the breach of an obligation not arising from contract', an ordinary tort claim, and for any case of oppression, fraud, or malice, but hands the whole question of whether and how much interest to add over to the court's or jury's discretion, with no rate fixed by statute. North Dakota's Supreme Court has recognized that both tracks can apply in the same lawsuit when it mixes contract and tort or fraud theories |
Split exactly along the same line as the contract/tort axis. § 32-03-04 is mandatory once its conditions are met, 'is entitled to recover interest thereon.' § 32-03-05 is genuinely discretionary, interest 'may be given in the discretion of the court or jury', with no entitlement at all until that discretion is exercised in the claimant's favor |
Neither § 32-03-04 nor § 32-03-05 addresses compounding, and this survey did not locate a North Dakota case resolving simple-vs-compound interest for a prejudgment award under either section specifically. North Dakota's separate postjudgment-interest statute, § 28-20-34, expressly states its own rate 'may not be compounded in any manner or form': suggestive of the state's general practice, but not a direct answer for the prejudgment period |
Two parallel chapters, not one. Claims against the State itself are governed by N.D.C.C. ch. 32-12.2, which caps total liability at $500,000 per person and $2,000,000 for any number of claims from a single occurrence (a figure that stepped up in stages through 2026 under a 2021 act) and bars the State from paying punitive or exemplary damages at all; state employees acting within the scope of their employment are immunized, with claims redirected to the State instead. A separate chapter, ch. 32-12.1, extends the identical $500,000/$2,000,000 cap and the identical bar on punitive damages to counties, cities, school districts, and other political subdivisions. Neither chapter's text says whether prejudgment interest counts inside or outside its damages cap, and this survey located no case resolving the question |
§ 32-03-06 creates a real trap: 'Accepting payment of the whole principal as such waives all claim to interest, unless interest is provided for expressly in the contract', a creditor who accepts full principal without reserving accrued interest can lose the interest claim entirely, contract or no contract, unless the contract itself expressly provides for it. § 32-03-09 works as a gate in front of § 32-03-04 for contract claims specifically: no contract damages, and by extension no § 32-03-04 interest on them, can be recovered at all unless they are 'clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin' |
| Ohio verified 2026-10-06 | R.C. 1343.03(A) covers money due; (C) governs tort prejudgment interest; R.C. 2743.18(A) covers judgments against the state |
R.C. 5703.47 rate: July federal short-term rate, rounded, plus 3 points; 7% in 2026. A written contract may set a different rate (R.C. 1343.03(A)) |
Money due: when due and payable. Tort: after a favorable settlement-effort finding, from claim accrual for admitted liability or deliberate harm; otherwise the earlier of qualifying written notice or the pleading date (R.C. 1343.03(A), (C)(1)) |
Money due under a contract or similar obligation earns interest under (A); tort prejudgment interest requires the postdecision settlement-effort finding under (C) |
Creditor is entitled to interest when money is due under (A); tort interest follows if the court makes the required good faith findings under (C)(1) |
R.C. 1343.03 and 5703.47 specify annual rates but do not expressly address compounding |
State Court of Claims judgments: prejudgment interest for the same period and rate as between private parties; the court may deny periods of claimant-caused undue delay (R.C. 2743.18(A)) |
No tort prejudgment interest on future damages; other-law periods, state Court of Claims actions, and workers' compensation actions are excluded from (C) (R.C. 1343.03(C)(2), (D)) |
| Oklahoma verified 2026-10-06 | 23 O.S. §§ 6–8 govern ascertainable damages and discretionary noncontract interest; 12 O.S. § 727.1(E)–(I) governs personal-injury and personal-rights verdicts |
General legal rate is 6% absent a contract rate (15 O.S. § 266); § 727.1 prejudgment rate is the prior year’s average U.S. Treasury Bill rate, certified annually |
Ascertainable damages: when right to recover vested (23 O.S. § 6). Covered injury verdict: 24 months after suit commenced, until verdict acceptance or judgment filing (12 O.S. § 727.1(E)) |
23 O.S. § 6 applies to certain or calculable damages; § 7 permits jury-awarded interest for noncontract obligations, oppression, fraud, or malice; § 727.1(E) separately governs covered injury verdicts |
§ 6 claimant is entitled to interest; § 7 leaves interest to jury discretion; under § 727.1(E) the court shall add interest to a covered verdict |
These prejudgment provisions specify rates and accrual periods but do not expressly require compounding; § 727.1(C) separately addresses postjudgment compounding |
Covered injury verdict against state or political subdivision: interest from filing, subject to Governmental Tort Claims Act total liability cap (12 O.S. § 727.1(F)) |
Punitive-award interest starts at judgment; a qualifying lien judgment earns interest from lien filing; accepting full principal waives interest (12 O.S. § 727.1(G), (H); 23 O.S. § 8) |
| Oregon verified 2026-10-06 | ORS 82.010(1)(a) (9%/yr on 'all moneys after they become due'): one statute for both contract and tort claims, gated by a judge-made 'ascertainability' test rather than a contract/tort split |
9% a year by default under ORS 82.010(1); a written contract's own agreed rate controls instead if the parties set one |
The date the money became due (a contract debt), or the date damages became a sum certain or readily ascertainable (a tort or unliquidated contract claim): can be an earlier date even if a jury later had to resolve disputed facts to reach that figure |
No formal split: one statute and the same ascertainability test applies to both; in practice most fixed contract debts qualify and most pain-and-suffering tort damages don't, but a property-damage or business-tort claim with a fixed formula qualifies exactly like a contract claim |
Mandatory as a matter of law once ascertainability is shown: not an equitable discretion call for the court; but if the facts needed to fix the date or amount are genuinely disputed, that threshold question goes to the jury first |
ORS 82.010(2)(b) expressly makes judgment interest simple unless a contract provides otherwise; subsection (1)(a) does not expressly specify compounding for prejudgment interest |
The state and counties generally have interest immunity absent specific statutory authorization or a lawful agreement; ORS 82.010(1)(a) alone does not waive it. Cities differ under the cited cases |
The agreed contract rate displaces the statutory nine-percent default when enforceable; a compounding term requires separate analysis. The lower rate in ORS 82.010(2)(f) for medical-malpractice judgments is a POSTjudgment-only rate: it doesn't apply to prejudgment interest and is easy to confuse with the general rate |
| Pennsylvania verified 2026-07-05 | Contract: common-law right (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 354, adopted in Fernandez v. Levin) using the 41 P.S. § 202 rate; bodily injury/death/property damage: Pa.R.Civ.P. 238 delay damages, a court rule, not a statute |
Contract: the contract's own rate, or 6%/yr under 41 P.S. § 202 if silent; bodily injury/death/property damage: Wall Street Journal prime rate (first January edition) plus 1%, reset every year (7.75% for 2026) |
Contract: the date performance was due or the breach occurred; bodily injury/death/property damage: one year after original process was served on the defendant (not the date of injury), running to the date of the verdict |
Two unrelated regimes: contract interest is a common-law right that borrows a statutory rate; bodily injury, death, and property-damage claims instead get Rule 238 'delay damages,' a distinct procedural mechanism with its own rate and clock |
Contract: interest is due as a matter of right if the sum is liquidated or ascertainable from the contract; otherwise discretionary. Rule 238 delay damages: added whenever the plaintiff requests them, regardless of who caused the delay, subject to two exclusions |
Simple interest under both systems: the contract rate is 'simple interest at the statutory legal rate' (Restatement of Contracts § 337(a)); Rule 238 delay damages are calculated 'not compounded' by the rule's own text |
Commonwealth parties: Rule 238 delay damages apply and are computed on the full jury verdict, even though the underlying sovereign-immunity damages cap is $250,000 per plaintiff/$1,000,000 aggregate (Woods v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp.); local political subdivisions have their own separate $500,000 aggregate cap |
Rule 238 doesn't apply to eminent domain proceedings or to cases where delay damages are already allowed without the rule; a defendant's qualifying written settlement offer, or delay the plaintiff caused, stops the delay-damages clock; claims outside bodily injury/death/property damage (e.g., most other torts) fall outside Rule 238 entirely |
| Rhode Island verified 2026-08-16 | R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-10 governs prejudgment interest in civil actions; § 9-21-8 separately states the postjudgment rate |
12% per year under § 9-21-10(a) and (b). The statute does not apply to a contractual obligation where interest is already provided |
Ordinary civil action: date the cause of action accrued (§ 9-21-10(a)). Covered medical-malpractice action filed on or after January 1, 1987: written notice to the insurer/provider or filing, whichever occurs first (§ 9-21-10(b)) |
The same § 9-21-10(a) text covers any civil action for pecuniary damages, without a general contract/tort split; covered medical malpractice has a different trigger, and a contract already providing interest is excluded |
Mandatory once the statute applies: the text says interest 'shall be added by the clerk of the court' and included in the judgment (§ 9-21-10) |
Section 9-21-10 states no prejudgment compounding mechanism: it applies 12% per year to the damages. It separately says postjudgment interest accrues on both judgment principal and the prejudgment interest entered |
Section 9-31-2 caps tort damages against the State or a political subdivision at $100,000 but removes that cap for a proprietary function. Section 9-21-10 states no government-specific interest rule; any sovereign-immunity limit on interest depends on law outside the statutory text quoted here |
Only pecuniary-damages verdicts or decisions qualify; § 9-21-10 excludes contractual obligations where interest is already provided and substitutes the special notice/filing trigger for covered medical-malpractice actions |
| South Carolina verified 2026-10-06 | S.C. Code § 34-31-20(A) sets the general prejudgment ("legal interest") rate for any ascertained sum of money that is due; § 34-31-20(B), in the same section, sets a separate, higher, annually-compounding POSTjudgment rate. § 15-78-120(b) of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act separately bars interest before judgment on an award under that chapter |
A flat 8.75% a year for a private-party claim, set directly by the statute's own text (it doesn't float or get republished annually the way the postjudgment rate under subsection (B) does), unless the parties' own contract sets a different rate, in which case the contract rate controls instead |
From the date the obligation became demandable, either by the parties' own agreement or by operation of law, provided the sum was already certain or capable of being reduced to certainty at that time (Babb v. Rothrock). If the underlying claim wasn't demandable until later (for example, a contribution claim that only ripens once one party has paid and then demanded reimbursement), interest instead runs from the date suit was filed |
The statute doesn't mention contract or tort by name at all: the real dividing line is whether the DAMAGES are an ascertained sum certain, or capable of being reduced to certainty by a fixed method, not what legal theory produced them. A contract debt or a stated account is almost always ascertained. A tort claim can qualify too if the damages are a fixed, calculable amount (a specific repair bill, a stipulated loss), but ordinary personal-injury damages like pain and suffering are not "ascertained" until a jury fixes the number, so they typically draw no prejudgment interest under this statute at all |
Once a claim clears the ascertained-sum threshold, interest is a matter of right, not something a court can grant or withhold as a matter of discretion: the real gatekeeping happens earlier, in deciding whether the claim actually qualifies as ascertained in the first place |
Simple interest only. A federal appeals court applying South Carolina law held directly that no South Carolina statute allows compounding prejudgment interest under § 34-31-20(A), reversing a trial court that had compounded it monthly (Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Year Round Pool, Inc., 4th Cir. 1996): a sharp contrast with subsection (B)'s postjudgment rate, which the statute's own text says compounds annually |
For claims under the Tort Claims Act, § 15-78-120(b) bars interest before judgment in an award against the state or a political subdivision, on top of separate per-person and per-occurrence damages caps that apply to the same claims |
Parties are always free to contract for a different (including higher) interest rate, which then displaces the 8.75% statutory rate entirely (Turner Coleman, Inc. v. Ohio Constr. & Eng'g, Inc., 251 S.E.2d 738 (S.C. 1979)). Because the right depends on the sum being ascertained, a claim whose amount is genuinely left to a fact-finder's judgment, not merely disputed as to liability, draws no prejudgment interest, whatever the claim type |
| South Dakota verified 2026-08-09 | One statute covers both contract and tort claims: SDCL § 21-1-13.1, 'Interest on damages, Prejudgment interest.' It replaced an older, narrower statute, former § 21-1-13 (repealed 2014), which still controls any suit commenced before July 1, 1990, effectively obsolete now, since no current suit could have been filed that long ago. The statutory rate itself comes from a separate general-purpose statute, § 54-3-16, which sets the numeric 'Category' interest rates used throughout the SD code |
One rate for every claim type: the parties' own contract rate if the contract specifies one; otherwise the 'Category B' rate under § 54-3-16(2), currently a flat 10% a year (not a floating, benchmark-tied rate). A separate, lower 'Category A' rate (4.5%) applies only to inverse condemnation actions, which this survey excludes as a specialized proceeding rather than ordinary civil damages |
From the day the loss or damage occurred: not the date of filing, demand, or judgment. If the exact date the loss occurred is a disputed question of fact, the statute itself supplies a fallback: interest instead commences on whatever date the jury specifies in its verdict (via a special interrogatory, if necessary), running through the verdict date, or the date judgment is entered if there's no verdict |
No split at all: § 21-1-13.1 applies identically to 'any person who is entitled to recover damages,' whether the claim sounds in contract, tort, or otherwise (counterclaim, cross claim, third-party claim). Unlike the older, repealed statute it replaced, the current law doesn't require damages to be 'liquidated' or 'ascertainable' by any special test; the only thing that varies is which date interest starts from, and that turns on whether the date of loss is disputed, not on the type of claim |
Mandatory 'when applicable,' confirmed by South Dakota's Supreme Court, once the statutory conditions are met, awarding interest isn't a matter of judicial discretion. But mandatory-in-principle doesn't mean automatic: because the statute requires the date of loss to be established (through a jury verdict or a special interrogatory if that date is disputed), a party who fails to request the necessary jury instruction or interrogatory, and fails to object when the verdict form omits it, can forfeit the claim to prejudgment interest entirely, even though the underlying entitlement was never disputed |
The statute and its companion rate provision speak only in terms of an annual ('per year') rate, consistent with simple interest, but this survey did not locate a South Dakota case squarely confirming simple interest (as opposed to compounding) for a § 21-1-13.1 prejudgment award specifically |
South Dakota's sovereign immunity is waived only to the extent of insurance or risk-pool coverage, not as a general matter. For the State itself, § 21-32-16 says the State 'shall be deemed to have waived' immunity and consented to suit only 'to the extent' it has purchased liability insurance under § 21-32-15 and coverage applies; state employees acting within the scope of employment are separately immune except to that same extent (§ 21-32-17). For every other public entity (cities, counties, school districts, and the like), § 21-32A-1 waives immunity in the same way: only 'to the extent' the entity participates in a risk-sharing pool or carries liability insurance. Neither statute, nor any case this survey located, creates a distinct prejudgment-interest rule for a government defendant once a claim clears this insurance-based immunity threshold |
The statute's own text carves out three categories entirely: 'Prejudgment interest is not recoverable on future damages, punitive damages, or intangible damages such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, injury to credit, reputation or financial standing, loss of enjoyment of life, or loss of society and companionship.' The other major exception is procedural rather than substantive: because entitlement depends on fixing the date of loss, a party's failure to secure a jury finding on a disputed date of loss operates as a waiver of the interest claim, regardless of how strong the underlying case for interest otherwise was |
| Tennessee verified 2026-10-06 | Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-123 preserves eligible statutory and common-law claims and sets a rate ceiling; state Claims Commission claims use § 9-8-307(d) |
Up to 10% annually under § 47-14-123; contracts subject to § 47-14-103 have its category ceiling. State commission interest is capped by the § 47-14-121 judgment rate |
§ 47-14-123 sets no fixed start date; the court or jury determines an equitable award for an eligible claim |
Eligible contract claims may receive discretionary interest; personal-injury and wrongful-death claims are barred. A UM-insurer defense to an injury suit does not itself convert the claim to contract (Haddon, 2026) |
Eligible claims: discretionary award by court or jury under equitable principles (§ 47-14-123); personal-injury claims are ineligible under preserved common law |
§ 47-14-123 sets an annual ceiling but does not expressly address compounding |
Successful Claims Commission claims may receive interest as commissioner finds proper, capped by § 47-14-121; contractual rate controls in a qualifying contract action (§ 9-8-307(d)) |
§ 9-8-307(d) requires facts that would entitle the claimant to judgment against a private person and bars punitive damages; tort damages generally capped at $300,000/claimant and $1 million/occurrence, subject to insurance (§ 9-8-307(e)) |
| Texas verified 2026-08-11 | Tex. Fin. Code ch. 304, Subch. B (§§ 304.101-.107, wrongful death/personal injury/property damage only); a contract claim instead gets common-law interest (Johnson & Higgins v. Kenneco Energy) |
Same as the postjudgment rate: the contract's own rate (capped at 18%/yr) or a floating prime-rate-linked rate, floor 5%/cap 15% (§§ 304.002-.003) |
Both tracks: earlier of 180 days after the defendant receives written claim notice or the date suit is filed (§ 304.104; Johnson & Higgins) |
Same rate, notice-or-filing accrual rule, and simple-interest method; covered injury/property cases use Subchapter B, while contract claims use the common-law rule in Johnson & Higgins |
Mandatory/as of right for both tracks; not left to a court's or jury's discretion |
Simple interest only; never compounds (§ 304.104; Johnson & Higgins expressly rejected daily compounding) |
A state contract claim resolved under Gov't Code ch. 2260's dispute process gets the same ch. 304 rate, but capped at 6%/yr (§ 2260.106) |
No interest on an award of future damages (§ 304.1045); a rejected written settlement offer can stop interest from accruing on the judgment or the offer amount (§§ 304.105-.107) |
| Utah verified 2026-10-06 | Utah Code § 15-1-1 governs contract rates; § 78B-5-824 governs injury and death claims; Utah case law governs other fixed, measurable losses |
Contracts: agreed rate or 10% under § 15-1-1. Injury/death: January prime plus 2 points, minimum 5%, maximum 10% (§ 78B-5-824). Other eligible losses: § 15-1-4 rate under Fuller |
Injury-year special damages: first date incurred; later-year damages: January 1 of each year incurred (§ 78B-5-824(5)). Other fixed losses: date measurable (Bjork); contract timing depends on when the loss became fixed |
Contracts use § 15-1-1; injury/death claims use § 78B-5-824 only for incurred special damages; other measurable tort losses follow the common-law rule and § 15-1-4 rate |
Fixed, measurable damages qualify under Bjork; § 78B-5-824 says a qualifying plaintiff may claim interest and directs the court to calculate it at the statutory rate |
Simple interest expressly required for injury/death claims (§ 78B-5-824(5)(a)); §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4 give no express compounding instruction |
Qualifying government judgments face adjusted liability limits. For incidents from July 1, 2026: $963,800 per person, $3,879,500 aggregate, $387,700 property damage (Utah Code § 63G-7-604; R37-4-3) |
§ 78B-5-824 excludes future medical and wage losses. Tier 1 requires a written demand no more than 1⅓ of the eventual judgment, with the controlling offer at least 60 days before trial; tier 2/3 and named arbitration are exempt |
| Vermont verified 2026-08-09 | Vermont has no dedicated prejudgment-interest statute. Instead, Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) states that the amount of a judgment includes prejudgment interest and costs, and the Vermont Supreme Court has built a body of case law defining when that interest is available and how much. The actual rate comes from a separate, general-purpose statute, 9 V.S.A. § 41a(a), the state's general 'legal rate of interest', which courts (including a federal court applying Vermont law) have confirmed supplies both the pre- and postjudgment rate; 12 V.S.A. § 2903(c) cross-references the same rate for a judgment lien |
A single flat rate for everything: 12% a year, computed by the actuarial method, under 9 V.S.A. § 41a(a): 'the rate of interest ... shall be 12 percent per annum.' Vermont courts apply this same 12% figure to a prejudgment interest award whether the underlying claim is contract or tort, with no separate rate track for either |
Runs from the date each element of loss was actually incurred, not necessarily from a single fixed injury or breach date. For special damages made up of several distinct items (medical bills, for example), interest on each item runs from the date that particular expense was incurred, because 'its cost and date was known precisely' at that point, not from an earlier date like the date of the underlying accident; a federal court applying Vermont law rejected a request to run interest on all medical bills from the date of injury instead of each bill's own date. For damages a court chooses to award interest on in its discretion, the trigger is whatever date the court finds necessary to make the plaintiff whole |
Vermont doesn't split this by claim type into separate statutes or rates, one case-law framework covers both. Interest is available as of right (mandatory) whenever damages are 'liquidated or readily ascertainable at the time of the tort,' squarely covering an easily-quantified item of tort damages (a medical bill) exactly the same way it covers a liquidated contract debt. Damages that aren't liquidated or readily ascertainable, typically non-economic tort damages like pain and suffering, but potentially some contract damages too, fall to the same discretionary standard instead: the trial court may still add interest if doing so is 'required to make the plaintiff whole.' The Vermont Supreme Court has also held that the presence of an unliquidated counterclaim doesn't defeat an otherwise-available prejudgment interest award |
A genuine two-track system that turns on whether the damages are liquidated or ascertainable, not on claim type. Liquidated or readily ascertainable damages draw interest as of right: the rationale being that a defendant could always have avoided the interest simply by tendering the known, calculable amount. Everything else is discretionary, left to the trial court's judgment about what's needed to fully compensate the plaintiff; a court can and does decline discretionary interest on an uncertain damages category (like pain and suffering) even while awarding interest as of right on the same plaintiff's liquidated medical-expense damages in the same case |
No Vermont statute or case located by this survey specifically addresses whether the 12% figure compounds for the prejudgment period. 9 V.S.A. § 41a(a) specifies the rate is 'computed by the actuarial method,' a calculation method the same statute defines in more technical detail, but this survey did not confirm whether that method compounds interest over the prejudgment period itself: noted as an open question rather than assumed |
Vermont's Tort Claims Act, 12 V.S.A. § 5601, waives the State's sovereign immunity for an employee's negligent or wrongful act within the scope of employment, treating the State 'under the same circumstances, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a private person would be liable', but caps total State liability at $500,000 to any one person and $2,000,000 in the aggregate per occurrence, and carves out several categories entirely (a discretionary-function act, tax assessment or collection, quarantine, National Guard activities, and intentional torts like assault, battery, or fraud, among others). This survey found no case or statute addressing whether prejudgment interest counts inside or outside the $500,000/$2,000,000 cap, or any interest rule distinct from the ordinary private-party rules described above |
Vermont's own case-law framework is itself the main limit: damages that are neither liquidated nor readily ascertainable draw no prejudgment interest at all unless the trial court affirmatively exercises its discretion to add it, meaning the default for a genuinely uncertain damages category (pain and suffering, for instance) is no interest, not automatic interest. Separately, Vermont has a narrower, distinct statute for one specific contract context, the Prompt Payment Act, 9 V.S.A. § 4007(b), covering construction-contract payment disputes, which the Vermont Supreme Court has held is a legally distinct remedy from ordinary prejudgment interest, even though both currently accrue at the same 1%-per-month rate; that narrower statute is outside the general prejudgment interest rule covered here |
| Virginia verified 2026-10-06 | One general statute covers both contract and tort claims: Va. Code § 8.01-382, which lets the court or jury decide whether to award interest and fix its start date in any action at law, suit in equity, or Administrative Process Act proceeding. The rate itself comes from a separate statute, § 6.2-302. Case law (Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC Inc.; Skretvedt v. Kouri; Marks v. Sanzo) explains how that discretion works in practice. A negotiable instrument is carved out and uses its own specified rate under § 8.3A-112. Claims against the Commonwealth face additional limits: the Virginia Tort Claims Act (§ 8.01-195.3) for tort claims, and a common-law sovereign-immunity rule for contract claims (Commonwealth v. AMEC Civil, LLC) |
Default: 6% per year. Exception: a money judgment entered in an action arising from a contract carries interest at whichever is HIGHER: the rate lawfully charged under the contract itself, or 6%. A judgment on a negotiable instrument instead uses the rate stated in the instrument, or 6% if none is stated |
The court or jury MAY fix any start date it chooses for interest, and may decline to award any interest before judgment at all. If the final order or verdict says nothing about interest, the default is that interest runs only from the date judgment is entered (or the date of the jury verdict), forward: silence produces no retroactive prejudgment interest, just ordinary interest running from that point |
Virginia doesn't split contract and tort into separate statutes: both run through the same § 8.01-382 discretionary framework, unlike states with dedicated tort or contract interest provisions. The practical difference is evidentiary rather than statutory: courts generally won't award prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages still in dispute (common in tort cases with contested damages), while a fixed contract debt supplies an ascertainable principal amount and due date. A contract's own interest-rate clause also controls the rate, which has no tort-side equivalent |
Discretionary, both on whether to award interest at all and on what date it starts. Virginia's courts describe this repeatedly as 'a matter submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court.' That discretion isn't unlimited: an appellate court reversed an award of interest that ran during a delay the trial judge himself had caused, subject to appellate review under the cited cases |
Va. Code §§ 8.01-382 and 6.2-302 set an annual rate and refer to interest on the principal sum; they do not expressly prescribe compounding |
Tort claims against the Commonwealth and transportation districts face an express prejudgment-interest bar, with a statutory exception for a transportation district that contracts under § 33.2-1919. For a TORT claim, the Virginia Tort Claims Act states outright that 'neither the Commonwealth nor any transportation district shall be liable for interest prior to judgment' (§ 8.01-195.3). For a CONTRACT claim, there's no comparable statute, but the Virginia Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth's general rule of being 'as liable for its contractual debts as any citizen' does NOT extend to prejudgment interest absent an explicit statutory or contractual waiver: reaffirming a rule over a century old and applying it to deny a contractor prejudgment interest on a VDOT construction judgment (Commonwealth v. AMEC Civil, LLC) |
Interest doesn't attach to punitive or treble damages: only to the 'principal sum awarded,' meaning the portion of a judgment that compensates for actual harm sustained, not damages meant to punish (Sidya v. World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC). The Supreme Court held prejudgment interest is part of actual damages and thus falls inside the medical malpractice cap at § 8.01-581.15 (Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services of Richmond, Inc.). A judgment on a negotiable instrument follows its own rate rule under § 8.3A-112 rather than the general contract/6% default |
| Washington verified 2026-08-24 | Washington splits this across two different bodies of law. RCW 4.56.110 governs interest on the JUDGMENT itself, running from the date of entry (or verdict), and sets different rates for written-contract judgments, tort judgments against public agencies, tort judgments generally, and a residual catch-all tied to the usury statute, RCW 19.52.020. Separately, a judge-made common-law doctrine (Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equipment Co.; Prier v. Refrigeration Engineering Co.) creates the actual right to TRUE prejudgment interest, running before suit is even filed, on a claim, of any type, that is 'liquidated.' That doctrine borrows its default rate from the general legal-rate-of-interest statute, RCW 19.52.010 (12%) |
For a true prejudgment award on a liquidated claim: the rate the parties agreed to in writing, or ordinarily 12% per year under RCW 19.52.010 if there's no agreed rate; medical-debt prejudgment interest is capped at 9%. For a written-contract judgment generally: the contract's own specified rate (RCW 4.56.110(1)). For an ordinary tort judgment (which draws interest only from the date of entry, not before, under RCW 4.56.110(3)): 2 percentage points above the prime rate for a private defendant, or 2 points above the 26-week Treasury bill yield for a 'public agency' defendant. Judgments not covered by RCW 4.56.110(1)-(5) use the maximum rate permitted under RCW 19.52.020 |
For a liquidated claim, interest runs from the date the debt became due, the date payment should have been made, not from the date suit was filed or judgment entered; this is Washington's true prejudgment period. For an ordinary tort judgment under RCW 4.56.110's general rules, by contrast, interest runs only from the date judgment is entered (or from the date of a jury verdict, if a judgment on that verdict is later affirmed on review), there's no earlier accrual for that claim type under the statute |
Washington's operative distinction is liquidated versus unliquidated damages, not contract versus tort. A claim of either type earns true prejudgment interest if its amount can be computed with exactness from the evidence, without resort to a judge's or jury's opinion or discretion, this doctrine has been applied to a tort claim (the cost of repairing a negligently designed ice rink, held liquidated once the repair contracts were let) just as readily as to a contract debt. An unliquidated claim, most personal injury verdicts, and any contract claim whose damages require expert testimony or discretion to fix, gets no true prejudgment interest; the judgment only starts drawing interest from the date of entry under RCW 4.56.110's general rules |
For a liquidated claim, prejudgment interest is essentially automatic once the claim qualifies: courts don't have discretion over WHETHER to award it, only over the antecedent question of whether the claim actually IS liquidated. For an unliquidated claim, there's no discretionary judicial power to award true prejudgment interest at all under Washington's doctrine; the claim simply doesn't qualify, and interest instead starts from the date judgment is entered under the general statute |
Neither RCW 4.56.110 nor RCW 19.52.010 mentions compounding; both describe a straight annual rate applied to a principal sum, and Washington courts and practitioners apply it as simple interest |
Washington doesn't bar prejudgment or post-entry interest against the government, but it does set a different, generally lower RATE for a tort judgment against a 'public agency' (state agencies, counties, cities, school districts, and similar political subdivisions defined in RCW 42.30.020): 2 points above the 26-week Treasury bill yield, instead of the 2-points-above-prime rate that applies to a private tort defendant. This is a rate difference, not a bar: a liquidated claim against a public agency can still draw true prejudgment interest under the same common-law doctrine that applies to a private defendant |
Medical-debt prejudgment interest is capped at 9% under RCW 19.52.010(2). The tort and residual-catch-all rates are pegged to published financial benchmarks reset monthly, so the specific rate depends on the judgment-entry month. When a liquidated claim faces an opposing unliquidated counterclaim, Washington generally calculates prejudgment interest on the liquidated amount before the offset. ESSB 5993 would have reduced medical-debt interest to 1%, but the 2026 session adjourned after the bill returned to Senate Rules without final passage |
| West Virginia verified 2026-08-16 | W. Va. Code § 56-6-27 governs jury-awarded interest in an action founded on contract; § 56-6-31(b) governs court-awarded prejudgment interest on special or liquidated damages and written-agreement obligations |
Section 56-6-27 states no percentage. Under § 56-6-31(b)(1), the statutory rate is 2 points above the Fifth Federal Reserve District secondary discount rate on January 2 of the accrual year, floor 4% and cap 9%; a written agreement's own rate and terms govern until judgment |
Section 56-6-27 has the jury find principal plus interest due at trial. Section 56-6-31(b)(1) keys the statutory rate to January 2 of the year the right to sue accrued and keeps that rate constant until judgment; the text does not state one universal event-date start for every special-damage item |
Contract-founded action: jury route under § 56-6-27, with no stated percentage. Special or liquidated damages in a judgment: court route under § 56-6-31(b). A written agreement's stated rate and terms apply to its obligation until judgment |
Discretionary under the two ordinary award clauses: the jury 'may allow' contract interest (§ 56-6-27), and the court 'may award' interest on all or some special or liquidated damages (§ 56-6-31(b)); a written-agreement obligation instead 'bears' its stated rate and terms |
Simple only: § 56-6-31(a) says every money judgment bears simple, not compounding, interest, and subsection (b) repeats that rule for special or liquidated damages |
The Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act begins at § 29-12A-1. For a political subdivision or its employee, § 29-12A-7(b)'s $500,000 noneconomic-loss cap expressly does not apply to court costs or interest on a judgment; that section does not independently create an interest award |
Written-agreement rate and terms displace the statutory § 56-6-31(b)(1) rate until judgment; § 56-6-31(b) reaches only special damages (including lost wages, medical expenses, tangible-property damage, and similar out-of-pocket costs) or liquidated damages; pre-2009 accruals have a separate preserved rule |
| Wisconsin verified 2026-08-09 | No comprehensive statute exists. The right to what Wisconsin calls "preverdict interest" is common law, dating to Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161 (1899), and reaffirmed in Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740 (1993); the RATE for that common-law right defaults to Wis. Stat. § 138.04's 5% "legal rate." A separate, independent statutory route, § 807.01(3)-(4) (the settlement-offer statute), lets a party who made a formal written settlement offer collect interest at a different, floating rate if the eventual judgment matches or beats the offer: available for BOTH liquidated and unliquidated damages |
5% a year (the § 138.04 "legal rate") for common-law preverdict interest on a liquidated or determinable claim, confirmed by case law (Estreen v. Bluhm) applying § 138.04 to this exact purpose. The independent § 807.01(4) settlement-offer route instead uses 1% plus the prime rate, reset every January 1 and July 1 based on the Federal Reserve's H.15 release, and expressly displaces Wisconsin's general post-judgment rate statutes (§§ 814.04(4), 815.05(8)) when it applies, the two rates are never combined |
For common-law preverdict interest: from the date payment was due under the contract, or, if no date was specified, from the date of demand or the date suit was filed (Estreen v. Bluhm). For the independent § 807.01(4) settlement-offer route: from the date of the rejected settlement offer itself, regardless of when the underlying claim arose |
Wisconsin's common-law axis is liquidated-or-determinable versus not, cutting across contract and tort exactly like Arizona's and Washington's: a debt due on a specific date and a tort claim like conversion with a readily ascertainable value both qualify; ordinary personal-injury damages (pain and suffering) almost never do, because a jury has to value them. But Wisconsin adds a further limitation none of those other states have: even a liquidated claim draws NO common-law preverdict interest if there are multiple defendants, because no single defendant can know, before the verdict apportions fault, the exact amount it alone would need to tender to stop interest from accruing (Beacon Bowl, citing Wyandotte Chemicals and City of Franklin). Separately, the § 807.01(4) settlement-offer statute is available for unliquidated tort damages too, confirmed by Graves v. Travelers Insurance Co.: giving a personal-injury plaintiff who serves a formal offer a real path to preverdict interest the common law alone would deny |
Mandatory ("as a matter of right," not equitable discretion) once damages are shown liquidated or determinable AND there's no multiple-defendant apportionment problem. Wisconsin has no discretionary middle ground the way some states do for unliquidated contract claims: if damages aren't liquidated or determinable, the common law simply denies preverdict interest outright, an on/off switch rather than a judgment call. The independent § 807.01(4) settlement-offer interest is likewise automatic (not discretionary) once its own three conditions are met: an unaccepted offer, a judgment, and a judgment at or above the offer |
Simple interest only. Section 807.01(4)'s settlement-offer interest is confirmed simple, not compound, by case law (Morrison v. Rankin), calculated on a single amount over one continuous period; neither § 138.04 nor the common-law cases mention compounding at all |
A debt or contract claim against the STATE itself must first be presented to, and rejected by, the state legislature as a claims bill before a court action can even be filed (§ 775.01), a procedural gate, not an interest-specific carve-out; no separate reduced rate or interest exclusion applies once that gate is cleared. A tort claim against a LOCAL government (a county, city, town, or their employees) can be barred entirely, before any interest question is reached, by governmental immunity for "acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" under § 893.80(4), Wisconsin courts read that to cover any genuinely discretionary act; once liability does attach (a purely ministerial-duty failure, for instance), no separate interest discount or exclusion applies, ordinary preverdict-interest rules run the same as against a private defendant |
The multiple-defendants bar on common-law preverdict interest (see above) is Wisconsin's sharpest, least-obvious exception. Section 807.01(4)'s interest is also exclusive of the general post-judgment rate statutes when it applies, "interest under this section is in lieu of interest computed under ss. 814.04 (4) and 815.05 (8)," so a plaintiff collects one or the other, never both stacked together. Wisconsin's own courts and statutes use the term "preverdict interest," not "prejudgment interest", worth knowing if researching Wisconsin case law directly, since the two terms mean the same thing here |
| Wyoming verified 2026-10-07 | Wyo. Stat. § 40-14-106(e) supplies the default rate; Wyoming Supreme Court decisions set eligibility. |
7% per year absent a different agreement or law (§ 40-14-106(e)); the 10% judgment rate starts at rendition (§ 1-16-102(a)). |
After the debtor receives notice of the amount due on a liquidated claim (Ropken, ¶ 10). |
The court states a liquidated-amount and notice test; application depends on the particular damages (Ropken, ¶¶ 10, 20). |
Eligibility is a legal question; an award on the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Ropken, ¶ 7). |
7% per annum (§ 40-14-106(e)); check the judgment for the calculation. |
No interest before judgment in an action under the Governmental Claims Act (§ 1-39-118(d)). |
A liability dispute alone does not make a sum-certain claim unliquidated; the liquidated portion must be identifiable (Ropken, ¶¶ 14, 21). |
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