Prejudgment Interest Rules in Maryland
At a glance
| Governing law | No single statute governs. The RIGHT to prejudgment interest comes from case law, a "modified discretionary approach" (Buxton v. Buxton, building on I.W. Berman Properties v. Porter Bros.), while the RATE defaults to Md. Const. art. III, § 57's 6% "Legal Rate of Interest." Two narrow statutes cover specific mechanisms only: § 11-106 (a loan contract's own rate continues on a judgment through the loan's original maturity date) and § 11-301 (a discretionary, capped, delay-based interest award limited to motor-vehicle bodily-injury cases) |
|---|---|
| Interest rate | 6% a year, the constitutional default rate under Art. III, § 57, unless a written contract sets its own rate, which then controls (and, for a loan-of-money judgment, continues through the loan's originally scheduled maturity date under § 11-106). The narrow § 11-301 motor-vehicle delay-interest mechanism is separately capped at 10%. This 6% prejudgment default is a different, lower rate than Maryland's 10% POST-judgment rate under § 11-107, which only applies once a judgment is actually entered |
| When interest starts running | For a matter-of-right claim, from the specific date the debt became certain, definite, and due, a breach date, a note's maturity date, a date rent was owed, not the filing date. For the discretionary middle category of unliquidated contract claims, whatever date the trier of fact finds equitable; no statute fixes one. For a tort claim involving bodily harm, emotional distress, or similarly intangible damage, there is no true prejudgment accrual at all. The narrow § 11-301 delay-interest mechanism instead runs from a court-set date no earlier than when the action was filed |
| Contract vs. tort claims | Maryland sorts by whether damages are certain and liquidated, not simply by contract versus tort, but layers an absolute tort-specific bar on top. A LIQUIDATED claim of either kind, a contract debt due on a specific date, or a tort claim like conversion where the value taken is readily ascertainable, draws interest as a matter of right. An unliquidated CONTRACT claim falls into a broad middle zone left to discretion. A tort claim for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar intangible damage gets NO prejudgment interest at all, as a matter of law, not merely a discretionary denial |
| Mandatory or discretionary | Mandatory ("a matter of right") once a claim, contract or tort, is certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date before judgment. Discretionary, left to the judge or jury, for the broad middle category of unliquidated contract claims. Categorically UNAVAILABLE, not merely subject to discretion, for a tort claim recovering for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similarly intangible, unliquidated damage |
| Simple or compound | Simple interest under Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 653 (2001); a 2025 Maryland appellate opinion also calculated a disputed award at 6% simple interest. |
| Claims against the government | The State tort-claims waiver expressly excludes interest before judgment (Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(2)). The local-government cap excludes interest accrued on a judgment (§ 5-303(a)(2)); that text concerns interest on a judgment and does not itself establish prejudgment interest. Section 5-522(d) addresses punitive damages in State contract actions. |
| Other exceptions | The tort intangible-damage bar is itself the sharpest exception, Maryland doesn't merely leave tort personal-injury prejudgment interest to discretion the way it does unliquidated contract claims; it forbids it outright. A narrow carve-out partly offsets that: in a motor-vehicle bodily-injury case specifically, § 11-301 lets a court assess delay-based interest, capped at 10% and running from no earlier than the filing date, if the DEFENDANT (or the defendant's insurer or counsel) caused unnecessary delay getting the case to trial, a sanction for stalling, not classic prejudgment interest, and unavailable if the plaintiff caused the delay. A loan-of-money judgment keeps the loan's own contract rate through its original maturity date under § 11-106, rather than switching immediately to the general default |
Requirements one by one
Governing law
Maryland's default rate comes from Md. Const. art. III, § 57: “The Legal Rate of Interest shall be Six per cent per annum, unless otherwise provided by the General Assembly.” Courts apply that rate under the case-law framework in Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634 (2001). The Maryland appellate court reaffirmed in Pellet v. Pellet (2025) that interest is either discretionary or awarded as of right, depending on the claim.
Interest rate
The 6% prejudgment default differs from the 10% rate on a judgment under Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-107(a). A loan-of-money judgment may retain its contract rate through the loan's original maturity date under § 11-106(a), while § 11-301 caps the separate motor-vehicle delay-interest award at 10%.
When interest starts running
For a debt fixed and due by a known date, Buxton ties interest to that date. A discretionary award depends on the trier of fact. Section 11-301 permits delay interest from a court-selected date no earlier than filing the motor-vehicle action.
Contract vs. tort claims
Buxton allows interest as of right for a fixed contract debt and also for a conversion claim when the property's value is readily ascertainable. Its rule bars ordinary prejudgment interest for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar intangible tort damages. Other contract claims may call for a discretionary award.
Simple or compound
Buxton held that a claimant was “entitled to no more than simple interest at the rate of 6%” on the award at issue. The later Pellet opinion likewise describes the litigants' stipulated calculation as 6% simple interest.
Claims against the government
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(2) expressly excludes “Interest before judgment” from the State's tort-immunity waiver. The local-government cap in § 5-303(a)(2) says only that its limits “do not include interest accrued on a judgment”; that clause does not itself grant prejudgment interest against a local government. Section 5-522(d) addresses punitive damages in State contract actions without specifying a prejudgment-interest rule.
Other exceptions
Under § 11-301, a court may assess interest of no more than 10% in a motor-vehicle bodily-injury case if the defendant unnecessarily delayed trial readiness or scheduling. Delay by the defendant's insurer or counsel counts as defendant delay. This is a narrow statutory route despite the ordinary intangible-tort rule.
What trips people up
The 10% judgment rate in § 11-107(a) begins with a judgment; using it as the default rate for the preceding period confuses two distinct rules. The local-government cap's reference to interest on a judgment likewise does not answer whether prejudgment interest is available on a particular local-government claim.
Common questions
Does a fixed debt need a separate request for interest? Buxton treats prejudgment interest as a matter of right when the obligation and amount were certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date.
Can a judge award interest for delay in a car-injury suit? Section 11-301 allows a court to assess up to 10% interest from no earlier than filing if it finds that the defendant, insurer, or counsel caused unnecessary trial delay.
Statutes and sources
- Md. Const. art. III, § 57 — “The Legal Rate of Interest shall be Six per cent per annum, unless otherwise provided by the General Assembly.” Accessed 2026-10-06: https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/43const/html/03art3.html
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-107(a) — 10% interest on a judgment, subject to its exceptions. Accessed 2026-10-06: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=11-107
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-106(a) — contract rate through the loan's original maturity date. Accessed 2026-10-06: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=11-106
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-301 — court-assessed motor-vehicle delay interest, no more than 10%, from no earlier than filing. Accessed 2026-10-06: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=11-301
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a), (d) — State tort-immunity exclusion for interest before judgment and contract-action punitive damages. Accessed 2026-10-06: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=5-522
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(a)(2) — local-government cap excludes interest accrued on a judgment. Accessed 2026-10-06: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=5-303
- Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634 (2001) — interest framework and simple-interest holding. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2362129/buxton-v-buxton/
- Pellet v. Pellet, No. 1439, Sept. Term 2024 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 21, 2025) — “Courts recognize two categories of pre-judgment interest: discretionary and as of right.” Accessed 2026-10-06: https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2025/1439s24.pdf
Source links
Every statute quoted above, linked, with the date we checked it.
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