Maryland: Prejudgment Interest Rules
The short answer
Maryland has no single prejudgment-interest statute -- the right comes almost entirely from case law, and the rate defaults to the state constitution's 6% "legal rate of interest" rather than any interest-specific statute. A claim earns interest as a matter of right once the amount owed became certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date before judgment -- true of many contract debts and of some tort claims, like conversion, with an exactly ascertainable value. An unliquidated contract claim instead falls into a broad middle zone left to the judge or jury's discretion. A tort claim for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar intangible damage gets no prejudgment interest at all -- a categorical bar, not just a discretionary denial. When interest is awarded, it's simple, non-compounding interest at 6% a year unless a written contract sets its own rate.
| Governing law | No single statute governs. The RIGHT to prejudgment interest comes from case law -- a "modified discretionary approach" (Buxton v. Buxton, building on I.W. Berman Properties v. Porter Bros.) -- while the RATE defaults to Md. Const. art. III, § 57's 6% "Legal Rate of Interest." Two narrow statutes cover specific mechanisms only: § 11-106 (a loan contract's own rate continues on a judgment through the loan's original maturity date) and § 11-301 (a discretionary, capped, delay-based interest award limited to motor-vehicle bodily-injury cases) |
|---|---|
| Interest rate | 6% a year -- the constitutional default rate under Art. III, § 57 -- unless a written contract sets its own rate, which then controls (and, for a loan-of-money judgment, continues through the loan's originally scheduled maturity date under § 11-106). The narrow § 11-301 motor-vehicle delay-interest mechanism is separately capped at 10%. This 6% prejudgment default is a different, lower rate than Maryland's 10% POST-judgment rate under § 11-107, which only applies once a judgment is actually entered |
| When interest starts running | For a matter-of-right claim, from the specific date the debt became certain, definite, and due -- a breach date, a note's maturity date, a date rent was owed -- not the filing date. For the discretionary middle category of unliquidated contract claims, whatever date the trier of fact finds equitable; no statute fixes one. For a tort claim involving bodily harm, emotional distress, or similarly intangible damage, there is no true prejudgment accrual at all. The narrow § 11-301 delay-interest mechanism instead runs from a court-set date no earlier than when the action was filed |
| Contract vs. tort claims | Maryland sorts by whether damages are certain and liquidated, not simply by contract versus tort, but layers an absolute tort-specific bar on top. A LIQUIDATED claim of either kind -- a contract debt due on a specific date, or a tort claim like conversion where the value taken is readily ascertainable -- draws interest as a matter of right. An unliquidated CONTRACT claim falls into a broad middle zone left to discretion. A tort claim for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar intangible damage gets NO prejudgment interest at all, as a matter of law, not merely a discretionary denial |
| Mandatory or discretionary | Mandatory ("a matter of right") once a claim -- contract or tort -- is certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date before judgment. Discretionary, left to the judge or jury, for the broad middle category of unliquidated contract claims. Categorically UNAVAILABLE, not merely subject to discretion, for a tort claim recovering for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similarly intangible, unliquidated damage |
| Simple or compound | Simple interest only. The Maryland Supreme Court has directly held that even where prejudgment interest on lost investment income was properly allowed, the claimant was "entitled to no more than simple interest at the rate of 6%" -- no Maryland statute or case authorizes compounding it |
| Claims against the government | The State and local governments are treated differently. A tort claim against the STATE itself cannot include any prejudgment interest -- the Maryland Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity expressly excludes "interest before judgment" (§ 5-522(a)(2)), an outright bar on top of whatever the common-law rules would otherwise allow. A tort claim against a LOCAL government has no comparable bar -- its separate damages cap expressly does NOT include "interest accrued on a judgment" within that cap (§ 5-303(a)(2)), so interest sits on top of the cap rather than inside it. A CONTRACT claim against the State has no express interest bar at all (only punitive damages are barred, under § 5-522(d)), so the ordinary case-law framework applies |
| Other exceptions | The tort intangible-damage bar is itself the sharpest exception -- Maryland doesn't merely leave tort personal-injury prejudgment interest to discretion the way it does unliquidated contract claims; it forbids it outright. A narrow carve-out partly offsets that: in a motor-vehicle bodily-injury case specifically, § 11-301 lets a court assess delay-based interest, capped at 10% and running from no earlier than the filing date, if the DEFENDANT (or the defendant's insurer or counsel) caused unnecessary delay getting the case to trial -- a sanction for stalling, not classic prejudgment interest, and unavailable if the plaintiff caused the delay. A loan-of-money judgment keeps the loan's own contract rate through its original maturity date under § 11-106, rather than switching immediately to the general default |
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The short answer
Maryland doesn't have one comprehensive statute that sets prejudgment interest -- the right to it comes almost entirely from case law, and even the rate defaults to a line in the state constitution rather than an interest-specific statute. If the amount you're owed was certain, definite, and fixed by a specific date before judgment -- most contract debts, and some tort claims like conversion where the value taken is exactly knowable -- you get prejudgment interest as a matter of right. If your contract claim is unliquidated, meaning its exact value wasn't fixed and knowable before trial, the decision is left to the judge or jury's discretion. And if you're recovering tort damages for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar damage that can't be precisely measured, Maryland doesn't allow prejudgment interest at all -- not as a matter of discretion, but as a categorical rule. When interest is awarded, it runs as simple interest at 6% a year unless a contract sets its own rate.
Requirements one by one
Governing law
No single Maryland statute creates a general right to prejudgment interest. That right instead comes from a long line of case law describing what the Maryland Supreme Court calls a "modified discretionary approach" -- built out of I.W. Berman Properties v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1 (1975), and restated in Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634 (2001), and Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Selective Way Insurance Co., 473 Md. 178 (2021). Where a statute enters the picture at all, it's the Maryland Constitution's Art. III, § 57, which sets the default "Legal Rate of Interest" but says nothing else about when prejudgment interest applies. Two narrow Courts and Judicial Proceedings sections cover specific mechanisms only: § 11-106 lets a loan contract's own interest rate continue on a judgment through the loan's originally scheduled maturity date, and § 11-301 creates a discretionary, capped, delay-based interest award available only in a motor-vehicle bodily-injury case.
Interest rate
Absent a contract that sets its own rate, prejudgment interest runs at 6% a year -- the constitutional default under Art. III, § 57, confirmed as the applicable prejudgment rate in Buxton. If there's a written contract with its own interest rate, that rate controls instead, and on a loan-of-money judgment specifically, § 11-106 keeps that contract rate running through the loan's originally scheduled maturity date rather than switching to the general default the moment the debt is unpaid. The one statutory exception to the 6% figure is the narrow § 11-301 motor-vehicle delay-interest mechanism, capped separately at 10%. It's worth keeping the 6% prejudgment rate distinct from Maryland's 10% POST-judgment rate under § 11-107 -- the two apply to different time periods and come from different sources (the constitution versus a statute), and it's easy to mix them up.
When interest starts running
For a matter-of-right claim, interest starts on the specific date the debt became certain and due -- a breach date, a promissory note's maturity date, the date rent was owed -- not the date the lawsuit was filed. For the broad middle category of discretionary, unliquidated contract claims, there's no fixed statutory start date; it's whatever date the judge or jury finds equitable given the facts. For a tort claim barred from prejudgment interest entirely (bodily harm, emotional distress, similarly intangible damage), there's no accrual question to answer -- only ordinary post-judgment interest applies, starting at entry of judgment. The narrow § 11-301 motor-vehicle delay-interest mechanism runs from a date the court sets, no earlier than when the lawsuit was filed.
Contract vs. tort claims
Maryland's real dividing line is whether damages are certain and liquidated, not simply whether the claim sounds in contract or tort -- but it adds an absolute bar specific to certain tort damages that has no contract-side counterpart. A liquidated claim of either kind draws interest as a matter of right: that includes plenty of contract debts, but also a tort claim like conversion, where the value of the property taken is readily ascertainable. An unliquidated contract claim -- one whose value wasn't fixed and knowable before trial -- falls into a broad middle zone left to the trier of fact's discretion. But a tort claim recovering for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar intangible damage gets no prejudgment interest at all, because Maryland presumes the verdict itself already accounts for the delay -- a bright-line rule, not a case-by-case call.
Mandatory or discretionary
Once a claim -- whether contract or tort -- is certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date before judgment, awarding prejudgment interest isn't optional; it's a matter of right. For the broad middle category of unliquidated contract claims, it's genuinely discretionary, left to the judge or jury based on the equities of the case. For a tort claim involving bodily harm, emotional distress, or similarly intangible damage, Maryland goes further than leaving it to discretion: prejudgment interest is categorically unavailable, full stop.
Simple or compound
Simple interest only. Neither Art. III, § 57 nor § 11-106 mentions compounding, and the Maryland Supreme Court has directly addressed the point: even where prejudgment interest on lost investment income was properly allowed, the plaintiff was "entitled to no more than simple interest at the rate of 6%" -- no compounding, regardless of how long the case took to resolve.
Claims against the government
Maryland treats the State differently from local governments on this exact question. A tort claim against the State itself can never include prejudgment interest -- the Maryland Tort Claims Act's waiver of sovereign immunity expressly carves out "interest before judgment" under § 5-522(a)(2), an outright statutory bar that applies regardless of what the common-law rules above would otherwise allow. A tort claim against a county or municipality has no equivalent bar: its separate damages cap under the Local Government Tort Claims Act expressly excludes "interest accrued on a judgment" from that cap under § 5-303(a)(2), meaning interest is added on top of the capped amount rather than absorbed into it. A contract claim against the State has no comparable interest bar at all -- § 5-522(d) only bars punitive damages in a state contract action -- so the ordinary matter-of-right/discretionary/bar framework applies the same way it would against a private party.
Other exceptions
The biggest exception in this survey is the tort intangible-damage bar itself: Maryland doesn't merely leave a personal-injury plaintiff's prejudgment interest to a judge's discretion the way it does an unliquidated contract claim -- it forbids the award outright. A narrow carve-out partly offsets that bar in one specific context: § 11-301 lets a court assess delay-based interest, capped at 10% and running from no earlier than the filing date, in a motor-vehicle bodily-injury case where the defendant (or the defendant's insurer or counsel) caused unnecessary delay in getting the case to trial. That's a sanction for stalling litigation, not ordinary prejudgment interest, and it's unavailable if the delay was the plaintiff's fault instead. A loan-of-money judgment is its own exception too: § 11-106 keeps the loan's own contract rate running through the loan's originally scheduled maturity date, rather than switching immediately to the 6% default the moment the debt goes unpaid.
What trips people up
The most common mistake is assuming Maryland's 10% judgment-interest rate (the one everyone quotes from § 11-107) is the prejudgment rate too. It isn't -- that 10% figure is the POST-judgment rate. The prejudgment default, confirmed directly by the Maryland Supreme Court, is the lower 6% constitutional rate, unless a contract sets a different figure.
People also tend to assume that if their tort claim doesn't qualify for prejudgment interest, at least a judge might award it anyway in their discretion. For most personal-injury and similar intangible-damage claims, that's not how it works: Maryland doesn't just leave the door open to a judge's discretion here -- the door is closed by rule. The one path back in is narrow and specific to motor-vehicle bodily-injury cases where the defendant caused the delay.
Finally, don't assume the "liquidated" line always tracks the "contract" label. A tort claim like conversion can be liquidated (and get interest as a matter of right) if the value of what was taken is exactly knowable, while a contract claim that depends on expert testimony or a jury's valuation call is unliquidated and only discretionary.
Common questions
What's Maryland's prejudgment interest rate?
6% a year by default, under the state constitution's Art. III, § 57 -- not the 10% rate people often see quoted, which is Maryland's separate POST-judgment rate. A written contract's own rate controls instead if one exists.
Can I get prejudgment interest on a personal injury verdict in Maryland?
Generally no. If your damages are for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar damage that can't be precisely measured, Maryland bars prejudgment interest on that recovery outright. The one exception is a motor-vehicle case where the defendant caused unnecessary delay getting to trial.
Is prejudgment interest automatic if I win a contract case in Maryland?
Only if the amount you were owed was certain and fixed by a specific date before judgment -- then it's a matter of right. If the amount was genuinely unliquidated, it's up to the judge or jury's discretion instead.
Does Maryland compound prejudgment interest?
No. Maryland courts apply simple interest only, at whatever rate applies to the claim.
Statutes and sources
- Md. Const. art. III, § 57 (constitutional legal rate of interest) — quoted in full above. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/43const/html/03art3.html
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-107(a) (post-judgment 10% rate) — quoted in full above. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=11-107
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-106(a) (loan-judgment contract-rate continuation) — quoted in full above. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=11-106
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-301 (motor-vehicle delay interest) — quoted in full above. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=11-301
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a), (d) (State tort/contract immunity exclusions) — quoted in full above. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=5-522
- Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(a)(2) (local government cap excludes interest) — quoted in full above. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=5-303
- Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 656-57 (2001) — the three-rules framework (matter of right / discretionary / absolute non-allowance). Accessed 2026-07-05: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2362129/buxton-v-buxton/
- Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 644 (2001) — confirms the 6% constitutional cap on prejudgment interest. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2362129/buxton-v-buxton/
- Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 653 (2001) — confirms simple, non-compounding interest. Accessed 2026-07-05: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2362129/buxton-v-buxton/
Source links
Every statute quoted above, linked, with the date we checked it.