District of Columbia: Prejudgment Interest Rules
The short answer
It depends heavily on the kind of claim. A liquidated debt draws interest close to as a matter of right under D.C. Code § 15-108, from the date it became due. A general breach-of-contract claim works differently: the judgment itself only draws interest from the date of judgment, but D.C. courts have long read § 15-109 to let a judge or jury include prejudgment interest as an element of the damages award, if needed to fully compensate the plaintiff for being kept out of money owed -- a genuinely discretionary call. An ordinary tort claim -- a personal injury or property-damage 'wrong' -- has no comparable mechanism at all: the statute's own text gives that judgment interest only from the date of judgment, so the District has no general prejudgment interest right for an ordinary tort claim. The rate is 6% a year, except a judgment against the District government itself is capped at 4%.
| Governing law | Three provisions work together, not one dedicated statute. D.C. Code § 15-108 gives a near-mandatory right to interest on a liquidated debt (one on which interest is payable by contract, by law, or by usage), running from the date it became due. D.C. Code § 15-109 covers everything else: for a breach-of-contract claim, the judgment itself draws interest only 'from the date of the judgment,' but the statute expressly lets the court or jury include prejudgment interest as an element of the damages award if necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff -- a judicially developed discretionary doctrine. For a tort ('a wrong') claim, § 15-109 says only that 'the judgment for the plaintiff shall bear interest,' which courts and practice guides read as a postjudgment-only rule. D.C. Code § 28-3302 supplies the actual rate for all of this |
|---|---|
| Interest rate | 6% a year under § 28-3302(a) -- 'the rate of interest in the District upon the loan or forbearance of money... in the absence of expressed contract' -- is the rate D.C.'s courts apply both to a § 15-108 liquidated-debt award and to a § 15-109 discretionary compensatory-interest award, rejecting a claimant's attempt to use a higher market rate of return instead. A written contract's own stated rate controls if there is one. A separate, lower rate applies specifically to a judgment against the District government or its officers or employees: § 28-3302(b) caps that rate at 'not exceeding 4% per annum' |
| When interest starts running | For a § 15-108 liquidated debt: from 'the time when it was due and payable.' For a § 15-109 discretionary contract award: courts look to when the plaintiff was actually deprived of the use of money owed -- in the leading case, that meant the date the District finally accepted a contractor's completed work and the payment became due, not an earlier date of substantial performance. For an ordinary tort claim: there is no comparable prejudgment accrual date at all, because § 15-109's tort clause has been read as addressing only the postjudgment period |
| Contract vs. tort claims | A genuine three-way split, not just a difference in rate. A liquidated contract debt draws interest close to as a matter of right under § 15-108. A non-liquidated or general breach-of-contract claim draws interest only if a court or jury exercises discretion under § 15-109 to include it 'as an element of damages' -- and D.C.'s courts have held that this discretion doesn't turn on whether the debt was liquidated or unliquidated, only on whether the plaintiff was in fact deprived of the use of money owed. An ordinary tort ('wrong') claim is the outlier: § 15-109's own text gives that judgment interest only from the date of judgment, with no statutory or case-law doctrine importing the contract side's 'element of damages' theory into an ordinary personal-injury or property-damage tort claim |
| Mandatory or discretionary | A genuine three-way split. § 15-108's liquidated-debt interest is essentially mandatory -- the judgment 'shall include' it. § 15-109's contract 'element of damages' interest is squarely discretionary: 'the decision whether to award prejudgment interest is confided to the discretion of the trial court,' though that discretion must rest on correct legal principles and a stated factual basis, not a bare, unexplained denial. An ordinary tort claim presents no prejudgment-interest decision to make at all under the statute's plain terms, mandatory or discretionary, because no mechanism reaches back before the date of judgment |
| Simple or compound | No District of Columbia statute or case located by this survey squarely addresses whether a § 15-108 or § 15-109 interest award compounds; this is noted as an open question rather than assumed one way or the other |
| Claims against the government | A judgment against the District of Columbia government, or one of its officers or employees acting within the scope of employment, draws interest at a rate capped at 'not exceeding 4% per annum' under § 28-3302(b) -- a full 2 percentage points below the 6% rate that applies to every other judgment debtor. This survey found no case addressing whether this reduced 4% cap governs only the postjudgment period or also limits a § 15-109 discretionary prejudgment-interest award entered against the District specifically |
| Other exceptions | § 15-109's contract clause is itself an exception to the ordinary rule that a judgment draws interest only from its own entry date -- but that exception only opens the door to a compensatory-interest award if the fact-finder is persuaded the plaintiff was genuinely 'deprived of the use of money withheld' and should be made whole for that loss; a plaintiff who can't show that deprivation gets no more than ordinary postjudgment interest even on a contract claim. The reduced 4% rate for a judgment against the District government (§ 28-3302(b)) is itself the clearest carve-out in the rate structure |
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The short answer
The District of Columbia splits prejudgment interest three ways rather than using one uniform rule. A liquidated debt -- one where interest is already payable by contract, law, or usage -- draws interest close to as a matter of right under D.C. Code § 15-108, running from the date it became due. A general breach-of-contract claim is different: the judgment itself only draws interest starting from the date of judgment, but D.C. courts have long read a second statute, § 15-109, to let a judge or jury include prejudgment interest as an element of the damages award, if doing so is necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff for being kept out of money that was owed -- a genuinely discretionary call, not an automatic one. An ordinary tort claim -- a personal injury or property-damage "wrong" -- has no comparable mechanism at all: the statute's own text gives that kind of judgment interest only from the date of judgment, meaning the District has no general prejudgment interest right for an ordinary tort claim. The rate is 6% a year for most defendants, but a judgment against the District government itself is capped at a lower 4%.
Requirements one by one
Governing law
D.C. splits this across three sections rather than one comprehensive statute. § 15-108 handles a liquidated debt -- one on which interest is already payable by contract, by law, or by usage -- and gives it a near-mandatory right to interest from the date it became due. § 15-109 handles everything else, and does two different jobs within a single section: for a breach-of-contract claim, it sets interest running "from the date of the judgment only" as the default, but expressly authorizes the court or jury to include prejudgment interest as "an element in the damages awarded" instead, if that's necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff -- a discretionary doctrine the D.C. Court of Appeals has developed over several decades of cases. For a tort claim ("a wrong"), the same section simply says "the judgment for the plaintiff shall bear interest" -- language courts and practice guides read as addressing only the postjudgment period. § 28-3302 supplies the actual numeric rate that applies across all of this.
Interest rate
6% a year under § 28-3302(a) is the rate D.C.'s courts apply both to a § 15-108 liquidated-debt award and to a § 15-109 discretionary compensatory-interest award on a contract claim -- the D.C. Court of Appeals has expressly rejected a claimant's attempt to use a higher market rate of return (15.99%, in the leading case) instead of the statutory 6% figure, absent an express contract provision setting a different rate. If the parties' own written contract does specify a rate, that rate controls. A separate, lower rate applies only to a judgment against the District government itself, or an officer or employee acting within the scope of employment: § 28-3302(b) caps that rate at "not exceeding 4% per annum," two full points below the general rate.
When interest starts running
For a § 15-108 liquidated debt, interest starts "from the time when it was due and payable" -- typically a fixed contractual due date. For a § 15-109 discretionary contract award, D.C. courts look to when the plaintiff was actually deprived of the use of money owed; in the leading case, that meant the date the District of Columbia finally accepted a contractor's completed work and the final payment became due, not an earlier date when the contractor had merely substantially performed. For an ordinary tort claim, there is no comparable prejudgment accrual date at all under the statute -- the tort clause of § 15-109 has been read as reaching only the period after judgment is entered.
Contract vs. tort claims
This is a genuine three-way split, not just a difference in rate. A liquidated contract debt draws interest close to as a matter of right under § 15-108. A non-liquidated or general breach-of-contract claim draws interest only if a court or jury actually exercises its discretion under § 15-109 to include it as an element of damages -- and D.C.'s courts have been explicit that this discretion doesn't turn on whether the underlying debt was liquidated or unliquidated in the traditional sense; the real question is simply whether the plaintiff was deprived of the use of money it was owed and should be made whole for that loss. An ordinary tort ("wrong") claim stands apart from both: § 15-109's own text gives that kind of judgment interest only from the date of judgment, with no statutory language, and no case law located by this survey, extending the contract side's "element of damages" doctrine to an ordinary personal-injury or property-damage tort claim.
Mandatory or discretionary
A genuine three-way split here too. § 15-108's liquidated-debt interest is essentially mandatory -- the statute says the judgment "shall include" it. § 15-109's contract "element of damages" interest is squarely discretionary: D.C.'s courts have said directly that "the decision whether to award prejudgment interest is confided to the discretion of the trial court" -- though that discretion has to be exercised on stated, legally correct grounds, and a trial court that denies the request without any explanation risks being sent back to reconsider. An ordinary tort claim doesn't present a mandatory-or-discretionary question at all under the statute's plain terms, because there's no mechanism described that reaches back before the date of judgment in the first place.
Simple or compound
No District of Columbia statute or case located by this survey squarely addresses whether a § 15-108 or § 15-109 interest award compounds. That's noted here as an honest open question rather than assumed one way or the other.
Claims against the government
A judgment against the District of Columbia government itself, or against one of its officers or employees acting within the scope of their employment, draws interest at a reduced rate: § 28-3302(b) caps it at "not exceeding 4% per annum," a full 2 percentage points below the 6% rate that applies to every other judgment debtor. This survey found no case specifically addressing whether that reduced 4% cap governs only the postjudgment period on a judgment against the District, or whether it also limits the rate available for a § 15-109 discretionary prejudgment-interest award entered against the District on a contract claim.
Other exceptions
§ 15-109's contract "element of damages" doctrine is itself an exception layered onto the ordinary rule that a judgment draws interest only from its own entry date -- but that exception only opens up if the fact-finder concludes the plaintiff was genuinely "deprived of the use of the money withheld" and needs to be made whole for that specific loss; a plaintiff who can't make that showing gets no more than ordinary postjudgment interest, even on a contract claim. Beyond that doctrine, the clearest carve-out in the whole scheme is the reduced 4% rate reserved for a judgment against the District government under § 28-3302(b).
What trips people up
The biggest trap is assuming an ordinary personal-injury claim in D.C. works like it does in most other states -- with some kind of automatic or discretionary prejudgment interest running from the date of injury. It doesn't. D.C.'s tort clause in § 15-109 gives that judgment interest only from the date of judgment, so a tort plaintiff who assumes they're accumulating interest for the years a case takes to resolve may be badly mistaken.
The second trap runs the other way on the contract side: assuming a contract claim automatically gets prejudgment interest just because the underlying debt is "liquidated" enough to trigger § 15-108. In practice, D.C.'s courts have moved away from a strict liquidated/unliquidated test for the § 15-109 discretionary award and instead ask whether the plaintiff was actually kept out of money it was owed -- meaning the argument for prejudgment interest has to be made and won, not simply assumed from the nature of the debt.
Common questions
What's D.C.'s prejudgment interest rate?
6% a year for most judgments, under D.C. Code § 28-3302(a), unless a written contract specifies its own rate. A judgment against the District government itself is capped at 4%.
Do I get prejudgment interest automatically if I win a personal injury case in D.C.?
No. D.C. Code § 15-109 gives an ordinary tort judgment interest only from the date of judgment -- there's no general prejudgment interest mechanism for a personal-injury or property-damage claim under this statute.
Can I get prejudgment interest on a breach-of-contract claim in D.C.?
Possibly, but it's discretionary, not automatic -- a court or jury has to decide it's necessary to fully compensate you for being deprived of the use of money you were owed. It's not simply awarded because the contract was breached.
Does D.C. prejudgment interest compound?
This survey did not locate a District of Columbia statute or case addressing that question directly for either § 15-108 or § 15-109.
Statutes and sources
- D.C. Code § 15-108 -- "the judgment for the plaintiff shall include interest on the principal debt from the time when it was due and payable, at the rate fixed by the contract, if any, until paid." Accessed 2026-07-05: https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/15-108
- D.C. Code § 15-109 -- "In an action to recover damages for breach of contract the judgment shall allow interest on the amount for which it is rendered from the date of the judgment only. This section does not preclude the jury, or the court... from including interest as an element in the damages awarded, if necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff. In an action to recover damages for a wrong the judgment for the plaintiff shall bear interest." Accessed 2026-07-05: https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/15-109
- D.C. Code § 28-3302(a) -- "The rate of interest in the District upon the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action in the absence of expressed contract, is 6% per annum." Accessed 2026-07-05: https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/28-3302
- D.C. Code § 28-3302(b) -- "Interest, when authorized by law, on judgments or decrees against the District of Columbia, or its officers, or its employees acting within the scope of their employment, is at the rate of not exceeding 4% per annum." Accessed 2026-07-05: https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/28-3302
Source links
Every statute quoted above, linked, with the date we checked it.