W. Va. Code § 56-1-1

Section 56-1-1 generally permits venue in the county where the cause of action arose or where the defendant resides.

Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Board of Regents · filed 1983-06-30

Generally, venue for a cause of action lies in the county wherein the cause of action arose or in the county where the defendant resides. See Hesse v. State Soil Conservation Committee, 153 W.Va. 111, 168 S.E.2d 293 (1969); W.Va. Code §§ 56-1-1, -2 (1966). Accordingly, in the instant case, venue is proper in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County.

Section 56-1-1(a) bases venue on where a defendant resides or where the cause of action arose.

SER Thornhill Group v. Charles E. King, Jr., Judge · filed 2014-06-06(a)

Only two statutory factors control the issue of venue before us: the place of the defendants’ residence and the place where the cause of action arose.

Section 56-1-1(a)(1) bases venue on the county where a defendant resides or the cause of action arose.

SER Airsquid Ventures, Inc. v. Hon. David W. Hummel, Jr. · filed 2015-09-24(a)(1)

Under that statute, the primary factors for determining venue are the county in which “any of the defendants may reside or the cause of action arose.” W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(a)(1).

Section 56-1-1(a)(1) permits venue for a breach of contract claim where a defendant resides or where the contract was made, breached, or caused substantial damage.

STATE EX REL. GALLOWAY GROUP v. McGraw · filed 2011-05-16(a)(1)

Our venue statute first provides that venue lies in the circuit court of any county wherein any of the defendants may reside. The circuit court below found that "it is undisputed that no defendant resides in Wyoming County." Because venue cannot be established based on the defendant's residence in Wyoming County, Fredeking had to demonstrate that its cause of action arose in Wyoming County. The action below is based on breach of contract. As a result, in order to demonstrate venue, Fredeking had to show specifically that the contract between the parties was made in Wyoming County; breach of the contract occurred in Wyoming County; or that the manifestation of the breach occurred in Wyoming County. Fredeking has failed to do this. Therefore, Fredeking failed to legally demonstrate that venue lies in the Circuit Court of Wyoming County.

A corporation’s alleged contacts with a county must be sufficient to establish that it does business there for venue purposes.

Reed v. Jance Ann Reed Collins · filed 2018-11-21(a)(2)

There are simply no allegations of Pioneer’s contacts with Kanawha County or any conduct relative to Pioneer occurring in Kanawha County. We, therefore, find no error in the circuit court’s finding that there is no venue-giving defendant in Kanawha County, and petitioner’s complaint was properly dismissed for lack of venue.

Section 56-1-1(a)(1) permits venue where a cause of action arose; for a third-party medical negligence claim, that is the county where the provider rendered or failed to render the challenged healthcare.

State ex rel. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a Chestnut Ridge Center v. Judge Nelson · filed 2021-05-10(a)(1)

So, both applicable venue statutes serve to require the action to be filed in the county where the cause of action arose. ... As a result, we hold that for purposes of determining venue, the cause of action for a third-party medical negligence claim pursued under West Virginia Code § 55-7B-9b (2003) arises in the county where the provider rendered or failed to render healthcare services with allegedly willful and wanton or reckless disregard of a foreseeable risk of harm to third persons.

Section 56-1-1(a)(7)’s provision allowing venue in an adjoining circuit when a judge is interested in the case was superseded by Trial Court Rule XVII.

Williams v. Cummings · filed 1994-06-16(a)(7)

This statute refers to a situation under which a judge might be disqualified, and therefore it is in conflict with and superseded by T.C.R. XVII, which addresses the disqualification and temporary assignment of judges, and thereby dispenses with W.Va.Code § 56 — 1—1(a)(7).

Section 56-1-1(a)'s general venue rules give way when another statute specially provides venue.

United Bank, Inc. v. Blosser · filed 2005-11-29(a)

Subsection (a) of W. Va. Code § 56-1-1 contains a plainly worded exception to the general venue provisions “where it is otherwise specially provided.”

Section 56-1-1 controls venue in a suit between two new motor vehicle dealers when the special venue rule in § 17A-6A-12(3) does not apply.

Thornhill Motor Car, Inc. d/b/a Thornhill Chrysler Dodge Jeep RAM v. The Honorable Miki Thompson, Judge of the 30th Judicial Circuit, and Moore Chrysler, Inc. · filed 2022-04-26(a)(1)-(2)

After careful review of the parties’ arguments, the record before us, and the applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court committed a clear legal error in applying the specific venue statute, § 17A-6A-12(3), rather than the general venue statute, § 56-1-1.

When venue is challenged under Rule 12(b)(3), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper under § 56-1-1 in the county where the action is pending.

SER Michael B. Ferrell v. Honorable Warren R. McGraw, Judge and Employers' Innovative Network, LLC, and Jeff Mullins · filed 2020-03-10(a)

Where a challenge is made to venue under Rule 12(b)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish proper venue for the civil action in the county in which it is pending under the framework of West Virginia Code § 56-1-1.

Section 56-1-1(b) permits suit against a foreign corporation in a county where it performs an act specified in § 31-1-15, if the claim arises from that act.

Brent v. BD. OF TRUSTEES, ETC. · filed 1979-07-10(b)

Foreign corporations do business in a particular county under Code, 56-1-1(b) when they do any of those acts specified in Code, 31-1-15 in that county and may be sued in that county on any cause of action arising from those acts.

A corporation may be sued in a county where its minimum contacts are sufficient to show that it does business there.

Kidwell v. Westinghouse Electric Co. · filed 1987-07-14(b)

Consequently, we conclude whether a corporation is subject to venue in a given county in this State under the phrase in W.Va.Code, 56-l-l(b), “wherein it does business” depends upon the sufficiency of the corporation’s minimum contacts in such county that demonstrate it is doing business, as that concept is used in W.Va.Code, 31-1-15.

Section 56-1-1 permits a nonresident insurance company to be sued in a county where it does business or where the cause of action, or part of it, arose.

Commercial Union Insurance v. Great American Insurance · filed 1997-09-05

Furthermore, under West Virginia’s venue statute, W.Va.Code 56-1-1, a nonresident insurance company may be sued in any county in which it does business or in which the cause of action “or part thereof’ arose.

Section 56-1-1(b) permits a change of venue when the action was brought in the county where the cause of action arose; it does not apply when venue rests on the defendant doing business in the county.

Gardner v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 1988-07-13(b)

This statute is not applicable to the present case because venue here was not based upon where the cause of action arose but upon where the defendant was doing business.

Section 56-1-1(b) permits a change of venue only when the action was brought in the county where the cause of action arose.

State ex rel. Huffman v. Stephens · filed 1999-12-09(b)

West Virginia Code 56 — 1—1(b) authorizes a change of venue only when a civil action or proceeding is brought in the county in which the action arose.

When an action is filed where the cause of action arose, subsection (b) exclusively controls a defendant’s request to transfer it to the county where the defendant resides.

State Ex Rel. Smith v. Maynard · filed 1994-11-18(b)

We hold that W.Va.Code, 56 — 1—1(b), exclusively controls a transfer decision where its prerequisites have been met; namely, the forum selected is where the cause of action arose, and the defendant resides in another county and requests the case be transferred to that county.

Section 56-1-1(b) is the exclusive authority for discretionary changes of venue between West Virginia counties; transfers it does not expressly permit are forbidden.

State Ex Rel. Riffle v. Ranson · filed 1995-10-27(b)

To recapitulate, we hold that W.Va.Code, 56 — 1—1(b), is the exclusive authority for a discretionary transfer or change of venue and any other transfer or change of venue from one county to another within West Virginia that is not explicitly permitted by the statute is impermissible and forbidden.

Section 56-1-1(b) controls any subsequent change of venue once a case has been transferred.

State Ex Rel. Mitchem v. Kirkpatrick · filed 1997-04-14(b)

Once a case is transferred, W. Va.Code 56 — 1—1(b) [1986] controls any subsequent transfer.

Section 56-1-1(a)(3) places venue for an action directly affecting title to land in the county where the land is located.

Ray v. Hey · filed 1990-09-21(a)(3)

However, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County lacks jurisdiction, because under W. Va. Code, 53-5-3 [1931], only the Circuit Court of Nicholas County has jurisdiction to consider this case directly affecting the title to land located in Nicholas County. Venue for the present case is proper in Nicholas County, under W.Va. Code, 56-1-1(a)(3) [1986].

Section 56-1-1(a)(1) permits venue for a legal malpractice action in any county where the attorney was retained, breached a duty, or caused substantial damage.

McGuire v. Fitzsimmons · filed 1996-07-17(a)(1)

The circuit court may find venue to be proper in more than one county. Venue based on where the cause of action for the legal malpractice suit arose is proper in the following counties: (1) where the attorney’s employment was contracted, that is, where the duty came into existence; or (2) where the breach or violation of the duty occurred; or (3) where the manifestation of the breach — substantial damage — occurred.

Section 56-1-1 permits a civil action where an individual defendant resides, where the cause of action arose, or where a corporate defendant has its principal place of business.

Crispen v. West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission · filed 1999-12-09(a)

Given the fact that W. Va.Code 56-1-1 prescribes that a civil action shall be brought where the individual defendants reside, where the cause of action arose, or where a corporate defendant has a principal place of business, and given the facts of the present case, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that venue for this action did not he in Mason County and in dismissing the action for that reason.