W. Va. Code § 33-11-4

Section 33-11-4(4) does not treat the insurer’s letter to policyholders about its former agents as an act of boycott, coercion or intimidation.

Bryan v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1987-07-16(4)

The appellants also argue that W.Va. Code § 33-11-4(4), which makes it illegal for any person to commit an act of boycott, coercion or intimidation in restraint of or in monopoly of the insurance business, was violated by the letter. The Court does not see how the letter which Massachusetts Mutual sent can be construed as an act of boycott, coercion or intimidation.

Collection letters and a lawsuit over a questionable claim did not violate § 33-11-4(3) or (5) on these facts.

Cleo B. Smalley Dorothy I. Smalley v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company · filed 1992-06-26(3), (5)

The only parts of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act which could conceivably pertain to Aetna's actions in this case are sections (3) and (5).3 Conceding that Aetna's claim was questionable, the consequent letters and law suit simply do not rise to the level of a violation of either provision.

Section 33-11-4(12) permits disclosure of nonpublic personal financial information in compliance with a court order.

Martino v. Barnett · filed 2004-03-15(12)

West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(12) makes it explicit that compliance with court orders is an additional exemption to those encompassed within the Privacy Rule.

Section 33-11-4(7) primarily concerns insurance rates and premiums, not claim settlement practices.

Michael Ex Rel. Michael v. Appalachian Heating, LLC · filed 2010-06-11(7)

It should be noted, however, that the provision relied upon by State Auto, W. Va.Code § 33-11-4(7) (2002) (Repl.Vol.2006), primarily pertains to the rates and premiums charged for insurance coverage. It does not pertain to settlement practices and, thus, is irrelevant to the instant question.

Section 33-11-4(9) applies to uninsured motorist claims and requires unfair settlement acts frequent enough to indicate a general business practice.

Rodney Weese Maude Weese v. Nationwide Insurance Company, an Ohio Corporation · filed 1989-06-27(9)

A claimant under the Act also must show that the insurer committed the objectionable acts “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” W.Va. Code § 33-11-4(9) (1982). ... The Act does not exclude uninsured motorist coverage from its terms, and we are confident that the Supreme Court of West Virginia would apply the Act in accordance with its plain language.

Failure to prove a violation of § 33-11-4(9)(g) does not bar a claim that the insurer violated other provisions of § 33-11-4(9).

Maher v. Continental Casualty · filed 1996-02-14(9)(g)

Nevertheless, no West Virginia case has held that a plaintiff's mere inability to prove a violation of Paragraph (g) precludes an attempt to demonstrate that an insurer has violated other provisions of the statute.

An allegation of bad faith alone does not plead a claim under § 33-11-4(9) when the complaint identifies no specific unfair settlement practice.

Sizemore v. State Farm General Insurance · filed 1998-06-23(9)

In addition, the plaintiffs clearly failed to plead an unfair settlement practices claim. Nowhere in the complaint do the plaintiffs refer to “unfair settlement practices,” W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9), or any specific practices listed therein that would constitute such a claim.

Section 33-11-4(9)(g) compares an insured’s ultimate recovery only with settlement offers made before the lawsuit began.

Rodney Scott Maher, D/B/A Creative Furniture and Waterbeds v. Continental Casualty Company · filed 1996-02-14(9)(g)

Because the manifest purpose of Paragraph (g) is to discourage the practice of “[c]ompelling insureds to institute litigation,” only offers of settlement that are made prior to the commencement of the lawsuit may be compared to the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery for the purpose of determining whether the Paragraph has been violated.

Section 33-11-4(9) does not limit unfair claim settlement practices to conduct before litigation begins.

Mordesovitch v. Westfield Insurance · filed 2002-11-27(9)

The UTPA does not specifically restrict its coverage to the handling of a claim prior to the institution of a legal proceeding. Contrary to Mr. Kesner’s assertion, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not held that the UTPA is so limited.

Liability is reasonably clear when a reasonable person who knows the relevant facts and law would conclude, for good reason, that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff.

Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2004-07-02(9)(f)

Based on the reasoning above, we now hold that liability is “reasonably clear,” as stated in W.Va.Code, 33-11^4(9)(f) [2002], when a reasonable person, with knowledge of the relevant facts and law, would conclude, for good reason, that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff.

Whether an insurer’s settlement offer is fair and equitable under § 33-11-4(9)(f) is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.

Hicks Ex Rel. Saus v. Jones · filed 2005-07-08(9)(f)

Whether an insurer has made a fair and equitable settlement offer is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.

A delayed-response bad faith claim under § 33-11-4(9) fails when the insurer responds within the 15 working days required by the implementing regulation and no other basis for the claim is asserted.

Aluise v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2005-12-01(9)

Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, Nationwide had to respond within 15 working days. ... Excluding nonworking days, it is clear that Nationwide responded within 15 working days. ... This response was also within the 15 day requirement. Insofar as the Aluises have not asserted any other reasons why their bad faith claims should not have been dismissed, we will not disturb the circuit court’s ruling on the issue.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires repeated unfair claim settlement practices to state a claim; violations may occur while handling a single claim.

Soyoola v. Oceanus Insurance · filed 2013-12-11(9)

To state a claim under UTPA, the plaintiff must show that the insurer repeatedly violated § 33-11^(9). Syl. Pt. 4, Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 201 W.Va. 1, 491 S.E.2d 1 (1996). Violations may occur in the handling of multiple claims or a single claim. See id.

An unfair claim settlement practices claim under § 33-11-4(9) fails when the insured offers no supporting facts beyond a coverage denial and the insurer promptly investigates without misrepresenting coverage.

Liberty Corporate Capital LTD v. Peacemaker National Training Center, LLC · filed 2018-10-24(9)

There are no facts before the Court to support a claim that Liberty has engaged in an unfair claim settlement practice under W. Va. Code § 33-11-4 (9).

Section 33-11-4(9) does not support an unfair claim settlement practices claim based only on a denial of coverage when the insurer promptly investigates and makes no misrepresentation about coverage.

Liberty Corporate Capital Ltd. v. Peacemaker Nat'l Training Ctr., LLC · filed 2018-10-24(9)

Peacemaker has failed to provide facts that could support this claim other than Liberty's failure to provide coverage. From the facts before the Court, Liberty has not made any misrepresentations regarding coverage, Liberty has acted reasonably promptly and investigated the claims and only after this investigation did Liberty deny coverage. Furthermore, Liberty responded to the request and conducted the investigation the same month the claim was received. ECF Nos. 46-10, 46-11. There are no facts before the Court to support a claim that Liberty has engaged in an unfair claim settlement practice under W. Va. Code § 33-11-4 (9).

Section 33-11-4(9) allows a claim alleging multiple unfair settlement practices in the handling of a single insurance claim to survive dismissal.

Abraham Linc Corporation v. Spinnaker Insurance Company · filed 2024-07-16(9)

Here, the Court finds the Amended Complaint alleges multiple violations of W. Va. Code § 33-11-4(9), which are sufficient to survive dismissal.

Section 33-11-4(9) claims can survive summary judgment when evidence of an unreasonable investigation and possible misrepresentations creates a factual dispute over multiple alleged unfair practices.

Gazvoda v. Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2025-02-06(9)

In sum, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Gazvoda, the Court concludes the evidence adduced is minimally sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact on his punitive damages claim and the multiple alleged WVUTPA violations.

Section 33-11-4(9)(c) and (f) require a UIM insurer to investigate a claim and make reasonable settlement attempts once its duties arise after settlement for the tortfeasor’s full policy limit.

Raszkiewicz v. Progressive Max · filed 2025-04-23(9)(c), (f)

Here, Progressive Max’s duties did not arise until after the underlying negligence claim was settled for the tortfeasor’s full policy limit. At that point, Progressive Max owed Raszkiewicz a duty to investigate his UIM claim and to make reasonable attempts at settlement. See W. Va. Code § 33-11-4(9)(c), (f). Based on our review of the record, we agree with the district court’s determination that Progressive Max properly discharged these duties.

Claims under § 33-11-4(9)(a), (g), and (n) can proceed when factual disputes remain about the insurer’s claim settlement practices.

West Virginia Industrial Parks Sales and Management Corporation v. Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company · filed 2025-08-01(9)(a), (g), (n)

The parties’ disagreements as to the Unfair Trade Practices Act violation center on factual disputes. Summary judgment is not appropriate. Erie’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Count IV (Violations of Unfair Trade Practices Act) insofar as WVIP may proceed on its claim under West Virginia Code §§ 33-11-4(9)(a), (g), and (n).

Section 33-11-4(9)(c), (d), (f), and (n) generally leave the reasonableness of an insurer’s claim handling to the jury when material facts are disputed.

White v. American General Life Insurance · filed 2009-08-24(9)(c), (d), (f), and (n)

To summarize, material questions of fact remain as to whether American General violated W. Va.Code § 33-ll-4(9)(c), (d), (f) and (n).

Section 33-11-4(9)(d) prohibits refusing to pay a claim without a reasonable investigation based on all available information; allegations that an adjuster failed to investigate claimed losses can state a claim under the section.

Banks v. Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2019-02-20(9)(d)

These allegations appear sufficient to state a WVUTPA claim against McGahan. ... see also W. Va. Code § 33-11-4(9)(d) (prohibiting “[r]efusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information”).

An insured’s failure to substantiate a claim or make a demand before filing suit can relieve the insurer of its duty to attempt prompt settlement.

Raines v. Westfield Insurance Company · filed 2023-08-24(9)(f)

The Court finds that Mr. Raines’s failure to substantiate his claims or afford a demand prior to filing suit obviated the insurer’s responsibility to promptly attempt to settle his claim.

Section 33-11-4(9) permits insurance regulation violations to inform the scope of an unfair trade practices claim, but those violations are not independent grounds for recovery.

Hartsog · filed 2025-12-02(9)

While Series 14 does not set forth an independent ground for the UTPA claim, the Court may consider such violations to inform the scope of the properly alleged UTPA violations.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires an insurer to promptly investigate a policyholder’s claim at its own expense after receiving proof of loss.

Miller v. Fluharty · filed 1997-12-19(9)

The public policy set forth in W.Va.Code, 33-11-4(9) [1985] is that an insurance carrier has a duty to promptly conduct its own investigation, at its own expense, when a policyholder submits proof of a loss.

Section 33-11-4(9)’s unfair claim settlement rules apply to claims under annuity contracts.

Stonewall Jackson Memorial Hospital Co. v. American United Life Insurance · filed 1999-12-06(9)

Accordingly, we believe that the AUL Master Group Annuity Contract is an “insurance policy” or “insurance contract” subject to the terms of the Act. Any dispute that the Hospital had with AUL regarding claims against the Contract would be governed by the unfair claims practice provisions of the Act.

Section 33-11-4(9)(d) did not support an unreasonable-investigation claim where the insurer paid the covered claims.

Scotchel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2020-01-13(9)(d)

While petitioner asserts that the reasonableness of an insurance company’s conduct is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, the case he cites for that proposition actually holds that “[w]hether an insurer refused to pay a claim without conducting a reasonable investigation based on all available information under W.Va. Code, 33-11-4(9)(d) [2002], and whether liability is reasonably clear under W.Va. Code, 33-11-4(9)(f) [2002] ordinarily are questions of fact for the jury.” Syl. Pt. 3, Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 215 W. Va. 634, 600 S.E.2d 346 (2004). Petitioner does not dispute that State Farm paid the amounts set forth above for his benefit and to make him whole, less the $250 deductible and the portion of the rental car expense not covered by petitioner’s policy. For these reasons, we find that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to respondents based on the claims clarified by petitioner during the proceedings below.

Claims under § 33-11-4(9) for unfair claim settlement practices involving an employee welfare benefit plan are preempted by ERISA.

Ball v. Life Planning Services, Inc. · filed 1992-07-15(9)

While we find that the appellants’ claim under W.Va.Code § 33-12-21 is not preempted by ERISA, we reach the opposite conclusion with respect to their claim under W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9). This claim relates to unfair claim settlement practices and is clearly the same type of claim that the United States Supreme Court found to be pre-empted by § 514(a) of ERISA in Pilot Life Insurance Co. Dedeaux.

Claims under § 33-11-4(9) concerning the processing of ERISA plan benefits are preempted and are not preserved by ERISA’s insurance saving clause.

Kolenich v. Highmark West Virginia, Inc. · filed 2020-01-21(9)

Further, while certainly a closer question on its face, all pertinent courts to have considered the issue have found that claims under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, W.Va. Code §§ 33-11-1 through 33-11-10, including claims for unfair claim settlement practices under W.Va. Code § 33-11-4(9) such as those brought by plaintiffs here, are not subject to ERISA'’s saving clause as “regulat[ing] insurance.” ... Accordingly, this Court finds that the saving clause does not apply to plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 33-11-4(9) claims for improper processing or administration of ERISA plan benefits are preempted and are not saved by ERISA’s insurance savings clause.

Custer v. Pan American Life Insurance Company · filed 1993-12-17(9)

Custer argues that her state law claim alleged in Count III, based on West Virginia's unfair trade practices, W.Va.Code Sec. 33-11-4(9) (defining unfair settlement practices as an unfair trade practice), is saved from preemption as arising under a law that regulates insurance. ... Controlled by Pilot Life and Powell, we hold that Custer's claims under West Virginia law relating to improper claims processing or administration are not saved from preemption by the savings clause.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires allegations of a general business practice; several alleged violations arising from one isolated incident do not suffice.

Russell v. Amerisure Insurance · filed 1993-07-16(9)

The factual basis for each of these violations is the same isolated scenario and does not suffice to represent a “general business practice.”

Section 33-11-4(9) requires a private unfair trade practices claimant to show acts occurring frequently enough to indicate a general business practice; an allegation to that effect can survive a motion to dismiss.

Pen Coal Corp. v. William H. McGee and Co., Inc. · filed 1995-10-19(9)

To establish a private cause of action under West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, a plaintiff must show that a defendant committed certain acts “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9) (1992). Pen Coal alleges: “McGee and Phoenix have knowingly committed and performed, with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, one or more of the following acts_” (Complaint ¶32). Assuming this allegation to be true, as the Court must, the Court concludes that Pen Coal has made out an unfair trade practices claim and that dismissal is inappropriate.

Section 33-11-4(9) permits a private action based on a single claim when separate violations arise from an insurer’s habit, custom, usage, or policy and together show a general business practice.

Dodrill v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1997-07-21(9)

Accordingly, we hold that to maintain a private action based upon alleged violations of W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9) in the settlement of a single insurance claim, the evidence should establish that the conduct in question constitutes more than a single violation of W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9), that the violations arise from separate, discrete acts or omissions in the claim settlement, and that they arise from a habit, custom, usage, or business policy of the insurer, so that, viewing the conduct as a whole, the finder of fact is able to conclude that the practice or practices are sufficiently pervasive or sufficiently sanctioned by the insurance company that the conduct can be considered a “general business practice” and can be distinguished by fair minds from an isolated event.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires a plaintiff alleging unfair claim settlement practices to show a general business practice rather than an isolated violation.

Barefield v. DPIC Companies, Inc. · filed 2004-06-25(9)

It is well established, of course, that if a plaintiff is alleging that an insurance company violated the UTPA by committing an unfair claim settlement practice, as set forth in W.Va.Code, 33-11-4(9) [2002], the plaintiff must establish that the insurance company had a “general business practice” of committing unfair claim settlement practices and that the breach of the law was not an isolated event.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires more than an isolated violation to show a general business practice; prior violations by the same insurer may be discovered to prove that element.

Miller v. Pruneda · filed 2004-07-20(9)

Proof of multiple past breaches by an insurance company is required to prove that the company has a general business practice of acting in bad faith. Therefore, this Court finds that previous bad faith/UTPA cases involving State in West Virginia are relevant to the instant action because they are needed to prove the “general business practice” element found in UTPA.

Section 33-11-4(9)’s general business practice requirement cannot be established through collateral estoppel based on a prior claim when credible evidence shows the insurer changed its practices before handling the later claim.

Holloman v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-06-21(9)

Accordingly, we now hold that collateral estoppel will not apply in a statutory cause of action for violation of W. Va.Code § 33-11-4(9) to establish an insurer’s “general business practice” where there is credible evidence on the record in the action at bar that the insurer altered its general business practice between the time the insurer handled the claim underlying a prior general business practice finding and the time the *277claim or claims at issue in the subsequent litigation were handled.

Section 33-11-4(9)(f) permits an unfair settlement practices claim based on a single insurance claim when the alleged conduct supports a general business practice.

EXECUTIVE RISK INDEMNITY, INC. v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2009-07-30(9)(f)

Because CAMC may allege a violation of the WVUTPA based on a single insurance claim, I FIND that CAMC has pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that ERC may have had a business policy that it would not pay any large claims or a business policy that it would now reject all claims by CAMC under the Reinsurance Certificate and the Hercules policy despite having paid such claims before.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires unfair claim settlement practices to occur frequently enough to establish a general business practice; one isolated violation is insufficient.

SER AIG Domestic Claims v. Hon. Larry L. Starcher, Judge · filed 2014-02-21(9)

To establish their claim that AIG committed unfair claims settlement practices in the resolution of their lawsuit in violation of the UTPA, W.Va. Code § 33-11-4(9) requires more than simply showing one isolated violation. The UTPA requires the plaintiffs to show that AIG engaged in unfair claim settlement practices with such frequency as to establish that the conduct was a pervasive “general business practice.”

Section 33-11-4(9) requires evidence that alleged violations occurred frequently enough to indicate a general business practice.

Creamer v. Lacaria · filed 2017-08-11(9)

As articulated in the text of the statue, to prove violations under § 33-11-4(9), the Plaintiff must demonstrate that they occurred “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”

Section 33-11-4(9) requires facts showing that unfair claim settlement practices occurred frequently enough to indicate a general business practice.

Fisher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2017-10-05(9)

Section 33-11-4(9) of the Act provides remedies for conduct determined to be unfair claim settlement practices that are “commit[ed] or perform[ed] with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” ... Stripped of the threadbare recitation of portions of the Act and her conclusory allegations, Ms. Fisher’s complaint does not adequately allege or demonstrate that State Farm has engaged in a “general business practice” in violation of the Act.

Section 33-11-4(9) allows an unfair claim settlement claim to proceed when allegations about the insurer’s handling of the claim and similar suits sufficiently plead a general business practice.

Fisher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2018-08-13(9)

The amended complaint now adequately alleges that State Farm engages in unfair claim settlement practices as a general business practice in violation of W. Va. Code § 33-11- 4(9) by its failure to adequately compensate Ms. Fisher for the loss of her personal property and by many similar suits making like allegations.

A violation affecting every claim can support a finding that unreasonable claim investigations are a general business practice under § 33-11-4(9)(d).

Robertson v. Cincinnati Life Insurance Company · filed 2019-02-04(9)(d)

This violation of the regulations could lead a reasonable jury to also find that Defendant violated § 33-11-4(9)(d) of the UTPA14 and that such a violation must have logically occurred each and every time Defendant takes on a new claim.

Unfair claim settlement practice claims under § 33-11-4(9) require evidence of a general business practice; an isolated violation is insufficient.

Hinkle v. Matthews · filed 2019-03-25(9)

To allege violations of the WVUTPA, a plaintiff “must establish that the insurance company had a ‘general business practice’ of committing unfair claim settlement practices and that the breach of the law was not an isolated event.”

Section 33-11-4(9) permits a general business practice claim when the alleged claim settlement violations are sufficiently separate and discrete.

Gue v. Nationwide Insurance Company of America · filed 2021-08-12(9)

The Court finds these allegations are sufficiently discrete violations to plausibly state a claim of a general business practice.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires a general business practice of unfair claim settlement; separate, discrete violations during one claim may satisfy that requirement, but an isolated violation does not.

Ward v. American Life Insurance Company · filed 2022-12-20(9)

Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that AILIC engaged in a “general business practice” of unfair claim settlement in violation of the UTPA. The Complaint contains no facts demonstrating that AILIC has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating the unfair settlement practice provision of the UTPA, nor have Plaintiffs provided any facts showing a series of “separate [and] discrete” violations of the UTPA while AILIC processed Plaintiffs’ individual claim.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires prohibited claim settlement conduct to occur with enough frequency to indicate a general business practice.

GMC Real Estate, LLC v. AmGUARD Insurance Company · filed 2023-07-25(9)

As relevant to this case, subsection 33-11-4(9) of the UTPA prohibits any insurer from using the settlement practices listed5 “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”

Section 33-11-4(9)'s general business practice requirement can be plausibly alleged through separate acts or omissions in handling a single claim.

Morrison v. Indian Harbor Insurance Company · filed 2024-07-01(9)

Assuming the truth of the allegations, it is plausible that Defendants committed separate and discrete acts or omissions in violation of West Virginia Code § 33-11- 4(9). If so, it likewise is plausible that Plaintiff may be able to show a general business practice.

Multiple distinct unfair claim settlement acts in handling one claim can establish a general business practice under § 33-11-4(9).

Viking Energy Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London · filed 2024-07-15(9)

Taken together, these alleged acts or omissions constitute separate and discrete violations that can be used to establish a general business practice on Defendant’s part.

Section 33-11-4(9)’s general business practice requirement can be met through an insurer’s repeated unfair settlement acts in a single claim.

Walker v. American Strategic Insurance Corp · filed 2024-08-29(9)

However, it is well established that a “general business practice” of unfair claim settlement can be based on an insurer’s handling of a single claim.

Section 33-11-4(9) requires unfair claim settlement practices to amount to a general business practice; a single incident is insufficient.

Ware v. Doe · filed 2025-09-05(9)

A plaintiff cannot sustain a statutory bad faith claim under § 33-11-4(9) based on a single instance of alleged misconduct alone.

Section 33-11-4(9)’s general business practice requirement can be plausibly pleaded through separate omissions violating different subparagraphs in the handling of one insurance claim.

Maynard · filed 2025-10-29(9)

Plaintiff, then, has plausibly alleged four separate, discrete omissions by Defendant that each constitute violations of different subparagraphs of § 33-11-4(9). It is therefore plausible that Defendant’s alleged misconduct with respect to Plaintiff’s insurance claim was part of a general business practice.

A claim under subsection (9) must allege conduct amounting to a general business practice; one alleged violation is insufficient.

ATT Holding, LLC v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company · filed 2026-04-06(9)

But even though Plaintiff has alleged these violations, it has not alleged Defendant’s belated response arose from a general business practice. ... But here, Plaintiff has alleged only one act or omission that violated § 33-11-4(9).

Section 33-11-4(9)’s general business practice requirement is sufficiently pleaded by an allegation that the insurers engaged in such a practice.

Ferrell v. Grange Insurance · filed 2005-02-03(9)

However, Plaintiff did allege that “the defendants have engaged in a general business practice.” Taking this allegation as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made out a claim under WVUTPA. Therefore, dismissal would not be appropriate.

Section 33-11-4(9) allows an unfair settlement practices claim based on a single insurance claim when separate violations reflect the insurer’s general business practice.

Sheila Cross, Individually as Next Friend of Deven Cross v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 1996-12-31(9)

Thus, West Virginia's highest court has now made it clear that it is possible to find a violation of § 33-11-4(9) "based upon alleged violations ... in the settlement of a single insurance claim." Id.

Section 33-11-4(9) permits violations arising from a single insurance claim to establish a general business practice.

Cross v. State Farm Mutual · filed 1996-12-31(9)

However, we part with the district court in its determination that Cross could not establish a claim under W. Va. Code§ 33-11-4(9) (Michie 1992) for unfair claim settlement practices"with such fre- quency as to indicate a general business practice" because all of the alleged violations of the statute arose from the same claim.

An unfair settlement practices claim under § 33-11-4(9) requires violations reflecting a general business practice, but does not require the insured to substantially prevail on the underlying contract claim.

McCormick v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1996-07-18(9)

Whereas under Hayseeds it is necessary that a policyholder substantially prevail on an underlying contract action before he may recover enhanced damage, under Jenkins there is no requirement that one substantially prevail; it is required that liability and damages be settled previously or in the course of the Jenkins litigation. Jenkins instead predicates entitlement to relief solely upon violation of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9), where such violation arises from a “general business practice” on the part of the insurer.

Section 33-11-4(9) does not require a policyholder to substantially prevail on an underlying contract claim to pursue a statutory bad faith settlement claim.

Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 1998-11-24(9)

We note, however, that the appellants also brought a claim for the violation of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, W.Va.Code § 33-ll-4(9)(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f). This is not a claim that could have been brought in the New York action. It is also not a claim that rests on substantially prevailing on the underlying contract action.

A self-insured company can qualify as an insurance company for a claim under § 33-11-4.

Wise v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · filed 2002-02-22

However, under West Virginia law, a self-insured company qualifies as an insurance company.

An insurance company’s employee claims adjuster can be personally liable in a private action for unfair practices defined by section 33-11-4.

Taylor v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2003-11-21

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices are defined in detail in W.Va.Code § 33-11-4 (2002). ... Accordingly, we hold that a cause of action exists in West Virginia to hold a claims adjuster employed by an insurance company personally liable for violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, W.Va. Code § 33-11-1 to -10.

Section 33-11-4(9) allows a primary life insurance beneficiary to bring a statutory bad faith claim against the insurer after the insured dies, standing in the insured’s shoes as a first-party claimant.

Goff v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2012-06-21(9)

Accordingly, we hold that upon the death of the insured, a primary beneficiary of a life insurance policy has standing to bring a statutory bad faith claim against the insurer pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9). In bringing such a suit, the beneficiary stands in the shoes of the insured in asserting a first-party type of statutory bad faith action.

Section 33-11-4 permits an unfair settlement practices claim to proceed after the insurer pays the policy benefits, if the claimant can prove the claim on its merits.

Kenney v. Independent Order of Foresters · filed 2014-03-10(9)(f)

Insofar as the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has previously entertained questions regarding an action brought pursuant to the WVUTPA against an insurer subsequent to settlement, where the cause of action was limited to “unfair settlement practices,” see Wilt, 506 S.E.2d at 609, we hold that Mrs. Kenney’s complaint therefore states a claim upon which relief can be granted should she prevail on the merits.

An insured under a liability policy may bring a first-party claim under § 33-11-4(9) for its insurer’s unfair settlement of claims the insured becomes legally obligated to pay.

SER State Auto Property Insurance v. Hon. James C. Stucky, Judge · filed 2016-06-14(9)

However, as the insured under a liability insurance policy issued by State Auto, CMD is a first-party claimant and has a cause of action for State Auto’s alleged violations of W. Va. Code § 33-11-4(9) in settling those claims that CMD becomes legally obligated to pay to the Evanses because of property damage suffered by the Evanses.

Section 33-11-4(9) supports a private unfair settlement practices claim against a third-party administrator that is engaged in the business of insurance.

Shaffer v. National Health Insurance Company · filed 2018-04-27(9)

Thus, because Meritain is a “company” within the meaning of a “person” under the UTPA, the Shaffers have a private cause of action against it.

A proper policy rescission does not dispose of a claim for unfair claim settlement practices under § 33-11-4(9).

Orum v. Liberty Insurance Corporation · filed 2019-12-03(9)

Even though this Court finds that defendant Liberty properly rescinded the policy at issue, that finding does not dispose of the plaintiffs’ claim based on West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9).

Section 33-11-4 may support a personal claim against an insurer’s investigator for misrepresentations to insureds during claim handling.

Hammer v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2022-06-06

Hatfield interacted with Plaintiffs on behalf of State Farm, and it is possible that he made misrepresentations to them under W. Va. Code § 33-11-4.

Subsections (9)(b), (c), (d), and (f) concern claims by third parties against an insured; an insured seeking benefits from its own insurer lacks standing to sue under them.

Findley · filed 2026-03-31(9)(b)-(d), (f)

The term “claim” as used in the § 33-11-4(9)(b), (c), (d), and (f) refers to an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured – not a first party recovering money from its insurer. Thus, Plaintiffs lack standing to sue North Light under § 33-11-4(9)(b), (c), (d), and (f).

Section 33-11-4(9) allows a third-party claimant to sue an insurer for unfair claim settlement practices after the underlying suit against the insured is resolved.

Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. · filed 1981-07-14(9)

In this case we are asked to consider whether W. Va. Code, 33-11-4(9), relating to unfair insurance claim settlement practices, gives rise to an initial direct cause of action against an insurance company by a third-party claimant. We hold that it does, but not until the underlying suit against the insured has been resolved.

Section 33-11-4(3) and (5) allow a private cause of action for violations of their prohibitions on defamation and false statements or entries.

Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exchange · filed 1985-03-28(3), (5)

There is no reason here to repeat the exhaustive reasoning and citations to authority in our opinion in Jenkins, and therefore, we answer the Federal Court's second question affirmatively and hold that there is a private cause of action for a violation of W.Va.Code, 33-11-4(3) and (5) [1974].

An insured must resolve the underlying claim for policy proceeds before pursuing a first-party unfair settlement practices claim.

Thompson v. West Virginia Essential Property Insurance · filed 1991-11-04(9)

In this case, we deal with a first party claim where the insured is proceeding against his own insurance carrier; however, the same logic applies. ... Although the insured has filed suit, we do not yet know whether he is entitled to the insurance proceeds. For these reasons, we find the claim based on the Act premature.

Section 33-11-4(1)(a) allows a private action for misrepresenting the benefits or terms of an insurance policy.

Morton v. Amos-Lee Securities, Inc. · filed 1995-12-14(1)(a)

We hold that there is a private cause of action for a violation of W.Va.Code 33-11-4(l)(a) (1985), of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act.

A named policyholder who claims injury caused by a nonnamed insured under the same policy is a first-party claimant who may pursue an unfair settlement practices claim against the insurer.

Loudin v. National Liability & Fire Insurance · filed 2011-09-22

Consequently, we now hold that, when a named policyholder files a claim with his/her insurer, alleging that a nonnamed insured under the same policy caused him/her injury, the policyholder is a first-party claimant in any subsequent bad faith action against the insurer arising from the handling of the policyholder’s claim.

Section 33-11-4 permits an insured to recover for annoyance, inconvenience, and attorney fees caused by unfair settlement practices even when the insurer pays the excess verdict.

Mirandy v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1998-06-01(9)(f), (9)(n)

We therefore conclude that insureds can maintain a suit against their insurer under the UCSPA to recover compensation for any annoyance and inconvenience suffered, as well as attorney fees, despite the fact that their insurer paid the excess verdict.

Section 33-11-4(9) permits punitive damages on an insured’s unfair claim settlement practices claim only upon proof of actual malice in the settlement process.

McCormick v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1998-08-07(9)

Accordingly, in harmony with other jurisdictions and consistent with our prior decisions in this area, we now hold that where an insured asserts a first-party claim against his or her insurance carrier for unfair claim settlement practices under W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9) [1985], punitive damages shall not be awarded against the insurer unless the policyholder can establish a high threshold of actual malice in the settlement process. By “actual malice” we mean that the insurance company actually knew that the policyholder’s claim was proper, but willfully, maliciously and intentionally utilized an unfair business practice in settling, or failing to settle, the insured’s claim.

Section 33-11-4(9) permits a punitive damages claim to reach the jury when evidence of unfair claim settlement practices supports a finding of actual malice.

Nance v. Kentucky National Insurance · filed 2007-05-08(9)

Additionally, several factual circumstances established by Nance at trial, when viewed collectively and in conjunction with the expert testimony of Conrad Diaz, establish actual malice: (1) Kentucky National took steps to place liability on the part of Nance, when the circumstances clearly showed that Nance was not at fault; (2) Kentucky National refused to follow the advice of its outside counsel to offer Nance $80,000 without any plausible reason for so doing; and (3) the jury heard testimony from Attorneys King, Tiano, and Bucci, demonstrating that it was Kentucky National’s company policy to use unfair claims practices, to delay, and to fight the payment of just claims. In conclusion, we hold the district court did not err in denying Kentucky National’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages.

Section 33-11-4(9) does not authorize recovery of attorney fees incurred litigating the implied bad faith claim itself.

Wayne A. Lemasters and Mary Joan Lemasters v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2013-10-29(9)

The circuit court’s conclusion that it was without authority to award the petitioners attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred in vindicating their Jenkins/UTPA claims is supported by the Dodrill case and its specific statement that attorney fees were recoverable in the underlying action against the tortfeasor, as opposed to the present case where the fees arose out of a bad faith action.

Section 33-11-4(9)(f) imposes a duty to attempt good-faith settlements when liability is reasonably clear, but it does not entitle a prevailing plaintiff to attorney’s fees from the defendant’s insurer in the underlying personal injury or wrongful death action.

Grove by and Through Grove v. Myers · filed 1989-06-09(9)(f)

Similar to our holding in syllabus point 2 of Jenkins, we hold that a prevailing plaintiff in a personal injury or wrongful death action is not entitled to recover in that action his or her reasonable attorney’s fees from the defendant’s liability insurer for its alleged failure to negotiate a settlement in good faith.

A trial court may bifurcate and stay a first-party unfair settlement practices claim, and may stay discovery on that claim, but neither step is mandatory.

Light v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1998-07-27(9)

We hold, therefore, that in a first-party bad faith action against an insurer, bifurcation and stay of the bad faith claim from the underlying action are not mandatory. ... We hold, therefore, that trial courts have discretion in determining whether to stay discovery in a first-party bad faith claim against an insurer that has been bifurcated and stayed.

A claim under § 33-11-4(9) sounds in tort for choice-of-law purposes.

Yost v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1999-06-21(9)

Violation of W.Va. Code § 33-11-4(9) is considered a tort.

The one-year limitations period for an unfair settlement practices claim under § 33-11-4(9) does not begin until the appeal period for the underlying action expires.

Klettner v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1999-07-08(9)

After exhaustively reviewing the law in this area, we conclude that the one-year statute of limitations which applies to claims of unfair settlement practices brought pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9) does not begin to run until the appeal period has expired on the underlying cause óf action upon which the statutory claim is predicated.

A claim under § 33-11-4(9) is timely if filed within one year after the underlying action is ultimately resolved; a mutual release can mark that resolution.

McCorkle v. DPIC Companies, Inc. · filed 2001-07-03(9)

The statute of limitations in the case began to run on July 3, 1997 when McCorkle executed a mutual release in the underlying action. This constitutes an ultimate resolution. The complaint in the instant case was filed on July 2, 1998, one day prior to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, because the complaint was timely filed, the judgment of the district court is reversed.

A final judgment on an insured’s Marshall consequential damages claim does not preclude a later § 33-11-4(9) claim based on the insurer’s alleged settlement misconduct.

Slider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2001-12-13(9)

The Court therefore holds that where an insured has previously brought a claim for consequential damages under Marshall and a final judgment has been entered with respect to such claim, the insured is not thereby precluded under principles of res judicata or claim preclusion from bringing a subsequent action asserting causes of action predicated upon a defendant insurer’s alleged bad faith or other intentional misconduct in the course of settling the insured’s policy claim.

A court-approved settlement of a minor’s claim bars a later UTPA bad-faith claim against a released insurer if the insurer was unaware of grounds for that claim when it agreed to settle.

Mills v. Watkins · filed 2003-05-22(9)(a)

We, therefore, hold that when an infant is injured in an automobile accident and the infant’s legal guardian enters into a settlement agreement with an insurer by complying with the dictates set forth in W.Va.Code § 44-10-14 (1929), the settlement is final as to that insurance company at the time the circuit court approves the legal guardian’s petition for permission to settle the claim if the insurer is released in the settlement agreement and the insurer is unaware of any misconduct which would constitute substantive grounds for a bad faith action at the time the insurer agrees to the settlement. In the case at bar, Nationwide did not unfairly settle the appellant’s claim. The appellant’s reliance upon the UTPA is unfounded.

Section 33-11-4(9) permits a separate bad faith claim against an insurer even after the underlying tort case is settled.

Johns-Manville Corp. v. Chubb Indemnity Insurance · filed 2008-02-15(9)

Moreover, it is clear under West Virginia law that settlement of the underlying tort case against the tort-feasor does not preclude a separate and independent recovery against the tortfea-sor’s insurer arising out of its alleged bad faith insurance practices.

For a first-party unfair settlement practices claim based on an insurer’s refusal to defend, the limitations period begins when the insured knows or reasonably should know of the refusal.

Noland v. Virginia Insurance Reciprocal · filed 2009-09-24(9)

Therefore, we now hold that, in a first-party bad faith claim that is based upon an insurer’s refusal to defend, and is brought under W. Va.Code § 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl. Vol. 2006) and/or as a common law bad faith claim, the statute of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action.

A claimant cannot maintain an unfair settlement practices action under § 33-11-4(9) until the underlying suit is resolved, including any appeal.

Robinson v. Continental Casualty Co. · filed 1991-06-27(9)

The liability and damages are not established until the appeal is decided.

An insured's private claim for unfair settlement practices under subsection (9) is premature until the underlying insurance claim is resolved.

Thompson v. W. VA. ESSENTIAL PROPERTY INS. · filed 1991-11-04(9)

In this case, we deal with a first party claim where the insured is proceeding against his own insurance carrier; however, the same logic applies. ... Although the insured has filed suit, we do not yet know whether he is entitled to the insurance proceeds. For these reasons, we find the claim based on the Act premature.

Claims for unfair settlement practices under § 33-11-4(9) have a one-year statute of limitations.

Wilt v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-06-24(9)

Accordingly, we determine that claims involving unfair settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act are governed by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(c).

Section 33-11-4(9) can make an insurer liable for breaching its own claim investigation or settlement duties when it knowingly encourages, directs, participates in, relies upon, or ratifies wrongful litigation conduct by defense counsel.

Rose v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 2004-06-25(9)

A claimant can establish a violation of the UTPA by showing that an insurance company, through its own actions, breached its duties under the Act by knowingly encouraging, directing, participating in, relying upon, or ratifying the wrongful litigation conduct of a defense attorney hired by the insurance company to represent an insured.

Section 33-11-4(10) requires an insurer to maintain a record of complaints, not complete complaint files.

Hager v. Graham · filed 2010-04-28(10)

Defendant was correct in its objection that the statute only required a record of the complaints. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs misstatement of the requirements does not permit Defendant to avoid disclosure. Defendant is directed to provide the information in accordance with W. Va.Code § 33-11-4(10).

Section 33-11-4(10) requires insurers to maintain records of written complaints, including their nature, disposition, and processing time.

Walker v. American Strategic Insurance Corp · filed 2024-09-19(10)

Pursuant to the provisions of W.Va. Code 33-11-4(10), West Virginia law requires insurers to “maintain a complete record of all the complaints which it has received” indicating the “total number of complaints, their classification by line of insurance, the nature of each complaint, the disposition of these complaints, and the time it took to process each complaint.” ... Given that the requested information is required to be maintained by West Virginia law, the Court finds ASI’s objection on the basis that it is overly burdensome to be unfounded.

A defendant insured under a liability policy lacks standing to bring claims against its insurer under subsections (9)(b), (c), (d), and (f).

State of West Virginia ex rel. West VIrginia Mutual Insurance Company v. The Honorable Judge Tera Salango, Judge of the · filed 2021-11-16(9)(b)-(d), (f)

While the Court in Stucky did not have reason to address subsections (c) and (d), we find that defendants insured under liability policies likewise lack standing to pursue claims under those provisions for the same reason.

Under a liability policy, subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) do not give the insured standing to challenge the insurer’s handling of a third party’s claim; subsection (9)(g) does not apply when the insured has no right to recover amounts under the policy.

State ex rel. State Auto Property Insurance Companies v. Stucky · filed 2017-10-10(9)(b), (9)(f), (9)(g)

In the context of a liability policy, such as the commercial general liability policy herein, subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related damages from an insured, and are not designed to protect the insured. ... Therefore, CMD has no standing to assert a claim under subsection (9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of W.Va. Code, 33-11-4 [2002]. ... Under a typical liability policy, an insured is not entitled to any “amounts” under the policy, and an insured can make no “claims for amounts” that would later be “reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.” ... CMD therefore has no standing to assert a claim under W.Va, Code, 33-11-4(9)(g) [2002].