Statute Annotations › West Virginia › W. Va. Code § 55-2-12

W. Va. Code § 55-2-12

Limitation of actions for personal injury: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
West Virginia
Case notes
126
Cited in passing
49
Citing cases indexed
104
Case dates
1984–2026
Screened through
2026-04-01
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-04
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

175 citing cases reviewed: 126 interpreted the section (annotated below), 49 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-04-01 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under W. Va. Code § 55-2-12?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1993-06-11 Courtney v. Courtney held that severe emotional distress arising from tortious conduct is a personal injury subject to § 55-2-12(b)'s two-year period, overruling Funeral Services by Gregory's contrary one-year rule. Source
  • 2005-07-08 Senate Bill 418 added § 33-11-4a, ending private unfair claims settlement practice actions by third-party claimants and providing an administrative complaint remedy. Source
  • 2009-12-01 The federal rules deleted Rule 13(f) and placed amendments adding omitted counterclaims under Rule 15; Rule 15(c)'s relation-back test still governs, leaving the counterclaim note's substantive rule intact. Source
  • 2016-06-10 House Bill 2605 amended § 55-2-15 to allow a person sexually assaulted or abused as a minor four years after majority or four years after discovery, whichever is longer, to sue the perpetrator. Source
  • 2020-06-01 House Bill 4559 extended the childhood sexual assault or abuse period against the perpetrator to 18 years after majority or four years after discovery, whichever is longer, and allowed 18 years after majority to sue an aider, abettor, or concealer; it states the extension applies even when an earlier period expired. Source

Two-year statute of limitations

Section 55-2-12 requires an action to be brought within two years from the date of the injury when no other limitations period applies.

Bucklin v. Department of Highways · filed 1984-05-25

Under W. Va. Code §55-2-12, this claim must have been brought within two years from the date of the injury.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for fraud in the inducement, negligence, emotional-distress, breach-of-fiduciary-duty, and constructive-fraud claims, and the discovery rule applies to determine when that period begins absent a clear statutory prohibition.

Charles J. and Cynthia B. Evans v. United Bank, Inc. · filed 2015-06-16

Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 55-2-12, a two-year statute of limitations applies to Petitioners’ fraud in the inducement claim, negligence, claim, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, breach of fiduciary duty claim, and constructive fraud claim.
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Subsection (c) imposes a one-year limitations period on false-arrest and wrongful-arrest claims.

Brown v. Belt · filed 2019-03-21(c)

Plaintiff’s state law claims for wrongful arrest are subject to a one-year statute of limitations under West Virginia law. See Canterbury v. Laird, 221 W. Va. 453, 455, 655 S.E.2d 199, 202 (2007) (“[O]ne year statute of limitations found in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(c) . . . controls a claim for false arrest.”).
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on fraud damages claims when no more specific limitation applies.

Ortiz v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB · filed 2019-08-01

Plaintiff also seeks damages for fraud in Count IV, triggering the two-year statute of limitations period pursuant to W. Va. Code § 55-2-12, which began to toll on a date no later than February 29, 2004. Thus, Counts II, III, and the equitable portion of IV are barred by laches and the damages at law portion of Count IV is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims because West Virginia treats them as personal-injury actions.

Ballock v. Costlow · filed 2019-12-23

In West Virginia, § 1983 actions are considered personal injury actions subject to the two year statute of limitations. McCausland v. Mason Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1981); W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for WVHRA claims, and subsection (b) governs IIED claims.

Brevard v. Racing Corporation of West Virginia · filed 2020-04-13(b)

The applicable limitations period for bringing a claim under the WVHRA is two years. See Metz v. E. Associated Coal, LLC, 799 S.E.2d 707, 710 (W. Va. 2017) (applying a two-year limitations period found in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 to WVHRA based claims); Price v. Region 4 Planning & Dev. Council, No. 2:16-cv-1529, 2019 WL 1869961, at *14 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 25, 2019) (same). ... Plaintiff’s claim, which he suggests in his response is only one for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), is governed by a two-year statute of limitations under West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(b).
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Subsection (a) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal actions seeking damages for property damage when no other limitation is prescribed, including trespass and conversion claims.

Parsons v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC · filed 2020-04-28(a)

Claims for trespass appear to be governed by the two-year limitations period generally applicable to “personal action[s] [for damage to property] for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed.” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(a); see Scott Hutchison Enters., Inc. v. Cranberry Pipeline Corp., No. 3:15-cv-13415, 2016 WL 955627, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 11, 2016) (“The parties agree that an action for trespass . . . in West Virginia must be brought within the applicable two year statute of limitation period as provided in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.”); Wendy Rupe Tr. v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 2:09-cv-01435, 2010 WL 3894039, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 30, 2010) (“The parties agree that West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations applies to the count of trespass.” (citing W. Va. Code § 55-2-12)). Claims for conversion are also subject to that statute. Dunn, 689 S.E.2d at 268.
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Section 55-2-12 supplied a two-year limitations period for the claims at issue, running from accrual, and the period was not extended by the asserted tolling or relation-back theories.

Grimmett v. Wiseman, Excavating, Inc. · filed 2020-07-30

Under Dunn, the statute of limitation period was not “arrested by some other tolling doctrine” and continued to run against the petitioner. Moreover, the record shows that the amended complaint against Wiseman was filed some three years and nine months after the accrual of petitioner’s cause of action, long after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitation contained in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. We therefore conclude that circuit court correctly granted summary judgment and dismissed petitioner’s claims against Wiseman.
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on constructive-fraud claims.

Shelton v. Collins Career Center · filed 2020-12-08

Claims for constructive fraud are subject to the two-year statute of limitation provided by W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.
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Section 55-2-12(b) supplies a residual two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims when no other limitations period is prescribed.

Braxton v. City of Buckhannon · filed 2021-04-29(b)

Rather, such claims are governed by “the most analogous state-law cause of action,” which is that for a personal injury claim. Id. Because the alleged acts occurred in West Virginia, the Court must look to West Virginia law. State law provides that “[e]very personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought . . . within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries[.]” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) (emphasis added). A personal injury claim is such a claim for which no statute of limitations is specifically set forth in West Virginia. Thus, it is governed by this “residual” statute of limitation – that is, the statute of limitations for causes of action for which no statute of limitations is otherwise specified.
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Section 55-2-12(b)'s two-year limitations period governs § 1983 claims filed in West Virginia because those claims are treated as personal injury actions.

Greene v. Eastridge · filed 2022-11-10(b)

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. “[A]ll claims filed in West Virginia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are personal injury actions governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b).” Rodgers v. Corp. of Harpers Ferry, S.E.2d 358, 362 (W. Va. 1988).
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on tort claims.

Hallman-Warner v. Umina · filed 2024-12-23

If the claim lies in tort, the statute of limitations is two years pursuant to W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (1959).
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Section 55-2-12(b) gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period, subject to possible tolling under the discovery rule.

Bailey v. Michelle Woomer, Teri Stone, and Legal Aid of West Virginia, Inc. · filed 2026-04-01(b)

It is well-settled that negligence claims in West Virginia are subject to a two-year limitations period. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) (1959). In this case, the subject incident occurred on January 7, 2019, Ms. Woomer issued her report on February 25, 2019, and Mr. Bailey’s employment was terminated on March 11, 2019. Pursuant to § 55-2-12(b), the limitations period for Mr. Bailey’s proposed negligence claims expired no later than March 11, 2021, but Mr. Bailey’s motion for leave to amend with the proposed negligence claims was not filed until November 29, 2023. Therefore, the proposed negligence claims were filed well after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12(b)'s two-year personal-injury limitations period does not govern WARN Act claims when the analogous five-year contract period applies.

Bell v. PHILIPS ELECTRONICS, OF THE NETHERLANDS · filed 1995-09-13(b)

The question now before the Court is whether the five-year limitations period applicable to contracts under W.Va. Code § 55-2-6 (1981) or the two-year limitations period applicable to personal injury under W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) should control in this case. ... This Court believes that application of West Virginia’s five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract to WARN cases would serve the policies embodied in the WARN Act, and allow sufficient time for employees to discover their rights.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year catch-all limitations period for tort-based claims when no more specific limitations period applies, and the discovery rule determines when that period begins to run.

Robinson v. Quicken Loans Inc. · filed 2013-12-24

Given that neither § 55-2-6 nor § 46A-5-101(l) provides the statute of limitations period for § 31-17-8(m)(8), the two-year, catch-all statute of limitations period contained in § 55-2-12 governs. ... Under the discovery rule, which is generally applicable to all torts, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know (1) that the plaintiff has been injured, (2) the identity of the entity who owed the plaintiff a duty ..., and who may have engaged in conduct that breached that duty, and (3) that the conduct of that entity has a causal relation to the injury.
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Section 55-2-12 provides a two-year limitation period for claims under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.

Houchins v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 2003-02-06

We find it is apparent that Houchins’ claim under WHVRA lacks merit. See McCourt v. Oneida Coal Co., 425 S.E.2d 602 (W. Va. 1992) (apply- ing two-year limitation period under W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 to actions under the WVHRA). Thus, the district court properly granted NWR’s motion to dismiss.
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Property-damage limitations

Section 55-2-12 requires a property-damage claim to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues, with accrual occurring when the damage could have been detected.

Bell v. Division of Highways · filed 1991-07-09

Under W.Va. Code §55-2-12, this claim must have been brought within two years from the date of injury. This provision commences the running of the two-year limitation, “after the right to bring same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property.” The two years began to run upon the date when the damages would have been detected. ... It is the opinion of the Court that claimants’ cause of action would have commenced no later than May 1985, and would have expired as of May 1987. The filing in May of 1989 was not within the applicable statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12(b)'s two-year personal-injury limitations period is not tolled by an attorney's failure to file on time, including when the failure is characterized as excusable neglect, unless a statutory exception applies.

Perdue v. Hess · filed 1997-02-21(b)

Thus, we hold generally that an attorney’s failure to file a personal injury cause of action within the two-year statute of limitations imposed by W. Va.Code § 55-2-12, regardless of whether such failure constitutes excusable' neglect, does not toll the statutory filing period where such failure does not correspond with a statutory exception to the applicable statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12's two-year limitations period for state-law claims is tolled under West Virginia's adverse-domination doctrine while a corporation is controlled by parties acting against its interests.

Clark v. Allen · filed 1998-03-13

The parties agree that West Virginia's two-year statute of limitations, W. Va. Code § 55-2-12, applied to the Commissioner's state law claims and that the Commissioner filed the suit more than two years after the challenged transactions had occurred. They disagree only over whether the doctrine of adverse domination tolled the statute of limitations. Under the doctrine of adverse domination, as recognized in West Virginia, the statute of limitations is tolled on a corporation's claims against its directors, officers, and others while the corporation is controlled by parties acting against its interests. ... "[T]he defendants have the burden of showing that there was someone who had the knowledge, ability and motivation to bring suit during the period in which defendants controlled the corporation." ... Appellants have failed to carry their burden. ... Thus, the district court did not err in granting the Commissioner judgment as a matter of law on this defense.
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Section 55-2-12(b) provides the two-year personal-injury limitations period applicable to a Bivens Fourth Amendment claim in West Virginia.

Reinbold v. Evers · filed 1999-08-05(b)

With respect to the West Virginia district court's ruling on statute of limitations grounds, because there is no statute of limitations for Bivens actions, the district court correctly looked to West Virginia law. ... The district court determined, and Reinbold does not dispute, that West Virginia's two-year, personal injury statute of limitations applies to Reinbold's Fourth Amendment claim. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). ... Applying the West Virginia statute of limitations, combined with the federal accrual standard, to Reinbold's complaint, it is apparent that the district court's analysis of the applicable West Virginia statute of limitations was correct.
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Section 55-2-12 requires personal-injury actions to be brought within two years after the right to sue accrues; the court held that the discovery rule did not save these untimely claims.

David M. and Doris Smith v. Velotta Company and Safety Caution Equipment · filed 2016-02-12

Our law is clear that actions for personal injuries must be brought “within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued.” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. It is without dispute that petitioners filed their third-party complaint against respondents on August 18, 2014, more than two years following the accident. ... Based upon our review of the record before us, we find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that the discovery rule is inapplicable to petitioners’ claims herein. ... Because petitioners’ personal injury claims are not proper as third-party claims we find that the statute of limitations on those claims is not tolled. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissal of these claims.
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Section 55-2-12(b) requires personal-injury actions to be filed within two years after accrual, generally accruing when the tort occurs, subject to recognized tolling doctrines.

Bishop v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority · filed 2018-03-26(b)

West Virginia’s general statute of limitations for personal injury claims states that personal injury actions “shall be brought . . . within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued . . . .” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). West Virginia law further provides that an action for personal injury accrues when the tort occurs. See Merrill v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 632 S.E.2d 307, 312 (W. Va. 2006). However, there are three ways in which the statute of limitations can be tolled.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period as the analogous period for an RMBLSA claim, but it does not directly govern an equitable action subject to laches.

Boster v. TIAA, FSB · filed 2018-03-30

Here, the analogous statute of limitations for claims brought under RMBLSA is two years. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12; Woods 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161500; Lavis 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89144; CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5:05CV202, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25241 (N.D.W. Va., Mar. 28, 2008) (citing Alpine Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Mountaintop Dev. Co., 179 W. Va. 12, 365 S.E.2d 57, 66 (W. Va. 1987)).
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Section 55-2-12(b)'s two-year general personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1983 actions.

Ali v. Raleigh County · filed 2018-08-28(b)

As both this Court and the West Virginia Supreme Court have recognized, West Virginia’s two-year general personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to § 1983 actions. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b); Rodgers v. Corp. of Harpers Ferry, 371 S.E.2d 358, 362 (W.Va. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W.Va. 1993); Ali v. Raleigh Cty., No. 5:17-CV-03386, 2018 WL 1582722, at *9 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 29, 2018); Morales v. Robinson, No. CIV A 205-0509, 2007 WL 1074836, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 6, 2007) (Copenhaver, J.); Bell ex rel. Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of Cty. of Fayette, 290 F. Supp. 2d 701, 709–10 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) (Haden, J.).
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Section 55-2-12 requires West Virginia personal-injury actions to be brought within two years after the right to sue accrues.

Carter v. State of West Virginia · filed 2018-10-31

The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims “is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In West Virginia, actions for personal injuries must be brought “within two years . . . after the right . . . shall have accrued.” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12; Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436, 438 (W. Va. 1993).
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in West Virginia.

Dixon v. Perdue · filed 2018-11-13

In West Virginia, Section 1983 claims are subject to the two-year period set forth in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.
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For personal injury actions, the statute of limitations is two years.

Redden v. Ballard · filed 2019-03-27(b)

Any action stemming from the alleged assault should have been filed within two years of the assault. DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is equivalent to “the statute of limitations for personal injuries of the state in which the alleged violations occurred”); W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) (providing that statute of limitations for personal injury action is two years).
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Section 55-2-12(b) provides a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 personal-injury claims.

Coss v. Blatt · filed 2019-05-17(b)

However, upon further reflection, the court should have applied the residual statute for personal injury actions which provides a two-year statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989).
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Section 55-2-12(b) gives personal-injury actions for which no other limitation is prescribed a two-year limitations period, including claims for damages arising from assault and battery.

Lizotte v. Finley · filed 2019-07-02(b)

Indeed, W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 states that “[e]very personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought . . . within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries[.]” See also Courtney v. Courtney, 190 W. Va. 126, 129 (1993) (“it is clear that damages for personal injuries arising out of an assault and battery are controlled by the two-year statute of limitations contained in W. Va. Code, 55–2–12(b).”). The court thus agrees with the plaintiff that her claim for assault and battery is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Inasmuch as the alleged assault and battery occurred on October 28, 2016, and the complaint was filed October 27, 2018, the court finds that the claim was brought within the statute of limitations and cannot be dismissed on that ground.
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Section 55-2-12(b) requires personal-injury actions to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Jones v. Fikes · filed 2019-07-11(b)

In West Virginia, an action must be brought “within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries[.]” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). ... Therefore, unless equitable tolling applies, he can only assert causes of action that accrued on or after November 7, 2014. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b).
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Section 55-2-12(b) supplies a two-year residual limitations period for personal-injury claims when no other limitation is prescribed.

Wilson v. Wexford Medical and Administration/staff at fault · filed 2019-08-19(b)

In West Virginia, the residual statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is two years. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) (providing that “[e]very personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought ... within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries[.]”). Therefore, a two-year limitations period is typically applied to claims filed in this district asserting Eighth Amendment violations.
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Section 55-2-12(b) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, running from accrual of the right to sue.

Adkins v. Ballard · filed 2020-09-17(b)

The West Virginia Code sets a limitations period for personal injury actions of two years from accrual of the right to sue. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). The incident at issue occurred on July 25, 2017 and plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint was filed on June 25, 2020, almost three years later. Thus, an action against C.O. Wilson is barred unless it relates back.
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Section 55-2-12 requires a personal-injury action to be brought within two years.

Wilmink v. Kanawha County Board of Education · filed 2007-01-17

Under West Virginia law, a personal injury action must be brought within two years. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (2000).
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Section 55-2-12(a) requires a property-damage action, when no other limitation applies, to be brought within two years after accrual; discrete, recurring flooding events do not toll that period, so damages from events outside two years are time-barred.

Myra Kay Reilley, Administrator of the Estate of Francis E. Reilley and Myra Kay Reilley, Individually v. The Board of E · filed 2022-04-26(a)

Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property; ... As was the case in Ziler and Hall’s Park Motel, the evidence of record shows that there were four discrete traumatic events that caused injury to Respondent, rather than a continuing event stemming from a breach of duty. ... Thus, the circuit court erred in denying Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue. The statute of limitations was not tolled and the damages caused by the September 17, 2004 and February 1, 2008 flood events are time-barred.
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Section 55-2-12(a) gives tort claims for property damage a two-year limitations period.

Hall v. Nichols · filed 1990-12-20(a)

Since the underlying tort action in this case involves property damage given the obvious diminution of the value of the condominium complex which resulted from appellants’ inability to sell certain units once the lien dispute arose, the malpractice action is controlled by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12.
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Section 55-2-12(a) gives a two-year limitations period for property-damage claims, but when a tort causes continuing or repeated injury, the period runs from the last injury or when the tortious acts or omissions cease.

Spencer v. Beverage · filed 2002-06-12(a)

The statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action involving tort liability is West Virginia Code § 55-2-12. ... The statutory limitation for filing claims involving damage to property is two years. W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(a); ... To dispel any such doubts, we hereby hold that where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease. Applying this holding to the instant case, we do not find the negligence claim time-barred because the alleged negligence of the Parkers complained of by the Grahams constitutes continuing wrongful conduct from which continuing injuries emanate.
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One-year limitations

Section 55-2-12(c) supplies a one-year limitation period for common-law bad-faith claims, but timeliness is a factual question when the pleadings do not permit only one conclusion.

SER State Auto Property Insurance v. Hon. James C. Stucky, Judge · filed 2016-06-14(c)

State Auto’s final argument with regard to CMD’s bad faith claims is that these claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitation applicable to bad faith claims. Syl. pt. 4, Noland v. Virginia Insurance Reciprocal, 224 W. Va. 372, 686 S.E.2d 23 (2009) (“The one year statute of limitations contained in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl. Vol. 2008) applies to a common law bad faith claim”). ... This Court’s examination of the pleadings indicates that this is not the type of case from which only one conclusion may be drawn regarding the timeliness of CMD’s bad faith claims. For this reason, we find no merit to State Auto’s timeliness argument.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for employment-discrimination actions when no other limitation applies, measured from the discriminatory act.

Petrovsky v. United States Attorney General · filed 2018-04-24

In West Virginia, employment discrimination actions are generally governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (two-year limitations period for “every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed”). ... Here, the causes of action grounded in Petrovsky’s non-selections accrued, if at all, on the dates when he was notified of each decision not to hire him: September 16, 2011 (Lieutenant, FCI-Elkton); August 28, 2012 (Unit Manager, FCI-Gilmer); and October 16, 2012 (Unit Manager, FMC-Lexington).
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Section 55-2-12(c) provides a one-year statute of limitations for false-arrest claims.

Brown v. Belt · filed 2017-10-13(c)

The one-year statute of limitations found in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(c) (2000) controls a claim for false arrest.
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Section 55-2-12 gives fraudulent-concealment claims a two-year statute of limitations, running under the discovery rule when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the elements of a possible claim.

Michael v. Consolidation Coal Company · filed 2018-08-15

Claims for fraudulent concealment in West Virginia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. Under West Virginia’s discovery rule, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff “knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the elements of a possible cause of action,” namely, “(1) that the plaintiff has been injured, (2) the identity of the entity who owed the plaintiff a duty to act with due care, and who may have engaged in conduct that breached that duty, and (3) that the conduct of that entity has a causal relation to the injury.” Dunn v. Rockwell, 689 S.E.2d 255, 262, 265 (W. Va. 2009) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Gaither v. City Hosp., Inc., 487 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997)).
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Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year limitations period on state-law false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims; false arrest accrues on the arrest date, while malicious prosecution accrues when the underlying action terminates.

Coss v. Blatt · filed 2019-01-29(c)

Plaintiff also brought claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under state law. False arrest and malicious prosecution claims both have a statute of limitations period of one year. Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n v. Nutter, 238 W. Va. 375, 390, 795 S.E.2d 530, 545 (2016) (“Numerous torts such as . . . false arrest, . . . and malicious prosecution take the one-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(c).”) (quoting Wilt v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 203 W. Va. 165, 170-71, 506 S.E.2d 608, 613- 14 (1998)).
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Section 55-2-12(b) requires personal-injury actions for which no other limitation is prescribed to be brought within two years after the right to sue accrues.

Butcher v. The City of Clarksburg · filed 2019-11-13(b)

Under West Virginia law, “the statute of limitation for a civil conspiracy claim is determined by the nature of the underlying conduct on which the claim of conspiracy is based . . . .” Dunn v. Rockwell, 689 S.E.2d 255, 269 (W. Va. 2009) (citations omitted). Because Butcher’s civil conspiracy claims allege personal injury, the two-year statute of limitation set forth in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 applies. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (“Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: . . . (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries.”); see also Dunn, 689 S.E.2d at 269 (concluding that the two-year statute of limitation in § 55-2-12 applied to civil conspiracy claim). Butcher’s § 1983 claim is likewise governed by the two-year statute of limitation set forth in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.
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Section 55-2-12(b) imposes a two-year limitations period, and a tort claim accrues at the last injury or when the tortious acts or omissions cease; continuing misconduct does not toll the period absent misconduct within two years of filing.

Norwood v. Bynum · filed 2020-03-06(b)

Under the continuing misconduct doctrine, “the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease.” ... But Mr. Norwood does not allege or identify any continuing misconduct within two years of the filing of the Complaint.! Inasmuch as the action accrued on the date of the last injury or when the tortious over acts ceased, the instant Complaint, filed August 19, 2019, is well outside the two-year limitations period.
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Subsection (b) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury damages claims when no other limitation is prescribed; the period begins when the claim accrues, and the discovery rule did not delay accrual on these facts.

Howell v. The County Commission of Hampshire County, West Virginia · filed 2020-12-04(b)

A two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). The discovery rule does not apply here because the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the factual circumstances underlying their claims on the day Defendant Lahman shot Rascal. The statute of limitations began to run on the same day.
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Section 55-2-12(b) gives plaintiffs two years to file a personal injury action.

Saunders v. Raleigh County · filed 2021-03-29(b)

West Virginia law affords plaintiffs two years to file a personal injury action. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). Mr. Saunders’ false arrest, false imprisonment, and abuse of process claims were thus timely filed.
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Subsection (b) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury damages actions when no other limitation period is prescribed.

Bell v. Board of Educ. of County of Fayette · filed 2003-11-10(b)

In West Virginia that period is two years.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for claims treated as torts, including breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with business relationships.

General Assurance of America, Inc. v. Arch Insurance Company · filed 2018-12-12

Under West Virginia laws, the Court finds that GAA’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and for tortious interference with business relationships are considered torts, subject to West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year limitations period on UTPA claims involving unfair settlement practices, and repeated offers do not restart that period as a continuing tort.

Moss v. Erie Ins. · filed 2020-03-12(c)

Finally, Erie argues that plaintiff’s Count III allegation of unfair trade practices is barred by a one-year statute of limitations. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(c). The parties agree that claims involving unfair settlement practices under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”) are governed by the one-year statute of limitations. ... The mere fact that Erie made the same offer multiple times does not transform its actions into a continuing tort. ... Plaintiff’s UTPA claim stems from the failure to make an offer reflecting Actual Cash Value pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy. This harm accrued when the tort originally occurred two years prior to the filing of this suit. Thus, plaintiff filed her original Petition after the statute of limitations had expired as to what is now presented as Count III. Therefore, the court finds that Count III is barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12 provides a two-year statute of limitations for civil conspiracy claims alleging personal injury.

Quigley v. Abel · filed 2020-11-02

The two-year statute of limitations set forth in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 applies to civil conspiracy claims alleging personal injury.
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Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year limitations period on claims for breach of confidentiality and invasion of privacy.

Post v. Amerisourcebergen Corporation · filed 2023-08-29(c)

Claims for breach of confidentiality and invasion of privacy generally fall within the latter clause and are governed by a one-year statute of limitation.
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Section 55-2-12's “next after” language means the two-year limitations period runs from accrual of the right to sue, not from the following day.

Ross v. City of Charleston, West Virginia · filed 2021-07-22

Plaintiff apparently misapprehends the use of the phrase “next after” as used in W. Va. Code § 55-2-12, arguing that the “Day [sic] of the event is not counted.” (ECF No. 6 at 2.) However, as evidenced above, the date of the alleged injury starts the clock on the limitations period, as otherwise without injury, there would be no right. The “next after” wording that Plaintiff focuses on instead refers to the next two years after the right has accrued, not the next day after the right accrues.
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Section 55-2-12(b) provides the two-year limitations period that applies to a § 1983 claim arising in West Virginia.

Smith v. Travelpiece · filed 2022-04-20(b)

State law determines the applicable term of limitations for a § 1983 claim. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239, 249–50 (1989). As the claim here arose in West Virginia, West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b).
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Subsection (b) requires a personal action for which no other limitation is prescribed to be brought within two years after the right to bring it accrues.

Segal v. Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP · filed 2023-03-31(b)

W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 provides “[e]very personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: ... (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries[.]”. ... Thus, the Court will assess Defendants’ statute of limitations defense to the legal malpractice claim under the two-year tort claim period. Plaintiffs’ other claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud and tortious interference with business relations are also subject to the same two-year statute of limitations period.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for these tortious-interference claims, which the court applied to bar claims known or discoverable by the end of 2013.

Gregory S. Moore, O.D. v. Lawrence M. Minardi, M.D., individually, and Minardi Eye Center, Inc., a West Virginia Corpora · filed 2023-04-05

Regarding step one, it is undisputed that Dr. Moore’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitation. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. ... Thus, Dr. Moore knew or should have known no later than the end of 2013 that the statute of limitations had begun to run on his tortious interference claims against respondents. ... Thus, for the reasons set forth herein, we find that the circuit court did not err in determining that Dr. Moore’s claims were time-barred and granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
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Section 55-2-12(b) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury damages actions, subject to accrual under the discovery rule and potential tolling; the period’s expiration could not be established from the complaint’s face here.

Russell v. KLEB, Inc. · filed 2024-10-29(b)

This action is subject to West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal actions for damages for personal injuries. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). ... The Defendant has not established conclusively, from the face of the Complaint, that the statute of limitations had expired, and no tolling doctrine is applicable. Therefore, the motion to dismiss should be denied.
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year limitations period on legal-malpractice claims, subject to applicable tolling doctrines such as the discovery rule and continuous representation.

Corotoman, Inc. v. Central West Virginia Regional Airport Authority, Inc. · filed 2022-02-25

In West Virginia, legal malpractice claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. Thus, given that the incident at issue occurred in 2012, absent some fact(s) which toll the statute of limitations, it would expire in 2014. Certain doctrines, however, toll the statute of limitations and extend the period within which a claim may lawfully be brought. Two doctrines are relevant to the instant dispute: (1) the discovery rule, and (2) the continuous representation doctrine.
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For tort actions, the two-year limitations period under § 55-2-12 begins when the plaintiff knows or should know through reasonable diligence of the injury, the potentially responsible entity, and the causal connection.

Phillip R. Collins and Latonya Collins v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. · filed 2022-10-17

“In tort actions, unless there is a clear statutory prohibition to its application, under the discovery rule the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know (1) that the plaintiff has been injured, (2) the identity of the entity who owed the plaintiff a duty to act with due care, and who may have engaged in conduct that breached that duty, and (3) that the conduct of that entity has a causal relation to the injury.” Syllabus Point 4, Gaither v. City Hosp., Inc., 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.E.2d 901 (1997). ... It is undisputed that Mr. Collins knew the name and make of the respirator he contends he wore continuously throughout his employment before the time of his diagnosis. There is also no question that he was diagnosed with black lung on May 23, 2017, but did not file his complaint until September 24, 2019, well after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. We, therefore, find that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to respondent.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in West Virginia, subject to applicable accrual principles such as the continuing-violation doctrine.

Lowe v. Ames · filed 2024-06-28

To determine the statute of limitations applicable to this § 1983 action, the court must “borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions” in West Virginia. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). In West Virginia, that statute provides for a two-year statute of limitations. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. The parties appear to agree on this point. ... Accordingly, even under the continuing violations doctrine, plaintiff has failed to allege any violation within the applicable statutory limitations period, and his complaint is untimely.
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Section 55-2-12 requires personal-injury claims to be brought within two years, and in a products-liability case the period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, the product maker, and the product’s causal relation to the injury.

Teets v. Mine Safety Appliances Company, LLC · filed 2022-10-25

Sitting in diversity, we apply substantive state law, and West Virginia law requires that a personal injury claim be brought within two years. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. ... Gaither holds that, in “products liability cases, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know, (1) that he has been injured, (2) the identity of the maker of the product, and (3) that the product had a causal relation to his injury.” Id. at 909–10. ... Here, the district court correctly determined the statute of limitations began to run in April 2017 at the latest. Regardless of what Teets knew in 2001 or 2003, it is undisputed that when he was diagnosed in 2017, Teets knew that he had been injured, that the inhalation of coal dust caused CWP, that he always wore respirators made by Moldex and MSA, and that the respirators would prevent CWP if they worked properly. Thus by 2017, Teets knew or should have known of the elements of a possible cause of action.
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Section 55-2-12 requires personal-injury actions to be brought within two years after accrual, and in products-liability cases the period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, the product maker's identity, and the product's causal relation to the injury.

James Goodwin, John Ingram, Raymond Lovejoy, Jeffrey Allen, Charles Lilly, and Raymond Muncy v. 3M Company, American Opt · filed 2024-12-23

This case is governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12, which states that “[e]very personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought . . . within two years after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries[.]” In the context of products liability cases, “the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, (1) that he has been injured, (2) the identity of the maker of the product, and (3) that the product had a causal relation to his injury.”
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Section 55-2-12(c) supplies a one-year limitations period for personal actions otherwise lacking a limitations period when the claim is of a kind that could not have been brought at common law by or against a personal representative after death.

Reuschel v. Chancellor Senior Management, Ltd. · filed 2023-07-10(c)

CSM contends Plaintiffs’ WVCCPA claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code section 55-2-12(c). Section 55-2-12(c) governs the limitations period for claims that could not be asserted at common law upon the claimant’s death where no other limitation is otherwise prescribed. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (“Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought . . . within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law by or against his personal representative.”). ... First, CSM incorrectly contends section 55-2-12(c) controls. ... Plaintiffs’ claims are thus subject to the four-year limitation period set by section 46A-5-101(1).
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Section 55-2-12 gives negligence actions a two-year limitations period measured from accrual, subject to applicable discovery-rule and fraudulent-concealment tolling principles.

Nichols v. Maroney Williams Weaver & Pancake PLLC and Patrick K. Maroney · filed 2023-11-13

The statute of limitations for negligence actions is two years from the time when the cause of action accrued. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (1959). In this case, the alleged malpractice occurred more than two years before the lawsuit was filed. Accordingly, the defendants argue that Mr. Nichols’ negligence claim was time barred and properly dismissed by the lower court. Mr. Nichols responds that his claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because he did not discover the malpractice until January 13, 2020, when FMC claimed that his deliberate intent claim in a separate personal injury lawsuit was barred by res judicata because his workers’ compensation claim had been denied. He also argues that the statute of limitations was tolled by the allegedly fraudulent concealment of the defendants in their letter of June 27, 2017. We find that the lower court did not err in rejecting both of Mr. Nichols’ arguments.
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Section 55-2-12 provides limitations periods for property damage, personal-injury damages, and certain other personal actions, but does not apply to abuse-and-neglect civil actions.

In re A.B. and M.B. · filed 2024-04-25(a) (b) (c)

Applying the plain language of § 55-2-12, it is clear that it prescribes the statute of limitations for damage to property, damages for personal injuries, and “for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law by or against his personal representative.” It does not purport to apply to abuse and neglect civil actions.
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on negligence claims.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2025-02-28

However, in West Virginia, the statute of limitations on a claim for negligence is two years. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. Claimants’ general claims for negligence occurred prior to the State Court Complaint that was filed in 2016, and therefore, their claims for negligence are time-barred.
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Section 55-2-12 provides a two-year limitations period applicable to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Lowe · filed 2025-11-19

In the Rule 60(b)(1) Order, the court acknowledged its prior conclusion that a two-year statute of limitation applied to plaintiff’s claims under W. Va. Code § 55-2-12, and the plaintiff failed to “place one or more of [defendants’ violations] within the statutory limitation period.” ... Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has shown continued harm on November 2, 2020, which placed his complaint within the two-year limitations period.
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For a § 1983 claim arising in West Virginia, subsection (b) supplies a two-year limitations period regardless of whether the claim would survive under state law.

Cooper v. City of Wheeling · filed 2026-03-03(b) (c)

Accordingly, we make clear today -- to the extent it was not already clear -- that the applicable statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in West Virginia is two years pursuant to Section 55-2-12(b), regardless of the survivability of a claim in state law, because the Supreme Court has held that all § 1983 claims are to be governed by the state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period when a state provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year limitations period on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Ayash v. Barnette · filed 2025-03-13

First, regarding the applicable statutes of limitations, claims for breach of fiduciary duty are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.
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Section 55-2-12 requires negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty actions to be brought within two years after the claim accrues; under West Virginia's discovery rule, accrual is tolled until the claimant knows or reasonably should know of the claim.

Cin Dale 3 v. Peoples Bank Corp. · filed 2025-03-25

Actions for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within two years “after the right to bring the claim shall have accrued.” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. “Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when a tort occurs; however, under the ‘discovery rule,’ the statute of limitations is tolled until a claimant knows or by reasonable diligence should know of his claim.” ... Here, the Court finds that the statutes of limitation have expired for Plaintiffs’ negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims. ... Thus, Counts I and II are DISMISSED.
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Section 55-2-12(c) supplies a one-year limitations period for COBRA notification claims when borrowed as the analogous West Virginia rule for unfair insurance practices.

Harvey v. Mingo Logan Coal Co. · filed 2003-08-05(c)

Due to the statutory nature of a COBRA notification claim, and the significant dissimilarities between a COBRA notification claim and a contract action, the court FINDS that West Virginia’s statute of limitations applicable to unfair insurance related practices is the appropriate measure. Under Wilt v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, 203 W.Va. 165, 506 S.E.2d 608 (1998), unfair insurance settlement practices claims brought pursuant to the WVUTPA are governed by the one year statute of limitations found in W. Va.Code § 55-2-12(e). ... Because Harvey’s COBRA claims are time-barred, the court GRANTS Mingo’s motion for partial summary judgment.
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Two-year limitations period for negligence claims; discovery-rule tolling

Section 55-2-12 gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period, and the discovery rule may toll that period.

Jones v. Home Loan Investment, FSB · filed 2010-03-22

Inasmuch as plaintiffs negligence claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations within W. Va.Code § 55-2-12, plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to assert that she complied with the two-year statute of limitations as tolled by the discovery rule. Accordingly, Home Loan’s motion to dismiss the entirety of plaintiffs claims within Count I based on the statute of limitations is denied.
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Section 55-2-12(b) gives claims for severe emotional distress arising from tortious conduct a two-year limitations period because they are personal injury claims.

Courtney v. Courtney · filed 1993-06-11(b)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a claim for severe emotional distress arising out of a defendant’s tortious conduct is a personal injury claim and is governed by a two-year statute of limitations under W.Va. Code, 55-2-12(b).
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Section 55-2-12 gives negligence tort claims a two-year statute of limitations, barring a claim filed nearly six years after the alleged losses.

Parsley v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company · filed 2018-02-13

In West Virginia, “claims in tort for negligence . . . are governed by a two-year statute of limitation.” Trafalgar House Const., Inc. v. ZMM, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 294, 299 (W.Va. 2002); W.Va. Code § 55-2-12 (1959). ... Plaintiff did not file his Complaint in state court until October 2017, nearly six years after he suffered the alleged losses. To the extent Plaintiff pleads an action in negligence, then, Plaintiff’s claims are clearly barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, as to any negligence claim brought in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
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Accrual and tolling of the statute of limitations

Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year limitations period on the wrongful-discharge tort, running when the claim accrues, and tolling an age-discrimination claim before the Human Rights Commission does not toll other causes of action.

Conaway v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. · filed 1987-06-08

The respondent contends, because Mr. Conaway waited over two years to file suit, this cause is barred because of the two-year statute of limitations in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12 (1981). ... Mr. Conaway claims that the statute of limitations for this action should be tolled because his age discrimination action was pending before the Human Rights Commission. We disagree. A statute of limitations commences to run when the right to sue accrues. See syl. pt. 1, Jones v. Trustees of Bethany College, 177 W.Va. 168, 351 S.E.2d 183 (1986); Sansom v. Sansom, 148 W.Va. 603, 607, 137 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1964). With respect to the age discrimination claim alone, that cause of action did not accrue until March 31, 1983, when the West Virginia Human Rights Commission issued Mr. Conaway a notice of right to sue. All other causes of action accrued October 31, 1980, when Mr. Conaway’s discharge was confirmed by the management at Eastern. The fact that Mr. Conaway’s age discrimination claim was tolled during the period which he was proceeding before the Human Rights Commission does not act to toll the statute of limitations from running on his other causes of action.
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Section 55-2-12(a) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal actions seeking property damage when no other limitation is prescribed, and the period may be tolled during adverse domination until a receiver is appointed.

Clark v. Milam · filed 1994-02-10(a)

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs state law claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. They assert that a two-year statute of limitations applies to all of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to W.Va. Code § 55-2-12 (1959), that states, in pertinent part: “Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property[.]” ... It seems clear on the basis of West Virginia law and cases that West Virginia courts would toll the statutes of limitation until the Plaintiffs appointment as Receiver on a basis substantially similar to application of the doctrine of adverse domination. Thus, the statute of limitations was tolled against these Defendants until the Plaintiffs appointment as Receiver on June 3, 1991. ... Based upon the foregoing, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs state law claims based upon the expiration of the limitation periods is denied.
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year limitations period that begins when the injury is inflicted.

Corbett v. Duerring · filed 2010-07-21

Both parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is two years and that the statute begins to run upon infliction of the injury. ... Thus, plaintiff having filed his claim within two years of his termination, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs Count III section 1983 claim for retaliatory termination as barred by the statute of limitations is denied.
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Section 55-2-12’s two-year personal injury filing period is not tolled for an attorney’s excusable neglect unless a statutory exception applies.

Squires v. Sartor · filed 2022-01-12(b)

Mr. and Ms. Squires have identified no statutory exception. We, accordingly, find no error in the circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint.
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Accrual of products-liability claims under the discovery rule

For a products-liability claim, the two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, the product maker's identity, and the product's causal connection to the injury.

Hickman v. Grover · filed 1987-06-16

In answer to the circuit court’s question, we now hold as follows: In products liability cases, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, (1) that he has been injured, (2) the identity of the maker of the product, and (3) that the product had a causal relation to his injury. This rule in products liability cases will allow the plaintiffs a fair chance to sue, while upholding the purposes behind the statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12's two-year fraud limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or should know that they were injured and who injured them, and the discovery rule does not require knowledge of the defendant's legal responsibility or state of mind.

Childers Oil Company, Inc. v. Exxon Corporation · filed 1992-04-03

The "discovery rule" tolls a statute of limitations until the plaintiff has, or ought to have, answers to two questions: Am I injured? Who injured me? ... Lest the discovery rule abrogate West Virginia's fraud statute of limitations, we hold that the fraud claim is barred.
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Section 55-2-12's two-year fraud limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the nature of the injury and who caused it, not when the plaintiff learns the defendant's legal culpability or intent.

Childers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1992-04-03

The “discovery rule” tolls a statute of limitations until the plaintiff has, or ought to have, answers to two questions: Am I injured? Who injured me? ... The appellants had sufficient knowledge to be put on a duty to inquire when Exxon built its company station. Lest the discovery rule abrogate West Virginia’s fraud statute of limitations, we hold that the fraud claim is barred.
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Limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury actions

Section 55-2-12(b) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury actions, while subsection (c)'s one-year period applies to civil actions that do not survive the death of a party.

Rodgers v. Corporation of Harpers Ferry · filed 1988-07-18(b), (c)

The primary statute of limitations for personal injuries in West Virginia is the two-year statute of limitations in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b). The one-year statute of limitations in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(c) applies to civil actions which do not survive the death of a party. ... Consistent with that mandate from our nation’s highest court, we hold that all claims filed in West Virginia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are personal injury actions governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981).
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury civil actions.

Roe v. County Commission of Monongalia County · filed 1996-05-07

From all of this, the Court concludes that this civil action is subject to the two year statute of limitations found at W.Va.Code § 55-2-12 as the West Virginia Human Rights Act is the most analogous West Virginia law to the Americans with Disabilities Act, and it is fully consistent with the Act and its underlying policies.
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Section 55-2-12 requires a personal-injury action to be brought within two years after the right to sue accrues when no other limitation is prescribed.

Dean v. Pilgrim's Pride Corporation · filed 2005-01-26

It is undisputed that West Virginia substantive law applies in this case and that the statute of limitations in a personal injury action is two years. See W. Va.Code § 55-2-12 ("Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: ... within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries."). Plaintiffs' causes of actions accrued no later than July 28, 2000, the filing date of the amended complaint in the Virginia suit, to which all twenty of the present plaintiffs were also a party. Therefore, the applicable limitations period expired no later than July 28, 2002. Thus, when plaintiffs filed this action in West Virginia state court on December 18, 2002 it was outside of the normal limitations period and therefore time-barred, unless the limitations period was extended by West Virginia's savings statute.
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Section 55-2-12 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims in West Virginia.

Orme v. Charleston Police Department · filed 2022-12-08

The Supreme Court in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989), clarified that because § 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations period, the applicable limitations period is that of the state’s general limitations period for personal injury actions. Accordingly, in West Virginia, this statute of limitations is two years. W.Va. Code § 55-2-12; see also Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436, 440 (W. Va. 1993).
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Subsection (b) requires personal-injury actions for which no other limitation is prescribed to be brought within two years after the right to sue accrues.

Smith v. Weaver · filed 2024-08-07(b)

In fact, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that West Virginia’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations contained at W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) is appropriately applied in Bivens actions. ... In this case, the Plaintiff’s claims are clearly outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
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Accrual of tort claims based on latent defects

Section 55-2-12 requires tort actions to be brought within two years after accrual, and for latent construction defects accrual begins when the injured parties knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its source.

Sewell v. Gregory · filed 1988-07-29

In West Virginia, tort actions must be brought within a maximum of two years of the time they accrue. W.Va.Code § 55-2-12 (1981 Replacement Vol.). The circuit court was correct in stating that the two year statute of limitation for a tort action arising from latent defects in the construction of a house begins to run when the injured parties knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the nature of their injury and its sources, and determining that point in time is a question of fact to be answered by the jury. See Syl. Pt. 1, Hickman v. Grover, 178 W.Va. 249, 358 S.E.2d 810 (1987); see also Pauley v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 528 F.Supp. 759 (S.D.W.Va.1981).
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Discovery rule—notice of conduct

In a § 1983 action borrowing West Virginia’s two-year limitations period, the discovery rule does not toll the period when the plaintiff was already on notice of the complained-of conduct.

Sattler v. Johnson · filed 1988-09-19

We agree with the district court that under the circumstances of this case the “discovery rule” is not available to toll the statute of limitations. Under the discovery rule, “[i]t is not necessary that [the plaintiff] knew ... all of the [defendants’] alleged torts. [The plaintiff’s] action is time-barred as long as [he was] ‘on notice’ of the conduct about which [he] complain[s].” Id. at 820. Sattler’s first complaint and the memorandum he filed in support of it show that he learned of the substance of any actionable conspiracy long before the statute of limitations expired.
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Limitations periods for personal tort and misrepresentation claims

Law changed since Courtney v. Courtney (June 11, 1993) overruled this opinion's one-year rule for severe emotional distress arising from tortious conduct; those claims have the two-year personal-injury period under § 55-2-12(b).

Section 55-2-12(b) provides the two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims and applies to misrepresentation claims sufficiently related to fraud or deceit, while subsection (c) provides the one-year period for personal tort actions that do not survive death, including the emotional-distress claims at issue.

Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hospital · filed 1991-12-05(b), (c)

The primary statute of limitations for personal injuries in West Virginia is the two-year statute of limitations in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). The one-year statute of limitations in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(c) applies to civil actions which do not survive the death of a party. ... Thus, we conclude that the lower court properly granted summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs’ emotional distress claims as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. ... Even though “misrepresentation” is not listed in W.Va.Code § 55-7-8a along with “deceit” and “fraud,” we believe that it is “sufficiently related to an action for fraud and deceit so that the two-year statute of limitations applies under W.Va. Code, 55-2-12, and W.Va.Code, 55-7-8a.”
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One-year limitations period for personal torts excluded from survivability

Law changed since Courtney v. Courtney (June 11, 1993) displaced the one-year rule for severe emotional distress arising from tortious conduct; § 55-2-12(b)'s two-year period governs those claims.

Section 55-2-12(c) provides a one-year limitations period for personal tort actions excluded from statutory survivability, including outrageous conduct or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hospital · filed 1992-12-18(c)

In Rodgers, we ruled that “personal tort actions such as libel, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution take the one-year statute of limitations [set forth in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(c) (1981)] because they are excluded from statutory survivability under W.Va.Code § 55-7-8a(a) (1981)....” 179 W.Va. at 640, 371 S.E.2d at 361. Accordingly, Appellant’s first cause of action which is predicated on the tort of outrageous conduct or negligent infliction of emotional distress is governed by a one-year statute of limitations.
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One-year limit for libel and slander claims

Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year limitations period that bars libel and slander claims filed more than one year after the cause of action accrues.

Barnes v. International Amateur Athletic Federation · filed 1993-09-30(c)

Inasmuch as the cause of action for libel and slander has been grounded upon allegedly false statements "published and republished to the worldwide news media” by the IAAF and TAC (Compl. ¶ 79), to the effect that plaintiff has used steroids, and inasmuch further as the cause of action accrued on September 10, 1990, and October 20, 1990, the alleged dates of publication (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 36; Ex. 27), it is accordingly barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations in that this action was not filed until June 22, 1992. W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(c); Duffy v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 170 W.Va. 318, 294 S.E.2d 121 (1982).
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Tolling — adverse domination

Section 55-2-12's statute of limitations is tolled until a receiver is appointed under the doctrine of adverse domination only when the plaintiff makes a strong showing that the defendant's alleged wrongdoing constituted some action contributing to the adverse domination.

Clark v. Milam · filed 1994-06-28

The Court thus concludes under West Virginia law, the doctrine of adverse domination would toll the statute of limitations until the appointment of a receiver only where the plaintiff makes a strong showing that the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing constitutes “some action” contributing to the adverse domination.
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Discovery rule—when the limitations period begins in product-liability cases

Section 55-2-12(b)'s two-year limitations period begins under the discovery rule when a product-liability plaintiff knows or, through reasonable diligence, should know that the product caused the injury.

Sayre v. General Nutrition Corp. · filed 1994-11-16(b)

The parties agree the two-year statute of limitations provided by W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) applies, as well as the discovery rule developed for product liability cases by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Hickman v. Grover. ... The Court concludes that the plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that L-tryptophan had a causal relation to her injury when she saw the warning reported by NBC on November 13, 1989. ... The Plaintiffs claim is time-barred by application of the two-year statute of limitations provided in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b).
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Two-year limitation for personal injury actions

Section 55-2-12(b) requires a personal-injury action to be brought within two years after the right to bring it accrues, and the complaint must be timely received by the proper custodian to be considered filed.

Johnson v. Nedeff · filed 1994-11-18(b)

West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 (1994) requires that a cause of action for personal injury must be brought within two years after the right to bring the action has accrued. ... Accordingly, we hold that a complaint filed in a civil action must be timely received by the proper custodian before that action is deemed to be filed. By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations, we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions.
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Section 55-2-12(b) imposes a two-year limitations period on common-law fraud claims.

Davey v. Estate of Haggerty · filed 2006-07-27(b)

Within the two-year period that followed their indirect *458notification of the will’s filing — October 29, 1996 — the Appellants filed the declaratory judgment action below. Consequently, because the Appellants’ common law fraud claim was timely filed within the applicable two-year period of limitations, there is no need to apply the “discovery rule” to this claim. See W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1959) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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Section 55-2-12(b) requires personal-injury actions, including strict product liability and negligence claims, to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues; for a minor, the limitations period is tolled until age eighteen under § 55-2-15.

Hendricks v. Cordis Corporation · filed 2019-07-01(b)

In West Virginia, an action for personal injury for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed must be brought “within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued.” W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(b). West Virginia applies the two-year statute of limitations to both strict product liability and negligence claims (See Fugate v. Borg Textile Corp 881 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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Section 55-2-12(b) requires personal-injury actions to be brought within two years after the right to sue accrues.

Vega v. Beck · filed 2024-05-06(b)

For purposes of determining the appropriate statute of limitations, claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are analogous to “general personal injury actions.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985). Thus, their timeliness is determined based upon the relevant state limitations period for personal injury actions. W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) provides: Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party dies, it could not have been brought at common law by or against his personal representative. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations is two (2) years.
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Subsection (b) requires personal-injury actions with no otherwise prescribed limitation to be brought within two years after accrual, and the court held that the discovery rule did not toll that period here.

Merrill v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources · filed 2006-05-12(b)

Because the statute of limitations was not tolled under Gaither, Kimberly and Teresa were required to bring their cases within two years of turning eighteen. Their claims were not filed within that period and, therefore, summary judgment was proper under a Gaither analysis.
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Property damage—noticeable injury from traumatic event; latent damages

For property damage caused by a traumatic event, the two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff sustains a noticeable injury, and latent damages from the same event do not toll the period.

Hall's Park Motel, Inc. v. Rover Construction, Inc. · filed 1995-07-11(a)

Because of this, the Court believes that the present ease falls within the rule set forth in the Bethany College case. The Court also believes that the principles governing a “traumatic injury/latent manifestation” case set forth in Jones v. Trustees of Bethany College, supra, should apply in eases involving injury to property, and that where a plaintiff sustains a noticeable injury to property from a traumatic event, the statute of limitations begins to run and is not tolled because there may also be latent damages arising from the same traumatic event.
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Accrual of cause of action

Section 55-2-12's limitations period in tort and product-liability actions begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the injury, the responsible entity, and the causal connection, subject to the discovery-rule inquiry.

Chancellor v. Shannon · filed 1997-02-26

The parties concede that the appellant’s claims against Boston Scientific are governed by the two-year statute of limitations contained in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12. See Taylor v. Ford Motor Company, 185 W.Va. 518, 408 S.E.2d 270 (1991). ... In cases such as the present one, where all facts regarding the existence of the injury and the identity of the manufacturer of the instrument of injury are not immediately known, this Court has recognized the so-called “discovery rule” and has generally stated that: *4In product liability cases, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, (1) that he has been injured, (2) the identity of the maker of the product, and (3) that the product had a causal relation to his injury. Syllabus point 1 Hickman v. Grover, 178 W.Va. 249, 358 S.E.2d 810 (1987). See also Barney v. Auvil, 195 W.Va. 733, 466 S.E.2d 801 (1995). ... This circumstance indicates to this Court that at the time summary judgment was granted further inquiry concerning the facts was desirable to determine whether the appellant’s inquiries, and/or other attempts to identify the maker of the wire, constituted a reasonable effort. ... As indicated in syllabus point 3 of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Federal Insurance Company of New York, supra, summary judgment should not be granted where inquiry concerning the facts of a case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. In view of this, this Court believes that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
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Two-year limitation for IDEA compensatory-education claims

Section 55-2-12(b) supplies a two-year limitation for an IDEA § 1415(b)(2) compensatory-education request when borrowed as the analogous state period.

Leake Ex Rel. Shreve v. Berkeley County Board of Education · filed 1997-02-27(b)

The Court is convinced that use of a two-year limitation in the present matter will both safeguard the handicapped’s educational rights and reconcile this tension. Under a two-year approach, a student and family seeking compensatory education for a period in which benefits were denied will have a substantial amount of time during which they can vindicate their rights through the administrative hearing process. At the same time, a two-year limitation will be long enough to provide incentives for non-adversarial negotiation and compromise, yet sufficiently short so as to insure finality and closure within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the Court holds that § 55-2-12(b) governs Stacey Leake’s § 1415(b)(2) request.
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Section 55-2-12 gives a two-year limitations period for tort actions causing property damage, and separate, discrete injuries from separate blasts accrue separate limitations periods measured from each injury.

Smith v. Raven Hocking Coal Corp. · filed 1997-03-21

In the present case the parties apparently do not dispute the fact that the two-year limitation period established by W.Va. Code § 55-2-12 for tort actions resulting in damage to property is the appropriate limitation period. The real question presented is when the two-year limitation period began to run in the present action. ... In the present case, what is presented to the Court suggests that the explosions which give rise to the appellant’s cause of action occurred as discrete events. Although the explosions were of like nature, each apparently occurred independently of the others, and each was apparently concluded before the others occurred. There is no evidence that they occurred in a consistent, connected rhythmic manner. ... In view of the circumstances the Court believes that the torts involved in the present ease were of the DeRocchis type, in that they were similar, but separate, and the Court believes that the principles set forth in DeRocchis v. Matlack, Inc., supra, should control here. Further, as indicated in syllabus point 3 of DeRocchis “the statute of limitations for each cause of action begins to run from the date of the injury giving rise thereto, without regard to any previous injury or injuries.”
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Uninsured-motorist actions—two-year limitation

Subsection (b)'s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies to a John Doe uninsured-motorist action because the action is treated as a tort action.

Kiger v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. · filed 1997-03-31(b)

The district court also properly dismissed the action against John Doe, reasoning that the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied. See W. Va.Code § 55-2-12(b). The accident occurred on June 20, 1991. Kiger moved to amend her complaint to sue John Doe on September 28, 1994, more than two years after the date of the accident. The district court held that personal injury liability is the issue in the John Doe action and therefore the two-year limit applies. We agree. West Virginia law treats John Doe actions for uninsured motorist coverage as tort actions. See Perkins v. Doe, 350 S.E.2d 711, 713 (W.Va.1986) ("The 'John Doe' suit initiated by the Perkins is an action in tort.")
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Section 55-2-12(b) requires personal-injury actions with no otherwise prescribed limitation to be filed within two years after the right to sue accrues.

Stephens v. West Virginia College of Graduate Studies · filed 1998-07-10(b)

In their claims against ACT, the Stephens-es seek to recover for their personal injuries resulting from Jarrett’s sexual advances towards Mrs. Stephens during his alleged counseling sessions with her. W. Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1959) (Repl.Vol.1994) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury causes of action. Therefore, to have been timely filed, the Stephenses’ complaint must have been filed within two years of the date on which ACT tortiously injured the plaintiffs. ... If, as the Stephenses allege, Jarrett’s misconduct began at the time he was employed by ACT and could be attributable, in some measure, to ACT, then the Stephenses would have had two years from this time, until December, 1992, through June, 1993, within which to file their claims against ACT. Facially, their failure so to file renders their complaint untimely pursuant to the two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year limitation period on personal actions not otherwise covered by the statute, including a tort of breach of confidentiality created by statute.

Thompson v. Branches-Domestic Violence Shelter · filed 2000-07-10(c)

The case sub judice alleges breach of confidentiality by a domestic violence shelter in violation of a statute. This tort is similarly governed by a one-year statute of limitations. We, therefore, hold that the tort of breach of confidentiality in violation of a statute is governed by a one-year statute of limitations.
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Law changed since Courtney v. Courtney (June 11, 1993) had already displaced the one-year rule for the tort of outrage; severe emotional distress arising from tortious conduct has a two-year period under § 55-2-12(b).

Section 55-2-12 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, while the tort of outrage is governed by a one-year limitations period.

Rankin v. Berkeley County Sheriff's Department · filed 2002-09-19

A two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions exists in West Virginia under W. Va.Code § 55-2-12. Therefore, a two year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims. However, pursuant to W.Va.Code § 55-2-12 and case law, the tort of outrage, a state law claim, is governed by a one year statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12(b) requires a personal-injury action for which no other limitation is prescribed to be brought within two years after the claim accrues, and the court held that period applies to a deliberate-intent action under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Hamilton v. PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP. · filed 2004-03-29(b)

As correctly noted by the Defendant in its Memorandum In Support of its Motion For Summary Judgment, the applicable statute of limitations for personal injury actions such as the one brought by the Plaintiff in the above-styled civil action is set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(b) (2002), which provides as follows, in pertinent part: ... Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: ... (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damages for personal injuries; .... The Defendant is also correct in his assertion that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W. Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) is the statute of limitations applicable to a deliberate intent action brought under the Workers’ Compensation Act. ... From the undisputed facts in this matter, the Court finds that the applicable two-year statute of limitations began to run as early as July 14, 1999, the date on which the Plaintiff alleges he was exposed to excessive levels of carbon dioxide. ... With an accrual date of July 14, 1999, the two-year statute of limitations on the Plaintiffs personal injury claims arising from his alleged exposure to excessive levels of carbon dioxide expired on July 14, 2001, a date well before the January 17, 2003, filing of the above-styled civil action.
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Accrual of tort claims; continuing tort and fraudulent concealment

Section 55-2-12's two-year limitations period applies to the tort claims, generally beginning when the injury occurs; continuing damage does not defer accrual, although concealment may toll the period and can require factual development.

Thomas v. Gray Lumber Co. · filed 1997-04-16

The circuit court apparently concluded that the two-year statute of limitations contained in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12 governed the question of whether the tort aspects of the Thomas’ complaint were timely filed, and ... The general proposition in this State is that the limitation’s period in an action commences running from the date of injury. ... Contrary to the assertions in the present case, this Court does not believe that any tort committed by the defendants was a continuing tort within the meaning of Handley v. Shinnston, supra. ... Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding, in effect, that there was no continuing tort and that the limitation period, not taking into consideration any allegation of attempt by the defendants to conceal the defects, began to run in 1992, and that the Thomas’ action was accordingly barred by the statute of limitations.
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One-year limitations period for torts not surviving at common law

Law changed since Senate Bill 418 (effective July 8, 2005) added § 33-11-4a, ending private unfair settlement practice suits by third-party claimants; the Wilts' claim against the tortfeasor's liability insurer is subject to that limit, while available first-party claims retain the one-year period.

Subsection (c) imposes a one-year limitations period on statutory tort claims that do not fall within the property-damage, personal-injury, or fraud-and-deceit categories and did not survive at common law.

Wilt v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-06-24(c)

Given its recent statutory genesis, an unfair settlement practices claim clearly did not survive at common law and thus falls squarely into subdivision (c) of West Virginia Code § 55-2-12. ... Accordingly, we determine that claims involving unfair settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act are governed by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(c).
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Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on both statutory UTPA and common-law bad-faith claims.

Parsons v. Standard Insurance Co. · filed 2016-05-05(c)

Under W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(c), both UTPA and common law bad faith claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Noland v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, 224 W.Va. 372, 686 S.E.2d 23, 33, 35 (2009) (holding that the one year statute of limitations contained in § 55-2-12(c) applies to both statutory and common law bad faith claims).
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Discovery rule—when the tort limitations period begins

For tort claims, the two-year limitations period can be tolled under the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, the responsible entity, and the causal connection; when the trigger is disputed, a jury must decide it.

Casto v. Dupuy · filed 1999-03-26(a)

In tort actions, unless there is a clear statutory prohibition to its application, under the-discovery rule the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know (1) that the plaintiff has been injured, (2) the identity of the entity who owed the plaintiff a duty to act with due care, and who may have engaged in conduct that breached that duty, and (3) that the conduct of that entity has a causal relation tb the injury. ... With this standard in view, a clear factual dispute exists as to whether Mr. Martin’s opinion or that of Mr. Knight triggered the discovery rule for the purpose of tolling the two-year tort statute of limitations. This material factual dispute involving the tort theory of liability should not have been decided by the trial court. Under Stemple, it is a jury question that precludes summary judgment.
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Statute of limitations for fraud claims

Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for fraud claims, subject to the discovery rule: the period begins when the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

University of West Virginia Board of Trustees v. VanVoorhies · filed 2000-02-17

VanVoorhies’ fraud claims are all subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations. ... Under the discovery rule, the two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims commences when a person discovers or could have, with reasonable diligence, discovered the fraud.
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Section 55-2-12 requires a property claim to be brought within two years after the claimant discovers the property loss.

Adkins v. Division of Corrections · filed 2001-06-29

W.Va. Code §55-2-12, is the applicable statute of limitations for a property claim, and provides that this claim should have been brought within two years of the date that claimant discovered the property loss.
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Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year limitations period on a first-party UTPA claim, running when the appeal period expires on the underlying cause of action.

Johnson Ex Rel. Estate of Johnson v. ACCEPTANCE INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2003-09-19(c)

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held in Klettner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 W.Va. 587, 519 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1999), that the statute of limitations for a first-party claim under the UTPA was “governed by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(c) (1994).” ... The statutory claim at issue in this case is predicated on Acceptance’s unfair settlement practice in denying coverage for the underlying claim. Acceptance denied coverage on September 26, 1997. .Therefore, BHA had until September 26, 1998 to file a first-party claim under the statute of limitations. Plaintiff, asserting the cause of action on behalf of BHA due to the assignment, would have also had until September 26, 1998 to file the first-party claim. Plaintiff filed her first-party claim in November 2001, past the deadline under the statute of limitations. Therefore, plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations and Acceptance’s motion for summary judgment on the first-party claim under the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act is GRANTED.
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Section 55-2-12(c) and (e) provide one-year limitations periods for statutory unfair-settlement claims and common-law bad-faith claims, respectively; for a first-party bad-faith claim based on refusal to defend, the period begins when the insured knows or reasonably should have known of the refusal.

Noland v. Virginia Insurance Reciprocal · filed 2009-09-24(c), (e)

Based upon the reasoning employed in Wilt, we find that a common law bad faith action does not involve property damage, personal injury, or fraud or deceit. Therefore, we expressly hold that the one year statute of limitations contained in W. Va. Code § 55 — 2—12(e) (1959) (Repl. Vol. 2008) applies to a common law bad faith claim.
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Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year limitations period on fraud claims seeking damages, subject to possible tolling under the discovery rule.

Powell v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2012-02-02

Inasmuch as the Count I fraud claim requests damages — a legal remedy — the two-year statute of limitations period set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 governs. ... Here, it does not clearly appear on the face of plaintiffs’ complaint that the discovery rule does not apply to toll the two-year statute of limitations.
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Subsection (e) bars a defamation claim under its one-year statute of limitation when the action is not brought within that period after the right to sue accrues.

Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital Assoc. v. Nutter · filed 2016-11-17(e)

By any reading of this record, the plaintiffs cause of action for defamation was barred by the one-year statute of limitation contained in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(e). Thomas Memorial was plainly entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this cause of action, and the circuit court erred in ruling otherwise.
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Section 55-2-12 supplies a two-year catch-all limitations period for HRA employment-discrimination actions filed in circuit court; the period begins when the plaintiff first learns of the adverse employment decision and is not tolled until the plaintiff discovers the alleged discriminatory motive.

Metz v. Eastern Associated Coal, LLC · filed 2017-04-06

Both sides agree that the applicable limitations period is the “catch-all” two-year period set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 (2016). ... Accordingly, it follows, and we so hold, that the statute of limitations for employment discrimination cases brought to enforce rights under the HRA, including allegations of discriminatory failure to hire, begins to run from the date a plaintiff first learns of the adverse. employment decision. ... Consistent with the weight of authority on this issue, we hold that the statute of limitations for employment discrimination cases brought to enforce rights under the HRA, including allegations of discriminatory failure to hire, is not tolled by the discovery rule until a plaintiff discovers the alleged discriminatory motive underlying the employment decision.
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Tolling—fraudulent concealment

Law changed since House Bill 4559 (effective June 1, 2020) amended § 55-2-15(a) to give a person sexually abused as a minor 18 years after majority to sue an alleged aider, abettor, or concealer, including a claim of concealment like this one; the ordinary two-year period is no longer the governing baseline for that claim.

Section 55-2-12(b)’s personal-injury limitations period is tolled for fraudulent concealment of an undiscovered wrongdoer when the claim arose during the victim’s infancy, with accrual beginning upon actual or reasonably discoverable knowledge of the injury.

Miller v. Monongalia County Board of Education · filed 2001-12-13(b)

We, therefore, hold that the general statute of limitations contained in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) (1959) is tolled with respect to an undiscovered wrongdoer by virtue of fraudulent concealment when the cause of action accrues during a victim’s infancy and the injured person alleges in his or her complaint that the wrongdoer fraudulently concealed material facts. The statute begins to run when the injured person knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, the nature of his or her injury, and determining that point in time is a question of fact for the jury.
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Accrual of limitations period for temporary and continuing nuisances

For a temporary and continuing nuisance, the two-year limitations period under § 55-2-12(a) begins on the date of the last injurious act or when the nuisance is abated or discontinued.

Taylor v. Culloden Public Service District & West Virginia-American Water Co. · filed 2003-11-24(a)

Where, as in this case, the acts which constitute a nuisance are continuing in the sense that distinct instances of injury result from the nuisance, as opposed to a singular injury, and the acts of nuisance are capable of being abated or discontinued, the temporary nuisance continues until such time as those acts are abated or discontinued. Consequently, the two year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(a) does not begin to run in a nuisance action where the tort at issue is both temporary and continuing until the date of the last injurious act or when the acts constituting the nuisance have been abated or discontinued.
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Statute of limitations—accrual of medical monitoring claim

Section 55-2-12 imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury actions when no other limitation is prescribed, and a medical-monitoring claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the increased disease risk from exposure and the party responsible for the exposure.

State Ex Rel. Chemtall Inc. v. Madden · filed 2004-12-02

A cause of action for medical monitoring lies in tort. According to W.Va.Code § 55-2-12 (1959), the statute of limitation applicable to tort actions in West Virginia, “[e]very personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought ... within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries[.]” ... Accordingly, we now hold that a medical monitoring cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that he or she has a significantly increased risk of contracting a particular disease due to significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance and the identity of the party that caused or contributed to the plaintiffs exposure to the hazardous substance.
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Tort limitations period—actions sounding in both tort and contract

Section 55-2-12's tort limitations period does not bar an action that sounds in both tort and contract when treating it solely as a tort would make it untimely.

Fuller v. Riffe · filed 2001-03-09

Finally, the complaint could be *212also read as stating a cause of action in tort based upon the manner in which Mr. Meek’s signature was obtained on the deed. “We therefore conclude that this action sounds in tort and contract and should not be precluded by a tort statute of limitations.” Smith v. Stacy, 198 W.Va. 498, 503, 482 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1996). Consequently, the trial court committed error in applying the tort statute of limitations to bar the action.
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Contract or tort statute of limitations

Section 55-2-12(a)’s two-year tort limitation does not govern a secured party’s Article 9 collateral-preservation claim when the recoverable damages are contractual in nature.

Thomas v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. · filed 2006-08-04(a)

In West Virginia, the limitation normally applicable to a claim of conversion is the two-year period in § 55-2-12(a). ... In light of the contract-based measure of the damages recoverable in a § 46-9-207 claim and the applicability of general U.C.C. restrictions on the type of damages recoverable, this Court concludes that the West Virginia legislature intended that claims brought under § 46-9-207 be limited by the ten-year period in § 55-2-6.
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False arrest — statute of limitations

Section 55-2-12(c)'s one-year limitations period applies to false-arrest claims, and the period was not tolled here because proving the claim would not undermine a possible criminal conviction.

Canterbury v. Laird · filed 2007-11-21(c)

This Court has previously noted in passing that “torts such as ... false arrest ... take the one-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(c).” ... Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this Court adopted the position advocated by the dissenting appellate judge in Wallace, the dissent would not help Mr. Canterbury. ... In the instant case the record is clear. Proof of the validity of Mr. Canterbury’s false an'est claim would have had no impact on a possible conviction in his criminal case. ... Therefore, even if this Court adopted the tolling exception, the facts in Mr. Canterbury’s ease would not have triggered that exception. Consequently, we must affirm the circuit court’s ruling finding the false arrest claim was not timely filed.
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Applicable statute of limitations

Section 55-2-12(c) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on defamation claims.

Collins v. Keller · filed 2018-09-28(c)

The Cavendish court went on to state that “[i]t is clear that libel is a form of defamation which . . . is limited by the one-year limitation period established in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12(c).” Id. In other words, the West Virginia Supreme Court clearly held in Cavendish that the one-year statute of limitations still applies to defamation claims. Thus, the Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983, although based on alleged fraud, are still governed by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims. Because Mr. Collins did not file his complaint within two years of the alleged fraud, those claims are time barred. Further, to the extent Mr. Collins brings an additional claim for defamation against Ms. Keller based on a newspaper article published on April 15, 2014, that claim is governed by a one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 55-2-12(c)’s one-year limitations period does not govern claims alleging violations of the credit services organization statute and the resulting unfair or deceptive practices prohibition.

Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc. · filed 2010-11-23(c)

Is the appropriate limitations period for actions alleging violations of the CSO statutes (id. § 46A-6C-1 et seq.) and the statutory prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices (id. § 46A-6-104) four years under West Virginia Code § 46A-5-101(l), or one year under the general limitation period in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12? ... Accordingly, under the express terms of these statutory provisions, we find that for actions alleging violations of the CSOA, W. Va.Code § 46A-6C-1 et seq. and the resulting statutory prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices specifically identified in W. Va.Code § 46A-6-104, the applicable statute of limitations is four years pursuant to W. Va.Code § 46A-5-101(l).
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Intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress

Section 55-2-12(b) gives a two-year limitations period for intentional-or-reckless-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, running from the last extreme and outrageous conduct precipitating an employment termination.

Clay v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co. · filed 2013-07-03(b)

Under West Virginia law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to a claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. W. Va.Code § 55-2-12(b); Travis v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 202 W.Va. 369, 504 S.E.2d 419, 432 (1998) (citations omitted). As to when such statute of limitations begins to run, the West Virginia Supreme Court has held that “in claims for intentionally or recklessly inflicted emotional distress that arise from a termination of employment, the two-year statute of limitation ... begins to run on the date of the last extreme and outrageous conduct, or threat of extreme and outrageous conduct, which precipitated the termination of employment.”
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Two-year limitation for tortious damage to property

Section 55-2-12(a) gives two years to bring an action for tortious damage to property after the claim accrues; when accrual depends on disputed discovery-rule facts, the issue goes to the jury.

Moore v. Equitrans, L.P. · filed 2014-09-23(a)

The applicable statute of limitation provision for tortious damage to property is West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(a). ... The statute prescribes a two-year period within which to institute an action after accrual of the right to bring it. W. Va.Code § 55-2-12(a). ... Pursuant to Dunn, this Court finds that the discovery defense forwarded by the plaintiffs in response to the defendant’s statute of limitations argument is a question for the jury. ... Accordingly, this Court may not grant summary judgment, because material questions of fact still exist and thus, the discovery rule is an issue left for the trier of fact.
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49 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

United States Ex Rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, the statute appears only in a string citation in the dissent's discussion of analogous wrongful-discharge limitations periods; the court's majority opinion did not discuss or construe § 55-2-12. opinion →
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States Ex Rel. Wilson, the Supreme Court mentioned § 55-2-12 only in a footnote listing possible analogous state statutes of limitations. It expressly left the choice of the state statute to borrow for remand and did not construe or apply West Virginia law. opinion →
Worley v. Beckley Mechanical, Inc., the concurrence recites § 55-2-12(b)'s general two-year rule as background, but the court's actual discussion and decision concern tolling under § 55-2-15; it does not construe or decide an issue about § 55-2-12(b). opinion →
Logar v. West Virginia University Board of Governors, the court cites § 55-2-12 only to identify the applicable two-year state limitations period; it does not construe or decide how the statute applies, and resolves accrual under federal law. opinion →
EQT Gathering Equity, LLC v. Fountain Place, LLC, the opinion merely reports the district court’s dismissal of EQT’s tort claims as time-barred under § 55-2-12(a). The Fourth Circuit does not interpret or apply that statute; its holding concerns the parties’ lease obligations and allocation of pipeline-relocation costs under Quintain. opinion →
James R. and Jamila J. Fleet v. Webber Springs Owners Assoc., the statute appears only in Webber Springs's argument that the counterclaims were time-barred. The court did not interpret or apply § 55-2-12; it held instead that the WVCCPA applied and that the counterclaims were not time-barred under W. Va. Code § 46A-5-102. opinion →
Horton v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, section 55-2-12 is mentioned only while summarizing an argument from a prior case and the respondent's reliance on that reasoning; this opinion decides whether a consumer-protection claim survives death under § 55-7-8a, not what § 55-2-12 means or how it applies. opinion →
State of WV ex rel. Gallagher Bassett Services v. the Honorable Carrie Webster, Robin Lusk and Old Dominion Freight Line, the opinion cites § 55-2-12 only in a footnote to identify the two-year limitations period. The dissent's discussion concerns whether the limitations issue could be resolved on a writ of prohibition and whether disputed facts required application of the discovery rule; it does not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
State of WV ex rel. Gallagher Bassett Services v. The Honorable Carrie Webster, Robin Lusk and Old Dominion Freight Line, the court cited § 55-2-12 only in a footnote as the statute supporting the parties' agreed two-year limitations period. It did not interpret or independently apply § 55-2-12; its limitations analysis applied the Dunn discovery-rule framework and concluded the claim was time-barred. opinion →
Williams v. West Virginia Division of Corrections, the court cites § 55-2-12 only to identify the applicable two-year personal-injury limitations period; it does not interpret or independently analyze the statute, and its ruling concerns relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). opinion →
Weirton Area Water Board v. 3M Company, the statute appears only in Neo Industries’ summary of its dismissal argument. The court did not construe § 55-2-12(c); it addressed the untimeliness issue by applying the continuing-tort rule from Graham and denied dismissal. opinion →
Zulauf v. Marshall University Board of Governors, the court merely recited the parties’ agreement that § 55-2-12 supplies a two-year limitations period for Title IX claims. It did not construe the statute; its timeliness ruling addressed when the federal claim accrued under federal law. opinion →
Dean v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., Incidental: the statute appears only in the opinion’s quotation/report of the district court’s reasoning in Armor v. Michelin Tire Corp.; this court does not construe or apply § 55-2-12. opinion →
Hupp v. Monahan, section 55-2-12 is cited only in footnote 7 to support the undisputed proposition that a tort legal-malpractice claim is subject to a two-year limitations period. The court’s decision concerns the continuous-representation doctrine and when the limitations period began, not the meaning or independent application of § 55-2-12. opinion →
Saunders v. Kummer, the court cites § 55-2-12(b) only as authority for the two-year personal-injury limitations period. It does not interpret or apply that statute; its timeliness ruling concerns the West Virginia Savings Statute, W. Va. Code § 55-2-18(a). opinion →
Franklin, the statute is cited only to identify the two-year limitations period in summarizing the parties’ arguments. The court resolves the motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)’s relation-back requirements, including service timing and prejudice, without construing or independently deciding the meaning, scope, or application of § 55-2-12(b). opinion →
Klug v. Marshall University Board of Governors, the court quoted § 55-2-12(b) and addressed a limitations defense, but did not interpret or finally apply the statute; it denied dismissal because the accrual date presented disputed factual questions. opinion →
Burns v. Bell, the court cited W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) only in a footnote string cite listing jurisdictions said to use the discovery rule. It did not construe or apply West Virginia law; the holding concerned the District of Columbia statute. opinion →
Bradford v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., Incidental: the statute is mentioned only as one limitations defense asserted by the third-party defendants. The court did not construe or apply § 55-2-12; it held that admiralty laches, rather than a specific statute of limitations, governed. opinion →
Price v. Boone County Ambulance Authority, the statute is cited only in a footnote while reporting and approving the Fourth Circuit's limitations-period holding; this Court did not construe or apply § 55-2-12, and expressly noted that the plaintiff's 117-day filing was timely even under a one-year period. opinion →
Sharp v. Southern West Virginia Regional Health Council, the court expressly declined to decide which particular limitations statute applied. It mentioned § 55-2-12 only as one of the statutes to consult and resolved timeliness on the fact that the complaint was filed within the minimum one-year period. opinion →
Shirkey v. MacKey, the court mentions § 55-2-12 only in a footnote as an example of a pre-existing limitations statute operating within the outside limit of § 55-2-6a. It does not apply, construe, or decide anything about § 55-2-12; the holding concerns § 55-2-6a and the discovery rule. opinion →
Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, the court merely recited the plaintiff’s argument invoking § 55-2-12 and expressly declined to decide whether a discovery rule applied. opinion →
Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, the statute appears only in Brumbaugh’s argument about the limitations period. The court expressly declined to decide whether a discovery rule applied, and resolved the appeal on due-diligence and inquiry-notice grounds without construing or applying § 55-2-12. opinion →
Adamson v. City of Provo, Utah, the court mentions W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) only in a footnote's string cite listing state personal-injury limitation statutes. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the West Virginia statute; the court applies Utah limitation law instead. opinion →
Russell v. Amerisure Insurance, the opinion concerns an unfair-insurance-claim-settlement action under W. Va. Code § 33-11-4(9). Section 55-2-12 is not construed or applied; the two-year limitations period appears only in the appellant's allegations and the court does not decide its meaning or operation. opinion →
Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc., the opinion mentions § 55-2-12 only in a footnote describing the general limitations statute for most tort actions. The court's actual holding concerns the medical-malpractice limitations provision in W. Va. Code § 55-7B-4 and its discovery rule, so it does not construe or apply § 55-2-12. opinion →
Sizemore v. State Farm General Insurance, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 55-2-12(c) barred the claim and held that certified question moot; the statute was only discussed as an unresolved alternative. opinion →
Korzun v. Yi, section 55-2-12 is cited only in a footnote identifying the statute of limitations referenced as a ground for the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court did not analyze, interpret, or rule on that statute. opinion →
Time Warner Cable National Division v. Bubacz, the statute appears only as the limitations period asserted in the defendants’ motion. The court instead held that the three-year limitations period borrowed from the federal Copyright Act applied to the federal Cable Act claims, so it did not decide what § 55-2-12 means or how it applies. opinion →
Wright v. Myers, the court used § 55-2-12 to identify and calculate the applicable two-year deadline, but the decision did not construe or otherwise decide what the statute means or requires. The ruling concerned whether the clerk's alleged filing-date error warranted reconsideration under Rule 60(a). opinion →
U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., the statute appears only in the dissent's string cite as an example of a wrongful-discharge limitations statute; the court does not interpret or apply W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. opinion →
United Bank, Inc. v. Stone Gate Homeowners Ass'n, the appellate court mentions § 55-2-12 only in describing the circuit court’s ruling and reproducing statutory text in a footnote. The court’s holding concerns attorney’s fees under W. Va. Code § 36B-3-116(f), not the meaning or application of § 55-2-12. opinion →
MUTO EX REL. MUTO v. Scott, the court mentions § 55-2-12 only to identify the applicable two-year limitations period in the facts and procedural discussion; it does not interpret or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
Perrine v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., the statute appears only in a footnote introduced by “See,” while the opinion’s limitations analysis addresses CERCLA and the discovery rule rather than construing or applying § 55-2-12. opinion →
J.A. Street & Associates, Inc. v. Thundering Herd Development, Inc., the appellate court did not construe or apply § 55-2-12(c); it mentioned the subsection only in a footnote while reporting the lower court’s time-bar ruling. The appellate decision instead addressed tolling under § 55-2-21 and the discovery rule. opinion →
Ja Street & Associates v. Thd., the opinion only reports the circuit court's ruling that Street's claims were time-barred under § 55-2-12(c). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded based on § 55-2-21 and possible discovery-rule fact issues, without construing § 55-2-12. opinion →
Tudor's Biscuit World of America v. Critchley, the opinion mentions W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 only in footnote 14 as the source of the two-year limitations period. The court uses the already-applicable period to calculate when the statute of limitations ran while reviewing prejudice under the Parsons factors; it does not interpret, construe, or decide any issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Cava v. National Union Fire Insurance, the opinion reports the circuit court's treatment of § 55-2-12(c) and the parties' arguments, but the Supreme Court does not construe that statute. It resolves the timeliness issue under § 55-2-21 and the savings statute, § 55-2-18(a). opinion →
Thomas v. Trooper Crowder, Trooper Fields, the opinion merely reports the circuit court’s limitations ruling and cites § 55-2-12(b) and (c) in footnotes; the appellate court does not construe or explain what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Pizzuto v. Rebecca Randolph, Main Street Financial, the opinion mentions § 55-2-12(b) and (c) in a footnote while reporting the circuit court’s statute-of-limitations findings. The Supreme Court does not construe or independently apply the statute; it simply affirms the summary judgment generally. opinion →
Givens v. Main Street Financial Services, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the circuit court’s statute-of-limitations findings. The appellate court did not construe or independently apply § 55-2-12; it affirmed the summary judgment on the record without deciding what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Johnson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., the court cited § 55-2-12 only to note West Virginia’s two-year personal-injury limitations period while comparing the two states’ laws under Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute. It applied Pennsylvania law and did not construe or independently apply the West Virginia statute. opinion →
E.K. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, section 55-2-12 appears in a footnote listing the two-year personal-injury limitation as the basis for the DHHR’s affirmative defense. The court did not construe the statute; it reversed on pleading and procedural grounds and held that accrual and tolling issues required factual development. opinion →
Gravely v. Mullins, the court mentioned § 55-2-12(b) in a footnote to support its observation that the dismissal without prejudice was less harsh because the petitioner could refile. It did not construe or decide any issue about the statute; the appeal concerned sanctions for litigation misconduct. opinion →
Butler v. Poffinberger, the court cites the section as the limitations period raised against the counterclaim and decides whether the amendment relates back under federal procedural rules. opinion →
Wilfong v. Chenoweth Ford, Inc., the court mentions § 55-2-12 in a certified question but decides which limitations period § 5-11-13(b) refers to. opinion →
Keeney v. Infinity Insurance, the court discusses the section as part of Wilt’s limitations analysis while deciding whether an unfair trade practices claim survived the plaintiff’s death. opinion →
Birchfield v. Zen's Development, LLC, Uptown Properties, LLC, & Kenneth W. McBride, Jr., the court affirmed the negligence judgment because the plaintiff waived her challenge to the trial court’s application of the section’s two-year limit. opinion →

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