W. Va. Code § 21-5-1

Section 21-5-1(h) makes corporate officers who knowingly permit violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Act personally liable for unpaid wages, fringe benefits, and liquidated damages.

Mullins v. Venable · filed 1982-11-18(h)

Although the Wage Payment and Collection Act does not explicitly impose liability on corporate officers, it is clear from a reading of W.Va.Code § 21-5-1(h) that the Legislature intended to impose liability on officers in the management of a corporation who knowingly permit their corporation to act in violation of the provisions of the Act.

An officer must participate in corporate management and knowingly permit a wage violation to face personal liability under the Act.

McDaniel v. West Virginia Division of Labor · filed 2003-12-08(h)

The Wage Payment and Collection Act specifically defines an “officer” to “include officers or agents in the management of a corporation or firm, who knowingly permit the corporation or firm to violate the provisions of this article.” W. Va.Code § 21-6-1 (h) (1987) (Repl.Vol.2002). ... Because we find that the circuit court correctly determined that Mr. McDaniel was not an officer of MCDI and thus was not subject to liability under the Wage Payment and Collection Act, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling in this regard.

Section 21-5-1(h) includes officers of an employing entity within the Wage Payment and Collection Act when they oversee an employee’s contract, salary, and fringe benefits.

Carr-Lambert v. Grant County Board of Education · filed 2011-08-11(h)

Firms and corporations, as well as officers who “knowingly permit” a violation, are liable under W.Va.Code § 21-5-4(e). W.Va.Code § 21-5-l(h) (1987). ... Nevertheless, this Court finds the WPCA applicable to the individually-named defendants as they were officers of the GCBOE that employed the plaintiff. As officers, the individual defendants oversaw the execution of her contract, the payment of her salary, and the allocation of her fringe benefits.

A Wage Payment Act claim against an individual requires allegations that the individual qualifies as an officer or manager under the Act.

Blackwood v. Berry Dunn, LLC · filed 2020-11-02(a), (h)

Blackwood’s complaint is devoid of allegations that Becnel qualified as an officer or manager under the West Virginia Wage Payment Act. See W. Va. Code § 21-5-1(a), (h).

Corporate officers who knowingly permit wage-payment violations may be personally liable for unpaid wages.

Halstead v. MUCKLOW · filed 2023-04-04(h)

First, it is clear that Mr. Mucklow was an officer of New Beginnings and that he is personally liable for any wages owed to Ms. Adkins that fit within the WVWPCA; he admitted so in his testimony.

Section 21-5-1(h) permits personal liability for a corporate officer who knowingly allows the corporation to violate the Wage Payment and Collection Act.

Elliot v. MUCKLOW · filed 2023-04-04(h)

First, it is clear that Mr. Mucklow was an officer of New Beginnings and that he is personally liable for any wages owed to Ms. Adkins that fit within the WVWPCA; he admitted so in his testimony.

Corporate officers who knowingly permit violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Act may be personally liable for unpaid wages.

Adkins v. MUCKLOW · filed 2023-04-04(h)

First, it is clear that Mr. Mucklow was an officer of New Beginnings and that he is personally liable for any wages owed to Ms. Adkins that fit within the WVWPCA; he admitted so in his testimony.

Section 21-5-1 defines wages to include an employee’s total compensation, including union dues deducted from pay.

Cooper v. Glavas Contracting Co. · filed 1987-03-11

The term “wages” is defined in W.Va.Code § 21-5-1 (1985) to mean “compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee....” Thus, wages as used in the article include the total compensation an employee receives from his employer. Union dues that are deducted from a member’s pay are a part of that compensation.

Section 21-5-1 includes annual raises promised in employment agreements within its definition of wages.

Britner v. Medical Security Card, Inc. · filed 1997-06-10(e)

The definition of wages contained in W.Va.Code § 21-5-l(e) (1996) encompasses the annual raise contained in plaintiffs’ employment agreements.

Section 21-5-1(c) defines wages as compensation for labor or services rendered, which excludes WARN Act payments for failure to give closure notice.

Conrad v. Charles Town Races, Inc. · filed 1999-10-20(c)

WARN Act payments are not compensation for services rendered but are damages designed to compensate employees for an employer’s failure to provide the required sixty days’ notice prior to closure. The WPCA, on the other hand, only applies to “wages,” that is, “compensation for labor or services rendered.”

Section 21-5-1’s definition of wages excludes payments made under a three-fourths work guarantee when the employer fails to provide the promised opportunity to work.

Rowe v. Grapevine Corp. · filed 1999-12-15(c)

Consequently, we conclude that payments made to migrant workers pursuant to provisions required by federal law which mandate that an employer/grower must guarantee work for three-fourths of the contractual period or make payments in lieu of providing such work opportunity do not constitute wages as defined by the Act.

Section 21-5-1(c) excludes damages awarded as back pay from the definition of wages, even when the award compensates for lost earnings.

Taylor v. Mutual Mining, Inc. · filed 2000-12-11(c)

Such amounts, just as in Conrad, were awarded not for “labor or services rendered,” but instead as a form of damages for violation of the collective bargaining agreement. We were clear in Conrad that amounts awarded as a form of damages do not qualify as “wages” under the Act.

Section 21-5-1(c) defines wages as compensation for labor or services rendered; the employee’s administrative leave did not count as labor or services on the day she was terminated.

Boggess v. Housing Authority of City of Charleston · filed 2003-07-25(c)

Despite Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary, because she was on administrative leave as of May 29, 2001, she was not performing labor or services as defined in the Act on August 27, 2001.

Compensation for time spent waiting for delivery materials is wages under the WPCA.

Dalton v. Omnicare, Inc. · filed 2015-10-09(c)

Dalton’s unpaid “wait time” therefore fits within the category of “wages,” as it was meant to compensate her for her time spent waiting for Omnicare- pharmacists to get the totes ready for delivery.

Section 21-5-1(c) defines wages as compensation for labor or services rendered; an employee who has been paid for all work performed is owed no wages.

Foster v. Nash · filed 2020-06-18(c)

W.Va. Code § 21-5-1(c). Because Foster admits that he “received full payment for any work he actually performed” there is no dispute of material fact that Defendants do not owe Foster any “wages.”

Whether compensation is wages payable under the Wage Payment and Collection Act depends on the terms of the employment agreement, whether written or established by a consistently applied unwritten policy.

Davari v. The West Virginia University Board of Governors · filed 2021-04-16(c)

The determination as to whether “wages,” as defined in West Virginia Code § 21-5-1(c) (2013 Repl.Vol.), are payable pursuant to the requirements of West Virginia Code § 21-5-1 et seq. (2013 Repl.Vol.) is governed by the terms of the employment agreement, whether written or in the form of a consistently applied unwritten policy.

Section 21-5-1(c) includes calculable fringe benefits payable directly to an employee in its definition of wages.

Beall v. The City of Morgantown · filed 2023-05-04(c)

West Virginia Code § 21-5-1(c) defines wages to include fringe benefits that are capable of calculation and payable directly to the employee.

Section 21-5-1(c) includes calculable fringe benefits payable directly to an employee in its definition of wages; employment terms determine whether particular benefits qualify.

Viola v. The City of Morgantown · filed 2023-05-04(c)

West Virginia Code § 21-5-1(c) defines wages to include fringe benefits that are capable of calculation and payable directly to the employee. The terms of employment determine if such benefits qualify as wages under the WPCA.

Whether wages defined by § 21-5-1(c) are payable depends on the employment agreement, written or established through a consistently applied unwritten policy.

Adkins v. American Mine Research · filed 2014-10-30(c)

We therefore now hold that the determination as to whether “wages,” as defined in West Virginia Code § 21-5-1(c) (2013 Repl. Vol.), are payable pursuant to the requirements of West Virginia Code § 21-5-1 et seq. (2013 Repl. Vol.) is governed by the terms of the employment agreement, whether written or in the form of a consistently applied unwritten policy.

Wages payable under the Wage Payment and Collection Act are determined by the terms of the employment agreement.

Grim v. Eastern Electric, LLC · filed 2014-11-03(c)

The amount of wages payable to an employee pursuant to the provisions of the WPCA is determined exclusively by the terms of the employment agreement.

Section 21-5-1(c) defines wages to include compensation calculated on a commission basis.

Atkins v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC · filed 2020-06-01(c)

Commissions are a type of “wage” that may be covered under the WPCA. See W. Va. Code § 21-5-1(c) (2015).

Section 21-5-1(b) defines employee broadly enough to include management employees.

Szturm v. Huntington Blizzard Hockey Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1999-05-17(b)

The Act defines “employee” to “inelude[ ] any person suffered or permitted to work by a person, firm or corporation.” W. Va.Code § 21-5-l(b) (1987). The statute’s broad definition of employee thus defeats any contention that the protections afforded by § 21-5-4 do not extend to management employees.

Section 21-5-1(b) includes a person suffered or permitted to work within its definition of an employee.

Saunders v. Tri-State Block Corp. · filed 2000-07-12(b)

Specifically, an “employee” is defined to include “any person suffered or permitted to work by a person, firm or corporation.” W. Va.Code 21-5-l(b). ... Thus, under the documents submitted by David C. Saunders, the Court believes that the trial court could properly have concluded that David C. Saunders was an “employee” of Tri-State Block Corporation for the purposes of West Virginia’s Wage Payment and Collection Act.

Section 21-5-1(b)'s definition of employee does not cover a person solely because they share an office with a firm while working for their own clients.

Legg v. Johnson, Simmerman & Broughton, L.C. · filed 2002-12-03(b)

Similarly, the Court does not believe that an office-sharing arrangement, such as the one in the present case, alone, makes the sharing party an “employee” for the purposes of the Wage Payment and Collection Act.

Section 21-5-1(b) defines “employee” to include any person permitted to work by a person, firm, or corporation, including a physician.

Shaffer v. FT. Henry Surgical Associates, Inc. · filed 2004-07-01(b)

Instead, the Legislature elected to employ language which encompasses any person, regardless of occupation, trade, vocation or profession, who is suffered or permitted to work by a person, firm or corporation and thus, satisfies the statutory definition.

Section 21-5-1(c) treats fringe benefits as wages when they have vested under the terms of employment, can be calculated, and are payable directly to the employee; ambiguities in those terms favor employees.

Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2000-06-09(c)

In summary, we hold that, pursuant to W.Va.Code § 21-5-1(c) (1987), whether fringe benefits have then accrued, are capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee so as to be included in the term "wages" are determined by the terms of employment and not by the provisions of W.Va. Code § 21-5-1(c). Further, the terms of employment may condition the vesting of a fringe benefit right on some eligibility requirement in addition to the performance of services, and these terms may provide that unused fringe benefits will not be paid to employees upon separation from employment. However, the terms of employment must be express and specific so that employees understand the amount, if any, of the fringe benefits owed to them upon separation from employment. Accordingly, this Court will construe any ambiguity in the terms of employment in favor of employees.

Section 21-5-1(c) permits accrued fringe benefits to be calculated under an employer’s benefit plans or employee handbook when those terms do not conflict with the Wage Act.

Tobin v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp. · filed 1993-11-15(c)

Based on the italicized language above, the Court concludes Plaintiffs are only entitled to performance sharing and profit sharing payments calculated pursuant to RAC’s benefit plans. Similarly, Plaintiffs are only entitled to accrued vacation pay calculated pursuant to RAC’s employee handbook. Because the Plaintiffs have received the payments required by these benefit plans, the Court grants summary judgment on the count two claim for fringe benefits. The Court therefore dismisses count two in its entirety.

Section 21-5-1(c) treats a fringe benefit as wages only after it accrues under the employer’s employment policy.

Gress v. Petersburg Foods, LLC · filed 2003-12-18(c)

Before a fringe benefit is payable to an employee, the fringe benefit must have accrued to the employee. As defined in Meadows, the employer's policies define when a fringe benefit accrues to an employee. The terms of the appellant's policy dictated that to qualify for the yield bonus an employee must have been employed by the appellant on the date that the appellant distributed the yield bonus payments. Ms. Gress was not employed by the appellant on the date that the appellant distributed the yield bonuses; therefore, the yield bonus fringe benefit had not yet accrued to Ms. Gress.

Section 21-5-1(c) includes accrued, calculable fringe benefits in wages, so earned vacation pay cannot be delayed until the following year.

Robertson v. Opequon Motors, Inc. · filed 1999-06-17(c)

The Act demands that an employer pay as wages “then accrued fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee.” W. Va.Code § 21-5-l(c) (1987). If, for example, one takes a vacation day, a fringe benefit, on Thursday, July 25, the right to do so must have accrued by that date, and the amount of compensation clearly is capable of calculation.

Section 21-5-1 includes accrued sick leave among fringe benefits that may qualify as wages, and an employer’s policy against paying unused leave defeats a claim only if the employee knew of it.

Howell v. City of Princeton · filed 2001-10-05(c), (l)

Under W. Va.Code § 21-5-l(c) of the Act, “wages” is defined to “include then accrued fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee[.]” ... Insofar as the Officers’ claims were disposed of at the pleading stage, there is nothing in the record to show that the Officers were aware of the policy. Without such an affirmative showing, the complaints filed by the Officers stated a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

Section 21-5-1(c) includes accumulated sick leave in wages only when the terms of employment make it payable.

Wolfe v. Adkins · filed 2011-09-29(c)

Whether unpaid, accumulated sick leave is payable to an employee upon termination is determined by the terms of employment and not by the provisions of W.Va.Code, 21-5-1 [1987].

Section 21-5-1 includes accrued fringe benefits in wages; the employment agreement determines whether a termination payment has accrued.

Clay v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co. · filed 2013-07-03(c)

The term fringe benefit is defined as “any benefit provided an employee or group of employees by an employer, or which is required by law.” W. Va.Code § 21-5-1 (i). ... Whether or not the plaintiff was fired “for cause” is disputed, and the plaintiff has sufficiently plead that he was not fired for cause, but instead for discriminatory reasons. If it is determined that he was not fired “for cause” at a later stage in this litigation, the plaintiff may at that time be entitled to the termination payment. Therefore, this Court cannot dismiss Count VIII based on the defendants’ argument that the fringe benefit did not accrue to the plaintiff.

A severance benefit counts as wages when it has accrued under the terms of employment, can be calculated, and is payable directly to the employee.

Amie Miller v. St. Joseph Recovery Center, LLC, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, St. Joseph's Operating Company, LL · filed 2022-04-26(c)

Under the Employment Agreement, at the time of Ms. Miller’s separation from employment, the severance package was accrued, capable of calculation, and payable directly to her. The severance package was an inducement to procure an employee’s services and represented a form of deferred compensation for work performed during the employment. Therefore, Ms. Miller’s severance package is a fringe benefit that constitutes unpaid wages under the WPCA, and SJRC was required to pay those wages in accordance with the timeline provided by the Act.

Section 21-5-1(c) excludes conditional terminal appointments for possible future services from fringe benefits under the Wage Payment and Collection Act.

Wheeling Jesuit University, Inc. v. Kathryn A. Voorhees, Jason Fuller, Jessica Wrobleski, Peter Ehni, Andrew Staron, Amy · filed 2024-10-15(c)

Here, terminal appointments do not constitute a fringe benefit under West Virginia Code § 21-5-1(c) because terminal appointments contemplate possible future wages for possible future services rendered by the employee.

Vested performance units that are accrued, capable of calculation, and payable directly to an employee are wages under § 21-5-1(c).

Citynet, LLC v. Toney · filed 2015-02-06(c)

Accordingly, Mr. Toney’s vested performance units are “wages” pursuant to W. Va. Code § 21-5-1(c).

Section 21-5-1’s definition of fringe benefits for the Wage Payment and Collection Act does not establish that an attendance incentive policy is a benefit under the education statutes.

Hartman v. BOARD OF EDUC. CTY. OF MINERAL · filed 1995-07-17

The general definition of “fringe benefits” for the purpose of the Wage Payment and Collection Act of Chapter 21 does not supply sufficient support for the proposition the legislature intended to designate the AIP authorized in Chapter 18A as a benefit.

Section 21-5-1(m) defines “employer” to include governmental employers, including municipalities.

Ingram v. City of Princeton · filed 2000-07-12(m)

Accordingly, we do not hesitate to find that the Legislature did not intend to bind private employers to certain wage payment and collection guidelines designed to protect workers, yet exclude State and political subdivision workers from such protections. Rather, we conclude that the Legislature intended its statutory wage payment and collection guidelines to apply to both governmental and nongovernmental employers alike.

A corporation is doing business in West Virginia when its employees actively engage in its principal activity there.

Gregory v. Forest River, Inc. · filed 2010-03-10(n)

As noted, the WPCA applies to corporations that are “doing business” in West Virginia, which means “having employees actively engaged in the intended principal activity of the ... corporation in West Virginia.” W.Va.Code § 21-5-l(n). Unquestionably, Gregory was actively engaged in FRI’s intended principal activity (ie., sales) in West Virginia. Between 2004 and 2007, he worked from his West Virginia home as an FRI salesman, servicing West Virginia as well as other locations. Therefore, FRI falls within the plain terms of the WPCA.

Section 21-5-1(o) defines an assignment of wages as a transfer of the right to collect future wages from the employee to the employer.

Fairmont Tool, Inc. v. Adam J. Davis, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated · filed 2021-11-22(o)

Hence, we hold that under the WPCA, West Virginia Code §§ 21-5-1(o) and 21-5-3, an “assignment of wages” is the transfer of the right to collect future wages from the wage earner to the employer.