W. Va. Code § 33-6-31

Section 33-6-31 requires uninsured motorist coverage for injuries causally connected to the use of an insured vehicle and foreseeably identifiable with its normal use.

Keefer v. Ferrell · filed 2007-12-19(c), (e)

With respect to the “use” of a motor vehicle, we previously have held that W. Va,Code, 33-6 — 31(e) [1995] requires insurance companies to provide uninsured motorist coverage, and make available underinsured motorist coverage, for any person, except a bailee for hire, who uses the insured vehicle with the express or implied consent of the named insured. The term “uses” in W. Va.Code, 33-6-31(c) [1995] is less restrictive than the term “occupying.” “Use” of an insured vehicle implies employing the vehicle for some purpose or object of the user. ... Applying these holdings to the facts of the case sub judice, we conclude that the circuit court correctly determined that Mr. Keefer was “using” the insured truck at the time of his accident with Ms. Ferrell. Pursuant to Syllabus point 4 of Adkins, Mr. Keefer’s injuries were both “causally connected to the use of the” covered truck and were “foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the” covered truck. ... Therefore, the circuit court did not err by concluding that Mr. Keefer was “using” the covered truck at the time of the accident.

Section 33-6-31(c) creates two classes of insureds and bars a permissive user from stacking coverage from another vehicle.

Starr v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1992-11-13(c)

Consequently, we hold that under W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(c), one who is entitled to uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits solely by virtue of his or her occupancy or use of the policyholder’s vehicle may not stack the policyholder’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage on another vehicle not involved in the accident.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires insurers to make an effective offer of underinsured motorist coverage, which becomes part of the policy by operation of law absent proof of an effective offer and knowing rejection; rejection need not be in writing.

Bias v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1988-02-24(b)

While we agree with that defendant that Code § 33-6-31(b) does not require that underinsurance coverage be waived in writing, the insurer has presented no proof on the record before us that it made an effective offer of underinsured motorist coverage to Plaintiff Bias, and such coverage is, therefore, included in her policy by operation of law.

Section 33-6-31 limits its uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage policy to automobile insurance issued or delivered in West Virginia to the vehicle owner, or issued or delivered by an insurer licensed there for a vehicle titled in West Virginia.

Nadler v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1990-11-21(a), (b)

It is thus clear that the public policy articulated by the West Virginia Legislature in W.Va.Code § 33-6-31 is limited by its plain language to situations where an automobile insurance policy was issued or delivered in West Virginia to the owner of the vehicle or was issued or delivered by an insurer licensed in West Virginia upon a motor vehicle for which a certificate of title has been issued by the West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.

Section 33-6-31(b) bars deducting a tortfeasor’s liability insurance payment from underinsured motorist coverage limits, and its 1988 clarification of that rule applies retroactively.

Brown v. Crum · filed 1990-12-17(b)

In the present case, we reemphasize that W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(b) precludes offsets of amounts paid by a tortfeasor’s insurer against the underinsured motorist policy limits of an insurance carrier. This preclusion of offsets was the public policy of this state prior to the 1988 amendments which explicitly added such language to W.Va. Code § 33 — 6—31(b). Consequently, the 1988 amendments are to be applied retroactively to govern the resolution of the present controversy.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires an insurer to offer optional underinsured motorist coverage; uncontradicted evidence of an offer and rejection can establish that the coverage was not included even when the written rejection was signed after an accident.

Miller v. Hatton · filed 1991-04-02(b)

West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b) (1982) requires insurance companies to provide an insured with the opportunity to procure optional underinsured motorist coverage up to an amount not less than the limits of bodily injury liability insurance purchased by the insured. ... The appellants’ failure in the present case to introduce specific evidence in opposition to Travelers’ motion for summary judgment undermines their claim that summary judgment was improperly granted. ... Because we conclude that the lower court correctly determined that no underinsured coverage existed in the policy issued by Travelers and that summary judgment was the appropriate disposition of this case, we need not address the appellants’ second assignment of error regarding the appropriate manner of calculation of any amounts of underinsurance coverage to be paid by Travelers.

Section 33-6-31(b) does not require increased underinsured motorist coverage merely because a single policy covers multiple vehicles.

Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance · filed 1992-06-29(b)

The statute does not mandate that the amount of coverage be increased if the policy covers multiple vehicles.

Section 33-6-31 permits an anti-stacking provision to limit underinsured motorist coverage under a single policy covering multiple vehicles when the insured receives a multi-car discount.

Arbogast v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1993-02-11(b)

Similarly, a multi-car discount was received by the Arbogasts. Thus, under the theory set forth in Russell, the Arbogasts cannot stack the underinsured policies on their three vehicles.

Section 33-6-31(b) permits an insurer to bar stacking underinsured motorist coverage for vehicles covered by one policy, even when a computer limit puts one vehicle on a separate declaration sheet with a different policy number.

Allstate Insurance v. Ashley · filed 1993-10-08(b)

Applying the Russell decision, an insurance company may preclude stacking un-derinsured coverage when only one policy is involved. Underinsured coverage under the four car policy is therefore limited to $100,-000.

Section 33-6-31 permits an insurer to bar stacking of underinsured motorist coverage for multiple vehicles under one policy when the policy clearly limits recovery and the insured receives a multi-car discount.

Linkinoggor v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1997-06-19(b)

West Virginia Code sec. 33-6-31 [1996] does not forbid the inclusion and application of an anti-stacking provision in an automobile insurance policy where a single insurance policy is issued by a single insur*269er and contains an underinsured endorsement even though the policy covers two or more vehicles. ... The latter quoted language from the policy clearly and unambiguously states that insuring more than one vehicle under a policy does not increase the $100,000 limit. ... We conclude that the circuit court correctly determined that plaintiff received a multi-car discount in this case.

Section 33-6-31(h) does not bar an employee who receives workers’ compensation for injuries caused by a third-party driver from seeking underinsured motorist benefits under the employer’s policy when recovery against that driver activates the coverage.

Henry v. Benyo · filed 1998-07-13(h)

Where, however, an employee’s work-related injuries are caused by a third-party, as in the accident between Henry and Benyo at issue in this appeal, subsection (h) does not apply because the employer is not “liable” for the accident.

Section 33-6-31(b) permits an insurer to exclude punitive damages from underinsured motorist coverage without obtaining the insured’s waiver, but a policy that does not expressly exclude them covers them.

State Ex Rel. State Auto Insurance v. Risovich · filed 1998-12-11(b)

Having determined that the exclusion of punitive damages is not prohibited by either public policy or by the spirit and intent of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31, we hold that under W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b) (1998) (Supp.1998), an insurer is not required to obtain a waiver from its insured in order to exclude punitive damages from a policy for underinsured motorist coverage. However, if the insurer fails to expressly exclude punitive damages from its underinsured motorist policy, the policy will be deemed to cover such damages.

Section 33-6-31(b) permits an insurer that gives a multi-car discount for underinsured motorist coverage to enforce an anti-stacking exclusion across separate policies covering the insured’s vehicles.

Dairyland Insurance v. Fox · filed 2001-07-10(b)

State Farm argues that even though its un-derinsured motorist coverage was provided to the appellees in two “separate single vehicle insurance policies,” it provided the appel-lees with a “discount for multiple motor vehicles,” and therefore argues it is entitled, under W.Va.Code, 33 — 6—31(b), to be treated no differently than an insurance company utilizing a single insurance policy to cover multiple vehicles. We agree. Accordingly, we hold that the anti-stacking exclusion contained in the State Farm policies is enforceable in the underinsured motorist insurance policies purchased by the appellees.

Section 33-6-31(b) allows an insurer to bar stacking underinsured motorist coverage across separate vehicle policies when it provides a multiple vehicle discount; the discount need not be individually negotiated.

Ingles v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2003-06-04(b)

Plaintiff also asserts the Court should ignore the fact her parents’ policies also reflected multiple vehicle discounts, thus precluding stacking. ... The argument, however, misconceives the nature of insurance rate setting.

An offer of underinsured motorist coverage under subsection (b) is commercially reasonable if its overall content gives the insured enough information to make an informed choice, even if it omits technical details such as the agent’s name or policy number.

Webb v. Shaffer · filed 2010-03-09(b)

In West Virginia, an offer of underinsured motorist coverage made pursuant to § 33-6-31 must be “commercially reasonable.” ... Therefore, it is the overall content and quality of an offer for underinsured motorist coverage that matters, not its technical details.

Subsection (b) bars a provision that caps recovery from separate underinsured motorist policies issued by different insurers at the highest single policy limit when the insured paid separate premiums.

Cunningham v. Hill · filed 2010-06-18(b)

In examining the plain and clear language of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b) as it applies to the policy terms and conditions now before us, we find that policy language which provides that the limit of underinsured motorist coverage available from all policies shall not exceed the liability limits of the policy with the highest limit of underinsured motorist coverage conflicts with the spirit and intent of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b).

Section 33-6-31(d) gives an underinsured motorist insurer that receives notice of the suit the right to file pleadings and take other actions allowed by law in the underinsured driver’s name.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Rutherford · filed 2011-11-17(d)

Pursuant to W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(d), set forth above, State Farm had the right upon receiving such notice to file pleadings and to take other actions allowable by law in the name of the underinsured driver, Ms. McClanahan. This means that State Farm had many of the same rights of a party to the case.

Section 33-6-31(b)’s full-compensation requirement concerns the availability of underinsured motorist coverage, not the insured’s contingent attorney fees.

Frisenda v. Floyd · filed 2018-04-05(b)

Frisenda speculates that she would not be fully compensated under W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(b) if the jury determines that her damages amount to at least $75,000 because she would then owe her attorney one-third of the $25,000 already received under MPC (Dkt. No. 33 at 16-17). This argument is misguided. The requirement that an injured person be fully compensated for her damages relates to the availability of coverage, not the insured’s contingent fee arrangement with counsel.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires an insurer to offer optional underinsured motorist coverage on commercially reasonable terms that permit an informed choice; use of a different form does not alone defeat that offer.

Lydick v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. · filed 2019-01-14(b)

Under *559West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b), every automobile insurance agency must provide optional underinsured motor vehicle coverage to its insured under each policy. W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(b). An insurer is required to make a "commercially reasonable" offer of optional underinsured motorists coverage so that the insured can make a "knowing and informed" decision concerning its selection or rejection of that coverage. ... Therefore, Erie can show that its offer was commercially reasonable even in light of its differing form.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires an insurer to offer underinsured motorist coverage for every motor vehicle insured for liability under a policy, including covered non-owned vehicles used for business.

Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. Cooper · filed 2021-01-28(b)

Excluding certain vehicles from the offer for UIM coverage is contrary to the spirit and intent of the uninsured and underinsured motorists statutes.

Section 33-6-31(c) does not allow an injured insured to collect uninsured motorist benefits when the tortfeasor carried the required minimum liability insurance and that insurer paid its policy limits to the injured insured.

Tennant v. Smallwood · filed 2002-08-02(c)

Therefore, we hold that an injured insured cannot collect UM benefits under his/her own policy of motor vehicle insurance where the tortfeasor driver carried motor vehicle insurance which satisfies the financial responsibility limits enumerated in W. Va.Code § 17D-4-2 (1979) (Repl.Vol. 2000), and the tortfeasor's insurer has paid such policy limits to the injured insured.

Section 33-6-31(b) permits an underinsured motorist policy to deduct medical payments benefits from the insured’s damages to prevent duplicate recovery, so long as the deduction does not reduce available underinsured motorist coverage.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Schatken · filed 2012-11-16(b)

Therefore, we hold that a “non-duplication” of benefits provision in an underinsured motorist policy which permits an insurer to reduce an insured’s damages by amounts received under medical payments coverage does not violate the “no sums payable” language of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b), insofar as it does not serve to reduce the underinsured motorist coverage available under the insured’s policy.

Section 33-6-31 does not require an insurer issuing a commercial automobile policy covering specified owned vehicles and a class of non-owned vehicles for liability to offer underinsured motorist coverage for the non-owned vehicles.

Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. Cooper · filed 2025-04-29(b)

Where a commercial automobile insurance policy insures certain owned vehicles and a class of non-owned vehicles for liability protection, West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 does not require the insurer to offer to the named insured underinsured motorist coverage for the class of non-owned vehicles.

Section 33-6-31 imposes a statutory duty on insurers to offer underinsured motorist coverage independent of the insurance contract.

Ware v. Doe · filed 2025-09-05

State Farm’s duty to offer UIM coverage is governed by statute, not contract. See W. Va. Code § 33-6-31.

Section 33-6-31(b) activates underinsured motorist coverage when the tortfeasor’s available liability insurance is less than the injured person’s damages, regardless of whether it is less than the underinsured motorist coverage limits.

Pristavec v. Westfield Insurance · filed 1990-12-14(b)

In accordance with these rules of statutory construction, and in light of the preeminent public policy of the underinsured motorist statute, which is to provide full compensation, not exceeding coverage limits, to an injured person for his or her damages not compensated by a negligent tortfeasor, this Court holds that underinsured motorist coverage is activated under W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, when the amount of such tortfeasor’s motor vehicle liability insurance actually available to the injured person in question is less than the total amount of damages sustained by the injured person, regardless of the comparison between such liability insurance limits actually available and the underin-sured motorist coverage limits.

Section 33-6-31(b) provides uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for damages not compensated by a negligent tortfeasor, subject to coverage limits.

Nadler v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1992-11-13(b)

Our substantive law governing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages in motor vehicle insurance policies is intended to apply only to insurance transactions which occur in West Virginia or which affect the rights and responsibilities of West Virginia citizens.

Section 33-6-31(b) bars offsets against uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for payments received from other insurance when the verdict exceeds those payments and the available coverage.

Morrison v. Haynes · filed 1994-11-23(b)

Thus, we conclude under W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(b), an offset is not available to an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier where the plaintiffs jury verdict exceeds both the amount he has received from other insurance arising from the tortfeasor’s negligence and the amount available under the plaintiffs own uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires liability insurers to offer underinsured motorist coverage and treats that coverage as first-party insurance.

Miller v. Fluharty · filed 1997-12-19(b)

An underinsured motorist insurance policy, such as the one purchased by the plaintiff in this case, is “first party” insurance which is required to be offered to liability insurance policyholders by law. See W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b) [1995], “First party insurance means that the insurance carrier has directly contracted with the insured to provide coverage and to reimburse the insured for his or her damages up to the policy limits.”

Section 33-6-31 does not require an insurer to offer underinsured motorist coverage for non-owned vehicles merely because its policy provides liability coverage for them.

Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. Cooper · filed 2025-06-24(b)

We now apply the West Virginia court’s conclusion that West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 did not require Erie, which issued a policy with liability protection for both owned and non-owned vehicles, to offer UIM coverage for the non-owned vehicles.

Section 33-6-31(e)(iii)'s physical contact requirement does not govern a policy issued in Pennsylvania when Pennsylvania law controls.

Lee v. Saliga · filed 1988-09-16(e)(iii)

These questions require us to decide whether the requirement of physical contact contained in our uninsured motorist statute, W.Va.Code, 33 — 6—31(e)(iii), applies to an uninsured motorist insurance policy issued in Pennsylvania. ... We come to the contrary conclusion under our conflict of laws rule, and hold that the question is controlled by the law of Pennsylvania, the state in which the policy was issued and the insured risk was located.

Section 33-6-31(g) prevents an uninsured motorist endorsement from requiring physical contact when the insured establishes the unknown motorist’s legal liability under the applicable law.

Perkins v. Doe · filed 1987-01-12(g)

State Farm asks us to apply the physical contact requirement of. the endorsement, notwithstanding the language of section 33-6-31(g) of the West Virginia Code (Supp.1986) which says, in part, that no endorsement may require anything of the insured “except the establishment of legal liability.” A judgment against the uninsured motorist would be sufficient to satisfy this statutory requirement.

Section 33-6-31(e) makes physical contact with an unknown motorist’s vehicle a condition of uninsured motorist coverage, rather than an element of the motorist’s tort liability; that condition does not govern a policy issued and delivered in Virginia.

Buchanan v. Doe · filed 1993-06-11(e)

Therefore, we think that the proof-of-contact requirement is a contractual provision imposed by statute and adopted as a method of protecting UM insurers against their insureds’ fraudulent UM claims. ... Hence, the West Virginia proof-of-contact requirement is inapplicable in this action.

Section 33-6-31(e)(iii) permits uninsured motorist coverage without actual contact when independent third-party evidence establishes that immediate evasive action prevented otherwise certain contact with an unidentified vehicle.

Hamric v. Doe · filed 1997-12-05(e)(iii)

We therefore hold that a close and substantial physical nexus exists between an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle and the insured for uninsured motorist insurance coverage under W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(e)(iii) (1995) when an insured can establish by independent third-party evidence to the satisfaction of the trial judge and the jury, that but for the immediate evasive action of the insured, direct physical contact would have occurred between the unknown vehicle and the victim.

Section 33-6-31(e)(iii) permits uninsured motorist coverage when a third party evades an unidentified vehicle and then collides with the insured, if independent third-party evidence establishes the required physical nexus; a driver involved in the collision does not qualify as a disinterested corroborating witness.

Dunn v. Doe · filed 1999-12-13(e)(iii)

Accordingly, we extend our holding in syllabus point three of Hamric v. Doe, 201 W.Va. 615, 499 S.E.2d 619 (1997), to rule that a close and substantial physical nexus between an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle and the insured vehicle sufficient to fulfill the physical contact requirement of West Virginia Code § 33 — 6—31(e)(iii) (Supp. 1999) exists when an insured can establish by independent third-party evidence that, as a result of the immediate evasive action of a third-party taken to avoid direct physical contact with an unknown vehicle, contact between the third-party’s vehicle and the insured’s vehicle resulted.

Section 33-6-31(e)(iii) permits uninsured motorist recovery without physical contact when disinterested third-party evidence corroborates the accident, but that rule applies only prospectively.

Dalton v. Doe · filed 2001-01-12(e)(iii)

Although the Hamric decision resulted in some variation of the common law as interpreted in this State, and that factor might, under the holding of Bradley v. Appalachian Power Company, supra , suggest that the Hamric decision should be given retroactive effect, this Court believes that the overwhelming presence of the other factors examined in Bradley dictates that the Hamric decision should be given only prospective effect.

Section 33-6-31(e)(iii) requires a close and substantial physical nexus between an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle and the insured vehicle; striking an immobile tire of unknown origin on the highway does not satisfy its physical contact requirement.

STATE FARM AUTO. INS. CO. v. Norman · filed 1994-07-11(e)(iii)

To summarize, we conclude that absent specific coverage provisions to the contrary, uninsured motorist coverage is not available where an insured vehicle strikes a tire or other type of immobile object or debris which may be lying on a highway. In order to satisfy the "physical contact" requirement set forth in W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(e)(iii), it is necessary to establish a close and substantial physical nexus between an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle and the insured vehicle. The "physical contact" requirement is not satisfied simply by asking a court to assume that, but for the negligence of an unknown and unseen driver, the tire or other object would never have been deposited on the highway.

The exception to § 33-6-31(e)(iii)'s physical contact requirement recognized in Hamric applies prospectively and cannot support an uninsured motorist claim arising before that decision.

Walker v. Doe · filed 2002-01-11(e)(iii)

Because Dalton was the law at the time the lower court issued its summary judgment ruling, there is no question that Hamric cannot be extended retroactively to permit Appellant to proceed under the principles announced in Hamric.

Section 33-6-31(d) does not give an underinsured motorist carrier an absolute right to participate separately in the defense when the tortfeasor’s liability insurer is defending.

State ex rel. State Auto Mutual Insurance v. Steptoe · filed 1993-11-23(d)

W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(d) (1988), does not give an underinsured motorist carrier the absolute right to file pleadings on behalf of a tortfeasor who has liability coverage and is being defended by a liability insurance carrier. ... Under the foregoing law, we hold that the circuit court was correct in its ruling.

Section 33-6-31 makes an insured who substantially prevails in a suit involving uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage eligible to recover the amount due up to policy limits, reasonable attorney fees, and proven aggravation and inconvenience damages.

Jones v. Sanger · filed 2005-07-26(b), (d)

When a policyholder of uninsured or un-derinsured motorist coverage issued pursuant to W. Va.Code, 33-6-31 (b) substantially prevails in a suit involving such coverage under W. Va.Code, 33-6-31(d), the insurer issuing such policy is liable for the amount recovered up to the policy limits, the policyholder’s reasonable attorney fees, and damages proven for aggravation and inconvenience. Syl. Pt. 6, Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94, 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994). ... We cannot conclude that the circuit court acted improperly or abused its discretion in concluding that Jones did not substantially prevail. ... Because Jones did not substantially prevail in the settlement of his claim, he is not entitled to his attorney fees.

Section 33-6-31 requires insurers to pay covered damages up to policy limits and permits liability for an excess verdict after a bad-faith failure to settle.

Marshall v. Saseen · filed 1994-11-02(b), (d)

Thus, we conclude that under W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b), an insurance carrier is statutorily required to pay to its insured, who has purchased uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, all sums which the insured is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured or under-insured motor vehicle.

Section 33-6-31(d) does not give an underinsured motorist carrier an absolute right to file pleadings for a tortfeasor defended by a liability carrier, and its right to answer in its own name primarily permits policy defenses.

STATE EX REL. STATE AUTO MUT. v. Steptoe · filed 1993-11-23(d)

13. W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(d) (1988), does not give an underinsured motorist carrier the absolute right to file pleadings on behalf of a tortfeasor who has liability coverage and is being defended by a liability insurance carrier. "14. The language of W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(d) (1988), that allows an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier to answer a complaint in its own name is primarily designed to enable the carrier to raise policy defenses it may have against the plaintiff under its uninsured or underinsured policy." Under the foregoing law, we hold that the circuit court was correct in its ruling. Consequently, we refuse to issue a writ of prohibition.

Section 33-6-31(d) does not allow an underinsured motorist carrier to control or separately conduct the tortfeasor's defense.

State Ex Rel. Allstate Insurance v. Karl · filed 1993-10-29(d)

Nor do we find that the procedural language in W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(d), allowing an uninsured/underinsured carrier to file pleadings in its own name or on behalf of the tortfeasor, see Postlethwait v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., supra, enables the carrier to control the defense on behalf of the tortfeasor or to conduct a separate defense.

Section 33-6-31 does not authorize a direct action against an uninsured motorist insurer until the insured obtains a judgment against the uninsured motorist.

Davis v. Robertson · filed 1985-04-22

We find this analysis equally applicable to the language of our own uninsured motorist statute and, therefore, conclude that W.Va.Code, 33-6-31, does not authorize a direct action against the insurance company providing uninsured motorist coverage until a judgment has been obtained against the uninsured motorist.

Section 33-6-31(d) permits an insured to pursue uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits directly against the carrier after settling with the tortfeasor for liability limits with the insurer’s consent and waiver of subrogation rights, and the action sounds in contract subject to the contract statute of limitations.

Plumley v. May · filed 1993-07-22(d)

Consequently, we hold that when a direct action against an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier is pursued, that action sounds in contract and is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to contract actions. Where a plaintiff pursues an action to recover uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits, that action may be directed against the uninsured or underinsured carrier and does not require an action against the tortfeasor with whom the plaintiff has already settled for liability limits with the insurer’s consent and waiver of subrogation rights.

Section 33-6-31(d) permits an insured to sue an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier after settling with the tortfeasor’s liability insurer for policy limits and obtaining a waiver of subrogation.

Jones v. Sanger · filed 1998-12-15(d)

A plaintiff is not precluded under W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(d) (1988), from suing an uninsured/underinsured insurance carrier if the plaintiff has settled with the tortfea-sor’s liability carrier for the full amount of the policy and obtained from the uninsured/underinsured carrier a waiver of its right of subrogation against the tortfeasor.

Section 33-6-31(b) does not require an insured to obtain a judgment against an uninsured motorist before the insurer owes a contractual duty of fair dealing and good faith in settlement negotiations.

Rodney Weese Maude Weese v. Nationwide Insurance Company, an Ohio Corporation · filed 1989-06-27(b)

When the legislature required, in W.Va.Code § 33-6-31, that the insured show the sum which he is “legally entitled to recover” as damages from an uninsured motorist, it did not provide that the insured first had to win judgment against the uninsured motorist to invoke his contractual right to obtain from the insurer conduct characterized by fair dealing and good faith.

Section 33-6-31(c)(ii) does not provide uninsured motorist coverage when a claim against the tortfeasor’s insurer is barred because the plaintiff let the limitations period expire.

Harman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1993-07-16(c)(ii)

Consequently, we hold that a plaintiffs uninsured motorist coverage is not available as an alternative to the tortfeasor’s liability coverage when the plaintiff did not file a claim against the tortfeasor’s insurance company until after the statute of limitations had lapsed on the tortfeasor’s liability policy.

Section 33-6-31(d) requires an insured seeking to preserve an uninsured motorist claim to serve the insurer as though it were a named defendant.

Continental Casualty Co. v. Fuscardo · filed 1994-09-23(d)

To preserve the uninsured motorist claim, Continental Casualty had to be served as though it were a named party defendant.

Section 33-6-31(d) permits judgment against an underinsurance carrier without a judgment order against the underinsured motorist when the carrier was properly served, raised no coverage defense, and the motorist’s liability was established.

STATE EX REL. MOTORISTS v. Broadwater · filed 1994-12-08(d)

Based on the statutory principles recognized in Saseen which obligate an underinsured carrier "to pay the insured all sums which he shall legally be entitled to recover," we conclude that, provided the underinsurance carrier has been properly served pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(d) (1992) and no defenses to coverage were raised by the carrier, the absence of a judgment order entered directly against the underinsured motorist does not prevent entry of an order against the underinsurance carrier if liability of the underinsured motorist has been established.

Section 33-6-31(d) allows an underinsured motorist carrier to appear and defend in the tortfeasor’s name; when the tortfeasor is within the court’s jurisdiction and liability and damages remain undetermined, the tortfeasor may be joined in the insured’s coverage action.

Smith v. Westfield Insurance · filed 1996-06-26(d)

In the present case, there has been no determination of liability or the extent of damages which the Plaintiff is entitled to recover as a result of the accident. Unlike the situation in Postlethwait, the tortfeasor here, a West Virginia resident, is not beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. At this stage of the litigation, the appropriate manner to pursue recovery of the underinsured motorist coverage is to join the tortfeasor as a defendant. Such joinder would avoid undue prejudice to Westfield by allowing Westfield to appear and defend in the name of the tortfeasor pursuant to W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(d).

Section 33-6-31(d) permits an uninsured motorist carrier to appear and defend in its own name even when it asserts no policy defense concerning coverage.

STATE EX REL. STATE FARM v. Canady · filed 1996-07-12(d)

Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(d), an uninsured motorist carrier is entitled to appear and defend in its own name rather than that of the uninsured tortfeasor even when policy defenses raising issues of coverage are not asserted by the carrier.

Section 33-6-31 generally requires an insured to obtain a judgment against the uninsured tortfeasor before suing the insurer directly for uninsured motorist coverage, subject to a judicial economy exception.

Kiger v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. · filed 1997-03-31

Section 33-6-31 contemplates a direct action against the tortfeasor only, unless a judicial economy exception applies. No such exception applies to this case. We therefore agree with the district court that Kiger may not maintain a direct action against Cincinnati.

Subsection (d) lets an underinsured motorist carrier file pleadings in its own name even when it was not named as a party.

Cales v. Wills · filed 2002-07-11(d)

National contends that it did not file an answer to the complaint because it was not named as a party. This argument by National has no merit. Under W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(d) (1998) (Repl.Vol.2000), an underinsured insurance carrier has "the right to file pleadings and to take other action allowable by law in the name of the owner, or operator, or both, of the ... underinsured motor vehicle or in its own name."

Section 33-6-31(d) permits an insured to sue an underinsured motorist carrier without first obtaining a judgment against the motorist when the insured settles for the motorist’s full policy limits and the carrier waives subrogation rights.

Halstead v. Kalwei · filed 2005-06-01(d)

The two salient prerequisite facts necessary for an insured to proceed under the exception established in Postlethwait are a settlement with the underinsured motorist for the full limits of his policy’s coverage and a waiver of the rights to subrogation of the insured’s motorist carrier.

Subsection (d) lets an insurer defend an underinsured motorist claim in the alleged tortfeasor's name while permitting separate voir dire questions about the insurer affiliated with captive defense counsel.

STATE EX REL. NATIONWIDE MUT. INS. v. Karl · filed 2008-06-27(d)

Treating captive counsel's representation of insureds and defense of uninsured and underinsured motorist claims the same preserves the insurer's right under W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(d) to defend in the name of the alleged tortfeasor.

Subsection (d), which lets an underinsured motorist insurer defend in the tortfeasor’s name, does not require the court to bifurcate and stay discovery on the insured’s bad-faith claim.

Blankenship v. Jordan · filed 2019-09-03(d)

Therefore, while the Court leaves open the possibility that certain portions of otherwise discoverable information may be restricted while Plaintiff’s tort claims await resolution, it remains unconvinced that Section 33-6-1(d) should have any effect on a court’s decision to bifurcate and stay discovery.

Section 33-6-31(d) allows a UIM carrier to intervene to protect its subrogation rights, but permits it to assume primary control of the defense only when the alleged tortfeasor’s liability insurer defends in bad faith.

Kentucky National Insurance v. Lester · filed 1999-03-19(d)

However, the West Virginia courts have construed that provision to allow the UIM carrier to assume primary control of the defense only if the liability insurance carrier of the alleged tort-feasor is "defending the claim in a bad faith manner.”

Section 33-6-31(f) gives an insurer that pays an uninsured or underinsured motorist claim a subrogation right against the person who caused the injury, to the extent of the payment.

Barth v. Keffer · filed 1995-10-26(f)

Although this statutory right of subrogation does not arise until payment is made, it is apparent that when an injured party settles with a tortfeasor and gives a complete release, the injured party thereby abolishes the uninsured or underinsured carrier’s statutory subrogation rights. Consequently, the injured party should not be able to recover against the uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier.

Section 33-6-31(d) permits an insured to sue an uninsured or underinsured carrier after settling with the tortfeasor’s liability carrier for its policy limits and obtaining a waiver of subrogation.

Postlethwait v. Boston Old Colony Insurance · filed 1993-06-28(d)

The rule we fashion today is a narrow one. It is that a plaintiff is not precluded under W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(d), from suing an uninsured/underinsured insurance carrier if the plaintiff has settled with the tortfeasor’s liability carrier for the full amount of the policy and obtained from the uninsured/un-derinsured carrier a waiver of its right of subrogation against the tortfeasor.

An insurer that wrongfully leads an insured to believe no coverage exists may be estopped from using the insured’s failure to give the statutory notice as a bar to uninsured motorist coverage.

Ara v. Erie Insurance · filed 1989-11-29(d)

When an insured is wrongfully lulled into a belief that no coverage exists, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will preclude the insurer from raising the insured’s failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements as a bar to enforcement of the uninsured motorist statute.

Section 33-6-31(f) permits enforcement of a written-consent-to-settle condition in underinsured motorist coverage to protect the insurer’s statutory subrogation right when a claim involves or may involve that coverage.

Arndt v. Burdette · filed 1993-07-22(f)

Consequently, we hold that a consent-to-settle provision of an automobile insurance policy pertaining to underinsured motorists coverage whereby an insured voids his underinsurance coverage by settling a claim with a tortfeasor without first obtaining the insurer’s written consent ... when such claim involves either the insured’s underinsurance coverage or potentially involves that coverage is a valid and enforceable means by which an insurer may protect its statutorily-mandated right to subrogate claims pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(f).

Section 33-6-31(f) permits an underinsured motorist insurer to protect its subrogation right through a consent-to-settle clause, but when the insured settles for the tortfeasor’s full liability policy limits, the insurer must show prejudice from the lack of consent before denying benefits.

Kronjaeger v. Buckeye Union Insurance · filed 1997-07-11(f)

In summary, we hold that where an insured has failed to obtain his/her insurer’s consent before settling with a tortfeasor but in settling has procured the full policy limits available under the tortfeasor’s insurance policy, the insurer must show that it was prejudiced by its insured’s failure to obtain its consent to settle in order to justify a refusal to pay underinsured motorist benefits.

Section 33-6-31(f) gives an insurer subrogation only for a payment required by subsection (b); payment for a release before liability is determined does not qualify when the judgment falls within the tortfeasor’s liability limits.

McDaniel v. Kleiss · filed 1998-06-12(f)

Because the money paid as consideration for McDaniel’s release was made prior to a determination of Kleiss’s liability to McDaniel for the accident, and because the judgment was within the limits of Kleiss’s liability insurance (and therefore McDaniel’s underinsured motorist coverage would not have been triggered), the $100,-000.00 payment by Aetna was not “required by subsection (b).” Therefore, W.Va.Code § 33 — 6—31(f) does not apply to the circumstances presented by this ease.

Section 33-6-31(f) gives an insurer that pays underinsured motorist benefits subrogation rights against the underinsured motorist and other nonmotorist tortfeasors who caused the injury, death, or damage, up to the amount paid.

Mordesovitch v. Westfield Insurance · filed 2003-04-23(f)

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes a right of subrogation exists under subsection 33-6-31 (f) against both the un-derinsured motorist and any other nonmo-torist tortfeasor “causing such injury, death or damage to the extent payment was made.”

Section 33-6-31(b) permits an insured to recover underinsured motorist benefits after settling below the tortfeasor’s liability limits if the insured’s damages exceed the full available liability limits, which are credited as constructively exhausted.

Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Adkins · filed 2004-06-30(b)

Moreover, constructive exhaustion actually facilitates an insured’s recovery of UIM benefits because whether or not the insured actually receives full policy limits from the tortfeasor, he/she may nevertheless recover UIM benefits when he/she has incurred damages that exceed the total of all applicable liability coverages.

Subsection (a) requires automobile liability policies to cover drivers using the vehicle with the named insured’s consent; absent an exclusion, a named insured injured by such a driver may recover a judgment against the driver from the insurer.

Broy v. Inland Mutual Insurance · filed 1977-03-15(a)

We, therefore, conclude that where an additional insured causes injury to a named insured under an automobile liability policy, the named insured may, in the absence of any exclusionary language to the contrary, maintain a direct action against the insurance company to recover the amount of the judgment rendered against the additional insured. Here, with no evidence of any exclusionary language and armed with the statutory requirement of the omnibus clause, W. Va. Code, 33-6-31(a), plaintiff should not have been directed out of court on this point.

Section 33-6-31(a) requires liability coverage for a driver who initially received permission to use an insured vehicle, even if the driver later exceeds restrictions on that use or intends to steal the vehicle.

Universal Underwriters Insurance v. Taylor · filed 1991-07-26(a)

If the legislature of this state wishes to amend the omnibus language found in W.Va.Code §§ 33-6-31(a) and 17D-4-12(b)(2) to except coverage under these facts, it of course may do so. However, as the language in both omnibus clauses clearly conditions coverage on use of the insured vehicle, we find it necessary to require coverage based on the initial permission granted by Harry Green to Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor’s subsequent acts, which evidence an intent to steal the vehicle, have no bearing, in this Court’s opinion, on the issue of coverage in an “initial permission” jurisdiction.

The omnibus clause requires coverage for permissive customer drivers up to the statutory minimum regardless of their own insurance.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. · filed 1991-09-17(a)

Therefore, after the car had been present for over thirty days in the state, McCombs had to provide minimum coverage of its customers without regard to the potential for coverage under the customer's policy.

Section 33-6-31(a) permits denial of liability coverage to a driver who lacks the named insured’s express or implied permission, and a person qualifies as a custodian only if the named insured or spouse entrusted that person with the vehicle.

Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance v. Acord · filed 1995-12-08(a)

Accordingly, we hold that consistent with the omnibus clause of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a), an insurer may properly deny liability coverage where the express terms of an automobile insurance policy provide that in order for liability coverage to exist, a driver, who is not otherwise insured under the policy, must have received the named insured’s permission to use the automobile, and said driver lacked the express or implied permission of the named insured prior to using the vehicle. ... Thus, utilizing the above-referenced definitions, we hold that in order to be a custodian as contemplated by West Virginia Code § 33-6-3‘l(a), a person must be entrusted, either expressly or impliedly, by the named insured or his spouse with the possession of the motor vehicle.

Section 33-6-31(a) does not extend liability coverage to a third-party driver who received permission only from a resident relative who lacked the named insured’s permission to use the vehicle.

Allstate Insurance v. Smith ex rel. Evans · filed 1998-06-22(a)

A resident relative who was not given initial permission to use the vehicle, but instead took the keys and subsequently took the vehicle, cannot give permission to a third person to drive the vehicle. When that happens and the third person wrecks the vehicle, the driver is not an insured under the provisions of the insurance policy.

Subsection (a) makes a policy exclusion unenforceable when it denies liability coverage to a permissive user of an insured vehicle for injuries the user caused to the policyholder’s employee.

United Financial Casualty Co. v. Ball · filed 2019-10-30(a)

At bottom, we conclude that while the language of the Employee Indemnification and Employer’s Liability exclusion, considered alone, is sufficiently broad to deny Perry coverage for his liability to Ball, such a limitation of coverage for a permissive user of an insured vehicle contravenes West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a) and thus renders the exclusion unenforceable.

Section 33-6-31(a) requires the named insured’s or spouse’s express or implied consent for liability coverage of another driver; consent is not presumed when someone moves an unoccupied vehicle away from a fire.

Collins v. Heaster · filed 2005-07-14(a)

Accordingly, this Court holds where a person moves an otherwise unoccupied vehicle from the "zone of danger" of a fire, the implied consent of the vehicle's owner is not presumed such that liability coverage under the policy of insurance insuring the vehicle would be triggered to cover that person's negligent operation of the vehicle pursuant to the provisions of the omnibus statute, W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(a)(1998).

Section 33-6-31(a) requires the named insured’s express or implied consent to another person’s use of a vehicle; permission to take a work vehicle home does not establish consent to use it for personal errands.

Canal Insurance v. Dupont · filed 2014-09-11(a)

Further, § 33-6-31(a) stipulates that the use of the vehicle must be "with the consent, express or implied, of the named insured or his or'her spouse W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(a). Here, as mentioned, supra, Mr. Dupont did not have the express or implied consent or permission of Williams Transport to operate the van that day or for any personal reason.

Section 33-6-31(h) exempts employer liability to employees under workers’ compensation law from the motor vehicle omnibus coverage requirement; that requirement does not give a permissive driver more liability coverage than the employer named in the policy.

United Financial Casualty Company v. Milton Hardware, LLC · filed 2018-05-14(h)

The relevant statute clearly sets forth that the omnibus requirements “do not apply to any policy of insurance to the extent that it covers the liability of an employer to his or her employees under any workers’ compensation law.” W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(h) (2016). ... Accordingly, the Court does not find that United owes a duty of liability coverage pursuant to the statutory omnibus requirement.

Section 33-6-31(a) requires bodily injury liability coverage for permissive drivers up to the full policy limits unless a restrictive endorsement specifically excludes them; an endorsement reducing coverage for unlisted drivers violates that requirement.

White Pine Insurance Company v. Interstate Towing, LLC · filed 2023-02-06(a)

Such a provision plainly violates the intent of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a), which states that every permissive driver of a covered vehicle is protected “within the coverage of the policy” unless specifically excluded in a restrictive endorsement.

Section 33-6-31(a) permits an automobile liability policy to exclude a driver when a restrictive endorsement specifically identifies that driver, including by reference to the policy declarations.

Nationwide Insurance Company of America v. Brittney Duty and Gregory Duty, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Beverly Duty, and Lula Conley, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Shelvy Conley, and Paul Conley · filed 2024-11-13(a)

What Burr requires is that “to be effective under W. Va. Code, 33-6-31(a), an exclusion must specifically designate by name the individual or individuals to be excluded.” 178 W. Va. at 404-05, 359 S.E.2d at 633. We do not read Burr or West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a) to require that this “specific designation” be done in a particular manner, only that the individual to be excluded be specifically noted, which Nationwide did in this case. We find that here, as the endorsement specifically refers to the declarations page, which clearly designates Marie Conley and Paul Conley as excluded drivers, the endorsement is sufficient.

Section 33-6-31(b) allows an insurer to unilaterally give a multi-car discount as consideration for enforcing anti-stacking language in an automobile insurance policy.

Joslin v. Mitchell · filed 2003-07-03(b)

We therefore hold that the phrase “bargained for discount” in W. Va. Code, 33-6-31(b) allows an insurance company to unilaterally give an insured a multi-car discount as consideration for the enforcement of anti-stacking language in an automobile insurance policy.

Section 33-6-31(a) requires a restrictive endorsement to specifically name the individual or individuals it excludes.

Burr v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1987-07-23(a)

We conclude that to be effective under W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(a), an exclusion must specifically designate by name the individual or individuals to be excluded. Since the “dealer plates” endorsement in Nationwide’s policy did not so designate Mr. Burr, it was null and void as to him.

Section 33-6-31 permits an owned-vehicle exclusion in optional underinsured motorist coverage; a guest passenger cannot claim that coverage under the owner’s policy unless the statute or policy provides for it.

Alexander v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance · filed 1992-03-20(b), (k)

In this case, the exclusionary language found in the State Auto policy is not more restrictive than, and thus is not contrary to, the statute. ... Because an underinsured motorist policy is intended to benefit the person who bought the policy, we conclude that underinsured motorist coverage is not available to a guest passenger unless the statute or policy language specifically provides for such coverage.

Section 33-6-31(k) permits an automobile policy to exclude a vehicle owned by the insured from uninsured motorist coverage.

Dairyland Insurance Co. v. East · filed 1992-12-18(k)

Given the language of this exclusion combined with our determination that the exclusion is valid pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(k), ... we conclude that the vehicle in question does not qualify as an uninsured vehicle.

Section 33-6-31(b) does not bar an absolute liability limit in a custom-designed policy procured by a body subject to the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act.

Cook v. McDowell County Emergency Ambulance Service Authority, Inc. · filed 1994-05-24(b)

The West Virginia State Board of Risk and Insurance Management, under the terms of W.Va.Code § 29-12A-16(a), is granted broad discretion and powers relating to the procurement of insurance, and this Court believes that when a policy is a custom-designed policy procured by a body subject to the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, the broad discretion granted the West Virginia State Board of Risk and Insurance Management authorizes that body to incorporate language absolutely limiting liability under the policy, even if such language would ordinarily be in violation of the provisions of W.Va.Code § 33 — 6—31(b), and the Court believes that that is what was done in the present case.

Section 33-6-31(b) does not prevent a custom-designed policy issued to a governmental entity under § 29-12A-16(a) from absolutely limiting liability.

Trent v. Cook · filed 1996-12-17(b)

Consequently, when an insurer issues a custom-designed policy to a governmental entity pursuant to the Act, that entity may incorporate language absolutely limiting liability under the policy, even if such language would otherwise violate the provisions of West Virginia Code § 33 — 6—31(b).

Section 33-6-31(b) permits an owned but not insured exclusion for uninsured motorist coverage above the mandatory minimum, but the exclusion cannot bar recovery of the statutory minimum.

Imgrund v. Yarborough · filed 1997-02-20(b)

We hold that an “owned but not insured” exclusion to uninsured motorist coverage is valid and enforceable above the mandatory limits of uninsured motorist coverage required by W. Va.Code §§ 17D-4-2 (1979) (Repl.Vol.1996) and 33-6-31(b) (1988) (Supp.1991). To the extent that an “owned but not insured” exclusion attempts to preclude recovery of statutorily mandated minimum limits of uninsured motorist coverage, such exclusion is void and ineffective.

An exclusion that denies liability coverage to a permissive user violates § 33-6-31(a) and is void through the full liability limits of the policy.

Ball v. United Financial Casualty Company, Milton Hardware, LLC, Builders Discount, LLC, and Rodney Perry · filed 2022-11-17(a)

Based upon all of the foregoing, and in light of West Virginia Code § 33-6- 31(a)’s clear and unambiguous language requiring motor vehicle liability insurance policies to insure permissive users against liability for death or bodily injury sustained or loss or damage occasioned within the coverage of the policy as a result of the permissive user’s negligence in operating or using an insured vehicle, we now hold that when an exclusion in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy violates West Virginia Code § 33- 6-31(a) because it would deny coverage to a permissive user of an insured vehicle, the exclusion is void, and the insurance policy must provide coverage to the permissive user up to the full limits of liability coverage available under the policy.

Section 33-6-31(k) supports a claim under Mitchell v. Broadnax only for a coverage exclusion incorporated into a motor vehicle policy on or after February 18, 2000, and before June 5, 2002.

Findley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2003-01-06(k)

Therefore, we hold as a matter of law, that the holdings of Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W.Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000), which allow insureds to pursue a cause of action against insurers to enforce the requirements of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(k) (1995) (Repl.Vol.1996), apply only to those exclusions to insurance coverage incorporated into policies of motor vehicle insurance on or after the effective date of our decision therein, i.e., February 18, 2000, and before the effective date of the Legislature's amendments to W. Va.Code § 33-6-30 (2002) (Supp.2002), i.e., June 5, 2002.

Section 33-6-31(b) permits a family use exclusion that prevents a passenger spouse from adding underinsured motorist benefits to liability coverage paid under the same policy for the driver spouse’s negligence.

Cantrell v. Cantrell · filed 2003-07-11(b)

Counsel contends that our holdings in Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W.Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989), and Thomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W.Va. 640, 425 S.E.2d 595 (1992), cannot be reconciled with W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(b); consequently, the exclusion cannot apply to the appellant. We disagree. ... We reject the appellant’s public policy argument that underin-surance benefits should be stacked on liability coverage.

When section 33-6-31(a) governs a supplemental liability policy, excluding a driver requires a restrictive endorsement attached to the policy that specifically identifies the driver, even for coverage above the mandatory minimum.

Lin v. Shin Yi Lin · filed 2009-11-25(a)

We find no merit to this argument. The supplemental policy at issue, while it is in excess of the statutory mandatory minimum coverage, does not specifically exclude Ms. Lin from coverage by a restrictive endorsement attached to the policy as mandated by W. Va.Code § 33-6-31 (a).

Section 33-6-31(b) requires insurers to offer insureds optional uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage above the mandatory uninsured coverage limits.

Cox v. Amick · filed 1995-12-11(b)

We note that while uninsured motorists coverage is mandatory up to certain minimum limits, W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b) [1988] requires the insurer to provide to the insured the option of selecting limits which are above the mandatory uninsured coverage requirement.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires uninsured motorist insurers to pay damages the insured is legally entitled to recover from an uninsured motorist, up to the policy limits.

Burgess v. Porterfield · filed 1996-03-11(b)

The language of W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b) [1988] is clear. The punitive damage award, which we concluded is not to be credited against the pretrial settlement, is a sum which was awarded plaintiff by the jury and which she is legally entitled to recover as damages from defendant Porterfield, the operator of the uninsured motor vehicle. As plaintiff's insurer, State Farm is required to compensate her for these damages, not compensated by defendant Porterfield, the negligent tortfeasor. Youler, supra. Accordingly, State Farm is required to pay the punitive damage award up to the policy limits of the uninsured motorist coverage.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires an effective offer of optional uninsured motorist coverage; omission of the insured’s present coverage from the form’s optional limits section can create a factual dispute over whether the offer was effective.

Jewell v. Ford · filed 2002-04-11(b)

Since Jewell’s present coverage was not listed under the “optional limits” section of the form, we believe that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether an effective offer of optional uninsured motorist coverage was made in accordance with W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(b).

Section 33-6-31(c) treats a vehicle as uninsured when the tortfeasor is immune from liability, triggering uninsured motorist coverage for an automobile injury or loss the tortfeasor causes.

Jenkins v. City of Elkins · filed 2012-11-15(c)

We believe the definition of uninsured motor vehicle under W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(c) is broad enough to encompass a tortfeasor who is immune from liability.

Subsection (b) requires the mandatory minimum uninsured motorist coverage for damage to an insured’s trailer and an ATV carried on it when an uninsured motorist causes the damage, despite policy exclusions.

Erie Ins. Co. v. Dolly · filed 2018-03-12(b)

As such, West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b) (1998) requires Erie to compensate its insured Mr. Dolly up to the mandatory minimum uninsured motorist coverage amount for his property damage, including damage to his trailer and ATV.

Section 33-6-31(b) permits an insurer whose optional-coverage form violates § 33-6-31d to prove under the Bias standard that it made an effective offer and obtained a knowing and informed rejection.

Snuffer v. National General Assurance Company · filed 2023-03-27(b)

Assuming Ms. Snuffer could establish that National General’s form violated the requirements of section 33-6-31d, National General would still be permitted to assert its offer satisfied section 33-6-31(b) under the Bias standard. National General could thus yet contend each offer was effective and that any rejection was knowing and informed.

When an insurer fails to prove an effective offer and a knowing and intelligent waiver, subsection (b) adds uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage by operation of law in an amount equal to the bodily injury and property damage liability limits the insured purchased.

Jewell v. Ford · filed 2003-12-04(b)

Therefore, we hold that when an insurer fails to prove an effective offer and a knowing and intelligent waiver under W.Va. Code § 33-6-31(b) (1998), the minimum uninsured or underinsured coverage required to be included in the insured’s policy by operation of law is a sum recoverable as damages “up to an amount not less than limits of bodily injury liability insurance and property damage liability insurance purchased by the insured.”

Section 33-6-31 does not require an insurer to offer underinsured motorist coverage for golf carts exempt from vehicle registration requirements.

Edward and Teresa Baez v. Foremost Insurance Co. · filed 2018-05-11(b)

As the circuit court found, because low-speed vehicles and retrofitted golf carts are exempt from the vehicle registration requirements set forth in West Virginia Code § 17A-3-2(c), respondent was not required to offer UIM coverage to petitioners on the golf carts described in the declarations page of the policy at issue. Having reviewed the circuit court’s April 24, 2017, “Order Granting Defendant, Foremost Insurance Company’s, Partial Motion to Dismiss,” we hereby adopt and incorporate the circuit court’s well-reasoned findings and conclusions as to the assignment of error raised in this appeal.

Section 33-6-31(b) requires an effective, commercially reasonable offer of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for umbrella policies covering motor vehicle liability.

Westfield Insurance v. Paugh · filed 2005-09-29(b)

In summary, the Court concludes that the Umbrella Policy is unquestionably a “policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance, or property damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle,” W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(a), and, thus, Westfield was required to make the Paughs an effective, commercially reasonable offer of UM/UIM coverage under § 33-6-31(b).

Section 33-6-31(b) does not require insurers to offer uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage when an insured purchases an umbrella insurance policy.

Newark Insurance Co. v. Brown · filed 2005-11-18(b)

Therefore, we hold that W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(b) (1998) (Repl.Vol.2003) does not require insurers to offer an insured uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage in an amount not less than the policy’s liability limits when an insured purchases a policy of umbrella insurance.

Section 33-6-31(b)'s underinsured motorist coverage requirements do not invalidate a workers' compensation exclusion in a custom-designed governmental insurance policy.

Reed v. Orme · filed 2007-11-08(b)

In Trent, this Court previously found that a virtually identical workers' compensation exclusion contained within a custom-designed policy precluded coverage where the claimant had received workers' compensation benefits despite any argued conflict with the requirements of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b). ... Under the undisputed facts of this case, our decision in Trent precludes coverage for Appellants' claims because the National Union policy qualifies as a custom-designed policy under Gibson.

Section 33-6-31(b) does not require uninsured motorist coverage for an ATV that is not required to carry liability insurance, so a policy may exclude such an ATV.

Boniey v. Kuchinski · filed 2009-05-14(b)

Based on the above, this Court determines that because an ATV is not required to have liability insurance coverage under the financial liability law, an ATV is not an “uninsured motor vehicle” for the purposes of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b). Accordingly, we conclude that an insurance policy provision excluding ATVs from the uninsured motorist coverage mandated by W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b) does not violate the intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist statute.

Section 33-6-31(c) limits uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for people other than the named insured, spouse, and resident relatives to use of a vehicle to which the policy applies.

Progressive Max Insurance Company v. Christine Brehm and Amber R. Hess · filed 2022-04-14(c)

For all others, coverage depends on whether, at the time of the accident, they operated or occupied a “covered auto”—in terms of § 33-6-31(c), “the motor vehicle to which the [Auto Policy] applies.”