W. Va. Code § 56-3-33

Section 56-3-33(c) permits service on a nonresident through the secretary of state when its notice requirements are met, even if the defendant denies personally receiving the papers.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Spartan Mining Co. · filed 1983-02-16(c)

The court concludes that in this case service of process on the secretary of state and subsequent notice to Malin and Schaffer in the manner provided by W.Va.Code § 56-3-33 were sufficient both to give this court jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against these defendants and to meet constitutional due process and state law standards for notice.

Section 56-3-33(c) requires a Postal Service stamp showing refusal before a returned certified mailing can establish substitute service through the Secretary of State.

State ex rel Monster Tree Service, Inc v. Jeffrey D. Cramer and David S. Duvall · filed 2020-11-06(c)

Thus, according to the Legislature, the United States Post Office is the sole arbiter of whether a certified mailing is “refused,” and that refusal must be indicated by a “stamp,” not some handwritten remarks.

Section 56-3-33(e) does not require a bond when service is properly made through the Secretary of State under § 31-1-15.

City of Bluefield Ex Rel. Sanitary Board of Bluefield v. Autotrol Corp. · filed 1989-09-21(e)

Although the Plaintiff attempted service of process upon this Defendant in various ways, the Plaintiff properly served this Defendant pursuant to W.Va.Code § 31-1-15 when it served the West Virginia Secretary of State. The Defendant attempts to invalidate this service because the Plaintiff did not post a bond pursuant to W.Va.Code § 56-3-33(e). The Court does not believe that the Plaintiff needed to post a bond, however.

Section 56-3-33(c), read with the corporate service statute, requires the Secretary of State to send process to a nonresident corporation’s principal office.

Bowers v. Wurzburg · filed 1999-07-09(c)

Accordingly, we hold that when the Secretary of State of West Virginia is deemed to be the attorney in fact for a nonresident defendant corporation pursuant to W. Va.Code § 31-1-15 (1984) (Repl.Vol.1996) and W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 (1984) (Repl.Vol.1997), the address to which the secretary of statd should transmit the summons, complaint, notice, or process is the address of the nonresident defendant corporation’s principal office.

Section 56-3-33 authorizes service of process on the personal representative of a nonresident’s estate.

Nezan v. ARIES TECHNOLOGIES, INC. · filed 2010-11-17

We conclude and hold that under the broad language of West Virginia’s long-arm statute, West Virginia Code § 56-3-33 authorizes service of process upon the personal representative of a non-resident’s estate.

Section 56-3-33 requires service through the West Virginia Secretary of State to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

ABB Construction, LLC v. Allen · filed 2024-01-09

Section 56–3–33 requires nonresident defendants to be served through the West Virginia Secretary of State to create personal jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff failed to serve the Summons and complaint upon the Secretary of State, this Court does not have in personam jurisdiction over Ms. Allen.

Section 56-3-33 allows a household member who receives and signs for certified mail addressed to a nonresident to qualify as the nonresident’s duly authorized agent for service.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Schaffer · filed 1984-04-17(c), (e)(1)

Under the West Virginia statute, Lipton, as a member of the household and who receipted for mail addressed to the defendant, constituted his “duly authorized agent.”

Section 56-3-33(e)(1) treats a person as a nonresident’s agent for service when, with the nonresident’s direction, knowledge, or acquiescence, that person usually receives the nonresident’s mail; family relationship alone does not establish agency.

Tucker v. Thomas · filed 2012-02-15(e)(1)

This definition designates any person, including a family member, who “at the direction of or with the knowledge or acquiescence of a nonresident ... usually receives and receipts for mail addressed to such nonresident.” W. Va.Code ' § 56-3-33-(e)(l). Again, Ms. Singleton avers in her affidavit that she does not normally accept mail for Mr. Singleton, and the plaintiffs do not offer factual argument to contradict this assertion. There is also no factual argument that the Ms. Singleton qualified, by operation of law, as an agent of Thomas Brad Singleton except that she is his mother and that she was present at his place of employment. This is insufficient, and this Court finds that plaintiffs have not shown that Ms. Singleton qualifies as an agent of Thomas Brad Singleton for purposes of accepting process on his behalf.

Section 56-3-33(e)(1) applies only to actions by or against nonresident persons and does not authorize service on a West Virginia resident through a coworker.

Simmons · filed 2025-12-08(e)(1)

They do cite to W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(e)(1), but this provision only applies to “[a]ctions by or against nonresident persons . . . .” W. Va. Code § 56-3-33; see ECF 75 at 3.

Section 56-3-33(a)(1) reaches nonresident directors who conduct a West Virginia corporation’s business through acts given effect in the state, even if they never enter it.

Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp. · filed 1987-10-23(a)(1)

We thus conclude that the acts of Hawk and Griffith amounted to “transacting any business” under the West Virginia long-arm statute.

Section 56-3-33(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that a nonresident corporation transacts business in West Virginia.

State Ex Rel. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc. v. Ranson · filed 1997-07-17(a)(1)

... have made a prima facie showing that BAC is transacting business in this State under W. Via. Code, 56-S-33(a)(l) [1984] and that BAC has committed a tort in whole or in part in this State, W.Va.Code, 31-l-15(b) [1984], satisfying the first step of our personal jurisdiction analysis.

Section 56-3-33 permits service on a party that transacts business in West Virginia; a contract involving performance in the state can satisfy that requirement.

United Coals, Inc. v. ATTIJARIWAFA BANK · filed 2020-04-14

W. Va. Code §56-3-33 provides that a party may be served process in the State of West Virginia if it transacts any business in the state. ... At a minimum, that agreement implicated action by United, a party to the contract, that would take place, in whole or in part, in West Virginia. Thus, the West Virginia long-arm statute is satisfied.

Section 56-3-33(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents based on their conduct in West Virginia.

Gillens v. Carvajal · filed 2023-09-13(a)(3)

As the Court has already noted, venue is proper there because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [Plaintiff’s] claim[s] occurred” at the BOP facility within the district, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); and that court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the remaining defendants either because they currently reside in the district or because of their conduct there as alleged in the complaint, see Compl. § B, ¶¶ 3–6; W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a)(3).

Section 56-3-33 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent whose failure to support children constitutes a tort, provided the statute’s requirements are met.

Lozinski v. Lozinski · filed 1991-07-17(a)(3)

When an individual commits a tort by failing to support his children, personal jurisdiction may be obtained over that individual pursuant to the West Virginia long-arm statute provided that the statutory requirements for asserting jurisdiction have been met.

Section 56-3-33 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business or contracts to supply services in West Virginia.

Clark v. Milam · filed 1994-02-10(a)(1), (a)(2)

Thus, ‘if the Plaintiff has alleged facts showing that the Defendants transacted any business or contracted to supply services in West Virginia, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over them.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits when a defendant has sufficient contacts with West Virginia.

Touchstone Research Laboratory, Ltd. v. Anchor Equipment Sales, Inc. · filed 2003-06-04

In West Virginia, the long-arm statute extends the full reach permitted by due process. ... Given these circumstances, this Court is satisfied that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with this forum so that it could expect to be haled into court here.

Section 56-3-33(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation that transacts business or contracts to supply services or goods in West Virginia, subject to due process limits.

Vass v. Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. · filed 2004-01-16(a)

The West Virginia long-arm statute, W. Va.Code § 56-3-33(a), provides a nonresident corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in this State if it engages in any of the following activities: ... Considering the very low threshold showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, and based on the allegations in the Complaint, particularly the complex relationships of Volvo entities, some of which unquestionably do extensive business in West Virginia, and Alt’s affidavit showing Volvo Logistics arranges truck deliveries of Volvo parts into West Virginia, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES Plaintiff has established the minimum requirements necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over Volvo Logistics.

Section 56-3-33 authorizes West Virginia courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when its service procedures are followed.

Leslie Equipment Co. v. Wood Resources Co. · filed 2009-10-30

By statutory design, compliance with the service of process procedures set forth in West Virginia Code § 56-3-33 expressly authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by the courts of this state.

Section 56-3-33(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose conduct fits one of the listed grounds, including transacting business or having a relevant real property interest in West Virginia.

Morris v. Estate of Robert Lee Morris · filed 2016-11-14(a)

Applying West Virginia Code § 56-3-33 to the case at bar, the circuit court first noted that none of the respondents are residents of West Virginia, and they do not own real estate in West Virginia, except for Ms. Matyas who has an interest in a burial plot that does not relate to any of the petitioners’ claims. ... Upon review, we find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that the petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that the nonresident respondents possessed sufficient “minimum contacts” with West Virginia to enable the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them.

Section 56-3-33(a) does not authorize personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has not performed one of its specified acts, personally or through an authorized agent.

Mays v. Saad · filed 2023-08-29(a)

The Maryland and District of Columbia Defendants are non-residents of West Virginia who have not personally engaged, or by authorized agents engaged, in any one or more of the acts specified in subdivisions (1) through (7) of subparagraph (a) of the West Virginia long-arm statute. See W.Va. Code § 56-3-33. Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants Williams and Connors because they did not engage in any specified acts, and their actions took place outside of West Virginia.

Section 56-3-33(a)(1)-(5) permits personal jurisdiction when the complaint makes a prima facie showing of the listed connections to West Virginia.

SER Ford Motor Co. v. Hon. Warren R. McGraw, Judge · filed 2016-05-18(a)(1)-(5)

Plainly, Mr. Wellman set forth sufficient allegations in the complaint such that he asserted a prima facie case of jurisdiction as to Ford in West Virginia under both the general long-arm statute, W. Va. Code §§ 56-3-33(a)(1)-(5), and the corporation-specific long-arm statute, W. Va. Code §§ 31D-15-1501(d)(1) and (3).

Section 56-3-33(a)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes injury in West Virginia through conduct outside the state and derives substantial revenue from goods used there.

HILL BY HILL v. Showa Denko, KK · filed 1992-12-17(a)(4)

Like the federal district court’s analysis of W.Va.Code § 56-3-33(a)(4) in Hinzman, we note that SDK derived substantial revenue from the L-tryptophan purchased and used in West Virginia.

Section 56-3-33(a)(4) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state act causing injury in West Virginia only if the defendant also has the specified business, conduct, or revenue ties to the state.

Rosenthal v. Mihans · filed 2015-06-26(a)(4)

Even when an injury occurs in this State caused by an act or omission outside this State, West Virginia Code § 56-3-33(a)(4) provides personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only when “he or she regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state.” ... We have examined the record in this case and also conclude that West Virginia Code § 56-3-33(a)(4) does not provide a basis for jurisdiction.

Section 56-3-33(a)(4) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state act causes tortious injury in West Virginia and the defendant derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed there.

Miller v. Cobra Enterprises of Utah, Inc. · filed 2023-03-22(a)(4)

All that being said, the Court cannot ignore obvious: subsection (4) confers jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 56-3-33 permits personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, so the statutory and constitutional inquiries are identical.

Clark v. Milam · filed 1993-07-22(a)(1)

The state law and due process analyses are therefore identical, and the Court proceeds directly to determine whether it is constitutionally permissible to require Defendants to defend this suit in this Court.

Section 56-3-33 permits long-arm jurisdiction and substituted service when the complaint alleges facts fitting one of its enumerated acts.

Ellithorp v. Ellithorp · filed 2002-10-11

Unlike the facts presented to this Court in Lozinski, the complaint in the case sub judice did not contain averments concerning Appellant’s failure to support his children or averments demonstrating any other basis for coming within the “single acts” enumerated in West Virginia § 56-3-33, which permit application of the long arm statute and the exercise of substituted service through the West Virginia Secretary of State.18 See Lozinski, 185 W.Va. at 561-63, 408 S.E.2d at 313-315. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly determined that the Lozinski decision was simply inapposite.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction to the limit permitted by the Due Process Clause.

Wince v. Easterbrooke Cellular Corp. · filed 2010-02-02

West Virginia’s long-arm statute extends to the constitutional maximum permitted by the Due Process Clause. W.Va.Code § 56-3-33; see also Touchstone Research Lab., Ltd. v. Anchor Equip. Sales, Inc., 294 F.Supp.2d 823, 827 (N.D.W.Va.2003). Thus, in West Virginia, the issue of personal jurisdiction is simple: whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause.

Section 56-3-33 does not apply when the only defendant is a West Virginia resident, and long-arm jurisdiction cannot establish venue.

STATE EX REL. GALLOWAY GROUP v. McGraw · filed 2011-05-16

The circuit court also found that venue exists in Wyoming County under the long-arm jurisdiction statute, W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 (2008). This is incorrect. First, the only defendant in the instant case is Petitioner Galloway, a resident of this State. Counsel for Fredeking indicated in the hearing below that "we are only proceeding in this Court against the Partnership Group, the Galloway Group, a West Virginia Partnership." Therefore, the long-arm statute is not applicable. Second, as set forth above, venue must be demonstrated independent of in personam jurisdiction. Therefore, the circuit court erred in finding venue under the long-arm statute.

Section 56-3-33 reaches as far as due process permits, so a court need not conduct a separate statutory inquiry into personal jurisdiction.

Bison Resources Corporation v. Antero Resources Corporation · filed 2018-02-02

Because the West Virginia long-arm statute is coextensive with the full reach of due process, it is unnecessary to go through the normal two-step formula for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction.

Section 56-3-33(a) permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.

CP 1109, LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc. · filed 2018-03-13(a)

West Virginia’s long-arm statute, contained in W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a), “is coextensive with the full reach of due process,” and so the statutory and constitutional queries merge.

Section 56-3-33(a) extends personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits, so the statutory and constitutional inquiries merge.

Brighter Sky Productions, LLC v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2018-05-16(a)

West Virginia’s long-arm statute, contained in W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a), “is coextensive with the full reach of due process,” and so the statutory and constitutional queries merge.

Section 56-3-33 reaches as far as due process allows, so a court may determine personal jurisdiction through the constitutional inquiry.

Mey v. Castle Law Group, PC · filed 2019-09-20

Because the West Virginia long-arm statute is coextensive with the full reach of due process, it is unnecessary to go through the normal two-step formula for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction.

Section 56-3-33(a) reaches as far as due process permits, so its jurisdictional inquiry merges with the due process inquiry.

Fredeking v. Triad Aviation, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27(a)

“Because the West Virginia long-arm statute is coextensive with the full reach of due process,” these questions merge into one inquiry.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits, so the statutory and constitutional inquiries merge.

Blankenship v. Fox News Network, LLC · filed 2020-12-29

The West Virginia long-arm statute, W. Va. Code § 56-3-33, is “coextensive with the full reach of due process,” so the statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the court’s analysis centers on whether exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant is consistent with the Due Process Clause.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Lane v. Gray Transportation, Inc . · filed 2021-09-24

As West Virginia’s long-arm statute provides jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the United States Constitution, see W. Va. Code § 56-3-33, the Court need only consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause.

Section 56-3-33 extends West Virginia personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution.

Turner v. Turner · filed 2021-09-29

As West Virginia’s long-arm statute provides jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the United States Constitution, see W. Va. Code § 56-3-33, the Court need only consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution.

Rettig v. Alliance Coal, LLC · filed 2022-09-14

As West Virginia’s long-arm statute provides jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the United States Constitution, see W. Va. Code § 56-3-33, the Court need only consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the U.S. Constitution.

M&J Transport, LLC v. Decker Truck Line, Inc. · filed 2023-08-24

As West Virginia’s long-arm statute provides jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the United States Constitution, see W. Va. Code § 56-3-33, the Court need only consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits, so a court may proceed directly to the constitutional inquiry.

Bashaw v. Belz Hotel Management Co., Inc. · filed 1995-01-10

West Virginia’s long-arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33, is “coextensive with due process.” ... Accordingly, this Court will only pursue the second step in the analysis: whether the statute’s application will violate the due process clause.

Section 56-3-33 reaches as far as due process permits in authorizing personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.

Dosso · filed 2025-12-29

As for personal jurisdiction, the West Virginia long-arm statute, like Virginia’s, is “coextensive with the full reach of due process.” See W. Va. Code § 56-3-33; In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 627–28 (4th Cir. 1997).

Section 56-3-33(g) bars use of the long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction for claims arising from acts before June 7, 1978.

Robinson v. Cabell Huntington Hospital, Inc. · filed 1997-11-21(g)

According to the clear and unambiguous language of W.Va.Code § 56-3-33(g), the long-arm statute “shall not be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall not be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any of said acts occurring prior to the effective date of this section [June 7, 1978].” ... Thus, according to the express terms of the statute, it is unavailable for use by the appellants for the purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction over Dr. Terlizzi’s personal estate.

Section 56-3-33 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, so a corporate officer cannot rely on a fiduciary shield to avoid jurisdiction based on his own contacts with West Virginia.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS VI, LLC v. Eleazer · filed 2005-11-08

As West Virginia’s long-arm statute, found at W. Va.Code § 56-3-33, is co-extensive with the full range of due process, insofar as defendant Eleazer purports to be protected by a fiduciary shield, such argument fails.

Section 56-3-33 imputes an agent’s West Virginia contacts to its principal for personal jurisdiction, but jurisdiction under that theory requires a showing of agency.

Weirton Medical Center, Inc. v. Community Health Systems, Inc. · filed 2017-12-12

West Virginia’s long-arm statute, which is coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, expressly imputes an agent’s contacts with West Virginia to the agent’s principal. W. Va. Code § 56-3-33. ... Weirton has failed to show, through discovery or otherwise, that CHSI is subject to personal jurisdiction under an agency or alter ego theory.

Section 56-3-33(a)(7) requires the insured property to be in West Virginia when the insurance contract is formed; backdating coverage does not change that requirement.

Gum Springs Corporation v. Master Drilling USA, LLC · filed 2025-03-26(a)(7)

Further, the Court agrees that at the time of contracting, the Drilling Rig was not in West Virginia. Chubb Canada consented to providing insurance coverage on January 2, 2020, when the Drilling Rig was in Louisiana. Thus, at the time of contracting, the Drilling Rig was not in West Virginia. Chubb Canada’s willingness to backdate the policy’s effective date does not change this fact.