Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07

Section 1.07 defines an individual as a living human being, so a fictitious identity cannot be another individual's identifying information.

Ford v. State · filed 2009-04-10(a)(26)

We have already noted that the penal code defines "individual" as a "human being who is alive." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(26). Thus, section 32.51 unambiguously proscribes the unauthorized appropriation or use of another living human being's identity--in the form of information that identifies that individual--for the purpose of defrauding or otherwise harming either the person whose identity is stolen or some other person.

Section 1.07(a)(26) includes an unborn child in the definition of “individual” from the moment of fertilization.

Brown v. State · filed 2010-01-13(a)(26)

Furthermore, the legislature defined an individual in the broadest manner, recognizing unborn life from the moment of fertilization.

Section 1.07(a)(26)’s definition of an individual does not include fertilized embryos cryogenically preserved outside a woman’s body.

Antoun v. Antoun · filed 2023-07-13(a)(26)

Thus, we do not construe the Penal Code definition of an “individual” to include fertilized embryos cryogenically preserved outside a woman’s body.

An unborn child is an “individual” under the Penal Code at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.

Haynes v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-06-19(a)(26)

Although Baby Walker was not yet born, for purposes of the Texas Penal Code, he was an “individual”: “‘Individual’ means a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(26).

Section 1.07 defines “another” as a person other than the actor; the term includes individuals of either gender.

Sanchez v. State · filed 1998-05-20(a)(5)

“Another” means “a person other than the actor.” ... A “person” means “an individual, corporation, or association.” ... It is clear that section 39.03(a)(3)(c) includes both genders within the term “another.”

Section 1.07(a)(1) defines an act to include speech.

Short v. State · filed 1999-07-01(a)(1)

The penal code’s definition of “act” clearly encompasses speech.

Section 1.07(a)(1)’s definition of “act” does not govern the “act or acts” that must be alleged to show recklessness under Article 21.15.

Smith, Joseph Denver · filed 2010-02-24(a)(1)

Article 21.15 addresses the "act" or "acts"--not as defined by the Penal Code--from which the State will ask the trier of fact to infer that the accused acted with the required recklessness.

Handling cocaine and placing a child close enough to ingest it can constitute an act involving bodily movement under § 1.07(a)(1).

Driver v. State · filed 2011-06-09(a)(1)

We disagree that the possession of cocaine as an underlying felony to felony murder forecloses proof of bodily movement that constitutes an act clearly dangerous to human life, or as the State charged in this case, “allowing” a child to ingest cocaine. ... Driver’s act of handling cocaine and placing the child in the proximity of it — so as to allow the child to eat it — was a clearly dangerous act.

Section 1.07(a)(1) defines an act to include speech.

Cornwell, Robert William · filed 2015-10-07(a)(1)

Furthermore, as the court of appeals recognized, the Texas Penal Code includes speech in its definition of “act.”

Section 1.07 defines an act as a voluntary or involuntary bodily movement and an omission as a failure to act.

Avellaneda v. State · filed 2016-06-16(a)(1), (a)(34)

An “act” is a voluntary or involuntary bodily movement. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(1) (West 2011). An omission is a failure to act. Id. at § 1.07(a)(34). ... Because an omission cannot be an affirmative act, the proof needed to establish the offense of injury to a child by omission is not included within the proof necessary to establish the charged offense of felony murder.

Section 1.07(a)(1) defines an act as a bodily movement, including speech; conduct that prevents someone from receiving food can satisfy that definition.

Thetford v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-03-03(a)(1)

Each listed behavior was an affirmative, identifiable “bodily movement,” and the State offered direct evidence of each.

Section 1.07’s definition of public servant includes a peace officer.

Monroy-Malagon v. State · filed 2001-03-29(a)(41)

Such instruction clearly placed Lawson within the meaning of the statutory definition of “public servants,” an essential element of the offenses charged in count five.

Section 1.07(a)(41)’s definition of public servant includes police officers.

Carriere, Byron Keith v. State · filed 2002-08-01(a)(41)

Although not explicitly included in the Penal Code definition of a "public servant," courts have interpreted public servant to include a police officer. ... It is undisputed that Officer Evans was a HISD police officer; therefore, we hold that he was a public servant within the meaning of section 36.06.

Section 1.07(a)(41) includes police officers within its definition of “public servant.”

Carriere v. State · filed 2002-08-15(a)(41)

Although not explicitly included in the Penal Code definition of a “public servant,” courts have interpreted public servant to include a police officer. ... It is undisputed that Officer Evans was a HISD police officer; therefore, we hold that he was a public servant within the meaning of section 36.06.

Section 1.07(a)(41)(A) includes a public school superintendent employed by a school district within the definition of public servant.

Moore v. State · filed 2004-07-21(a)(41)(A)

A "public servant" is "a person elected, selected, appointed, employed, or otherwise designated as ... an officer, employee, or agent of government." Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(41)(A) (Vernon Supp.2004). Thus, Hauerland was a public servant.

Section 1.07 includes police officers in its definition of a public servant.

Aguilar v. State · filed 2008-04-17(a)(41)(A)

A police officer is included in the penal code's definition of a public servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07.

Section 1.07(a)(41)(A) defines “public servant” to include an officer, employee, or agent of government; a police officer falls within that definition.

Carr v. State · filed 2010-07-20(a)(41)(A)

The Penal Code defines “public servant” as “an officer, employee, or agent of government.” Id. § 1.07(a)(41)(A). Although “public servant” is defined under the Penal Code, the jury charge in this case did not set forth the Penal Code’s definition. The trial court should have provided the statutory definition of “public servant,” not the instruction that a public servant means a police officer.

Section 1.07(a)(41)’s definition of public servant includes police officers, though it does not expressly list them.

Jimenez v. State · filed 2018-06-07(a)(41)

Although police officers are not included in the statutory definition of public servants, courts have routinely interpreted the term to include police officers such as Barletta.

Section 1.07(41) defines “public servant” to include people beyond the personnel covered by Kansas battery offenses against law enforcement and correctional officers.

State v. Alvarado · filed 2020-07-31(41)

But the Texas crime is broader than the Kansas crime of battery against a law enforcement officer or a correctional officer because the definition of a "public servant" covers more personnel than the Kansas crimes.

Section 1.07(38) defines “person” to include a corporation; that definition applies to Water Code offenses unless the offense statute provides otherwise.

L. B. Foster Company v. State · filed 2003-03-27(38)

Thus, under Penal Code subsections 1.03(b) and 1.07(38), L.B. Foster is a “person” for purposes of prosecution under Water Code section 7.176.

Section 1.07(38) defines “person” to include corporations; that definition applies to Water Code offenses unless the offense statute provides otherwise.

L.B. Foster Co. v. State · filed 2003-06-13(38)

Here, section 7.176 does not define “person” or otherwise indicate that a corporation cannot be prosecuted for the illegal disposal of used oil. Thus, under Penal Code subsections 1.03(b) and 1.07(38), L.B. Foster is a “person” for purposes of prosecution under Water Code section 7.176.

Section 1.07(a)(25) defines harm through loss, disadvantage, or injury, none of which requires physical force.

United States v. Acuna-Cuadros · filed 2004-09-21(a)(25)

First, even if we were to read the definition of the word "harm" in such a way as to import elements into the retaliation offense, a questionable procedure, none of the words that define "harm" — loss, disadvantage, or injury — requires the use of physical force.

Section 1.07(25) defines harm as a reasonably regarded loss, disadvantage, or injury; physical injury is not required.

Meyer v. State · filed 2012-05-03(25)

Harm is defined as “anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury....” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(25) (West Supp.2011). Therefore, while one certainly threatens harm if he or she threatens to cause someone bodily injury, a threat of physical injury is not required here.

Section 1.07(a)(25) defines harm to include reasonably regarded loss, disadvantage, or injury; physical injury is not required.

Brock v. State · filed 2016-01-07(a)(25)

Harm is defined as “anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, ’ or inju-ry_” Tex. -Penal .Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(25). While one certainly threatens, harm .if he. or she threatens to cause someone bodily injury, a threat of physical injury , is not required.

Harm under § 1.07(a)(25) includes the additional work an officer must perform when a driver presents a false insurance card and harm to motorists whose welfare concerns the officer.

Fuller v. State · filed 2009-08-31(a)(25)

Under this line of cases then, a police officer can be harmed in two ways by a driver presenting a false insurance card: (1) the officer must "take additional actions;" and (2) "other motorists in whose welfare [the officer is] interested" are also harmed.

Section 1.07 does not define “force.”

Medina v. State · filed 2007-07-12

However, the Texas Penal Code provides no definition of "force." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (general definitions), § 38.01 (Vernon 2003) (definitions specific to obstructing governmental operation).

Section 1.07 does not define “offense”; the term takes its common meaning unless it has acquired a technical or particular meaning.

LeClear v. State · filed 2007-10-16

Because the Texas Penal Code does not define the term “offense”; see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (Vernon 2003), the term must be defined by common usage unless the word has acquired a technical or particular meaning.

Section 1.07(a)(14) defines a correctional facility as an adult correctional facility because juveniles cannot be arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense.

PASTRANO v. State · filed 2008-04-08(a)(14)

Because juveniles cannot be arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense, a “correctional facility” within the meaning of section 1.07(a)(14) is an adult correctional facility.

Section 1.07(a)(14) treats a person as confined when the person is under arrest and not free to leave the facility; confinement does not require being locked behind bars.

Alvarez v. State · filed 2008-05-29(a)(14)

Because he was not free to leave the facility, appellant was, therefore, confined within the meaning of section 1.07(a)(14) of the penal code.

Section 1.07(a)(45) defines a secure correctional facility as a municipal or county jail or a facility operated by or under contract with a division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; a federal prison does not qualify.

West v. Robinson · filed 2016-02-24(a)(45)

A secure correctional facility under the Penal Code definition means a municipal or county jail or a confinement facility operated by or under a contract with any division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(45)(A),(B) (West Supp.2015). The record indicates that Donald West is in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and confined to its El Reno, Oklahoma corrections institute. Susan West is not incarcerated. Because neither plaintiff is an inmate, as that term is defined by Chapter 14, it cannot provide the basis for dismissal of their lawsuit.

Section 1.07(a)(35)’s definition of “owner” applies to the Penal Code, not to the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Universal Underwriters Group v. State · filed 2009-01-29(a)(35)

Under the unambiguous language of the Penal Code, this definition of “owner” applies to the Penal Code, not to the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 1.07(a)(48) defines “unlawful” as criminal or tortious conduct, including conduct that would be criminal or tortious but for a defense that is not a justification or privilege.

Diaz v. State · filed 2014-11-07(a)(48)

The Penal Code defines “[u]nlawful” as “criminal or tortious or both and includes what would be criminal or tortious but for a defense not amounting to justification or privilege.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(48) (West Supp. 2014). Therefore, the State had to prove that Diaz, while acting under color of his office, intentionally subjected McCormick to a detention he knew was criminal, tortious, or both.

Section 1.07(a)(48) defines “unlawful” as criminal or tortious conduct, including conduct that would be criminal or tortious but for a defense that is not a justification or privilege.

Diaz v. State · filed 2014-12-10(a)(48)

The Penal Code defines “[u]nlawful” as “criminal or tortious or both and includes what would be criminal or tortious but for a defense not amounting to justification or privilege.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(48) (West Supp. 2014). Therefore, the State had to prove that Diaz, while acting under color of his office, intentionally subjected McCormick to a detention he knew was criminal, tortious, or both.

Section 1.07(a)(2) includes a person whose conduct must be assessed to resolve a defendant’s self-defense claim, even if that person is not on trial.

Dexter Black v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-03-13(a)(2)

It is true that Guerrero’s criminal responsibility was not “in issue” in the sense that he stood to be convicted in this cause. Yet, in claiming self-defense, Black necessarily asserts that the force used against him was unjustified, and hence, unlawful. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(a). Where the evidence raises some question whether a person’s conduct was justified, as it did in this case, Guerrero becomes “a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue.” See Bennett, 726 S.W.2d at 36.