Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) classifies a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Hackaday v. State · filed 2009-06-18(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is, per se, a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). ... In addition, Holmes used a deadly weapon.

A motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Garza v. State · filed 2009-10-15(a)(17)(B)

A motor vehicle may become a deadly weapon if the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. ... At the very least, these facts raise an issue whether the manner in which Appellant used his vehicle made it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Hester v. State · filed 2009-11-19(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon 2003). ... Accordingly, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant used a deadly weapon during the commission of the three drug offenses.

A table leg can be a deadly weapon when the manner in which it is used is capable of causing serious bodily injury.

Rivers Jr. v. State · filed 2009-10-15(a)(17)(B)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to show that the table leg was used in a manner that was capable of inflicting serious bodily injury.

A motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon when the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and poses more than a hypothetical danger to others.

Garza v. State · filed 2009-10-15(a)(17)(B)

We find that the State’s evidence was sufficient to create a fact issue whether Appellant’s manner of using his car posed a danger to pursuing officers and the public that was more than hypothetical.

An object that is not inherently dangerous can be a deadly weapon if its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Guevara v. State · filed 2009-10-28(a)(17)(B)

However, when utilized in a manner which causes or has the potential to cause death or serious bodily injury, objects which are not inherently dangerous may be found to be deadly weapons under Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) of the Texas Penal Code.

A knife may qualify as a deadly weapon based on how it is used or intended to be used.

Jones v. State · filed 2009-12-17(a)(17)(B)

A knife can be found to be a deadly weapon based on the nature of its use or intended use. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones used or exhibited a knife while robbing Le, and it was therefore legally sufficient to support Jones’s conviction.

A knife is a deadly weapon when its manner of use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Roblow v. State · filed 2009-12-23(a)(17)(B)

Given this testimony and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the knife at issue was a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) permits a hand or the ground to qualify as a deadly weapon when used in a manner capable of causing death.

McCallum v. State · filed 2010-01-27(a)(17)(B)

The law is well-settled that both a hand and the ground can be deadly weapons — that is, objects capable of causing death.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) includes a knife as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, even if the actor did not intend to cause that injury.

in the Matter of J. A. B. · filed 2010-05-13(a)(17)(B)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the juvenile court could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that J.A.B. used and intended to use the knife in a manner that was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, regardless of whether he actually intended to cause such an injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) does not require a deadly weapon to actually cause death or serious bodily injury.

Smith v. State · filed 2010-05-27(a)(17)(B)

Although neither Randy nor Gary testified that they were physically injured by Appellant’s conduct, there is no requirement that the deadly weapon actually cause death or serious bodily injury before the jury can affirmatively answer the deadly weapon question.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) does not require a deadly weapon to actually cause death or serious bodily injury.

Walker v. State · filed 2010-05-27(a)(17)(B)

T here is no requirement that the deadly weapon actually cause death or serious bodily injury before the jury can affirmatively answer the deadly weapon question.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by its manner of use or intended use; a motor vehicle can qualify under that definition.

Griffith v. State · filed 2010-06-10(a)(17)(B)

In accordance with Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2009), the jury charge in the instant appeal defined “deadly weapon” as “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” ... Accordingly, the jury’s finding of guilt on the lesser included charge of manslaughter also constituted a finding that the motor vehicle constituted a deadly weapon under the applicable definition.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) does not require a deadly weapon to actually cause death or serious bodily injury; its capability to do so in the manner of its use or intended use is enough.

Hilburn v. State · filed 2010-04-15(a)(17)(B)

There is no requirement that the deadly weapon actually cause death or serious bodily injury before the jury can affirmatively answer the deadly weapon question.

Section 1.07(a)(17) allows a homemade stabbing instrument to qualify as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Barrera v. State · filed 2010-04-27(a)(17)

Homemade weapons or “shanks” can be considered deadly weapons. ... Whether an object, in its use or intended use, is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury must be evaluated in light of the facts that existed when the assault was committed. ... Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant assaulted the officer and used a deadly weapon in the commission of the assault.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) classifies a firearm as a deadly weapon.

Garcia v. State · filed 2010-03-11(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is, per se, a deadly weapon. ... Considering all the evidence in a light that supports the verdict, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant committed an aggravated robbery of Patricia and that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm .

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se.

Cruz v. State · filed 2010-06-10(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se. ... Taking all the evidence together, including Granados's accomplice-witness testimony, we find legally sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer Appellant intentionally or knowingly threatened Owens with imminent bodily injury while using and exhibiting a deadly weapon during the commission of an assault.

A knife qualifies as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Bud Purdy v. State · filed 2010-06-29(a)(17)(B)

Rather, the State must prove that, in the manner of its use and intended use, the knife is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats a BB gun as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing serious bodily injury.

Charles Blackburn, Jr. v. State · filed 2010-07-16(a)(17)(B)

Because the evidence supports that Appellant's BB gun was capable of causing serious bodily injury, the jury was justified in finding that Appellant used a deadly weapon during the two 2008 robberies.

Section 1.07(17)(B)'s definition of a deadly weapon includes an object's intended use.

Willis v. State · filed 2010-08-25(17)(B)

When the jury sent the note out neither the definition of deadly weapon nor the application paragraph contained the phrase “or intended use” when describing the tire tool as a deadly weapon or defining deadly weapon. ... The Penal Code definition of a deadly weapon includes the omitted phrase.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) permits a knife to qualify as a deadly weapon based on how it is used or intended to be used.

Kirby v. State · filed 2010-08-31(a)(17)(B)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, although the knife was not found on Kirby's person when he was arrested, a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that: (1) Kirby used a knife during the commission of the offense; (2) Kirby tried to hide the knife in the camouflage pants that were left behind the air-conditioning unit at the chiropractor's office; and (3) the knife used by Kirby constituted a deadly weapon under these circumstances.

A scalpel qualifies as a deadly weapon when its manner of use is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.

Williamson v. State · filed 2010-09-29(a)(17)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the record shows that manner of the use of the scalpel was, at a minimum, capable of causing serious bodily injury or death in each case.

A deadly weapon finding can rest on the victim's injuries even when the weapon is not recovered or described.

Yebra v. State · filed 2010-10-05(a)(17)(B)

Even without a description of the weapon, the victim's injuries can, by themselves, be a sufficient basis for inferring that an appellant used a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) does not require actual injury or an intent to inflict injury for an object to qualify as a deadly weapon.

Dunn v. State · filed 2010-12-16(a)(17)(B)

The statutory definition of “deadly weapon” does not require that death or serious bodily injury be inflicted or even intended by the actor.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) defines a firearm, including a shotgun, as a deadly weapon.

Alexander v. State · filed 2010-12-23(a)(17)(A)

Since a shotgun is a type of firearm, it constitutes a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(17)(B) requires an object to be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner it is used or intended to be used; pointing a toy gun as though to shoot does not meet that definition.

Hernandez v. State · filed 2010-12-29(17)(B)

Because the use and manner of intended use (i.e., pointing and threatening as if to shoot) was not a use of the toy capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, we find such evidence was legally insufficient to allow a jury to infer the toy was a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats a knife as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Shawn Kelly Vince Vinson A/K/A Shawn Kelly Vinson A/K/A Shawn Vince Vinson v. State · filed 2010-12-30(a)(17)(B)

Instead, a knife becomes a deadly weapon if, in the manner of its use or intended use, it is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A knife is a deadly weapon when its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Shawn Kelly Vince Vinson A/K/A Shawn Kelly Vinson A/K/A Shawn Vince Vinson v. State · filed 2010-12-30(a)(17)(B)

Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the knife Appellant used was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death in its use or intended use.

Section 1.07(17) includes as a deadly weapon an object capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner it is used or intended to be used.

McConnell v. State · filed 2011-01-07(17)

The jury could reasonably conclude that when used in this manner, the stick was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A motor vehicle is a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Lisa Kim Cook A/K/A Lisa K. Klovstad v. State · filed 2010-09-09(a)(17)(B)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Cook used her vehicle in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A knife qualifies as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; swinging a large butcher knife at people can support that finding.

Hernandez v. State · filed 2011-01-18(a)(17)(B)

In other words, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record must show that the manner of the use of the knife was, at a minimum, capable of causing serious bodily injury or death in each case. ... Based on the foregoing facts, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the finding that the knife was a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Colbert v. State · filed 2011-02-10(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (a)(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2010). ... We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the specific intent to kill the complainant when he fired a deadly weapon in the complainant’s direction at close range.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) includes a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Moore v. State · filed 2010-11-18(a)(17)(B)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore used the green truck in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A vehicle is a deadly weapon under § 1.07(a)(17)(B) when its manner of use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Burchfield v. State · filed 2011-01-06(a)(17)(B)

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Burchfield used or intended to use his vehicle in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon when the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Brown v. State · filed 2011-02-15(a)(17)(B)

Because the State presented evidence appellant drove the Suburban away at a high rate of speed, dragging Officer Barnhardt who was still partially inside, the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used the vehicle in a manner capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.

Section 1.07(17)(B) allows fire to qualify as a deadly weapon when the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Mims v. State · filed 2010-10-14(17)(B)

Whether fire is a deadly weapon in a particular case depends on whether the manner in which the fire was used, or was intended to be used, was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) allows hands to qualify as a deadly weapon when their manner of use or intended use makes them capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Goode v. State · filed 2011-02-09(a)(17)(B)

While hands are not a deadly weapon per se, a jury may find that they were used as a deadly weapon based upon their manner of use or intended use and their capacity to produce death or serious bodily injury.

A toy gun pointed as if to shoot is not a deadly weapon under § 1.07(17)(B) when that use is incapable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Hernandez v. State · filed 2010-12-03(17)(B)

Because the use and manner of intended use (i.e., pointing and threatening as if to shoot) was not a use of the toy capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, we find such evidence was legally insufficient to allow a jury to infer the toy was a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by its capacity, in the manner used or intended to be used, to cause death or serious bodily injury; actual serious bodily injury is not required.

Baltazar v. State · filed 2011-03-09(17)(B)

The State, while not conceding that the victim’s injuries were less than serious bodily injury, points out that its burden in this case simply was to prove that appellant used his hands in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The State is correct.

A pocketknife can qualify as a deadly weapon when its use causes severe injuries requiring surgery.

Dalton Ray Morehead, Jr. v. State · filed 2011-04-20(a)(17)(B)

In fact, the exhibits visually depicting McClanahan’s severe injuries and the fact that he required surgery to repair an injured liver supported the pocketknife’s status as a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by whether it is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner it is used or intended to be used.

Barnett v. State · filed 2011-06-14(a)(17)(B)

A deadly weapon is anything that, in the manner of its use or intended use, is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. ... There was testimony that the knife could be considered a deadly weapon capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Therefore, we find the evidence legally sufficient to sustain Barnett’s conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by its capacity, in the manner of its use or intended use, to cause death or serious bodily injury.

Vallado v. State · filed 2011-06-22(a)(17)(B)

This evidence was sufficient to support a rational finding by the jury that the knife, in its manner of use and intended use, was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats a knife as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; the defendant need not intend that harm.

John Charles Alexander AKA Bobby Ray Miller v. State · filed 2011-06-30(a)(17)(B)

The plain language of section 1.07(a)(17)(B), however, “does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury.” McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503. The State must only show that a defendant used or intended to use the knife in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by its use or intended use; proof of either means suffices.

Bayas v. State · filed 2011-07-13(a)(17)(B)

The definition of "deadly weapon" includes "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West 2011). ... Accordingly, even though the State originally alleged "use and intended use," it was only required to prove one of those means.

Section 1.07(17) includes an object as a deadly weapon when the manner of its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Marshall v. State · filed 2011-07-14(17)

Additionally, a reasonable jury could have concluded appellant committed (or was criminally responsible for) aggravated assault because she (and the other participants) intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to Shannon by using a “2 by 4” that, in the manner of its use or intended use, was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A knife qualifies as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Baladez v. State · filed 2011-07-14(a)(17)(B)

A deadly weapon is defined as anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. ... We therefore conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon based upon the evidence presented to the jury at trial.

A weapon can qualify as deadly based on its capability to cause death or serious bodily injury; no actual injury is required.

Bud Purdy v. State · filed 2011-07-28(a)(17)(B)

The statute speaks in terms of capability to cause death or serious bodily injury, meaning that no actual death or serious bodily injury need have occurred.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) permits a deadly weapon finding when a vehicle, as used, was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; actual harm is not required.

Garza v. State · filed 2011-08-31(a)(17)(B)

Regardless, we conclude that no showing of actual harm is required, and the trial court did not err by failing to include an instruction requiring a finding of actual harm.

A deadly weapon is anything capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner used or intended; actual injury is unnecessary.

Stewart v. State · filed 2011-09-13(a)(17)(B)

The statute speaks in terms of capability to cause death or serious bodily injury, meaning that no actual death or serious bodily injury need have occurred.

Section 1.07(17)'s definition of a deadly weapon includes a baseball bat capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner of its use.

Vega v. State · filed 2011-12-21(17)

Hennington testified that Vega hit Gamboa on the side of the head with a baseball bat, a weapon which can obviously cause death or serious bodily injury, and Allen testified that Gamboa had a "busted lip" and that Vega, at the time in question, was angry, intoxicated, and uncooperative and had injuries consistent with being the aggressor in an assault.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) permits hands and feet to qualify as deadly weapons when their use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Orona v. State · filed 2011-02-24(a)(17)(B)

Because there is no evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Orona beat Sartain with his hands or feet, but that he did not use or intend to use his hands or feet in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, we hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on assault causing bodily injury.

A motor vehicle is a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Harris v. State · filed 2011-03-03(a)(17)(B)

A deadly weapon is “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence supports a rational juror’s conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant used the car as a deadly weapon.

A vehicle can be a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, even if no one is injured.

Garza v. State · filed 2011-08-31(a)(17)(B)

Although no one was injured during Garza’s evasion, we cannot say based on this record that no reasonable jury could rationally conclude that this use of a vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(17) classifies a firearm as a deadly weapon.

Chaney v. State · filed 2011-04-28(17)

Aggravated robbery is robbery with the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon and a firearm constitutes a deadly weapon.

A knife is a deadly weapon when its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Jenkins v. State · filed 2011-06-30(a)(17)(B)

Therefore, in the case at hand, the State had the burden to prove that Appellant (1) used or exhibited a knife (2) that in the manner of its use or intended use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon when its manner of use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; specific intent is unnecessary.

May v. State · filed 2011-07-28(a)(17)(B)

A motor vehicle may become a deadly weapon if the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, and specific intent to use a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon is not required. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that May used his vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of the felony DWI and during the commission of the evading arrest offense.

Under § 1.07(a)(17)(B), hands and feet can be deadly weapons when their use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Orona v. State · filed 2011-07-27(a)(17)(B)

A deadly weapon means "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp.2010). ... Because there is no evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Orona beat Sartain with his hands or feet, but that he did not use or intend to use his hands or feet in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, we hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on assault causing bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) permits hands, arms, or water to qualify as deadly weapons when the evidence shows they are capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner used.

Webb v. State · filed 2012-05-03(a)(17)(B)

Accordingly, we hold that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Webb used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, namely his hands, arms, or water.

A knife is a deadly weapon when, in the manner of its use or intended use, it is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Santos Almanza, Jr. v. State of Texas · filed 2012-06-21(a)(17)

When we consider all of the evidence, including the deep wound to Lopez’s head, the wound to his throat, and the extensive bleeding he suffered, we hold that a rational jury could have found that, in the manner of its use or intended use, the knife used by Almanza was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17) includes sharpened metal bars adapted to cause serious bodily injury within the definition of a deadly weapon.

Richard Laredo, Jr. v. State · filed 2012-08-14(a)(17)

The jury could have reasonably found that the bars had been manifestly adapted for the purpose of causing serious bodily injury.

A knife qualifies as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, even if the victim did not suffer such an injury.

Arellano v. State · filed 2012-08-15(a)(17)(B)

One of the definitions of a deadly weapon is anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2011). ... This is some evidence from which a jury could have inferred that appellant's intended use of the knife could have severed an artery or nerve, placing Potts' life or use of his leg in jeopardy.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by its capacity to cause death or serious bodily injury in the manner it is used or intended to be used; actual injury and intent to injure are not required.

Simon Francis, Jr. v. State · filed 2012-11-29(a)(17)(B)

This definition does not require the State to prove that anyone actually died or suffered serious bodily injury or that the accused intended to cause serious bodily injury.

A knife may qualify as a deadly weapon under § 1.07(a)(17)(B) based on its use and the injuries it causes.

Dana v. State · filed 2012-12-12(a)(17)(B)

The jury could rationally conclude that the knife in this case was a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by whether its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Ronald Wayne Jackson, Jr. v. State · filed 2013-02-14(a)(17)(B)

Thus, we conclude that the jury was rationally justified in concluding that the implements used by appellant—the water hose, two-by-four board, and golf club—caused or were intended to cause serious bodily injury to the child, as defined in section 1.07(a)(17)(B) of the Texas Penal Code.

Section 1.07 treats an object as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing serious bodily injury, including serious permanent disfigurement.

Wilburt Dwaine Cash v. State · filed 2013-06-20(a)(17)(B), (a)(46)

Appellant’s use of the iron to torture the complainant, his continued brandishing of the iron while struggling with the complainant, and his dropping the iron onto the complainant’s thigh while she was on the floor support a finding appellant’s use or intended use of the iron was capable of causing serious permanent disfigurement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B), (a)(46).

Section 1.07 treats an object as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing serious permanent disfigurement.

Wilburt Dwaine Cash v. State · filed 2013-07-30(a)(17)(B), (a)(46)

Appellant’s use of the iron to torture the complainant, his continued brandishing of the iron while struggling with the complainant, and his dropping the iron onto the complainant’s thigh while she was on the floor support a finding appellant’s use or intended use of the iron was capable of causing serious permanent disfigurement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B), (a)(46).

Section 1.07(a)(17) can classify a homemade spear made of paper and a staple as a deadly weapon when its use is capable of causing serious bodily injury.

White v. State · filed 2013-08-15(a)(17)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the deadly weapon finding, the jury could have found that the homemade spear, composed of a staple and paper, fell under the definition of “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury” because the evidence showed that it was capable of puncturing the skin and causing injury, from damage to an unprotected eye to infection with a terminal disease.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Jones v. State · filed 2013-11-27(a)(17)(A)

The record reflects that Jones used a firearm—a deadly weapon per se— during the robbery and that he shot Elqutob several times at close range.

A sharpened object used to threaten a stabbing can qualify as a deadly weapon if, in the manner of its use or intended use, it is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Roe v. State · filed 2014-02-13(a)(17)(B)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the sharpened plastic object that Roe pointed at Officer Sheets while telling him that he wanted to or was going to stab him was, in the manner of its use or intended use, capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon to include an object capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner of its use or intended use.

Cantu III v. State · filed 2014-08-08(a)(17)(B)

Here, the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Cantu had intentionally or knowingly threatened S.C. with imminent bodily injury while exhibiting his sword during their argument when he threatened to “chop [her] into little pieces and chop [her] head off,” that she perceived this behavior as a threat, and that the sword was a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) classifies a firearm, including a handgun, as a deadly weapon.

Washington, Duane Lee · filed 2014-12-31(a)(17)(A)

A firearm, such as a handgun, is a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West 2011).

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a gun as a deadly weapon per se.

Cantu Jr. v. State · filed 2013-05-02(a)(17)(A)

A gun is a per se deadly weapon; thus, the deadly weapon affirmative findings arose as a matter of law upon the jury’s findings of guilt.

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se under Section 1.07(a)(17)(A).

Rodriguez v. State · filed 2013-06-26(a)(17)(A)

A firearm, the use of which was alleged here in the indictment, is a deadly weapon per se.

A firearm is a deadly weapon under Section 1.07(17)(A).

Andrews v. State · filed 2014-12-10(17)(A)

By statute, a firearm is a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon.

Hicks v. State · filed 2013-07-10(a)(17)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hicks committed the offense of aggravated robbery and used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to wit, a firearm.

Section 1.07(a)(17) treats firearms as deadly weapons per se; a deadly weapon finding involving drugs requires evidence that the firearms facilitated the offense.

Elpidio Molina A/K/A Pedro Gonzalez Aguilar v. State · filed 2014-02-20(a)(17)

We therefore hold that the evidence sufficiently supports the conclusion that the guns facilitated Appellant’s possession and distribution of the methamphetamine and cocaine and therefore sufficiently supports the deadly weapon findings.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) classifies a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Galvan, Adam v. State · filed 2015-02-20(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is a deadly weapon, per se. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West 2011). ... Thus, the evidence is sufficient to prove both that he threatened the officers and that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon while doing so.

A vehicle is a deadly weapon under § 1.07(a)(17)(B) only when the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; intoxication, speeding, and the presence of other drivers alone do not establish actual danger.

Glover v. State · filed 2014-03-26(a)(17)(B)

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the manner in which Glover used his vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A motor vehicle is a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

State v. Sneed · filed 2014-09-24(a)(17)(B)

We consider the manner in which the defendant used the motor vehicle during the offense and whether the motor vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Sneed used his vehicle as a deadly weapon.

A motor vehicle is a deadly weapon when the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, regardless of the driver’s intent.

Schwalbach v. State · filed 2015-02-12(a)(17)(B)

The jury could have found from any or all of these actions that he used the vehicle in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily harm.

An object can be a deadly weapon if the way it is used makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, including when it is thrown at someone.

Duran, Francisco Jr. · filed 2015-04-17(a)(17)(B)

In sum, we hold that a rational jury could have concluded that by throwing the DVD player at Gonzalez, appellant used the DVD player in a mannerin which it was capable of causing serious injury or death.6 See Landrian, 263 S.W.3d at 336.

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se under Section 1.07(a)(17)(A).

Willis III v. State · filed 2015-06-11(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (a)(17)(A).

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Hollins, Artavious Deon · filed 2015-10-16(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2014).

A pencil qualifies as a deadly weapon when its manner of use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Barrera, Rey · filed 2015-11-20(17)

Barrera’s use of the pencil to stab D.L. facilitated his possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution because that use made the object a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats an object as a deadly weapon per se when it is deadly by design rather than by usage; a DVD player does not qualify.

Duran v. .State · filed 2016-06-22(a)(17)(A)

To constitute . a deadly weapon per se, an object must be “deadly by design, rather than by usage,” which a DVD player-is certainly not.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats an ordinary object as a deadly weapon when its manner of use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Barrera v. State · filed 2015-10-14(a)(17)(B)

The charge authorized the jury to convict Barrera only if it found that he used or exhibited a pencil, which in the manner of its use by Barrera was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. ... Barrera’s use of the pencil to stab D.L. facilitated his possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution because that use made the object a deadly weapon.

Fire qualifies as a deadly weapon only if its use poses an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury.

Pruett v. State · filed 2015-12-10(a)(17)(B)

The evidence is sufficient to support a deadly weapon finding in this case if a rational jury could have concluded that that Appellant’s use of fire posed an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury. ... Because the evidence is insufficient to support the deadly weapon finding, we sustain Appellant’s second point and order the judgment modified to delete the deadly weapon finding.

A motor vehicle qualifies as a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

MacIas v. State · filed 2016-04-19(a)(17)(B)

The evidence presented demonstrates that Appellant’s car was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury to Officer Cunningham. We find the evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury finding, supports the conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found that Appellant’s vehicle was used or exhibited as a deadly weapon.

A vehicle qualifies as a deadly weapon only when its manner of use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and places others in actual danger of that harm.

Moore v. State · filed 2016-08-11(a)(17)(B)

In view of the lack of any evidence that Appellant was operating his vehicle in a reckless or dangerous manner when he rear-ended the BMW, as well as the lack of any evidence that his manner of use placed others in actual danger of death or serious bodily injury, there is legally insufficient evidence to support the deadly weapon finding against Appellant.

A vehicle can qualify as a deadly weapon when the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and places others in actual danger.

Cody Wayne Bedford A/K/A Cody Bedford v. State · filed 2016-09-22(a)(17)(B)

Section 38.04(b)(2)(A) of the penal code makes using a vehicle an element of the offense, and section 1.07(a)(17)(B) of the penal code makes it possible for the vehicle to be a deadly weapon. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the manner in which Appellant drove his car during the offense placed others in actual danger of death or serious bodily injury.

A motor vehicle qualifies as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Darril Hagger Karl, Jr. v. State · filed 2016-09-29(a)(17)(B)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, we conclude that it is sufficient to show that appellant’s truck qualified as a deadly weapon by his use and intended use of it.

Section 1.07(17) includes a firearm in the definition of a deadly weapon; testimony that the defendant exhibited a real gun can support a deadly-weapon finding.

Colquitt v. State · filed 2016-12-07(17)

A deadly weapon includes “a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury[,]” or “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17) (West Supp. 2016). ... Both men testified that they believed the gun was a “real” firearm. ... Based on the evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Colquitt exhibited a gun during the commission of the robbery. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conviction of aggravated robbery.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats a knife as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Mendez v. State · filed 2017-04-04(a)(17)(B)

Therefore, it is the State’s burden to not only prove that a knife was used, but that “in the manner of its use or intended use[, it was] capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2016).

Section 1.07(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon to include an object capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner it is used or intended to be used.

Leal v. State · filed 2017-04-20(17)(B)

A deadly weapon is “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17)(B). ... We conclude that the evidence cited above supports the conviction for aggravated assault.

Section 1.07(a)(17) includes a motor vehicle used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury within the definition of a deadly weapon.

Mills v. State · filed 2017-12-21(a)(17)

In addition, appellant stipulated to and was found guilty of causing death and serious bodily injury with a motor vehicle due to intoxication, which necessarily establishes that he used a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se, but does not treat every gun as one.

Castella Lee v. State · filed 2019-08-01(a)(17)(A)

A “gun” is not a deadly weapon per se, but a “firearm” is.

A knife is a deadly weapon when its manner of use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Parker v. State · filed 2019-08-27(a)(17)(B)

Considering the record as a whole, and applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Appellant used and exhibited a deadly weapon—the switchblade knife—to threaten Dickinson with imminent death or serious bodily injury as alleged in the indictment as well as the affirmative deadly weapon finding.

Section 1.07(a)(17) defines a firearm as a deadly weapon; describing an object only as a gun does not establish that it is a firearm.

Briggs v. State · filed 2020-01-16(a)(17)

As the State points out, a firearm is a deadly weapon, but a gun is not.

A baseball bat can qualify as a deadly weapon when its manner of use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Smith v. State · filed 2020-02-06(a)(17)(B)

A baseball bat is not a deadly weapon per se, but it may qualify as a deadly weapon through the manner of its use. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the cumulative force of this evidence would enable any rational factfinder to determine that Smith wielded a deadly weapon in assaulting Wife.

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se under section 1.07(a)(17)(A).

Johnson v. State · filed 2020-03-31(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is per se a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A).

Section 1.07(17) permits a truck to qualify as a deadly weapon depending on the manner in which it is used.

Tommy Jack Lewis Armstrong v. State · filed 2016-10-19(17)

Depending on the manner in which they are used, automobiles and trucks are capable of being used as deadly weapons. ... In the charge submitted to the jury in Armstrong’s case, the term “deadly weapon” was defined as: “(1) a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or (2) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” This is the same definition for “deadly weapon” that is found in the Penal Code.

A motor vehicle may be a deadly weapon when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Hoff v. State · filed 2016-10-19(a)(17)(B)

A motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se, but it may be found to be a deadly weapon if used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. ... Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Hoff used her vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, and the evidence is legally sufficient to support the deadly-weapon finding.

Section 1.07(a)(17) treats a hand as a deadly weapon only when its actual manner of use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; hypothetical capability is insufficient.

Davis v. State · filed 2017-06-01(a)(17)

Nevertheless, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used his hands in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A vehicle is a deadly weapon when its manner of use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Welch v. State · filed 2019-01-31(a)(17)(B)

For a vehicle to be considered a deadly weapon, it must be shown that the vehicle “in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B); Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798.

A revolver is a firearm and therefore a deadly weapon under section 1.07(a)(17)(A).

Lara v. State · filed 2019-02-21(a)(17)(A)

A revolver is a firearm and a deadly weapon per se.

A motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon when its manner of use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and creates actual danger to others.

Hazlewood v. State · filed 2019-06-27(a)(17)(B)

By statute, a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se, but it can be found to be a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner that is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. ... We hold that the evidence supports that appellant drove in a reckless or dangerous manner and that the manner of his use of the truck endangered others.

A hand can be a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Hocko v. State · filed 2019-11-26(a)(17)(B)

Here, the evidence was legally sufficient for a rational jury to find Appellant’s intended use of his hand was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon.

Stringer v. State · filed 2020-02-27(a)(17)

Thus, by definition, a “firearm” is a deadly weapon.

Feet qualify as deadly weapons when the way they are used is capable of causing serious bodily injury; an injury that impairs lung function and creates a risk of death is serious bodily injury.

Sorensen v. State · filed 2017-03-30(a)(17)(B), (a)(46)

Under the standards recited above, viewing this evidence and the remaining evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used at least his feet as deadly weapons because they were not only capable of causing, but did cause, serious bodily injury to Kimberly.

Section 1.07 treats a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon when the way it is used makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Winward v. State · filed 2019-02-13(a)(17)(B)

Considering the relevant factors and the evidence presented in the hearing, we conclude that a rational finder of fact could find that Winward used his truck in a way that made the truck capable of causing a death or serious bodily injury.

A motor vehicle supports a deadly weapon finding only if its use during the offense places someone in actual danger.

Clark v. State · filed 2019-03-27(a)(17)(B)

The State failed to present evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that people were placed in actual danger by Clark's operation of the vehicle during the offense for which he was charged.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) includes an object as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; the metal security rod qualified when used to strike the victim’s head.

Johnson v. State · filed 2020-03-05(a)(17)(B)

The Penal Code’s definition of “[d]eadly weapon” includes “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). ... In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could have concluded that Johnson used a deadly weapon when assaulting Girlfriend.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) allows a deadly weapon finding when the defendant’s manner of using an object is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; giving a child access to morphine with permission to take it can satisfy that definition.

Pruitt v. State · filed 2020-09-03(a)(17)(B)

Giving an underaged child unfettered access to and express permission to take a potentially deadly drug—not only without any adult supervision whatsoever but also while in the presence of other underage children—was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the manner of Appellant’s use of the morphine was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07’s definitions of deadly weapon and serious bodily injury support a proper jury charge on a deadly weapon finding.

Kenney v. State · filed 2021-03-04(a)(17)(B), (a)(46)

In this case, the jury charge tracked the statutory language of a deadly weapon finding and included statutory definitions of deadly weapon, serious bodily injury, and motor vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(17)(B), (46), 32.34(a)(2). Thus, the charge was a proper charge on the statutory issue of a deadly weapon finding.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) covers a car when the manner of its use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Daniel v. State · filed 2015-07-03(a)(17)(B)

Similarly, viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a ... reasonable doubt that appellant’s manner of using his car—including racing on a congested and busy street at night, cutting off Cabrera while requiring other cars on the roadway to adjust, “jumping back and forth” between lanes, driving “very aggressive[ly]” and more than twice the speed limit, and coming within feet of hitting the back end of Reyes-Ramirez’s car in the intersection—qualified the car as a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17) includes a knife as a deadly weapon when the evidence shows that its manner of use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Davis v. State · filed 2021-04-01(a)(17)

Consistent with Johnson, we hold the evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the knife was a deadly weapon in light of Davis’s threatening conduct and directives, his proximity to the cashier, his aggressive effort to prevent her from escaping, the knife’s “large” size, the video and photographs showing the knife’s characteristics, and the cashier’s fear of bodily injury or death.

Section 1.07(a)(17) defines a firearm as a deadly weapon; an allegation of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury or death necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon.

Broadus v. State · filed 2021-04-14(a)(17)

As such, an allegation that a defendant committed an aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury or death necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) defines a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Lewis v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-12-29(a)(17)(A)

The record before us reflects that, as in Lafleur, the trial court could have made a deadly-weapon finding (1) because the indictment alleged the use of a deadly weapon and (2) the instrument used—a firearm—was per se a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) includes a firearm in the definition of a deadly weapon.

Jennings v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-02-23(a)(17)(A)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, because the jury could have chosen to believe Ibarra’s testimony and to find Brule’s in-court testimony more credible than her statements to Jennings on Facebook (and more credible than Jennings’s statements to her on Facebook and to the police in his interview), the evidence was sufficient to establish that Jennings had a firearm, which is a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) permits an object to qualify as a deadly weapon when its intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, even if its actual use did not cause such injury.

Kosine v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-06-06(a)(17)(B)

It sufficed for the State to prove that, in the manner of its “intended use,” the stick with which Kosine struck Camille was “capable of” causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) includes a car as a deadly weapon when the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Coleman v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-11(a)(17)(B)

A deadly weapon includes “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). ... We hold that a car used in this manner is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a handgun as a deadly weapon per se.

Pena v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-27(a)(17)(A)

A handgun is a deadly weapon per se. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A); Braughton, 522 S.W.3d at 728; Mouton, 923 S.W.2d at 223.

Section 1.07(17)(A) defines a firearm as a deadly weapon.

Jordan Jr. v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-28(17)(A)

A firearm is statutorily defined as a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17)(A).

A motor vehicle qualifies as a deadly weapon when its manner of use creates an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury.

Mayo v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-06-24(a)(17)

A vehicle is not “capable of causing death or serious bodily injury” unless its manner of use presents an “actual danger” of causing such harm.

Section 1.07(17)(B) includes a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon when its manner of use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Serrano v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-11-18(17)(B)

By statute, a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se, but it can be a deadly weapon if its “manner of . . . use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”

A motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon under Section 1.07(17)(B) when its manner of use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and actually endangers others.

Gordon v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-05-30(17)(B)

By statute, a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se, but it can be a deadly weapon if its “manner of . . . use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17)(B); Couthren v. State, 571 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). ... We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Gordon’s reckless or dangerous driving actually endangered others.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats a vehicle as a deadly weapon when its manner of use creates an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury.

Lee v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-28(a)(17)(B)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the manner in which Lee used his vehicle when driving while intoxicated was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm, including a shotgun, as a deadly weapon per se.

Stewart v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-22(a)(17)(A)

A firearm, such as the shotgun here, is a deadly weapon per se.

Section 1.07(17)(B) allows a motor vehicle to qualify as a deadly weapon when its manner of use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Blankenship v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-01-22(17)(B)

By statute, a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se, but it can be a deadly weapon if its “manner of . . . use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” ... Based on our review of the evidence, we hold that the State introduced evidence of guilt embracing every essential element of the deadly weapon allegation.

A knife qualifies as a deadly weapon when its manner of use or intended use makes it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, including when it is pressed into a victim’s back to compel compliance during a robbery.

Castillo-Villamin v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-03-19(a)(17)(B)

Under the circumstances of this case, the presence of the knife during the robbery, after Castillo demonstrated to Appelgryn that it was present, was sufficient for a factfinder to conclude that the knife’s intended use was that it be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Briseno v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-05-27(17)(A)

A firearm is per se a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17)(A).

Section 1.07(17)(A) defines a deadly weapon to include a firearm.

Musgrove II v. State · filed 2008-12-18(17)(A)

A deadly weapon is defined as “a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). ... Under the appropriate standards of review and considering the statutory meaning of “used or exhibited” as defined in the referenced case law, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that Musgrove used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the charged offense of possession with intent to deliver, and we overrule his first point.

Section 1.07(17) defines a firearm as a deadly weapon.

Ervin v. State · filed 2010-12-15(17)

A firearm is a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17) (Vernon Supp. 2009).

Section 1.07(a)(17) defines a deadly weapon to include a firearm or an object capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner it is used or intended to be used.

Clayton v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-01-07(a)(17)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we hold the evidence is sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Clayton intentionally or knowingly threatened Denise, a member of his family, with imminent bodily injury and exhibited a firearm or weapon during the commission of the assault.

An indictment alleging that a defendant caused death with his hands gives notice that the State may seek a deadly weapon finding based on their use.

Turro v. State · filed 1997-07-03(a)(17)(B)

The allegation in the indictment that he caused Williams’s death by strangling her “with his hands” gave notice that the State would attempt to prove his “hands” were used as deadly weapons and that the prosecution would seek an affirmative finding as to Turro’s use of these deadly weapons.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Mejia v. State · filed 2010-03-25(a)(17)(A)

A firearm is a deadly weapon per se. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Ex parte Huskins , 176 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Use of a deadly weapon not only includes the wielding of a firearm, but also extends "to any employment of a deadly weapon, even its simple possession, if such possession facilitates the associated felony." Patterson , 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (emphasis in original).

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.

Chaney v. State · filed 2010-05-27(a)(17)(A)

To support a conviction for murder, the State was required to prove that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim's death by shooting him with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm. ... A firearm is a deadly weapon per se.

Section 1.07(a)(10) defines conduct as an act plus its accompanying mental state.

Harris v. State · filed 2012-04-06(a)(10)

By definition, "conduct" is an act plus its accompanying mental state.

Section 1.07’s definition of conduct does not exclude possession, even though possession is neither an act nor an omission.

T. Byrd AKA T. Edmond v. State · filed 1992-07-22(a)(8)

Possession is not an act or omission, but it is conduct.

Section 1.07(a)(10) defines “conduct” as an act or omission and its accompanying mental state; omitting that definition from a jury charge is error.

Smith v. State · filed 1998-03-11(a)(10)

Section 1.07(a)(10) of the Penal Code defines “conduct” as “an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(10) (Vernon 1994). Because the term is statutorily defined, the court erred by failing to provide the jury with the statutory definition in the charge.

Section 1.07(a)(10) defines conduct throughout the Penal Code as an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

Escobedo v. State · filed 2000-06-22(a)(10)

However, "conduct" has a specific definition that applies throughout the Penal Code: "Conduct means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(10) (West 1994).

Section 1.07(10) defines conduct as an act or omission together with its accompanying mental state.

Juarez v. State · filed 2010-03-31(10)

Conduct, in turn, is defined in Penal Code Section 1.07(10) as "an act or omission and its accompanying mental state." ... As our decisions make clear, the doctrine requires an admission to the conduct, which includes both the act or omission and the requisite mental state.

Section 1.07(10) defines conduct as an act or omission together with its accompanying mental state.

Juarez, Jaime Casas Jr. · filed 2010-03-31(10)

Conduct, in turn, is defined in Penal Code Section 1.07(10) as "an act or omission and its accompanying mental state." (35) ... As our decisions make clear, the doctrine requires an admission to the conduct, which includes both the act or omission and the requisite mental state.

Section 1.07(a)(10) defines conduct as an act or omission and its accompanying mental state; admitting the act alone does not admit the charged conduct for a necessity instruction.

Butler v. State · filed 2010-06-07(a)(10)

Conduct is defined as "an act or omission and its accompanying mental state." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 2009). ... Because appellant's defensive theory was predicated on a denial that he possessed the culpable mental state required to prove that he committed the offense of burglary of a habitation, appellant was not entitled to a necessity instruction.

Section 1.07(a)(22) defines the elements of an offense as forbidden conduct, required culpability, any required result, and the negation of any exception.

State v. Cooper · filed 2012-07-24(a)(22)

The elements of an offense include: the forbidden conduct; the required culpability; any required result; and the negation of any exception to the offense.

Section 1.07(a)(22) defines an element of an offense to include forbidden conduct, required culpability, a required result, or the negation of an exception.

HAAGENSEN v. State · filed 2011-06-10(a)(22)

The Texas Penal Code specifies that forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, or the negation of an exception form elements of an offense. The Texas Penal Code defines an "Element of offense" as: (A) the forbidden conduct; (B) the required culpability; (C) the required result; and (D) the negation of any exception to the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(22) (Vernon 2011). The definition of "day-care center" describes the forbidden conduct because it limits which day-care centers create a drug-free zone.

Section 1.07(a)(22) includes forbidden conduct among the elements of an offense; a day-care center’s statutory qualifications define forbidden conduct for the drug-free-zone enhancement.

Samuel Coy Haagensen v. State · filed 2011-06-10(a)(22)

The Texas Penal Code specifies that forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, or the negation of an exception form elements of an offense. ... The definition of “day-care center” describes the forbidden conduct because it limits which day-care centers create a drug-free zone.

Section 1.07(a)(22) defines an element of an offense to include forbidden conduct, required culpability, any required result, and the negation of any exception to the offense.

Van Lee Tollett v. State · filed 2007-04-05(a)(22)

The Texas Penal Code defines ''element of offense" as: ''(A) the forbidden conduct; (B) the required culpability; (C) any required result; and (D) the negation of any exception to the offense." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(22) (Vernon Supp. 2006). As discussed above, the forbidden conduct at issue is "at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing." See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.351(a). The information wholly fails to allege Tollett drove a vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent. The information fails to allege an element of the offense and, as such, is defective.

Section 1.07(a)(22) includes required culpability among the elements of an offense.

State · filed 2008-04-25(a)(22)

The Texas Penal Code defines “element of offense” as: “(A) the forbidden conduct; (B) the required culpability; (C) any required result; and (D) the negation of any exception to the offense.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(22) (Vernon Supp. 2009).

Section 1.07(a)(22) defines the elements of an offense as forbidden conduct, required culpability, any required result, and the negation of any exception.

State of Texas v. Barbernell, Stephen Gregory · filed 2008-07-02(a)(22)

First, a court must identify the elements of an offense. As recognized in Gray , the elements, defined by the Legislature, include: the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, if any, any required result, and the negation of any exception to the offense.