Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07

Section 1.07(22) defines an element of an offense as forbidden conduct, required culpability, a required result, or the negation of an exception.

Hackett v. State · filed 2008-10-30(22)

The Penal Code defines an "Element of offense" as: (A) the forbidden conduct; (B) the required culpability; (C) the required result; and (D) the negation of any exception to the offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (22) (Vernon Supp. 2008). ... There is nothing in the language of section 42.04(a) to suggest that it contains any elements of an offense. There is no forbidden conduct, no required culpability, no required result, and no exception to the offense.

Section 1.07(a)(22) defines an element of an offense to include forbidden conduct, required culpability, a required result, or the negation of an exception.

Cammack the Cook, L.L.C., Jason Cammack, Lauren Cammack, and Milton Cammack v. Eastburn · filed 2009-09-25(a)(22)

The Texas Penal Code specifies that forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, or the negation of an exception form elements of an offense. ... The definition of “day-care center” describes the forbidden conduct because it limits which day-care centers create a drug-free zone.

Section 1.07(a)(22)(B)’s definition of an offense element does not include the unavailability of the affirmative defense of duress.

Seibel v. State · filed 2014-01-23(a)(22)(B)

Its unavailability is not an element of the offense upon which the trial court was required to charge the jury and upon which the State bore any burden. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(22)(B) (West Supp. 2013), § 8.05(d) (West 2011).

Section 1.07’s definition of an element of an offense excludes venue.

Schmutz v. State · filed 2014-01-29(a)(22)

As it is not a “criminative fact,” venue is not an “element of the offense” under Texas law.

Section 1.07’s definition of an offense element excludes venue.

Schmutz, Randy · filed 2014-01-29

As it is not a "criminative fact," venue is not an "element of the offense" under Texas law.

Section 1.07(a)(22) defines the elements of an offense; the offense date pertains to limitations rather than an element.

State v. Jarvis · filed 2016-04-07(a)(22)

It includes the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, and the negation of any exception to the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(22) (West Supp.2015). The date of an offense pertains to the applicable statute of limitations, which is a defense.

Section 1.07(a)(22)(D) treats the negation of an exception to an offense as an element of the offense.

Blankenship v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-07-14(a)(22)(D)

To prove a criminal offense, “[t]he State must negate the existence of any exception to an offense . . . and the negation of an exception to the offense is an element of the offense.” State v. Laird, 208 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); see Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(22)(D), 2.02(b).

Section 1.07(a)(22)(D) treats the negation of an exception as an element of the offense that the State must prove.

Blankenship v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-11-08(a)(22)(D)

To prove a criminal offense, “[t]he State must negate the existence of any exception to an offense . . . and the negation of an exception to the offense is an element of the offense.” State v. Laird, 208 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); see Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(22)(D), 2.02(b).

Section 1.07(22) defines the elements of an offense; for failure to register, a person's status as a convicted sex offender is an element, but the facts underlying the prior sex offense are not.

Milligan v. State · filed 2000-04-20(22)

The Texas Penal Code defines "element of offense" as: "(A) the forbidden conduct; (B) the required culpability; (C) any required result; and (D) the negation of any exception to the offense." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(22) (West 1994). ... While appellant's status as a person with a reportable conviction was an element of the offense the State was required to prove, the facts underlying the sex offense are not elements of the offense of failure to register.

Section 1.07 defines a person to include an individual, meaning a living human being, even if that individual claims sovereign status.

Gray v. State · filed 2010-08-18(26), (38)

A “person,” as that term is defined by statute, means an individual, corporation, or association. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(38) (West Supp. 2009). An “individual” means a human being who is alive. Id. § 1.07(26). Gray is a person subject to the laws of this State.

Former § 1.07(38) defined “person” to include an individual, corporation, or association.

Bermudez v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-01-27(38)

Former § 1.07(38) of the Penal Code (effective at the time Appellant was indicted), which included definitions applicable to the entirety of the Penal Code, defined “person” as “an individual, corporation, or association.”

Section 1.07 defines an unborn child at every stage of gestation as an individual and a person, including for the defense of a third person.

Epps v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-30(a)(26), (a)(38)

Under the unambiguous language of the Texas Penal Code, an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth is an “individual” and a “person,” and thus a “third person” under Penal Code section 9.33.

Section 1.07(a)(30) defines “law” to include written opinions of courts of record and thus includes the common law.

State v. Taylor · filed 2010-09-14(a)(30)

Section 1.07(a)(30) of the Penal Code defines “Law” as “the constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States, a written opinion of a court of record, a municipal ordinance, an order of a county commissioners court, or a rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(30) (Vernon Supp. 2009). This 1993 statutory amendment incorporating the law as defined in the Texas Penal Code plainly includes the common law — written opinions of a court of record.

Section 1.07(a)(33) includes judicial proceedings before a public servant in its definition of an official proceeding; such a proceeding may still be underway while a defendant is escorted to a holding cell.

Walker v. State · filed 2010-10-14(a)(33)

Official proceeding is defined as “any type of administrative, executive, legislative, or judicial proceeding that may be conducted before a public servant.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(33) (Vernon Supp. 2010). ... Additionally, even though Appellant was being escorted to the holding cell when he made the statement, there is nothing in the record to show that Judge Nekhom had stated that the proceedings had ended. In fact, the court reporter was still transcribing when Appellant made the statement.

Section 1.07(a)(33) does not require proof of a prosecution or disposition of a citation to establish an official proceeding.

Fountain v. State · filed 2016-07-28(a)(33)

Barnett’s testimony and Fountain’s letter conclusively established that police had issued a disorderly-conduct citation to Fountain; no requirement exists that the State prove a prosecution or a disposition concerning the citation to meet the definition of “official proceeding.”

Section 1.07(a)(11) defines consent as assent in fact, whether express or apparent; a person’s responsive slap does not imply consent to later assaultive conduct.

Wooten v. State · filed 2011-02-07(a)(11)

The Texas Penal Code defines "consent" as "assent in fact, whether express or apparent." Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 1.07(a)(11) (West 2003). ... Her action cannot be seen as giving implied consent to his physical actions of slamming her leg in the door or pushing her into a wall.

Section 1.07(a)(11) defines consent as assent in fact; when the owner gives no consent, the taking is without effective consent.

Bozeman v. State · filed 2011-04-08(a)(11)

If the evidence shows the owner did not give any form of consent, that necessarily is evidence that the owner did not give “effective consent.”

Section 1.07(a)(11) defines consent as assent in fact, whether real or apparent; evidence that an owner gave no assent establishes a lack of effective consent.

Bozeman v. State · filed 2011-06-01(a)(11)

“Consent” means assent in fact, whether real or apparent. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(ll). If the evidence shows the owner did not give any form of consent, that necessarily is evidence that the owner did not give “effective consent.”

Section 1.07 defines consent as express or apparent assent in fact and effective consent to include consent by someone legally authorized to act for the owner.

In re D.J.H. · filed 2006-01-12(a)(11), (a)(19)

“Consent” means assent in fact, whether express or apparent. ... “Effective consent” includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, this evidence is legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not have Spielmaker’s effective consent, whether express or apparent, to re-enter Spielmaker’s residence after leaving it for the night.

Section 1.07(a)(11)’s general definition of consent does not control when the more specific definition for aggravated sexual assault applies.

Johnson v. State · filed 2007-06-20(a)(11)

In contrast, section 1.07(a)(ll)’s definition of consent is not specific to any offense. Additionally, the definition of consent contained in section 1.07(a)(ll) conflicts with the definition contained in section 22.011(b)(7) in the sense that the former is broader and less specific than the latter and could thus allow for conviction upon a wider range of facts. ... Applying the above rule of statutory construction, we hold that the trial court did not err in giving the more specific definition of consent found in section 22.011(b)(7), as alleged in the indictment here, and in rejecting the more general definition that appellant requested.

Effective consent includes consent from a person legally authorized to act for the owner; a person who returns to a residence without an invitation after being told to leave lacks effective consent.

in the Matter of D.J.H. · filed 2006-01-12(a)(19)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, this evidence is legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not have Spielmaker’s effective consent, whether express or apparent , to re-enter Spielberg’s residence after leaving it for the night.

Section 1.07(7) defines benefit as economic gain or advantage, including a gain for someone whose welfare interests the beneficiary.

Strange v. State · filed 2011-02-24(7)

“‘Benefit’ means anything reasonable regarded as economic gain or advantage, including benefit to any other person in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(7) (Vernon Supp. 2010). ... A reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the money in the account was held for the benefit of Hardesty and Vineyard.

Section 1.07(a)(7) includes points that allow replay without additional payment within the definition of “benefit” because they provide an economic gain or advantage.

State v. Gambling Paraphernalia, Devices, Equipment & Proceeds · filed 2011-05-12(a)(7)

Points which allow replay without payment of additional consideration are an economic gain or advantage, and, therefore, satisfy the definition of “benefit” found in the Penal Code.

Section 1.07(a)(6) defines benefit as economic gain or advantage without specifying a minimum value or amount.

Miller v. State · filed 1994-04-14(a)(6)

Although “economic benefit” is not defined in the Penal Code, “benefit” is defined in Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(6) (Vernon Pamph.1994) as “anything reasonably regarded as economic gain or advantage, including benefit to any other person in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested.” It is true that the plain language of sections 47.-02(b) and 1.07(a)(6) do not define a value or amount.

Under section 1.07(a)(7), more than $6,000 worth of unleaded gasoline obtained through unauthorized credit card use is a benefit.

Garza v. State · filed 2010-08-19(a)(7)

Section 1.07 of the penal code defines "benefit" as "anything reasonably regarded as economic gain or advantage, including [a] benefit to any other person in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2009). ... Based on the foregoing, we hold, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Garza knowingly presented the Mid Valley EMS credit card to obtain a benefit--more than $6,000 worth of unleaded gasoline--without the effective consent of the cardholders.

Section 1.07(34) treats a four-month impairment of breathing through the nose as serious bodily injury because it is a protracted impairment of a bodily organ.

Kenney v. State · filed 1988-03-29(34)

Poteet testified that his breathing was impaired by the injury until the time of trial, four months after the attack. ... This fact pattern falls within the definition of a protracted impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.

Section 1.07(a)(34) defines serious bodily injury to include injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes protracted impairment of a bodily member or organ.

Bosier v. State · filed 1989-05-18(a)(34)

“Serious bodily injury” means “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” ... The evidence in the record supports the jury’s finding that appellant caused the complainant “serious bodily injury.”

Serious bodily injury includes bodily injury that causes serious permanent disfigurement.

Sabedra v. State · filed 1992-08-31(a)(34)

Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that causes serious permanent disfigurement. ... We find that the evidence was sufficient to show that Samora sustained a serious permanent disfigurement.

Section 1.07(a)(46) assesses serious bodily injury as inflicted, before medical treatment lessens its effects.

Mendoza v. State · filed 1997-04-10(a)(46)

In determining whether the evidence supports a finding of serious bodily injury, the relevant issue is the quality of the injury as it was inflicted, and not after the effects are ameliorated by medical treatment.

Section 1.07(46) defines serious bodily injury by its risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ.

Carey Lynn Smith Dusek v. State · filed 1998-02-20(46)

There is no evidence that the first three conditions, either individually or collectively, created a substantial risk of death, or caused serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(46) (West 1994) (defining "serious bodily injury").

A loss or impairment of back function lasting well over a year is protracted under the definition of serious bodily injury.

Adams v. State · filed 1998-04-27(a)(8)

The loss continued for well over a year, a period long enough, in our view, to qualify as protracted.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury to include injury creating a substantial risk of death; proof of death is not required.

Ex Parte Gerald Christopher Zuliani · filed 1998-09-24(a)(46)

"Serious bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death , serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (West 1994) (emphasis added). ... The indictment does not require proof of death in order to secure a conviction.

Section 1.07(46) defines serious bodily injury by a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ.

Dusek v. State · filed 1998-11-18(46)

There is no evidence that the first three conditions, either individually or collectively, created a substantial risk of death, or caused serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury to include protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ; evidence of impaired vision and continuing eye problems can support that finding.

Chavez v. State · filed 2003-01-16(a)(46)

Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon 1994). ... This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Linda sustained serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(46) treats protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member as serious bodily injury.

Nash v. State · filed 2003-10-23(a)(46)

Applying the proper standard of review, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to demonstrate a protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member; thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to show serious bodily injury.

Serious bodily injury is assessed as inflicted; an injury does not qualify merely because it could have become serious without treatment.

Stuhler v. State · filed 2005-09-29(a)(46)

Although this evidence shows that M.V.’s constipation could have become a serious bodily injury absent medical intervention, it does not show that the injury, “as it was inflicted,” (footnote: 9) constituted a serious bodily injury as that term is statutorily defined.

Section 1.07(a)(46) includes death in the definition of serious bodily injury.

Fisher v. State · filed 2007-04-11(a)(46)

There is also no question that death is included in the definition of “serious bodily injury.”

Section 1.07(46)'s definition of serious bodily injury does not include damage to a child's mental well-being alone.

Ransdell v. State · filed 2007-05-08(46)

"Serious bodily injury" is defined by Section 1.07(46) of the Texas Penal Code as being "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(46) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Damage to the child's mental well-being does not fall within that definition.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury as injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ.

Landry v. State · filed 2007-06-05(a)(46)

Landry testified that he kicked Petrea once in the ribs, but there is no evidence that such action caused serious bodily injury to Petrea. (3) Thus, that form of aggravated assault was not raised by the evidence. ... 3. "Serious bodily injury" means "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon Supp. 2006).

Section 1.07's definition of serious bodily injury includes injuries causing loss of vision in an eye.

Kizer v. State · filed 2007-06-12(a)(46)

Karen required seventeen stitches and suffered a loss of vision in an eye. Such injuries qualify as serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(46)’s definition of serious bodily injury is not satisfied by a sole attempted punch.

Bundy v. State · filed 2009-01-15(a)(46)

“Serious bodily injury” is an injury that creates a “substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon Supp. 2008). A sole attempted punch does not satisfy these definitions.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury to include death.

Williams v. State · filed 2009-09-30(a)(46)

The definition of serious bodily injury includes death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon 2003).

Section 1.07(a)(46) includes an injury that would cause protracted loss or impairment of a bodily function without medical treatment within the definition of serious bodily injury.

Kipp v. State · filed 2009-10-09(a)(46)

The evidence presented at trial established that McQuagge suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the assault, given Dr. Read's uncontroverted testimony that if he had not performed surgery on McQuagge's facial injuries, McQuagge would have suffered protracted loss or impairment of the function of his jaw.

Section 1.07(a)(46) includes injuries that would cause protracted impairment of jaw function without surgery within the definition of serious bodily injury.

Steubing v. City of Killeen, Texas · filed 2009-10-09(a)(46)

Serious bodily injury is defined in the penal code as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (West Supp. 2008). The evidence presented at trial established that McQuagge suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the assault, given Dr. Read’s uncontroverted testimony that if he had not performed surgery on McQuagge’s facial injuries, McQuagge would have suffered protracted loss or impairment of the function of his jaw.

Section 1.07(46) defines serious bodily injury as bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death.

Barbour v. State · filed 2010-01-27(46)

A rational jury could have found Barbour's administration of morphine to C.S. caused him serious bodily injury which created a substantial risk of death.

Section 1.07(a)(17) treats an object as a deadly weapon when its manner of use or intended use makes it capable of causing serious bodily injury; actual serious bodily injury is unnecessary.

Perez v. State · filed 2010-03-25(a)(17)

Hence, here, the State was not required to show, as appellant urges, that the machete actually caused serious bodily injury to Guerrero.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury; whether loosened teeth and a possible mild concussion meet that definition can be a question for the jury.

Miller v. State · filed 2010-04-29(a)(46)

Serious bodily injury is “injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function” of a bodily organ. ... Here, Givens’s teeth were loosened, but not lost, and he may have had a mild concussion. The State did not specifically contend below that Givens’s injuries constituted “serious bodily injury.” Even had it done so, in light of current precedent, the question still would be a question of fact for the jury to decide.

Section 1.07 defines bodily injury and serious bodily injury as differing in severity; an allegation of bodily injury does not include serious bodily injury.

McCrary v. State · filed 2010-11-02(a)(8), (a)(46)

The term “bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.2010). The term “serious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46). By definition, these statutory elements differ by degree of severity. The allegation of “bodily injury” does not include “serious bodily injury.”

Section 1.07(a)(46) does not treat five days of swelling and chest pain, without protracted functional impairment or another qualifying injury, as serious bodily injury.

Benavidez v. State · filed 2010-12-16(a)(46)

The five day period between her hospital visit and her follow-up office visit where she continued to have swelling in an extremity and chest pain on movement does not elevate Coronado's injury to a serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury to include wounds whose location and severity create a substantial risk of death.

Spiller v. State · filed 2011-04-14(a)(46)

The combination of Shante’s wounds is sufficient to be considered serious bodily injury, due to the location of the wounds and the severity of damage such wounds could cause.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury; when that term is an element the jury must decide, omitting its definition from the charge is error.

in the Matter of A.C., a Juvenile · filed 2011-09-08(a)(46)

The Texas Penal Code defines “serious bodily injury” as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon 2011). Consequently, the trial court erred when it did not include the statutory definition of serious bodily injury in the charge.

Section 1.07(46) includes dental injuries that, without treatment, would cause protracted loss or impairment of the function of teeth within its definition of serious bodily injury.

Rogers v. State · filed 2011-10-20(46)

Absent dental treatment, all of Watson’s teeth would have had to be pulled and he would have been required to wear dentures; this is legally sufficient evidence of protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(46).

Section 1.07(a)(46) includes protracted impairment of the skin’s function within the definition of serious bodily injury.

Will v. State · filed 2011-11-22(a)(46)

"Serious bodily injury" is "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (West 2011). Here, the evidence supports a conclusion Terry sustained a protracted impairment of the function of his skin.

Serious bodily injury may be assessed as inflicted, even if medical treatment prevents permanent disfigurement or impairment.

Antoinette L. Sweat v. State · filed 2012-04-30(a)(46)

When determining whether a bodily injury meets the definition of "serious bodily injury," the jury may evaluate the seriousness of the injury as it was inflicted, even though its risk of death is not realized, or its disfiguring or impairing consequences are avoided, because of medical treatment. ... We are satisfied from review of the record, viewed in the proper light, that the jury rationally could have concluded that, had they not been treated, the severe lacerations would have left Merchant's neck and arm seriously and permanently disfigured.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury as an injury that creates a substantial risk of death, causes serious permanent disfigurement, or causes protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ.

Blea v. State · filed 2015-02-05(a)(46)

Considering all the evidence, we hold that there is no evidence from any source that would allow a jury to conclude or infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant’s injuries created a substantial risk of death.

Serious bodily injury includes bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death; failing to seek medical treatment can satisfy that definition when it substantially increases the risk of death.

Herrera-Garcia v. State · filed 2015-03-26(a)(46)

“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” ... Given the evidence that the complainant was in obvious physical distress and appellant’s awareness that immediate emergency medical attention should be sought, the jury could reasonably conclude that her failure to seek medical treatment increased substantially the risk of death.

Section 1.07(46) includes an injury that causes death within the definition of serious bodily injury.

Alberson, Tina Marie · filed 2015-02-06(46)

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death ..." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(46) (West Supp. 2013). ... Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant recklessly caused serious bodily ... injury to Jonathan by failing to provide him with adequate hydration.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury to include an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted impairment.

Terrence Desire Holman v. State · filed 2016-12-28(a)(46)

As defined by the Texas Penal Code, the term “[s]erious bodily injury” means an injury that “creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46). ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we hold that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that W.H. sustained a “serious bodily injury.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46).

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury to include an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ; either is sufficient.

Tufts v. State · filed 2020-09-03(a)(46)

But viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the record demonstrates that the rule Tufts points to from Estrella is satisfied and that the delay in seeking treatment in this case (1) created a substantial risk of death to Madison and (2) caused a protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ. See id.; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46). Either is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the delay caused a serious bodily injury.

Serious bodily injury includes injury that causes death; a jury may find it when a parent knowingly or intentionally causes a child’s injury by failing to provide adequate food or medical care.

Luna v. State · filed 2008-07-24(a)(46)

Serious bodily injury is injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon Supp.2007). ... The jury could have considered Dr. White’s testimony and still concluded that Luna knowingly or intentionally caused Natalie serious bodily injury by failing to provide adequate food or medical care.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury to include an injury that causes death.

Vasquez v. State · filed 2008-07-24(a)(46)

Serious bodily injury is injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

Section 1.07(a)(46) defines serious bodily injury as an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ.

Ward v. State · filed 2010-03-31(a)(46)

A serious bodily injury is one that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. ... The evidence was sufficient to support a jury conclusion that the knife was used in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Bodily injury under § 1.07(a)(7) includes injuries sustained when a victim is pushed against a wall and falls to the floor.

Johnson v. State · filed 1990-09-14(a)(7)

It is undisputed that the robber pushed the victim against the wall behind her desk, causing her to fall to the floor. Other portions of the victim’s testimony show that she sustained “bodily injury,” as that term is defined in Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(7) (Vernon 1974).

Section 1.07(7) defines bodily injury to include physical pain.

Smith v. State · filed 1992-01-15(7)

"Bodily injury" means "physical pain." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(7) (1974).

Section 1.07(a) defines serious bodily injury to include a protracted impairment of a bodily member’s function; a broken hip requiring surgery and prolonged recovery meets that definition.

Williams v. State · filed 1992-11-10(a)

Serious bodily injury is defined in part in Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a) (Vernon 1974 & Supp.1992) as bodily injury that causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. ... The evidence shows that Iglehart’s broken hip required surgery and a long period of recovery and rehabilitation, that it resulted in her having to use special devices in order to bathe and tend to her basic needs, and that she could not enjoy her gardening and other activities that she had been involved in prior to the injury.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury as actual physical pain, illness, or impairment of physical condition.

Castillo v. State · filed 1997-04-03(a)(8)

The State has to prove actual physical pain, illness, or impairment of physical condition in a robbery by bodily injury case rather than a threat of bodily injury. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8).

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

Edwards v. State · filed 2001-07-11(a)(8)

The Texas Penal Code defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. ... After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards assaulted Charles and that Charles sustained bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(8) includes physical pain caused by delayed medical care within the definition of bodily injury.

Byrd v. State · filed 2003-07-10(a)(8)

Furthermore, the State proved that D.L. suffered bodily injury because appellant failed to provide him medical care.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which a jury may infer from a cut, bruise, or scrape.

Brown v. State · filed 2005-02-17(a)(8)

Further, the existence of a cut, bruise, or scrape on the body is sufficient evidence of physical pain necessary to establish “bodily injury” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which a jury may infer from evidence of injuries.

Poe v. State of Texas · filed 2005-04-11(a)(8)

Bodily injury means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. ... The jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant pushed, struck, or choked the victim and that she suffered pain from those actions.

Section 1.07(8) includes physical pain within the definition of bodily injury.

Foster v. State · filed 2005-10-13(8)

Bodily injury includes physical pain. [2] Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient [3] to show that appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused Rice bodily injury.

Section 1.07 defines bodily injury broadly; a jury may infer physical pain from visible injuries without testimony from the injured person that she felt pain.

Smith v. State · filed 2006-06-15(a)(8)

This definition is purposefully broad and seems to encompass even relatively minor physical contact so long as it constitutes more than mere offensive touching. ... It is not necessary that the alleged victim testify that she experienced pain; the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, including an inference that the victim suffered pain as a result of her injuries. ... We hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant caused bodily injury; therefore, we overrule Appellant’s third point.

Section 1.07(8) includes physical pain within bodily injury.

Dewayne Montrell Foster v. State · filed 2005-10-13(8)

Bodily injury includes physical pain. (footnote: 2) Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient (footnote: 3) to show that appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused Rice bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which a jury may infer from injuries and the circumstances of an assault.

May v. State · filed 2006-12-05(a)(8)

Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition,” id. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2006), and is proved if the evidence shows that the victim suffered “some” pain. ... Instead, the jury reasonably could have believed that Freeman saw appellant throw Holmes to the ground by her hair and could have inferred from Holmes’s shaken demeanor, her scratched arm, and disheveled appearance that she suffered some pain as a result of appellant’s assault.

Section 1.07(a)(8) includes physical pain and impairment of physical condition within bodily injury; a complainant’s testimony about pain and limited movement can establish it without medical testimony.

Lozano v. State · filed 2007-11-29(a)(8)

Even without Dr. Milne’s testimony, Bah’s testimony that her shoulder hurt and that she could not raise her left arm above her head is enough to establish bodily injury under the broad definition in the penal code.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain.

Laredo Police Officer Ruben Nunez, in His Official Capacity and Individually v. Jimenez · filed 2007-12-12(a)(8)

The Texas Penal Code defines "bodily injury" to include "physical pain."

Section 1.07(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which can be established without proof of bruising.

Gallaway v. State · filed 2008-03-13(8)

The jury was instructed, in accordance with statute, that “bodily injury” means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(8) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007) (so defining the term). ... W.G.’s testimony that, as a result of the discipline administered at home by his mother and Kelly, his “behind” hurt to the degree he was “grabbing” it at school alone suffices to permit a rational jury to conclude appellant’s actions caused him physical pain.

Bodily injury includes physical pain or impairment of physical condition; pain need not be felt at the moment of impact.

Aguilar v. State · filed 2008-06-05(a)(8)

Further, pain is not the only element of bodily injury; the statutory definition of bodily injury also includes “impairment of physical condition.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8). ... Based on Rivera’s testimony, a rational juror could have therefore concluded that Rivera suffered bodily injury as a result of Aguilar striking Rivera.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.

Holmes v. State · filed 2008-07-31(a)(8)

Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.” ... From the officers’ testimony, a rational jury could conclude that appellant caused bodily injury to officer Glawson while the officer was lawfully discharging his duties.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain and covers minor physical contact that amounts to more than offensive touching.

Laster, Tommy G. · filed 2009-01-14(a)(8)

Bodily injury is broadly defined in the Penal Code as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical conduction." (77) This definition encompasses even relatively minor physical contact if it constitutes more than offensive touching.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain; testimony that a victim felt pain from being kicked can support that element.

Chadwick v. State · filed 2009-01-23(a)(8)

Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” ... The jury heard testimony that Rychlik felt Chadwick kick him on the leg several times and that this caused him physical pain. ... Therefore, we hold that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of assaulting a public servant.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, illness, or impairment of physical condition; bruising and shoulder pain can satisfy that definition.

Langs v. State · filed 2009-05-19(a)(8)

And, to the extent that the term bodily injury (for purposes of the robbery) encompasses “physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition,” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2008), the bruising on the victim’s knees (which indicates broken blood vessels) and her shoulder pain was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to hold, again beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant caused another to suffer bodily injury during the theft.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

Rico v. State · filed 2009-06-11(a)(8)

Bodily injury is defined as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2009).

Section 1.07(a)(8)’s definition of bodily injury includes skinned knees and the effects of pepper spray.

Earnest Dwain Morales v. State · filed 2009-08-12(a)(8)

Skinned knees and the results of the pepper spray constitute "bodily injury."

Section 1.07(a)(8) includes temporary impairment of physical condition within bodily injury and does not require medical treatment.

in the Matter of M v. Jr., a Juvenile · filed 2009-10-01(a)(8)

It does not require proof that the impairment last a certain amount of time. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8). The definition does not require that the impairment be permanent. See id. In fact, it does not even require medical treatment. See id.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain; a cut, bruise, or scrape can establish that pain.

Clayton v. State · filed 2009-10-02(a)(8)

The Texas Penal Code defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. ... The existence of a cut, bruise, or scrape on the body is sufficient evidence of physical pain necessary to establish "bodily injury" within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1.07(a)(8)’s definition of bodily injury includes skinned knees and the effects of pepper spray.

Morales v. State · filed 2009-11-04(a)(8)

Skinned knees and the results of the pepper spray constitute “bodily injury.”

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

Terriquez v. State · filed 2010-01-21(a)(8)

Deputy San Miguel testified that he felt pain when appellant struck him on the cheek. Bodily injury includes physical pain. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8).

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, illness, or impairment of physical condition; serious bodily injury is not required.

Dunn v. State · filed 2010-01-29(a)(8)

The indictment in this case charged Appellant with the offense of assault, which requires a showing of bodily injury such as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Consequently, the State was not required to show that R.D. suffered serious bodily injuries such as those that create a substantial risk of death, nor was the State required to show that Appellant used a deadly weapon, as in an aggravated assault.

Section 1.07(a)(8) does not require a visible injury to establish bodily injury; a jury may infer physical pain from the evidence.

Troyan v. State · filed 2010-03-19(a)(8)

There is no requirement that the victim have a visible injury, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2009), and juries may infer that a victim "felt or suffered physical pain," Aguilar , 263 S.W.3d at 434.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain; pain from a swollen lip satisfies that definition.

Williams v. State · filed 2010-04-23(a)(8)

"Bodily injury" is defined as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2009). ... Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that Williams recklessly caused bodily injury to Mercer.

Section 1.07(a)(8) does not require a visible injury to establish bodily injury; a relatively minor injury can suffice.

Troyan v. State · filed 2010-03-19(a)(8)

Accordingly, the fact that the visible injury was described as relatively minor does not render the conviction factually insufficient.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which a jury may infer from the victim’s injuries.

McDonald v. State · filed 2010-07-19(a)(8)

Bodily injury means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. ... A jury may reasonably infer that the victim suffered pain as a result of her injuries.

Section 1.07(a)(8) includes physical pain in the definition of bodily injury.

Baker v. State · filed 2010-11-24(a)(8)

If the jury believed the witnesses called by the State and disbelieved appellant‘s and Bryan‘s testimony, it could have rationally determined that appellant ran into the open garage, grabbed Dana‘s hair, and pulled her to the ground, causing her pain. This evidence shows that appellant attempted to commit or committed assault in the garage.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain; testimony that the victim felt pain is sufficient to establish it.

Josh Randall Riley v. State · filed 2011-11-04(a)(8)

“Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West 2011). ... Baker’s testimony that he felt pain as a result of the glass hitting him was sufficient to show bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, even without another physical impairment.

Culver v. Culver · filed 2011-12-15(a)(8)

The fact that Billy suffered only physical pain does not prevent the act from being an assault. The term “bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West 2011).

Section 1.07(a)(8) includes physical pain in the definition of bodily injury without requiring visible trauma.

Hill v. State · filed 2012-02-06(a)(8)

First, nothing in the statutory definition of "bodily injury" mentions that the physical pain alluded to must manifest itself visually on the victim's body.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

King v. State · filed 2012-03-08(a)(8)

“Bodily injury” means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”

Bodily injury may be inferred from visible injuries even without direct testimony that the injured person experienced pain, illness, or physical impairment.

Morrison v. State · filed 2012-04-26(a)(8)

This evidence allowed for an inference that Jesus suffered bodily injury despite the fact that Jesus did not testify directly that he had suffered physical pain, illness, or impairment of his physical condition.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or an impairment of physical condition.

Jeffery Neil Malnar, Jr. v. State · filed 2013-04-18(a)(8)

The term “bodily injury” refers to “physical pain, illness, or an impairment of physical condition.” ... Viewing the evidence under the prevailing standard, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant caused the child bodily injury by criminal negligence.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition; physical pain may be inferred without proof of medical treatment.

Richmond v. State · filed 2013-08-30(a)(8)

“Bodily injury” includes physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West 2011). ... Thus, despite the testimony the grandmother did not require medical attention that day, the court reasonably could have inferred from the testimony she suffered physical pain.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which a jury may infer from a swollen, split lip even if the victim felt numb immediately after being struck.

Rudolph v. State · filed 2014-07-24(a)(8)

The jury could have reasonably inferred that Johnson’s swollen, split open lip would have caused her physical pain after the shock and “numb[ness]” of the events wore off.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain without requiring visible signs of injury.

Rochell v. State · filed 2015-06-16(a)(8)

The definition of “bodily injury” does not specifically require visible manifestation of pain.

Section 1.07(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which a jury may infer from a blow even when the victim cannot describe it.

Crow v. State · filed 2016-07-21(8)

Bodily injury means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” ... Based on the contact shown via video and described in testimony, the jury reasonably could have concluded Vaughn received a blow to his head sufficient to cause physical pain constituting bodily injury.

Bodily injury includes physical pain, even from a minor contact, if the contact is more than a mere offensive touching.

Simon v. State · filed 2018-10-24(a)(8)

In evaluating the respective arguments, we note that the definition the Legislature adopted for the term bodily injury is purposefully broad and can include minor contacts should those contacts amount to more than a mere offensive touching.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain, which a factfinder may infer from a stun-gun shock.

Jackson v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-11-02(a)(8)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could infer from the evidence in this case that A.T. suffered pain when Jackson shocked her with a stun gun, which satisfies the “bodily injury” statutory element.

Section 1.07(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain or impairment of physical condition; broken ribs, a head cut, and leg swelling qualify.

Wesson v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-10-26(8)

Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(8). ... The record shows more than a hypothetical potential for danger as Appellant struck another vehicle causing bodily injury to the driver, including broken ribs, a cut on her head, and swelling in her leg.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain; pain and visible injuries can satisfy that definition.

Keylon Jr. v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-04-23(a)(8)

The evidence showed that Lisa suffered pain, sustained a swollen lip, redness, and a bite mark when Keylon assaulted her, which satisfies the “bodily injury” element.

Section 1.07(a)(8) defines bodily injury to include physical pain; pain and scratch marks that later bruise satisfy that definition.

Robert Jeremy Lane Smith v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-07-02(a)(8)

Bodily injury means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8). ... The evidence showed that during the assault Jane suffered pain and sustained scratch marks that later turned into bruises, satisfying the “bodily injury” element.

Physical pain qualifies as bodily injury, including additional pain caused by a failure to provide medical care.

Hargro v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-09-25(a)(8)

As earlier defined, “[B]odily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8). ... There is evidence that Gandara suffered bodily injury from Hargro’s omission—i.e., his failure to seek or to provide medical care caused Gandara additional physical pain.

Bodily injury includes physical pain, illness, or impairment of physical condition; a jury may infer that violently shaking a seven-week-old infant was reasonably certain to cause such injury.

Perez v. State · filed 1999-01-28(a)(8)

While it is possible that appellant did not intend to inflict this particular combination of injuries when he shook his son, or know that these particular injuries were reasonably certain to result from his actions, the jury could nevertheless infer that, at the least, appellant knew that such violent shaking of a seven-week-old infant was reasonably certain to cause physical pain, illness, or impairment of physical condition.

Section 1.07’s definition of government includes a county sheriff’s department as a branch or agency of the county.

Mills v. State · filed 1997-02-19(a)(15)

The Sheriffs Department is a branch or agency of the County.

Section 1.07(a)(24) defines government to include state agencies and political subdivisions while distinguishing those entities from the state.

Ex Parte Austin Independent School District · filed 2000-07-13(a)(24)

The legislative definition of "government" includes state agencies and political subdivisions and differentiates between these entities and "the state."

Section 1.07(a)(24) includes state agencies and political subdivisions within “government” while distinguishing them from “the state.”

Ex Parte Austin Independent School District · filed 2000-08-10(a)(24)

The legislative definition of “government” includes state agencies and political subdivisions and differentiates between these entities and “the state.”

Section 1.07(24)(C) includes a municipal police department within the definition of government.

Chambers v. State · filed 2017-05-04(24)(C)

Here, the records at issue were governmental records, at the time they were made because the police department of Indian Lake is.part of the government for purposes of the statute, and Chambers directed the falsification of the records in his capacity as police chief.

Section 1.07(42) defines reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances; whether that standard is met is generally a jury question.

Brazelton v. State · filed 1997-06-05(42)

A reasonable belief is one that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the actor. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the requested defensive instruction, appellant’s testimony is sufficient to raise the issue as to whether her belief that her actions were immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm was reasonable. We cannot say that this belief was unreasonable as a matter of law. This was a question for the jury.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief as a belief an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the actor’s circumstances.

Pennington v. State · filed 2001-10-04(a)(42)

“Reasonable belief’ means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (Vernon 1994).

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief by an objective standard based on what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the same circumstances.

Quattrocchi v. State · filed 2005-07-28(a)(42)

The “reasonable belief’ standard is an objective standard.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief as a belief an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the actor’s circumstances.

Villareal v. State · filed 2007-05-17(a)(42)

“Reasonable belief” means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor's circumstances.

Trove v. State · filed 2007-11-14(a)(42)

"Reasonable belief" means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2006). ... Therefore, if Trove believed that writing threatening letters to members of this Court was immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm, this belief was unreasonable as a matter of law.

Section 1.07(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the defendant’s circumstances.

Wood v. State · filed 2008-10-15(42)

A “reasonable belief’ is a belief that an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the same circumstances as the defendant. ... Regardless of whether or not Wood knew the attacker was McCoy, there was sufficient evidence that Wood reasonably believed her conduct was necessary to avoid imminent harm.

A reasonable belief is one an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the actor’s circumstances.

Loun v. State · filed 2008-11-20(a)(42)

The evidence, however, is sufficient to support a conclusion that Loun did not reasonably believe deadly force was immediately necessary — the third requirement of the justification. A “reasonable belief’ is “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.”

Section 1.07 defines reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor's circumstances.

Jaime Casas Juarez, Jr. v. State · filed 2009-03-25(a)(42)

"Reasonable belief" means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor. ... Viewed from Appellant's standpoint, we conclude that an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances would hold the same belief that biting Burge's finger was immediately necessary to avoid the imminent harm of suffocating.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief as a belief an ordinary and prudent man would hold in the actor's circumstances.

Walker v. State · filed 2009-10-01(a)(42)

The trial court's definition of "reasonable belief" tracked the statutory language verbatim. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42).

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Sony v. State · filed 2009-11-11(a)(42)

“Reasonable belief’ means a belief that an ordinary and prudent man would hold if he was in the same circumstances as the actor. ... After reviewing the record, we hold Sony’s testimony does not show he reasonably believed he had to immediately speed to prevent any imminent harm from occurring.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary, prudent person would hold in the same circumstances.

S. P. S. v. State of Texas · filed 2010-02-04(a)(42)

A “reasonable belief” is one that would be held by an ordinary, prudent person in the defendant’s same circumstances. Id. (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2009)).

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary, prudent person would hold in the defendant's circumstances.

Kidd v. State · filed 2010-02-04(a)(42)

A "reasonable belief" is one that would be held by an ordinary, prudent person in the defendant's same circumstances. Id. (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2009)).

Section 1.07(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the actor's circumstances.

Scroggs v. State · filed 2010-02-23(42)

A "reasonable belief" is one held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstance as the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(42) (Vernon Supp. 2009). ... Even if one accepts their contention they were motivated at least in part by concern over the possible effects of Oxycontin on Graves' unborn child, we find no reasonable person could believe the assault and kidnapping of Graves and burglary of her apartment were immediately necessary to prevent imminent harm to the child.

Section 1.07(42) defines a reasonable belief as one held by an ordinary and prudent person in the actor’s circumstances.

Scroggs v. State · filed 2010-05-19(42)

A “reasonable belief’ is one held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstance as the actor. ... Even if one accepts their contention they were motivated at least in part by concern over the possible effects of Oxycontin on Graves’ unborn child, we find no reasonable person could believe the assault and kidnapping of Graves and burglary of her apartment were immediately necessary to prevent imminent harm to the child.

Section 1.07(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the actor’s circumstances.

Gariepy v. State · filed 2010-05-19(42)

A “reasonable belief” is one held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstance as the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(42) (Vernon Supp. 2009). ... Even if one accepts their contention they were motivated at least in part by concern over the possible effects of Oxycontin on Graves’ unborn child, we find no reasonable person could believe the assault and kidnapping of Graves and burglary of her apartment were immediately necessary to prevent imminent harm to the child.

Section 1.07 defines reasonable belief as a belief an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the same circumstances.

McBride v. State · filed 2012-02-15

“Reasonable belief’ is a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as appellant.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the same circumstances.

Loris v. State · filed 2013-08-01(a)(42)

A ―reasonable belief‖ is a belief that an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the same circumstances as the defendant. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2012). ... Loris could not have entertained a reasonable belief that jumping out of a moving vehicle was immediately necessary to avoid experiencing a seizure.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines a reasonable belief by what an ordinary, prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Harper v. State · filed 2015-07-03(a)(42)

The penal code defines “reasonable belief” as “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42). ... The record reflects that Harper’s belief that it was necessary to shoot and kill a person helping his children escape from a mangled, smoking vehicle was unreasonable as a matter of law.

Section 1.07(a)(42) measures reasonable belief by what an ordinary, prudent person would believe in the actor's circumstances.

Harper, Thomas Lester · filed 2015-08-28(a)(42)

The penal code defines "reasonable belief' as "a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42). ... None of the evidence during the seven-day trial showed that Harper's shooting Robinson was immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm, or that an ordinary, prudent person in Harper's circumstances would have believed that it was.

Section 1.07(a)(42) measures a reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Bertrand v. State · filed 2019-05-22(a)(42)

A “reasonable belief” is “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2018). ... Furthermore, the jury could rationally believe Shiller’s and her mother’s testimony that Bertrand struck Shiller six more times, disbelieve Bertrand’s recollection of punching her twice, and rationally find that an ordinary prudent person would not have believed it necessary to pummel a smaller person with punches to prevent being injured by a blow from a tire brush.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the actor’s circumstances.

Smith v. State · filed 2020-02-06(a)(42)

The Penal Code defines “reasonable belief” as “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.”

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Delgato v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-06-03(a)(42)

The Penal Code defines “[r]easonable belief” as “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42). ... And there is no evidence in the record to support that Delgato’s alleged immediate necessity to throw the gun in the junkyard when he did was based on a reasonable belief that he was in danger.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Brown v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-06-08(a)(42)

“Reasonable belief” is an objective standard. See id.; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42).

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief by an objective standard: what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Spencer v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-06-08(a)(42)

“Reasonable belief” is an objective standard.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Sharpe v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-08-31(a)(42)

The “reasonable belief” standard is an objective standard. Id.; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (defining “reasonable belief” as that held by “an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor”).

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines a reasonable belief as one an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the actor’s circumstances.

Coolbaugh v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-07-27(a)(42)

“Reasonable belief” means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42). ... We conclude that the above provides some evidence that Coolbaugh had a reasonable belief that driving while intoxicated was immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm.

Section 1.07(a)(42)’s definition of “reasonable belief” applies to jury instructions on self-defense and defense of a third person.

Dean v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-02-15(a)(42)

We conclude and hold the trial court did not err by including Section 1.07(a)(42)’s definition of “reasonable belief” in conjunction with Dean’s self-defense and defense-of-a-third-person defenses and thus correctly instructed the jury on those defenses.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines a reasonable belief by what an ordinary and prudent person would believe in the actor’s circumstances.

Galvan v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-03-31(a)(42)

A reasonable belief is one held by an “ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42); Lozano, 636 S.W.3d 32.

Section 1.07(a)(42) defines reasonable belief as a belief an ordinary and prudent man would hold in the same circumstances.

Baty v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-05-27(a)(42)

Also, in accordance with the penal code, the charge defined “reasonable belief” as “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances.” See id. § 1.07(a)(42). While the jury charge omitted the language of “attempted use” in one sentence in the application paragraph, the trial court’s instructions tracked the statute’s definitions regarding self-defense, deadly force, and reasonable belief. See Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 430-431. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense, and the jury charge was not erroneous.

Section 1.07(a)(36)’s definition of “peace officer” does not include a prosecutor merely because he participates in executing a warrant.

Hart v. O'Brien · filed 1997-11-06(a)(36)

Starnes is not a sheriff or peace officer of Lamar County or the State of Texas, and is not otherwise mentioned in the warrant.

Section 1.07(a)(36) defines “peace officer” by reference to Article 2.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which includes police officers of incorporated cities.

Hadley v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-12(a)(36)

“Peace officer” means “a person elected, employed, or appointed as a peace officer under Article 2.12, Code of Criminal Procedure . . . .” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(36). ... Based on the evidence presented—including that Officer Hartman was an Aubrey police officer displaying authority by using his marked police car’s overhead emergency lights and siren—along with reasonable inferences—a rational trier of fact could have found that Officer Hartman was a “peace officer” beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 1.07(a)(26) defines an individual as a human being who is alive, so a homicide prosecution requires proof that the person was alive when the defendant allegedly caused death.

Grotti v. State · filed 2006-11-17(a)(26)

Because a homicide requires the death of an “individual” and the Texas Penal Code defines an “individual” as one “who is alive,” the State was required to show that McGhee was alive at the time Grotti allegedly caused her death.

Section 1.07(a)(26) includes an unborn child at every stage of gestation in the definition of an individual, so causing the deaths of a pregnant woman and her unborn child can constitute capital murder.

Holmes v. State · filed 2008-04-10(a)(26)

An "individual" is "a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth." Id. § 1.07(a)(26). Therefore, a person who intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a woman and her unborn child, at any stage of gestation, commits capital murder.