S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140

Section 39-5-140(a) does not entitle a plaintiff to treble damages without an adjudication of liability on the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim.

Hines v. IBG International, Inc. · filed 1987-03-23(a)

The essence of the plaintiff’s argument here is that he was entitled to treble damages under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) (1985). ... The difficulty with the plaintiff’s contention is that there has been no adjudication that anyone was liable to the plaintiff on the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim.

Section 39-5-140(d) defines a willful UTPA violation as one the violator knew or should have known violated the Act.

Haley Nursery Co., Inc. v. Forrest · filed 1989-06-12(d)

Willful violation is defined by statute as occurring “when the party committing the violation knew or should have known that his conduct was a violation of [the UTPA].” S. C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(d) (1985). ... Applying the statutory definition, we hold the record supports the trial judge’s finding the violation was not willful.

Section 39-5-140(d) permits treble damages only for willful conduct.

Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc. v. Smith · filed 1989-12-07(d)

Nevertheless, neither the use of the “little car” logo or the Lauber program was willful as that term is defined in S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(d). Consequently, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on this claim, but it is not entitled to treble damages.

Section 39-5-140 requires treble damages, attorney’s fees, and costs upon a finding of a willful SCUTPA violation.

Butler v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. (In Re Daniel) · filed 1992-03-10

If there is a finding of a willful violation of the SCUTPA, the court is required to award treble damages and attorney’s fees and costs. S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140 (1976). Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not err in awarding treble damages and attorney’s fees.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires evidence of a willful and knowing violation to support treble damages.

Top Value Homes, Inc. v. Harden · filed 1995-07-24(a)

Given this limitation on the scope of the appeal, we cannot say the trial court erred in refusing to award treble damages because the record does not show any evidence that the alleged violation of the UTPA by Top Value was willful and knowing.

Section 39-5-140 requires proof that the acts causing damages were willful to recover treble damages and attorney fees.

Global Protection Corp. v. Halbersberg · filed 1998-06-23

In order to recover treble damages and attorney fees under the UTPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate the acts causing the damages were willful. S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140 (1976). Halbersberg’s own testimony is sufficient to prove he willfully appropriated Global’s marks and packaging and he acknowledged he had done the same with other products. We hold the trial court did not err in finding Halbersberg hable for unfair trade practices and trebling the actual damages.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires treble damages for a willful or knowing SCUTPA violation and reasonable attorney's fees and costs for a successful plaintiff.

Liberty Mut. Ins. v. EMPLOYEE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT · filed 2001-03-29(a)

The jury not only found that defendant violated the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, it found that defendant committed said violation willfully or knowingly. This finding dictates that this court treble damages and award plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a).

Section 39-5-140(a) requires treble actual damages for a willful or knowing violation of section 39-5-20.

GTR RENTAL, LLC v. DalCanton · filed 2008-03-27(a)

The court concludes that Defendants’ acts were willful and knowing, and that treble damages are warranted under the SCUTPA. Therefore, the judgment as to DalCanton for violating the SCUT-PA is increased from $71,544 to $214,632.

Section 39-5-140(a) treats attorney’s fees separately from actual damages; only actual damages are subject to trebling.

Mull v. RIDGELAND REALTY, LLC · filed 2010-03-29(a)

Reading section 39-5-140(a) in its entirety leads to two conclusions: ... (2) whereas actual damages are subject to trebling, attorneys’ fees are not.

Section 39-5-140(a) provides for treble damages when a violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act is willful.

Saylor v. Kemp Custom Homes, Inc. · filed 2021-07-20(a)

For these reasons, the Court concludes a willful violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act occurred and holds that the trebling of the damages against Kemp to be appropriate, for a total award of $209,289.69.

Section 39-5-140(a) provides treble damages for a willful or knowing SCUTPA violation, and an arbitration agreement barring treble damages deprives a claimant of that statutory remedy.

315 Corley CW, LLC v. Palmetto Bluff Development, LLC · filed 2024-11-13(a)

Like in Simpson, the arbitration agreement in the Club Documents would deprive the Plaintiffs of their statutory right to treble damages for the SCUTPA claim that they bring.

Section 39-5-140(a) allows a court to award relief it deems necessary and proper for willful or knowing SCUTPA violations.

Hope Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Fagron Compounding Services, LLC · filed 2021-07-12(a)

As with the TCPA, a court may award “other relief as it deems necessary and proper” for willful or knowing SCUTPA violations. S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a).

Section 39-5-140(a) permits a private action for conduct prohibited by § 39-5-20 only when the conduct affects the public interest.

Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1987-08-31(a)

With respect to the unfair trade claim under state law, S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) creates a private right of action for persons damaged by acts or practices declared unlawful by § 39-5-20. This cause of action is limited, however, “to only those unfair or deceptive acts or practices ... that affect the public interest.” ... Accordingly, absent a showing of harm to the public interest, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count VIII as well.

Section 39-5-140 provides a private action for damage from an unfair or deceptive practice and allows treble damages for a willful or knowing violation; a claimant must show an effect on the public interest and potential for repetition.

Boyd v. Loignon (In Re Loignon) · filed 2004-01-30

The Statute provides for a private right of action for any person that is damaged by an unfair and deceptive act and treble damages are recoverable under Section 39-5-140 if the “use or employment of the unfair or deceptive ... act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of Section 39-5-20.” S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140. ... Case law in South Carolina provides that to prevail on an action under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the unfair or deceptive act or practice must impact upon the public interest and have the potential for repetition. ... Plaintiff has not alleged, nor has there been any evidence that the actions of Mr. Loignon adversely affected the public interest. Mr. Loignon only owned one vessel so there is no potential for repetition of his conduct. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and relief under the Act is denied.

A private action under § 39-5-140(a) requires proof that the challenged conduct adversely affected the public interest; a dispute limited to the parties does not suffice.

Newsmall v. Earth Management Systems, Inc. · filed 2008-07-31(a)

A plaintiff bringing a private cause of action under the UTPA is required to allege and prove the defendant’s actions adversely affected the public interest. ... We find no evidence in the record that this was any more than a dispute of the scope of the Assessment limited only to the parties involved.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits a private UTPA claim, but the claimant must show public impact; an unsupported assertion that the conduct could recur is insufficient.

Orangeburg Pecan Co. v. Farmers Investment Co. · filed 1994-07-27(a)

The South Carolina UTPA, S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a), creates a private right of action in favor of “any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by § 39-5-20.” ... Based on its examination, and the application of undisputed facts of this case to such law, the court is constrained to conclude that dismissal of Plaintiff’s UTPA is compelled because Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence whatsoever that the alleged acts of wrongdoing are capable of repetition. Accordingly, no showing of public impact exists and summary judgment under Rule 56(e) must be granted on the UTPA claim.

A private action under § 39-5-140(a) requires an adverse impact on the public interest; purely private harm provides no remedy.

Bessinger v. Food Lion, Inc. · filed 2003-11-20(a)

The court finds, in the cases before it, the only harm suffered from the alleged unfair act was purely private. Having failed to demonstrate that the act complained of adversely impacted the public interest, no remedy is available under the SCUTPA to redress the plaintiffs’ grievances.

A private claim under § 39-5-140 requires an unfair or deceptive practice that affects the public interest and has the potential for repetition.

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Suite · filed 2007-06-05

To be actionable under the act, the unfair or deceptive act or practice must have an impact upon the public interest and have the potential for repetition.

A private action under § 39-5-140 requires an adverse impact on the public interest; a general allegation that the conduct could be repeated is insufficient.

Thornton v. Johnson · filed 2020-12-07

Moreover, and separately, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently established an adverse impact on the public interest. ... While the Supreme Court of South Carolina has specified that the required public impact may be shown by the “potential for repetition” alone, this requires something more than a general allegation that the conduct “could” be repeated.

A private SCUTPA claim can satisfy the public interest element at the pleading stage by alleging similar conduct toward other independent contractors.

Acquino v. J A White & Associates Inc · filed 2021-11-12

The failure to pay other independent contractors may not ultimately prevail for purposes of establishing an impact on the public interest, but the court is constrained by South Carolina’s recognition that similar events occurring in the past may be sufficient to satisfy the public interest element of a SCUTPA claim. At this early stage in the litigation, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allow the SCUTPA claim to proceed.

Section 39-5-140(a) allows a private SCUTPA claim when the alleged unfair practice plausibly affects the public interest, including patient safety outside the parties’ contractual relationship.

Glytec LLC v. Prisma Health · filed 2026-03-31(a)

The Court finds that a hospital system testing a product that regulates a patient’s insulin in another entity’s test site without FDA approval or that other entity’s permission plausibly implicates the public interest.

A private action under § 39-5-140 requires facts plausibly showing an adverse impact on the public interest; a generalized or attenuated impact is insufficient.

PTA-FLA Inc v. ZTE Corporation · filed 2017-11-15

PTA-FLA’s complaint fails to allege facts that give rise to a plausible inference of adverse public impact. First, the allegation that ZTE Corp.’s actions delayed PTA-FLA’s ability to provide cellular telephone service to South Carolina consumers is too generalized and attenuated to constitute adverse public impact under SCUTPA.

A private action under § 39-5-140(a) does not cover unfair practices arising from an employer-employee relationship because such matters do not affect the public interest.

TELECO Inc v. Mutolo · filed 2025-06-10(a)

As such, Plaintiffs’ claims do not fall within the scope of the SCUTPA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss on Mutolo’s SCUTPA claim is granted.

In a private action under § 39-5-140(a), corporate directors and officers are liable for the corporation’s unfair trade practices only if they personally commit, participate in, direct, or authorize a violation.

Plowman v. Bagnal · filed 1994-10-19(a)

In accordance with this settled principle, we hold that in private actions under the UTPA, directors and officers are not liable for the corporation's unfair trade practices unless they personally commit, participate in, direct, or authorize the commission of a violation of the UTPA.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires proof of a UTPA violation, proximate cause, and damages by a preponderance of the evidence before a claimant may recover attorney fees.

Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Housing Corp. · filed 1995-03-13(a)

The statute clearly requires that in order to recover pursuant to the UTPA one must prove each of the following three elements by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence: 1) a violation of the Act, 2) proximate cause, and 3) damages. Although the jury found the actions of Charleston Lumber constituted an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce, it further found the Millers suffered no actual damages as a proximate result of the unfair act. Therefore, adhering to the plain language of the statute, the Millers failed to prove the elements necessary to be awarded attorney fees.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits successful UTPA plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees, and that provision does not violate equal protection.

Taylor v. Medenica · filed 1998-06-22(a)

The attorney’s fee provision of § 39-5-140 is rationally related to the policy objectives of the UTPA. Allowing plaintiffs who successfully pursue an action under the UTPA to recover their attorney’s fees encourages individuals to pursue litigation to protect the public interest. Similarly, requiring unsuccessful defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney’s fee discourages tradesmen from engaging in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts in the conduct of trade or commerce, thereby also enforcing the purpose of the UTPA. We find the attorney’s fee provision of the UTPA is a legitimate tool which supports the policy objectives of the statute. Consequently, the attorney’s fee provision does not violate equal protection.

The circuit court determines whether appellate attorney’s fees are available under § 39-5-140(a) and, if so, their amount.

Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Medenica · filed 1998-08-20(a)

Whether respondents are entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees pursuant to this statute and if so, in what amount, are questions to be determined by the circuit court.

Section 39-5-140(a) does not reserve attorney’s fees to the named plaintiff in a class action; the fees are divided pro rata among class members.

Phillips v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2005-01-05(a)

While defendants argue that this language is sufficient to show that the attorneys’ fees go to only the named plaintiff in this case because she “brought the action,” the statute is devoid of any reference to a “representative” as well as any other indication that the legislature intended any recovered attorneys’ fees to go only to the named party of a class action. Without such an indication from the legislature, the court finds that the better approach is to divide any recovery of attorneys’ fees pro rata.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits an award of reasonable litigation costs, including expert witness fees.

Maybank v. BB&T Corp. · filed 2016-06-03(a)

We therefore believe costs arising from UTPA litigation should be treated in the same manner, and may include expert witness fees.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits reasonable attorney's fees but does not require a court to award every hour requested.

Greenawalt v. Nissan North America, Inc. · filed 2025-05-28(a)

First, all of the statutes involved, including the federal Warranty Act and state Lemon Law, require a fee award to be reasonable. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-110(1) (2018) (providing for "reasonable attorney's fee[s]"); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) (2023) (providing for an award of "reasonable attorney's fees and costs"); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-28-50(D) (2018) (allowing, in the court's discretion, an award of attorney's fees "based on actual time expended" but "determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred"); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(2) (West) (same as section 56-28-50(D)). Second, we have not located a mandate in any statute or precedent requiring a circuit court to fully award the amount of attorney's fees requested via a submission of hours.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits a person to sue for the person's own ascertainable loss, but not for a company's loss.

Gray v. Riso Kagaku Corporation, Riso, Incorporated · filed 1996-04-17(a)

To the extent the alleged misconduct relates to harm to RGI, Gray does not have standing to assert that misconduct in his SCUTPA cause of action. See S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) (allowing "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property" to bring a SCUTPA claim).

Section 39-5-140(a) does not permit a plaintiff to recover for injuries suffered by others.

Wilson Group, Inc. v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc. · filed 1995-03-21(a)

The court does not believe that Wilson Group is the appropriate party to seek recovery of possible injuries suffered by the taxpayers.

Section 39-5-140(a) did not support a construction defect claim by homeowners who bought from the original owner more than three years after the builder’s initial sale.

Reynolds v. Ryland Group, Inc. · filed 2000-05-08(a)

Under South Carolina law, can Plaintiffs in a residential construction defects case sue Defendant builder, seller and developer under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act if Plaintiffs did not purchase their residences from Defendant but from the original homeowner more than three years after the initial sale? ... Although there is no specific provision within SCUPTA which limits a cause of action to an immediate purchaser, we answer the certified question in the negative.

Section 39-5-140 permits a municipality, as a legal entity, to bring a SCUTPA action for an ascertainable loss caused by an unfair or deceptive practice.

CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC v. Hotels. Com, LP · filed 2007-04-23

A SCUTPA cause of action may be asserted by any "person” who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of a defendant’s unfair or deceptive trade practice. ... As such, both Charleston and Mt. Pleasant are "legal entities” authorized to bring—with the prior approval of the Attorney General—a SCUTPA cause of action to protect their interests.

Section 39-5-140(a) allows a remote purchaser to bring an unfair trade practices claim without privity of contract.

Colleton Preparatory Academy, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc. · filed 2008-08-25(a)

In the order requesting certification, the district court asked for clarification regarding whether a remote purchaser may maintain a UTPA suit. Based on the way this question is posed, we answer, "yes." ... As the dissent in Reynolds pointed out, to hold privity is required before a party may maintain a UTPA action would lead to an absurd result. Such a finding would prohibit UTPA actions by all remote buyers and competitors, who have traditionally been allowed to proceed under the Act, because there could be no privity.

Section 39-5-140(a) allows recovery of consequential damages that naturally and proximately result from deceptive conduct.

Taylor v. Medenica · filed 1996-11-12(a)

Actual damages include special or consequential damages which are the natural and proximate result of the deceptive conduct. ... Accordingly, we conclude CIBL’s conduct did not cause Mrs. Taylor to incur $543,614.10 in ascertainable losses. Nonetheless, we find Mrs. Taylor incurred ascertainable losses of $36,242 as a result of CIBL’s deceptive practices and she is entitled to recover those losses from the laboratory.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits recovery of actual damages caused by a dealer’s deceptive failure to disclose a vehicle’s prior wreck and repair.

Wright v. Craft · filed 2006-11-27(a)

The damages Wright sustained arose out of Craft’s selling the Truck without disclosing it had been wrecked and repaired. Material evidence existed that could reasonably establish a finding of damages in the minds of the jurors.

Section 39-5-140 allows recovery of actual damages only when an unfair or deceptive practice causes an ascertainable loss.

Fields v. Yarborough Ford, Inc. · filed 1992-02-10

Under the UTPA, “[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice” may recover “actual damages.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140 (1976). ... In sum, we hold that the Fields have failed to prove that they suffered any actual damages as a result of the deceptive act.

Section 39-5-140 requires an ascertainable loss of money or property; a lawsuit dismissed before the claimant incurs legal fees does not itself satisfy that requirement.

Roddey v. NationsWaster, Inc. · filed 2005-07-28

Section 39-5-140 only protects a “person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal.” Roddey alleged NationsWaste committed an unfair trade practice against him by bringing an unfounded lawsuit. However, as the lawsuit was dismissed before Roddey obtained an attorney and he incurred no legal fees, he did not suffer an “ascertainable loss” as a result of the lawsuit.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires a claimant to show an ascertainable loss of their own and does not permit a claim for another person's loss in a representative capacity.

Wogan Ex Rel. Estate of Wogan v. Kunze · filed 2005-09-26(a)

Losses incurred by Mr. Wogan are inapposite here because Ms. Wogan is not permitted to assert a claim on his behalf. Because she did not demonstrate an ascertainable loss, and an action for losses incurred by Mr. Wogan cannot be maintained, we find the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires a plaintiff’s loss to result from the deceptive act, rather than merely coincide with it.

Collins Holding Corp. v. Defibaugh · filed 2007-04-16(a)

The UTPA only creates causes of action in those suffering a loss as a result of a deceptive act.

Section 39-5-140 requires the challenged conduct to proximately cause a loss of money or property for a claimant to recover actual damages.

Simmons v. Danhauer & Associates LLC · filed 2012-04-13

The challenged conduct must have been the proximate cause of a loss of “money or property, real or personal,” thus entitling the Simmonses to recover actual damages. S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140. ... Furthermore, the Simmonses have not established that Proxibid’s challenged conduct was a proximate cause of their alleged damages.

Section 39-5-140(a) allows a private claim based on an ascertainable monetary loss, including alleged medical costs and other out-of-pocket expenses.

Jones v. Ram Medical, Inc. · filed 2011-08-08(a)

S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) explains, “Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by § 39-5-20 may bring an action individually, but not in a representative capacity, to recover actual damages.” In Little, which is cited by the Defendants, the court noted that the “plaintiffs may have an action to recover their medical costs, lost earnings, and any other alleged out-of-pocket expenses” under the SCUTPA. Little, 1999 WL 33291385 at *11 (citing S.C.Code § 39-5-140(a)). Accordingly, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled an injury for which recovery may be sought under the SCUTPA.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires a plaintiff bringing a private action to allege an ascertainable loss of money or property.

Callum v. CVS Health Corp. · filed 2015-09-29(a)

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff does not allege an ascertainable loss of money or property in his complaint. The Court therefore grants the remaining Corporate Defendants’ motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs claim under the SCUT-PA.

Section 39-5-140 requires an ascertainable loss of money or property to recover damages under the SCUTPA.

Saferack, LLC v. Bullard Co. · filed 2018-11-27

Nonetheless, as above, SafeRack has not demonstrated any "ascertainable loss of money or property" and therefore is not entitled to damages under the SCUTPA.

A plaintiff seeking damages under Section 39-5-140(a) must present evidence of an ascertainable loss to survive summary judgment.

Charleston Development Company, LLC v. Alami · filed 2021-06-02(a)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, we find Appellants failed to present evidence of their damages. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment on Appellants' claim for violation of the SCUTPA.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits recovery of actual damages, but speculative damages are not recoverable.

Woodson v. DLI Properties, LLC · filed 2014-01-08(a)

Furthermore, Petitioners’ allegation that they suffered $3,000 in actual damages is purely speculative and, therefore, not recoverable, which we find further supports summary judgment in favor of Respondents.

Section 39-5-140 requires actual damages for a private SCUTPA action; a plaintiff who elects rescission cannot recover under it.

First South Bank v. Fifth Third Bank NA · filed 2015-11-20

Similarly, a plaintiff may only bring an action under the SCUTPA “to recover actual damages.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140; see also Fields v. Yarborough Ford, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 164, 166-67 (S.C. 1992) (explaining that a plaintiff must prove it suffered “actual damages” to recover under the SCUTPA, and that because the “two remedies [an action for damages and an action for rescission] are inconsistent,” the plaintiff “cannot in the one form of action secure the relief appropriate to the other” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Section 39-5-140(a) requires actual loss caused by an unfair or deceptive act; a difference between repair quotes alone does not establish damages.

Carolina Real Estate v. Brilin Electric · filed 2025-07-02(a)

However, a difference in quotes alone does not mean there were actual damages. Brilin never paid any of the higher quotes that CREH obtained. Brilin never showed that it sustained any injury to its property or business as a result of the higher quotes.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires a private claimant seeking actual damages to show an actual loss and a causal connection to the unfair or deceptive practice.

State Ex Rel. Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2015-02-25(a)

To recover actual damages under SCUTPA, a private claimant must suffer an actual loss, injury, or damages, and the claimant must demonstrate a causal connection between the injury-in-fact and the complained of unfair or deceptive acts or practices. S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a).

Section 39-5-140(a) requires actual damages apart from attorney’s fees; fees alone cannot support a private unfair-trade-practices claim.

SIB Development & Consulting, Inc. v. Save Mart Supermarkets · filed 2017-09-27(a)

Accordingly, Defendant’s allegation that its attorney’s fees satisfy SCUTPA’s actual damages element is incorrect as a matter of law.

A private SCUTPA misrepresentation claim requires actual injury causally connected to the deceptive act through detrimental reliance.

Doe 8 v. Varsity Brands LLC · filed 2023-06-20(a)

In contrast, a private litigant bringing a SCUTPA claim must show actual injury and a “causal connection” between that injury and the complained-of deceptive act. ... Establishing this causal connection in a misrepresentation case necessarily requires proof that the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the defendant’s deceptive conduct.

Section 39-5-140(a) requires a private plaintiff alleging a deceptive misrepresentation to show actual injury caused by the misrepresentation, including detrimental reliance.

Doe 3 v. Varsity Brands LLC · filed 2023-06-20(a)

In contrast, a private litigant bringing a SCUTPA claim must show actual injury and a “causal connection” between that injury and the complained-of deceptive act. Id. (explaining that S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) imposes “a requirement beyond the tendency to deceive element”). Establishing this causal connection in a misrepresentation case necessarily requires proof that the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the defendant’s deceptive conduct.

Section 39-5-140 requires a plaintiff to show an unlawful trade practice, resulting actual and ascertainable damages, and an adverse impact on the public interest.

Havird Oil Company, Incorporated v. Marathon Oil Company, Incorporated, and Emro Marketing Company, Incorporated · filed 1998-07-15

In order to bring an action under the UTPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice, (2) that the plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant’s use of the unlawful trade practice, and (3) that the unlawful trade practice engaged in by the defendant had an adverse impact on the public interest.

Section 39-5-140(a) permits a private damages claim for deceptive practices causing ascertainable loss when the alleged acts are capable of repetition.

DeBondt v. Carlton Motorcars, Inc. · filed 2000-07-24(a)

“Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act- or practice declared unlawful by § 39-5-20 may bring an action individually, but not in a representative capacity, to recover actual damages.” ... As alleged by deBondt in her complaint, the acts described were capable of repetition. We therefore conclude the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to both defendants on the UTPA claims at this time.

Section 39-5-140 requires a private plaintiff to show an unlawful trade practice, actual ascertainable damages caused by that practice, and an adverse impact on the public interest.

Phillips v. S.C. State University · filed 2005-05-12

In order to recover under UTPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice; (2) the plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant’s use of the unlawful trade practice; and (3) the unlawful trade practice had an adverse impact on the public interest.

Section 39-5-140 requires a claimant to show an unlawful trade practice, actual ascertainable damages caused by it, and an adverse impact on the public interest.

City of Charleston, SC v. Hotels. Com, LP · filed 2007-11-05

A cause of action pursuant to SCUTPA requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate the following: “(1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice, (2) that the plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant’s use of the unlawful trade practice, and (3) that the unlawful trade practice engaged in by the defendant had an adverse impact on the public interest.”

A private action under § 39-5-140 requires an unlawful trade practice, actual and ascertainable damages caused by that practice, and an adverse impact on the public interest.

Britt v. LivaNova PLC · filed 2023-09-06

To maintain a private cause of action under SCUTPA, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice; (2) the plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant’s use of the unlawful trade practice; and (3) the unlawful trade practice engaged in by the defendant had an adverse impact on the public interest. ... GHS, not Plaintiffs, purchased the device from Defendants, and Plaintiffs never received any communication from Defendants regarding the Sorin 3T Device. ... Accordingly, the Motion is granted as to this claim.

Section 39-5-140 governs private unfair trade practices claims without requiring a common law duty of care.

Columbia Venture, LLC v. Dewberry & Davis, LLC · filed 2010-05-12

However, Columbia Venture’s SCUTPA claims are not governed by a common law duty of care but by S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140.

Section 39-5-140 requires a private plaintiff to show an unlawful trade practice, actual ascertainable damages caused by that practice, and an adverse impact on the public interest.

Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp. · filed 2014-07-09

To maintain a private cause of action under SCUTPA, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice; (2) the plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant’s use of the unlawful trade practice; and (3) the unlawful trade practice engaged in by the defendant had an adverse impact on the public interest. ... The court finds that GAF is entitled to summary judgment on Named Plaintiffs’ SCUTPA claim because the unlawful trade practice attributed to GAF is not applicable to Named Plaintiffs since they neither purchased Timberline® 30 shingles nor received any direct communications from GAF regarding the duration of the shingles that they did purchase.

Section 39-5-140 does not permit a private UTPA claim for losses from illegal gambling, but a gambler may pursue a claim for losses incurred before video poker became illegal.

Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc. · filed 2015-10-07(a)

As a result, we hold that one engaged in illegal gambling cannot recover under UTPA. However, based on the distinct facts of this case, we find that Proctor may pursue the portion of her UTPA claim for the losses she alleged that she sustained between 1999 and July 1, 2000, the day on which the ban on video poker became effective.

Section 39-5-140(a) precludes private actions brought in a representative capacity.

Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., Inc. · filed 1999-04-28(a)

Further, assuming injunctive relief is available to a private litigant, it seems unlikely that the statute would allow for private parties to act as. private attorneys general since the statute expressly precludes private actions brought in any representative capacity. S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a). Thus, while this court would find more than adequate grounds for injunctive relief if the plaintiffs could pursue relief as private attorneys general, it finds the legal premise to be unsupported.

Section 39-5-140 bars private class actions seeking monetary damages.

In Re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation · filed 2007-06-01

First, as they point out, the statutes cannot be enforced by way of a class action suit. The clear language of all three statutes expressly states as much. ... S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(persons bringing suit under statute “may bring an action individually, but not in a representative capacity, to recover actual damages”).

Whether § 39-5-140(a) permits class actions was unsettled, so the court declined to certify a class under the South Carolina UDTPA.

In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation · filed 2008-09-26(a)

The question of whether class actions can be brought pursuant to South Carolina’s UDTPA appears to be unsettled. South Carolina’s UDTPA states that ”[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by § 39-5-20 may bring an action individually, but not in a representative capacity, to recover actual damages." S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a). However, plaintiffs contend, and cite some decisions in support of their contention, that this language is not intended to prevent class actions. In light of the unsettled nature of the law, this Court declines to certify a class under the South Carolina UDTPA.

Section 39-5-140(a) prohibits private SCUTPA class actions.

Harris v. Option One Mortgage Corp. · filed 2009-07-17(a)

It seems clear from the language of SCUTPA that class action suits are forbidden under the Act, and the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged this rule in Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir.2003).

Section 39-5-140(a) permits an individual unfair trade practices claim but bars bringing that claim in a representative capacity.

Harris v. Sand Canyon Corp. · filed 2010-07-22(a)

It seems clear from the language of SCUTPA that class action suits are forbidden under the Act, and the South Carolina Supreme Court has held as such.

Section 39-5-140(a)’s class-action restriction does not prevent a federal court from applying Rule 23 to a claim under the section.

Dremak v. Iovate Health Sciences Group, Inc. · filed 2014-01-27(a)

... South Carolina (S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a)), and Tennessee (Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-18-109(g)), do not allow class actions. ... As discussed below, the Court denies the Iovate Defendants’ motion to dismiss because the Court concludes that the claims are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which allows a class action to be maintained if certain preconditions are met.

Section 39-5-140(a) allows individual damages claims but bars representative class claims.

In re TD Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-12-10(a)

First, SCUTPA unambiguously states that the statute may not form the basis of a class action lawsuit: “Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by § 39-5-20 may bring an action individually, but not in a representative capacity, to recover actual damages.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) (emphasis added).

Section 39-5-140(a) bars these class action claims under South Carolina law, but the bar does not prevent them from proceeding in federal court under Rule 23.

In re Dealer Management Systems Antitrust Litigation · filed 2019-01-25(a)

Although it is true that Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, and South Carolina bar the kind of class action claims that Plaintiffs seek to bring here, see Alaska Stat. § 45.50.531(b) ; Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(B) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(b) ; 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/7(2) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a), Plaintiffs brought their claims in federal court-not state court. ... Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' class claims under Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, and South Carolina based on the relevant class action bars in those states.

Section 39-5-140(a) does not bar this SCUTPA class action from proceeding in federal court.

Sandee's Catering v. Agri Stats, Inc. · filed 2020-10-26(a)

Likewise here, Plaintiff’s claim under SCUTPA may proceed and is not barred by any statutory bar.

Section 39-5-140 bars a SCUTPA claim brought in a representative capacity and does not allow the claim to survive the claimant’s death.

Williams ex rel. Estate of Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC · filed 2014-04-29

By statute, however, a SCUTPA claim cannot be brought in a representative capacity — SCUPTA prohibits the survival of a cause of action after a plaintiffs death.

Section 39-5-140(a) bars a personal representative from bringing a SCUTPA survival claim on behalf of a deceased person.

Belvin v. Sedgewood Manor Health Care Center LLC · filed 2022-03-22(a)

Plaintiff is barred from bringing a claim based on a violation of SCUTPA because SCUTPA does not allow representative parties from bringing survival actions arising under the statute.

Section 39-5-140(a) bars statutory consumer fraud actions from proceeding as class actions.

Maniscalco v. Brother International Corp. · filed 2011-06-24(a)

And, indeed, there are substantial differences between the laws of the relevant state including, for example, that South Carolina does not permit statutory consumer fraud actions to proceed by way of a class action, S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a), and that California consumer protection laws only provide relief for a consumer who has purchased goods “primarily for personal, family or household purposes.”