S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803

Section 36-2-803 extends personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits of constitutional due process.

Atlantic Soft Drink Co. of Columbia, Inc. v. South Carolina National Bank · filed 1985-11-22

While it is clearly the law in South Carolina that the long arm statute, S. C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803 (1976), must be viewed as extending long arm jurisdiction to the limits imposed by the due process clause, ... the statute is subject to the bounds of constitutional due process.

Section 36-2-803 extends South Carolina personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process.

Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc. · filed 1992-01-21

Plaintiffs also look to the South Carolina Long-Arm Statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803, as a means of asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants. Under this statute, South Carolina’s jurisdiction extends to the Due Process limits.

Section 36-2-803 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, so its inquiry merges with the constitutional minimum contacts analysis.

Young v. Jones · filed 1992-10-16

South Carolina’s long-arm statute extends to the constitutional limits imposed by the due process clause. ... As a result, the state law analysis collapses into the constitutional analysis.

Section 36-2-803 permits personal jurisdiction only to the extent allowed by due process, so insufficient contacts cannot support service under the statute.

ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc. · filed 1997-10-17(1)(c) & (d)

South Carolina's long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause. ... For the reasons provided in this opinion, we reverse the ruling of the district court that the defendants were properly served under South Carolina's long-arm statute but affirm its conclusion that the district court has personal jurisdiction over Centricut and Aley.

Section 36-2-803 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process.

Moosally v. WW Norton & Co., Inc. · filed 2004-04-05

Because we treat our long-arm statute as coextensive with the due process clause, the sole question becomes whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case would violate the strictures of due process.

Section 36-2-803 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by due process, so the statutory and constitutional inquiries merge.

Callum v. CVS Health Corp. · filed 2015-09-29

South Carolina’s long-arm statute has been' construed to be coextensive with, and reach the outer limits allowed by, the Due Pro cess Clause. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 391 (4th Cir.2012) (citing Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 491, 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2005) (construing S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803 (2003))). Therefore, “the statutory inquiry necessarily merges with the constitutional inquiry, and. the two inquiries essentially become one.”

Section 36-2-803 extends South Carolina’s long-arm jurisdiction as far as due process permits.

PTA-FLA Inc v. ZTE Corporation · filed 2017-11-15

Where the forum state’s long-arm statute is coextensive with due process, as it is in South Carolina, the court’s inquiry becomes simply whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803; ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 391 (4th Cir. 2012).

Section 36-2-803 extends South Carolina’s long-arm jurisdiction as far as due process permits.

Builder Mart of America, Inc. v. First Union Corp. · filed 2002-04-29

Since South Carolina’s long-arm statute extends to the full reach of jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process Clause, we limit our inquiry to the issue of whether due process has been satisfied.

Section 36-2-803 permits specific jurisdiction to the extent due process allows, so a court may assess due process alone.

Cribb v. SPATHOLT · filed 2009-03-24

However, a more recent trend compresses the analysis into a due process assessment only.

Section 36-2-803 permits personal jurisdiction over a person who transacts business in South Carolina or commits a tortious act there in whole or in part.

Qzo, Inc. v. Moyer · filed 2004-03-15(1)(a), (1)(c)

Because Appellant was transacting business in this state, the long-arm statute is satisfied. ... Moreover, the long-arm statute is satisfied because Palmetto averred in its complaint that the alleged wrongful conduct occurred within South Carolina.

Section 36-2-803 lists the South Carolina contacts that can support long-arm personal jurisdiction.

Butler v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2010-07-09(A)

Because the conduct out of which the suit arises does not satisfy any, or fall within any, of the long-arm statutes enumerated categories, this court cannot conclude that personal jurisdiction over Snow exists.

Section 36-2-803 extends specific personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process; mere accessibility of a publisher’s website in South Carolina does not establish sufficient contacts.

Hidria, USA, Inc. v. Delo · filed 2016-03-23(A)

Courts have construed South Carolina’s long-arm statute, which affords broad power to exercise personal jurisdiction over causes of action arising from tortious acts and injuries in South Carolina, to extend to the outer limits of the due process clause. ... Hence, we agree with the circuit court that the mere accessibility of the articles via the unilateral use of the Internet by someone located in South Carolina does not satisfy the traditional minimum contacts analysis under the facts of this case.

Section 36-2-803 requires proof that a defendant purposefully availed itself of conducting activities in South Carolina to establish personal jurisdiction.

Grayson v. Anderson · filed 2016-03-07

Establishing personal jurisdiction over Vision International under South Carolina’s long-arm statute required, as a first step, that the plaintiffs prove that the defendant had “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in [South Carolina].”

Section 36-2-803(A) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent allowed by due process.

Higgins v. Tru Services Group Inc · filed 2021-08-31(A)

“South Carolina’s long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause.”

Section 36-2-803 permits personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Due Process Clause.

American Serleep Inc v. Purple Innovation Inc · filed 2025-04-29

“South Carolina's long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause.”

Section 36-2-803 reaches the limits permitted by due process, so its statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry.

Matias v. Kenda Rubber Industrial Co Ltd · filed 2025-05-14

Because South Carolina’s long-arm statute has been “interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause,” the statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry.

Section 36-2-803(A) reaches as far as due process permits, so its jurisdictional inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry.

FL Spring Hill Cortez LLC v. BC Waycross Spring Hill LLC · filed 2023-01-19(A)

“South Carolina’s long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause.” ... “Consequently, ‘the statutory inquiry necessarily merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the two inquiries essentially become one.’” ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this Court ... has general or specific personal jurisdiction over BCW, and the claims against it must be dismissed.

Section 36-2-803 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by due process, so jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant depends on sufficient contacts with South Carolina.

Campbell v. Avis Budget Group Inc · filed 2025-04-25

“South Carolina’s long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause.” ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 623. Therefore, the appropriate question for the Court in considering a personal jurisdiction defense raised by an out-of-state defendant is whether that defendant has “established minimum contacts with [South Carolina] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 36-2-803 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only when exercising it satisfies due process, including the requirement of sufficient contacts with South Carolina.

Abdulla v. Southern Bank · filed 2023-04-05

We hold the circuit court did not err in finding it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Southern Bank under the long-arm statute and Abdulla failed to demonstrate how subjecting Southern Bank to the jurisdiction of the court would not offend due process.

A nonresident’s solicitation of a South Carolina resident’s loan, together with alleged misrepresentation and tortious conduct, satisfies the business transaction and tortious act provisions.

Clark v. Key · filed 1991-05-20(1)(a), (c)

We conclude that the trial judge’s findings are supported by the evidence, and that the requirements of § 36-2-803(l)(a), (c) (1976) have been satisfied.

Section 36-2-803(1)(a) and (c) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on an out-of-state defendant’s single mailing of a file to South Carolina.

Jarrett v. North Carolina · filed 1994-11-15(1)(a) and (c)

Plaintiff asserts that this court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants under S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803(1)(a) and (c) because Defendants “transacted business in the state and committed a tortious act in whole or in part in this state,” (Pltfs Memo in Opposition, at 13), as a result of the mailing of Plaintiffs file to the South Carolina attorney. The court rejects Plaintiffs argument, and finds that this isolated fact, in itself, is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction ... over Defendants under either the long arm statute or the Due Process Clause.

Section 36-2-803 permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident director whose decisions transact business in South Carolina or whose alleged conduct contributes to a tort in the state.

Springs Industries, Inc. v. Gasson · filed 1996-04-16(1)(a), (1)(c)

Assuming that Santarlasci did not make any business decisions for New Swirl or NIC Textiles while personally in South Carolina, the court finds that the long-arm statute still authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. ... The court also finds that even if Santarlasei has not transacted business in South Carolina, Springs has alleged sufficient facts to show that Santarlasci has committed a tort in whole or in part within South Carolina for purposes of jurisdiction.

Section 36-2-803 permits personal jurisdiction based on an agent’s in-state business transactions or tortious misrepresentations when the agency relationship is sufficiently alleged at the pretrial stage.

Brown v. Investment Management & Research, Inc. · filed 1996-08-12(1)(a), (1)(c)

Because we find that at the pretrial stage Appellants sufficiently alleged an agency relationship between Respondents and Kean, jurisdiction over Respondents would meet the contacts requirements under the long-arm statute. Kean transacted business in-state for Respondents. § 803(l)(a). Additionally, Appellants have alleged fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations were made by or through Kean, both of which would constitute a tort.

Section 36-2-803(1)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a claim arising from business transacted in South Carolina through an agent when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of agency at the pre-trial stage.

M.B. Kahn Construction Co. v. Three Rivers Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2003-05-19(1)(a)

We conclude at this pre-trial stage, the evidence of an agency relationship is sufficient to support long-arm jurisdiction under § 36-2-803(l)(a).

Section 36-2-803(4) does not confer specific jurisdiction based on solicitation in South Carolina when the plaintiff’s claims do not arise from that solicitation.

E.E. ex rel. Epsey v. Eagle's Nest Foundation · filed 2016-07-29(4)

Indeed, none of the alleged solicitation by Defendant in South Carolina forms the basis of Plaintiffs suit. Accordingly, the Court cannot find specific jurisdiction exists under § 36-2-803(4).

Section 36-2-803(A) does not support personal jurisdiction based on an employee’s remote work in South Carolina when the employer did not transact business or supply services there.

Higgins v. Catalyst Exhibits Inc · filed 2021-08-31(A)

Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendants ever transacted business or supplied services in South Carolina, or that Defendants hired Plaintiff with the intent for him to transact business or supply services in South Carolina.

Section 36-2-803(1)(g) permits personal jurisdiction when a contract is performed partly in South Carolina by a resident plaintiff and all parties knew that performance would occur there.

Colite Industries, Inc. v. G. W. Murphy Construction Co. · filed 1989-02-21(1)(g)

A resident plaintiff’s performance of the contract in South Carolina constitutes part performance sufficient to satisfy § 36-2-803(l)(g) if all parties knew the performance was to take place in South Carolina. ... It is undisputed that respondent knew appellant’s performance would take place in South Carolina. We hold the trial judge erred in failing to apply § 36-2-803(l)(g).

Section 36-2-803 does not treat receipt of an unexercised power of attorney as transacting business in South Carolina; jurisdiction based on a contract requires a prima facie showing that it was to be performed in the state.

White Ex Rel. Estate of White v. Stephens · filed 1990-01-02(1)(a), (1)(g)

Therefore, we find that the mere receipt of a Power of Attorney does not constitute the transaction of business for jurisdictional purposes. ... We find that a prima facie showing of a contract to be performed in the state was not made.

Section 36-2-803(1)(g) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who contracts for work performed in South Carolina, even when the transaction is conducted by telephone.

Springmasters, Inc. v. D&M Manufacturing · filed 1991-02-11(1)(g)

South Carolina’s Long Arm Statute provides that state courts have personal jurisdiction over a “person” who transacts any business in South Carolina or who enters into a contract to be performed in whole or in part in South Carolina. ... A single transaction for the manufacture of goods, conducted by telephone and lasting several months, is sufficient to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Section 36-2-803(1)(g) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on shipment from South Carolina when shipment is a condition precedent to a brokerage agreement rather than performance required by it.

Umbro U.S.A. v. Goner · filed 1993-08-09(1)(g)

Therefore, the court finds that Umbro has failed to demonstrate that the contract was to be performed in whole or in part in South Carolina such that § 803(1)(g) applies in this case.

Section 36-2-803 provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction when a seller contracts to supply goods to a South Carolina facility, even if the contract is made elsewhere.

Wells American Corp. v. Electronics · filed 1989-07-24(1)(b)

At a minimum, it is clear that Sunshine contracted, albeit in Illinois, to provide printed circuit boards to Wells American, and that Wells American’s facility is located in South Carolina. Accordingly, the court agrees with both parties that a statutory basis for jurisdiction exists in the present case.

Section 36-2-803 does not authorize personal jurisdiction based on transacting business or a contract to be performed in South Carolina when the defendant had no other business activity in the state and the alleged contract required no action there.

Aviation Associates and Consultants, Inc. v. Jet Time, Inc. · filed 1991-02-25(1)(a), (1)(g)

Since there is no other contact or activity by Cobra which could constitute the transaction of business, we conclude that the jurisdictional requirement of § 36-2-803(l)(a) was not satisfied. ... However, the letter neither contemplated nor required any action to take place in South Carolina. Under these facts, we cannot conclude that the alleged contract was to be performed in South Carolina.

Section 36-2-803(1)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a person for a claim arising from that person’s transacting business in South Carolina, subject to due process limits.

Southern Plastics Co. v. Southern Commerce Bank · filed 1992-10-05(1)(a)

Section 36-2-803(l)(a) gives South Carolina broad powers to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person as to a cause of action arising from the person’s transacting any business in this State. We find that section 36-2-803(l)(a) applies to the facts of this case.

Section 36-2-803(1)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business in South Carolina by sending a representative there to assess proposed work.

Campbell v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. · filed 1999-11-01(1)(a)

Section 36-2-803 of the South Carolina Code confers specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in seven enumerated instances. ... Additionally, the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction under several provisions of the long-arm statute. ... To the contrary, there is sufficient allegation that Bramble/Tolchester transacted business when it sent a representative to South Carolina to assess the suitability of the vessel for the repowering service.

Section 36-2-803 permits personal jurisdiction on a claim alleging breach of a contract performed partly in South Carolina or tortious conduct causing damage there.

In Re Nine Mile Limited, D/B/A Serco Administrators and American Warranty Corporation · filed 1982-11-02(1)(c), (g)

The district court based its personal jurisdiction finding on the contract aspects of the South Carolina statute. The petitioners vigorously claim error in that Carnes was allegedly not party to any contract with them. We find no error in the district court’s conclusion. ... The contract was to be performed at least in part in South Carolina. Although we might read the contract as making only Prime Five a marketing party thereto, the petitioners’ complaint asserts that Carnes breached the contract individually. Even if Carnes was not a party to the contract, however, the District Court of South Carolina would have personal jurisdiction based on other subsections of the South Carolina long-arm statute. ... Carnes’ alleged tortious activity resulting in petitioners’ damage in South Carolina is enough for personal jurisdiction over him in that state.

Section 36-2-803(1)(f) permits personal jurisdiction over a person who contracts to insure a person, property, or risk located in South Carolina at the time of contracting.

Bell Ex Rel. Bell v. Senn Trucking Co. · filed 1992-06-08(1)(f)

South Carolina’s long-arm statute provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who contracts to insure any person, property or risk located in South Carolina at the time of contracting. S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803(l)(f) (1976).

Section 36-2-803(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident seller that transacts business in South Carolina, contracts to supply goods there, enters a contract partly performed there, and expects its goods to be used or consumed there.

Orangeburg Pecan Co., Inc. v. Farmers Inv. Co. · filed 1994-07-11(1)(a), (b), (g), (h)

The undisputed facts provide this court ample basis to conclude that Defendant’s activities have subjected it to jurisdiction under § 36-2-803(1)(a), (b), (g), and (h).

Section 36-2-803(1)(h) permits personal jurisdiction over a person whose goods are produced, manufactured, or distributed with a reasonable expectation that they will be used or consumed in South Carolina, when they are used or consumed there.

State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading, Co. · filed 2008-07-21(1)(h)

In the instant case, S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803(l)(h) (2003) ... applies to the facts of this case and states that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person ... who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person’s production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State and are so used and consumed.

Section 36-2-803(1)(c) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident for a tortious act committed in whole or in part in South Carolina, including an out-of-state act that causes injury in the state; the plaintiff must show facts connecting the alleged tort to South Carolina.

International Mariculture Resources v. Grant · filed 1999-06-28(1)(c)

Consequently, because neither the complaint nor any other evidence in the record on appeal indicates injury to ALC from Celle’s alleged torts, Mariculture has failed to bring its complaint within the scope of the long-arm statute.

Section 36-2-803(1)(h) permits jurisdiction over a manufacturer for a claim arising from goods it reasonably expects to be used in South Carolina and that are used there.

Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH · filed 1999-09-29(1)(h)

Giving Plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, she has produced sufficient evidence that Defendant Geha-Werke had a reasonable expectation that some of the shredders it manufactured would be, and in fact were, used in this State, thus satisfying subsection (h) of the long-arm statute.

Section 36-2-803(A)(4) treats an injury from medical treatment as occurring where the treatment was rendered, rather than where the patient resides.

Coggeshall v. Reproductive Endocrine Associates · filed 2007-12-20(A)(4)

Regarding subsection (A)(4), “causing tortious injury,” the tortious injury did not occur in South Carolina but in North Carolina where the medical treatment was rendered.

Section 36-2-803 permits personal jurisdiction over claims arising from business transacted in South Carolina or a contract partly performed there, even when the alleged wrongdoing occurred elsewhere.

Turner v. Pemberton · filed 1983-03-11(1)(a), (1)(g)

However, the difficulty with this argument is that the plain wording of the Long Arm Statute does not require that a cause of action arise in South Carolina. The statute only requires that a cause of action arise out of the transaction of business in this state or the entry of a contract to be performed in part in this state.

Section 36-2-803 requires a sufficiently direct connection between a defendant’s South Carolina activity and the claims asserted for specific jurisdiction.

Sheppard v. Jacksonville Marine Supply, Inc. · filed 1995-02-22(2)

Plaintiffs argue that specific jurisdiction is proper over Sharrow under S.C.Code § 36-2-803 by asserting that the fraudulent devaluation of Marinex took place, in part, in South Carolina at the Hanahan warehouse. It is the opinion of this court that to exercise specific jurisdiction over Sharrow as to Plaintiffs’ contract and fraud causes of action would require Sharrow’s activity in the state to be more directly related to those causes of action.

Section 36-2-803(B) permits a claim based solely on the long-arm statute only when it arises from an enumerated act; substantial revenue establishes contacts but is not itself such an act.

Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. · filed 2012-01-03(B)

Thus, the causes of action alleged did arise from the acts enumerated in the statute, i.e., the “act” of supplying an allegedly defective engine.7 The “substantial revenue” language is not “an act enumerated in the statute” from which a cause of action could arise, but merely refers to the minimum contacts required.

Section 36-2-803(A) reaches the limits of due process and permits specific personal jurisdiction when a nonresident directs enforcement efforts at a South Carolina business and its retailers.

Sunny Days Entm't, LLC v. Traxxas, L.P. · filed 2019-03-25(A)

"South Carolina's long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause." ... Therefore, the Court finds that the extrajudicial enforcement efforts undertaken by Defendant are sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction.

Section 36-2-803(A) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause.

Davis v. Horry County Council · filed 2019-07-23(A)

"South Carolina's long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause."

Section 36-2-803(A) extends personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits of due process; the plaintiff must show sufficient contacts with South Carolina.

Geismar North America Inc v. NPD Resources Inc · filed 2020-08-19(A)

The South Carolina long-arm statute “extend[s] to the outer limits of the due process clause.” Hidaria, USA, Inc. v. Delo, d.d., 783 S.E.2d 839, 542 (S.C. App. 2016); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803(A) (Supp. 2015). ... Based on the allegations in the amended complaint and affidavits supplied, the Court finds that Geismar has demonstrated neither that the South Carolina long-arm statute nor the Due Process Clause is satisfied.

Section 36-2-803 permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with South Carolina; a parent-subsidiary relationship alone does not establish those contacts.

Black Magic LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-15

Thus, Black Magic’s averments are insufficient to show that HFSG and HFIC established the minimum contacts with South Carolina necessary to confer specific jurisdiction under the State’s long arm statute.

Section 36-2-803 permits specific jurisdiction only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with South Carolina connected to the suit.

Fancy That! Bistro & Catering LLC v. Sentinel Insurance Company Limited · filed 2021-10-14

Thus, Fancy That’s averments are insufficient to show that HFSG established the minimum contacts with South Carolina necessary to confer specific jurisdiction under the State’s long arm statute.

Section 36-2-803 permits specific jurisdiction when the claim relates to a nonresident defendant’s South Carolina activities and exercising jurisdiction satisfies due process.

Berry v. The Secure Relationship, LLC · filed 2022-11-04

Specific jurisdiction is exercised when a cause of action is related to the defendant’s activities within the forum state. See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803; Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 416. ... For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 36-2-803(A) extends personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits permitted by due process.

Skeans v. Atlantic Marine Corps Communities, LLC · filed 2024-10-30(A)

The South Carolina long-arm statute “extend[s] to the outer limits of the due process clause.” Hidaria, USA, Inc. v. Delo, d.d., 783 S.E.2d 839, 542 (S.C. App. 2016); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803(A).

Section 36-2-803(A)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a person's interest in South Carolina real property.

Colleton River Plantation Club, Inc. v. Holmes · filed 2021-04-28(A)(5)

Because the evidence establishes Holmes still had an ownership interest in the Property during the period for which Colleton River seeks payment of the outstanding dues and fees, the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over her pursuant to the long-arm statute.

Section 36-2-803(2) bars a venue transfer for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice only when jurisdiction rests solely on the long-arm statute.

Whaley v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2005-02-02(2)

Subsection 2 provides that when jurisdiction is based solely on the long-arm statute, a trial judge is not permitted to transfer venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.9 S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803(2) (1976). ... Because we find that CSX was “doing business” in this state, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that jurisdiction was based solely on the long-arm statute. Consequently, the trial judge erred in ruling that he did not have the discretionary authority to transfer the case based on the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice.