Statute Annotations › South Carolina › S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10

S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10

Definitions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
South Carolina
Case notes
21
Cited in passing
71
Citing cases indexed
113
Case dates
1990–2022
Screened through
2026-05-14
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

92 citing cases reviewed of 113 in the citation index: 21 interpreted the section (annotated below), 71 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-14 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Employee status and independent contractors

Section 41-10-10 covers employee wages, including commissions, but excludes independent contractors; disputed employee status is for the jury to decide.

Adamson v. Marianne Fabrics, Inc. · filed 1990-04-16

Although Adamson was characterized in the contract as an independent contractor, it was for the jury to determine whether, under all the evidence, he was an employee so as to fall within the provisions of § 41-10-10 et seq. ... Accordingly, the trial Court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that § 41-10-10 applied to Adamson.
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Definition of wages

Section 41-10-10(2) excludes statutory military leave payments from wages because they are not compensation for labor rendered or leave due under an employer policy or contract.

Matthews v. City of Greenwood · filed 1991-08-05(2)

The payments claimed by Matthews are not “wages” within the quoted statutory definition. Matthew’s right to paid military leave is an entitlement created by statute, not a contractual right arising by agreement with his employer.
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Section 41-10-10(2) treats earned leave benefits as wages, including bonus pay, annual leave and retirement compensation.

Armstrong v. SCHOOL DIST. FIVE, LEXINGTON, RICHLAND · filed 1998-10-15(2)

In this case, the District’s policy revision operates to deprive Plaintiffs of lawful wages, including bonus pay, annual leave and full retirement compensation. ... Such conduct, if carried out, would clearly violate the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act.
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Section 41-10-10(2) excludes severance payments and profit sharing plans from wages, but a contractual equity interest may fall within the Act if it is not a profit sharing plan.

Osborn v. UNIVERSITY MED. ASSOC., MED. UNIV. OF SC · filed 2003-08-11(2)

It is clear that severance payments are not covered under the Payment of Wages Act because they were expressly excluded from the definition of "wages" by the South Carolina Legislature in 1990. ... Because there is no indication from the Agreement itself that Osborn was to be provided with a "profit sharing plan," in the traditional sense of that term, issues of fact remain as to whether Osborn's alleged equity interest falls under the Payment of Wages Act.
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Compensation forfeited under an enforceable employment agreement is not wages under § 41-10-10(2) because it is no longer due to the employee.

Baugh v. Columbia Heart Clinic, P.A. · filed 2013-01-16(2)

Here, because the forfeiture in Article 4 is enforceable and Respondents have forfeited their rights to compensation under that article, no evidence indicates the defined shares of accounts receivable, unpaid draws, and director’s fees are “due” to them under the Agreements. Accordingly, the items are not “wages” and the trial court erred in holding Respondents were entitled to them pursuant to their wage payment claims.
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Section 41-10-10 defines wages to include vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments due under an employer policy or employment contract.

Visco v. Aiken County · filed 2013-09-26(2)

“Wages” means all amounts at which labor rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount and includes vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are due to an employee under any employer policy or employment contract. S.C.Code Ann. § 41-10-10 (Supp.2011). ... In this action, Defendant contends that the SCPWA only required that it pay Plaintiffs benefit days in accordance with or as set forth in its ordinances. The court agrees.
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Section 41-10-10(2) defines wages to include amounts due under an employment contract; when a collective bargaining agreement is the exclusive contract, wages due are those agreed to in it.

Barton v. House of Raeford Farms, Incorporated · filed 2014-03-11(2)

The S.C. Wages Act defines the term “wages” as “all amounts at which labor rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount and includes vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are due to an employee under any employer policy or employment contract.” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10(2) (emphasis added); ... Any wages owed to the plaintiffs in this case were necessarily those agreed to in the CBA negotiated between the Union and Columbia Farms.
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Section 41-10-10’s definition of wages includes tips.

Gardner v. Country Club, Inc. · filed 2016-06-03

In light of the established purpose of the SCPWA and the analogous case law from other jurisdictions, the Court finds that tips meet the definition of wages under the SCPWA. ... Further, the Court notes that tips could plausibly fall under the “amounts at which labor rendered is recompensed” language of the SCPWA S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10.
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Section 41-10-10(2) defines wages as compensation for labor rendered; expected future earnings fall outside that definition.

Gentry v. Bioverativ US LLC · filed 2019-08-13(2)

The Act does not apply to prospective wages. ... Accordingly, the court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff seeks prospective earnings, which are not available under the Act.
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Section 41-10-10(d) defines wages as amounts due under an employment contract; lost prospective wages are not recoverable under the Payment of Wages Act.

Pastene v. Long Cove Club of HHI, S.C. · filed 2019-12-10(d)

The Act defines “wages” as “all amounts .. . which are due to an employee under any ... employment contract.” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10(d); see also Dumas v. Info Safe Corp., 463 S.E.2d 641, 645 n.4 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). The lost prospective wages that Plaintiff seeks are, therefore, not recoverable under the Wage Payment Act.
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Section 41-10-10(2) defines wages as compensation for labor already rendered, excluding prospective wages.

Mathis v. Brown & Brown of South Carolina, Inc. · filed 2010-08-09(2)

Based on the plain language of the statutes in the Payment of Wages Act, the Act does not apply to prospective wages.
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Accrued sick leave is payable as wages when it is due under an employer policy or employment contract; a void contract and no applicable policy leave no sick leave payment due.

Cunningham v. Anderson County · filed 2013-01-16(2)

However, the contract was void. Further, Cunningham has admitted that he would not be entitled to sick leave from the County if his contract is determined to be void as the County did not have a policy of compensating its at-will employees for accrued sick leave upon their termination. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment for the County on this cause of action.
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Section 41-10-10’s definition of wages includes tips.

Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon & Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2016-06-03

In light of the established purpose of the SCPWA and the analogous case law from other jurisdictions, the Court finds that tips meet the definition of wages under the SCPWA.
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Section 41-10-10 includes agreed percentage payments for client work in wages owed under an employment agreement.

Johnson v. Brock · filed 2021-11-03

Evidence supports the jury's finding that Brock failed to pay Johnson wages due pursuant to their employment relationship and agreement that Brock would pay Johnson an additional percentage for the 80% Clients.
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Section 41-10-10(2) includes vacation and sick leave payments due under an employer policy or employment contract in its definition of wages.

Minton v. Little River Electric Cooperative Inc · filed 2022-07-19(2)

SCPWA defines “wages” as “all amounts at which labor rendered is recompensed . . . and includes vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are due to an employee under any employer policy or employment contract.” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10(2). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she earned wages in the form of accrued vacation and sick leave pursuant to Defendant’s written policy and that Defendant has refused to pay all wages she earned during her employment. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant has violated SCPWA.
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Individual liability of corporate officers

Section 41-10-10(1) makes corporate agents or officers individually liable when they knowingly permit their corporation to violate the Payment of Wages Act.

Dumas v. InfoSafe Corp. · filed 1995-10-30(1)

Applying this rule of construction, we hold the legislature intended to impose individual liability on agents or officers of a corporation who knowingly permit their corporation to violate the Act. To hold otherwise would require us to ignore the words “and any agent or officer of the above classes.”
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Section 41-10-10(1) includes corporate officers in its definition of employer, but an officer without authority over wage payments cannot knowingly permit the business to withhold wages.

Gilmore v. Holiday Network · filed 2004-06-30(1)

McLaren could not knowingly permit the business to withhold wages, because there is no indication that he had the authority or power to grant or withhold wages. Therefore, we find the trial court erred in holding McLaren liable under the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act.
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Section 41-10-10 includes a company’s officer or agent in the definition of employer when that person knows of and is directly responsible for unpaid wages.

Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc. · filed 2006-07-24

Clearly, as an officer and agent of Tec-Fab with knowledge of the failure to pay Temple, and as the person ... directly responsible for such non-payment, Lytle falls under the definition of “employer” as contemplated by the statute.
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Section 41-10-10(1) permits personal liability for an agent or officer who knowingly permits a wage violation; LLC membership alone is insufficient.

Allen v. Pinnacle Healthcare Systems, LLC · filed 2011-07-27(1)

The Act, found in sections 41-10-10 to -110 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2010), defines “employer” as “every person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver, or other officer of a court of this State, the State or any political subdivision thereof, and any agent or officer of the above classes employing any person in this State.” S.C.Code Ann. § 41-10-10(1) (Supp.2010). ... Therefore, without evidence that Timothy Gunn knowingly permitted Pinnacle to violate the Act, we cannot hold him liable simply because he was a member of Pinnacle.
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Section 41-10-10 defines employer to include agents and officers who may be individually liable when they knowingly permit a company to violate the Payment of Wages Act.

Kuhn v. Inlet Creek Properties, Inc. · filed 2022-11-04

The statute defines “employer” as “every person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver, or other officer of a court of this State, the State or any political subdivision thereof, and any agent or officer of the above classes employing any person in this State.” ... South Carolina courts interpreting the SCPWA have determined the legislature intended to impose individual liability on agents or officers who knowingly permitted their company to violate the SCPWA. ... Therefore, Kuhn has sufficiently alleged that Defendants, including Raley, failed to pay all wages due to her at the time of her separation and that Defendant Raley knew of and was responsible for the failure to pay her wages.
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Corporations as employees

Section 41-10-10(1) uses “person” in its definition of employer, which does not categorically exclude a corporation from being an employee under the Payment of Wages Act.

Thornton v. Johnson · filed 2020-12-07(1)

While the SCPWA does not define the term “employee,” it defines an “employer” as “every person . . . employing any person in this State.” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10(1). The terms “person” and “individual” are not generally interchangeable within South Carolina’s statutory scheme, nor does the term “person” generally exclude corporate entities.
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71 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Madison v. Graffix Fabrix, Inc., the court cites the section while disposing of Graffix’s objection to treble wages on other grounds. opinion →
Taylor v. Cummins Atlantic, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the start of a range identifying the Wage Payment Act and decides the unpaid-wages claim under other provisions. opinion →
Belton v. State, the court cites the section’s definition of wages to support its ruling that the Board could hear an appeal about leave included in a reinstatement award. opinion →
Rice v. Multimedia, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the starting citation for the Wage Payment Act and decides the treble damages rule under § 41-10-80(C). opinion →
Keiger v. Citgo, Coastal Petroleum, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the start of a reference to the Payment of Wages Act while remanding a wrongful discharge claim. opinion →
Aiken v. County of Hampton, SC, the court cites the section for the plaintiffs’ argument about wages, then decides their salary status under federal overtime regulations. opinion →
Maher v. Tietex Corp., the court cites the section as part of a reference to the Payment of Wages Act while deciding the statute of limitations for Maher’s breach of contract claim. opinion →
Aiken v. County of Hampton, the court cites § 41-10-10 as the starting point of a reference to the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act and rejects the wage claim based on its FLSA ruling. opinion →
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act; it does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Branch v. City of Myrtle Beach, the court cites § 41-10-10 as an example of an employment statute that expressly covers public employment while deciding the scope of the right-to-work statute. opinion →
Baltimore Harbor Charters, Ltd. v. Ayd, the court lists the section among other states’ wage laws while deciding a question under Maryland law. opinion →
Trotter v. Perdue Farms, Inc., the court cites the section only as the starting point of an Act referenced in the plaintiffs’ state wage claims. opinion →
Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act, then holds that ERISA preempts Jackson’s claim under the Act. opinion →
Pitman v. Republic Leasing Co., Inc., the court cites the section to identify the Pitmans’ underlying wage claim but decides only whether Republic Leasing’s motion for sanctions was timely. opinion →
Fisher v. Wheat First Securities, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only to identify Fisher’s wage claim and decides whether Wheat First’s counterclaim was arbitrable. opinion →
Gamble v. Parker, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act; it decides that Gamble failed to prove withheld compensation. opinion →
Matthews v. Richland County School District One, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the start of a reference to the Payment of Wages Act and dismisses the appeal as untimely. opinion →
Adkins v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, the court cites § 41-10-10 only to identify the Payment of Wages Act while discussing a proposed claim under § 41-10-80(C). opinion →
Wall v. Fruehauf Trailer Services, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 as the starting point of a reference to the Payment of Wages Act while deciding the treble damages rule in § 41-10-80(C). opinion →
Leonard v. Kershaw County, the court cites the section as the start of a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act, while holding that the Magistrate’s Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for magistrate wage disputes. opinion →
Long v. Boston Scientific Corp., the court cites § 41-10-10 as the first section of the Payment of Wages Act while deciding whether the wage claim is preempted by ERISA. opinion →
Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc., the opinion cites § 41-10-10 only as the start of the Payment of Wages Act’s section range and decides the treble-damages issue under § 41-10-80(c). opinion →
Steinmetz v. American Media Services, LLC, the opinion cites the section only to identify the Payment of Wages Act as the basis for one of Steinmetz’s claims; it decides whether AMS’s arbitration appeal was properly before the court. opinion →
Newbanks v. Cellular Sales of Knoxville, the court cites the section only to identify the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act while deciding the scope of an arbitration agreement. opinion →
Riemann v. Palmetto Gems, the court cites section 41-10-10 only as the start of a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act and decides arbitrability under the parties' agreement. opinion →
Greenspan v. Brothers Property Corp., the court cites the section as the start of an Act referenced in the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim while deciding whether to remand the case. opinion →
Spirax Sarco, Inc. v. SSI Engineering, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 in a quotation defining wages, then decides whether Johnson adequately pleaded a claim under the Payment of Wages Act. opinion →
Zinn v. CFI Sales & Marketing, Ltd., the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a reference to the Wages Act and decides the reserve and charge back issue under res judicata. opinion →
Gelotte v. Davis Roofing, the opinion cites section 41-10-10 only as the first section in a citation to the Payment of Wages Act while deciding unpaid wages and remedies under the Act. opinion →
Crumbling v. Miyabi Murrells Inlet, LLC, the court cites the section only to identify the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act while deciding standing under Article III. opinion →
Weckesser v. Knight Enterprises S.E., LLC, the court cites the section to identify a wage claim while deciding whether the parties must arbitrate. opinion →
Jenkins v. Refuge Temple Church of God in Christ, Inc., the opinion cites the section only as the first provision in a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Jayroe v. Newberry County, the opinion cites section 41-10-10 only as the first provision in a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act; it decides Jayroe's compensation and remedies under other provisions. opinion →
Gould v. Worldwide Apparel LLC, the court cites section 41-10-10 only as the first section in a reference to the Payment of Wages Act and decides the writing requirement under section 41-10-30. opinion →
Doyle v. Horry County, the court quotes the section's definition of wages as background while deciding whether the claims were time-barred. opinion →
Bigleman v. Kennametal Inc., the court cites the section only as part of the Act named in the original complaint; the amended complaint did not include a wage claim. opinion →
Centraarchy Restaurant Mgmt v. Angelo, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the start of a range identifying the Wage Payment Act, then decides whether the employees’ counterclaims are precluded. opinion →
Batten v. Grand Strand Dermatology LLC, the court cites the section only to identify the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act and rejects the claim for lack of supporting evidence. opinion →
Rice v. M-E-C Company, the court cited the section only as the start of a reference to the Payment of Wages Act while adopting summary judgment on Lichtenfeld’s individual liability. opinion →
Propel PEO Inc v. Roach, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the start of a reference to the Payment of Wages Act and dismisses the claim because Roach alleged no facts showing he was an employee. opinion →
Finch v. Lowe's Home Centers LLC, the court cites the section only as the first provision in the Payment of Wages Act while describing Plaintiff’s claims. opinion →
Reed v. Grandsouth Bank, the court cites the section only as the starting point of a reference to the Payment of Wages Act when describing Plaintiff’s claims. opinion →
Howell v. Covalent Chemical, LLC, the court cites section 41-10-10 only as the first section in a reference to the Payment of Wages Act while deciding whether a forum selection clause required suit in Texas. opinion →
MEJIAS v. GOYA FOODS, INC., the court cited § 41-10-10 only as the starting point of a reference to the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act and decided a preemption defense without interpreting the definitions section. opinion →
Hedgepath v. East Richland County Public Service District, the court cites § 41-10-10 only to identify the Payment of Wages Act claim and does not decide the section’s definitions. opinion →
Keels v. Continental Tire Sumter, LLC, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the first provision in a reference to the Payment of Wages Act while listing the plaintiff's claims. opinion →
MEJIAS v. GOYA FOODS, INC., the opinion cites the section only to identify the wage claim in the complaint; the court decides a motion about communications with potential class members. opinion →
Hammonds v. Estate Management Services Inc, the court cites the section to identify the Payment of Wages Act claim, then denies a preliminary injunction for lack of irreparable harm. opinion →
Radford v. Hospital Housekeeping Systems LLC, the court quoted the wage definition while deciding a wrongful termination claim and left unresolved whether accrued PTO was wages under the section. opinion →
Bismack v. Xerox Corporation, the court cites § 41-10-10 only to identify the Act under which Bismack sued; it decides issues under other provisions. opinion →
Boyd v. Nephron Pharmaceuticals Corporation, the court cited § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a reference to the SCPWA and declined to decide the wage claim. opinion →
Helms v. Hilton Resorts Corp, the court cites the section only to identify the wage statute underlying a state law claim that it remands to state court. opinion →
Helms v. Hilton Resort Corp., the court cites § 41-10-10 only to identify the wage act, then remands the wage claim after declining supplemental jurisdiction. opinion →
Brinston v. Easley South Carolina, The City of, the court cites the section only as the start of the Payment of Wages Act range when listing the plaintiff’s claims. opinion →
Manley v. Professional Disposables International, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only to identify Manley’s Payment of Wages Act claim; it does not decide what the definitions section means. opinion →
Luce v. Lexington County Health Services District, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only to identify Luce’s Payment of Wages Act claim and does not decide the section’s definitions. opinion →
Chappell v. Ladle Soups, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference to the Payment of Wages Act and decides the claim under the Act without construing this section's definitions. opinion →
Davis v. Dynata, LLC, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the start of an Act cited among the plaintiffs’ claims. opinion →
Luce v. Lexington County Health Services District, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the starting citation for the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act while deciding immunity and joinder motions. opinion →
Adejola v. AMIkids Beaufort, Inc., the court cites the section while recounting the employer’s argument, then finds the complaint sufficient under the Payment of Wages Act without interpreting the section’s definitions. opinion →
Singletary v. King Crab Boiling Seafood and Bar, Inc., the court cites § 41-10-10 as the starting point of a reference to the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act without deciding the section’s definitions. opinion →
Saint Luke Baptist Church v. Terry, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a reference to the Wage Payment Act and decides the wage claim based on whether Terry was paid. opinion →
Singh v. Anesthesia Associates of Rock Hill, P.A., the opinion cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a reference to the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act when listing a claim, and resolves the motions on arbitration grounds. opinion →
Hess v. Morphis Pediatric Group, the opinion cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a reference to the Wage Payment Act and does not decide its definitions. opinion →
SHEPPARD v. MINDLANCE, INC., the opinion cites the section only to identify the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act among the plaintiffs’ claims and decides conditional certification under the FLSA. opinion →
Shamburg v. Ayvaz Pizza, LLC, the opinion cites § 41-10-10 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act in a footnote listing the plaintiffs’ claims. opinion →
Gabelhart v. Longhart Construction & Racking LLC, the court cites § 41-10-10 to identify the Payment of Wages Act, then decides the wage claim using the common-law test for an employment relationship. opinion →
Wilson v. Carolina Custom Painting and Drywall, LLC, the court cites § 41-10-10 only as the first section in a range identifying the Payment of Wages Act while deciding a dispute over treble damages and attorney's fees. opinion →
Moulton, the court cites § 41-10-10 as the starting point of the SCPWA while deciding claims under the Act without construing that section’s definitions. opinion →
Vander Toorn v. Billeter Recruiting, the court cited the section's definition of wages while affirming a default damages award based on the complaint, admissions by default, and testimony. opinion →
Chaney, the court quoted the section’s definition of wages while distinguishing an earlier case, then decided whether the plaintiffs’ West Virginia claims were preempted. opinion →

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