S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20

Section 39-5-20(b) directs courts to use federal interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act when construing the Unfair Trade Practices Act; an action under the Act does not require proof of fraud or irreparable harm.

State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown · filed 1982-08-24(b)

The trial court’s second ground for dismissal was the State’s alleged inability to prove fraud or to demonstrate irreparable harm or damage to any citizen. Neither of these is a prerequisite to an action under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The South Carolina Legislature directed that the courts be guided in construing the UTPA by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and by the Federal Courts to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). S. C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(b).

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair trade practices, but a claim fails when the evidence cannot reasonably support an inference of a violation.

Blanton Enterprises, Inc. v. Burger King Corp. · filed 1988-02-26(a)

Therefore, because defendants have pointed to the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and because plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence which viewed in the light most favorable to it, may reasonably be inferred to constitute an unfair trade practice violation, the court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s unfair trade practice count.

Section 39-5-20(a) does not treat a lender’s report that a defaulted loan was in foreclosure as an unfair practice when the lender had referred the loan to its foreclosure department.

Beattie v. Nations Credit Financial Services Corp. · filed 2003-05-27(a)

Assuming for the sake of argument that NationsCredit actually reported that the Beatties’ mortgage was in foreclosure, such a communication cannot be seen as being immoral, unethical or oppressive.

Section 39-5-20 does not require proof of a federal-law violation; an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce can suffice.

Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC v. Bloomberg · filed 2007-01-29

Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not need to prove any of the Defendants violated federal law in order to recover under the SCUTPA. Plaintiffs need only prove Defendants engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires a plaintiff to prove unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Hollman v. Woolfson · filed 2009-09-21(a)

To establish a cause of action under the UTPA, the plaintiff must prove unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.

A UTPA violation requires an unlawful trade practice that causes actual, ascertainable damages and adversely affects the public interest.

Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. · filed 2018-10-18

To establish a violation of the UTPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice; (2) the plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant's use of the unlawful trade practice, and (3) the unlawful trade practice engaged in by the defendant had an adverse impact on the public interest.

Section 39-5-20 does not support an unfair trade practice claim based on a distributor’s allegedly wrongful termination when the termination was lawful.

Glaesner v. Beck/Arnley Corp. · filed 1986-05-08

Glaesner has also alleged that Beck/Arnley violated the SCUTPA, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to 39-5-140, by terminating the distributorship.2 ... An unfair trade practice claim based on the alleged wrongful termination must therefore fail.

Section 39-5-20 requires evidence of unfair competition or unfair or deceptive conduct; an ordinary breach of contract alone does not establish a violation.

Pulliam Investment Co. v. Cameo Properties · filed 1987-02-09

Similarly, there is nothing in the record which might tend to show that the defendants engaged in “[ujnfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985).

Section 39-5-20(a) does not make a genuine fuel consignment or its lawful termination an unfair trade practice merely because a party considers it unfair.

Miller v. W.H. Bristow, Inc. · filed 1990-05-31(a)

The SCUTPA does not prohibit all business activities that someone may consider “unfair,” however. ... Although possibly “unfair” from plaintiffs perspective, neither the consignment arrangement itself nor the termination of the Sublease and Agreement can be considered a violation of the SCUT-PA.

A clearly stated limit on an alarm service provider’s liability is not, by itself, an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Bahringer v. ADT Security Services, Inc. · filed 2013-04-29(a)

Furthermore, Bahringer’s SCUTPA claim fails because he has not demonstrated that ADT has engaged in an unlawful trade practice. Even assuming that ADT regularly limits its liability to $500 in its alarm services contracts, such a limitation of liability is not an unfair or deceptive act.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires an exclusive dealing claim to be evaluated by defining the relevant market, assessing foreclosure of competing products and considering any procompetitive effects.

Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co. · filed 1987-02-09(a)

In summary, the appropriate analysis to apply to an exclusive dealing arrangement under the FTC Act, and therefore under the South Carolina act as well, is as follows. First, the court must determine the nature of the relevant market by identifying the particular type of goods and the geographical area involved. Second, the court must determine how much of that market has been closed off to the products of competing manufacturers because of exclusive dealing arrangements required by the defendant. In conjunction with this, the court should look at all relevant evidence indicating whether or not competitors have found or are likely to find it difficult to enter or remain in the market. Third, the court should consider any pro-competitive effects of the exclusive dealing arrangements that would justify their use.

Section 39-5-20 does not prohibit charging different prices to differently situated customers without evidence that the pricing is unfair or deceptive.

Adams v. GJ Creel and Sons, Inc. · filed 1995-10-16

The SCUTPA provides: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-20 (1985). ... There is no evidence that Creel was engaged in price fixing. We find no evidence that the price set by Creel was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or deceptive. Accordingly, we find that the Trial Court properly directed a verdict in favor of Creel on the unfair trade practice claim.

Section 39-5-20 does not prohibit selling gasoline at the same wholesale price to all wholesale customers when there is no evidence of price fixing.

Havird Oil Company, Incorporated v. Marathon Oil Company, Incorporated, and Emro Marketing Company, Incorporated · filed 1998-07-15

Under South Carolina case law, the sale of gasoline at the same wholesale price to all wholesale customers does not violate the UTPA.

Section 39-5-20 requires a likelihood of consumer confusion for a trademark infringement claim under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Johnson v. Sosebee · filed 2005-09-28

The standard for liability for trademark infringement under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act [UTPA], like that of the Lanham Act, is likelihood of consumer confusion.

Section 39-5-20 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive practices; a private claim based on it requires harm to the public interest.

Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1987-08-31

With respect to the unfair trade claim under state law, S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) creates a private right of action for persons damaged by acts or practices declared unlawful by § 39-5-20. This cause of action is limited, however, “to only those unfair or deceptive acts or practices ... that affect the public interest.” ... Accordingly, absent a showing of harm to the public interest, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count VIII as well.

Section 39-5-20 does not redress a private wrong if the challenged conduct does not affect the public interest.

LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc. · filed 1988-06-27

As a consequence, the circuit .court concluded that the Unfair Trade Practices Act is unavailable to redress private wrongs if the public interest is unaffected. ... We affirm the circuit court’s decision.

Unfair methods of competition must affect the public interest; that effect is not inherent when only two direct competitors are involved.

Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan · filed 1989-05-01(a)

Florence Paper also contends that unfair methods of competition inherently involve acts which impact public interst. While we do not reject this idea, we conclude that such an impact could not be inherent in this situation where only two direct competitors are involved.

Section 39-5-20 requires a competitor to show an effect on the public interest and unfair or deceptive conduct.

Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware · filed 1992-11-19

Therefore, all that is present in this case is a disappointed competitor with no impact upon the public interest. Additionally, the court finds that Lifschultz has failed to present evidence that any acts committed by the defendants were unfair or deceptive in any way. For these reasons, summary judgment must be granted as to the SCUTPA claim.

An unfair act that affects only the parties to a transaction and has no impact on the public interest does not support a claim under the UTPA.

Wade v. Waites · filed 1993-03-30(a)

The Wades' evidence clearly indicates that the allegedly unfair act by Waites only affected the Wades. Thus, we conclude that the Wades' claim against Waites involved a purely private dispute between two parties. In such circumstances, there is no claim under the UTPA.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires an unfair trade practice to adversely affect the public; potential repetition or conduct in a business setting alone is insufficient when only the parties are affected.

Daisy Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Abbott · filed 1994-09-06(a)

Merely offering evidence, however, that shows a wrongful act has the potential for repetition or that it occurs in the course of business is not enough to establish a violation of the UTPA if, as the evidence shows here, the conduct adversely affects only the parties involved.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires specific facts showing public harm or a real potential for repetition; an alleged breach of a private commercial contract alone does not violate it.

Wilson Group, Inc. v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc. · filed 1995-03-21(a)

Wilson Group has failed to set forth specific facts to demonstrate that members of the public were adversely affected by Quorum’s alleged acts. Furthermore, Wilson Group has failed to set forth facts showing a real potential for repetition. This action involves an alleged intentional breach of contract within a commercial setting. South Carolina courts have held such a breach is not a violation of the UTPA.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires an unfair or deceptive trade practice to affect the public interest. Prior opportunities for similar transactions alone do not establish a potential for repetition.

Crary v. Djebelli · filed 1995-12-28(a)

This testimony, however, is insufficient to prove a potential for repetition without proof that they also engaged in unfair or deceptive acts when they had those opportunities in the past or that they were inclined to engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices if given the opportunity in the future.

Section 39-5-20’s public interest requirement for a private claim is satisfied by evidence that the unfair or deceptive act has the potential for repetition.

Daisy Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Abbott · filed 1996-07-15

Prior case law makes very clear that evidence of a potential for repetition, generally speaking, in and of itself establishes the required public impact.

Section 39-5-20 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice that affects the public interest.

Craig v. Andrew Aaron & Associates, Inc. · filed 1996-11-13

To prove their claim for violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-20 (1976) (SCUT-PA), plaintiffs must demonstrate not only that Myers actions were an unfair or deceptive act or practice, but that they have an impact on the public interest.

Section 39-5-20 covers deceptive product packaging when the practice affects the public interest, as shown by repeated sales of the deceptively packaged product.

Global Protection Corp. v. Halbersberg · filed 1998-06-23(a)

Furthermore, because the copying produced a substantially identical product, a consumer had no way of knowing the truth about the source of the item in question. Halbersberg testified he sold approximately 48,000 condoms, each of which was deceptive. We think this supports the master’s finding that the public interest requirement was met.

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices, and alleged deceptive sales practices capable of repetition may support a claim under it.

DeBondt v. Carlton Motorcars, Inc. · filed 2000-07-24(a)

As alleged by deBondt in her complaint, the acts described were capable of repetition. We therefore conclude the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to both defendants on the UTPA claims at this time.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires proof that an unfair trade practice affects the public interest; harm confined to the parties, without evidence of potential repetition, is insufficient.

Brown v. Goode (In Re Brown) · filed 2001-08-24(a)

As for the last factor, courts have emphasized that an unfair trade practice is deemed to have an adverse impact on the public interest when such practice has potential for repetition. ... Despite Defendants’ wrongdoings and unlawful practices in this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have only offered proof of how Defendants’ actions impacted them directly, and no evidence was presented to demonstrate that Defendants could potentially engage in these practices repetitively. Therefore, the Court finds that no recovery is warranted in this case under the UTPA.

A private claim under § 39-5-20 requires evidence of an unfair or deceptive trade practice affecting the public interest.

Robertson v. First Union National Bank · filed 2002-05-13

The trial judge found that “there is no evidence of an act or practice that is unfair or one that affects the public interest.” We agree. ... Therefore, summary judgment on this issue was proper.

A claim under § 39-5-20(a) requires evidence of an unlawful trade practice and an adverse impact on the public interest; unsupported allegations in another complaint do not establish that impact.

Beattie v. Nations Credit Financial Services Corp. · filed 2003-06-27(a)

The SCUTPA prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a). ... Thus, the bare allegations of McCain’s complaint offered without further evidentiary support did not establish an adverse impact on the public interest and were not sufficient to withstand NationsCredit’s factually supported request for summary judgment.

A private claim for an unfair or deceptive trade practice requires evidence of public impact or a potential for repetition.

Burdette v. Turner · filed 2004-01-29(a)

In a light most favorable to Buyers, no evidence exists within the record indicating the actions of Seller, Broker, or the Baron Agency, if unfair or deceptive, had a public impact or a potential for repetition.

Section 39-5-20 prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices; a private claim requires an adverse effect on the public interest and potential for repetition.

Boyd v. Loignon (In Re Loignon) · filed 2004-01-30

Case law in South Carolina provides that to prevail on an action under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the unfair or deceptive act or practice must impact upon the public interest and have the potential for repetition. ... Plaintiff has not alleged, nor has there been any evidence that the actions of Mr. Loignon adversely affected the public interest. Mr. Loignon only owned one vessel so there is no potential for repetition of his conduct. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and relief under the Act is denied.

An unfair or deceptive practice is actionable under Section 39-5-20 only if it affects the public interest and has the potential for repetition.

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Suite · filed 2007-06-05(a)

To be actionable under the act, the unfair or deceptive act or practice must have an impact upon the public interest and have the potential for repetition.

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices; a private claim requires evidence that the conduct affected the public interest.

Dove Data Products, Inc. v. DeVeaux · filed 2008-03-24(a)

As in Florence , Dove Data failed to present evidence the greater public interest was actually affected by DeVeaux’s actions. Therefore, we find the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the UTPA claim in favor of DeVeaux.

A claim under § 39-5-20 requires specific facts showing that the challenged conduct could adversely affect the public, such as a potential for repetition.

Adrian v. Mesirow Financial Structured Settlements, LLC · filed 2009-08-25

With no factual allegations indicating that Mesirow has ever acted in unfair or deceiving ways in the past, and no factual allegations that Mesirow has any sort of policy, procedure, training method, or other likely-to-be-repeated operations, plaintiffs proposed second amended complaint fails to show any potential impact on the public interest as required for an actionable SCUTPA claim.

A claim under § 39-5-20 requires facts showing an adverse effect on the public interest; a conclusory allegation that the conduct could be repeated is insufficient.

Ameristone Tile, LLC v. Ceramic Consulting Corp. · filed 2013-08-19(a)

However, beyond this conclusory statement, Ameristone provides no specific facts demonstrating that the Defendants have conducted the same kind of actions in the past or that their procedures or business practices created a potential for repetition in the future. Without more, the *622Court concludes that Ameristone has failed to allege facts to establish an adverse effect on the public interest sufficient to recover under the SCUTPA.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires an unfair or deceptive practice to affect the public interest; evidence of a potential for repetition can establish that impact.

Skywaves I Corp. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. · filed 2018-05-02(a)

In order to be actionable under SCUTPA, the unfair or deceptive act or practice must have an impact on the public interest.

Section 39-5-20(a)'s public interest requirement is not met when an unfair billing practice has no demonstrated potential for repetition.

Turner v. Kellett · filed 2019-02-06(a)

As a result of these actions, there was no potential for either Finchem or the Kelletts to further engage in unfair business practices through Buddy's Garage. ... Based on the foregoing, we find Turner failed to meet the public interest prong of the Act.

Section 39-5-20(a) covers a lender's unfair practice of force-placing hazard insurance in breach of a mortgage contract when the practice has the potential for repetition.

Beneficial Financial I v. Windham · filed 2020-08-05(a)

Beneficial's unfair practice of force-placing hazard insurance in violation of a mortgage contract has the potential for repetition. ... Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Windham on his counterclaim against Beneficial for a violation of the SCUTPA.

A claim under § 39-5-20 requires conduct that adversely affects the public interest; conduct affecting only the parties to a transaction is insufficient.

Ruegner v. Sun Pet, LTD · filed 2021-03-30

Conduct that only affects parties to a transaction and not the public interest provides no basis for an SCUTPA claim.

A claim under § 39-5-20(a) requires facts showing an adverse impact on the public; multiple breaches of the same contract alone do not establish that impact.

T-Zone Health Inc v. SouthStar Capital LLC · filed 2021-09-01(a)

The court will not find public impact simply because T-Zone alleges multiple breaches of the same contractual agreement between it and SouthStar.

Allegations that a business also failed to pay other independent contractors can sufficiently plead the public interest element of a claim under § 39-5-20.

Acquino v. J A White & Associates Inc · filed 2021-11-12(a)

The failure to pay other independent contractors may not ultimately prevail for purposes of establishing an impact on the public interest, but the court is constrained by South Carolina’s recognition that similar events occurring in the past may be sufficient to satisfy the public interest element of a SCUTPA claim. At this early stage in the litigation, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allow the SCUTPA claim to proceed.

A claim under § 39-5-20 requires facts supporting a plausible inference of adverse public impact; a generalized, attenuated effect on consumers is insufficient.

PTA-FLA Inc v. ZTE Corporation · filed 2017-11-15

PTA-FLA’s complaint fails to allege facts that give rise to a plausible inference of adverse public impact. First, the allegation that ZTE Corp.’s actions delayed PTA-FLA’s ability to provide cellular telephone service to South Carolina consumers is too generalized and attenuated to constitute adverse public impact under SCUTPA.

A claim under § 39-5-20(a) requires facts showing an adverse impact on the public interest; a conclusory allegation that the conduct could recur is insufficient.

Tri-Lift NC Inc v. Drive Automotive Industries of America Inc · filed 2021-01-13(a)

To maintain a counterclaim pursuant to the SCUTPA, Drive must establish: “(1) that [Tri-Lift] engaged in an unlawful trade practice, (2) that [Drive] suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of [Tri-Lift’s] use of the unlawful trade practice, and (3) that the unlawful trade practice engaged in by [Tri-Lift] had an adverse impact on the public interest.” ... Drive’s conclusory allegations, without supportive facts, are insufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.

A claim under § 39-5-20(a) requires evidence that the challenged practice affects the public interest; evidence limited to one transaction without a potential for repetition is insufficient.

Morris v. Jayco, Inc. · filed 2025-01-03(a)

The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (“SCUTPA”) prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a). ... Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence that Defendant’s “unfair and deceptive acts” had an adverse impact on the public interest. Specifically, Plaintiff failed to provide admissible evidence to show that Defendant’s purported conduct has the potential for repetition. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence that Defendant violated SCUPTA and this Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment relating to this claim.

Section 39-5-20 requires an unfair or deceptive practice to affect the public interest; allegedly inflated repair quotes in a landlord-tenant dispute do not suffice without evidence of broader impact or potential repetition.

Carolina Real Estate v. Brilin Electric · filed 2025-07-02

Further, we hold Brilin did not offer any evidence to support the public interest element of a UTPA claim. Brilin, at most, showed that CREH's quotes were higher than the ones Brilin collected. Even if the quotes were artificially inflated or fraudulent, the practice—while lamentable—occurred between the parties in the course of their landlord-tenant relationship. Brilin offered no evidence that CREH engaged in this practice beyond the course of this relationship nor did Brilin offer any evidence that the higher quotes here adversely affected any member of the public.

A claim under § 39-5-20 requires an adverse impact on the public interest; materially different past acts and no indication of likely repetition do not establish that impact.

Brabham Oil Company, Inc. v. Fuel Trader Supply · filed 2026-05-18(a)

These prior acts, which were materially different than Brabham’s claims here, along with no indication Ford is anticipated to engage in further unfair business practices leads to this Court’s determination that Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s SCUTPA claim be granted.

Section 39-5-20(a) is not unconstitutionally vague.

Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. · filed 1988-01-11(a)

We hold § 39-5-20 is not unconstitutionally vague.

Section 39-5-20 covers unfair or deceptive debt collection activities, including repossessions, under the federal interpretations that guide its application.

Butler v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. (In Re Daniel) · filed 1992-03-10(b)

Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that debt collection activities are covered by the Federal Trade Commission Act and pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-20(b), are covered by the SCUTPA.

Section 39-5-20(a) does not make a fully disclosed 24-hour service station lease term an unfair practice merely because dealers find it harsh.

Wingard v. Exxon Co., U.S.A. · filed 1992-10-28(a)

As such, the 24-hour operation provision cannot be said to be “unfair” as that term is used in the UTPA. Accordingly, the court grants the motion of Exxon for summary judgment as to the UTPA claim.

Section 39-5-20(a) does not treat a lender’s refusal to use a particular closing attorney as an unfair or deceptive act on the facts alleged here.

Camp v. Springs Mortgage Corp. · filed 1993-02-16(a)

The conduct complained of here does not describe any action by Springs that was “unfair” or “deceptive.” The allegation that Springs told potential borrowers Camp was unacceptable fails to describe an unfair act in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Section 39-5-20(a) can prohibit using a promise to solicit business and then abandoning it, even if the promise is not a binding contract.

Prestwick Golf Club, Inc. v. Prestwick Ltd. Partnership · filed 1998-05-18(a)

The schedule, however, does not have to be a binding contract for constitute a UTPA violation. If, as the Club alleges, the Partnership used the schedule to solicit business and then simply abrogated the terms of the schedule, a jury may determine these representations were prohibited by the UTPA because they were “unfair and deceptive acts”.

Section 39-5-20(a) does not make a retailer’s decision to stop selling a vendor’s products because of the vendor’s speech an unfair act when the decision does not offend public policy or meet the standard for unfairness.

Bessinger v. Food Lion, Inc. · filed 2003-11-20(a)

When viewing all of the law and all of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court cannot find that the defendants’ decisions to discontinue selling the plaintiffs’ products either offends established public policy or was “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”

Section 39-5-20 can cover a dealership’s practice of accepting deposits for cars it cannot supply and delaying refunds when that practice is unfair or deceptive.

Johnson v. Fort Mill Chrysler Plymouth Dodge · filed 2005-01-24

Again viewed in a light most favorable to the Johnsons, sufficient evidence exists that indicates the dealership may have engaged in practices that were unfair or deceptive based on its dealings with them.

Section 39-5-20(a) does not make a retailer’s decision to stop selling a supplier’s products because of the supplier’s statements an unfair trade practice.

Bessinger v. Bi-Lo, Inc. · filed 2005-11-07(a)

We agree with the trial court that the allegations in the complaint do not suggest Defendants committed acts that would be unfair under the SCUTPA. ... Moreover, as free market participants, the defendant grocery store chains and their respective managers have the right to choose with whom they conduct their business.

Section 39-5-20 can cover a seller’s collection of accommodation tax from customers while allegedly retaining part of the tax instead of remitting it, at least at the pleading stage.

CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC v. Hotels. Com, LP · filed 2007-04-23

In other words, the alleged deceptive and unfair business practice is Defendant’s practice of collecting from consumers a higher tax than Defendants intended to remit, thereby wrongfully denying the municipalities of their tax revenues. The court finds that this allegation is sufficiently unfair and deceptive to satisfy the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 15(a).

Section 39-5-20 covers an alleged practice of charging consumers a tax and keeping part of the amount collected instead of remitting it.

City of Charleston, SC v. Hotels. Com, LP · filed 2007-11-05

In other words, the alleged deceptive and unfair business practice is Defendant’s practice of collecting from consumers a higher tax than Defendants intended to remit, thereby wrongfully denying the municipalities of their tax revenues. The court finds that this allegation is sufficiently unfair and deceptive to satisfy the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 39-5-20 does not make a poor lending decision an unfair trade practice without evidence of unfair or deceptive conduct.

Washington Mutual Bank v. Hiott · filed 2006-09-19

A poor business decision does not necessarily constitute an unfair trade practice.

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce; a conclusory allegation of deceptive marketing does not adequately plead such a practice.

Williams ex rel. Estate of Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC · filed 2014-04-29(a)

Finally, Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (“SCUTPA”). SCUTPA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a). ... Plaintiffs allege in a conclusory manner that Defendant marketed University Village in a way that was deceptive and unfair. (ECF No. 18 at 12-13.)

Section 39-5-20(b) directs South Carolina courts to use federal interpretations of unfair or deceptive practices, including the tendency-to-deceive standard.

State Ex Rel. Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2015-02-25(b)

The terms “unfair” and “deceptive” are not defined in SCUTPA; rather, in section 39-5-20(b) of the Act, the legislature directs that in construing those terms, the courts of our state “will be guided by” decisions from the federal courts, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), and interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

Section 39-5-20(b) directs South Carolina courts to use federal interpretations of unfair and deceptive practices, including the tendency-to-deceive standard.

State v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals · filed 2015-07-08(b)

The terms "unfair" and "deceptive" are not defined in SCUTPA; rather, in section 39-5-20(b) of the Act, the legislature directs that in construing those terms, the courts of our state "will be guided by" decisions from the federal courts, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), and interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Thus, South Carolina has been guided by federal law, which recognizes the public interest involved and requires a showing of a "tendency to deceive."

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce; a claim fails when there is no evidence of such conduct.

North Pleasant, LLC v. SC Coastal Conservation · filed 2015-08-12(a)

As to whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on the League's unfair trade practices claim, we find no evidence the League committed any "unfair or deceptive" acts or practices.

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce, and a claim under it cannot survive summary judgment without a genuine issue of material fact.

Plantation Federal Bank v. Gray · filed 2016-03-30(a)

Fourth, we find no genuine issues of material fact exist as to the SCUTPA claim. See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) (1985) (declaring as unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce"); Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 23, 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that in order to recover under the SCUTPA, a plaintiff must show "the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce"); id. at 26, 640 S.E.2d at 500 ("Whether an act or practice is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of the [SC]UTPA depends on the surrounding facts and the impact of the transaction on the marketplace.").

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce; knowingly false promises in a financial management agreement can support a violation.

Maybank v. BB&T Corp. · filed 2016-06-03(a)

The UTPA declares "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . unlawful." S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) (1985). ... We agree with the trial court the WMA constitutes evidence upon which a jury could conclude Appellants violated the UTPA.

A bank’s refusal to reimburse fraudulent checks can plausibly qualify as an unfair or deceptive act under § 39-5-20(a).

C&C Metal Recycling LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company · filed 2024-06-18(a)

Considering only the allegations contained in the complaint, then, C&C has plausibly alleged that First Citizens committed an unfair or deceptive act when it refused to reimburse C&C for the fraudulent checks drawn on C&C’s account.

Section 39-5-20(a) does not make customer difficulties alone an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Oakwood Products Inc v. SWK Technologies Inc · filed 2023-04-26(a)

At this point, the “code reds” highlighted by Oakwood merely evince some customer difficulties, and such evidence does not violate SCUTPA.

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices; a claim based on promised timeshare availability requires evidence supporting the alleged promise.

Bedgood v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts Inc. · filed 2025-07-02(a)

The court has already rejected this argument because the acknowledgement and disclosure statement does not guarantee specific availability at a certain time, the Brandons do not point the court to evidence that Defendant or its representative guaranteed specific availability, and the Brandons’ ability to use their points every year supports the contention that Defendant could accommodate the Brandons.

Section 39-5-20(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, and a claim of deceptive practices must be plausibly alleged.

Georgion v. Bank of America Corporation · filed 2025-08-18(a)

The SCUTPA “declare[s] unlawful” any “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a). ... The court concludes for the reasons below that plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege “fraudulent” or “deceptive” practices under any of the state statutes.

Section 39-5-20 does not cover a railroad’s removal of and refusal to reinstall a crossing because those acts are outside the conduct of trade or commerce.

Foggie v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 1993-06-21

South Carolina’s UTPA prohibits “[ujfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20 (1985). ... CSX’s acts here are not the “conduct of trade or commerce” within the meaning of the UTPA.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires evidence that the alleged unfair conduct occurred in trade or commerce.

Roddey v. NationsWaster, Inc. · filed 2005-07-28(a)

Although there is evidence that NationsWaste conspired with Funderburk to ruin Roddey and Funderburk made the allegations in furtherance of that conspiracy, as discussed below, there is no evidence in the record that NationsWaste or any of its employees or agents made any defamatory statements against Roddey as an unfair method of competition “in the conduct of any trade or commerce” as prohibited by the UTPA.[2] See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) (1985) (“Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”).

Section 39-5-20(a) applies to unfair or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce; the Association's conduct did not qualify here.

Brown v. Spring Valley HOA · filed 2016-06-29(a)

We affirm the circuit court's granting of summary judgment to the Association on Homeowner's UTPA claim pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) (1985) ("Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." (emphasis added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (defining "trade" and "commerce" as "the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.").

Section 39-5-20(a) requires unfair or deceptive conduct to occur in trade or commerce; the homeowners’ association dispute did not support a claim under that requirement.

Oak Pointe v. Peffley · filed 2018-03-28(a)

We affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Oak Pointe on Peffley's UTPA claim pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) (1985) ("Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." (emphasis added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (defining "trade" and "commerce" as "the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.").

Section 39-5-20(a) does not cover an individual’s service as a personal representative or a bank’s authorization of that service because neither is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce.

Nautilus Insurance Company v. Murdaugh · filed 2024-06-18(a)

Neither Westendorf’s service as a Personal Representative, nor PSB’s authorization of his service as a Personal Representative, constitutes “an unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce.”

Section 39-5-20 does not cover acts arising from an employer-employee relationship.

Rhoades v. Savannah River Nuclear Solutions LLC · filed 2021-12-03(a)

The SCUTPA does not apply to acts that take place in an employer-employee relationship.

Section 39-5-20(a) does not cover unfair acts arising from an employer-employee relationship because those private matters do not affect the public interest.

TELECO Inc v. Mutolo · filed 2025-06-10(a)

South Carolina courts have held that employer-employee relations matters are not covered by the SCUTPA because they are private matters that do not involve the public interest.

Section 39-5-20(a) covers unfair or deceptive medical laboratory services because providing services is trade or commerce even when the services are professional.

Taylor v. Medenica · filed 1996-11-12(a)

The provision of any service constitutes commerce within the meaning of the UTPA. The statute does not exclude professional services from its definition.

Section 39-5-20 may prohibit advertising a video poker jackpot above the statutory payout limit because the advertisement is offensive to public policy and tends to deceive players.

Gentry v. Yonce · filed 1999-07-13

Advertising a jackpot over the statutory $125 limit is offensive and has a tendency to deceive a person into thinking that a jackpot over $125 is legal.

Section 39-5-20 treats inaccurate representations about a car's history as deceptive trade practices.

Wright v. Craft · filed 2006-11-27(a)

South Carolina precedent establishes that failure to accurately represent the history of a car constitutes a deceptive trade practice under section 39-5-20.

Section 39-5-20(a) covers misbranding gasoline when it deceives consumers about its source, affects commerce, harms the public interest, and causes actual damage.

Shell Trademark Management BV & Motiva Enterprises, LLC v. Ray Thomas Petroleum Co. · filed 2009-06-15(a)

RTP’s deceptive actions affected commerce, impacted the public interest, and caused actual damage to Motiva. The Court grants Motiva’s request for summary judgment that RTP violated South Carolina’s UTPA.

A claim based on a deceptive product-duration representation fails when the buyers did not purchase the product bearing that representation or receive it from the seller.

Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp. · filed 2014-07-09

The court finds that GAF is entitled to summary judgment on Named Plaintiffs’ SCUTPA claim because the unlawful trade practice attributed to GAF is not applicable to Named Plaintiffs since they neither purchased Timberline® 30 shingles nor received any direct communications from GAF regarding the duration of the shingles that they did purchase.

Generalized statements that apartments are safe and secure and patrolled by courtesy officers are not unfair or deceptive acts under subsection (a) on these facts.

Wright v. PRG Real Estate Management, Inc. · filed 2015-07-15(a)

The generalized statements that the apartments are safe and secure and are patrolled by courtesy officers — on the facts of this case — simply cannot be unfair or deceptive acts under subsection 39-5-20(a).

Section 39-5-20(b) directs courts interpreting the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act to be guided by FTC and federal court interpretations of FTC Act § 5(a)(1).

Federal Trade Commission v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1999-12-14(b)

South Carolina’s claim for restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act will be reinstated. Section 39-5-50 of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to proceed in equity. Additionally, § 39-5-20(b) provides that courts interpreting the Act “be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ...” S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-20(b). The Court will therefore reinstate South Carolina’s claim for restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers under the South Carolina UTPA.

Section 39-5-20(a) applies to unfair or deceptive acts in legal services, but a claimant must establish the alleged conduct.

RFT Management Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P. · filed 2012-08-15(a)

Despite the trial court’s error in finding the UTPA is not available against the legal profession, RFT has shown no reversible error in this regard. Because RFT alleged the same facts for its UTPA claim as in the legal malpractice claim, i.e., the deceptive acts of Law Firm, which the jury has already rejected, RFT has not shown it could have established all of the necessary elements of this claim.

Section 39-5-20(a) requires evidence that the alleged unfair trade practice proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

The Muhler Company, Inc. v. Ply Gem Holdings, Inc. · filed 2016-02-10(a)

Thus, the district court properly concluded that Muhler failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish the proximate cause necessary to sustain its Lanham Act or SCUTPA claims.

A claim under § 39-5-20 does not require the plaintiff to show reliance on the alleged deceptive practice.

Blackwood v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2019-08-12

Reliance on defendants’ allegedly deceptive practices is not an element under the cited consumer protection laws. ... see also In re MI Windows & Doors, Inc. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:11-CV-00167-DCN, 2012 WL 5408563, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2012) (holding that to maintain a claim under S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20, a plaintiff must show only “(1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice; (2) that the plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant's use of the unlawful trade practice; and (3) that the unlawful trade practice had an adverse impact on the public interest”); ... Therefore, even if Blackwood failed to plead that she relied on defendants’ allegedly deceptive practices, that fact is not fatal to her consumer protection laws claim.

A private deceptive practices claim requires a causal connection between the alleged deception and the plaintiff’s monetary loss; when the claim rests on misrepresentations, the plaintiff must show detrimental reliance.

Doe 3 v. Varsity Brands LLC · filed 2023-06-20(a)

Establishing this causal connection in a misrepresentation case necessarily requires proof that the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the defendant’s deceptive conduct. ... Because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a causal nexus between his payment of fees and expenses to Varsity, on the one hand, and Varsity’s purported deceptive conduct, on the other, Plaintiff cannot maintain his SCUTPA claim.

A private plaintiff alleging deceptive conduct under § 39-5-20(a) must show a causal connection between the conduct and a monetary or property loss; a misrepresentation claim requires detrimental reliance.

Doe 9 v. Varsity Brands LLC · filed 2023-06-20(a)

Establishing this causal connection in a misrepresentation case necessarily requires proof that the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the defendant’s deceptive conduct. ... Because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a causal nexus between her payment of fees and expenses to Varsity, on the one hand, and Varsity’s purported deceptive conduct, on the other, Plaintiff cannot maintain her SCUTPA claim.