S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530

Section 63-3-530(28) and (29) authorizes the family court to issue mandates and compel attendance, including ordering a prisoner transported to court.

Stewart v. CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL · filed 2009-12-03(28) & (29)

The family court has the authority to order a prisoner transported from the prisoner's place of confinement to the family court. Id. at 30, 552 S.E.2d at 767. The family court is statutorily authorized "[to] send process and any other mandates in any matter in which it has jurisdiction into any county of the State for service or execution" and "[t]o compel the attendance of witnesses." S.C.Code Ann. § 63-3-530(28) & (29) (2008).

Section 63-3-530(28) and (29) authorize the family court to issue mandates and compel attendance, including an order to transport a prisoner to a hearing.

Department of Social Services v. Laura D. · filed 2009-12-03(28) & (29)

The family court has the authority to order a prisoner transported from the prisoner’s place of confinement to the family court. Id. at 30, 552 S.E.2d at 767. The family court is statutorily authorized “[to] send process and any other mandates in any matter in which it has jurisdiction into any county of the State for service or execution” and “[t]o compel the attendance of witnesses.” S.C.Code Ann. § 63-3-530(28) & (29) (2008).

Section 63-3-530(A)(17) permits a family court to award college expenses under the limited circumstances recognized in Risinger.

McLeod v. Starnes · filed 2012-03-07(A)(17)

Accordingly, for our purposes, section 63-3-530(A)(17) does permit the family court to award college expenses.

Section 63-3-530(A)(33) limits grandparent visitation to circumstances in which a parent has died or the parents are divorced or living apart.

Blackwell v. Birket · filed 2010-06-28(A)(33)

The South Carolina Legislature has specifically limited the circumstances in which a grandparent is entitled to visitation and none of those are present in this case.

Section 63-3-530(33) allows grandparent visitation over a fit parent's objection when compelling circumstances overcome the presumption that the parent's decision is in the child's best interests; aiding reunification with a parent can qualify.

Corey v. Corey · filed 2016-01-25(33)

However, when combined with the impact visitation with the paternal grandparents would have on advancing the reunification process with Father following nearly four years of separation and sexual abuse allegations, the circumstances are sufficiently compelling to overcome the presumption that Mother's decision on visitation was in the children's best interests.

Section 63-3-530(A)(33) applies when grandparents seek visitation over the objection of fit legal custodians; visitation requires clear and convincing evidence of unfitness or compelling circumstances.

Dendy v. Ajia Latrice Gamble · filed 2025-02-12(A)(33)

The family court erred in finding section 63-3-530 inapplicable to this case. As discussed, the grant of legal custody to Aunt and Uncle carried with it the presumption that their decisions regarding visitation are made in B.G.'s best interests. For this reason, this case fits within the circumstances contemplated by section 63-3-530(A)(33) because the child's biological grandparents seek visitation over the objection of fit, legal custodians. But in applying this statute, we disagree with the family court that all elements have been met because we do not find clear and convincing evidence of compelling circumstances that warrant visitation.

Section 63-3-530(A)(33)(2)(b) allows grandparent visitation when compelling circumstances overcome the presumption that a decision to deny visitation is in the child's best interest.

Charles v. Doehner · filed 2021-01-05(A)(33)(2)(b)

Overall, the Doehners' attempt to mislead the court, their ongoing refusal to allow court-ordered visitation, and evidence showing Children had a relationship with Charles before the Doehners moved to South Carolina are sufficient compelling circumstances to overcome the presumption that the Doehners' denial of visitation was in Children's best interest and to justify awarding visitation.

Section 63-3-530(A)(33) gives the family court jurisdiction to order grandparent visitation when a parent is deceased, the parents are divorced, or the parents live separately in different habitats.

Biondo v. Russell · filed 2014-11-12(A)(33)

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: 1. As to issue one: S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(33) (Supp. 2013) ("The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . to order visitation for the grandparent of a minor child where either or both parents of the minor child is or are deceased, or are divorced, or are living separate and apart in different habitats . . . ." (emphasis provided)).

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) gives the family court jurisdiction to determine whether property is marital or nonmarital in marital litigation.

Shaw v. Shaw · filed 2010-06-30(A)(2)

The determination of the marital nature of the property in question arose in the course of marital litigation and was therefore within the family court’s jurisdiction under former section 20-7-420(A)(2) and current section 63-3-530(A)(2).

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) gives the family court jurisdiction over claims involving common-law marriage, divorce, and division of marital property.

Johnson v. Williams · filed 2021-09-01(A)(2)

The family court also had jurisdiction over Erick's counterclaims that the parties were married under common law and for a divorce, division of marital property, and other related relief.

Section 63-3-530 gives the family court exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support and the equitable division of marital property.

Edwards v. Edwards · filed 2011-02-04

Husband's case concerns issues of spousal support and the equitable division of marital property, and the family court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over both issues.

Section 63-3-530 gives the family court jurisdiction to reconsider a court-approved divorce agreement at least to the extent a provision has been declared void.

Simmons v. Simmons · filed 2011-05-09

See S.C.Code Ann. § 63-3-530 (2010) (stating the family court has jurisdiction over “divorce ... and for settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties in the actions in and to the real and personal property of the marriage.... ”). Under these circumstances, we hold the family court has jurisdiction to reconsider a voided agreement, at least to the extent of the part declared void.

Section 63-3-530 gives the family court jurisdiction over marital property disputes, but a prenuptial agreement can place a claim to nonmarital property outside that jurisdiction.

Meehan v. Meehan · filed 2014-03-26

While we agree the family court in this case would typically have jurisdiction over the issues raised during the parties’ hearing, we must examine *477whether the prenuptial agreement removed the family court’s jurisdiction from some or all of those issues. ... Similar to our supreme court’s decision in Gilley, we believe the $190,000 Wife requested was nonmarital property according to the terms of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, and, thus, the family court was correct in determining that it did not have jurisdiction over that particular issue.

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) and (A)(13) give the family court jurisdiction to enforce its order resolving separate support, maintenance, and marital property rights.

Harwell v. Harwell · filed 2020-11-12(A)(2), (A)(13)

Because this case involved an allegation of a "failure to obey an order of the [family] court" issued to conclude a case for "separate support and maintenance . . . and for settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties . . . [to a] marriage," the family court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.2 § 63-3-530(A)(2), (13).

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) gives the family court jurisdiction to issue an order dismissing a marital case.

Holmes v. Holmes · filed 2022-12-07(A)(2)

The family court had jurisdiction to issue the order of dismissal.

Section 63-3-530 gives South Carolina family courts exclusive jurisdiction over domestic matters, including child support.

Horan v. Coen · filed 2023-08-21

Under South Carolina statute, the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over domestic matters, such as child support.

Section 63-3-530(A)(6) gives family courts exclusive jurisdiction over annulments, so another court cannot relitigate a family court annulment order.

Brown v. Sojourner (In re Estate of Brown) · filed 2018-07-25(A)(6)

However, to the extent Appellants also argue the trial court erred in granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment, we find the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to relitigate the family court order because only the family court has jurisdiction over annulments.

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) gives family courts exclusive jurisdiction over divorce actions; a probate court may determine whether someone is a decedent’s heir without granting a divorce.

Rosier v. Smith · filed 2021-07-14(A)(2)

Further, family courts hold exclusive jurisdiction to grant a divorce. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(2) (2010) ("The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . to hear and determine actions for divorce."). The probate court found Rosier failed to prove she was Decedent's wife at the time of his death and therefore was not his heir. Because probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine heirs, we find the probate court did not err in determining Rosier was not Decedent's heir at the time of Decedent's death.

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) gives the family court exclusive jurisdiction to apportion marital property, which it retains when a spouse dies after marital litigation begins.

Seels v. Smalls · filed 2022-08-03(A)(2)

In summary, section 63-3-530, governing the family court's subject matter jurisdiction, provides in subsection (A)(2) that the family court has "exclusive jurisdiction" to settle all legal and equitable rights regarding marital property. ... Because Wife initiated this marital litigation in the family court during the parties' lifetimes, the parameters of the marital property were already fixed and the family court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of equitable apportionment at that time.

Section 63-3-530 gives the family court subject matter jurisdiction to consider modifying or terminating alimony even when an award is nonmodifiable.

Frank Rish, Sr. v. Rish · filed 2024-07-31(A)(14), (A)(25), (A)(30)

Today we correct our prior caselaw and hold that parties to an alimony award cannot remove future modification from the family court's jurisdiction. By statute, 3 the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to order spousal support and to modify its prior orders.

Section 63-3-530(A)(38) gives the family court discretion to award attorney's fees in a contested adoption if the parties properly request them.

Youngblood v. SCDSS · filed 2012-03-08(A)(38)

We hold, therefore, that section 63-3-530(A)(38) gives the family court the discretion to award attorney's fees if the parties properly requested them.

Section 63-3-530(A)(38) authorizes a family court to consider attorney's fees when a party requests them in a pleading or motion in a matter within its jurisdiction.

Lawrence v. Brown · filed 2018-06-20(A)(38)

Initially, we find the family court had statutory authority to determine attorney's fees in this case because (1) the underlying case concerned the validity of Lawrence's consent for Brown to adopt Lawrence's baby girl (Child) and (2) Lawrence requested attorney's fees in her complaint.

Section 63-3-530(38) permits attorney's fees to be assessed for or against a party in an action brought in or subject to the family court's jurisdiction.

Moore v. Moore · filed 2019-06-05(38)

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530 (38) (2010) ("Suit money, including attorney's fees, may be assessed for or against a party to an action brought in or subject to the jurisdiction of the family court."); ... We find the circumstances of Wife and Husband satisfy the factors for awarding attorney's fees to Wife.

Section 63-3-530(A)(38) makes a claim for attorney's fees dependent on an underlying action within the family court's jurisdiction; the fee claim is moot when that action is moot.

Bristol v. Lipnevicius · filed 2024-08-07(A)(38)

The statutory language that "attorney's fees[] may be assessed for or against a party to an action brought in or subject to the jurisdiction of the family court" indicates a claim for attorney's fees is not an independent action but instead requires a preexisting cause of action within the family court's jurisdiction.

Section 63-3-530(A)(38) gives the family court exclusive jurisdiction to assess attorney's fees in an action brought in or subject to its jurisdiction.

Hewlette v. Hewlette · filed 2024-12-04(A)(38)

We hold the family court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant Husband attorney's fees. ... Once Wife filed her motion to vacate or modify the arbitration awards, the family court resumed jurisdiction of the case and the ability to grant attorney's fees. ... S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(38) (2010) (explaining the family court has the exclusive jurisdiction to assess attorney's fees "for or against a party to an action brought in or subject to the jurisdiction of the family court").

Section 63-3-530 authorizes the family court to award attorney's fees to a party when requested.

Lacefield v. Ginger Yvonne Lacefield · filed 2025-10-13

We hold the family court properly exercised its authority in awarding attorney's fees and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support both the family court's decision to award attorney's fees and the amount of attorney's fees it awarded. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530 (2010) (indicating the family court has authority to award attorney's fees to a party when requested); Couch v. Couch, 431 S.C. 170, 180, 847 S.E.2d 260, 265 (Ct. App. 2020) ("[O]n appeal, an award for attorney's fees will be affirmed so long as sufficient evidence in the record supports each factor." (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 428 S.C. 152, 187, 833 S.E.2d 432, 450 (Ct. App. 2019))).

Section 63-3-530(A)(38) permits attorney's fees in family court actions, but a party must present evidence supporting the request.

Haynes v. Haynes · filed 2026-04-22(A)(38)

As to issue four, we hold the family court did not err in declining to address Wife's request for attorney's fees. ... Wife acknowledges she did not submit an affidavit of fees; moreover, the family court stated it was unable to consider an award of attorney's fees because "no evidence was presented regarding Wife's attorney['s] fees."

Section 63-3-530(A)(30) authorizes the family court to issue a supplemental order clarifying the terms of an earlier order when necessary to enforce it.

Mullarkey v. Mullarkey · filed 2012-01-25(A)(30)

Nevertheless, although Husband cannot obtain “relief’ from the 1999 support order under Rule 60(b)(5), we hold he is entitled by statute to a supplemental order clarifying the terms of that order. See S.C.Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(30) (2010) (giving the family court exclusive jurisdiction “to make any order necessary to carry out and enforce the provisions of this title”).

Section 63-3-530(A)(25) allows the family court to modify its orders, including by permitting a custodial parent to relocate out of state without the other parent's consent.

Bernson v. Bernson · filed 2012-05-30(A)(25)

Under the terms of the divorce decree, as well as South Carolina law, Wife may, without Husband's consent, move with the child outside the State of South Carolina if she obtains an order from the family court allowing the relocation.

Section 63-3-530(A)(25) generally authorizes the family court to modify its orders, but that authority does not extend to a final division of marital property.

Howell v. Howell · filed 2015-05-20(A)(25)

We find the family court erred in crafting a civil contempt sanction that modified the parties' equitable distribution order. Generally, the family court has the authority to modify any order issued by the court. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3- 530(A)(25) (2010). However, "the law in South Carolina is exceedingly clear that the family court does not have the authority to modify court ordered property divisions." Green v. Green, 327 S.C. 577, 581, 491 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added).

Section 63-3-530(A)(25) gives the family court authority to modify or vacate its orders, but that authority does not extend to a final division of marital property.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 2019-08-07(A)(25)

Generally, the family court has the authority to modify any order issued by the family court. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(25) (2010) (stating the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to modify or vacate any order issued by the family court). However, subsection 20-3-620(C) of the South Carolina Code (2014) provides, "The [family] court's order as it affects distribution of marital property ... shall be a final order not subject to modification except by appeal or remand following proper appeal."

Section 63-3-530(A)(25) gives the family court jurisdiction to modify its orders, including an incorporated agreement about expenses affecting children.

Key v. Key · filed 2020-07-22(A)(25)

The family court had jurisdiction to modify the parties' respective obligations for their children's extracurricular activities expenses for two reasons. First, the 2009 Final Order did not provide the parties' agreement as to extracurricular expenses was unmodifiable. Second, extracurricular activities expenses affect Mother and Father's children and, therefore, are subject to modification by the family court.

Section 63-3-530(A)(25) gives the family court authority to modify its orders, but that authority does not extend to final divisions of marital property.

Simpson v. Simpson · filed 2013-06-26(A)(25)

Generally, the family court has the authority to modify any order issued by the court. S.C.Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(25)(2010) (stating the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to modify or vacate any order issued by the court). However, “the law in South Carolina is exceedingly clear that the family court does not have the authority to modify court ordered property divisions.” ... We find the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the property provisions in the Final Decree.

Section 63-3-530(A)(25) gives the family court general authority to modify its orders, but that authority does not extend to property divisions already ordered in a divorce.

Paul Kitchin, Jr. v. Spinelli · filed 2026-01-14(A)(25)

It is undisputed that a family court generally has jurisdiction and authority to enforce or modify an agreement that it approves. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(25) (2010) (stating the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to modify or vacate any order issued by the court). However, this is not the case for orders involving equitable distribution.

Section 63-3-530 gives the family court exclusive jurisdiction over marital litigation and authority to modify and enforce its orders.

Hammer v. Hammer · filed 2012-06-06(A)(2), (A)(25), (A)(30)

Appellant argues the circuit court erred in finding the family court had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to sections 20-3-690 and 63-3-530 of the South Carolina Code. We disagree.

Section 63-3-530(A)(4) gives the family court jurisdiction over termination-of-parental-rights actions, including authority to consider a TPR consent form when deciding related issues after the TPR claim is dismissed.

Branton v. Corbitt · filed 2014-11-12(A)(4)

Although Mother's TPR cause of action was dismissed, we find Father's TPR consent form was properly considered by the court in determining issues regarding visitation, child support, Child's name change, and restraining orders. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(4) (2010) ("The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . to hear and determine actions for termination of parental rights, whether such action is in connection with an action for adoption or apart therefrom.").

Section 63-3-530(A)(39) permits the family court to authorize alternative dispute resolution only when it complies with court rules and South Carolina law; it does not permit binding arbitration of child custody and visitation.

Kosciusko v. Parham · filed 2019-11-06(A)(39)

Thus, we find the family court's jurisdiction to authorize parties to engage in ADR is limited by court rules and the laws of the state as provided in section 63-3-530(A)(39) ("The family court has exclusive jurisdiction: to . . . issue consent orders authorizing parties to engage in any form of alternate dispute resolution [that] does not violate the rules of the court or the laws of South Carolina . . . .").

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) gives the family court jurisdiction over marital claims only when a marriage exists between the parties.

Swicegood v. Thompson · filed 2020-07-01(A)(2)

If no common-law marriage existed between the parties, the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any other matters Swicegood raised in her complaint.

Section 63-3-530(39) does not authorize family courts to approve binding arbitration of issues involving children.

Singh v. Singh · filed 2021-09-08(39)

Significantly, subsection 63-3-530(39) provides the family court with exclusive jurisdiction: ... S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(39) (2010) (emphasis added). While this provision envisions arbitration in some areas, our court rules and jurisprudence confirm that children's matters are not within the ambit of issues subject to arbitration.

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) gives the family court exclusive jurisdiction to settle spouses’ legal and equitable rights in marital property during divorce.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2024-07-03(A)(2)

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in granting Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) motion: ... S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(2)(2010) (establishing the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over a divorce and the "settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties . . . in and to the real and personal property of the marriage"); ... S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620 (2014) (establishing that if a party makes claims of marital misconduct or fault against his or her spouse, which resulted in the depreciation of a marital asset, such claims may be presented to the family court and considered in the apportionment of the marital estate).

Section 63-3-530(A)(42) authorizes joint custody when it serves the child’s best interests, but joint custody should be awarded only in exceptional circumstances.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 2012-11-14(A)(42)

“Although the legislature gives family court judges the authority to order joint or divided custody where the court finds it is in the best interests of the child, ... joint or divided custody should only be awarded where there are exceptional circumstances.” Patel II, 359 S.C. at 528, 599 S.E.2d at 121; S.C.Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(42) (2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). ... Here, not only has Husband failed to show exceptional circumstances warranting an award of joint custody, the evidence of record supports the conclusion that joint custody in this case would not be in the best interest of Son given the acrimonious relationship between Husband and Wife.

Section 63-3-530(42) authorizes joint or divided custody when it serves the child's best interests, but joint custody should be awarded only in exceptional circumstances.

Burgess v. Arnold · filed 2018-01-24(42)

Further, "[a]lthough the legislature gives family court judges the authority 'to order joint or divided custody [when] the court finds it is in the best interests of the child,' ... joint or divided custody should only be awarded [when] there are exceptional circumstances." ... Accordingly, we reverse the family court's order granting joint custody and remand for entry of an order granting Mother sole custody of Son and a determination of Father's visitation schedule.

Section 63-3-530(A)(42) authorizes joint custody when it serves the child's best interests; the court requires exceptional circumstances for such an award.

Clark v. Clark · filed 2018-05-02(A)(42)

The family court has jurisdiction to order joint custody when it finds it is in the child's best interests. ... We find the passage of time and the good reports on Child's welfare and mental adjustment to the situation comprise exceptional circumstances warranting joint custody.

Section 63-3-530 authorizes the family court to order joint custody when it serves the child's best interests; joint custody requires exceptional circumstances.

Boose v. Boose · filed 2022-01-12(A)(20), (A)(42)

We find the court did not err in awarding joint custody of the children because exceptional circumstances existed.

Section 63-3-530(A)(42) permits divided custody when it serves the child's best interests; the court requires exceptional circumstances to justify it.

Tomlinson v. Melton · filed 2019-11-06(A)(42)

Because we find there are no exceptional circumstances, the divided custody is in brief periods, and Mother and Father's relationship is acrimonious, we hold divided custody is not in the best interest of Child.

Section 63-3-530(B) gives the family court jurisdiction to determine whether a common-law marriage exists; the probate court’s concurrent jurisdiction is limited to matters involving estates, trusts, guardianships, and conservatorships.

Bell v. Progressive Direct Insurance · filed 2014-04-09(B)

We note that it was the exclusive province of the family court to determine the existence of a common-law marriage in this case. ... Therefore, Petitioner should have sought a declaration of common-law marriage in the family court, and the trial court and court of appeals erred in addressing the issue.

Section 63-3-530 authorizes grandparent and sibling visitation under specified conditions, but those provisions do not give people who are neither grandparents nor siblings standing to seek visitation.

Baker v. Hardwick · filed 2017-05-24(A)(33), (A)(44)

The Bakers are not the child's grandparents or siblings. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(33) (Supp. 2016) (providing the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to order visitation to grandparents under certain circumstances); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(44) (2010) (providing the family court has exclusive jurisdiction "to order sibling visitation where the court finds it is in the best interest of the children").

Section 63-3-530(A)(17) permits child support past age eighteen for continued high school attendance, a preexisting agreement or order, disability, or other exceptional circumstances.

Kendig v. Kendig · filed 2018-05-16(A)(17)

However, we find the family court erred by ordering Husband maintain life insurance as security for child support until the children reach the age of twenty-four because Husband's child support obligation terminates once the children reach the age of eighteen, or nineteen pursuant to section 63-3-530(A)(17).

Section 63-3-530(A)(17) provides that child support ends by operation of law when a child turns eighteen or graduates from high school, without a further court order.

Jasper Fickling v. Fickling · filed 2022-11-23(A)(17)

Under the express terms of the statute, a parent's obligation to pay child support does not require further court order to terminate and ends by operation of law when a child turns eighteen or graduates from high school.

Section 63-3-530(A)(17) permits child support to run until age eighteen unless the court determines that an earlier statutory endpoint applies.

D. Peters Wilborn, Jr. v. Caprice P. Wilborn · filed 2026-05-27(A)(17)

We hold the family court did not err in awarding Mother expenses through December 8, 2020, because the record contains no clear evidence that showed when Mother and Father's son, who was only seventeen years old on December 8, 2020, dropped out of high school and moved to Virginia, and the family court did not find he was emancipated prior to his eighteenth birthday.

Section 63-3-530(A)(17) permits the family court to order support for a qualifying person over 18, supplementing its continuing custody jurisdiction.

Arreaga-Velasquez v. Cissna · filed 2020-03-12(A)(17)

The court finds that a proper interpretation of South Carolina law and the Family Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is that the Family Court references S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(17) to supplement, not supplant, its jurisdictional authority and allow the Family Court to issue rulings on both custody and support.

Section 63-3-530(A)(17) permits child support past age eighteen for a child attending high school; GED classes do not satisfy that requirement.

Funderburk v. Funderburk · filed 2021-12-08(A)(17)

The fact that B was attending GED classes is not equivalent to being "in high school 'and . . . making satisfactory progress toward completion of high school.'" Blackwell v. Fulgum, 375 S.C. 337, 343, 652 S.E.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420(17) (Supp. 2006) [current version at § 63-3-530(A)(17)]). Accordingly, the family court did not err in finding B was emancipated.

Section 63-3-530(A)(26) allows a family court to order a mental, physical, or psychiatric examination before, during, or after a hearing when circumstances warrant, including a psychosexual evaluation after a final order.

Tranfield v. Tranfield · filed 2018-08-01(A)(26)

A family court has jurisdiction "to order either before, during, or after a hearing a mental, physical[, or] psychiatric examination as circumstances warrant." ... We find the family court was within its authority to order Father to submit to the evaluation.

Section 63-3-530(A)(26) authorizes the family court to order a sex offender treatability assessment when the circumstances warrant it.

SCDSS v. Cubbage · filed 2019-04-08(A)(26)

His sexual abuse of Sister was clearly supported by evidence at the merits hearing; accordingly, the family court correctly found he harmed Sister and ordered him to submit to a sex offender treatability assessment. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(6)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2018) ("'[H]arm' occurs when . . . [a] person responsible for the child's welfare . . . commits or allows to be committed against the child a sexual offense as defined by the laws of this [s]tate . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(26) (2010) ("The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . to order either before, during or after a hearing a mental, physical and psychiatric examination as circumstances warrant . . . .").

Section 63-3-530(36) gives the family court authority to order DSS to remove a person's name from the child abuse registry pending administrative review when DSS fails to provide an expedited hearing.

Wardlaw v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. · filed 2019-05-29(36)

South Carolina Code Section 63-3-530 provides exclusive jurisdiction to the family court "to issue orders compelling public officials and officers to perform official acts under Title 63, the Children's Code ...." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530 (36) (2010). We find no error by the family court in ordering the removal of Wardlaw's name from the Registry pending his administrative review as the remedy it imposed for DSS's failure to provide an expedited hearing.

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) does not divest the court of appeals of authority to modify a family court alimony award on appeal.

Gillmann v. Gillmann · filed 2025-07-02(A)(2)

We reject Wife's argument that sections 63-3-530 2 and 20-3-170(A)3 divest this court of subject matter jurisdiction to modify an award of alimony in family court cases appealed to this court.

Section 63-3-530(A)(2) requires a party to request a divorce ground in the pleadings before the family court considers it.

Miller v. Johnny Miller · filed 2026-04-29(A)(2)

Further, Husband never raised physical cruelty as a ground for divorce in his pleadings and never amended or supplemented his pleadings to include it. Therefore, this argument was not raised to and ruled upon by the family court and is not preserved on appeal. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(2) (2010) ("The family court has exclusive jurisdiction: . . . to hear and determine actions for divorce a vinculo matrimonii . . . if requested by either party in the pleadings . . . ." (emphasis added)); McAteer v. McAteer, 262 S.C. 475, 480, 205 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1974) (providing a ground for divorce not plead before trial constitutes a new matter which may be introduced only by supplemental pleading); Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 375-76, 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family court] to be preserved for appellate review.").