S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10

Section 39-5-10(b)'s requirement that trade or commerce affect the people of South Carolina requires proof of an adverse effect on the public, rather than harm only to the parties.

Daisy Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Abbott · filed 1994-09-06(b)

To satisfy the "affecting the people of this State" requirement, a plaintiff must show that the acts alleged " adversely affect the public." Noack, 290 S.C. at 480, 351 S.E.2d at 350 (emphasis added); McTeer v. Provident Life and Accident Ins., 712 F.Supp. 512 (D.S.C.1989).

Section 39-5-10(b) defines trade and commerce broadly enough to include acquiring a lease by purchasing a club’s equity.

Baker v. Chavis · filed 1991-10-28(b)

Obviously, therefore, the acquisition of a lease, when, as here, it is done by purchasing a club’s “equity,” constitutes “trade” and “commerce” within the meaning of the UTPA.

Section 39-5-10(b) defines trade or commerce for the SCUTPA, which covers debt collection activities, including repossession.

Butler v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. (In Re Daniel) · filed 1992-03-10(b)

“Trade” and “Commerce” are defined to include “advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property_” S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1976). ... Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that debt collection activities are covered by the Federal Trade Commission Act and pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-20(b), are covered by the SCUTPA.

Section 39-5-10(b) defines trade or commerce; removing and refusing to reinstall a railroad crossing falls outside that definition.

Foggie v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 1993-06-21(b)

Trade or commerce is defined as “the advertising, offering for sale or distribution of any services and any property . . . and any other . . . thing of value_” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985). CSX’s acts here are not the “conduct of trade or commerce” within the meaning of the UTPA.

Section 39-5-10(b) defines trade and commerce to include the sale or distribution of services, including professional medical laboratory services.

Taylor v. Medenica · filed 1996-11-12(b)

“Trade and commerce” are defined as the “sale or distribution of any services.” S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b). ... The statute does not exclude professional services from its definition.

Section 39-5-10(b) includes residential leases as things of value within its definition of trade and commerce.

Burbach v. Investors Management Corp. International · filed 1997-03-31(b)

S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985 & Supp.1996) sets forth a broad definition of “trade and commerce” to include the “sale or distribution” of any “thing of value” directly or indirectly affecting South Carolina’s citizens. Leases, while created by contract, grant to the tenant the right to use and enjoy property. They clearly are a “thing of value,” even under the strictest reading of the statute’s plain language.

Section 39-5-10 includes legal services within its definition of commerce.

Camp v. Springs Mortgage Corp. · filed 1992-02-24

S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10 (1976) defines “commerce” as including “the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services....” There is no question but what legal services come within the definition of this statute.

Section 39-5-10(b) defines trade and commerce to include legal services.

RFT Management Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P. · filed 2012-08-15(b)

We find the trial court erred in relying upon the regulated industries exception. See S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (defining “trade” and “commerce” in the UTPA as including the “sale or distribution of any services”); ... Despite the trial court’s error in finding the UTPA is not available against the legal profession, RFT has shown no reversible error in this regard.

Section 39-5-10’s definition of trade or commerce covers advertising hotel rooms online and providing them to consumers for payment.

City of Charleston, SC v. Hotels. Com, LP · filed 2007-11-05

The court is at a loss to comprehend Defendants’ claims that their alleged actions do not constitute trade or commerce. Defendants advertised their services, and when consumers visited their websites, Defendants provided consumers with hotel rooms in exchange for monetary consideration. This is plainly trade or commercial activity of the type legislators intended to regulate by enacting SCUTPA, and the court rejects Defendants’ claim to the contrary.

Section 39-5-10(b) defines trade and commerce broadly enough that the pharmaceutical industry is not clearly exempt from the UTPA.

Fisher v. Pelstring · filed 2012-01-11(b)

PLIVA has not presented any authority demonstrating that the pharmaceutical industry is not covered by the UTPA, and applying the definitions in the UTPA for trade and commerce, this Court does not conclude a clear basis exists for finding that the pharmaceutical industry is exempt from the UTPA.

Section 39-5-10(b) defines trade or commerce to cover business or consumer transactions; promulgating a regulation does not fall within that definition.

Health Promotion Specialists, LLC v. South Carolina Bd. of Dentistry · filed 2013-06-12(b)

As defined by the SCUTPA, “trade or commerce” includes “the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any *639services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” S.C.Code Ann. § 39 — 5—10(b) (1985). By these plain terms, it is clear the General Assembly intended for the SCUTPA to apply to business or consumer transactions.

Section 39-5-10(a)’s definition of “person” includes a commercial member of the public.

Daisy Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Abbott · filed 1996-07-15(a)

As Judge Connor noted in her dissent, Hamrick’s falls under UTPA’s definition of “person.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10(a) (1985). As a member of the public, albeit a commercial member, Hamrick’s was entitled to protection from Daisy’s unfair and deceptive acts.

Section 39-5-10(a) defines a “person” to include a corporation; a parent and subsidiary are separate entities for purposes of the UTPA absent a basis to treat them as one.

Havird Oil Company, Incorporated v. Marathon Oil Company, Incorporated, and Emro Marketing Company, Incorporated · filed 1998-07-15(a)

As defined in the UTPA, “person” includes natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, associations and any other legal entity. ... Thus, to come within the prohibition of § 39-5-330, Marathon and Emro must be considered one entity; otherwise, there would be no single “person” who is in both the wholesale and retail business of selling gasoline.

Section 39-5-10(a) includes municipalities within its definition of persons as legal entities.

CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC v. Hotels. Com, LP · filed 2007-04-23(a)

Moreover, the definition of "persons” under the Act includes "natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations and any other legal entity.” S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(a). As such, both Charleston and Mt. Pleasant are "legal entities” authorized to bring—with the prior approval of the Attorney General—a SCUTPA cause of action to protect their interests.