Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.482

Section 183.482(1) governs the scope of judicial review after jurisdiction is acquired under ORS 183.480; it does not itself confer jurisdiction.

Portland Mailing Services, Inc. v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1987-04-01(1)

SAIF contends that ORS 183.482 merely governs the scope of our review once jurisdiction is acquired under ORS 183.480. We agree.

Section 183.482(8) limits judicial review of agency orders to specified legal-error, discretion, constitutional or statutory violation, and substantial-evidence grounds.

Rise v. Board of Parole · filed 1987-11-24(8)

It is important at this juncture to emphasize precisely what kind of case confronts us. This is a case of judicial review of a decision of the Board of Parole. By statute, our review in such cases is limited to whether the Board committed one or more legal errors of a particular kind. ORS 144.335(3); 183.482(8); [2] see also Price v. Board of Parole, 301 Or. 393, 723 P.2d 314 (1986). ... ORS 183.482(8) states: "(a) The court may affirm, reverse or remand the order. If the court finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action, it shall: "(A) Set aside or modify the order; or "(B) Remand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law. ... (b) The court shall remand the order to the agency if it finds the agency's exercise of discretion to be: "(A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; "(B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency; or "(C) Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision. ... (c) The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding."

Section 183.482(8)(a) limits judicial review to determining whether an agency order is within the statutory text and the policy of safeguarding the public trust by preventing personal gain through official access to government.

Caragol v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission · filed 1989-10-11(8)(a)

The scope of our review is to determine whether the order is within the statutory text and the policy of safeguarding the public trust by preventing personal gain through an official’s access to the attributes of government.

Section 183.482(8)(a) limits review to whether the agency erroneously interpreted a provision of law and whether the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Gold v. Roberts · filed 1991-04-17(8)(a)

We review only to determine whether “the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and * * * a correct interpretation compels a particular action[.]” ORS 183.482(8) (a).

Section 183.482(8) limits judicial review of an agency order to specified grounds, including erroneous legal interpretation, action outside delegated discretion, unexplained inconsistency with agency rules or practice, constitutional or statutory violation, and lack of substantial evidence.

Lane County School District 4J v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n · filed 2007-05-02(8)

In particular, our review is circumscribed by the provisions of ORS 183.482(8) — and petitioners do not explain how the alleged irregularity in the proceeding led to an erroneous interpretation of law, involved an action outside of the range of discretion delegated to the agency, was inconsistent with an agency rule or practice, or otherwise violated a constitutional or statutory provision.

Subsection (8) circumscribes judicial review of agency orders and does not permit the reviewing court to reweigh evidence or try the facts anew.

Tri-County Ctr. Trust v. Dep't of State Lands · filed 2019-08-07(8)

Our role is not to reweigh the evidence or try the facts anew; rather, our review function is circumscribed by ORS 183.482(8).

Section 183.482(7) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or substituting its judgment on factual issues supported by substantial evidence, but permits the court to identify agency-analysis errors that could affect the outcome.

Sullivan v. SAIF · filed 2022-04-13(7)

As we pointed out in Guild, this court does not “reweigh the evidence or ‘substitute our judgment for that of the board as to any issue of fact supported by substantial evidence.’ ” 291 Or App at 796 (quoting Elsea v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 277 Or App 475, 483, 371 P3d 1279 (2016)); ORS 183.482(7). Nevertheless, the factfinder must meticulously review the entire record to correctly decide a case. ... Under our standard of review, it is not appropriate for us to correct the board’s findings, but it is incumbent upon us to point out errors in the board’s analysis that could have affected the outcome of the case.

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency’s final order for that agency’s own error of law.

West Side Sanitary District v. Health Division of the Department of Human Resources · filed 1980-07-23(8)(a)

ORS 183.482(8)(a) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency’s final order if that agency had erroneously interpreted a provision of law.

Section 183.482(8)(a) directs a reviewing court to assess whether an agency erroneously interpreted Oregon law, even when the agency drew its interpretation from federal cases.

Civil Service Board v. Bureau of Labor & Industries · filed 1984-12-11(8)(a)

So long as the interpretation of the Oregon statute is not erroneous, the source of that interpretation is not meaningful under the scope of review provided in ORS 183.482(8) (a) and whether Employer met a federal test is irrelevant.

Former subsection (8)(a)’s standard for procedural error governed the court’s review of agency orders; it did not govern ERB’s review of an employee’s dismissal.

Payne v. Department of Commerce · filed 1982-12-29(8)(a)

That is, the standard of review by which we purported to analyze the Ashman case was one that was applicable only to our review of ERB’s action, but we applied it as if it also were an enunciation of the standard by which ERB should have reviewed the other agency’s action.

Section 183.482’s party-status and aggrievement requirements do not add standing conditions for an interested person seeking review of a boundary commission order under ORS 199.461(4).

Mid-County Future Alternatives Committee v. Portland Metropolitan Area Local Government Boundary Commission · filed 1991-04-17

The city and the amicus City of Portland also contend that being “interested” is not enough for standing and that party status or a showing of being adversely affected or aggrieved under ORS 183.482 is also necessary. We disagree.

Section 183.482(8)(c) confines review of the Board’s findings to substantial evidence in the record rather than de novo review.

Queener v. United Employers Insurance · filed 1992-06-03(8)(c)

In 1987, the legislature eliminated de novo review and confined this court to reviewing the record for substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings. ORS 183.482(8)(c); ORS 656.298(6); Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 295, 787 P2d 884 (1990).

Section 183.482(5) provides for remand to take additional evidence, but that remand is unavailable in workers’ compensation review under ORS 656.298(6), which incorporates only subsections (7) and (8).

United Foam Corp. v. Whiddon · filed 1988-08-10(5)

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, remand for additional evidence taking is provided for in ORS 183.482(5). ... However, the legislature eliminated a specific provision for remand and replaced it with only a specific reference to specific parts of the APA and without a reference to ORS 183.482(5). We conclude that the legislature intended only what it expressly said.

Section 183.482(8)(c) does not authorize de novo review of an agency’s factual findings.

Mail-Well Envelope Co. v. Employment Division · filed 1989-09-06(8)(c)

Most of employer’s argument, in effect, asks that we undertake de novo review. We do not have that authority. ORS 183.482(8)(c); see Armstrong v. Asten-Hill Co., 90 Or App 200, 752 P2d 312 (1988).

Section 183.482(6) allows an agency to reconsider its order on the existing record; an agency seeking to present additional evidence after a petition for review is filed must satisfy section 183.482(5).

Gritter v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 2002-06-12(5), (6)

Here, ORS 183.482(6) provides for reconsideration. It does not provide for rehearing. If a party or an agency seeks rehearing — i.e., seeks an opportunity to present additional evidence — after a petition for review has been filed, it first must satisfy the criteria set out in ORS 183.482(5).

Section 183.482(5) allows a reviewing court to permit additional evidence before the hearing when the evidence is material and there are good and substantial reasons it was not presented earlier; it does not govern an agency’s decision on a motion to reopen its record.

Johnson v. Department of Public Safety Standards & Training · filed 2012-11-07(5)

However, ORS 183.482(5) is procedurally inapplicable to this case. Here, petitioner’s motion to reopen the record to present additional evidence occurred at the agency level before judicial review to this court. Additionally, the statute refers to this court’s ability to allow additional evidence before oral argument is scheduled; it has no bearing on our standard of review of the agency’s action.

Section 183.482(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to review contested cases, initiated by filing a petition there.

Murphy v. Oregon Medical Board · filed 2025-10-22(1)

ORS 183.482(1) provides in relevant part that “[j]urisdiction for judicial review of contested cases is conferred upon the Court of Appeals. Proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition in the Court of Appeals.” The statute goes on to provide the procedures for seeking judicial review in a contested case and our role on review. ORS 183.482. Significantly, we addressed the same issue that plaintiff raises here in Salibello v. Board of Optometry, 276 Or App 363, 367 P3d 932 (2016). There, as here, the plaintiff sought a declaration from the trial court regarding his rights and status in a dispute with an administrative agency and further requested an injunction requiring the agency to provide him with certain documents. Id. at 366-67. We concluded that the trial court erred in issuing the declaration and ordering production of the documents because the agency’s decision was subject to judicial review, and, “[w]hen the dispute at issue involves an agency’s action, or refusal to act, the review provisions of the APA provide the sole and exclusive means of obtaining judicial review, and an action for declaratory relief is not available.”

Section 183.482(1) gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review final orders in contested cases.

Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun. · filed 2021-09-01(1)

As a general matter, this court has jurisdiction to review orders in “contested cases,” ORS 183.482(1), and the circuit court has jurisdiction to review orders in “other than contested cases,” ORS 183.484(1).

Section 183.482(1) gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review final orders in contested cases.

Liu v. Portland State University · filed 2016-09-28(1)

Turning to those provisions, because, for purposes of the APA, PSU was an “agency” under ORS 183.310(1) (see 281 Or App at 300 n 6), and the expulsion proceeding is a “contested case” under ORS 183.310(2)(a)(B) (see 281 Or App at 301-02), we have jurisdiction under ORS 183.482(1) to review the expulsion order.

Section 183.482(1) gives the Oregon Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review a final order in a contested-case proceeding.

Wallace v. STATE EX REL. PERB · filed 2011-08-10(1)

Here, plaintiff initiated a contested case proceeding under the APA to challenge the trading restrictions placed on his Plan account, and, pursuant to ORS 183.482(1), we have jurisdiction to review PERB's order in that proceeding.

ORS 183.482's APA judicial-review provisions do not govern murder-review hearings conducted under ORS 163.105(3).

Larsen v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2009-09-23

Petitioner first argues that, because ORS 163.105(3) refers to “ORS 183.310 to 183.500,” all of the statutes encompassed within that range apply to murder review hearings, including the judicial review statutes, ORS 183.480 and ORS 183.482. We disagree. ... Thus, the statutes that prescribe the manner for a contested case hearing do not include the provisions governing judicial review. ... It follows that the APA statutes governing judicial review do not apply.

Section 183.482(1) requires a petition for judicial review to be filed within 60 days after service of the order, and a motion to set aside a default order does not extend that deadline as a petition for reconsideration would.

Puc v. Vci Co. · filed 2009-11-04(1)

We conclude that defendants' motion to set aside the order did not modify the 60-day deadline for filing a petition for judicial review of that order. Because the petition was untimely, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the PUC's order finding defendants to be in default and liable to the PUC in the amount of $203.391.97.

Section 183.482(1) requires a petition for judicial review to be filed within 60 days after service of the order; a motion to set aside a default is not a petition for reconsideration that triggers a new filing period or deemed-denied rule.

Public Utility Commission v. VCI Co. · filed 2009-11-04(1)

We conclude that defendants’ motion to set aside the order did not modify the 60-day deadline for filing a petition for judicial review of that order. Because the petition was untimely, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the PUC's order finding defendants to be in default and liable to the PUC in the amount of $203,391.97. ... Thus, there was no disposition that was subject to judicial review under ORS 183.482.

Section 183.482 gives the Oregon Court of Appeals initial jurisdiction to review final orders in contested cases.

Rooklidge v. Dmv · filed 2007-12-26

But, if petitioner's argument that she was entitled to a contested case proceeding before DMV is correct, then the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the case because ORS 183.482 confers initial jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases in this court only.

Section 183.482(1) generally measures the 60-day period for judicial review from service of the final order, but a specific statute may make the period run from the date the order becomes final instead.

ETU, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Commission · filed 2006-04-26(1)

We can see no reason that the result here should be different. Accordingly, the time for filing a petition for judicial review under ORS 183.482 was based on the dates of the default final orders, not on the date of service in accordance with ORS 183.470. DEQ’s failure to serve the default final orders on respondents’ attorney, therefore, did not affect the orders’ finality, so long as DEQ complied with the requirements of ORS 183.745 in serving the original notice of violation.

Section 183.482 gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review agency orders in contested cases.

Corey v. Department of Land Conservation & Development · filed 2007-01-31

It necessarily follows that, under ORS 183.310(2)(a), the DLCD procedure should have been conducted as a contested case, and therefore, under ORS 183.482, jurisdiction for judicial review lies in this court.

Section 183.482 does not give the Oregon Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review an agency final order when the proper review route is a petition under ORS 183.484 in circuit court.

Berger v. SOSCF · filed 2004-10-13

In Berger(A117291), we held that petitioner was not entitled to a contested case hearing and that the proper method for reviewing the final order at issue was by a petition for review under ORS 183.484 in circuit court. As a result of that holding, we conclude that neither ORS 183.482 nor any other statute gives us jurisdiction over this case.

ORS 183.482 does not give the appellate court jurisdiction to review this agency order when the proper review method is a petition under ORS 183.484 in circuit court.

Berger v. State Office for Services to Children & Families · filed 2004-10-13

As a result of that holding, we conclude that neither ORS 183.482 nor any other statute gives us jurisdiction over this case.

Section 183.482(1) gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to judicially review contested cases, not orders outside contested cases.

Quaker State Oil Co. v. Taskinen · filed 1997-03-26(1)

The statute directs that our review of an order from the Director shall be according to the provisions of ORS 183.310 to ORS 183.550, and ORS 183.482 only gives us authority to review orders in contested cases. ... That approach was erroneous because it overlooked the limited grant of jurisdiction that we have under ORS 183.482. In essence, we reviewed an order in other than a contested case; the authority to review those orders is vested in other courts and not the Court of Appeals.

Section 183.482(1) gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review contested cases, including review of different types of orders generated within a contested case when the requirements for interlocutory review are met.

Oregon Health Care Ass'n v. Health Division · filed 1997-06-25(1)

For example, ORS 183.482 repeatedly refers to jurisdiction to "review a contested case," not to review a particular type of order within a contested case. See ORS 183.482(1) ("jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases"); ORS 183.482(5) ("review of a contested case"); ORS 183.482(7) ("[r]eview of a contested case"). The same statute requires that all petitions for judicial review of contested cases "state the nature of the order the petitioner desires reviewed," expressing the assumption that more than one type of order generated within a contested case is subject to the court’s jurisdiction.

Section 183.482(1) starts the 60-day period for a judicial-review petition when the agency deposits its final order in the mail (or otherwise serves it), rather than on the date of the order.

Ososke v. Driver and Motor Vehicle Services · filed 1995-03-30(1)

Thus, the filing of a petition for judicial review within 60 days of the date on which a final order in a contested case is “served” vests jurisdiction to conduct judicial review in the Court of Appeals. ORS 183.482(1). An agency may serve the final order by mail. ORS 183.482(1), 183.470(3). For the purpose of ORS 183.482(1), then, the date on which a final order is deposited in the mail is the date of service and, therefore, the date from which the statute measures the 60-day limit to file a petition for judicial review with the Court of Appeals.

Section 183.482 gives the Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review a final contested case order, leaving the circuit court without jurisdiction over the same issue.

City of Klamath Falls v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality · filed 1993-04-21

The trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction and that exclusive jurisdiction over the issue was in this court, as part of our review of EQC’s final contested case order under ORS 183.482. The trial court was correct, and we have decided the issue in City of Klamath Falls v. Environ. Quality Comm., 119 Or App 375, 851 P2d 602 (1993).

Section 183.482 limits judicial review to contested cases, so a controversy that does not qualify as a contested case is not reviewable under the statute.

Mercy Medical Center, Inc. v. Office of Health Policy · filed 1993-07-14

Because the controversy does not qualify as a contested case, we do not have authority to review the orders under ORS 183.482.

Section 183.482 requires service of the petition for review on all parties, but the service requirement is not jurisdictional and dismissal is unwarranted absent prejudice.

Southern Oregon Neurological Associates v. EBI Companies · filed 1990-11-07

EBI also moves to dismiss, because petitioner did not serve employer with a copy of the petition, as required by ORS 183.482. Although service on all parties is mandatory, it is hot jurisdictional under the APA and dismissal of the petition is not warranted where there is no prejudice.

Section 183.482(8)(d) requires the Court of Appeals to determine whether an agency finding is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

Lewis & Clark College v. Bureau of Labor · filed 1979-11-26(8)(d)

Based upon our reading of this entire record, it is our conclusion that there is not "substantial evidence in the whole record" within the meaning of that term in ORS 183.482(8)(d) to support the Labor Commissioner's finding that Lewis and Clark College discriminated against Dianne Hart on the basis of her sex.

Section 183.482(8)(d) requires an agency decision to be supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

Employment Division v. Janitorial Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1979-04-02(8)(d)

On review of the record, we conclude that JE did not satisfy its burden of proof. The referee’s findings of fact are agreed to be true and complete, but under the rule in Kirkpatrick as applied in the 1978 Supreme Court decisions they do not reflect "substantial evidence in the whole record” (ORS 183.482(8)(d)) sufficient to support the decision.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency order to be supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Estremado v. Employment Division · filed 1983-11-30(8)(c)

The dispositive issue is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the referee’s order holding that the services performed for petitioner by one Swarthout and his logging crew constitute “employment,” subjecting petitioner to the payment of payroll taxes. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

The amended provisions apply to pending litigation because they change only the scope of judicial review, and they require remand when the agency's action may have been impaired by procedural error or when the agency erroneously interpreted the law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Fish & Wildlife Department v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1979-12-18(7) and (8)(a)(B)

Therefore, under the amended provisions of ORS 183.482(7) and (8)(a)(B) previously set forth, this matter must be remanded by us to LCDC for decision because we find either "that the correctness of the action may have been impaired," as provided by subsection (7) or "that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action," as provided by subsection (8)(a).

Section 183.482 requires the court to uphold an agency finding supported by substantial evidence and disregard an error that did not prejudice the petitioner’s substantial rights.

Bierly v. Employment Division · filed 1980-02-19(8)(d), (8)(a)

Applying the rule as written, there was substantial evidence before the referee to support that conclusion. ORS 183.482(8)(d). The portion of the referee’s conclusions relating to intent stemmed from an erroneous reading of the rule, but that did not prejudice the substantial rights of petitioner. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Subsection (8)(a)(A) requires a reviewing court to set aside or modify an agency order when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners · filed 1980-01-08(8)(a)(A)

Thus ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A) requires that the board’s order be reversed.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires reversal when an agency erroneously interprets a provision of law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action, and subsection (8)(a)(A) requires reversal of the agency order in that circumstance.

Federation of Independent Seafood Harvesters v. Oregon Fish & Wildlife Commission · filed 1980-06-16(8)(a) (8)(a)(A)

In summary, we conclude that the Commission "erroneously interpreted a provision of law”, ORS 183.482(8)(a), by deciding it could issue the hatchery permits without first making the findings required under ORS 508.710. Given the Commission’s conclusion that it could not make the required findings from the evidence presented, the error under ORS 508.710(1) could not be cured on a remand. Thus, ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A) requires that the Commission’s order be reversed.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires a court to remand an agency order when the agency erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Goldhammer v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 1983-06-22(8)(a)

“(a) The court may affirm, reverse or remand the order. If the court finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action, it shall: ... “(B) Remand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law.”

Section 183.482(2) makes service of a petition for review mandatory but not jurisdictional, while subsection (1) states the jurisdictional requirements for reviewing a contested case.

Hill v. Employment Division · filed 1988-08-03(2)

Whether the service requirement of ORS 183.482(2) is jurisdictional has never been decided. We hold that it is mandatory, but not jurisdictional. ORS 183.482(1) sets forth the jurisdictional requirements for review of a contested case. Failure to meet a requirement of ORS 183.482(2) may nonetheless result in dismissal of the petition.

Section 183.482(1)'s 60-day period for seeking review runs from the filing of the commission's order when the governing boundary statute makes filing the operative service event, and subsection (2) does not require an adverse-effect affidavit from persons interested in the boundary change under ORS 199.462(4).

Donaldson v. Lane County Local Government Boundary Commission · filed 1988-10-05(1) (2)

“Jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases is conferred upon the Court of Appeals. Proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition in the Court of Appeals. The petition shall be filed within 60 days only following the date the order upon which the petition is based is served unless otherwise provided by statute.” ... Contrary to City’s contention, we conclude that the time for seeking review of the orders runs from the date when they are filed as provided in ORS 199.461(5) and (6) and not from the date when they are adopted. ... Additionally, because their petitions show that they are persons “interested in the boundary change,” ORS 199.462(4), they need not file an affidavit under ORS 183.482(2) showing how they were “adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency order.”

When a proposed-and-final agency order becomes final by operation of law, the 60-day period for filing a petition for judicial review runs from the date it becomes final, without requiring reservice.

Saif Corp. v. Glubrecht · filed 1998-09-30(1)

“Under the third and final construction, the 60-day time for filing the petition for review would run from the date that the “proposed and final” order became final — that is, “the 30th day following the date of service of the proposed order,” ORS 183.464(1) — without any requirement of reservice. ... We adopt that construction.”

Section 183.482(1) requires a petition for judicial review of a boundary commission order to be filed within 60 days.

Suburban East Salem Water District v. Marion-Polk County Local Government Boundary Commission · filed 1979-09-24(1)

Such petitions must be filed within 60 days. ORS 183.482(1). As petitioner acknowledges, this petition was not filed until far later than 60 days after the Commission’s decision.

Section 183.482 permits Court of Appeals review when a proceeding qualifies as a contested case, regardless of the kind of hearing the agency actually held.

Patton v. State Board of Higher Education · filed 1982-07-07

In other words, the court believed that its jurisdiction depended on the kind of hearing actually conducted by the agency rather than on whether the proceeding qualified as a “contested case” under the Administrative Procedure Act. This is erroneous.

Section 183.482 permits Court of Appeals review of claimed APA violations in a state agency decision even when the decision also qualifies as a land use decision.

Kalmiopsis Audubon Society v. Division of State Lands · filed 1984-02-08

We conclude, therefore, that the legislature did not intend to divest this court of jurisdiction over appeals taken pursuant to ORS 183.480 and 183.482 claiming APA violations, even when the agency decision comes within the definition of a land use decision.

Section 183.482(2) requires a petition to state the basis for standing to challenge a contested-case order, but its recital requirement does not apply to rule challenges.

Lovelace v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2002-08-14(2)

Instead, ORS 183.482(2) requires a recital of standing that has no application in rule challenges because no statute imposes a comparable standing requirement for such proceedings.

Section 183.482 contemplates a contested case hearing before the Court of Appeals reviews issues that could arise in that hearing.

Hood River Valley Residents' Committee, Inc. v. State Ex Rel. Department of Administrative Services · filed 2007-12-26

Our authority to review orders in contested cases is governed by ORS 183.482, and that statute contemplates that a contested case hearing has taken place before we address the issues that might arise in such a hearing.

Section 183.482(1) requires a petition for judicial review of a contested case to be filed in the Court of Appeals within 60 days after service of the order.

1000 Friends v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1986-09-03(1)

“Without deciding whether reconsideration of final LCDC orders is authorized in other circumstances, we hold that, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, an order correcting only minor factual clerical ... errors that were not germane to a determination that is the subject of the final order cannot extend the period of review of the final order.”

Section 183.482(1) provides for Court of Appeals review of an agency decision after a contested case hearing.

Bay River, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Commission · filed 1976-09-13(1)

After the hearing, any aggrieved person may seek review of the agency decision in this court. ORS 183.480(1) and (2), ORS 183.482(1).

Subsection (6) preserves an agency’s jurisdiction to withdraw and reconsider an order after judicial review is sought and does not bar agency action before review is filed, while subsection (8)(a) requires deference to a plausible agency interpretation of its own administrative rule.

Stella v. Dept. of Human Services · filed 2025-10-08(6), (8)(a)

“ORS 183.482(6) establishes that an agency retains some jurisdiction over a matter, even in the face of a petition for review in this court, unlike the rule that the filing of an appeal generally divests the lower tribunal of jurisdiction. ... We therefore reject petitioner’s assertion that ORS 183.482(6) functions to limit an agency’s authority to withdraw an order prior to a petition for judicial review having been filed. ... An agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule is entitled to deference.”

Subsection (6) permits an agency to withdraw an order for reconsideration, and a petitioner who wants to continue judicial review after a nonminor revision must timely file an amended petition; otherwise, the review must be dismissed.

D. M. v. Or. Health Auth. · filed 2019-03-06(6)

When an agency withdraws an order under ORS 183.482(6) and then files an order on reconsideration that does not merely "affirm[ ] *** or modif[y] the order with only minor changes," a petitioner must file a timely amended petition for judicial review of the order on reconsideration if the petitioner seeks to proceed with the case: "If the petitioner is dissatisfied with the agency action after withdrawal for purposes of reconsideration, the petitioner may refile the petition for review and the review shall proceed upon the revised order." ORS 183.482(6).

A party seeking a stay under subsection (3)(a)(B) must assert a statutory ground for setting aside, modifying, reversing, or remanding the agency order and show that the claim is substantial and nonfrivolous or seemingly valid, genuine, or plausible.

Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer School District · filed 2003-01-08(3)(a)(B)

In sum, to satisfy ORS 183.482(3)(a)(B), a party moving for a stay must (1) assert that it is entitled to have the agency order set aside, modified, reversed, or remanded on one or more of the grounds specified in ORS 183.482(8), and (2) show that the assertion is substantial and nonfrivolous, or seemingly valid, genuine, or plausible, under the circumstances of the case.

Section 183.482(6) does not require an amended petition for review when the agency’s reconsideration order affirms the original order or makes only minor changes.

Nida v. Bureau of Labor & Industries · filed 1992-03-04(6)

In short, although the text has been expanded and the pages have been renumbered, the facts, analysis and result all remain the same. We conclude that the changes to BOLI’s original order were “minor,” within the meaning of ORS 183.482(6). Accordingly, we hold that employers were not required to file an amended petition for judicial review.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires reversal of an agency order when the agency erroneously interprets and misapplies the governing law.

Keeble v. Employment Division · filed 1984-01-11(8)(a)

The Board erroneously interpreted and misapplied the Division’s rule, and its order is reversed. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency order unless the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law.

International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 314 v. City of Salem · filed 1984-06-27(8)(a)

Ordinarily, it is the initial responsibility of the agency, whether by rule or order, to explain the application of the statute to specific facts. Because the function of the court is to review an interpretation if review is sought, rather than to formulate it in the first instance, under ORS 183.482(8)(a) the court must uphold the order unless the agency has ‘erroneously interpreted a provision of law.’

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) permits reversal of an agency order that falls outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law.

American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Locals 626 & 2831 v. Lane County Board of Commissioners · filed 1980-03-10(8)(b)(A)

It follows that its order declaring the strike to be an unfair labor practice was "[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law.” ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A).

Section 183.482(1) permits judicial review within 60 days after an agency actually denies reconsideration or rehearing, even when more than 60 days have passed since service of the original order.

Vorm v. David Douglas School District No. 40 · filed 1980-03-17(1)

The obvious purpose of the statute was to allow a party to petition for judicial review of an agency order after he has unsuccessfully sought reconsideration or rehearing by the agency and has not appealed to this court within 60 days following service of the order because his petition for reconsideration or rehearing was pending before the agency. ... We conclude that we have jurisdiction, and we turn to the merits.

Section 183.482(3) authorizes an agency to stay an order while an appeal from that order is pending.

City of Wood Village v. Portland Metropolitan Area Local Government Boundary Commission · filed 1980-04-03(3)

That statute specifies that this appeal is to be handled "in accordance with the provisions of ORS 183.480 to 183.500.” One of the cross-referenced statutes is ORS 183.482(3) which authorizes agencies to issue stays of orders from which appeals are taken. The boundary commission thus had authority to grant petitioner’s motion for a stay, and erred in not ruling on the merits of that motion.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a reviewing court to set aside or remand an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence, and the current version of the statute governs the court’s scope of review.

Glover v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 1980-06-30(8)(c)

We review the agency’s decision pursuant to ORS 183.482(8)(c), ... which provides that in a contested agency case ... (c) The Court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) limits review to whether an agency order is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, while subsection (7) requires a showing that a procedural error affected the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action before a new hearing is ordered.

Spray v. Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1981-02-09(8)(c), (7)

However, our review is limited to whether or not the order is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... While it was error for the Board not to hold a public hearing, the petitioner fails to demonstrate how the "fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action” was affected by this failure to follow prescribed procedure. ORS 183.482(7). Thus, were this the only error involved in this case, we would decline to order a new hearing.

Subsection (8)(c)'s substantial-evidence review does not apply to LCDC acknowledgment orders because those orders are not contested-case orders subject to review under § 183.482.

Oregon Business Planning Council v. Department of Land Conservation & Development · filed 1981-03-31(8)(c)

It follows, in our opinion, that "acknowledgment” proceedings are not "contested cases” as defined by subsection (A) of that statute. ... For the reasons previously stated, we hold that unless and until the legislature provides for judicial review of LCDC acknowledgment orders in some other manner, the provisions for judicial review as provided by ORS 183.484 for "orders other than contested cases” are the exclusive provisions for judicial review of LCDC orders under ORS 197.251, acknowledging local comprehensive plans to be in compliance with LCDC statewide planning goals.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the reviewing court to determine whether the agency board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Fullmer v. Employment Division · filed 1980-07-28(8)(c)

We must determine whether the Board’s decision in this case is supported by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(6) allows a petitioner costs when an agency withdraws an order for reconsideration and then modifies or reverses it in the petitioner’s favor; withdrawal alone is insufficient.

Kilham Stationery & Printing v. National Council on Compensation Insurance · filed 1991-11-13(6)

However, it is not the withdrawal of the agency’s order that triggers the right to costs under ORS 183.482(6), but the modification or reversal of that order in the petitioner’s favor.

Section 183.482(3) lets the agency grant a stay and makes only the agency’s denial of a stay motion reviewable by the Court of Appeals.

Meredith v. Oregon · filed 2003-02-27(3)(a), (3)(d)

Under Oregon Revised Statute section 183.482(3)(a), the “agency” may grant a stay of the ALJ’s final order, and only “[ajgency denial of a motion for stay is subject to review by the Court of Appeals .... ”

When an agency withdraws an order for reconsideration and then modifies or reverses it in the petitioner’s favor, subsection (6) entitles the petitioner to costs.

Voelz Oil & Land Survey, Inc. v. Oregon State Fire Marshal · filed 1995-11-29(6)

In this case, however, ORS 183.482(6) — not ORAP 13.05(3) — determines whether petitioner is allowed costs.

Section 183.482(7) requires remand when a material procedural error or failure to follow prescribed procedure may have impaired the fairness or correctness of the agency action, while subsection (8)(c) requires setting aside or remanding an order unsupported by substantial evidence.

Skadsen v. Employment Division · filed 1982-01-25(7), (8)(c)

Because it did not do so, we cannot base our review on subsection (7) of ORS 183.482 ... and must consider whether, under subsection (8)(c) of that section, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the application was untimely filed.

Section 183.482 requires judicial review to defer to an agency’s credibility determinations and factual findings when the record contains substantial evidence supporting them.

Groener v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission · filed 1982-09-29(7)

Whether there is too little evidence to support the findings relates to the question of substantiality, which the court may assess on judicial review. Here, once the credibility issue was resolved by the Commission, there is substantial evidence to support the findings, and we are bound by them under ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

Redmond v. Employment Division · filed 1984-02-08(8)(c)

In order to resolve claimant’s second assignment of error, we need to determine whether the decision that claimant had “reasonable assurance” of reemployment is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record. ... Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that there was no agreement, express or implied, written contract or written notification which amounts to substantial evidence of mutual commitment or assurance.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires judicial review of an agency decision under the substantial-evidence standard.

Engman v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 1984-03-07(8)(c)

Judicial review of administrative decisions is for substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a reviewing court to set aside or remand an agency order when the agency's unexplained inconsistency prevents the court from determining whether substantial evidence supports the order.

Moki, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission · filed 1984-06-27(8)(c)

Because OLCC failed to explain why it acted inconsistently, we are unable to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the order. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) permits remand when an administrative agency acts beyond the range of discretion delegated to it by law.

Gaudry v. Bureau of Labor & Industries · filed 1980-10-06(8)(b)(A)

This court may remand an order of an administrative agency where it finds that the agency acted beyond the range of discretion delegated to it by law. ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A).

Section 183.482(7) permits remand when the correctness of an agency action may have been impaired by a material procedural error or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.

Nichols v. Oregon State Board of Pharmacy · filed 1980-11-10(7)

Petitioner requests that we appoint a master under ORS 183.482(7), but we are doubtful that that would help. Instead, we find that "the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure” and remand for further agency action. ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(4) requires the agency to forward the record for review, and section 183.482(8)(c) permits review of whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Oregon Business Planning Council v. Department of Land Conservation, & Development · filed 1980-11-17(4), (8)(c)

If LCDC’s acknowledgment decision is reviewed as a contested case order, LCDC must forward to us the record developed before it, ORS 183.482(4), which we can examine to determine if the decision is supported by substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482 does not apply to prisoners’ petitions for review brought under ORS 144.335.

Esperum v. Oregon Board of Parole · filed 1984-04-17

However, the provisions of ORS 183.482 are not applicable to petitions for review brought pursuant to ORS 144.335 by prisoners.

Section 183.482(6) does not apply to judicial review of Board of Parole orders.

Stelljes v. State Bd. of Parole · filed 1989-02-14(6)

The Board argues that petitioners did not prevail on the merits in the Court of Appeals and, further, that ORS 183.482(6) does not apply to judicial review of Board orders. We agree with the Board.

Section 183.482(8)(a) authorizes a reviewing court to set aside or modify an agency order, or remand the case, when the agency erroneously interpreted the law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Springfield Education Ass'n v. Springfield School District No. 19 · filed 1980-12-16(8)(a)

Having concluded that ERB erred regarding this proposal and that a correct interpretation of law "compels a particular action,” we are authorized by ORS 183.482(8)(a) to set aside or modify the order or to remand the case to ERB for further action.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires a court to remand an agency order when the agency’s discretionary action is inconsistent with an agency rule and the agency has not explained the inconsistency.

Stadelman v. Builders Board · filed 1983-03-02(8)(b)(B)

In reviewing a decision of an administrative agency in a contested case, ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) provides that: ... “(B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency * * * ... Because we cannot determine whether the agency considered evidence in violation of its rules, we remand for the Board to reconsider its order.

Section 183.482(6) permits an agency to withdraw an order for reconsideration even after an appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals.

Tektronix Corp. v. Twist · filed 1983-04-13(6)

ORS 183.482(6) permits an agency to withdraw an order for reconsideration even after an appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. ... We agree.

Section 183.482 permits remand for material procedural error and permits reversal or remand when an agency has erroneously interpreted law, lacks substantial evidentiary support, or exercises discretion unlawfully.

Van Gordon v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners · filed 1983-06-22(7), (8)(a), (8)(b), and (8)(c)

Under subsection (7), we may remand an order for further agency action if we find that “the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the [agency] action may have been impaired” by a material procedural error or a failure to follow prescribed procedure. Subsection (8) of that statute allows us to reverse or remand an order if the agency “has erroneously interpreted a provision of law” or if “the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Under that subsection we may also remand an order if the agency’s exercise of discretion is outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law, inconsistent with an agency rule, policy, position or practice, or otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision.

Section 183.482(7) requires a reviewing court to find an enumerated review ground before disturbing an agency order; when no such ground is shown and the order has a rational basis, there is nothing further to review.

Ainsworth v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission · filed 1981-12-21(7)

Where none of the grounds enumerated in ORS 183.482(7)-(8) are shown on review, and where a rational basis existed for the commission’s order, there is nothing more for this court to review.

Section 183.482(6) allows an agency to withdraw its order for reconsideration after a petition for review is filed and requires judicial review to proceed on the revised order, with an amended petition if the petitioner is dissatisfied.

Knapp v. Employment Division · filed 1984-03-07(6)

Under ORS 183.482(6),. an agency may withdraw its order for purposes of reconsideration and may affirm, modify or reverse it; if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the agency action after reconsideration, the petitioner may file an amended petition for review and the review shall proceed upon the revised order which is the final order for purposes of judicial review.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of agency findings to determine whether substantial evidence in the record supports them.

Cook v. Employment Division · filed 1980-07-23(8)(c)

We are to determine whether the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(6) permits a state administrative agency to withdraw its order for reconsideration so it can correct errors before judicial review becomes fully enmeshed.

Cascade Aggregates, Inc. v. Scappoose Drainage District · filed 1981-09-08(6)

The purpose of ORS 183.482(6) is to permit state administrative agencies to correct errors before the same becomes enmeshed in the governmental process, including judicial review.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires courts reviewing agency action to decide whether the agency's legal interpretation is erroneous, while subsection (8)(c) requires acceptance of historical findings supported by substantial evidence.

Ross v. Springfield School District No. 19 · filed 1984-11-21(8)(a), (8)(c)

The court's role is to review the agency's interpretation of the law to determine whether it is erroneous, not to set forth our own interpretation. ORS 183.482(8)(a). 290 Or. at 234, 621 P.2d 547. We accept the agency's findings of the "historical facts" if they are supported by substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), but we review the application of those facts to the appropriate legal standard as a matter of law.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires an agency to explain or rectify a qualifying inconsistency with its officially stated position or past practice, but does not require the agency to repeat an earlier error.

1000 Friends of Oregon v. Washington County · filed 1985-03-06(8)(b)(B)

Reduced to essentials, the county’s assignment is that LCDC erred by not repeating its earlier error. That is not the kind of inconsistency that ORS 183.482(8) (b)(B) contemplates that agencies must explain or rectify.

An agency's different conclusions in adjudicative settings do not constitute an inconsistency under this provision when the issue may properly be decided differently in different factual contexts, unless the disparity occurs at different stages of the same proceeding or in separate proceedings concerning the same event.

1000 Friends v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1985-03-06(8)(b)(B)

We hold that an agency’s conclusion in an adjudicative setting on an issue that can be decided differently in different factual contexts does not give rise to an inconsistency subject to ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), at least when the disparity does not occur at different stages of the same proceeding or in separate proceedings that relate to the same event.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) permits a reviewing court to remand when an agency acts outside the range of discretion allowed by law.

Berwick v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 1985-07-17(8)(b)(A)

The hearings officer has broad discretion in how to carry out this duty but, if the officer acts outside the range of that discretion, we may remand for further proceedings. ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A).

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires a reviewing court to remand an agency order when the agency’s exercise of discretion is inconsistent with an agency rule and the agency has not explained the inconsistency.

Price v. Oregon State Board of Parole · filed 1985-11-26(8)(b)(B)

The reviewing court must remand the order to the Board if it finds the Board’s exercise of discretion to be “[inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency.” ORS 183.482(8) (b)(B), which is made a part of ORS chapter 144 by cross-reference in ORS 144.335(3).

Section 183.482(8)(b) requires remand only upon a clear showing that an agency order is inconsistently applied under an agency rule, officially stated position, or prior agency practice and the inconsistency is unexplained; it does not require substantial-evidence support for consistency across different cases.

Association of Engineering Employes v. Department of Transportation, Highway Division · filed 1985-02-27(8)(b)

ORS 183.482(8) (b) does not compel us to require that agencies support the consistency of their rulings in different cases with substantial evidence in the record. We interpret it to require only that we remand an order upon a clear showing of an unexplained inconsistency.

Section 183.482 governs judicial review of contested-case orders and does not expressly require the petition to state grounds for reversal or remand, although judicial review presumes that the petitioner identifies some fault in the agency order.

Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J · filed 1986-07-29

ORS 183.482, prescribing judicial review of orders in contested cases, does not expressly require the petition for review to state the grounds why the order should be reversed or remanded, but ORS 183.484(3) makes this clear with respect to agency orders outside contested cases.

Section 183.482(7) requires the reviewing court to remand when a material procedural error may have impaired the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the agency action.

Mascorro v. Employment Division · filed 1984-10-31(7)

ORS 183.482(7) requires this court to remand a case if we find “that either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure.”

Subsection (8)(a) governs review of questions of law, while under subsection (8)(c) the agency’s factual finding is final if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Ogden v. Bureau of Labor · filed 1985-04-30(8)(a), (8)(c)

“Alternative work” is not a statutory term, and there is no reason to think that the court meant to decide a question of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a). ... What the effects of the unlawful practice were in this case and what monetary award was “reasonably calculated to * * * elminate [its] effects” are questions of fact on which the commissioner’s finding is final if supported by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(6) does not require an amended petition for review when the agency’s reconsideration order neither expressly withdraws nor modifies the prior order.

Fischer v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1985-12-04(6)

Because the Board neither expressly withdrew the October 31 order nor modified it, we hold that ORS 183.482(6) did not require claimant to file an amended petition for review after the November 28 order.

Section 183.482(1) requires a petition for judicial review of a contested case order to be filed within 60 days after service, and a correction of minor clerical errors unrelated to the determination does not extend or restart that period.

Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Clatsop Co.) · filed 1986-09-03(1)

Without deciding whether reconsideration of final LCDC orders is authorized in other circumstances, we hold that, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, an order correcting only minor factual clerical errors that were not germane to a determination that is the subject of the final order cannot extend the period of review of the final order.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires agency findings to be supported by substantial evidence, while § 183.482(8)(b)(B) permits remand for an unexplained inconsistency with prior agency practice.

Legg v. Oregon Racing Commission · filed 1988-01-13(8)(c); (8)(b)(B)

The Commission’s findings in that regard are “supported by substantial evidence in the record.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... The fact that the Commission has promulgated rules allowing limited use of two drugs dissimilar to sulfonamides ... does not amount to anything as significant as a “prior practice” under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B).

Section 183.482(8)(a)(A) authorizes setting aside an agency order when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law.

Erbs v. Board of Parole · filed 1988-04-06(8)(a)(A)

Pursuant to ORS 144.335(3), our review of revocation orders is specified in ORS 183.482(8). We conclude that the Board’s determination that petitioner was properly released on parole, and therefore subject to the conditions of the release, is an erroneous interpretation of law. Petitioner was entitled to a discharge on July 16, 1986. The Board’s release on parole and the subsequent revocation of parole and return to prison were unlawful. The order revoking parole is set aside. ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A).

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires corrective relief when an agency has erroneously interpreted the law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry Co.) · filed 1986-08-12(8)(a)

Moreover, "a correct interpretation" of Goal 14 "compels a particular action," ORS 183.482(8)(a): LCDC must determine whether the county's exceptions areas allow "urban uses."

Section 183.482 allows judicial review of an agency's disallowance of a claim for payment from the State Treasury when there is a final administrative order.

Pebb v. Ohsu · filed 2006-04-05

A person aggrieved by the disallowance of a claim for payment of "any moneys in the State Treasury" may seek judicial review of the disallowance under ORS 183.482. ORS 293.316. As noted, the demutualization proceeds are held in a special trust account of the State Treasury. Any claim against those funds is subject to the provisions of ORS chapter 293. PEBB's disallowance of Sundermier's claims against the funds would therefore have been subject to judicial review under ORS 183.482. But PEBB did not expressly allow or disallow Sundermier's claims; instead, it filed the interpleader complaint in this proceeding, seeking a judicial determination of its rights and obligations respecting the funds. There is no final administrative order disposing of the claims.

On review of an agency order, the court determines whether the agency rule falls within the range of discretion allowed by the legislative delegation of authority.

Employment Division v. Asher · filed 1987-07-08(8)(b)

Our function on review of EAB’s order is to determine if the rule is within the range of discretion allowed by the legislative delegation of authority. ORS 183.482(8)(b).

Section 183.482(1) places judicial review of orders in contested cases in the Court of Appeals.

Standard Insurance v. Olin · filed 1987-09-09(1)

Given a reviewable final order, the next preliminary question is whether this court has authority to review it. Jurisdiction to review orders in contested cases is in this court, ORS 183.482(1); jurisdiction to review orders in other than contested cases is in circuit court. ORS 183.484(1).

Section 183.482(1) provides a 60-day deemed-denial rule for petitions for rehearing or reconsideration when an agency does not otherwise act, but it does not apply to Board of Parole orders.

Taylor v. Board of Parole · filed 2005-07-06(1)

ORS 183.490 is discussed in the text below; ORS 183.482 does not apply to board orders such as the one in this case. ORS 183.315(5).

Section 183.482 does not apply to persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

Meriweather v. Board of Parole · filed 1988-08-24

Petitioner also cites OAR 255-80-010 and ORS 183.482 as bases for jurisdiction. The administrative rule is inapposite, and ORS 183.482 does not apply to persons in custody of the Department of Corrections. ORS 183.315(5).

Section 183.482(3)(a) provides that filing a petition for review does not stay enforcement of an agency order, so a pending appeal does not suspend the order unless a stay is entered.

State v. Hercenberger · filed 2025-12-17(3)(a)

Further, absent a stay pending appeal of the DMV’s suspension order—which defendant conceded at oral argument was not entered in that case—defendant’s pending appeals did not affect the validity of DMV’s suspension of defendant’s license. See ORS 183.482(3)(a) (“The filing of the petition shall not stay enforcement of the agency order[.]”).

Section 183.482(3) permits an agency to stay enforcement of its order on the required showing and permits Court of Appeals review of an agency's denial of a stay.

Weldon v. Board of Licensed Professional Counselors & Therapists · filed 2012-12-20(3)

Our interpretation of ORS 676.210 as granting courts authority to enter injuctions and not as prohibiting courts from ordering stays allows us to harmonize ORS 676.210, ORS 183.480(3) (1957), and ORS 183.482(3), and give effect to each. ORS 676.210 makes a board's order suspending or revoking a health care practitioner's license immediately effective and grants a court authority to enforce it, but also permits a board and a court acting pursuant to the APA to stay an order of suspension or revocation of license pending appeal.

ORS 183.482(8), as incorporated into review of parole-board orders by ORS 144.335(3), requires substantial-reason review, including an explanation connecting supported facts to the agency's specific decision.

Contreras v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2019-05-15(8)

We review the board's order for substantial evidence and reason. ... ORS 144.335(3) (providing that appellate review of board orders is "on the same basis as provided in ORS 183.482(8)"). ... Based on the foregoing, we conclude that our substantial reason standard of review applies to the board's deferral period decision under ORS 144.280.

Section 183.482(2) permits a petition for review by a person adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency order, including when an amended site certificate was reviewed without a contested case proceeding.

Friends of the Columbia Gorge v. Energy Facility Siting Council · filed 2019-08-01(2)

And ORS 183.482 allows a petition for review to be filed by, among others, "a person adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency order." ORS 183.482(2).

Section 183.482(2) allows a person adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency order to seek judicial review.

Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun. · filed 2020-12-10(2)

And ORS 183.482 allows judicial review to be sought by, among others, “a person adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency order.” ORS 183.482(2).

Section 183.482(8)(a)(B) permits remand for an agency’s erroneous legal interpretation when the correct interpretation requires further agency action, but remand is unnecessary when the agency reached the legally correct result.

Coleman v. SAIF · filed 2020-05-13(8)(a)(B)

Typically, when the board has erroneously interpreted a provision of law, as it did here in concluding that ORS 656.267(1) prohibited claimant’s physician from filing a claim on his behalf, we will reverse and remand the board’s order. See ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B) (where an “agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and * * * a correct interpretation compels a particular action,” one option is to “[r]emand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law”); see also Kuhn v. Dept. Human Services, 283 Or App 695, 701, 389 P3d 1167 (2017) (remanding administrative order for reconsideration under a correct interpretation of law when the agency’s error prohibited it from considering the “critical question” at issue). Here, however, even under a correct interpretation of the law, the board’s conclusion that claimant’s chart note did not initiate an omitted medical condition claim was legally correct, and a remand would serve no purpose. Accordingly, we affirm the board’s order.

Section 183.482(4) permits the reviewing court to add materials to the record when doing so is desirable under the circumstances and will not unfairly surprise or prejudice a party.

Mata v. Dept. of Transportation · filed 2020-06-10(4)

Given that the applications were considered by the ALJ and that they were actually produced by ODOT, we conclude that including the applications as part of the record on review would neither surprise any party nor place any party in an unfair position, and that to do so is desirable under the circumstances of this review. ... “The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record when deemed desirable.” ORS 183.482(4).

Section 183.482(7)(c) gives a reviewing court discretion to set aside or remand an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence or substantial reason.

Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County · filed 2020-06-17(7)(c)

Under ORS 183.482(7)(c), we have discretion to either set aside or remand ERB’s order if it is not supported by substantial evidence and, by extension, substantial reason.

Section 183.482(7) directs a reviewing court to remand when fairness or correctness may have been impaired by material procedural error, while subsection (8)(a), including (8)(a)(A), authorizes reversal or remand for legal error and requires setting aside, modifying, or remanding when an erroneous legal interpretation compels a particular agency action.

Pulito v. Board of Nursing · filed 2020-07-02(7), (8)(a), (8)(a)(A)

ORS 183.482(7) guides a reviewing court in determining the appropriate remedy where the fairness of the proceedings “may have been impaired by a material error in procedure.” ... The APA expressly authorizes a court reviewing a final order for error of law to “reverse or remand” the order. ORS 183.482(8)(a). If an agency has acted under an erroneous interpretation of law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action, the APA requires the court to set aside or modify an agency’s order or remand the case. ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A) - (B).

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits a reviewing court to overrule an agency’s interpretation of a rule only when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law; a plausible interpretation of the agency’s own rule that is not inconsistent with the rule’s wording, context, or another source of law cannot be overruled.

Sky Lakes Medical Center v. Dept. of Human Services · filed 2021-03-17(8)(a)

“As noted, this court is authorized to overrule an agency’s interpretation of a rule if an agency has ‘erroneously interpreted a provision of law.’ ORS 183.482(8)(a). In this case, the ‘provision of law’ is the rule itself. Where, as here, the agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule cannot be shown either to be inconsistent with the wording of the rule itself, or with the rule’s context, or with any other source of law, there is no basis on which this court can assert that the rule has been interpreted ‘erroneously.’ It follows that, in circumstances like those presented here, this court cannot overrule, under ORS 183.482(8)(a), an agency’s interpretation of its own rule.”

Section 183.482(3)’s stay provisions do not apply to judicial review of prison disciplinary orders under ORS 421.195.

Evans v. Oregon State Penitentiary · filed 1987-09-30(3)

ORS 421.195 makes only a portion of ORS 183.482 applicable to disciplinary review cases (“The court may affirfn, reverse or remand the order on the same basis as provided in ORS 183.482”), but it does not incorporate the stay provisions of ORS 183.482(3).

A petitioner seeking a stay must show that denying it probably would cause irreparable injury; speculative harm is insufficient.

Arlington School District No. 3 v. Arlington Education Ass'n · filed 2002-10-02(3)(a)(A)

Therefore, as pertinent here, a “showing” must at least demonstrate that irreparable injury probably would result if a stay is denied.

ORS 183.482(3) authorizes an agency to stay an order pending judicial review and permits this court to review the agency’s denial of a stay.

Northwestern Title Loans, LLC v. Division of Finance & Corporate Securities · filed 2002-03-13(3)

A more difficult question is the applicability to rule challenges of ORS 183.482(3). Again, that subsection authorizes an agency to stay an order when the petitioner for judicial review demonstrates that enforcement of the order would cause “irreparable injury to the petitioner” and demonstrates that there is a “colorable claim of error” in the order. Subsection (3) also provides for judicial review, in this court, of an agency’s denial of a stay. For the following reasons, I conclude that that portion of ORS 183.482 also properly does not apply to judicial review of a rule.

Section 183.482(2) requires a person seeking judicial review as adversely affected or aggrieved to state in a supporting affidavit the facts showing how the agency order affects them.

IBEW Local 89 v. Wallan · filed 2023-07-06(2)

To the extent the briefs identify other concrete harms, such as the requirement to provide the Union access to staff during working hours or the inability to take into consideration an LA’s union affiliation in the hiring and firing process, those injuries are not alleged in the affidavits and therefore do not provide a basis for standing under ORS 183.480(1) and ORS 183.482(2).

Section 183.482(6) requires a timely amended petition for judicial review after an agency reconsiders its order unless the revised order completely affirms the original or makes only minor changes.

Haskell Corp. v. Filippi · filed 1998-01-07(6)

Thus, ORS 183.482(6) requires the filing of an amended petition for judicial review from an order on reconsideration except when that order either completely affirms or makes only "minor changes" to the original, withdrawn order. ... We need not resolve that issue here, because even assuming, without deciding, that ORS 183.482(6) does apply, its terms require an amended petition in this case. The Board's order on reconsideration materially differed from the original order in that it conferred additional substantive relief, viz an award of attorney fees. Because the order on reconsideration did not merely "affirm[ ] the order or modif[y] the order with only minor changes," Wausau was required under ORS 183.482(6) to file a timely amended petition for judicial review.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires the appellate court to review an agency’s application of law to the facts as a matter of law.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries · filed 1998-02-04(8)(a)

We review BOLI’s application of that rule to the facts as a matter of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make it, and review asks whether a reasonable person could make the challenged findings, not different findings.

Loomis v. Board of Psychologist Examiners · filed 1998-02-11(8)(c)

Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c). We review to determine whether a reasonable person could have made the findings supporting the decision, not whether a reasonable person could have made different findings.

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Conner v. B & S LOGGING · filed 1998-04-01(8)(c)

Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Subsection (8)(c) treats a factual finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make it.

Williams v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1998-06-03(8)(c)

To the extent that petitioner argues that certain of the county’s basic factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, we disagree. “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). The county’s predicate factual findings satisfy that standard, as LCDC properly concluded.

Section 183.482(8) requires an agency to provide some explanation connecting the facts of the case, including any facts found, to the result it reaches, even when the agency is exempt from formal findings requirements.

Martin v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 1998-05-29(8)

Our review of the pertinent case law satisfies us that the requirement of some kind of an explanation connecting the facts of the case (which would include the facts found, if any) and the result reached by an agency is a requirement of ORS 183.482(8), as that section has been construed authoritatively by this court.

Subsection (8)(c) treats a factual finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make it.

Bohr v. Employment Department · filed 1998-08-26(8)(c)

In our review of the Board’s order pursuant to ORS 656.298, we conclude that the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482 gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review orders in contested cases and sets out the procedure for invoking that jurisdiction; it does not confer jurisdiction over noncontested agency orders.

Berry v. Metro Electrical Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee · filed 1998-07-15(1) (2)

The APA defines the jurisdiction of the courts to review orders generated in either of two categories of administrative proceedings. First, ORS 183.482(1) provides that “[jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases is conferred upon the Court of Appeals.” The statute next details the procedure by which the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals may be invoked to review contested cases. ORS 183.482(2) through (8). Second, ORS 183.484(1) provides that jurisdiction for judicial review of all other administrative agency orders, for “orders other than contested cases,” is conferred on the circuit courts. The jurisdictional line thus runs between contested cases and noncontested cases.

Section 183.482(2) requires a petition for judicial review to state the nature of the order being reviewed.

Waterwatch of Oregon, Inc. v. Boeing Agri-Industrial Co. · filed 1998-08-05(2)

ORS 183.310(6)(c) makes clear that the agency’s determination is subject to judicial review pursuant to ORS 183.482. That statute, in turn, requires that the petition for judicial review state the “nature of the order” to be reviewed. ORS 183.482(2).

Section 183.482(8)(c) defines substantial evidence as evidence that, viewing the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the agency’s finding, and that review standard is distinct from the burden of proof.

Gallant v. Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1999-03-17(8)(c)

The APA section on judicial review, ORS 183.480 to ORS 183.497, also uses that phrase and defines it as a quantity of evidence that, “when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make th[e agency’s] finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). However, that definition is not helpful because standards of proof and standards of review are not synonymous: the former guides the fact-finder; the latter guides the reviewer of facts already found.

Section 183.482(8)(a) does not permit a court to overrule an agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule unless the interpretation is inconsistent with the rule’s wording, context, or another source of law.

Oregon Occupational Safety & Health Division v. D & H Logging, Inc. · filed 1999-04-07(8)(a)

“As noted, this court is authorized to overrule an agency’s interpretation of a rule if an agency has ‘erroneously interpreted a provision of law.’ ORS 183.484(8)(a). ... Where, as here, the agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule cannot be shown either to be inconsistent with the wording of the rule itself, or with the rule’s context, or with any other source of law, there is no basis on which this court can assert that the rule has been interpreted ‘erroneously.’ It follows that, in circumstances like those presented here, this court cannot overrule, under ORS 183.482(8)(a), an agency’s interpretation of its own rule.” (Footnote omitted.)

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of agency factual findings for substantial evidence, meaning the whole record must permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Alp Incorporated v. Boli · filed 1999-07-07(8)(c)

We review the Commissioner's findings for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). "Substantial evidence" exists to support a finding of fact "when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding." Id.

Subsection (8)(c) requires appellate review of agency findings for substantial evidence, meaning evidence that would permit a reasonable person to make the finding when the record is viewed as a whole.

A.L.P. Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries · filed 1999-07-07(8)(c)

We review the Commissioner’s findings for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial evidence” exists to support a finding of fact “when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(7) requires remand of an agency order when a material procedural error or failure to follow prescribed procedure may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or correctness of the action.

Bauerle v. Employment Department · filed 1999-07-07(7)

“The court shall remand the order for further agency action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ... “It follows that remand is required under ORS 183.482(7).”

Section 183.482 gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of contested cases.

Lone Oak Racing v. Oregon Racing Com'n · filed 1999-08-04

ORS 183.482 confers jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases in this court.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires affirmance of an agency finding when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Crowder v. Alumaflex · filed 1999-09-29(8)(c)

Claimant’s second assignment of error is that the Board erred when it found that his compensable injury was not the major contributing cause of his current psychological condition. We will not disturb the Board’s findings if there is substantial evidence in the record to support them. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires reviewing whether the record as a whole permits a reasonable person to make the challenged finding, while avoiding substitution of the reviewing court’s judgment for the agency’s.

Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Jacobson · filed 1999-11-03(8)(c)

Our review of the director’s factual findings is for substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence” supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make the finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c). In assessing whether findings are supported by substantial evidence, our task is not to substitute our judgment for that of the director, but rather to decide whether the findings are reasonable in light of countervailing as well as supporting evidence.