Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.482

A factual finding is supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Mueller v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 1997-05-30(8)(c)

"Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding."

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the whole record permits a reasonable person to make it.

Saif Corp. v. Moe · filed 1996-07-03(8)(c)

Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make that finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make it.

Daquilante-Richards v. CIGNA Ins. Cos. · filed 1997-09-10(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Subsection (8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make it.

Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Rector · filed 1997-12-17(8)(c)

The Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). The evidence in the record supports a finding that claimant’s back pain was caused by the internal disc disruption and annular fissure at L5-S1. Employer does not dispute that finding but argues that the evidence also supports a finding that that condition caused claimant’s groin pain. Even if that were true, it is irrelevant. The relevant issue is whether, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person could find that claimant’s condition had changed after the rejection of the groin claim. We conclude that a reasonable person could make that finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency finding to be supported by substantial evidence for the finding to be upheld on judicial review.

Einstein v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 1998-04-22(8)(c)

Because the medical records do not suffice to demonstrate petitioner’s current medical status, PSRB’s finding that petitioner’s disease is in remission is not supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court reviewing an agency finding for substantial evidence to consider the entire record, including both supporting and countervailing evidence.

SAIF Corp. v. Paxton · filed 1998-06-10(8)(c)

“[SJubstantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make the finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c).”

On judicial review, the statute requires an agency order to explain how the case facts connect to the result reached.

Castro v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2009-11-18(8)

ORS 183.482(8) also requires that the board provide “some kind of an explanation connecting the facts of the case (which would include the facts found, if any) and the result reached.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make that finding.

Jefferson State Rock Products, Inc. v. Lane Regional Air Pollution Authority · filed 1999-09-22(8)(c)

Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make that finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency decision to be supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

Franke v. Lamb-Weston, Inc. · filed 2000-02-23(8)(c)

We examine the record as a whole to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings in this case and whether her conclusion is based on substantial reason. ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats an agency factual finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Einstein v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 2000-03-23(8)(c)

Judicial review for substantial evidence to support a finding of fact is a statutory undertaking under ORS 183.482(8). "Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding." ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) defines substantial evidence as evidence that would permit a reasonable person to make the finding when the record is viewed as a whole, requiring consideration of both supporting and detracting evidence.

Osborn v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 2000-12-06(8)(c)

Substantial evidence exists to support an agency’s findings when “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). That standard requires us to consider evidence that detracts from PSRB’s finding as well as evidence that supports it in determining whether the supporting evidence is substantial.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires courts reviewing agency findings to consider the entire record, including evidence against the finding, and uphold a finding if it is reasonable in light of all the evidence.

Barnes v. Employment Department · filed 2000-12-13(8)(c)

“[Sjubstantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make the finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c). A court must evaluate the substantiality of supporting evidence by considering all the evidence in the record. That is, the court must evaluate evidence against the finding as well as evidence supporting it to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support that finding. If a finding is reasonable in light of countervailing as well as supporting evidence, the finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)

Section 183.482(8)(c) directs reviewing courts to determine whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence that, viewed in the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make a finding.

SAIF Corp. v. January · filed 2000-04-19(8)(c)

Our role on review is to evaluate whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, which means evidence that, in viewing the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make a finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c); ... The problem here is that the Board did not acknowledge the existence of Kelly’s subsequent opinion, it did not reconcile her two opinions, and it did not explain why it found Kelly’s opinion of an “actual worsening” persuasive notwithstanding her agreement that she was treating claimant for a “waxing and waning” of symptoms.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence to support an agency finding when the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Agricomp Insurance v. Tapp · filed 2000-07-26(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) defines substantial evidence as evidence that, viewing the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Golliher v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services Division · filed 2001-04-25(8)(c)

Substantial evidence to support a finding of fact exists “when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires reviewing courts to uphold an agency’s factual finding when the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Bonham · filed 2001-09-12(8)(c)

We review that determination for substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the court to uphold an agency’s factual finding when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Munks v. Employment Department · filed 2001-12-26(8)(c)

The EAB’s findings are binding on us if there is substantial evidence in the record to support them. “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Substantial evidence supports a factual finding when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

SAIF Corp. v. Custer · filed 2002-05-01(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides that “[substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Under ORS 183.482(8)(c), substantial evidence supports a factual finding when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Hanson v. Dan's Steel Co. · filed 2002-07-17(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides that “[substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ... We hold that there is substantial evidence to support the board’s finding that the medical arbiters’ range of motion findings were not “due to” the industrial injury.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires affirmance of an ERB factual finding when substantial evidence supports it.

Lincoln County Education Ass'n v. Lincoln County School District · filed 2003-03-20(8)(c)

We agree that a reasonable person, reading the 1995-2000 collective bargaining agreement and knowing that the association had made and then withdrawn a proposal regarding contact time, could find that, when the district unilaterally increased contact time in 2001, it did so pursuant to an already-bargained agreement that it could increase contact time if doing so did not violate some other term of the contract. However, a reasonable person could also easily reach the contrary conclusion: Because the actual contract that the parties bargained did not expressly mention contact time, and because the topic was raised and then voluntarily withdrawn, the parties did not bargain that issue. That is ERB’s finding, and substantial evidence supports it. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats an agency finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Friends of Parrett Mountain v. Northwest Natural Gas Co. · filed 2003-11-06(8)(c)

Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to set aside or remand an agency order unsupported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence that, considering the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Garcia v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2003-03-20(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides: "The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding when the record viewed, as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding."

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires reviewing courts to determine whether an agency’s evaluation is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole—evidence that would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Boeing Company v. Cole · filed 2004-07-08(8)(c)

Our role on review of the board’s evaluation of expert medical opinions is to determine whether the evaluation is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence that, considering the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the findings. ORS 183.482(8)(c); ... To be supported by substantial evidence, however, the board’s opinion must include a “sufficient explanation to allow a reviewing court to examine the agency’s action.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires judicial review of an agency’s additional factual findings for substantial evidence.

Becklin v. Board of Examiners for Engineering & Land Surveying · filed 2004-09-15(8)(c)

Then, as to any additional findings of fact, the APA requires that we review for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... We therefore conclude that each of them is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Petteys v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services Branch · filed 2004-10-13(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ... “In light of the quality and quantity of corroborating and opposing evidence, we conclude that the report is reliable and constitutes substantial evidence that Lindley observed numerous signs of intoxication before he stopped petitioner.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

United States Bakery v. Shaw · filed 2005-04-27(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides, “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Guzman v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON · filed 2005-07-06(8)(c)

We review the board’s order for substantial evidence and errors of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a), (c). “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires remand when an agency’s order does not show whether it rejected, disbelieved, or overlooked evidence on a material issue.

Bruer's Contract Cutting v. National Council On Compensation Insurance · filed 1992-11-18(8)(c)

Similarly, we cannot determine whether DIF rejected the evidence of SAIF’s knowledge as a matter of law, whether DIF was simply unpersuaded by it or whether DIF erroneously overlooked it. ORS 183.482(8)(c) requires a ... remand to permit DIF to make findings about the issue of SAIF’s knowledge.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency order to explain the logical connection between the evidence and its conclusion so that a court can review it for substantial reason.

Alcala v. Employment Department · filed 2010-04-21(8)(c)

Nevertheless, we understand him to posit that the board’s operative determinations, particularly with respect to misconduct, were not supported by “substantial evidence in the record.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... We conclude that the board’s decision is not supported by substantial reason.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency’s findings to have substantial evidence and to provide substantial reason for its legal conclusion.

Warkentin v. Employment Department · filed 2011-08-17(8)(c)

As part of our review of an agency’s findings for substantial evidence, we look at whether the findings provide “substantial reason” to support the legal conclusion reached by the agency. ... Accordingly, the board’s order does not provide substantial reasoning because it fails to explain how its conclusion follows from its first and third findings concerning claimant’s alternatives to quitting.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency’s conclusions to follow reasonably from its factual findings; an order lacking substantial reason must be reversed or remanded.

Campbell v. Employment Department · filed 2011-09-21(8)(c)

We review EAB’s decision according to the standard provided in ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... We agree with claimant that EAB’s order in this case does not comport with substantial reason.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency’s necessary conclusion to rest on supporting facts and reasoning that connects those facts to the conclusion.

Register Guard v. Employment Department · filed 2012-01-25(8)(c)

In short, we agree with petitioner’s argument in its supplemental brief. In the order on reconsideration — the only order that we can review, the original order having been withdrawn and revised — there are no facts supporting the necessarily implied conclusion that claimant was an employee and not an independent contractor. If there were such facts, their connection to the conclusion is nonexistent; that conclusion is “assumed.” An agency cannot assume the outcome of the very issue it has taken upon itself to decide.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency’s conclusions to reasonably follow from its factual findings.

Tamargo v. Employment Department · filed 2014-10-08(8)(c)

It necessarily follows that the board’s conclusion does not “reasonably follow from the facts found,” Campbell, 245 Or App at 579, and, hence, lacks substantial reason. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration on that basis.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency’s factual findings to have substantial evidence in the whole record and its conclusions to reasonably follow from the facts found.

Severy v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2015-10-14(8)(c)

The standard of review in ORS 183.482(8)(c) also requires that the board’s conclusions “be supported by substantial reason, i.e., its conclusions must reasonably follow from the facts found.” Simpson v. Board of Parole, 237 Or App 661, 663, 241 P3d 347 (2010). ... Because the board identified the particular facts and the particular criteria on which it relied in support of its conclusion, the board’s order is adequately supported by substantial reason.

An agency's damages award satisfies substantial reason review when its findings connect the amount awarded to the harm found; the reviewing court does not reweigh competing evidence.

Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. · filed 2017-12-28(8)(c)

That is sufficient to satisfy the substantial reason requirement, and we decline to reweigh, under the guise of substantial reason, the competing evidence as to the extent of the complainants' damages.

ORS 183.482 permits remand for a material procedural error affecting the fairness or correctness of an agency action and for an unexplained exercise of discretion inconsistent with the agency’s rule.

Sunny Oaks, Inc. v. Dept. of Human Services · filed 2023-03-29(7), (8)(b)(B)

We are unpersuaded that the agency’s violations impaired petitioner’s ability to have a fair hearing, which would require a remand under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B). ... Petitioner has not established that the failure to follow the prescribed procedures materially impaired either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the agency’s determination.

Section 183.482(7) permits the Court of Appeals to supplement the agency record for procedural irregularities not shown in the record, and requires remand when a material procedural error may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or correctness of the agency action.

Kerr v. Board of Psychologist Examiners · filed 2020-05-13(7)

That statute “is designed to supplement the agency record regarding irregularities in procedure before the agency that do not appear in the record.”

On judicial review, a court must remand when a failure to follow prescribed procedure may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the agency action.

Yankee v. Oregon Medical Board · filed 2016-08-03(7)

Having concluded that the board procedurally erred when it did not provide petitioner with a hearing before the ALJ, we must remand this matter for further proceedings if “the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired” by that “failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ORS 183.482(7). Here, the fairness of the proceedings may have been impaired. Petitioner was entitled to have a hearing before a neutral ALJ on the reasons for his not appearing once the board disputed the facts articulated by petitioner. Instead, the board resolved those disputed factual issues in its own favor. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 183.482(8)(a)(B) permits a reviewing court to remand an agency order for further action when the agency erroneously interpreted the law and a correct interpretation requires a particular action.

1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 2011-07-13(8)(a)(B)

Thus, a remand is appropriate under ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B) (allowing remand to an agency for “further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law”).

Section 183.482(8)(b)(C) requires a reviewing court to remand an agency order when the agency action violates a constitutional or statutory provision.

O'HARA v. Board of Parole · filed 2009-03-05(8)(b)(C)

ORS 183.482(8)(b)(C) provides that the court shall remand an order to the agency issuing the order if the agency action was “in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision.”

Subsection (8)(a)(B) requires a court to remand an agency case for further action under the correct interpretation of law when the agency’s erroneous interpretation requires that course.

Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer School District · filed 2006-09-28(8)(a)(B)

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that we must “[r]emand [this] case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the * * * law.” ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B).

Section 183.482(7) authorizes the Oregon Court of Appeals to appoint a special master to take evidence and make findings of fact about disputed procedural irregularities before an agency that are not shown in the record and, if proved, would warrant reversal or remand.

Gilbertson v. Albright · filed 2004-09-03(7)

This argument fails in light of the appellate court's authority to appoint a special master "to take evidence and make findings of fact" in cases that involve "disputed allegations of irregularities in procedure before the agency not shown in the record which, if proved, would warrant reversal or remand." Or.Rev.Stat. § 183.482(7). As a result, a full factual record could have been developed.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(C) requires an appellate court to remand to the agency for a correct interpretation of law when it determines that the agency violated the constitution.

Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Warner · filed 2003-02-19(8)(b)(C)

Oregon law directs appellate courts to remand to the agency for a correct interpretation of law if the court determines that the agency violated the constitution. Or. Rev.Stat. § 183.482(8)(b)(C). Such a requirement satisfies Dayton.

Section 183.482(7) permits the Oregon Court of Appeals to appoint a special master to take evidence and make factual findings about disputed procedural irregularities not shown in the agency record when proof could warrant reversal or remand.

Gilbertson v. Albright · filed 2003-12-01(7)

Although the Oregon Court of Appeals ordinarily is limited to the administrative record in deciding a contested case, that court also may appoint a special master "to take evidence and make findings of fact" in cases that involve "disputed allegations of irregularities in procedure before the agency not shown in the record which, if proved, would warrant reversal or remand." Or.Rev.Stat. § 183.482(7). In other words, the state appellate court had a means of developing a full factual record if it believed that one was necessary.

Section 183.482(7) applies to procedural irregularities before an agency that are not shown in the record and may impair the fairness of the proceedings; it does not govern procedural errors evident on the record.

Villanueva v. Board of Psychologist Examiners · filed 2002-01-23(7)

As the Supreme Court has explained, ORS 183.482(7) “is designed to supplement the agency record regarding irregularities in procedure before the agency that do not appear in the record.” ... ORS 183.482(7) governs review of orders in contested cases when irregularities in agency procedure that are not shown on the record impair the fairness of its proceedings. ... By its terms, ORS 183.482(7) does not apply to the claims that petitioner raised on review.

ORS 183.482(7) permits reversal or remand when the fairness of an agency proceeding was impaired by a material procedural error, while subsections (7) and (8) do not authorize reversal or remand for abuse of discretion.

Caron v. Oregon State Penitentiary · filed 1996-08-28(7) and (8)

However, the state is correct that ORS 183.482(7) and (8) do not provide a basis for reversal or remand of an agency order for abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we allow the state’s petition in order to eliminate any confusion.

Section 183.482(8)(d) authorizes the court to vacate an agency finding that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Marlette Homes, Inc. v. Employment Division · filed 1978-04-17(8)(d)

Therefore, we conclude that the Board’s finding that claimant was discharged for her inability to improve is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and must be vacated. ORS 183.482(8)(d).

Section 183.482(8)(d) requires reversal or remand when an agency order is not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record; otherwise, the court may affirm it.

Robbins v. Executive Department · filed 1977-11-21(8)(d)

The decision of the Board must be affirmed if it is based on substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(d). ... There is substantial evidence that the "Field Representative” position was amalgamated in the "Manpower Analyst” position which was essentially only a change in the name of the position.

Section 183.482(8)(d) requires the court to affirm an agency order unless the whole record lacks substantial evidence to support it.

Dietz v. Smith · filed 1977-03-28(8)(d)

Each of the above findings is directly supported by the testimony of claimant who was apparently found by the Board to be a credible witness. Although employer gave a different account of the events leading to claimant’s discharge, claimant’s testimony, by itself, constitutes "such proof as a reasonable mind would employ to support a conclusion.” ... Thus the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Subsection (8) requires a challenge to an agency order to identify whether the alleged error concerns fact, substantial-evidence support, or the application of substantive or procedural law.

McPherson v. Employment Division · filed 1979-03-20(8)

The statute thus requires a party challenging an agency determination to specify, and the court to decide, whether the asserted agency error is one of fact, lacking support in the evidence, or a misapplication of the relevant substantive or procedural law. Of course the challenge may involve several grounds, but it remains necessary to identify which is which.

Section 183.482 authorizes review of agency orders for procedural and legal correctness and substantial evidentiary support, and permits remand when a material procedural error may have impaired the fairness or correctness of the action.

City of Wood Village v. Portland Metropolitan Area Local Government Boundary Commission · filed 1980-09-02(7), (8)

Our review of the Boundary Commission’s action is to determine if the correct procedures and law were followed and whether its order is supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(7X8). ... This court has the power to remand an agency order if the "fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(8) permits judicial review of agency orders for specified agency errors, but an order cannot be meaningfully reviewed when the agency fails to explain the reasoning connecting its findings to its decision.

Employers Mutual Liability Insurance v. Insurance Division · filed 1980-12-01(8)

Our review of this matter is pursuant to ORS 183.482. Subsection (8) of that statute sets out three possible types of agency error reviewable by this court: ... We need not decide which kind of claimed error Employers’ contention asserts because we cannot review this order as it stands under any of those provisions.

ORS 183.482(8)(a) makes the court's review of an agency's statutory interpretation a legal review limited to whether the agency action falls within the legislative policy embodied in the statutory term.

American Federation of State v. Executive Department · filed 1981-05-26(8)(a)

"The dispositive question of law on review under [ORS 183.482(8)(a)] is whether the agency action is within the legislative policy which inheres in the statutory term."

Section 183.482(8)(c) allows a reviewing court to remand an agency order when the agency’s findings are insufficient to determine whether the order is supported by substantial evidence.

Timberline Lodge v. Kyle · filed 1989-06-14(8)(c)

Because the Board’s opinion does not contain findings necessary to determine if claimant’s injury has a “sufficient work relationship,” we remand this matter to the Board for further findings of fact. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(7) requires a court to remand an agency order for further agency action when a material procedural error or failure to follow prescribed procedure may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or correctness of the agency action.

Magana v. Wilbanks International · filed 1992-03-11(7)

“The court shall remand the order for further agency action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or the ... correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ... “Because of the ambiguity, the Board must reconsider and explain its conclusion regarding causation.”

Section 183.482(7) requires remand for further agency action when a material procedural error or failure to follow prescribed procedure may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or correctness of the agency action.

Cansino v. Employment Division · filed 1994-03-02(7)

Under ORS 183.482(7), we must remand an order for further agency action if we find that “either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.”

Section 183.482(7) permits remand for further agency action when a material procedural error may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the agency action.

Heide v. Oregon State Correctional Institution · filed 1991-06-05(7)

ORS 183.482(7) is applicable in our review of this proceeding, ORS 421.195, and allows a remand for further agency action if we find “that either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ... We remand so that the superintendent may reconsider the sanction imposed so that it comports with the advice in the notice.

Section 183.482(7) permits remand for a procedural error only when the error impaired the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action.

Logging v. Jones · filed 1991-10-30(7)

Misallocation of the burden of proof is a procedural error, ... for which we will remand only if the error can be seen to have impaired the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action. ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(7) permits remand for a procedural irregularity that may impair the fairness of the proceedings, but an agency’s objection to a discovery request did not warrant remand when the petitioner did not pursue available procedures.

Gustafson v. Board of Accountancy · filed 2015-04-22(7)

The board provided a penalty matrix in response to petitioner’s informal requests, and responded with an objection to petitioner’s formal request for prior disciplinary orders. Petitioner has not identified a procedural irregularity that necessitates a remand under ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(7) requires remand when a material procedural error or failure to follow prescribed procedure may have impaired fairness or correctness.

Glass v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 1984-03-07(7)

MRT’s refusal to consider social documentation is an obvious violation of this rule and constitutes a failure to follow a prescribed procedure. ORS 183.482(7) provides, in pertinent part: “* * * The court shall remand the order for further agency action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.”

Section 183.482(7) requires remand when a material procedural error may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or correctness of the agency action.

Meyer v. Employment Division · filed 1981-04-06(7)

ORS 183.482(7) provides that: "The court shall remand the order for further agency action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” In this case it appears that the fairness of the proceeding was certainly impaired and the correctness of the action may have been.

Section 183.482(7) requires remand when a material procedural error may have impaired the fairness or correctness of an agency action.

Morrison v. University of Oregon Health Sciences Center · filed 1984-06-27(7)

ORS 183.482(7) provides in part: “The court shall remand the order for further agency action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ... We find that the committee erred materially in discussing matters not in the record, particularly when such discussion included a nonmember of the committee. ... Because we find that the inclusion of the quoted comments may have impaired the fairness of the hearing, we must remand.

Section 183.482(8)(a) directs a reviewing court to determine whether an agency erroneously interpreted the law and whether the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Allied Structural v. CCB · filed 2021-05-05(8)(a)

Our review, accordingly, is governed by ORS 183.482(8)(a), which directs us to examine whether “the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law” and, if it has, to determine if “a correct interpretation com- pels a particular action.”

When an agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action, the reviewing court must set aside or modify the agency order or remand for further action under the correct interpretation.

Harless v. Board of Parole · filed 2026-04-08(8)(a)(A), (8)(a)(B)

ORS 144.335(3) provides that we may “affirm, reverse or remand” the board’s order on the same basis as provided in ORS 183.482(8). If we find “that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action,” then we are required to “[s]et aside or modify the order,” ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A), or “[r]emand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law,” ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B).

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires remand for further agency proceedings when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation requires further action.

Haugen / Norvell v. Oregon Health Authority · filed 2026-05-06(8)(a)

The agency based that determination on its reading of ORS 183.400, so our review is to determine whether “the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law.” ORS 183.482(8)(a). ... In rejecting petitioners’ rule challenges, the agency erroneously interpreted ORS 183.400. Because a correct interpretation requires that petitioners be given an opportunity to develop the record in support of their as-applied and fact-based challenges, we must remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires the court to remand a case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law.

Ferry v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2018-08-01(8)(a)

"If the court finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law *** the court shall *** [r]emand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law."

Section 183.482(8)(a)(B) permits a court to remand an agency decision for further action when the agency based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law.

Medi-Tech International Corp. v. Kwiecinski · filed 2016-04-13(8)(a)(B)

Because the director failed to do so, our standard of review requires us to reverse and remand for the director to determine whether claimant is a subject worker under the correct legal standard. ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B) (providing for remand to agency for further action when agency has based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable law).

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires remand when an agency’s approval is legally erroneous because the decision was based on an incomplete record.

Manning v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 2005-03-23(8)(a)

Although those issues would not in themselves require reversal based on the present record, the lack of a hearing means that the county did not base its decisions on a complete record. As a result, the county has not given the issues that petitioners raise the consideration that the rules require it to give them; LCDC’s approval of the county’s decision based on an incomplete record was legal error that requires a remand. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits a court to set aside agency action based on an erroneous interpretation of law, but not an agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule absent inconsistency with the rule’s text, context, or another source of law.

ONRC Action v. Columbia Plywood, Inc. · filed 2001-06-08(8)(a)

“Where * * * the agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule cannot be shown either to be inconsistent with the wording of the rule itself, or with the rule’s context, or with any other source of law, there is no basis on which this court can assert that the rule has been interpreted ‘erroneously.’ It follows that * * * this court cannot overrule, under ORS 183.482(8)(a) [or ORS 183.484(5)(a)], an agency’s interpretation of its own rule.”

Section 183.482(8)(a) directs courts reviewing an agency's interpretation of an inexact legal term to determine whether the interpretation is consistent with legislative policy.

Schultz v. Springfield Forest Products · filed 1997-12-24(8)(a)

The role of the court, with respect to inexact terms, is to determine whether the agency interpreted a provision of law in a way that is consistent with legislative policy.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires judicial review of an agency order to determine whether the agency erroneously interpreted a provision of law.

Robison Jewish Home v. Senior & Disabled Services Division · filed 1996-12-24(8)(a)

We review SDSD’s order to determine whether it “erroneously interpreted a provision of law.” ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(a)(A) requires a court to reverse or remand an agency order when the agency has erroneously interpreted the law and the correct interpretation compels a different result.

Proctor v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1993-09-22(8)(a)(A)

On the facts found by the Board, a correct interpretation of the “distinct departure on a personal errand” exception requires us to reverse. ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A). ... The Board’s incorrect interpretation of the “distinct departure on a personal errand” exception is an error of law.

Section 183.482(8)(a)(B) requires a court to remand an agency case when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Tualatin Valley Bargaining Council v. Tigard School District 23J · filed 1992-09-24(8)(a)(B)

ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B) provides that, "[i]f the court finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action, it shall * * * [r]emand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law." ... It is impermissible for ERB to "enact" general and all-inclusive declarations as to what are "other conditions of employment" and to say, respecting all proposals that concern the subject of such declarations, that any such proposal necessarily does or does not concern an other condition of employment. ... We therefore remand this case to ERB to decide, in a manner consistent with this opinion, whether the proposal set forth in note 2, ante, concerned a condition of employment.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires a court to set aside or remand an agency order when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Williams v. Saif Corp. · filed 1990-09-20(8)(a)

This case presents a classic example of the kind of error contemplated by ORS 183.482(8)(a), viz., "the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law." ... In terms of ORS 183.482(8)(a), the referee and the Board have erroneously interpreted a provision of law — in this case, by interpreting the provision of law to apply to a situation, when a correct interpretation shows it does not apply.

Section 183.482(8)(a) allows remand for an agency's erroneous legal interpretation only when the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Raridon v. Board of Parole · filed 1990-11-21(8)(a)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(a), we would need to “find” that the Board misinterpreted the rule and that a correct interpretation requires a particular result before we could remand. ... We conclude that petitioner has failed to demonstrate error under ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8) requires remand for specified agency abuses of discretion and limits review, when the agency acts within its discretion, to whether the order is supported by substantial evidence.

Minton v. Employment Division · filed 1982-05-12(8)(c)

If the agency has acted within its discretion, review is limited to determining whether the order is supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482 permits the court to set aside an agency decision as impermissibly arbitrary when the agency applies an offense-severity rating inconsistently based on an inmate’s prior offense.

Eggsman v. State Board of Parole · filed 1982-11-24(7), (8)(b)(A), (8)(b)(C)

The scope of our review is limited by ORS 183.482(7), (8). ... Such individualized treatment of the abstract application of the offense severity rating is impermissibly arbitrary.

Section 183.482(8)(b) permits remand when an agency’s exercise of discretion is inconsistent with an agency rule, officially stated position, or prior practice and the inconsistency is unexplained.

City of Canby v. Canby Police Assoc. · filed 1984-05-09(8)(b)

The creation of the mixed unit is within the range of discretion delegated to the agency, does not violate the statute and is consistent with agency policy and previous rulings.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires the reviewing court to decide whether an agency's determination is legally correct while giving whatever deference the agency's special expertise warrants.

1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1984-09-19(8)(a)

We take this statement to mean that whether the county has shown adequate justifications for the proposed exceptions is a question of law, both for LCDC and for us. While that determination is for LCDC in the first instance, we review whether it is correct, giving such deference to the agency as its special expertise, if any, may justify. ORS 183.482(8)(a); ORS 197.732(6)(b).

Section 183.482(7) confines review of contested cases to the record but permits the Court of Appeals to refer unrecorded procedural-irregularity allegations to a master when they could warrant reversal or remand.

Van Gordon v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners · filed 1978-05-30(7)

As long as a procedure under the APA exists which will permit plaintiff to make the challenges he now makes, he may not shortcut that procedure by seeking premature equitable relief. Such a procedure exists by judicial review on direct appeal to this court, even if plaintiff is unable to make a record before the Board. ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(8) limits judicial review to reversing or remanding an order when it is unlawful, unconstitutional, based on an invalid rule, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Melton v. Oregon State Correctional Institution · filed 1978-06-20(8)

Under these statutes judicial review of disciplinary sanction is limited to determining if the sanction was lawful and constitutional and supported by substantial evidence. In Whiley v. OSP, 18 Or App 86, 523 P2d 1051 (1974), we stated that absent a showing by petitioner of unlawfulness or unconstitutionality we are not authorized to alter the sanction. Petitioner does not challenge the sanction on statutory or constitutional grounds and does not contend there is a want of substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8) permits judicial review to affirm, reverse, or remand an agency order based on its underlying findings and reasoning, but does not authorize review of advisory declarations in the abstract when the underlying legal act is unchallenged.

1000 Friends v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1979-03-05(8)

Upon judicial review, the court may affirm, reverse or remand the order. ORS 183.482(8). We examine underlying findings, reasoning and conclusions to determine if a legal act based upon them is correct. On the other hand, we have no cause to do so if there is no challenge to the act itself because no purpose is served by remanding the case to require the agency to retake the same action for a different reason. Here, declarations are challenged, but the acts which form the basis of the orders are not. Petitioners would have us reverse the cases and remand them to LCDC for identical orders with different accompanying language.

Section 183.482(8) permits judicial review of an agency order for unlawfulness in substance or procedure or lack of substantial evidence in the whole record.

RSMJ, Inc. v. Employment Division · filed 1979-04-24(8)

The scope of judicial review of the referee’s order is whether it is "unlawful in substance or procedure” or is not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, ORS 183.482(8).

Section 183.482 does not provide a route to relief when the issue was not litigated before the Boundary Commission and the proceeding is an original mandamus action rather than an appeal.

Eklund v. Clackamas County · filed 1978-09-06

It follows that a judicial review of the Boundary Commission order under ORS 183.482 would not have afforded petitioners relief since review by this court would be limited to the record made before the Boundary Commission.

Subsection (8) permits reversal or remand of an agency order only when the order meets one of the statute's specified grounds, including being unlawful in substance or procedure or unsupported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

Oregon State Employes Ass'n v. Deschutes County · filed 1979-05-21(8)

The scope of our review of ERB’s order is limited by ORS 183.482, which states in subsection (8) ... that we may reverse and remand in this case only if the order is "unlawful in substance or procedure” or "not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.”

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits reversal and remand when an agency misinterprets controlling case law and thereby erroneously interprets a provision of law.

Rulien v. Employment Division · filed 1986-05-14(8)(a)

Because EAB misinterpreted our decision in Petro and, therefore, “erroneously interpreted a provision of law,” ORS 183.482(8)(a), we reverse and remand for consideration.

Section 183.482 does not authorize remand without reversal for a legal error when the correct interpretation does not compel a particular action.

SAIF Corp. v. Basham · filed 1992-03-04(8)(a)(B)

ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B) requires the court to remand if it finds that the agency has incorrectly interpreted a provision of law and that the correct interpretation compels a particular action. A correct interpretation of the provision of law involved here does not compel any particular action.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires remand when an agency erroneously interprets the law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

1000 Friends v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1986-08-12(8)(a)

LCDC’s disposition of 1000 Friends’ Goal 14 objection “erroneously interpreted a provision of law,” ORS 183.482(8)(a), because it is impossible “[t]o provide for an orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban land use,” Goal 14, when the county and LCDC fail to do what is necessary to determine whether such a transition is taking place. Moreover, “a correct interpretation” of Goal 14 “compels a particular action,” ORS 183.482(8)(a): LCDC must determine whether the county’s exceptions areas allow “urban uses.” We must remand this case to LCDC so that it may do this analysis that the correct interpretation of Goal 14 requires.

Section 183.482(8)(a)(B) requires a reviewing court to remand a case to an agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the law.

Kuralt v. SAIF Corp. (In re Kuralt) · filed 2018-02-28(8)(a)(B)

We remand the case for the board to determine in the first instance whether claimant's subjective belief based on that actual occurrence was objectively reasonable. ... ORS 183.482(8)(a)(B) (requiring court to "[r]emand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law").

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires the reviewing court to decide as a matter of law whether a contract is ambiguous.

State v. Federation of Oregon Parole & Probation Officers · filed 1988-08-03(8)(a)

We must first decide, as a matter of law, whether the agreement is ambiguous. ORS 183.482(8)(a). If it is, we must then determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support ERB’s findings of fact regarding what the ambiguous term means. ORS 183.482(8)(c). In determining whether the contract is ambiguous, we need look only to the words of the contract.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) does not require remand of a valid agency order because it conflicts with an earlier, erroneous agency position.

Roth v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1982-06-09(8)(b)(B)

Therefore we do not remand the valid determination before us on judicial review for inconsistency with the erroneous position taken by LCDC in Abrego II.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) does not require remand when the agency’s orders and the record do not establish an inconsistency.

Maresh v. Yamhill County · filed 1984-06-06(8)(b)(B)

All the county has succeeded in showing is that LCDC found certain Goal 5 objections to be unmeritorious and others to be meritorious. That is not enough to warrant a remand pursuant to ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B).

Section 183.482(8)(b) governs judicial review of an agency’s discretionary determination of good cause.

Ogden Aviation v. Lay · filed 1996-07-31(8)(b)

Accordingly, we clarify ... that our review of determinations of “good cause” under ORS 656.319(1) is pursuant to ORS 183.482(8)(b).

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) permits remand for an agency’s unexplained inconsistency in exercising its discretion, but the court declined to remand when the petitioner did not assign that issue as error.

Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry · filed 1997-04-10(8)(b)(B)

The Board’s unexplained and inconsistent treatment of the “takings” issue, generally, might merit remand under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B). However, Boise Cascade did not assign that issue as error on judicial review and, therefore, we do not remand to the agency under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B).

An agency may depart from an officially stated position or prior practice if it explains its reasons.

Hays v. Tillamook County General Hospital · filed 1999-04-21(8)(b)(B)

As in Fister, the standard of review set out in ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires consistency with “an officially stated agency position” unless the agency explains the reasons for its new course.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires remand when an agency departs from a prior practice without a rational, fair, and principled explanation.

Gordon v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2007-12-28(8)(b)(B)

We hold that the June 2003 order, reflecting the board’s “policy” to use the rules in effect at the time of an inmate’s first election, is inconsistent with a prior board practice and that the board has not offered a rational, fair, or principled explanation for the inconsistency. In that order, then, the board abused its discretion under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B).

Section 183.482(8)(b) requires an agency to explain a discretionary sanction sufficiently for a court to review why it chose that sanction.

Robin v. Teacher Standards & Practices Comm'n · filed 2018-04-18(8)(b)

In this case, TSPC's explanation of the sanction of revocation fails to meet that standard. Although the modified explanation shows that the agency took into account the factors for imposing disciplinary sanctions set forth in OAR 584-020-0045, it lacks any understandable articulation as to why, in this case, those factors warranted revocation as opposed to a lesser sanction.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires remand for an unexplained departure from an agency rule, stated position, or prior practice; it does not let an agency rely on a prior order instead of evidence in the record.

Calpine Energy Solutions LLC v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Or. · filed 2019-06-19(8)(b)(B)

The PUC's and PacifiCorp's citation to ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) does not provide a basis on which the PUC could simply rely on its prior orders as a substitute for substantial evidence in the record. ... Nothing in that statutory section provides support for the notion that the PUC must maintain consistency with a prior order unless petitioner presented a persuasive reason to depart from the prior order.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires remand when an agency’s exercise of discretion is inconsistent with a prior practice and the agency does not explain the inconsistency.

Answorth, Inc. v. OLCC · filed 2025-10-29(8)(b)(B)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), we will remand an order to an agency if we conclude that an agency’s exercise ... of discretion is “[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency[.]”

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires remand when an agency does not explain why its exercise of discretion differs from an agency rule, officially stated position, or prior practice.

Kellim v. Dept. of Human Services · filed 2026-04-01(8)(b)(B)

Indeed, ORS 183.482(8) (b)(B) mandates that we remand a final order to the agency ... if we find that the agency’s exercise of discretion is “[i]ncon- sistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency posi- tion, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency.”

Section 183.482(8)(b) requires remand when an agency’s exercise of discretion is inconsistent with an agency rule, position, or prior practice and the inconsistency is unexplained.

Folkers v. Lincoln County School District · filed 2006-05-10(8)(b)

ORS 183.482(8)(b) requires the court on judicial review to ... “(B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency[.]” Here, however, the board’s decision is not inconsistent with its precedents.

A reviewing court defers to an agency’s plausible interpretation of its own administrative rule.

Fort Klamath Critical Habitat Landowners v. Woodcock · filed 2024-08-28(8)(a)

The OWRD’s construction of its own rule is a plausible one that is owed deference. See Don’t Waste Oregon Com. v. Energy Facility Siting, 320 Or 132, 142, 881 P2d 119 (1994) (explaining that, under ORS 183.482(8)(a), a reviewing court will defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own administrative rule if that interpretation is plausi- ble); Sky Lakes Medical Center v. Dept. of Human Services, 310 Or App 138, 148, 484 P3d 1107 (2021) (applying stan- dard in review of agency order under ORS 183.484).

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) permits remand of an agency order inconsistent with an agency rule, officially stated position, or prior practice only when the agency has not explained the inconsistency.

Gordon v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2014-11-26(8)(b)(B)

Instead, “under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), an inconsistent order is subject to remand by the court only ‘if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency.’”

When an agency exercises discretion, it must follow its prior practice or explain why it is departing from it.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 75 v. City of Portland · filed 2016-01-27(8)(b)(B)

In the exercise of its discretion, ERB must either act consistently with its prior practice or else explain why it has not done so.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) does not require reversal where the asserted agency departure from precedent is unsupported and the agency reasonably explains its decision.

PERMANENTE v. Bonfiglio · filed 2011-03-02(8)(b)(B)

In its second assignment of error, employer contends that the board violated ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) by departing from long-established precedent without explanation. That long-established precedent, employer contends, is the board's practice of requiring physicians to rebut contrary medical opinions in the record. Specifically, employer contends that the board should have required Stigler to explain why his opinion was persuasive in the face of an inconsistent opinion by Yoshinaga, who, as previously noted, supported the compensability of claimant's condition but suggested that it may have been triggered by an event after March 2006. We reject employer's contention. Assuming the existence of such a "precedent," as previously noted, Yoshinaga's ultimate conclusion was not contrary to Stigler's; he explicitly concurred in Stigler's opinion. Additionally, as also previously noted, the board reasonably explained why it found Stigler's opinion more persuasive than the other medical opinions. The board's order is supported by substantial reason and substantial evidence. Affirmed.

Section 183.482 requires courts reviewing agency discretion not to substitute their judgment for the agency’s and to remand when the discretion is outside the delegated range, unexplainedly inconsistent with agency rules or practice, or otherwise unlawful.

Read v. OREGON MEDICAL BOARD · filed 2011-08-03(7), (8)(b)

Our review of the agency’s exercise of its discretion is governed by ORS 183.482: ... “(7) [T]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion. * * ... “[(8)](b) The court shall remand the order to the agency if it finds the agency's exercise of discretion to be: ... “(A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; ... “(B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency; or ... “(C) Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision.” ... Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the $10,000 fine was disproportional to petitioner’s offense. We therefore reverse as to the civil penalty and remand for reconsideration.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) directs review of whether an agency’s discretionary action falls within the range delegated by law, and subsection (c) supplies review for substantial evidence and substantial reason.

Weems v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2008-07-02(8)(b)(A), (8)(c)

Pursuant to ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A), we review the board’s order to determine whether the imposition of the special conditions was within the range of discretion delegated to it by ORS 144.102(3)(a). ... Review for substantial evidence and substantial reason is pursuant to ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires a court to remand an agency order when the agency's discretionary action is inconsistent with an agency rule, officially stated position, or prior practice and the agency does not explain the inconsistency.

Lake County v. Teamsters Local Union 223 · filed 2006-09-27(8)(b)(B)

The standard for judicial review of this bargaining unit clarification decision is embodied in ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), which requires us to remand if an agency's exercise of its discretion is "[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency[.]" It is under that statute that we consider whether ERB's decision in this case is inconsistent with its pronouncements in other cases.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires remand when an agency's exercise of discretion is inconsistent with an agency rule, officially stated agency position, or prior agency practice and the inconsistency is unexplained.

Birmingham v. Department of Forestry · filed 2006-12-13(8)(b)(B)

We conclude that the board’s approval of the exchange did not contravene ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) by failing to explain any departure from prior practice and, for that reason, we reject petitioners’ fourth assignment of error as well.

Section 183.482(8)(b) requires review of whether an agency acted within the range of discretion delegated to it by statute.

Meza v. Bruce Packing Co. · filed 2003-02-19(8)(b)

“Our review here, thus, is to see whether the agency’s determination of‘good cause’ is within ‘the range of discretion delegated to’ the Board by ORS 656.319(1). ORS 183.482(8)(b).”

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) requires the court to set aside or remand an agency order when the agency acts outside the range of discretion delegated to it by law.

Arlington Education Ass'n v. Arlington School District No. 3 · filed 2001-10-31(8)(b)(A)

An agency abuses its discretion when its action is (1) outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; (2) inconsistent with an agency rule or an officially stated agency position; or (3) otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision. ... Although ERB has discretion under ORS 183.450(4) to take official notice, ERB acted outside the range of discretion delegated. In doing so, it erred.

Subsection (8)(a), rather than (8)(b), governs judicial review when the agency reviews an ALJ’s discretionary decision instead of exercising discretion itself; (8)(a) asks whether the agency erroneously interpreted a provision of law.

SAIF Corp. v. Kurcin · filed 2002-07-25(8)(a) and (8)(b)

Because the Board did not purport to exercise discretion of its own, ORS 183.482(8)(b), which describes this court’s standard of review regarding an “agency’s exercise of discretion [,]” does not state the standard of review that applies here. Instead, ORS 183.482(8)(a), under which this court reviews the Board’s order to determine whether “the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law[,]” states the standard of review that applies here.

Section 183.482(8)(b) directs judicial review of an agency’s delegated discretion by asking whether the agency’s determination falls within the range of discretion delegated by law.

Saif Corp. v. Avery · filed 2000-05-17(8)(b)

We concluded that “[o]ur review here, thus, is to see whether the agency’s determination of ‘good cause’ is within ‘the range of discretion delegated to’ the Board by ORS 656.319(1). ORS 183.482(8)(b).”

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) authorizes judicial review of a contested-case order when it is inconsistent with an agency rule.

Mendieta v. STATE, DIVISION OF STATE LANDS · filed 1997-06-25(8)(b)(B)

ORS 183.484(4)(b)(B) provides for review of an order in other than a contested case when the order is "[i]nconsistent with an agency rule." ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) similarly provides for judicial review of such orders in contested cases.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) requires remand when an agency exercises discretion outside the range delegated to it by law.

Schuch v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 1996-02-28(8)(b)(A)

The Board’s determination that petitioner is a predatory sex offender was not outside the range of the discretion delegated to it by law.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires remand when an agency exercises discretion inconsistently with an agency rule and does not explain the inconsistency.

Calderon-Pacheco v. State Board of Parole · filed 1990-03-20(8)(b)(B)

Petitioner is correct in his assertion on judicial review. Board rules concerning admissible evidence were not followed during the hearing held by the Board. His evidence in mitigation was improperly excluded from consideration at the time it was relevant and could have affected the outcome. We hold that the Board erred when it refused to receive and evaluate the proffered evidence. Under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), the refusal was inconsistent with Board rules.

ORS 183.482(8) supplies the scope of judicial review for final Parole Board orders because ORS 144.335(3) incorporates it by cross-reference.

Harris v. Board of Parole · filed 1980-07-21(8)

The only sensible way to approach this curious legislative hodgepodge [14] is simply to hold, as we do, that the referenced provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act do not apply ipso facto to review of final orders of the Board, but ORS 183.482(8) is made a part of ORS chapter 144 by the cross-reference in ORS 144.335(3).

Section 183.482(8)(a) and (c) limits judicial review of agency factual conclusions to whether the agency applied the proper legal standard and whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.

Britton v. Board of Podiatry Examiners · filed 1981-08-24(8)(a) and (c)

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, that line-drawing function is left to the agency’s expertise; our review is confined to ascertaining whether it applied the proper legal standard and whether there was substantial evidence to support its factual conclusions. ORS 183.482(8)(a) and (c).

Section 183.482(8) limits the court’s review of an agency order.

Bethel School District, No. 52 v. Skeen · filed 1983-05-11(8)

Our review of the order pursuant to ORS 183.482(8) is limited.

ORS 183.482(7) and (8) require review of the commission’s action for correct procedures and law and support by substantial evidence.

Redland Water District v. Portland Metropolitan Area Local Government Boundary Commission · filed 1983-06-22(7) and (8)

Therefore, we review the commission’s action in this case to determine if the correct procedures and law were followed and whether its order is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) limits judicial review to whether the record discloses facts from which the agency’s conclusion could be reached by reasonable minds.

Rotten Roberts, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission · filed 1983-11-09(8)(c)

Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the record discloses facts from which the conclusion drawn by OLCC could be reached by reasonable minds.

Section 183.482(8)(d) requires appellate review of an agency decision for substantial evidence.

Storms v. Oregon State Penitentiary · filed 1978-08-02(8)(d)

ORS 183.482(8)(d) requires that we review for substantial evidence. We cannot make such review without a record of the evidentiary hearing upon which the decision was made.

Section 183.482(8)(d) requires the court to affirm, reverse, or remand an agency order based on whether the order is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

Valleur v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 1979-12-24(8)(d)

The above evidence is sufficient to satisfy the substantial evidence test of ORS 183.482(8)(d).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an appellate court to set aside or remand an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Adams v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 1980-04-21(8)(c)

We need reach only the first question, which we review under ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... "The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence in the record to support an agency's findings on judicial review.

Messer v. Polk County District Boundary Board · filed 1982-06-23(8)(c)

The record before us does not contain substantial evidence to support the findings, as required by ORS 183.482.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to set aside or remand an agency order unsupported by substantial evidence; for such a remand that is unlikely to change the outcome, the court will usually decline an attorney-fee award.

Britton v. Board of Podiatry Examiners · filed 1983-07-06(8)(c)

Our reversal and remand of the agency’s action was pursuant to ORS 183.482(8)(c), which provides: ... “(c) The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) permits setting aside an agency decision when the agency's exercise of discretion exceeds the discretion delegated by law.

Oregon Ass'n of Classified Employees/NEA v. Eagle Point School District No. 9 · filed 1989-11-08(8)(b)(A)

“OAR 115-25-060(12), unlike the rules and statutes that govern unit determinations, requires ERB to set a hearing only “when appropriate” and thereby gives ERB discretion to decide when a hearing is “appropriate.” ERB did not act beyond its discretion in deciding that a hearing on the challenged votes was not appropriate. ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A).”

Subsection (8)(a) permits a court to overturn an agency’s interpretation of a rule when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law, but requires deference to a plausible interpretation consistent with the rule and other law.

Body Imaging, P.C. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries · filed 2000-03-08(8)(a)

We review for substantial evidence and errors of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a) and (c), and reverse, in part. ... As noted, this court is authorized to overrule an agency’s interpretation of a rule if an agency has ‘erroneously interpreted a provision of law.’ ORS 183.482(8)(a). ... Consequently, we conclude that, because OAR 839-06-235 is a BOLI rule, we are to apply the Don’t Waste Oregon Com. analysis to the Commissioner’s interpretation of that rule, rather than the analysis urged by Body Imaging. ... Consequently, we defer to it.

Section 183.482 governs the jurisdiction and procedure of judicial review in the Oregon Court of Appeals, not the Employment Appeals Board’s review of an administrative law judge’s decision.

Powell v. Employment Dept. · filed 2026-02-11(7) and (8)

ORS 183.482 governs the jurisdiction and procedure of review of the Oregon Court of Appeals, not those of the board.

Section 183.482(8)(b) permits review of whether the Board’s determination of “good cause” falls within the range of discretion delegated to it.

Rhoades v. Sandy Rural Fire Protection District 72 · filed 2000-08-09(8)(b)

Our inquiry is whether the Board’s decision that a claimant has or has not established good cause falls within the Board’s delegated range of authority.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of factual conclusions for substantial evidence, while subsection (8)(a) requires review of statutory interpretations for errors of law.

Hanson v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 1998-09-30(8)(c), (8)(a)

It is such factual conclusions that we review for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). Statutory interpretations, on the other hand, are legal conclusions. As such, they are reviewed for errors of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Subsection (7) requires review of factual issues for substantial evidence in the whole record, while subsection (8)(a) requires review of statutory meaning and application for errors of law.

Smith v. Real Estate Agency · filed 1997-05-07(7), (8)(a)

On fact issues we review for substantial evidence in the whole record, ORS 183.482, and cannot substitute our judgment for the agency’s. ORS 183.482(7). On issues involving the meaning and application of statutes we review for errors of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482 provides for Court of Appeals review of agency orders, without a jury trial or an initial award of compensatory damages.

Burns v. Board of Psychologist Examiners · filed 1992-11-18

ORS 183.482 and ORS 183.484 provide for judicial review of agency orders by the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, respectively. Under both provisions, the court conducts the review, and jury trials are not available. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has no authority to make an initial award of compensatory damages under any circumstances.

Section 183.482(7) and (8) requires review of agency orders for substantial evidence and errors of law.

Wausau Insurance v. Morris · filed 1990-09-05(7) and (8)

We review the Board’s own motion order pursuant to ORS 183.482(7) and (8) for substantial evidence and errors of law.

Section 183.482 limits review of an agency order to whether its findings lack substantial evidence or whether the agency erroneously interpreted a provision of law.

SAIF Corp. v. Curtis · filed 1991-06-19(7), (8), and (8)(a)

We are persuaded that that is the correct standard for our review of the Board’s decision under ORS 183.482(7) and (8). We may reverse the Board only if its findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if it has erroneously interpreted a provision of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a). As we have held, the Board’s findings here are supported by substantial evidence. The Board’s decision that the circumstances here constitute good cause is not erroneous as a matter of law.

Section 183.482(7) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency on factual issues, while section 183.482(8)(a) permits remand when the agency erroneously interpreted the law.

Jefferson County School District No. 509-J v. Fair Dismissal Appeals Board · filed 1991-05-30(7), (8)(a)

Although ORS 183.482(7) expressly limits a reviewing court’s authority to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact, ORS 183.482(8)(a) gives a reviewing court express authority to remand a case to the agency if the agency has “erroneously interpreted a provision of law.”

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires reversal or remand for procedural error only when the error prejudices the petitioner's substantial rights.

Loera v. State Board of Higher Education · filed 1980-04-14(8)(a)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(a), error in procedure is not cause for reversal or remand unless the court shall find that substantial rights of the petitioner were prejudiced thereby.

Section 183.482 confines contested-case review to the record, bars the court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on factual issues, and permits affirmance, reversal, or remand only on the statutory grounds, including unlawful agency action or lack of substantial evidence.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor · filed 1979-03-19(7) and (8)

ORS 183.482(7) and (8) establish our scope of review: "(7) Review of a contested case shall be confined to the record, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact. * * * "(8) The court may affirm, reverse or remand the order. The court shall reverse or remand the order only if it finds: (a) The order to be unlawful in substance or procedure, but error in procedure shall not be cause for reversal or remand unless the court shall find that substantial rights of the petitioner were prejudiced thereby; or * * * * * * (d) The order is not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record."

Section 183.482(1) requires judicial review of contested cases to be initiated in the Court of Appeals, and subsection (8) provides a scope of review broad enough to raise the same challenges in this case.

Marion County v. State ex rel. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1978-08-01(1) (8)

Under these statutory provisions, it is clear that the sole remedy for the plaintiff was direct appeal to this court. ... The scope of review provided by such an appeal could raise the same challenges urged by plaintiff in its suit before the circuit court. ...

Section 183.482(8)(a) governs judicial review when an agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and the correct interpretation compels a particular action.

Federation of Independent Seafood Harvesters v. Oregon Fish & Wildlife Commission · filed 1981-08-04(8)(a)

The Department’s conducting of what it referred to as “a contested case hearing” from November 14 to November 21 constitutes a contested case for purposes of judicial review under ORS 183.482.

Section 183.482(1) gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review contested cases.

Linnton Plywood Ass'n v. Department of Environmental Quality · filed 1984-05-23(1)

Under the APA, this court has jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases. ORS 183.482(1).

Subsection (8) requires the court to uphold an agency finding when substantial evidence supports it.

Redmond School District 2J v. Redmond Education Ass'n · filed 1979-10-08(8)

There is substantial evidence to support ERB’s finding on this issue. Under the provision of ORS 183.482(8), this ends the matter.

Section 183.482(8)(c) authorizes reversal of an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Van Gordon v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners · filed 1981-06-15(8)(c)

We find that the Board’s order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and therefore reverse. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires setting aside an agency order when its findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

McAulay v. Employment Division · filed 1984-02-08(8)(c)

Those two findings, therefore, are not based on substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8) (c).

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits reversal or remand when an agency order is unlawful in substance, meaning that it incorrectly construes or applies the governing regulatory statute.

Nelson v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 1979-10-29(8)(a)

We have previously defined "unlawful in substance” as meaning that "[the order] incorrectly construes or applies the regulatory statute involved.” ... The order conditioning the eligibility for assistance on the assignment of support rights which are not required to be assigned by statutory authority is unlawful in substance.