N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn the wages the employee received at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.

Bentley v. Revlon, Inc. · filed 2014-04-15(9)

“Disability” for workers’ compensation purposes “means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any ...other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2011). ... We conclude that the competent record evidence supports the Commission’s findings, which, in turn, support the Commission’s conclusion that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate her entitlement to total disability benefits.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or any other employment; ongoing total disability requires medical or other competent evidence of that inability.

Stippich v. Reese's Transit, Inc. · filed 2018-07-17(9)

Disability is defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2015). ... Because the record is wholly devoid of medical or other competent evidence to support the finding that plaintiff has been totally unable to work since 28 December 2015, and because plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing he is incapable of earning wages, we hold that the Commission erred in concluding plaintiff established ongoing disability and in extending plaintiff’s benefits beyond that date.

Section 97-2(9) permits an employee to establish disability by showing that, although capable of some work, preexisting conditions make seeking other employment futile.

Monroe v. MV Transp. · filed 2022-01-18(9)

In addition to this mistake, the Commission failed to consider whether plaintiff had, under Russell, met her burden of establishing her disability by showing that, though she was capable of some work following her injury, it would be futile to seek other employment at the time due to preexisting conditions, such as age, inexperience, lack of education, or a previous disability.

Disability means injury-caused incapacity to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment, and the Commission must make express findings on its existence and extent when disputed and material to compensation.

Cromartie v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2022-08-02(9)

Our General Statutes define disability as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2021). ... Since the question of Ms. Cromartie’s disability affects her right to compensation, the Commission must make express findings about Ms. Cromartie’s disability status. See id.

Disability means an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages; a worker capable of some work must make a reasonable effort to obtain employment to establish disability on that basis.

Cable v. Consol. Metco, Inc. · filed 2025-06-18(9)

“The term ‘disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” ... Because competent evidence supports the Full Commission’s determination that Plaintiff did not conduct a reasonable job search, and the findings sufficiently explain how Plaintiff failed to conduct a reasonable job search, we conclude the Full Commission did not err by concluding Plaintiff was not disabled from 2 April 2020 to 20 April 2022.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as incapacity because of injury to earn preinjury wages, and total disability means total incapacity to earn wages.

Sturdivant v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety · filed 2023-03-21(9)

More importantly, our General Assembly expressly defines “disability” in the Act as the “incapacity . . . to earn wages[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9). Applying the plain language of this statutory definition of “disability”, it reasonably follows that “total disability” means “total incapacity to earn wages.”

Section 97-2(9) defines disability in terms of incapacity to earn wages, making total disability equivalent to a total loss of wage-earning capacity.

Sturdivant v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety · filed 2023-04-18(9)

More importantly, our General Assembly expressly defines “disability” in the Act as the “incapacity . . . to earn wages[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9). Applying the plain language of this statutory definition, it reasonably follows that “total disability” means “total incapacity to earn wages.” The phrase “total incapacity to earn wages” conveys the same idea as the phrase “total loss of wage-earning capacity”.

Section 97-2(i) defines disability as an injury-caused loss of wage-earning capacity, rather than physical impairment alone.

Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co. · filed 1951-09-28(i)

As used here, the term “disability” signifies an impairment of wage-earning capacity rather than a physical impairment. This is necessarily so for the very simple reason that the Act expressly specifies that “the term ‘disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. 97-2 (i).

Section 97-2 defines disability as incapacity caused by an injury to earn wages.

Smith v. Mecklenburg County Chapter American Red Cross · filed 1956-12-12

Disability is defined by the statute as incapacity because of an injury to earn wages, G.S. 97-2.

Section 97-2(i) defines disability from an ordinary industrial accident as incapacity to earn the employee’s prior wages in the same or other employment; silicosis uses a different definition.

Brinkley v. United Feldspar & Minerals Corp. · filed 1957-04-10(i)

It must be kept in mind that a claim based on disability resulting from an ordinary industrial accident as defined in G.S. 97-2 (i) means "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” ... On the other hand, “disability” resulting from asbestosis or silicosis means the event of becoming actually incapacitated from performing normal labor in the last occupation in which remuneratively employed. G.S. 97-54.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused incapacity to earn preinjury wages, and that definition applies to the continuing-disability requirement for death benefits.

Burton v. Peter W. Blum and Son · filed 1967-06-20(9)

The Act defines disability as follows: “The term ‘disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment.” G.S. 97-2(9). This definition must be read into G.S. 97-38 in lieu of the word “disability.”

Disability means diminished capacity to earn wages; receiving the same wages after an injury is evidence of earning capacity but does not conclusively establish that no disability exists.

Ashley v. Rent-A-Car Company · filed 1967-07-24(9)

Certainly the amount of wages received by the employee .after his injury should be -strong evidence of his capacity or incapacity to earn wages, but under the conditions here disclosed receipt of wages in the amount received before the injury cannot be conclusive proof that no “disability” exists.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages; scheduled injuries may be compensable without a loss of earning power.

Hollman v. City of Raleigh, Public Utilities Department · filed 1968-03-20(9)

G.S. 97-2(9) reads: “The term 'disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” To obtain an award of compensation for an injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee must establish that his injury caused his disability, “unless it is included in the schedule of injuries made compensable by G.S. 97-31 without regard to loss of wage-earning power.”

Section 97-2(i)'s definition of disability does not govern disablement from asbestosis or silicosis.

Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co. · filed 1952-04-30(i)

It is clear that “disability” resulting from asbestosis and silicosis, as defined in G.S. 97-54, is not synonymous with its meaning as defined in G.S: 97-2 (i).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn the employee’s pre-injury wages in the same or other employment.

Watkins v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. · filed 1971-06-10(9)

The term “disability,” as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, means incapacity because of injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury. G.S. 97-2(9).

Section 97-2(9) treats an injury-related reduction in earning capacity as a disability, even when the worker can perform other work.

Willis v. Reidsville Drapery Plant · filed 1976-05-05(9)

This reduction in wage amounts to a “disability” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act since the term “disability” means “ . . . incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. 97-2(9).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by a loss of earning capacity, rather than by the degree of physical impairment.

Pruitt v. KNIGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY · filed 1975-10-15(9)

Thus we see that disability is defined in terms of a diminution in earning power. It is more than mere physical injury and is markedly different from technical or functional disability.

Disability is measured by the worker’s loss of earning capacity.

Morrison v. Burlington Industries · filed 1980-06-03(9)

Our courts have historically and consistently held that the disability of the injured employee is to be measured by his capacity or incapacity to earn the wages he was receiving at the time of the injury and that loss of earning capacity is the criterion.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused incapacity to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment.

Hundley v. Fieldcrest Mills · filed 1982-07-06(9)

“Disability” is defined as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. 97-2(9). ... We hold that plaintiff presented evidence of an impairment of his wage-earning capacity because of an occupational disease.

Disability under § 97-2(9) requires an injury-related loss of capacity to earn the employee’s pre-injury wages in the same or another job.

Algary v. McCarley & Co. · filed 1985-04-02(9)

Furthermore, by statutory definition disability in a workers’ compensation case “means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment,” G.S. 97-2(9), and according to the Commission’s findings of fact, in which no error is perceived from the record before us, plaintiffs ability to work and earn has not been reduced, notwithstanding the severity of her injury.

Section 97-2(9) measures disability by earning capacity; a specially modified job that is not ordinarily available in the competitive job market does not establish that capacity.

Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp. · filed 1986-05-06(9)

If the proffered employment does not accurately reflect the person’s ability to compete with others for wages, it cannot be considered evidence of earning capacity. Proffered employment would not accurately reflect earning capacity if other employers would not hire the employee with the employee’s limitations at a comparable wage level. The same is true if the proffered employment is so modified because of the employee’s limitations that it is not ordinarily available in the competitive job market.

Section 97-2(9) treats an injury as a disability when it reduces the employee’s earning ability.

Little v. Penn Ventilator Co. · filed 1986-07-02(9)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that future medical treatment will not lessen the period of plaintiffs disability because plaintiffs injury has not resulted in a period of disability beyond the healing period. Where as in this case there is no reduction in earning ability, there is no period of disability to be lessened.

Section 97-2(9) measures disability by the extent to which an employee’s earning capacity is impaired.

Heffner v. Cone Mills Corp. · filed 1986-10-21(9)

Whether an employee is disabled within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(9) is a question of law which must be based on findings of fact supported by competent evidence. ... The test of disability is whether, and to what extent, an employee’s earning capacity is impaired.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by the effect of an occupational disease on the employee’s ability to earn wages in the same or other employment.

Carothers v. Ti-Caro · filed 1986-11-18(9)

The term “disability” means incapacity, because of an occupational disease, to earn the wages which the employee was receiving in the same or any other employment. G.S. 97-54; G.S. 97-2(9). The question here is what effect the disease has had upon the earning capacity of this particular plaintiff.

Section 97-2(9) includes reduced earning capacity caused by a job transfer necessitated by a compensable injury within its definition of disability.

Thomas v. Printables · filed 1988-08-02(9)

The plaintiff suffered disablement, which is equivalent to disability as defined in G.S. 97-2(9); i.e., incapacity because of injury to earn the wages she was earning prior to the injury in the same or any other employment, because of a job transfer compelled by a compensable injury.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or another job.

Radica v. Carolina Mills · filed 1994-02-01(9)

G.S. § 97-2(9) defines disability as an “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.”

A job tailored for an injured employee that would not be available in the competitive labor market does not establish wage earning capacity under the disability definition.

Alexander v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation · filed 1995-02-16(9)

Under the foregoing circumstances, the modified microfilm clerk's job is the type of tailored or created job that would not be available in the open and competitive labor market, is not reflective of plaintiff's actual wage earning capacity and is a job that plaintiff could not be compelled to accept.

Section 97-2(9) ties disability to the ability to earn wages; a worker who can earn wages and fails to prove an inability to obtain employment is not totally disabled.

Lecompte v. L.J.'s Electric Company · filed 1996-01-04(9)

After 7 November of 1991, plaintiff had the physical ability to earn wages in some employment, the wages he had earned prior to the injury, and failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was unable to obtain employment.

Subsection 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn the same wages in the same or another employment.

Hoyle v. Carolina Associated Mills · filed 1996-05-21(9)

N.C. Gen. Stat. section 97-2(9) defines “disability” as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. § 97-2(9) (Cum. Supp. 1995). In order to find a worker disabled under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Commission must find: (1) that plaintiff was incapable after her injury of earning the same wages she earned before her injury in the same employment, (2) that she was incapable after her injury of earning the same wages she earned before her injury in any other employment, and (3) that her incapacity to earn was caused by her injury.

Section 97-2(9) defines compensable incapacity as inability caused by injury to earn the wages received before the injury in the same or any other employment.

Saums v. Raleigh Community Hospital · filed 1996-10-15(9)

An employee is entitled to compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) if there is an “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (1991).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by diminished capacity to earn wages rather than physical infirmity.

Saums v. Raleigh Community Hospital · filed 1997-07-24(9)

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, disability is defined by a diminished capacity to earn wages, not by physical infirmity. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (1991).

The section defines disability as inability caused by injury to earn the wages the employee was receiving before the injury in the same or another job.

Harrington v. Adams-Robinson Enterprises · filed 1998-02-03(9)

The term “disability” means “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. 97-2(9).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn pre-injury wages in the same or other employment; a temporary, unsuccessful return to work alone does not end continuing disability.

Stamey v. N.C. Self-Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 1998-12-15(9)

“Disability” is defined as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (Supp. 1997). ... Plaintiffs temporary, and ultimately unsuccessful, return to work is insufficient to rebut the presumption of continuing disability in her favor.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an incapacity caused by a workplace injury to earn the wages the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.

Coppley v. PPG Industries, Inc. · filed 1999-06-15(9)

“Disability” is a technical term, meaning that because of a workplace injury the employee suffers from an “incapacity ... to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. 97-2(9).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused incapacity to earn the wages the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or another employment.

Fuller v. MOTEL 6 · filed 2000-03-07(9)

A disability exists if the injury results in an “incapacity ... to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (1999).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn the wages the employee received at injury in the same or any other employment.

Lanning v. Fieldcrest-Cannon, Inc. · filed 2000-06-16(9)

The Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) defines “disability” as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (1999).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as incapacity caused by injury that prevents an employee from earning the wages received at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.

Terrell v. Terminix Services, Inc. · filed 2001-02-20(9)

North Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act N.C.G.S. § 97-2 (9) provides, “[t]he term ‘disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.”

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as inability, because of an injury, to earn the wages received before the injury in the same or any other employment.

Demery v. Perdue Farms, Inc. · filed 2001-05-01(9)

“Disability,” within the meaning of the of the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, is defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (1999).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by an injury's effect on an employee's capacity to earn wages.

Ricks v. Cvt Installations · filed 2002-05-22(9)

Under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, a disability is defined as the incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9). ... Plaintiff was no longer disabled after August 23, 1999, because plaintiff's carpet work for Custom Colors and Williams Classic Homes through the end of 1999 and all of 2000 demonstrates his post-injury capacity was not diminished.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn the employee’s prior wages in the same or any other employment.

Bailey v. Western Staff Services · filed 2002-07-16(9)

“Disability” is defined by the Workers’ Compensation Act as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (2001). ... We further conclude that these findings support the Industrial Commission’s determination that plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability benefits.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused inability to earn pre-injury wages in the same or other employment; the Commission must make findings on each part of that test.

Parker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-02-18(9)

To support a conclusion of disability, the Industrial Commission must thus find facts indicating: “(1) [the plaintiff] was incapable of earning pre-injury wages in the same employment, (2) she was incapable of earning pre-injury wages in any other employment, and (3) the incapacity to earn pre-injury wages in either the same or other employment was caused by [the] plaintiff’s injury.”

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn the wages the employee received at the time of injury in the same or other employment.

Ashford v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2003-09-29(9)

1. "Disability" means the incapacity because of injury to earn wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by loss of earning capacity caused by injury, rather than by physical infirmity alone.

Johnson v. Southern Tire Sales and Service · filed 2004-08-13(9)

Consequently, a determination of whether a worker is disabled focuses upon impairment to the injured employee’s earning capacity rather than upon physical infirmity.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused incapacity to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment.

Adams v. METALS USA · filed 2005-02-15(9)

Disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act is defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (2003). ... From the evidence presented, it appears plaintiff was still currently disabled as he had not yet regained his pre-injury wage capacity.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or any other employment.

Matthews v. City of Raleigh · filed 2003-10-21(9)

Under N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (2001), disability is an “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.”

An employee who returns to work at full salary without restrictions has no presumption of continuing disability after termination.

Jones v. MODERN CHEVROLET · filed 2008-12-02(9)

Further, because Plaintiff returned to work at his full salary and without work restrictions, there is no presumption of continuing disability after he was terminated.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused incapacity to earn preinjury wages. A worker capable of some employment may prove disability through a reasonable but unsuccessful job search or by showing that a search would be futile.

Myles v. LMS Inc. · filed 2016-12-30(9)

"Disability," within the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, "means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment." N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9). ... As there is evidence to support the Commission's finding that plaintiff performed a minimal job search and did not conduct a reasonable search as considered by Russell , we overrule plaintiff's argument. ... As it was plaintiff's burden to establish futility and plaintiff failed to meet that burden, we uphold the Commission's finding/conclusion that "[plaintiff] has not shown that it would be futile due to preexisting conditions to search for work."

Section 97-2(9) ties disability to diminished ability to earn wages resulting from an employment injury.

Hinson v. Cont'l Tire The Ams. · filed 2019-09-03(9)

Generally, “disablement” means a diminished ability to earn wages resulting from an injury sustained due to employment. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9); N.C.G.S. § 97-54 (2017).

Section 97-2(9)’s definition of disability does not govern extended compensation under § 97-29(c).

Sturdivant v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety · filed 2024-12-13(9)

As explained at length above, the General Assembly chose not to incorporate the “disability” legal doctrine into N.C.G.S. § 97-29(c) and instead applied a new standard examining whether the employee sustained a complete loss of the ability to earn any wages in any type of employment.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment.

Valenzuela v. Delhaize Am., LLC · filed 2026-03-18(9)

Here, Plaintiff cannot establish the third, statutory Hilliard element proving she is earning less or suffers from a diminished wage capacity because of her compensable injury.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages; the worker’s capacity to return to work determines whether that disability continues.

Miller v. Mission Hospital, Inc. · filed 2014-07-01(9)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) defines “disability” as an “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” ... The Commission’s ruling on plaintiff’s claim for disability required it to determine whether or not plaintiff was capable of returning to work.

Disability means an injury-caused inability to earn pre-injury wages in the same or any other employment.

Griffin v. Absolute Fire Control · filed 2020-01-07(9)

Disability means incapacity, because of injury, to earn the wages the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused incapacity to earn the employee’s prior wages in the same or any other employment.

Davidovic v. Allbound Carrier, Inc. · filed 2025-09-03(9)

Disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act is defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2023). ... Based on these findings, supported by competent evidence, we hold the findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law that as a result of the incident Plaintiff “has been totally incapacitated from earning his pre-injury wages in the same or any other employment beginning 13 March 2020” and Plaintiff is entitled to total disability compensation.

Section 97-2(9) measures disability by lost wage earning capacity; disability ended when the worker could return to her former job at her previous wage.

Black v. Tw services/hardees · filed 1997-02-03(9)

As a result of her injury by accident, plaintiff was temporarily totally disabled from July 25, 1992 until January 4, 1993, for which she is entitled to compensation, less amounts heretofore paid. N.C.G.S. §§ 97-2 (9) and 97-29.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability in terms of wage earning capacity; a worker who can perform suitable employment is not totally disabled.

Crawford v. Ferrell Gas · filed 2003-09-29(9)

At no time was plaintiff totally disabled as a result of his injury on December 16, 1999 following his release to return to work in January 2000. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by an injury’s effect on earning capacity; matching prior weekly wages by working longer hours does not necessarily rule out partial disability.

Harris v. North American Products · filed 1997-02-18(9)

Had the Commission considered plaintiff’s post-injury earnings alone, without regard to the number of hours he was required to work to produce those earnings, plaintiff’s capacity to earn would have been exaggerated. Therefore the evidence showed that plaintiff’s actual post-injury earnings were not a reliable indicator of his post-injury earning capacity and the Commission properly determined that, during such period, plaintiff was partially disabled.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by a worker’s capacity to earn wages; active work in a self-owned marketing business can be employment, and its earnings can be wages.

Lanning v. Fieldcrest-Cannon, Inc. · filed 1999-07-06(9)

The term “disability” is defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (Cum. Supp. 1997). ... Although the Commission was well within its authority to find plaintiff’s expectation of making a living through this venture “to be a triumph of hope over experience and thus not highly credible,” there was no basis whatsoever for the Commission’s conclusion that plaintiff’s marketing business is not “employment” and that his earnings are not “wages.”

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment.

Flores v. Stacy Penny Masonry Co. · filed 1999-08-03(9)

“Disability” refers to the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (Cum. Supp. 1997). ... Insofar as the Commission was correct in finding that defendants had failed to rebut the presumption of continuing disability as to plaintiff, the Commission was likewise correct in concluding that plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability after 25 September 1995.

Under § 97-2(9), a worker does not establish temporary total disability when suitable employment remains available within the worker’s physical capacity.

Williams v. Carolina Food Processors · filed 2002-06-05(9)

4. However, plaintiff has not met her burden of proving that she has ever been temporarily totally disabled as a result of her compensable injuries by accident, as at all times defendant-employer had available employment suitable for plaintiff's physical capacity. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9).

Section 97-2(9) treats an employee as disabled when a compensable injury, including resulting psychological maladjustment, leaves the employee unable to earn wages in suitable employment.

Trantham v. Volvo Constr. Equip. · filed 2003-08-14(9)

As a result of his compensable injury, plaintiff was temporarily disabled from February 19, 1999, until August 29, 1999, as stipulated by the parties, and from October 5, 2000, when Dr. Jarvis surgically implanted the intrathecal pump and continuing. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(9) and 97-29 . Plaintiff's psychological maladjustment to his physical injury has rendered him incapable of earning wages at Volvo or any other employment that is suitable based upon his age, education, vocational history, and residual functional capacity.

Section 97-2(9) requires proof that a work injury prevents earning preinjury wages; a worker capable of some work must show a reasonable effort to find suitable employment or that seeking it would be futile.

Shook v. Motor Freight Carriers · filed 2004-04-01(9)

As of this date plaintiff was not capable of returning to work as a truck driver, but was capable of some work and failed to produce evidence that he made a reasonable effort to find suitable employment. The greater weight of the evidence does not show that it would be futile for plaintiff to seek employment. Neither Dr. DeFranzo nor Dr. Ruch stated that plaintiff was unable to work in any employment. Therefore, plaintiff was no longer disabled as of July 5, 2002. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(9); 97-29 ; Russell V. Lowes Product Distribution , supra.

Section 97-2(9) recognizes total disability when an injury, considered with the worker’s physical restrictions, pain, age, education, and work history, makes employment physically impossible and a job search futile.

Taylor v. Carolina Restaurant Group · filed 2004-04-02(9)

Given plaintiff's restrictions of no kneeling, squatting, climbing, sitting for more than fifteen minutes, no prolonged walking and further considering that her only jobs have been manual labor, and given her age, education, her other health conditions and given Dr. Oakley's testimony, plaintiff has proved that she is physically incapable of any employment and that it would be futile to seek work because of the aforementioned factors in conjunction with the other restrictions of pain. Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Company, 305 N.C. 593 , 595 , 290 S.E.2d 682 , 684 (1982). Therefore, plaintiff is totally disabled under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29 as the result of the July 22, 1994 right knee injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6)(9).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-related loss of earning capacity, which a worker may prove through medical evidence of physical limitations and an unsuccessful job search.

Myers v. Bbf Printing Solutions · filed 2007-06-19(9)

Plaintiff met his burden of proving total and permanent disability through medical testimony "regarding the extent of [his] physical limitations" and evidence plaintiff unsuccessfully sought numerous jobs.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment, which an unsuccessful reasonable job search can establish.

Graham v. Masonry Reinforcing Corp. of America · filed 2008-02-19(9)

From these facts the Industrial Commission could properly conclude that plaintiff had proven his disability as the evidence presented by plaintiff about his job search showed that he was incapable of earning the same wages he had earned in the same or other employment.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment; a reasonable but unsuccessful job search or a futile search due to age, experience, and education can establish it.

Anthony v. CONTINENTAL TIRE NORTH AMERICA, INC. · filed 2009-08-18(9)

Disability under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act is defined as "incapacity because of the injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employments." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2007). ... The first and second prongs of the Russell test have been satisfied because the Commission found as fact, adequately supported by the evidence, that plaintiff conducted a reasonable job search, but due to the nature and severity of his injury was unable to find employment. Additionally, the third prong of the Russell test was satisfied because the Commission found as fact, adequately supported by the evidence, that due to his age, experience, and lack of education, plaintiff's job search would be futile. Plaintiff has carried his burden and the Commission did not err in concluding he was disabled.

Under § 97-2(9), an injured worker who cannot find suitable employment within physical restrictions may qualify for continuing disability benefits.

Strickland v. Coastal Assembly · filed 2009-11-30(9)

Plaintiff has remained out of work since January 11, 2009 and has been unable to find suitable employment within his physical restrictions. Plaintiff is entitled to temporary total disability from the time of his termination and continuing until further orders of the Industrial Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9).

The 2011 statutory definition of suitable employment in § 97-2(22) does not apply to a pre-amendment injury claim.

Santos v. Wake County Public School System · filed 2011-09-08(22)

The Full Commission further notes that the statutory definition of suitable employment in Session Law 2011-287 , House Bill 709, N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-2 (22), does not apply to this case.

Section 97-2’s suitable-employment definition does not supply the standard for salary continuation benefits under § 143-166.19.

Yerby v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety/Division of Juvenile Justice · filed 2014-02-18

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2013). The definition above illustrates that the criteria required to determine a refusal of suitable employment is separate and distinct from a determination of whether a refusal “to perform any duties to which [an individual] may be properly assigned” occurred. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-166.19. Since the issue of salary continuation benefits is decided under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-166.14 and not workers’ compensation benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29 and 97-30, the Commission erred in its use of the suitable employment analysis as a basis for its decision.

Section 97-2(22) treats a regularly hired job within an injured employee’s work restrictions as suitable employment rather than make work.

Morgan v. Interim Healthcare · filed 2014-08-05(22)

The evidence of record supports the Commission’s finding that the job requirements of the position offered plaintiff included light duty work in an office consistent with plaintiff’s physician-imposed work restrictions and it was a position for which defendant regularly hired. Defendant’s job offer was not “make work.” Therefore, we overrule plaintiff’s argument that the employment offered was “make work” and not suitable employment.

Section 97-2(22) requires employment offered after maximum medical improvement to be within 50 miles of the employee’s qualifying residence; distance is a requirement, not merely a factor.

Falin v. Roberts Co. Field Services, Inc. · filed 2016-02-02(22)

Therefore, to read the statute as including the 50-mile radius requirement as a “factor” would ignore the “ordinary rules of grammar” and disregard the legislature’s intent that the 50-mile radius language be a requirement rather than merely a factor to be considered.

An offered job qualifies as suitable employment when the Commission’s findings show that it falls within the employee’s work restrictions and has the approval of the employee’s authorized health care provider.

Garrett v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2018-07-03(22)

These findings sufficiently demonstrate that the job offered was “within the employee’s work restrictions, including rehabilitative or other noncompetitive employment with the employer of injury approved by the employee’s authorized health care provider.”

Disability is presumed to continue until an employee returns to work at wages equal to those earned at the time of injury.

Khalil v. North Carolina State University · filed 1996-05-16

Disability is presumed to continue until the employee returns to work at wages equal to those he was receiving at the time of his injury.

Disability under subsection (9) depends on post-injury earning capacity rather than actual post-injury wages.

McGee v. Estes Express Lines · filed 1997-02-04(9)

Because the employee’s continued entitlement to benefits must be based on his post-injury earning capacity, not his post-injury wages, the Commission erred.

Disability is an injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment; once established, it is presumed to continue until the employee returns to work at equal wages.

Snead v. Carolina Pre-Cast Concrete, Inc. · filed 1998-04-30(9)

Disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act is defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (Cum. Supp. 1997). ... Once the plaintiff-employee establishes his disability, there is a presumption that the disability continues until he returns to work at wages equal to those he was receiving at the time of his injury.

Section 97-2(2) includes a worker learning through practical job training as an apprentice and therefore as an employee.

Sutton v. Ward · filed 1988-12-06(2)

Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff was an apprentice to Haywood County and therefore an employee under the Act.

Section 97-2(2) includes illegally employed minors within the Workers’ Compensation Act’s definition of employee.

Lemmerman v. A. T. Williams Oil Co. · filed 1986-11-18(2)

This issue is not affected by the fact that the minor may have been illegally employed because the Act specifically includes within its provisions illegally employed minors.1 N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2) (1985).

Section 97-2(2) includes a casual worker whose work is required in the employer’s business, even if the worker is too young to be lawfully employed.

Lemmerman v. A. T. Williams Oil Co. · filed 1986-03-04(2)

It is also plain that his employment is not excluded by the statute, since the work that he did was required in the operation of defendant’s business. And that the child was too young to be lawfully employed is irrelevant, as the statute plainly states.

Section 97-2(2) uses ordinary common law tests to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists.

Dockery v. McMillan · filed 1987-05-05(2)

This statutory definition adds nothing to the common law meaning of the term, and whether an employer-employee relationship existed is to be determined by the application of ordinary common law tests.

Section 97-2(2) treats laboratory assistant trainees who work as apprentices while receiving on-the-job training as employees under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Wright v. Wilson Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1976-07-07(2)

A critical reading of this record indicates as a matter of law that the participants in this laboratory assistantship program, including this plaintiff, are acting as “apprentices” undergoing on-the-job training and hence should be considered employees subject to the provisions of Workmen’s Compensation.

Section 97-2(2) permits a sole proprietor to elect employee coverage, and an insurer can be estopped from invoking the statutory notice requirement to deny that coverage.

Doud v. K & G JANITORIAL SERVICES · filed 1984-06-19(2)

In summary, we hold that the Commission has jurisdiction over Doud’s workers’ compensation claim based on Doud’s election to be included as an employee under his own policy, pursuant to G.S. § 97-2(2) (1979 & Supp. 1983). For the reasons discussed above, Fidelity is estopped from asserting the statutory notice requirement to deny coverage.

Section 97-2(2) determines employee status by common-law employer-employee tests, with the right of supervisory control decisive; paying wages and having hiring or firing authority alone do not establish employer status.

Woodling v. Garrett Corp. · filed 1987-03-03(2)

Whether one is an employee of a particular employer within the meaning of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-2(2) is a question of fact to be determined by applying the common-law tests for finding an employer-employee relationship. See Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1944); Carter v. Frank Shelton, Inc., 62 N.C.App. 378, 303 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1983), review denied, 310 N.C. 476, 312 S.E.2d 883 (1984). The right to control the employee, i.e., “the power to set work hours, assign duties and establish the manner of performance,” is determinative of who is the employer. Barrington v. Employment Security Commission, 55 N.C.App. 638, 286 S.E.2d 576, 579, review denied, 305 N.C. 584, 292 S.E.2d 569 (1982); accord Lucas v. Li’l General Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (1976); Carter v. Frank Shelton, Inc., 303 S.E.2d at 187. In the absence of supervisory control, the payment of salary and the right to hire and discharge are insufficient to establish employer status.

Section 97-2(2) treats a student performing practical respiratory therapy work at a hospital as an apprentice employee covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Ryles v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., Inc. · filed 1992-09-15(2)

Therefore, we are of the opinion that while plaintiff may have been a student at DTI, when he entered the hospital to perform respiratory therapy, his status changed to apprentice, making him subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Volunteer firemen are treated as employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act even though § 97-2(2) does not expressly list them.

Hix v. Jenkins · filed 1995-02-21(2)

Although the plaintiffs are correct in their statement that volunteer firemen do not receive compensation for their services and are not listed as “employees” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2), we reject their assertion that volunteer firemen should not be treated as “employees” under the Act.

Section 97-2(2) permits a worker supplied by a temporary agency to be an employee of both the agency and the borrowing employer under the special employment doctrine.

Brown v. Friday Services, Inc. · filed 1995-08-15(2)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2) defines an employee as “every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written....” This Court has recognized the “special employment” or “borrowed servant” doctrine which holds that under certain circumstances a person can be an employee of two different employers at the same time. ... In sum, we conclude that at the time of his death, decedent was performing work as a loaned servant on behalf of Kassem.

Under the 1987 version of § 97-2, an employer that regularly employed four or more people was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act even if fewer than four worked on the injury date.

Grouse v. DRB Baseball Management, Inc. · filed 1996-01-16(1)

Although current law mandates that an employer with three employees is bound by the Act, the statute in effect at the time of plaintiff’s accident on 27 September 1987 provided that employers who regularly employed four or more persons were subject to the Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2. ... In considering whether defendants had four or more regularly employed workers, “the fact that [the employer] fell below the minimum requirement on the actual date of injury would not preclude coverage.” ... Since there is evidence that defendants regularly employed four or more employees during the year 1987, we hold defendants are subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction and we therefore overrule this assignment of error.

Section 97-2 requires an employer-employee relationship for a worker to claim compensation from a business; supervising its workers without being employed by that business does not establish that relationship.

Harpe v. Finger Land Clearing · filed 1996-11-25

The employer-employee relationship did not exist between defendant-employer and plaintiff-employee. Plaintiff was in no way employed by defendant-employer but had only supervised defendant-employer's workers at the above-described job site. Therefore, the North Carolina Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction in this matter. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

Section 97-2(2) treats sporadic work that is part of an employer’s regular business as employment rather than casual work.

Church v. Church's Nursery Evergreens · filed 1996-12-03(2)

Although plaintiff's work for defendant-employer was sporadic, the work he performed was a part of the employer's regular business. Therefore, plaintiff was not a casual employee and the employee-employer relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant-employer at the time of the alleged injury.

Section 97-2(1) brings an employer within the Workers' Compensation Act when it regularly employs three or more employees.

Weigel v. the Kelly Group · filed 1997-02-13(1)

On July 14, 1994, the date of plaintiff's injury by accident, the defendant Kelly Group regularly employed three or more employees so as to come within the coverage of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(2) does not exclude a casual employee from workers’ compensation when the employee’s work is in the course of the employer’s trade, business, or occupation.

Moffett v. Terrell Atlantic Corporation · filed 1998-02-24(2)

On 24 August 1994, plaintiff was a casual employee of defendant when he engaged in welding for defendant-employer, but the work plaintiff performed was in the course of the trade, business or occupation of his employer and the casual nature of the employment alone would not exclude plaintiff from benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(2) permits a partner to exclude himself from workers’ compensation coverage, leaving him uncovered by the partnership’s policy.

Guillory v. Star Erectors, Inc. · filed 1998-06-04(2)

H L Enterprises had in effect at the time of this accident workers' compensation coverage for its employees, but plaintiff was an owner of H L Enterprises and he had elected to exclude himself from coverage and was therefore not covered by said policy. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (2); 97-93 and 97-94 .

Section 97-2(2) does not exclude a casual employee from workers’ compensation benefits when the work is in the course of the employer’s trade, business, or occupation.

Rivera v. Trapp · filed 1998-07-27(2)

On 3 January 1997, plaintiff was a casual employee of defendant John Schuck, but the work plaintiff performed was in the course of the trade, business or occupation of his employer and the casual nature of the employment alone would not exclude plaintiff from benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Under § 97-2(2), a carrier's sufficient control over a driver's duties and equipment establishes an employment relationship.

Newton v. Ranger Transportation, Inc. · filed 1999-01-22(2)

On 23 June 1993, defendant-carrier exercised sufficient control over plaintiff's duties and equipment to constitute an employment relationship.

Section 97-2(2) treats a driver supplied with a leased truck as an employee of the carrier when he hauls under the carrier’s authority, at its direction, and for its benefit.

Harris v. J. L. Rothrock, Inc. · filed 2000-03-09(2)

During the pendency of the same trip, Carzell Harris was hauling under Rothrock's ICC Franchise Authority, at their direction, and for their benefit. Therefore, he was an employee of Rothrock and Rothrock was primarily responsible for any injuries arising out of and in the course of that employment.

Section 97-2(2) recognizes an employer-employee relationship despite an employee’s violation of a release agreement with a former employer when the current employer hired and employed the worker.

Williams v. Landspan · filed 2001-11-21(2)

Notwithstanding the violation of the release agreement entered into between plaintiff and his former employer Watkins, a valid employer-employee relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant-employer Landspan at the time of the alleged injury by accident on May 17, 1999. Therefore, the Commission has jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

A worker performing usual duties in an employer’s ongoing business is not a casual employee merely because the work occurs on a Saturday under a barter arrangement.

Parker v. Wilson · filed 2001-12-07(2)

Regardless of the fact that plaintiff's injury occurred on a Saturday or the fact that Wilson made a barter agreement with Mr. Stancil for the roofing job, plaintiff was performing duties within the course and scope of his regular employment with defendant-employer Wilson and he was not merely a casual employee. Furthermore, on Saturday 27 May 2000, the work performed was in the regular course of defendant-employer Wilson's ongoing construction laborer work. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) includes an owner-operator acting as a driver for the carrier as an employee, but excludes the owner-operator acting as an independent contractor while maintaining the truck as owner-lessor.

King v. Epes Transport Systems, Inc. · filed 2002-03-06(2)

As driver-operator of the truck in the service of defendant-employer, plaintiff was an employee under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. However, as owner-lessor and caretaker of the truck, plaintiff was an independent contractor and, for workers' compensation purposes, was not a person included within the terms of the Act.

An hourly worker whom a business supplies with tools and directs to projects is an employee under § 97-2(2), despite being called a subcontractor.

Gibson v. Charles Crisp Constr. · filed 2003-03-06(2)

The defendant paid plaintiff an hourly rate of $15.00 per hour and paid him weekly by check. The defendant provided all the major tools and equipment to the plaintiff. The defendant told the plaintiff what to do on the various projects on the various projects assigned to plaintiff. ... The defendant contended that plaintiff was a sub-contractor. ... On July 4, 2000 plaintiff was an employee of the defendants. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) excludes a person from employee status when no employment relationship existed with the alleged employer on the injury date.

Davis v. Carpenter Constr. Co. · filed 2003-10-31(2)

1. On December 18, 2000, an employee/employer relationship did not exist between plaintiff and defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) uses the common-law meaning of employee, so employee status is determined under common-law tests that consider the hiring party’s right to control how the work is performed.

Hughart v. Dasco Transportation, Inc. · filed 2005-01-04(2)

Our Supreme Court has held that the definition of “employee” contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act “adds nothing to the common law meaning of the term.” Lucas, 289 N.C. at 219, 221 S.E.2d at 261. To determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee, we apply the traditional common law tests.

Section 97-2(2) excludes independent contractors from its definition of employee, so they are not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

Chavers v. Polyvision Corp. · filed 2005-08-19(2)

Plaintiff was an independent contractor, and as such, is not an employee as contemplated by the Workers' Compensation Act, and is therefore not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

Section 97-2(2) requires a contract of hire, express or implied, for employee status; a person with no hiring agreement or reasonable expectation of payment is not an employee.

Whipple v. Sanford · filed 2007-01-30(2)

Under the Act, an "employee" is defined as every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, but excluding casual employment that is not in course of the business of the alleged employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2). ... In the present case, plaintiff did not prove the existence of any employment agreement with either Mr. Sanford or defendant Bi-Lo, Inc. Plaintiff did not have any conversations with Mr. Sanford regarding his hiring her to perform any work on the North Carolina jobsites and had no reasonable expectation of payment for the performance of any work at those jobsites.

Section 97-2 excludes from its definition of employee a distributor who buys distribution rights, earns resale profits, controls his work schedule, and may hire others to perform the work.

McDaniel v. George Weston Bakeries Distribution · filed 2007-11-01(2)

The North Carolina Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide this matter because plaintiff was not an employee of defendant as defined by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

Under § 97-2(2), a worker employed by an independent framing contractor is not the property owner’s employee merely because the owner hired the contractor.

Lynch v. Builders · filed 2008-09-11(2)

At the time of his August 16, 2006 work injury, Plaintiff was not an employee of Defendant Robin G. Pigg, as that term is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) treats a worker as an employee when an implied contract for hire exists and the employer controls the essential details of the work.

Hughart v. Dasco Transportation, Inc. · filed 2008-09-22(2)

Plaintiff was an employee of defendant-employer Dasco given that: (a) an implied contract for hire existed between the decedent and Dasco; (b) at the time of the incident which resulted in his death, the work the decedent was performing was essentially that of Dasco; and (c) Dasco directly controlled the most crucial aspects of the decedent's work through the supervision of its lead driver and provided the valuable instrument through which its business could be conducted.

Section 97-2(2) defines an employee as a person working under an express or implied appointment or contract of hire; an employer-employee relationship is required for Commission jurisdiction.

Ballard v. Williams · filed 2011-08-30(2)

The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act defines "employee" as ". . . every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written. . . ." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2). ... Because Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of the employer-employee relationship with Williams or any subcontractor of Williams, the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19 do not apply and the North Carolina Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction in this case. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

An employee may have an employment relationship with both a client company and its payroll services provider for workers’ compensation coverage.

Putnam v. Sweep Rite, Inc. · filed 2011-10-06

An employment relationship existed between Plaintiff and said Defendant-Employers, Sweep Rite, Inc. and Excel Payroll Plus, Inc., at the time of her injury and said Defendant-Employers were insured at that time. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

Section 97-2(2) includes workers under express or implied contracts of hire as employees, and joint or lent employment requires a contract with the alleged employer.

Whicker v. Compass Group USA, Inc. · filed 2016-04-05(2)

The Workers’ Compensation Act recognizes that employment contracts can be implied when it defines “employee” to include workers who labor under a contract that is either “express or implied.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2).

Section 97-2 defines an employee as a person working under an express or implied appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship.

Jackson v. Bobbitt · filed 1961-01-20(2)

G.S. 97-2 of our Workmen’s Compensation Act defines the term “employee,” so far as relevant here, thus: “The term ‘employee’ means every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and also minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.” ... In our opinion, it does not appear from the record that there existed an express or implied obligation on the part of Bobby Roberts to provide transportation for plaintiffs to and from their work, and it does not appear from the record that James Lamar Roberts at the time of the wreck was an employee of Bobby Roberts within the purview of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, or that he was conducting any business for Bobby Roberts at the time, but it does appear from the record before us that the transportation furnished these plaintiffs was gratuitous or a mere accommodation or courtesy rides, and, therefore, plaintiffs were not injured by accident arising out of and in the course of their employment.

Section 97-2(b) covers a minor employee even if the employer hired the minor contrary to law.

McNair Ex Rel. McNeil v. Ward · filed 1954-05-19(b)

The validity of these conclusions is not impaired in any degree by the fact that the employers may have hired the infant plaintiff contrary to law.

Section 97-2's definition of employee excludes jurors, whose service is not obtained through a contract of hire with the county.

Hicks v. Guilford County · filed 1966-05-25(2)

His services, if he is accepted and empaneled to try the issues in an action, are not obtained or defined by a contract of hire between him and the county. There are no negotiations between him and the county, express or implied, for those services. He is not a public officer, an independent contractor or an employee. He is a juror. ... Since in this jurisdiction a juror is not an employee, the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act does not apply to an injury sustained by a juror in the course of his or her service as such.

Section 97-2(2) excludes a person from its definition of employee when the person who purported to hire them lacked actual and apparent authority to contract for the employer.

Lucas v. Li'l General Stores · filed 1975-03-19(2)

Thus, Shaver lacked both actual and apparent authority to enter into a contract for hire on behalf of Li’l General Stores with respect to decedent, Leonard M. Lucas. We find therefore that decedent was not an “employee” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(2) uses the common-law meaning of employee; a person without a contract of hire with the alleged employer is not its employee.

Lucas v. Li'l General Stores · filed 1976-01-29(2)

This statutory definition adds nothing to the common law meaning of the term. ... Under these circumstances, we think the conclusion is inescapable that there was no contract between Li’l General Stores and Mr. Lucas re-establishing the relation of employer and employee between them. Thus, he was not the employee of Li’l General Stores at the time of his injury and the Industrial Commission should have dismissed the claim.

Section 97-2(2) includes the plaintiff within the Act’s definition of an employee.

Oliva-Flores v. the Hiring Link, Inc. · filed 1998-06-11(2)

The plaintiff was an employee under the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and an employer-employee relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant at the time of the injury by accident. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2).

Section 97-2 defines disability as injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages and includes aliens within the definition of employee.

Rivera v. Trapp · filed 1999-10-19(2), (9)

Disability is the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. § 97-2(9) (Supp. 1998). ... G.S. § 97-2(2) (Supp. 1998) defines employee to include “every person engaged in an employment . . . including aliens.” The statute makes clear that the General Assembly sought to include individuals like the plaintiff under the protections of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(2) defines an employee relationship based on the employer's control over the worker's duties and equipment and the relationship of the worker's actions to the employment.

Davis v. Coastal Moving Co. · filed 2001-11-19(2)

On 14 January 1998, defendant-employer exercised sufficient control over plaintiff's duties and equipment such that an employment relationship was established. Further, the nature and goal of plaintiff's actions at the time of his injury were reasonably related to his employment. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2); Hoffman v. Truck Lines, Inc.,306 N.C. 502, 293 S.E.2d 807 (1982); Brown v. Truck Lines, 227 N.C. 299,42 S.E.2d 71 (1947); Smith v. Central Transport, 51 N.C. App. 316,276 S.E.2d 751 (1981).

Section 97-2(2) requires an employment agreement for employee status; an applicant taking a preemployment test without an agreement or promise of employment is not an employee.

Huntley v. Howard Lisk Co., Inc. · filed 2002-12-17(2)

Our review of relevant case and statutory law reveals that in North Carolina, the existence of an employment agreement is essential for the formation of an employer-employee relationship.

Section 97-2(2) treats an owner-driver as an employee when the carrier exercises sufficient control over the driver's duties and equipment.

Holbert v. Central Transport · filed 2003-07-28(2)

Defendant-employer was exercising sufficient control of plaintiff's duties and equipment to constitute an employment relationship on October 7, 1998.

Section 97-2(2) covers a fifteen-year-old worker hired using false identification as an employee.

Arroyo v. Rubber Granules · filed 1998-06-19(2)

On June 28, 1995, the deceased was an employee of the Defendant-Employer. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2).

Section 97-2(2) and (3) define the employer and employee relationship used to identify a worker’s employer in a compensation claim.

Vaughan v. Carolina Industrial Insulation · filed 2002-02-27(2), (3)

Plaintiff was employed by Carolina Industrial Insulation from 1964 to 1974. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2),(3).

Section 97-2(1) excludes agricultural and domestic employees from Workers’ Compensation Act coverage.

Thornton v. Thornton · filed 1980-02-05(1)

G.S. § 97-2(1) specifically exempts from the statute’s coverage agricultural and domestic employees.

Section 97-2(1) excludes agricultural employment from workers’ compensation coverage unless the employer regularly employs at least ten full-time nonseasonal agricultural workers.

Kenion v. Maple View Farm · filed 2007-08-24(1)

Employment, as it is defined in the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, does not include agriculture and domestic services, "unless 10 or more full-time nonseasonal agricultural workers are regularly employed by the employer." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1). In the case at bar, the Farm was engaged in agricultural operations and regularly employed fewer than ten full-time nonseasonal employees. Plaintiff's job duties of feeding and birthing calves and cleaning stalls, place her in the category of a farm laborer. Thus, the Farm does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Act and is not liable for injuries plaintiff allegedly sustained on December 1, 2005. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (1); 97-13 (b).

Section 97-2(1) excludes agriculture from employment, but a farmer’s services cease to be agriculture when the farmer clearly enters a service or other business remote from direct agricultural production.

Hinson v. Creech · filed 1974-11-26(1)

It. is only when a farmer departs from his argicultural pursuits and clearly enters into a service business or -another business remote from the direct production of agricultural products that his services cease to be “agriculture” within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(1).

Section 97-2(1) exempts agricultural employees from coverage under North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act.

Soto v. McLean · filed 1998-09-03(1)

Since N.C.G.S. § 97-2(1) specifically exempts agricultural employees from the Compensation Act’s coverage, the fellow servant doctrine may properly be discussed in conjunction with the agricultural worker action before the court.

Section 97-2(12)’s definition of child does not determine who receives compensation under § 97-40 when the deceased employee leaves no dependents.

Brimley v. Logging · filed 1989-04-18(12)

The Commission’s reliance on N.C.G.S. § 97-2(12) to interpret who shall take payment of compensation in the absence of dependents as set out in N.C.G.S. § 97-40 is misplaced.

A stepchild must be substantially factually dependent on the deceased employee to qualify as a child under § 97-2(12).

Winstead v. Derreberry · filed 1985-02-19(12)

Having held that stepchildren must be factually dependent upon the deceased employee, the remaining question we must resolve is the degree of dependency required. We hold that the test to be applied is “substantial” dependency upon the deceased employee.

Section 97-2(12) limits “child” to a person under 18 when the employee dies, excluding an adult offspring from the child-based presumption of complete dependency for death benefits.

Allen v. Piedmont Transport Services, Inc. · filed 1994-09-06(12)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(12) (Cum. Supp. 1993) defines “child” to “include only persons who at the time of the death of the deceased employee are under 18 years of age.” ... Thus Scott, the only minor child at the time of decedent’s death, was conclusively presumed wholly dependent upon the decedent for support under § 97-39 and thus entitled to all of the compensation payable under § 97-38. Appellant, who was 25 at the time of decedent’s death, was not entitled to any compensation under § 97-38.

Section 97-2(12) permits acknowledgment of an illegitimate child through written or verbal statements, conduct, or other satisfactory evidence recognizing the parental relationship.

Jackson v. Garner · filed 1995-01-19(12)

The "acknowledgment" of paternity of illegitimate children required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (12) generally has been held to mean the recognition of a parental relation, either by written agreement, verbal declarations or statements, by the life, acts, and conduct of the parties, or any other satisfactory evidence that the relationship was recognized and admitted.

Under § 97-2(12), an illegitimate child qualifies for survivor benefits only if the father sufficiently acknowledged the child; a condition fulfilled after the father’s death cannot supply that acknowledgment.

Tucker v. City of Clinton · filed 1995-11-21(12)

The Act defines a child as including: “a posthumous child ... or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(12) (1991 and Cum. Supp. 1994). ... Thus, to qualify for survivor’s benefits under the Act, an illegitimate child must be acknowledged in sufficient fashion by the father. ... Thus, Carpenter requires conscious, volitional behavior by the putative father. It is manifest that a condition met after a person’s death is not such an act.

Section 97-2(12) requires a stepchild to be substantially dependent on the deceased employee for support to qualify for death benefits.

Johnson v. Barnhill Contracting Company · filed 1996-04-08(12)

For the reasons stated in the above Findings of Fact, at the time of the death of deceased-employee, his stepson, Jeremy D. Dobbins, was not substantially dependent upon him for his support and had not been for more than three months. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (12); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38 ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-39 ; Winstead v. Derreberry , 73 N.C. App. 35 , 326 S.E.2d 66 (1985).

Section 97-2(14) includes a deceased worker’s wife living apart from him for justifiable cause within the definition of widow.

Smith v. Mecklenburg Paving Inc. · filed 1996-09-23(14)

Widows who come within the definition of subsection (14) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 are entitled to the presumption of dependency provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-39 . Section 97-2 (14) state the term "widow included only decedent's wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion at such time." Mrs. Smith justifiably removed herself from the marital residence in March of 1994.

Section 97-2(14) treats a deceased employee’s surviving husband as her widower for workers’ compensation purposes.

Edwards v. Archer Daniels Midland Company · filed 1997-07-09(14)

David Allen Edwards became the widower of decedent at the time of her death on 1 December 1995. Accordingly, David Edwards is presumed to be wholly dependent on the decedent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38 ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-39 ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (14).

Section 97-2(12) technically excludes from its definition of "child" a child raised and wholly supported by the deceased employee who was neither his biological nor adopted child.

Nicholson v. Edwards Wood Products, Inc. · filed 2004-12-01(12)

Notwithstanding Keith Allred's technical exclusion from the definition of "child" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (12), the Commission, reading the Act in its entirety and taking into account other pertinent definitions, finds Keith Allred to be a "dependant child" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38 (3).

Section 97-2’s definitions of family members relevant to dependency cover only people whom the deceased employee had a legal or moral obligation to support.

Fields v. Hollowell & Hollowell · filed 1953-11-25

It is significant that the Act, in respect to dependents of an employee whose death results from an injury, as so defined, specifically defines who are meant by the terms, child, grandchild, brother, sister, parent, widow and widower. G.S. 97-2, subsections (1), (m), (n), and (o), and who are next of kin, father, mother, widow, child, brother or sister, in the event the deceased employee leaves no dependents. G.S. 97-40. The significance of these provisions is that these persons are only those to whom the deceased employee is under legal or moral obligation to support.

Section 97-2(12) excludes a person over 18 at the employee’s death from the definition of “child” for workers’ compensation benefits.

Jones v. Sutton · filed 1970-05-27(12)

We hold that Nancy Carol, as a person over 18 at the time of her father’s death, is not a “child” as defined in G.S. 97-2(12), is therefore not “next of kin” as defined in G.S. 97-40, and for that reason is not entitled to “next of kin” compensation conferred by G.S. 97-38(3).

Section 97-2(12) must be read with section 97-40 when determining who qualifies as next of kin for death benefits.

Stevenson v. City of Durham · filed 1971-11-17(12)

We adhere to our previous position in the Jones case and hold that G.S. 97-40 must be construed with G.S. 97-2(12).

The age, marital-status, and dependency limits in subsection (12) do not restrict who qualifies as next of kin under § 97-40.

Stevenson v. City of Durham · filed 1972-05-10(12)

Imposition of the restrictions contained in G.S. 97-2(12) upon the definition of “next of kin” as defined in G.S. 97-40 would require that we ignore the unambiguous language contained in G.S. 97-40 that “next of kin” be as “herein defined.”

Section 97-2 defines who qualifies as a widow and who counts as a dependent for workers' compensation death benefits.

Gaskins v. Thomas Transport System, Inc. · filed 1996-11-14(12), (14)

The plaintiff Laura Buck Gaskins is not a widow as defined in N.C.G.S. § 97-2(14) and is thus not entitled to receive any workers' compensation death benefits under N.C.G.S. § 93-38 to -39. ... At the time of his death, the decedent had no children and no persons wholly or partially dependent upon him for support. N.C.G.S. §§ 97-2(12), -38.

Section 97-2(6) covers a back injury caused by a specific traumatic incident of assigned work when it arises out of and in the course of employment.

Bennett v. Carolinas Medical Center · filed 1995-03-06(6)

On 4 March 1992 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer which was the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) requires a claimed back injury to arise from a specific traumatic incident during the employee’s work duties.

Steely v. 4 C's Food services/flagstar · filed 1995-07-13(6)

On 21 July 1993 plaintiff did not sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer, in that she did not injure her back as a result of a specific traumatic incident while performing her assigned work duties. N.C.G.S. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a back injury caused by a specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Hollifield v. Cody Cable Services, Incorporated · filed 1994-12-15(6)

On November 30, 1992, the plaintiff suffered a specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) does not cover conditions that developed gradually and did not result from an injury by accident or a specific traumatic incident of assigned work.

Powell v. Carolina Turkeys · filed 1995-01-03(6)

The neck, arm and back conditions for which plaintiff has claimed compensation were not the result of either an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment or a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned on January 16, 1992.

A back injury results from a specific traumatic incident when the trauma occurs at a cognizable time rather than developing gradually.

Bradley v. E. B. Sportswear, Inc. · filed 1985-10-15(6)

We believe that the use of the words “specific” and “incident” means that the trauma or injury must not have developed gradually but must have occurred at a cognizable time.

Section 97-2(6) allows a back injury caused by contemporaneous events within a cognizable time period to qualify as a specific traumatic incident, but excludes injuries that develop gradually over long periods.

Richards v. Town of Valdese · filed 1988-12-06(6)

Back injuries that occur gradually, over long periods of time, are not specific traumatic incidents; however, we believe that events which occur contemporaneously, during a cognizable time period, and which cause a back injury, do fit the definition intended by the legislature.

A specific traumatic incident causing a back injury may occur over a cognizable two-hour period, but there must be evidence that the incident proximately caused the injury.

Livingston v. James C. Fields, & Co. · filed 1989-04-04(6)

We recognize that a “specific traumatic incident” could occur during a “cognizable time” of two hours but in every case there must be evidence of proximate cause between the “specific traumatic incident” and the injury.

Section 97-2(6) treats a back injury caused by a specific traumatic incident during assigned work duties as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Williams v. Guardian Care (Hillhaven) · filed 1994-12-28(6)

On 28 August 1992 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer, in that, he injured his back as a result of a specific traumatic incident of his assigned work duties.

Section 97-2(6) treats a back injury caused by a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned as an injury by accident, but the claimed disabling condition must be proved to result from that incident.

Minoda v. Kikuya Japanese Steak House · filed 1995-01-12(6)

On 24 October 1991 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer in that he sustained a back injury as the result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned. However, the recurrent herniated disc for which he was subsequently treated was not proven to have been approximate result of this injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) recognizes a new back injury arising from a specific traumatic incident of assigned work as an injury by accident.

Batton v. Gant Oil Company · filed 1995-03-27(6)

On 18 February 1992 plaintiff sustained another injury by accident to his low back arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer as a result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A back injury caused by striking a pipe while repairing a valve qualifies as a specific traumatic incident under § 97-2(6).

Creel v. P.I. Mechanical, Incorporated · filed 1995-04-03(6)

When he hit his back on a pipe while trying to repair a valve, this was a specific traumatic incident which resulted in back injury.

Section 97-2(6) treats a disabling back injury directly caused by a specific traumatic incident of assigned work as an injury by accident.

Sievers v. Kawai America Manufacturing Co. · filed 1995-04-04(6)

Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on November 7, 1991 by way of a disabling back injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and which was the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).