N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury to result from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment to be compensable.

Melendez v. Nucor Corp. · filed 2008-01-04(6)

In order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, it must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Snow v. Piedmont Metro Service Co. · filed 2008-10-10(6)

Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant-Employer on September 23, 1997.

Section 97-2(6) does not make a claimed specific traumatic incident compensable when the incident did not cause the disability for which compensation is sought.

Ambrose v. Cvs Pharmacy · filed 2008-10-31(6)

However, on November 17, 2006, plaintiff did not sustain a compensable specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer RHG. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). No causal relationship existed between the alleged incident on November 17, 2006 and the disability for which compensation is sought.

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment as compensable.

Stottlemyer v. City of Charlotte · filed 2009-01-06(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment on March 10, 2005. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6) (2007).

Section 97-2(6) requires proof that the worker sustained an injury by accident while working for the employer.

McDougald v. Horn Hardart, Inc. · filed 2009-05-29(6)

Plaintiff failed to establish that he sustained an injury by accident on or about November 1, 1989, while working with Defendant-Employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires proof of an injury by accident occurring in the course and scope of employment.

Smith v. Valley Proteins · filed 2009-06-23(6)

5. Plaintiff has not proven by the greater weight of the evidence that he sustained an injury by accident, occurring in the course and scope of his employment, in November 2006. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires credible evidence that an injury by accident, including a claimed specific traumatic incident, arose out of and in the course of employment.

Fox v. N.C. State Veterans Home · filed 2009-07-11(6)

Based upon the credible lay and medical evidence of record, Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Defendant-Employer in the form of a specific traumatic incident or otherwise on or about May 25, 2007. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires credible evidence of an injury by accident or specific traumatic incident for a claim to be compensable.

Lassiter v. Bertie County Schools · filed 2009-10-23(6)

The credible evidence of record fails to establish that plaintiff suffered an injury by accident or specific traumatic incident within the meaning of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and therefore her claim is not compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment or a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned.

Emory v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 2009-12-28(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment or a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned with Employer-Defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of employment that aggravates a pre-existing lumbar condition.

McNeill v. Food Lion Warehouse · filed 2010-01-15(6)

On December 26, 2007, plaintiff experienced a specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer resulting in the aggravation of a pre-existing lumbar condition. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a temporary exacerbation of a preexisting back injury caused by a specific traumatic incident at work.

Palmer v. Triad Construction Services, Inc. · filed 2010-02-05(6)

Plaintiff sustained a temporary exacerbation of a previous work related injury as the result of a specific traumatic incident on April 8, 2008. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires a compensable injury to be caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Austin v. Management Cleaning Controls · filed 2010-03-17(6)

"For an injury to be compensable under the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act, it must be proximately caused by an accident arising out of and suffered in the course of employment." Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers , 300 N.C. 164 , 167 , 265 S.E.2d 389 , 391 (1980) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6)). Plaintiff failed to prove she sustained a compensable injury by accident while working for the Defendant-Employer on October 14, 2005. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a lower back injury caused by a compensable workplace accident even when initial treatment focused on a neck injury.

Boling v. Potters Trucking Co. · filed 2010-03-26(6)

As a result of the June 4, 2004 compensable injury by accident, Plaintiff sustained neck and lower back injuries. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires proof of an injury by accident for a compensable claim.

Gore v. Southwest Airlines Company · filed 2010-05-28(6)

Plaintiff failed to prove that she sustained an injury by accident to her left knee. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires sufficient evidence that an alleged injury by accident arose out of and in the course of employment; a claimed specific traumatic incident must also be supported by sufficient evidence.

Baldus v. Mac Sign Comp. Inc. · filed 2010-06-28(6)

Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that on 1 October 2007 he sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer involving his left shoulder, and has failed to produce sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that on 1 October 2007 he sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer in the form of a specific traumatic incident or otherwise.

Section 97-2(6) requires proof by the greater weight of the evidence of a compensable injury by accident while at work.

Williams v. North Carolina a T State Univ. · filed 2010-07-07(6)

Plaintiff failed to prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that he sustained a compensable injury by accident while at work on February 2, 2008. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a back injury sustained while performing truck maintenance required by the worker's contract.

Bryson v. Phil Cline Trucking, Inc. · filed 1995-10-26(6)

On March 12, 1994, plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant when he lifted two and a half gallons of oil while providing maintenance to his truck pursuant to the terms of a contract entered into between plaintiff and defendant and dated February 18, 1994. N.C.G.S. § 97-2 (6).

An injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Stearns v. Elmore Construction and Supply Company · filed 1998-06-23(6)

The Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising in the course of his employment with the Defendant-Employer on July 7, 1993; therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) requires proof of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment; a condition unrelated to the alleged work incident does not qualify.

Madigan v. Staffmark, Inc. · filed 2002-07-17(6)

Plaintiff's inability to earn wages stems from work misconduct and psycho-social factors and is unrelated to the alleged March 1, 2000 event. Thus, plaintiff has failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant and his alleged resultant disability and the extent thereof.

An injury claim under § 97-2(6) fails when the claimant establishes neither an injury by accident nor a specific traumatic event.

Kelso v. Piedmont Fuel Distribution · filed 2004-01-08(6)

5. Plaintiff has not established an injury by accident or specific traumatic event. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, including an injury sustained in a work-related motor vehicle accident.

Lewis v. Estes Express Lines · filed 2004-09-17(6)

Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment on June 13, 2000. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury from an automobile accident while an employee travels with a coworker between job sites.

Sandoval v. Kittrell · filed 2010-06-10(6)

On March 19, 2008, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident while riding in a vehicle driven by a co-worker traveling from one job site to the next. ... 4. Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident on March 19, 2008. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury at an employer-sponsored social event can arise out of and in the course of employment when the evidence establishes a sufficient connection between the injury and the job.

Martin v. Mars Manufacturing Co. · filed 1982-08-03(6)

Pursuant to the foregoing method of analysis approved and adopted by this Court in Chilton, supra, and to the well-established principle that the Workers’ Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees, and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction, Hinson v. Creech, 286 N.C. 156, 161, 209 S.E. 2d 471, 475 (1974); Pennington v. Flame Refractories, Inc., 53 N.C. App. 584, 588, 281 S.E. 2d 463, 466 (1981), we hold that the evidence here established a sufficient nexus between claimant’s injury and her employment to permit the award of compensation.

Section 97-2(6) excludes an injury sustained while lifting weights at a gym before work because it did not arise out of and in the course of employment.

Harkey v. Mohican Mills · filed 1995-11-27(6)

The disabling back injury for which compensation is claimed did not arise out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment; but rather, was the result of his lifting weights at a local gym before work on the morning of July 25, 1993 with a couple of co-employees. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury during employer-provided recreation can be an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment when the activity helps the employee perform assigned duties and benefits the employer.

Anderson v. City of Raleigh · filed 1997-08-06(6)

The recreational activity provided by defendant-employer in which plaintiff participated on February 8, 1995 aided in plaintiff's advancement and better qualification to carry out his prescribed job duties and was also beneficial to defendant-employer. ... Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and the course of his employment on February 8, 1995, resulting in a completely ruptured left Achilles tendon.

Section 97-2(6) can cover an injury at an employer-sponsored recreational event when the event has a sufficient connection to the employment, including employer sponsorship, encouragement to attend, financing, and a tangible benefit to the employer.

Frost v. Salter Path Fire Rescue · filed 2005-02-08(6)

Plaintiff suffered an injury by accident on September 30, 2001, arising out of and in the scope of her employment with the defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). ... To determine whether an injury sustained at an employer-sponsored recreational and/or social activity arose out of and in the course and scope of employment, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has adopted the test set out in Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 22.23, p. 5-85.

An injury at an employer-sponsored recreational event may arise out of and in the course of employment when the event has a sufficient employment nexus; all six Chilton factors need not be satisfied.

Frost v. Salter Path Fire & Rescue · filed 2006-03-07(6)

The Worker's Compensation Act provides compensation only for injuries "arising out of and in the course of the employment." N.C. Gen.Stat. 97-2(6) (2003). ... The findings discussed above, which are supported by the evidence, in turn support the Commission's conclusion that at least four, if not all six, of the Chilton factors are present here. We note that Chilton did not establish a requirement that all six questions must be answered affirmatively in order to support an award of compensation.

Section 97-2(6) includes a personal comfort errand within the course of employment when the employee’s manner of carrying it out is not abnormally dangerous, unconventional, or unusual.

Spratt v. Duke Power Co. · filed 1983-12-20(6)

We conclude that running was not so abnormally dangerous, unconventional or unusual a manner of proceeding to the canteen for chewing gum as to take his conduct outside the course and scope of his employment.

An injury during a recreational activity is not compensable when participation is voluntary and the employer neither sponsors nor encourages it.

Brown v. North Carolina Special Care Ctr. · filed 2003-09-15(6), (18)

For a workers' compensation claim to be compensable, plaintiff must show that he sustained an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6), (18). Both parts of the definition must be satisfied in order for compensability to be found. ... In this case, plaintiff's attendance was not required and the degree of employer involvement at the time of plaintiff's injury did not consist of sponsorship or encouragement; therefore, plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of his employment.

Section 97-2(6) excludes injuries sustained during purely voluntary recreational activities from compensable injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.

Frost v. Salter Path Fire & Rescue · filed 2007-01-26(6)

Therefore, we hold that an employee who, on a purely voluntary basis, attends a “Fun Day” and is injured while participating therein, cannot be said to have suffered a compensable injury which arises out of and in the course of the employment.

Section 97-2(6) covers a workplace carbon dioxide exposure that causes coughing and a collapsed lung as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Blakeney v. Cuddy Farms, Inc. · filed 1997-03-13(6)

Since plaintiff was exposed to carbon dioxide, which precipitated the collapse of his right lung, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident on 6 January 1994 arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with defendant-employer.

Under § 97-2(6), an insect sting arises out of employment when the work exposes the employee to a greater risk of being stung than the general public.

Minter v. Osborne Co. · filed 1997-08-05(6)

To be compensable, an insect sting must be an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (1996 Cum. Supp.). ... The test our courts have used in similar situations to determine whether the injury arose out of employment is the increased risk test. We adopt the increased risk test for this case.

Section 97-2(6) treats an unexpectedly high chemical gas exposure during assigned work as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

McLaughlin v. Sandoz Chemical Corp. · filed 1998-08-13(6)

Plaintiff's exposure to an unexpectedly high level of chlorine bromide (gas) during a 2 to 3 hour period while cleaning an underground pit for defendant-employer constituted an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Under § 97-2(6), an employee may establish that a lightning injury arose out of employment through evidence of work conditions that increased the risk of a strike; expert testimony is not always required.

Heatherly v. THE HOLLINGSWORTH CO., INC. · filed 2011-04-19(6)

We, however, decline to establish a “bright-line” rule requiring expert evidence in every workers’ compensation case in order to establish that the employee’s job exposed him or her to an increased risk of a lightning strike injury.

A claimant alleging an injury by accident from toxic exposure need not establish exact toxicity levels but must prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Jacobs-Sams v. Duke Univ. Med. Ctr. · filed 2017-12-05(6)

However, while a plaintiff is not faced with the burden of establishing exact toxicity levels, a plaintiff nevertheless maintains the burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat an injury sustained while an employee performs regular duties in the usual and customary manner as a compensable accident.

Jupiter v. City of Raleigh · filed 1994-12-16(6)

If an employee is performing his regular duties in the usual and customary manner and is injured, there is no "accident" and the injury is not compensable. ... Plaintiff's injury was not the result of an accident, and is not, therefore, compensable under the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident to result from an interruption of the employee’s regular work routine by unusual circumstances likely to cause unexpected consequences.

Dennis v. Duke Power Company · filed 1995-01-18(6)

Plaintiff did not injure himself on 14 July 1992 as a result of an interruption of his regular work routine by unusual circumstance likely to result in unexpected consequences.

Under § 97-2(6), an unexpected interruption of the normal work routine can constitute an injury by accident even if the event has happened before.

Hincemon v. Monroe Ice and Fuel · filed 1995-05-09(6)

On 1 May 1993, plaintiff suffered an injury to his right shoulder by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). The catching the lip of the handcart on the back of the truck that plaintiff was loading constituted an interruption in his normal work routine and although it had happened before, this was not the usual or expected result.

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury as an injury by accident when unusual exertion and heat interrupt the normal work routine and lead to unexpected consequences.

Harris v. Action Temporaries · filed 1995-09-07(6)

The amount of exertion required by plaintiff due to the malfunctioning weed eater, particularly in light of the high temperature in the middle of the day on August 16, 1993, constituted an interruption of plaintiff's normal work routine and was an introduction of unusual circumstances likely to result in unexpected consequences. ... On August 16, 1993, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer.

Section 97-2(6) requires an interruption of the employee’s regular work routine by unusual conditions for an injury to qualify as an injury by accident.

Jenkins v. Candle Corporation of America · filed 1995-09-26(6)

An accident is an event which involves the interruption of the regular work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. Harding v. Thomas Howard Company , 256 N.C. 427 (1962). Because plaintiff was performing her regular job without any interruption, any incident on 6 August 1993 was not an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury is an accident under § 97-2(6) when an employee takes on a duty outside the employee’s usual work on that job, interrupting the work routine, even if the employee performed that duty in earlier work for the employer.

Brown v. G. E. Piland Sons · filed 1995-11-30(6)

The act of throwing the chain was not a part of plaintiff's duties on this site or this job. Therefore, it was an interruption of plaintiff's given work routine. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an unusual interruption of the regular work routine for an injury to qualify as an injury by accident.

Montez v. National Service Industries · filed 1995-12-19(6)

This incident was not an interruption of her regular work routine by unusual circumstances likely to result in unexpected consequences. ... On 6 September 1994, plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) excludes an injury sustained while an employee performs usual work duties in the customary manner because it is not an injury by accident.

Strickland v. Taurus Textiles · filed 1996-02-20(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant on 14 January 1994. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). ... An injury which results from the performance of the employee's usual work routine in the customary manner is not compensable. Id . Plaintiff's injury to her right chest on 14 January 1994 occurred while she was performing her regular work duties in her usual and customary manner.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat a knee injury sustained while opening a trailer door during a routine ground delivery as an injury by accident.

Reid v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation · filed 1996-05-30(6)

On the April 23, 1993 ground delivery, plaintiff in the course and scope of his normal job duties had to climb onto the rear bumper of his trailer and from a crouched position had to pull up on the trailer door to open it. Plaintiff had done this on numerous occasions involving ground deliveries when there was no loading dock available. ... On April 23, 1993, plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident for compensation; performing usual duties in the usual way is not an accident without an interruption of the work routine introducing unusual conditions.

Robinette v. Catawba Memorial Hospital · filed 1996-12-06(6)

In order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, it must be the result of an "accident." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). 2. An "accident" must involve more than merely carrying on the usual and customary duties in the usual way, but rather involves the interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury as an accident when a faster-than-normal work pace interrupts the employee's normal routine and introduces unusual conditions.

Jackson v. Furniture · filed 1996-12-09(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident in the course of scope of her employment with defendant-employer on 30 June 1994. On said date and at the time of the injury, plaintiff was involved in a faster-than-normal work pace thereby constituting an interruption of plaintiff's normal work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A broken machine belt that wraps around an employee’s leg constitutes an injury by accident when its failure interrupts the regular work routine and introduces unusual circumstances.

Plymouth v. Glen Raven Mills · filed 1996-12-10(6)

The breakdown of the machine belt that wrapped around plaintiff's left leg constitutes an interruption of her regular work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual circumstances likely to result in unexpected consequences. ... On 30 October 1994, plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident, a left leg palsy, arising out of and in the course of her employment With the defendant employer when a machine belt broke and wrapped around plaintiff's left leg. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury during an employee’s usual work routine, performed in the usual manner without interruption, is not an injury by accident under § 97-2(6).

Cline v. Total Scope Health Care Services · filed 1996-12-20(6)

Plaintiff has failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that on or about December 28, 1992 she sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant. The evidence shows that there was no interruption of plaintiff's usual work routine and that the activity that she engaged in was performed in the usual manner. N.C.G.S. § 97-2 (6).

An injury by accident requires an interruption of the employee’s normal work routine by unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.

Purcell v. Autumn Care of Raeford · filed 1997-02-17(6)

Plaintiff did not prove by the greater weight of the evidence that she sustained an injury which resulted from an interruption of her normal work routine by the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences; therefore, on August 17, 1989, plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An unexpected and untoward interruption of a worker’s normal work routine can constitute an accident under § 97-2(6).

Tabor v. J. H. Johnson Construction, Inc. · filed 1997-04-01(6)

The closing of the door into plaintiff's right shoulder by Pat Dyer was an accident in that it was an interruption of plaintiff's normal work routine by an unlooked for and untoward event not expected or designed by plaintiff.

Section 97-2(6) requires an interruption of the usual work routine that introduces unusual conditions for an injury to qualify as an accident; performing customary duties in the usual way is insufficient.

Shepard v. Greenville Drycleaning Group, Inc. · filed 1997-04-03(6)

An "accident" must involve more than merely carrying on the usual and customary duties in the usual way, but rather involves the interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury caused when an interruption of normal work requires unusual physical exertion while performing the job.

Davis v. Peek measurements/brandt Instruments · filed 1997-04-04(6)

On January 1, 1993, in the process of tightening down the vise on a new part in order to insure it was securely held in place to prevent further breakage of the limited number of drill bits available, plaintiff experienced an interruption of her normal work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences when she was required to pull back on the vise with both hands with all her weight resulting in a compensable injury to her dominant right upper extremity, giving rise to pain extending from the fingers to the elbow.

Section 97-2(6) requires findings on whether an employee was performing usual duties in the usual manner and whether an interruption of routine introduced unusual conditions before the Commission can conclude that an injury was not by accident.

Lineback v. Wake County Board of Commissioners · filed 1997-07-01(6)

Even though the Industrial Commission describes the activities in which plaintiff was engaged when he suffered his knee injury, there are no findings of fact as to whether such activities were part of his usual and customary duties, or whether they were being performed in the usual manner. Moreover, there are no findings of fact from which it may be determined whether the occurrence which caused his injury involved an interruption of routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. Accordingly, the findings of fact are insufficient to support the conclusion that plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident.

Extra effort to free stuck equipment can qualify as an injury by accident when it is an unusual event that interrupts the employee’s normal work routine.

Wright v. Owens-Brockway Plastic Products, Inc. · filed 1997-07-01(6)

On 11 January 1994, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant when, by using extra effort to push and pull on a stuck disc on the press she was operating, she sustained injury to her right upper extremity. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats unexpected, untoward extra exertion in unfamiliar work as an injury by accident.

Dorton v. Comar Industries, Inc. · filed 1997-07-09(6)

Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident as a result of unexpected and untoward events not expected by plaintiff while she was filling a special order which involved more physical exertion than that to which she was accustomed.

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment; regularly filled rush orders do not supply an unusual interruption of the work routine.

Dyson v. Twin Knitting Company, Inc. · filed 1997-07-29(6)

These rush orders were filled between two and four times per week and were not an interruption of her regular work routine by unusual circumstances likely to result in unexpected consequences. ... On 1 September 1994 Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Defendant-Employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) does not cover a right arm condition that did not result from a specific traumatic incident of assigned work or an interruption of the normal work routine by unusual conditions.

Lee v. Interstate Brands Corporation · filed 1997-07-29(6)

Plaintiff's right arm condition was not sustained as a direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned or from an interruption of his normal work routine by the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. In addition, as there is insufficient evidence of record to determine by its greater weight that plaintiff's right arm condition was due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to his employment or that his employment placed him at a greater risk than the general public of contracting the condition, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6), § 97-53 (13).

Section 97-2(6) requires an interruption of the usual work routine and unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences for an injury by accident; carrying out customary duties in the usual way is insufficient.

Storie v. Interstate Brands Company · filed 1997-08-05(6)

An "accident" must involve more than merely carrying on the usual and customary duties in the usual way, but rather involves the interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat an injury sustained during an uninterrupted normal work routine under normal working conditions as an injury by accident.

Coleman v. County of Forsyth · filed 1997-08-06(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident to the left leg on 23 August 1993 as she was performing her normal work routine without interruption under normal work conditions.

An injury arising from normal work duties under normal working conditions is not an injury by accident under § 97-2(6), even when exertion causes the injury.

Sims v. Burns Aerospace Corp. · filed 1997-09-09(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident to her right shoulder on August 1, 1993. ... If a claimant's injury is caused by an event that involved his normal work routine in normal working conditions, it would not consider to have been caused by an accident. This is true even when the exertion is the obvious cause of the injury.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat an injury during normal job duties under normal working conditions, without an interruption of the work routine, as an injury by accident.

Engblom v. US Air, Inc. · filed 1997-09-15(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident to his left knee on 7 March 1995. The preponderance of the credible evidence of record supports a finding that on 7 March 1995 plaintiff was, without any interruption in his work routine, performing his normal job under normal working conditions at the time of the incident in question.

Section 97-2(6) requires proof of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, such as a specific traumatic incident of assigned work or an unusual interruption of the normal work routine.

Barnes v. Home Rent All Center · filed 1997-10-16(6)

Since plaintiff's testimony was not credible, the evidence of record is insufficient to prove by its greater weight that plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned or from an interruption of his normal work routine by unusual circumstances likely to result in unexpected consequences. ... Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury occurring under normal working conditions is not an injury by accident under § 97-2(6).

Dorey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-12-17(6)

While the plaintiff sustained an injury to her left knee on or about May 30, 1995, that injury was not a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). An injury which occurs under normal working conditions is not considered an accident arising out of the employment.

Section 97-2(6) requires an accident to be a separate event preceding and causing an injury; pain sustained while performing usual duties in the customary manner is not an injury by accident.

Hurt v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital · filed 1998-02-19(6)

The terms "injury" and "accident" are not synonymous. An accident as defined by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act must be a separate event preceding and causing the injury. When plaintiff experienced pain in her elbow, she was performing her assigned job duties in the usual and customary manner. Plaintiff has not sustained an injury by accident as defined by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and is therefore not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury as an injury by accident when it results from a specific traumatic incident of the assigned work or an interruption of the normal work routine by unusual conditions likely to produce unexpected consequences.

McKnight v. Croscill, Inc. · filed 1998-03-02(6)

On 11 November 1991, plaintiff did not sustain an injury either as the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned, or from an interruption of her normal work routine by the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.

An extra or unusual degree of exertion while performing assigned work may constitute an accident under § 97-2(6).

Humphreys v. Aci Distribution Binswanger Glass · filed 1998-03-06(6)

An extra or unusual degree of exertion by an employee while performing a job may constitute the unforeseen or unusual event or condition necessary to make the resulting injury an injury by "accident".

Section 97-2(6) does not treat a rotator cuff injury sustained during ordinary work duties, without unusual activity or an interruption of the work routine, as an injury by accident.

Leach v. Lorillard Tobacco Company · filed 1998-03-18(6)

At the time that Plaintiff first began to experience pain in her right shoulder, she was performing her normal job duties. Plaintiff was not engaged in any unusual activity at work at the time she began to experience this pain and there was no interruption of her usual work routine. ... Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Defendant/employer on or about August 18, 1994, resulting in injury to her right shoulder. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) permits a specific traumatic incident to establish a back injury, but a hip injury sustained during normal work duties must meet the accident requirement.

Wheeler v. Magla Products, Inc. · filed 1998-03-19(6)

Although plaintiff felt a pop in her back which could have constituted a specific traumatic incident had the injury been to her back, her injury was, in fact, to her hip and thus must have occurred under "accident circumstances" G.S. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) does not treat an injury sustained while doing usual work in the usual way, without an interruption of the usual work routine, as an injury by accident.

Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. · filed 1998-03-26(6)

On October 2, 1995, the plaintiff sustained an injury on the job that was not an injury by accident because she was doing her usual job in her usual way and the circumstances leading to her injury were not sufficient to constitute an interruption of her usual work routine.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat aggravation of a preexisting condition during customary work as an injury by accident when no unexpected circumstance interrupts the usual routine.

Morgan v. Premium Custom Builders · filed 1998-03-27(6)

Plaintiff's aggravation of his arthritis on 1 December 1995 was not the result of an interruption of his usual work routine by unlooked for or unexpected circumstances. Rather, plaintiff aggravated his arthritis while performing his usual duties in his customary manner. ... Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A fortuitous event that interrupts an employee’s normal work routine can constitute an injury by accident under § 97-2(6).

Landmesser v. Bulb Electric, Inc. · filed 1998-04-01(6)

This was a fortuitous event that interrupted plaintiff's normal work routine and constituted an injury by accident. ... On 29 December 1995, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) excludes an injury from routine lifting that involves no unusual or unexpected exertion and does not interrupt the employee’s normal work routine.

Hunt v. Whisper Knits · filed 1998-06-08(6)

None of the bundles lifted by plaintiff on July 29, 1996 required an unusual or unexpected degree of exertion. ... The July 29, 1996 incident did not constitute an interruption of plaintiff's normal job routine. ... Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident when she injured her left shoulder on July 29, 1996. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury during regular duties performed in the usual and customary manner is not an accident and is not compensable under § 97-2(6).

Puckett v. Tultex of Dobson, Inc. · filed 1999-02-19(6)

If an employee is performing his regular duties in the usual and customary manner and is injured, there is no "accident" and the injury is not compensable.

An unlooked for and untoward event that the employee neither expected nor designed qualifies as an accident under § 97-2(6).

Costin v. Pennaly · filed 1999-11-29(6)

Plaintiff's slip from the ladder was an unlooked for and untoward event not expected or designed by plaintiff and thus an accident.

Section 97-2(6) requires an unexpected interruption of the employee’s usual work routine for an injury to qualify as an accident; an injury sustained while performing normal duties in the usual manner is not a compensable accident.

Gray v. Rdu Airport Authority · filed 2009-07-16(6)

The undersigned has carefully considered the evidence and concluded that there was no interruption of Plaintiff's work routine by an unlooked for event, and where Plaintiff was performing his normal job in the usual manner when his injury was sustained, there was no compensable accident.

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident; performing usual and customary work with no interruption in the work routine does not establish one.

Miles v. Nano-Tex, Inc. · filed 2009-06-15(6)

Therefore, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment with Defendant-Employer. He performed his usual and customary work on September 7, 2005, with no interruption in his work routine.

An injury by accident under § 97-2(6) requires an interruption of the usual work routine and an unusual event.

Moore v. High Point Enterprise · filed 2009-06-26(6)

Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with defendant on September 6, 2006. The injury involved the interruption of the work routine and constituted an unusual event. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury during a temporary departure from an employee’s normal work routine can qualify as an accident under § 97-2(6) when the departure introduces new work conditions.

Shay v. Rowan Salisbury Schools · filed 2009-08-27(6)

In the present case, the act of climbing the stairs as opposed to using the elevator was an interruption of plaintiff's normal work routine and introduced new conditions to plaintiff's employment. The period of time during which plaintiff had to break from her normal routine of using the elevator was insufficient for the act of climbing the stairs to become part of her normal work routine. Thus, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer on December 4, 2006.

Lifting rebar heavier and larger than any the employee had lifted before interrupted his normal work routine and constituted a compensable injury by accident.

McCoy v. Commercial Metals Company · filed 2010-03-05(6)

The greater weight of the evidence in this case establishes that Plaintiff hurt his shoulder when he lifted rebar heavier and larger than any he had lifted before and tore his right rotator cuff. This incident constitutes an interruption of his work routine sufficient to constitute a compensable injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury to be caused by an accident; an employee’s subjective lack of intent to be injured does not by itself satisfy that requirement.

Gray v. RDU AIRPORT AUTHORITY · filed 2010-04-20(6)

Adopting plaintiff’s argument would effectively render N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6)’s requirement that the injury be caused “by accident” superfluous since virtually every injury would be accidental from the point of view of the injured employee.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat an injury during normal work conditions as an injury by accident when there is no interruption of or departure from the employee’s usual work routine.

Shepherd v. Hood Packaging Corp. · filed 2010-05-18(6)

An injury that occurs under normal work conditions, no matter how serious the injury, is not considered an injury caused by "accident" and is not compensable under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

An accident under § 97-2(6) involves an interruption of the work routine that introduces unusual conditions likely to cause unexpected consequences.

Parker v. Ecolab, Inc. · filed 2010-06-02(6)

Under the Act, an accident involves the interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident to involve an unlooked-for interruption of the employee’s normal work routine; an injury during usual work without such an event is not compensable.

Shepherd v. Blue Ridge Paper Products · filed 2010-06-18(6)

The Full Commission has carefully considered the evidence and has concluded that there was no interruption of plaintiff's normal work routine on December 7, 2006 by an unlooked for event such as constitutes an "accident."

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury caused by newly assigned heavy lifting as an injury by accident when those conditions interrupt the employee’s usual work routine.

Norman v. Food Lion, llc/delhaize America · filed 2010-04-28(6)

Plaintiff has established that on November 5, 2008 he suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant to his left shoulder. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). The greater weight of the evidence establishes that at the time of his injury, plaintiff's new working conditions had not become part of his usual work routine. Plaintiff had not gained proficiency in performing the heavier lifting of 90 to 100 pound boxes of meat (instead of his usual job requirements of lifting up to 35 pounds) at heights above his shoulder as was required when working on aisle M4 and had not become so accustomed to these lifting conditions for the job to have become a part of his normal work routine.

An injury by accident under Section 97-2(6) includes an interruption of the normal work routine that introduces unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.

Barker v. City of Charlotte · filed 2010-07-06(6)

An accident involves an interruption of the normal work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. Harding v. Thomas Howard Co. , 256 N.C. 427 , 124 S.E.2d 109 (1962). 3. On May 21, 2009, Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) does not treat a groin injury from ordinary work duties as an injury by accident when no unusual circumstance or departure from the normal work routine occurs.

Giddeons v. Subway Burgaw, Inc. · filed 2010-07-12(6)

Plaintiff sustained a groin injury in the May 20, 2008, incident, but there was no injury by accident, as the incident did not involve any unusual circumstance or departure from Plaintiff's normal work routine. As such, the groin injury is not compensable.

Section 97-2(6) excludes an injury from compensation as an injury by accident when the activity causing it has become part of the employee’s normal work routine.

Shay v. ROWAN SALISBURY SCHOOLS · filed 2010-07-20(6)

We hold that, in the instant case, climbing the stairs for a period of more than one month became a part of plaintiff's "normal work routine" and that she did not suffer an injury that was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury caused by an extra or unusual degree of exertion as an injury by accident when that exertion constitutes an unforeseen or unusual event or condition.

Harrell v. Chevrolet · filed 2010-08-05(6)

It is settled law in North Carolina that the "injury by accident" requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6) can be satisfied when a plaintiff is injured due to an extra or unusual degree of exertion, in that this can constitute an unforeseen or unusual event or condition.

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment; injury during a routine work activity does not qualify without an interruption introducing unusual conditions.

Battle v. Meadowbrook Meat Co. · filed 2015-07-21(6)

The determinative inquiry in this case that was addressed by the Commission is whether employee suffered an injury by accident. ... However, once an activity, even a strenuous or otherwise unusual activity, becomes a part of the employee's normal work routine, an injury caused by such activity is not the result of an interruption of the work routine or otherwise an injury by accident under the Workers' Compensation Act. ... Turning to the Commission's ultimate conclusion that employee did not suffer a compensable injury, we hold the Commission's findings support its conclusion. ... These findings tend to show it is common for driver's representatives to have to lean over pallets and maneuver on top of pallets in order to complete deliveries when the pallets cannot be moved.

An injury arising during a normal work routine is not an injury by accident under § 97-2(6) when the worker does not establish an unusual position, exertion, or interruption of that routine.

Lea v. David's Bridal of Greensboro, Inc. · filed 2019-03-19(6)

Plaintiff's testimony, as found by the Commission, did not establish this stance was "unusual." Although she had to twist and pull the dress down, Plaintiff's testimony did not establish the amount of force she used was "unusual." The findings support the Commission's conclusions of law 3 and 4, and Plaintiff's argument is without merit.

An injury is an injury by accident under § 97-2(6) when an unforeseen interruption of the employee’s normal work routine causes it, including moving a large patient with fewer helpers than usual.

Aldridge v. Novant Health · filed 2021-12-07(6)

The Commission’s Findings that Plaintiff had never attempted to move a patient of this size with only one other person, and that such patients were usually moved by a team of three to four people supported the Conclusion this incident was unforeseen and was an interruption not designed or expected by Plaintiff. ... Thus, here, we conclude the Commission’s Findings support its Conclusion Plaintiff’s injury was the result of an accident.

Section 97-2(6) excludes an injury from the definition of injury by accident when the employee is doing the usual job in the usual way and nothing unexpected happens.

Thompson v. Cape Fear Valley Medical Center · filed 1996-06-27(6)

On September 15, 1993 the plaintiff sustained an injury on the job that was not an injury by accident because she was doing her usual job in her usual way and nothing unexpected happened. N.C.G.S. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats an electrical shock suffered at work as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Cochran v. Supreme Elastic Corporation · filed 1995-06-01(6)

Plaintiff suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment when she was injured by electrical shock on May 24, 1993. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats an accidental blow from a falling wrench while an employee adjusts a machine at work as an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

Cash v. Ball Corporation · filed 1995-09-18(6)

While making said adjustments, a plunger wrench weighing ten pounds fell off of the top of the machine that plaintiff was adjusting. ... On 26 August 1993, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A slip and fall on a ladder is an injury by accident when the slip is an unlooked for or untoward event arising out of and in the course of employment.

Bonham v. Conitex USA, Inc. · filed 1995-10-05(6)

The plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the slip and fall on the ladder, which was an unlooked for or untoward event. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Under § 97-2(6), an on-call truck driver struck by a vehicle while walking from his truck to a motel after ending personal errands sustains an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Brown v. Four Truckers, Inc. · filed 1996-03-28(6)

Although the deceased employee had been on personal errands earlier in the day, at the time he was struck by the motor vehicle, he had returned to his duties with defendant and was not on a personal errand. Therefore, the incident on 14 March 1993 when he was struck by a motor vehicle was an interruption of his regular work routine by unusual circumstances likely to result in unexpected consequences; and therefore, the incident was an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer.

Section 97-2(6) covers an accidental fall that occurs while an employee performs work duties as a compensable injury by accident.

Strickland v. Reed Homes · filed 1996-10-17(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident on November 18, 1993 when she fell through the floor of a mobile home while engaged in her employment duties with the defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats an employee’s slip and loss of balance while carrying a heavy load at work as an accident.

Costello v. House of Raeford · filed 1997-03-10(6)

The claimant was involved in an on-the-job accident on or about August 19, 1993, when the claimant slipped and lost his balance while carrying a crate of chicken weighing approximately eighty pounds. N.C.G.S. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a worker’s fall while getting out of a truck driven for her employer as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Morrison v. Clark Lundy Trucking Incorporated · filed 1997-03-18(6)

On September 23, 1992, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant when she fell while getting out of the truck she and her husband drove for defendant.

Section 97-2(6) treats a stumble and fall as an injury by accident when the fall unexpectedly interrupts normal work duties.

Hedges v. Wake County Public School System · filed 2009-07-10(6)

Based upon the greater weight of the evidence, the Full Commission finds as fact that, although plaintiff's June 1, 2007 workplace injury occurred while she was performing her normal work duties, plaintiff's manner of injury constituted an accident as her stumble and fall was an unexpected interruption of her normal work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. ... Plaintiff's manner of injury in the case herein constituted an accident under the Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats an electrical jolt from lightning and the resulting fall as an injury by accident when they are unexpected and interrupt the employee’s normal work routine.

Heatherly v. the Hollingsworth Co. · filed 2010-05-07(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant-Employer on July 12, 2004 when lightning struck tools and equipment used in the furtherance of his work and located either inside the house, or in some other part of the open garage near him. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6) (2007). ... The electrical charge or jolt to Plaintiff due to the lightning and his resulting fall constituted an unlooked for and unexpected event, and the interruption of his normal work routine.

An employee who falls after a sudden light flicker startles her during a restroom break at work can have a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Wilson v. Lenoir County Schools · filed 2010-06-25(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident to her right hip and right ankle arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer on May 29, 2008. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(5) permits combining a volunteer fireman’s wages from multiple paid jobs to calculate average weekly wages after a compensable injury.

Derebery v. Pitt County Fire Marshall · filed 1986-08-29(5)

The dictum in Barnhardt which suggests that N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5) does not permit a combination of a volunteer fireman’s outside wages is overruled.

A volunteer fireman laid off subject to recall from his principal employment has compensation calculated from the average weekly wages earned in that employment when laid off.

Brown v. Walnut Cove Volunteer Fire Department · filed 1984-11-20(5)

Nevertheless, plaintiffs employment with Roadway Express in this case represents “the employment wherein he principally earned his livelihood as of the date of the injury,” G.S. 97-2(5), because this vocation corresponds to plaintiffs primary source of income upon which plaintiff relied and intended to return to as soon as he was recalled to work.

Section 97-2(5) bases compensation for an occupational disease on the employee’s wages when disability occurs, because that is the time of injury.

Frady v. Groves Thread/General Accident Ins. · filed 1982-02-16(5)

Finally, Groves argues that the wording of the statute in effect in 1973 limits plaintiff to recovery based on his wages in the employment “in which he was working at the time of injury.” G.S. 97-2(5). This is true. However, G.S. 97-52 explains that “[disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident. . . .” Thus, since the time of injury is the time of disability in the case of occupational disease, plaintiff is entitled to benefits based on the wages he was earning in 1973, the year he became disabled.

Section 97-2(5) bases a volunteer rescue squad member’s average weekly wage on earnings from the employment in which the member principally earned a livelihood at the time of injury.

Lineberger v. Hickory Volunteer Rescue Squad · filed 1994-12-15(5)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) specifically mentions "disabling injury or death to a volunteer fireman or member of an organized rescue squad" and sets the average weekly wage to be that of what he was "earning in the employment wherein he principally earned his livelihood as of the date of the injury. Here, plaintiff earned $190.00 per week.

Section 97-2(5) permits an owner-operator’s average weekly wage to be based on net earnings after operating expenses when gross trip earnings do not reflect those expenses.

Swain v. C N Evans Trucking Co., Inc. · filed 1996-01-30(5)

Inasmuch as the evidence of record concerning plaintiff's average weekly wage on 6 June 1991 consists of tax returns for calendar years 1990 and 1991 from which can be derived plaintiff's earnings during those calendar years, and 11 weeks of operator settlement statements which reflect some of plaintiff's expenses incurred in generating gross revenue but which settlement statements, while providing for deductions and reimbursements, do not reflect all of plaintiff's expenses incurred in generating his gross revenue, the fairest method of ascertaining plaintiff's average weekly wage as an owner-operator under a lease agreement which will most nearly approximate the amount that plaintiff would have earned were it not for his 6 June 1991 compensable injury, is to take the average of plaintiff's gross trip earnings during his 11 weeks of employment with defendant, $1,469.58, and multiply that by one-third, which represents the general rule in the trucking industry of what an owner-operator under a lease agreement nets after deducting operating expenses, which in this case results in an average weekly age of $489.37.

Section 97-2(5) permits average weekly wage to be determined from the worker’s wages with the employer, wages from earlier comparable employment, and periods of unemployment when that method fairly reflects the worker’s earnings.

Sadler v. Fall Time, Incorporated · filed 1996-10-15(5)

The fairest method for determining plaintiff's average weekly wage is to consider the wages plaintiff earned from defendant, the wages she earned from previous employers in the film industry and her occasional unemployment.

When only annual Social Security earnings are available, average weekly wage may be calculated by dividing those earnings by 52 weeks.

Seagle v. Kent-Coffey Manufacturing Company · filed 1997-04-30(5)

Inasmuch as the only evidence of plaintiff's average weekly wages are Social Security records, and inasmuch as those Social Security records reveal that plaintiff earned $21,492.22 during calendar year 1987, but said earning records are not further broken down into quarterly periods, the fairest method of calculating plaintiff's average weekly wage is to take calendar year earnings and divide the same by 52 weeks.

Section 97-2(5) permits using a comparable employee’s wages to calculate average weekly wage when the injured worker’s short period of unusually high hours would make actual earnings unfair to use.

Robinette v. Palliser Furniture Corporation · filed 1997-05-30(5)

Where the plaintiff had been employed for only a short period of time prior to the compensable injury and where his employment had been during a time when he was asked to work more hours than the usual hour, it would not be fair and just to calculate his average weekly wage based upon his actual earnings. Therefore, the better method is to utilize the wage chart drawn for a similar employee who had worked over the fifty-two weeks period prior to the injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) governs the determination of an employee’s average weekly wage for calculating workers’ compensation benefits.

Hanes v. Duracell International · filed 1997-08-22(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time she sustained said occupational diseases was $527.04, yielding a compensation rate of $351.38. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) calculates average weekly wage by dividing earnings over the preceding year by the weeks in that period after excluding absences of eight or more consecutive days.

Moore v. Foamex · filed 1997-09-10(5)

His average weekly wage amounts to $471.08 ($18,506.74 divided by 39.2857 weeks during the period from 15 October, 1990 through 14 October , 1991, less all periods of eight or more consecutive days which he did not work).

Section 97-2(5) permits calculating an employee’s average weekly wage from actual earnings during a short period of employment when that method is fair and just to both parties; uncertain future earnings need not be used.

Sims v. charmes/arby's Roast Beef · filed 1997-12-18(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly wage must be calculated by one of the methods set forth by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5). Plaintiff was employed by defendant-employer less than fifty-two (52) weeks. During that period he was a trainee-employee earning an average weekly wage of $240.00 resulting in a compensation rate of $160.01 per week. Utilizing a method which would result in a windfall to the plaintiff would be unfair and not in accordance with the plain meaning of the statute. In this case, it is fair and just to both parties to compute the average weekly wage based on plaintiff's earnings during the time plaintiff actually worked for defendant-employer, as reflected on the Form 22.

When employment is too brief to make calculation from the employee’s own weekly earnings practical, § 97-2(5) allows average weekly wage to be determined using the earnings of a comparable employee in the same locality.

Jones v. Super 8 Motel · filed 1998-01-08(5)

11. During the five days that plaintiff worked for defendant-employer, she earned $130.54. Due to the shortness of time during which plaintiff was employed by defendant-employer, it is impractical to compute her average weekly wage by dividing her earnings by the number of weeks during which she was so employed. 12. An employee of the same grade and character, in the same class of employment and in the same locality as plaintiff earned an average weekly wage of $103.18 per week during the fifty-two week period prior to 26 April 1996. ... 1. Plaintiff's average weekly wages was $103.18. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Average weekly wage under subsection (5) is used to calculate the weekly compensation rate.

Norman v. North Hand Protection · filed 1998-01-09(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly wage was $254.40 yielding a compensation rate of $169.61 per week. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) includes the value of food and lodging provided in lieu of wages when calculating an injured employee’s average weekly wage.

Shah v. Johnson · filed 1998-03-23(5)

At the time that he sustained the compensable injury by accident on December 31, 1995, plaintiff's average weekly wage was $200.00 a week salary plus $100.00 for food and lodging for a total of $300.00. ... Plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time that he sustained a compensable injury by accident on December 31, 1995 was $300.00. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Average weekly wage is calculated by dividing the employee’s earnings during the employment period by the number of weeks in that period.

Lawhon v. Lane-Venture Furniture Company · filed 1998-08-28(5)

Her average weekly wage was $171.50 ($1,274.00 divided by 7.4286 weeks for the period from 15 January 1996 through 6 March 1996).

Section 97-2(5) uses average weekly wage, as determined from Form 22, to calculate the weekly compensation rate.

Bradford v. Finishes First, Inc. · filed 1998-10-14(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly wage as determined by the Form 22 is $280.00, yielding a compensation rate of $186.68 per week. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) allows the first three methods of calculating average weekly wages to be rejected as unfair when setting the wage the employee probably would have earned without the injury.

Turner v. Billings Freight Systems · filed 1998-11-12(5)

The undersigned under G.S. § 97-2 (5) rejects the first three methods for calculating plaintiff's average weekly wages as being unfair and finds that plaintiff in September 1993 probably would have worked 45 hours each week at $10.03 per hour and would be earning $475.95 per week were it not for his injury by accident.

Section 97-2(5) permits an alternative average weekly wage calculation for exceptional reasons when recent changes in a worker’s efforts and earnings make the ordinary calculation unfair.

Hendricks v. Hill Realty Group, Inc. · filed 1998-12-29(5)

Here, the conclusion by the Commission that exceptional reasons exist is supported by the competent evidence in the record and the findings made by the Commission. The decedent made certain changes in the way that she performed her job over the closing months of 1993 and the beginning of 1994 including the purchase of a personal computer for use in her work, increased use of the telephone as a business tool, and increased number of hours worked each week. The results of these positive changes were illustrated by the increased commissions earned during the first fifteen weeks of 1994 just before her death.

Section 97-2(5) does not treat a firefighter paid an hourly wage for fighting fires as a volunteer fireman when calculating compensation.

Caldwell v. Town of King's Mountain · filed 1999-01-20(5)

The plaintiff earns an hourly wage for his time spent fighting fires for the defendant. Accordingly, while actually fighting fires, he is not a "volunteer fireman" within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Determining average weekly wage under § 97-2(5) requires applying its statutory definition and presents a question of law.

Swain v. C N Evans Trucking Co., Inc. · filed 1999-01-20(5)

The determination of plaintiff's average weekly wage requires application of the definition set forth in the Workers' Compensation Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) and the case law construing that statute and thus raises an issue of law, not fact, and does not affect the validity of the Form 21 Agreement.

Food and lodging provided in lieu of wages count toward average weekly wage under § 97-2(5).

Shah v. Johnson · filed 1999-03-23(5)

At the time that he sustained the compensable injury by accident on December 31, 1995, plaintiff's average weekly wage was $200.00 a week salary plus $100.00 for food and lodging for a total of $300.00.

Section 97-2(5) permits average weekly wage to be calculated by dividing annual earnings by 52 when Social Security records are the only wage evidence and do not break earnings down by quarter.

Seagle v. Kent-Coffey Manufacturing Company · filed 1999-03-30(5)

Inasmuch as the only evidence of plaintiff's average weekly wages are Social Security records, and inasmuch as those Social Security records reveal that plaintiff earned $19,906.47 during calendar year 1986, but said earning records are not further broken down into quarterly periods, the fairest method of calculating plaintiff's average weekly wage is to take calendar year earnings and divide the same by 52 weeks.

Section 97-2(5) permits an average weekly wage calculated to be fair and just to both parties when an incomplete Form 22 does not show the hours worked each day.

Ollis v. Inn-Asheville · filed 1999-04-13(5)

The Form 22 submitted by the defendants cannot be used to calculate plaintiff's average weekly wage because it is incomplete in that it fails to indicate the actual hours plaintiff worked each day. Plaintiff's average weekly wage should be calculated such that the results are fair and just for both parties; therefore, plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time of her injury by accident was $400.00 per week, yielding a compensation rate of $266.67.

Section 97-2(5) excludes payments for a worker’s employees and for the use of the worker’s tools or equipment from the worker’s average weekly wage.

Lyda v. Sapphire Lakes · filed 1999-05-12(5)

Calculation of plaintiff's average weekly wage cannot include sums paid for plaintiff's employees or paid for the use of plaintiff's tools or equipment.

Section 97-2(5) bases average weekly wage in an occupational disease claim on earnings at the time of disablement rather than earnings at the time of last injurious exposure.

Lipe v. Starr Davis Company, Inc. · filed 1999-08-24(5)

For the reasons described in the above findings of facts, the average weekly wage of the plaintiff should be determined based upon his last employment at the time of his disablement from the involved occupational disease, rather than his earnings at the time of his last injurious exposure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-52 , Tulor v. Cone Mills , 306 N.C. 314 , 293 S.E.2d 189 (1982), Wood v. J. P. Stevens 297 N.C. 636 , 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979).

Section 97-2(5) permits average weekly wage to be based on the earnings of a comparable worker in the same locality when brief employment makes a fifty-two-week calculation impractical and that method is fairest to all parties.

Tew v. E. B. Davis Electric Company · filed 2000-02-03(5)

Due to plaintiff's brief period of employment with defendant Junius Burney, it in impractical to compute the plaintiff's average weekly wage during a fifty-two (52) week period. A person in the same grade and character of employment as the plaintiff employed in the same class of employment in the same locality or community would have earned $600.00 per week, yielding a compensation rate of $400.00 per week. This method of computation is fairest to all parties. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) requires the second method of calculating average weekly wage to divide yearly earnings by the weeks remaining after time lost from work is deducted; it does not permit multiplying a daily wage by seven.

Bond v. Foster Masonry, Inc. · filed 2000-07-18(5)

First, we note that the second method of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) does not authorize using a “daily wage rate” and multiplying it by seven in calculating an average weekly wage.

Section 97-2(5) permits an alternative calculation of average weekly wages for exceptional reasons when the usual methods would be unfair, and a supported Commission finding that the method is fair and just binds the reviewing court.

Austin v. Continental General Tire · filed 2000-12-29(5)

In the case before us, the Commission found the method used by Moore to be unfair to the parties. Accordingly, it relied upon the following language of N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5): "But where for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair, either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury." ... The method prescribed by the Commission was to rely upon plaintiff's earnings during his last year of employment. Using this figure was, according to the Commission, fair to both plaintiff and General Tire. As this finding is supported by competent evidence, it is binding on our Court.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of a comparable employee’s wages to calculate average weekly wage when using the injured employee’s actual wages is impractical.

Sims v. Charmes/Arby's Roast Beef · filed 2001-02-06(5)

The statutory language of G.S. § 97-2(5) permits the use of a comparable employee’s wages when it is impractical to use the injured employee’s weekly wages. Here, plaintiff’s weekly wages were undisputed and the Commission was justified in calculating plaintiff’s wage using his actual wages.

Section 97-2(5) permits an alternative average weekly wage calculation that approximates what an injured employee would have earned but for the injury when the usual method would be unfair to the employer or employee.

Davis v. TAYLOR-WILKES HELICOPTER SERVICE, INC. · filed 2001-07-17(5)

However, where this method would be “unfair, either to the employer or employee,” the statute also allows for the use of “such other method ... as will most nearly approximate the amount the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury.” ... After a careful review of the Commission’s calculations, we conclude the method utilized would not be unfair to either the employee or the employer.

Section 97-2(5) allows average weekly wage to be calculated from a similarly situated employee’s annual hours multiplied by the injured employee’s hourly wage and divided by 52 when the injured employee’s brief tenure makes the usual calculation impractical and the comparison is fair and just to both parties.

Hulett v. Bek Const. Co. · filed 2001-09-05(5)

Due to the shortness of time plaintiff was employed by defendant prior to 25 March 1995, it is impractical to compute plaintiff's average weekly wage by dividing his earnings by the number of weeks and parts thereof during which he earned wages. Instead, a comparison to a similarly situated employee's annual hours worked for defendant-employer, multiplied by plaintiff's hourly wage and divided by 52 weeks, yields a result that is fair and just to both parties.

Section 97-2(5) permits a method that approximates what the employee would earn without the injury when wages from the preceding 52 weeks would be unfair because a prior injury reduced the employee’s hours.

Lakey v. U.S. Airways · filed 2001-10-03(5)

Calculation of plaintiff's average weekly wage based upon the 52 weeks preceding her injury of July 17, 1997 would not yield results which are fair or just because, during most of the 52-week period prior to July 17, 1997, plaintiff was working for defendant-employer on a reduced hour basis of about 50 to 55 hours a month, due to her prior injury by accident. The best option is use of such other method "as will most nearly approximate the amount the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury."

Section 97-2(5) permits another method of calculating average weekly wages when the listed methods would be unfair to either party, using the amount that most nearly approximates what the employee would earn absent the injury.

Ruffin v. Sumitomo Electric Lightwave Corp. · filed 2001-12-05(5)

Where, as here, the other methods of calculating an average weekly wage set out in Section 97-2 (5) of the General Statutes would be unfair to either party, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury. Without a wage chart, the fairest standard to both would be the calendar year prior to the onset of the occupational disease.

Section 97-2(5) permits a catch-all method for exceptional reasons, but that method cannot justify using the first calculation method when the employee worked less than fifty-two weeks before the injury.

Loch v. ENTERTAINMENT PARTNERS EMPLOYER · filed 2001-12-28(5)

We note that this method of calculation is not permitted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) in computing plaintiff’s average weekly wage, because plaintiff worked less than fifty-two weeks prior to his injury. While there existed an “exceptional reason” to resort to the final “catch-all” method of the statute because of the part-time nature of plaintiffs employment, the Commission was not permitted to circumvent the statute when calculation under the first method was otherwise inappropriate.

Average weekly wage is based on the 52 weeks before termination when termination marks the start of disability from a work-related condition.

Geer v. Bellsouth Telecommunications · filed 2002-01-28(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly should be based upon the 52 weeks preceding her termination on March 21, 1997, as the termination date reflects the start of her disability due to her work-related condition of carpal tunnel syndrome. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 , 97-52 .

Section 97-2(5) permits average weekly wages to be calculated from the employee’s earnings over the 52 weeks before injury when that method most nearly approximates what the employee would have earned but for the injury and no exceptional reason calls for another method.

Richards v. Allied Security · filed 2002-02-08(5)

This method of computing plaintiff's average weekly wage most nearly approximates the amount which plaintiff would be earning were it not for his injury, and there are no exceptional reasons in this case which, in fairness to the parties, mandate computing plaintiff's average weekly wage in a manner other than the above method as set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) permits using pay for each weekly trip to calculate a trip-paid employee’s average weekly wage when that method most nearly approximates what the employee would have earned without the injury.

Rhodes v. Hersek Express, Inc. · filed 2002-02-28(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly wage is calculated based upon the $600.00 per weekly trip paid by defendant. This method of calculation provides the most fair result to both parties in that it most nearly approximates the amount plaintiff would have earned had he not sustained the compensable injury by accident on 10 July 1992. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) bases average weekly wages on earnings from the employment at the time of injury, excluding earnings from an earlier, distinct job.

Trueba v. Shoe Booties Cafe · filed 2002-03-18(5)

Calculating plaintiff's average weekly wages based on his earnings as a lab technician at Chatuge Regional Hospital for the last 52-week period of employment, as contended by the plaintiff, would produce unfair and unjust results to the defendants. First, this basis for plaintiff's average weekly wages utilizes earnings that are outside the "employment in which [plaintiff] was working at the time of the injury," N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5), in a distinctly separate field of employment in which the plaintiff had not been employed for approximately two years.

When tax returns are the only evidence of wages, section 97-2(5) permits dividing annual income by 52 to calculate average weekly wage if that method is fair to both parties and most closely approximates actual earnings.

Atwood v. Lanier · filed 2002-03-22(5)

There is no evidence of record of plaintiff's wages other than plaintiff's federal tax returns from 1999 and 1998, indicating earnings of $3,773.00 and $1,409.00 respectively. Dividing plaintiff's 1999 income by 52 yields an average weekly wage of $72.56 per week. No other method of computing plaintiff's wage would be fair to either party. This method most closely approximates plaintiff's actual earnings. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) permits calculating average weekly wage by dividing the worker’s prior-year earnings by 52 when that method fairly approximates earnings absent the injury.

McClure v. Celanese · filed 2002-06-14(5)

Calculating plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time of his injury by dividing his total earnings in 1995 by 52 weeks, most nearly approximates the amount which plaintiff would be earning were it not for the injury, and provides results that are fair and just to both plaintiff and defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5); Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co ., 266 N.C. 419 , 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966).

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its exceptional-reasons method to calculate a retired asbestosis claimant’s average weekly wage from the latest full year of employment when using income at diagnosis would be unfair.

Abernathy v. Sandoz Chemicals/Clariant Corp. · filed 2002-07-02(5)

In the present case, it would be obviously unfair to calculate plaintiffs benefits based on his income upon the date of diagnosis because he was no longer employed and was not earning an income. ... Because plaintiff contracted asbestosis by working around asbestos for 25 years at defendant employer, the only fair method for determining his average weekly wage is using his latest full year of employment with defendant company, which appears to be the same figure the deputy commissioner and the Full Commission used in their calculations of plaintiff’s average weekly wage.

Section 97-2(5) permits calculating average weekly wage from the wages actually earned during a brief employment period when that method is fair and just to both parties and comparable-worker earnings are unavailable.

Vallejo-Benitez v. B R Homes and Dev. · filed 2002-09-30(5)

Plaintiff did not work for defendant for 52 weeks prior to 16 September 1996. There is no evidence of earnings of a person of the same grade and character employed in the same class of employment in the same community. Although plaintiff only worked 43 ½ hours for defendant-employer, it is more fair and just to both parties to use the actual wages plaintiff earned during that period. This results in an average weekly wage of $316.75, with a compensation rate of $211.18 per week.

Section 97-2(5) requires findings showing how the Commission calculated average weekly wages when its figure cannot be reconciled with the wage record.

Cox v. City of Winston-Salem · filed 2003-04-15(5)

We are unable to ascertain from the record how the Commission determined plaintiff’s average weekly wage since the Commission’s finding does not conform to the Form 22. Therefore, we remand this case for the Commission to make findings showing its specific calculations in reaching plaintiff’s average weekly wage.

Average weekly wage is calculated from wages earned in the 52 weeks before the injury, so a pay rate received for only two months before injury is insufficient by itself.

Branson v. Ppg Indus. · filed 2003-06-03(5)

19. Using the $13.89 pay rate to calculate plaintiff's average weekly wage for her September 1999 injury by accident would be inappropriate in that plaintiff just began earning this wage two months prior thereto, and a claimant's average weekly wage is to be calculated based on that claimant's wages earned in the 52 weeks preceding the date of injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of wages from a worker’s last full-time employment to calculate average weekly wage when asbestosis is diagnosed after full-time employment and the preferred methods would be unfair.

Patterson v. Spectrum Dyed Yarns · filed 2003-06-12(5)

The first four preferred methodologies used to calculate average weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) would not be fair to the parties. ... The fifth methodology under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) is for exceptional reasons involved for purposes of calculating average weekly wages for those diagnosed post full-time employment as having asbestosis or silicosis. This method is fair and just to the parties.

Section 97-2(5) bases average weekly wages for a new injury on actual earnings during the preceding 52 weeks, excluding temporary partial disability payments and wages earned before an earlier injury.

Bittner v. May Dept. Stores · filed 2003-09-29(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly wage for her temporary total disability arising out of the May 30, 2001 injury by accident is based on her actual earnings for the 52-week period prior to May 30, 2001 and is not based on temporary partial disability paid or plaintiff's 1993 wages.

Section 97-2(5) permits average weekly wage to be based on expected monthly trips and pay per run when that method is fair and just to both parties.

Crosby v. Kahan Transport · filed 2003-09-29(5)

It is more fair and just to both parties for plaintiff's average weekly wage to be determined based on an average of three to four trips per month at the rate of $800.00 to $900.00 per run, which yields an average weekly wage of $692.31, and a compensation rate of $461.56 per week. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).