N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1

Rules 404(b) and 403 permit evidence of another incident to impeach a defendant’s testimony when the danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value.

State v. Moore · filed 2026-06-17Rules 404(b) and 403

The trial court did not err in its determination that the State’s line of questioning was permissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 404(b), and it did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the same under Rule 403.

Rule 610 bars using a witness’s religious beliefs to show impaired or enhanced credibility, but permits evidence of those beliefs to show interest or bias.

State v. Reilly · filed 1984-11-06Rule 610

While our case was tried prior to 1 July 1984, the date the new Rules of Evidence for North Carolina courts became effective, we feel that G.S. 8C-1, Rule 610 helps clarify, but does not change, prior law. This rule provides: Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced; provided, however, such evidence may admitted for the purpose of showing interest or bias. ... The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the evidence to be received on the issue of credibility and bias, which two word concepts are intertwined.

Rule 607 allows any party to attack a witness’s credibility in proceedings commenced after July 1, 1984.

State v. McDonald · filed 1984-11-06Rule 607

The new North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which became effective 1 July 1984 and which are fully applicable to all proceedings commenced after that date, effect a change in this long-standing anti-impeachment rule. Rule 607 provides that “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 607 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The trial in the instant case began in January 1983 and therefore we apply the rule that a party may not impeach his own witness by evidence of prior inconsistent or contradictory statements, unless the party is surprised and has been misled as to the witness’s expected testimony.

Rule 103(a)(1)’s timely objection requirement does not prevent a court from imposing Rule 11 or Rule 26 sanctions when a party did not object to the evidence at trial.

Turner v. Duke University · filed 1991-01-15Rule 103(a)(1)

Generally, “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(1) (1988). However, since the trial court may impose sanctions “upon its own initiative . . . ,” see Rules 11 and 26, plaintiff’s objection at trial to the use of Dr. Havard’s deposition is not essential to the imposition of sanctions.

Rule 103(a) requires a timely objection or motion to strike to preserve a challenge to an evidentiary ruling affecting a substantial right.

State v. Smith · filed 1990-06-19Rule 103(a)

G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a) provides that a party may not assign error to a ruling to admit or exclude evidence unless a substantial right is involved, and a timely objection or a motion to strike appears in the record. ... In the instant case, defendants’ objection was not timely made, and, therefore, the defendants have waived this assignment of error.

Rule 103(a)(1) requires a timely objection to the admission of evidence; failure to object waives the issue.

Spencer v. Spencer · filed 1984-09-04Rule 103(a)(1)

It is well-established that, except in certain circumstances not applicable here, failure to object to the admission of evidence at the time it is offered waives the objection. 1 H. Brandis, North Carolina Evidence § 27 (2d rev. ed. 1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(1) (Supp. 1983).

Rule 103(a) requires an objection to identify the alleged error to preserve it for appeal.

State v. Catoe · filed 1985-12-03Rule 103(a)

Defendant’s objections to the contested testimony were only general. Error may not be argued on appeal where the underlying objection fails to present the nature of the alleged error to the trial court. This rule serves to facilitate proper rulings and to enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures to avoid retrial. G.S. 8C-1, R. Ev. 103(a); 1 H. Brandis, N.C. Evidence Section 27 at 107 (1982). The assignment is not properly before this Court.

Rule 103 requires the record to show the substance of an excluded answer before an appellate court can assess whether its exclusion harmed the defendant.

State v. Bunn · filed 1986-02-18(a)(2)

Since the record does not disclose what the answer to the question would have been, we cannot assume that it would have been helpful to defendant.

Rule 103(a)(1) allows a timely objection to preserve error in admitting evidence without a further motion to strike.

Coley v. Garris · filed 1987-11-03Rule 103(a)(1)

G.S. 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(1) requires “a timely objection or motion to strike . . .” in order to assign error to a ruling admitting evidence. ... In the present case, plaintiff entered a timely objection to the question eliciting Trooper Booth’s opinion as to the speed of the motorcycle; a further motion to strike his answer was not required.

Rule 103 requires a timely objection or motion to strike to preserve a challenge to admitted evidence.

Stimpson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. PAM Trading Corp. · filed 1990-06-05Rule 103(a)(1)

We determine that defendants’ motion to strike Mr. Stimpson’s testimony was untimely, occurring at least one hundred questions and answers after plaintiff adduced the testimony. Defendants neither offer nor argue a ‘specific reason’ for postponing their objection until well past the time in which the court or plaintiff could have remedied the effect of the alleged error. Therefore, defendants waived objection to the testimony.

Rule 103(a)(1) requires a party to clearly present an evidentiary objection to the trial court to preserve that ground for appeal.

State v. Sherrill · filed 1990-07-17Rule 103(a)(1)

Neither do we address the merits of defendant’s Rule 608 argument since he did not raise this issue at trial. Rule 103(a)(1) of the Rules of Evidence requires that to preserve an error for appeal, the alleged error must be “clearly presented” to the trial court.

Rule 103(a)(1) preserves an evidentiary objection without a stated ground when the objection clearly presents the alleged error to the trial court.

State v. Benson · filed 1992-06-25Rule 103(a)(1)

As a threshold matter, we disagree with the State that defendant waived this assignment of error because he failed to specify the nature of his objection. The patent nature of the basis of defendant’s objection is borne out by the fact that the trial court responded to the objection in terms of the very basis sought by defendant: that the testimony about to be provided by Eatmon was not corroborative of Bryan’s testimony. Therefore, we conclude that defendant successfully preserved this assignment of error for appellate review. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(1) (“No particular form is required in order to preserve the right to assert the alleged error upon appeal if the motion or objection clearly presented the alleged error to the trial court . . . .”); N.C. R. App. P. 10(b).

Rule 103(a)(1) requires a timely motion to strike an in-court identification; waiting until after further questions waives the objection.

State v. McCray · filed 1995-11-03Rule 103(a)(1)

A motion to strike will therefore be deemed untimely if the witness answers the question and the opposing party does not move to strike the response until after further questions are asked of the witness.

Rule 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof, unless the substance of the excluded evidence is otherwise apparent, before a party can claim error from its exclusion.

Tolbert v. County of Caldwell · filed 1996-03-05Rule 103(a)(2)

We do not address these arguments, however, because in each instance the plaintiffs failed to make an offer of proof. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) (1992) (error may not be predicated on ruling excluding evidence unless “the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent”).

Rule 103(a) requires a showing that excluded evidence was offered before its exclusion can be held erroneous.

State v. Dial · filed 1996-05-07Rule 103(a)

Moreover, there is no indication in the record that defendant made any offer of evidence as to “the location and movement of the body” or that the trial court excluded such evidence. The exclusion of evidence will not be held for error in the absence of a showing of an offer thereof. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a).

Rule 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof to preserve a challenge to excluded testimony unless its substance is apparent from context.

State v. Atkins · filed 1998-10-09Rule 103(a)(2)

Defendant did not make an offer of proof developing the witness’s responses to the questioning. Accordingly, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review according to the standard set forth in N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2). We do not agree that the substance of the excluded testimony was necessarily “apparent from the context within which questions were asked” and that therefore no offer of proof was necessary to preserve this issue for appeal.

Rule 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof to show the substance of excluded evidence, but does not require the witness’s entire testimony when that substance is sufficiently shown.

State v. Braxton · filed 2000-07-13Rule 103(a)(2)

We conclude that this excerpt constitutes a sufficient showing of the substance of the records for a complete offer of proof as required by N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2).

Rule 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof to preserve an objection to excluded evidence for appellate review.

State v. Hardy · filed 2000-12-21Rule 103(a)(2)

By failing to make an offer of proof, defendant has failed to properly preserve this issue for appellate review, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2).

Rule 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof to preserve the exclusion of testimony for appellate review unless the testimony’s significance is obvious from the record.

State v. Pallas · filed 2001-06-19Rule 103(a)(2)

We also uphold the trial court’s decision not to enforce the subpoena for Wiley’s appearance because defendant failed at trial to make an offer of proof as to Wiley’s proposed testimony. “Accordingly, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review under the standard set forth in N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2).” ... In the case at bar, defendant made no offer of proof regarding his proffered testimony and the significance of the excluded testimony is not obvious from the record. The defendant therefore failed to preserve any issue concerning the exclusion of this testimony for appellate review.

Rule 103(a)(1) requires a timely objection to preserve a challenge to an expert’s valuation methodology.

Walter v. Walter · filed 2002-04-16Rule 103(a)(1)

A party believing the methodology used by a witness is not valid or, if valid, is not properly applied to the facts at issue, has an obligation to object to its admission.

Rule 103 requires an offer of proof to preserve a challenge to excluded evidence unless the substance of that evidence is obvious from the record.

State v. Gay · filed 2002-07-16Rule 103

Defendant made no offer of proof concerning what Ms. Walsh’s answers to the excluded question might have been, nor is it obvious from the record what the excluded testimony would have shown. We hold that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, and that this issue is not properly before us.

Rule 103(a)(1) requires an objection to clearly present the claimed evidentiary error to preserve it for appeal; general objections do not suffice.

Nunn v. Allen · filed 2002-12-17Rule 103(a)(1)

At trial, however, he interposed only general objections and, as such, did not clearly present the alleged error to the trial court as required by G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(1). The rulings, therefore, have not been preserved for appeal.

Rule 103(a) prevents a party from challenging the competency of admitted evidence when it did not object to the evidence's receipt.

Smith v. N.C. Department of Transportation · filed 2003-02-18Rule 103(a)

In any event, defendant cannot assert the lack of competency of this evidence as grounds to reduce the award as there was no objection to its receipt. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a) (2001).

Rule 103(a)(2) requires a party challenging the exclusion of evidence to make its substance known through an offer of proof unless it is apparent from context.

In Re the Purported Last Will & Testament of Barnes · filed 2003-04-15(a)(2)

Accordingly, the 1967 Will Beneficiaries did not object to the trial court's exclusion or make an offer of proof. Therefore, because (1) the 1967 Will Beneficiaries "made no offer of proof to the witness' possible answers," and (2) "the substance of the [evidence is not] apparent from the context within which the questions [were] asked" (because no questions were asked), the 1967 Will Beneficiaries "failed to preserve this issue for appellate review."

Rule 103(a)(2)'s amendment allowing a definitive pretrial evidentiary ruling to preserve an objection without renewal applies only to rulings made on or after 1 October 2003.

State v. Pullen · filed 2004-04-20Rule 103(a)(2)

This amendment, however, applies only to rulings made on or after 1 October 2003. 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 101. Since the pre-existing rule applies to this case, we must hold that defendant failed to fully preserve the issue of the admissibility of the Little confession for appellate review.

The 2003 amendment to Rule 103(a)(2), which removes the need to renew an objection after a definitive ruling, is not retroactive.

State v. Richards · filed 2004-10-19Rule 103(a)(2)

The North Carolina General Assembly recently amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) to include, "Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal." The effective date was 1 October 2003, and the amendment is not retroactive. 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 101, §§ 1-2. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress was dated 13 February 2003. The amended statute does not apply to this case.

Rule 103 excuses renewing an objection after a definitive evidentiary ruling, but the 2003 amendment applies only to rulings made on or after October 1, 2003.

State v. Leach · filed 2004-11-02Rule 103(2)

This rule was changed by the legislature in 2003: “Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103 (2) (2003). However, the amendment applies only to rulings on evidence made on or after 1 October 2003. Session Laws 2003-101, s.l. Thus, it does not apply to this case.

Rule 103 permits a party to preserve a suppression challenge for appeal by objecting when the trial court denies the motion.

In Re SW · filed 2005-07-05

We note initially the juvenile properly preserved his assignment of error by objecting when the trial court denied his motion to suppress in conformity with the amended North Carolina Rules of Evidence 103.

Rule 103(a)(2) cannot excuse a renewed objection at trial when doing so conflicts with the appellate rule requiring one.

State v. Tutt · filed 2005-07-19(a)(2)

In sum, we must hold that to the extent that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) is inconsistent with N.C. R.App. P. 10(b)(1), it must fail.

Rule 103(a)(2)'s amendment concerning preservation of evidentiary objections applies to rulings made on or after October 1, 2003.

State v. Highsmith · filed 2005-10-04Rule 103(a)(2)

The General Assembly attempted to change this law by amending Rule 103(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence to provide: “Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) (2004). This amendment applies to the case before us.

Amended Rule 103(a)(2), which excuses renewal of an objection after a definitive evidentiary ruling, applies only to rulings made on or after 1 October 2003.

State v. Watts · filed 2005-08-02Rule 103(a)(2)

The General Assembly recently amended Rule 103(a) of the Rules of Evidence to provide that “[o]nce the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) (2003). This amendment, however, applies only to rulings made on or after 1 October 2003 and thus does not apply in this case.

Before its 2003 amendment, Rule 103(a)(2) required a party to offer excluded evidence at trial to preserve a challenge to a pretrial ruling.

Miller v. Forsyth Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2005-09-20Rule 103(a)(2)

The only ruling upon this evidence was made on 22 September 2003. As such, the ruling is governed by the previous version of Rule 103(a)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and not the version applicable to rulings made on or after 1 October 2003. By failing to offer this evidence at trial, plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue on appeal.

Rule 103(a)(2) cannot dispense with a renewed trial objection when Appellate Rule 10(b)(1) requires one to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal.

State v. Oglesby · filed 2007-08-24Rule 103(a)(2)

Although Rule 103(a)(2) is contained in the Rules of Evidence, it is manifestly an attempt to govern the procedure and practice of the Appellate Division as it purports to determine which issues are preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, we hold that, to the extent it conflicts with Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1), Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) must fail.

Rule 103(a)(1) requires a timely objection or motion to strike to preserve a challenge to admitted evidence.

State v. Ellis · filed 2010-07-20Rule 103(a)(1)

“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits . . . evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(1) (2009). ... Defendant’s motion to strike at the close of the State’s evidence was untimely, and this argument is deemed waived.

Rule 103 requires a timely objection to the admission of evidence to preserve the issue for appeal; objections to particular questions do not preserve an objection to the evidence itself.

State v. Boyd · filed 2011-02-01Rule 103

Objections to the admission of evidence must generally be preserved by an objection by counsel at the time of their admission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103; N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1). ... Accordingly, we find that no objection was entered to the introduction of the video evidence sufficient to preserve defendant’s assignments of error.

Rule 103(a)(1) requires a timely objection or motion to strike to preserve a challenge to admitted evidence; a motion made after further testimony is untimely.

State v. McCain · filed 2011-05-17Rule 103(a)(1)

As defense counsel did not make an objection to Mr. Alcox’s testimony during direct examination but waited until after the completion of Mr. Alcox’s and Sergeant Williams’ testimony, and his motion to suppress before raising the above motion to strike, we hold that defendant’s motion to strike was untimely.

A trial court’s discretionary Rule 403 balancing decision is not reviewed for plain error.

State v. Tabron · filed 2014-04-01Rule 403

Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 when weighing the probative and prejudicial values of the evidence is not reviewed by this Court for plain error.

A defendant must testify to preserve a challenge to a Rule 609 ruling permitting impeachment with a prior conviction.

State v. Perkins · filed 2014-08-05(a)

However, because of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984) (holding that “to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify”), defendant’s argument is not properly preserved for appeal.

Rule 614(c) does not preserve a constitutional objection to a court’s inquiry of a witness when the objection was not raised at trial.

State v. Woods · filed 2019-02-19Rule 614(c)

However, this rule does not apply when, as here, Defendant argues that the trial court's inquiry with a witness infringed upon Defendant's constitutional rights.

Rule 103(a)(2) requires a party to make an offer of proof to preserve a challenge to excluded evidence unless its significance is obvious from the record.

In re M.Y.P. · filed 2021-09-24Rule 103(a)(2)

Importantly, to preserve an argument concerning the exclusion of evidence, a party is required to make an offer of proof in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2).

Rule 103(a)(1) requires a party to raise an objection in the trial court to preserve it for appellate review.

State v. Maye · filed 2024-08-06(a)(1)

Therefore, any arguments concerning ASC’s motion signature are unpreserved, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(1), and we will not consider them, see Harris, 253 N.C. App. at 327, 800 S.E.2d at 680.

Rule 103(a)(1) requires an objection to identify the evidentiary issue; an objection for lack of foundation that does not mention hearsay does not preserve a hearsay challenge.

Fish v. Stetina · filed 2025-02-19Rule 103(a)(1)

Without specifying that a “foundation” objection actually concerns a hearsay exception, the objection does not “clearly present[]” a hearsay question to the trial court.

Rule 614(c) deems objections to a judge’s questions preserved, but claims that the questioning denied a fair hearing or showed judicial bias must be preserved separately.

In re: T.J.S. & W.B.S. · filed 2025-08-06Rule 614(c)

“No objections are necessary with respect to . . . questions propounded to a witness by the court but it shall be deemed that proper objection has been made and overruled.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 614(c) (2023). However, when a party challenges that the trial court’s questioning infringed upon their constitutional right to a fair hearing or that the trial court was prejudiced against the party, as respondent-father argues here, this rule does not apply and the issues must be preserved for appellate review.

Rule 103(a)(2) does not preserve an appeal from a pretrial suppression ruling without an objection at trial when it conflicts with the appellate preservation rule.

State v. Oglesby · filed 2005-12-06Rule 103(a)(2)

Defendant therefore failed to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of his statement. ... This Court, however, recently held that “to the extent that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) is inconsistent with N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1), it must fail[,]” and that a motion to suppress made prior to trial does not preserve the subject of the suppression motion for appeal.

Rule 103(a) does not preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal without a renewed objection at trial when its exception conflicts with Appellate Rule 10(b)(1).

State v. Ray · filed 2010-08-27Rule 103(a)

However, in State v. Oglesby this Court held that the 2003 amendment to Rule 103(a) is unconstitutional, "to the extent it conflicts with Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1)." 361 N.C. 550, 554, 648 S.E.2d 819, 821 (2007). In Oglesby we explained that this Court "has consistently interpreted" Appellate Rule 10(b)(1) "to provide that a trial court's evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue of admissibility for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial." Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, we consider the statements taken from Thibodeaux and referenced herein an accurate statement of the current law.

Rule 103(b)(2) requires an offer of proof when the content of excluded testimony is needed for appellate review.

State v. Boomer · filed 2005-01-18Rule 103(b)(2)

Furthermore, defendant did not evoke plain error review in his brief, and any such review would be improperly speculative without an offer of proof as to the content of the passenger's testimony. N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (raising prejudicial error review); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 103(b)(2)(2003)(circumstances requiring an offer of proof).

Rule 1004(2) permits a duplicate to be admitted when the original cannot be obtained through available judicial process or procedure.

Investors Title Insurance v. Herzig · filed 1992-01-27Rule 1004(2)

As contemplated in Rule 1004(2), the court found that the original could not be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure, thereby placing the duplicate within an exception to the Best Evidence Rule and allowing its admission into evidence. ... Therefore, we hold that the duplicate was properly admitted.

Rule 1004 permits admission of a duplicate agreement when reasonable efforts to obtain the original from the opposing party fail.

Investors Title Insurance v. Herzig · filed 1990-12-18Rule 1004

Pursuant to G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 1004, a duplicate is admissible if the original is, inter alia, lost or destroyed, not obtainable or in the possession of the opponent. ... In determining that the duplicate trust agreement was admissible pursuant to the N.C. Rules of Evidence, the trial judge appears to have been of the opinion that Investors Title made every reasonable effort to obtain the original trust agreement from defendant Herzig, but was unsuccessful. We agree.

Rule 1002 generally requires the original writing to prove its contents; authentication alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc. · filed 1986-03-18Rule 1002

One of these is that to prove the content of a writing, the original is usually required. G.S. 8C-1, R. Ev. 1002. Defendant sought not only to introduce the document, but to prove that its contents were what he claimed they were, ie. a list of bank accounts with the names of the persons authorized to sign on them. For this purpose the original signature cards clearly were the best evidence. No reason was given for their non-production and the court did not err in excluding the document.

Rule 1002 requires the writing itself to prove its contents.

State v. Jones · filed 1990-05-01Rule 1002

Defendant contends that this testimony violated the so-called “best evidence” or original document rule by placing into evidence the content of a writing without the admission of the writing itself. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 1002 of the N.C. Rules of Evidence (1988). Agent Ransome was allowed to testify that the note said “Dwight, let me know.” We agree that the note itself was the best evidence of its content; however, the testimony elicited did not prejudice defendant.

Rule 1002’s original-writing requirement does not apply to a document used only to refresh a witness’s memory and not offered into evidence.

State v. Mlo · filed 1994-01-28Rule 1002

The “best evidence” rule does not apply to a document that serves only to refresh a witness’ memory and is not offered into evidence.

Rule 403 permits a trial court to exclude relevant testimony when it needlessly repeats evidence already before the jury.

State v. Barton · filed 1994-03-04Rule 403

By sustaining the prosecutor’s objection to the question at issue, the trial court in the case at bar did nothing more than exclude cumulative evidence. The trial court’s action, therefore, was consistent with Rule 403 and did not constitute error.

Rule 1002 requires a writing to be admitted into evidence before a witness reads its contents aloud to prove what it says.

State v. Walker · filed 1996-05-10Rule 1002

The "best evidence rule," Rule 1002 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, states: "To prove the content of a writing,... the original writing ... is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 1002 (1992). Therefore, the trial court did not err in requiring that the writings be admitted into evidence before Haizlip could read their contents aloud.

Rule 1002 generally excludes a transcript offered to prove a recording’s contents when the original recording is available.

State v. York · filed 1997-09-05Rule 1002

In the present case, the tape recordings themselves were available, were introduced by defendant and were played for the jury. As such, the trial court properly excluded introduction of the transcripts under the best evidence rule.

Rule 1004 permits evidence of a document’s contents without the original when it was lost or destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed it in bad faith.

State v. Jarrell · filed 1999-05-18Rule 1004

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 1004 (1992), an original of a document is not required as evidence of its contents if the original is lost or destroyed unless the proponent lost or destroyed it in bad faith. The defendant made no showing that Wilson destroyed the letter in bad faith.

Rule 1003 permits a duplicate unless the original’s authenticity is genuinely disputed or admitting the duplicate would be unfair.

State v. Ferguson · filed 2001-08-07

When an original document is lost or destroyed, cannot be obtained or is in the possession of an opponent, “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.” G.S. 8C-1, Rule 1003. ... Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly found that neither Rule 1003 exception applied requiring the production of the original document.

Rule 1002’s best evidence rule applies when evidence is offered to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, not when testimony describes a physical inspection or repair.

Hogan v. TERMINAL TRUCKING CO., INC. · filed 2008-06-03Rule 1002

In this case, since the challenged finding of fact does not seek to establish the content of a writing, but rather whether the truck was physically inspected and repaired, the “best evidence rule” does not apply, and the manager’s testimony about the inspection and repair of the truck was competent.

Rule 1002 does not require the original recording when its contents are not in question.

State v. Haas · filed 2010-02-02Rule 1002

Because the contents of the recording of defendant’s prior testimony in the juvenile hearing are not in question, Rule 1002 is not applicable.

Rule 402 makes evidence inadmissible when it has no tendency to prove a fact consequential to the case.

State v. Samuel · filed 2010-05-04Rule 402

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence about the guns was wholly irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 402.

Rule 1003 permits a duplicate recording when no genuine question exists about the original’s authenticity and admitting the duplicate would not be unfair.

Bowman v. Cox Toyota Scion · filed 2012-12-04Rule 1003

The fact that the version of the surveillance videos introduced into evidence was a duplicate rather than the original is irrelevant to the admissibility determination given the absence of “a genuine question ... as to the authenticity of the original” or “circumstances” making it “unfair to admit the duplicate instead of the original.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 1003.

Rule 1004(1) permits other evidence of a recording’s contents when the original cannot be found after a diligent search, unless the proponent lost or destroyed it in bad faith.

State v. Barnette · filed 2014-04-15Rule 1004(1)

Their combined testimony coupled with no assertion by defendant that the voice mails were destroyed or lost in bad faith were sufficient grounds for the trial court to allow other evidence of the voice mails’ contents.

The best evidence rule does not bar a certified ACIS printout used to prove a prior conviction when the printout is not offered to prove the contents of another document.

State v. Edgerton · filed 2019-08-06Rule 1005

Because the evidence tendered was not proof of the contents of another document, the best evidence rule did not bar the admission of the printout. Id. ... In this case, the State similarly provided an ACIS printout evidencing Defendant’s prior conviction. An assistant clerk testified as to its accuracy, and the printout was a certified copy. Following Waycaster, this is competent evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction, and was properly admitted by the trial court.

Rule 1005’s reasonable diligence requirement does not apply when an ACIS printout is used to prove that a prior conviction occurred rather than the contents of the original judgment.

State v. Waycaster · filed 2020-08-14

Thus, the State was not required to comply with the reasonable diligence provision contained in Rule 1005 for the simple reason that Rule 1005 has no application here.

Rule 403 permits exclusion of evidence when the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion substantially outweighs its probative value.

Maldjian v. Bloomquist · filed 2020-12-15Rule 403

This evidence had little probative value, and that minimal value was abundantly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this testimony.

Rule 1002 requires the original writing when its contents must be proved, but does not require it when the evidence is offered to show an event rather than the writing’s contents.

State v. Hernandez-Mendez · filed 2025-11-05Rule 1002

First, the ... best evidence rule is inapplicable in the present case where the State did not seek to introduce the diary to prove its contents, but to show an event contributing to the deterioration of Christina’s and defendant’s friendship shortly before her death.

Rule 1002 requires the original writing to prove its contents; a generalized description of a contract does not suffice.

State v. Leach · filed 2013-05-21

However, given that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17-7(3) requires an applicant to attach a copy of any “warrant or other process” by virtue of which the applicant is detained or provide an adequate explanation for failing to attach such a document and given that, “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording or photograph is required,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 1002, we do not believe that a mere generalized description of the MAPP contract like that contained in Defendant’s application is sufficient to preclude summary denial of an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Rule 606(b) bars juror affidavits about a foreman's mistaken explanation of punitive damages because that belief is an internal influence, not extraneous prejudicial information.

Berrier v. Thrift · filed 1992-09-01Rule 606(b)

As the information allegedly received by the jurors in the present case did not concern either the defendant or the case being tried, but was rather information about the foreman’s belief or impression about the impact of punitive damage awards, the trial court correctly refused to consider the juror affidavits under Rule 606(b).

Rule 606(b) bars juror affidavits offered to impeach a verdict when they show no extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influence.

State v. Costner · filed 1986-05-20Rule 606(b)

The jurors’ affidavits contain no evidence of extraneous prejudicial information or any outside influence improperly brought to bear upon any juror. The affidavits are therefore not admissible in evidence under G.S. 8C-1, Rule 606.

Rule 606(b) permits a court to strike a juror’s affidavit stating that the verdict included interest.

Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Johnston · filed 1992-08-04Rule 606(b)

Defendants next assign error to the court’s striking of an affidavit of a juror stating that the verdict included interest. This affidavit was attached to defendants’ motion for a new trial and amendment of judgment and was stricken on plaintiff’s motion. We find no error. This affidavit was properly struck under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 606(b) (1988).

Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony offered to impeach a verdict based on internal influences, including jurors’ discussion of parole eligibility.

State v. Robinson · filed 1994-05-06Rule 606(b)

Again, Rule 606(b) prohibits juror testimony that impeaches a jury verdict on the basis of internal influences.

Rule 606(b) does not treat general information unrelated to the defendant or the case as extraneous information that can support a challenge to a verdict.

State v. Heatwole · filed 1996-07-31Rule 606(b)

This Court has interpreted extraneous information under Rule 606(b) to mean information that reaches a juror without being introduced into evidence and that deals specifically with the defendant or the case being tried. ... Under these circumstances, defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 606(b).

Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about how evidence admitted at trial affected jurors’ minds or mental processes.

Fenz Ex Rel. Gladden v. Davis · filed 1998-02-17Rule 606(b)

The juror’s affidavit in this case does not disclose that any extraneous information about the parties or the case was brought to the attention of the jurors. Information concerning the manner in which the child and her mother were seated in the van was put in evidence by plaintiffs; the effect of that evidence upon the minds, emotions, or mental processes of the jurors, based on their life experiences, is not a proper subject for juror testimony under G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 606(b).

Rule 606(b) does not apply to juror testimony in a contempt proceeding when no one seeks to impeach the jury’s verdict.

State v. Pierce · filed 1999-07-06Rule 606(b)

Defendant admits, and we agree, that Rule 606 of our Rules of Evidence does not apply in this case because there is no effort to impeach the verdict of the jury.

Rule 606(b) permits juror testimony about extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury’s attention or an outside influence on a juror.

Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-11-20Rule 606(b)

The trial court properly received the affidavits and considered them, pursuant to Rule 606(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which provides that the trial court may receive juror testimony as to "whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror."

Rule 606(b) does not treat standard dictionary definitions read during jury deliberations as extraneous information that permits juror affidavits to impeach a verdict.

State v. Bauberger · filed 2006-03-07Rule 606(b)

As the affidavits attest to the reading of standard dictionary definitions, the matters in the affidavits are not extraneous information under Rule 606(b).

Rule 606(b) limits juror testimony offered to impeach a verdict to matters such as extraneous information, bribery, or intimidation.

State v. Elliott · filed 2006-05-05Rule 606(b)

Under N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1240(c) and 8C-1, Rule 606(b), those jurors defendant intended to call could have only testified whether extraneous information came to their attention, or whether someone did or attempted to bribe or intimidate them.

Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about deliberations, except testimony concerning extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence.

Call v. Polk · filed 2006-09-22(b)

Indeed, these affidavits may not be considered by this Court as they constitute testimony about the jury’s deliberative processes. ... N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 606(b). Thus, the MAR court which struck these affidavits was entirely correct in so doing.

Rule 606(b) permits juror testimony about an outside influence improperly brought to bear on a juror.

State v. Lewis · filed 2008-01-15Rule 606(b)

This was not a “harmless conversation” between a juror and a third person not tending to influence or prejudice the jury in their verdict. This was a conversation between a sheriff’s deputy and a lead detective that was intended to influence the verdict. This was not a “clearly fair and proper” trial, but rather one where an “outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon a juror.”

Rule 606(b) does not permit juror testimony to impeach a verdict based on jurors’ consultation of definitions of legal terms, because those definitions are not extraneous prejudicial information.

State v. Patino · filed 2010-10-05Rule 606(b)

Because definitions of legal terms are not extraneous information under Rule 606 and did not implicate defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him, the allegations raised by defendant’s trial counsel were not proper matters for an inquiry by the trial court.

Rule 606(b) bars using jurors’ statements about deliberations to establish that a verdict was a compromise.

Smith v. White · filed 2011-07-05Rule 606(b)

However, a juror’s statements may not be used in determining whether a compromise verdict was delivered.

Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about internal juror misconduct offered to challenge a verdict, even when the misconduct occurred before deliberations.

Cummings v. Ortega · filed 2011-10-07Rule 606(b)

Instead, we hold that Rule 606(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence bars jurors from testifying during consideration of post-verdict motions seeking relief from an order or judgment about alleged predeliberation misconduct by their colleagues.

Rule 606(b) permits a juror to testify about extraneous information brought to the juror’s attention.

State v. Heavner · filed 2013-05-07Rule 606(b)

We believe, in the case sub judice, that the conversation between Ms. Elmore and Mr. Diffendarfer was both “extraneous information” within the meaning of Rule 606(b) and a “matter not in evidence” that implicated Defendant’s confrontation right within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1240(c)(l).

Rule 606(b) bars inquiry into jurors’ deliberations unless the information at issue is specific extraneous information about the defendant or the case being tried.

State v. Marsh · filed 2013-09-17Rule 606(b)

Certainly jurors often discuss their personal ideas and beliefs about many issues, and these comments may at times be incorrect in the legal sense or without any basis in fact, but Rule 606(b) still forbids inquiry into these matters unless the information presented is specific information about “the defendant or the case being tried.”

Rule 606(b) bars jurors from testifying about their mental processes concerning a verdict but permits testimony about extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence.

Barnes v. Joyner · filed 2014-05-05Rule 606(b)

This is because both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the North Carolina Rules of Evidence prohibit a juror from testifying about his or her mental processes concerning the verdict. ... There is an exception, however, that permits a juror to testify about "whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.”

Rule 606(b) allows inquiry into extraneous prejudicial information, but a juror’s general knowledge does not qualify as such information.

N.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Mission Battleground Park · filed 2016-09-06(b)

The statement of Juror Number Six during deliberations was not prejudicial “extraneous information” to warrant a new trial under Rule 606(b).

Rule 606(b) does not preclude treating juror misconduct disclosed to the trial judge immediately after the verdict as structural error.

State v. Blake · filed 2020-12-31(b)

Further, we conclude based on the facts of this case that it is not the type of situation Rule 606 was designed to protect against, and Rule 606 does not preclude the juror’s misconduct from being structural error.

Rule 606(b) bars juror affidavits offered to impeach a verdict unless they concern extraneous prejudicial information or an outside influence.

State v. Newmones · filed 2026-03-04Rule 606(b)

However, Defendant fails to provide any argument that the jurors’ affidavits contain any evidence of extraneous prejudicial information or that any outside influence improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in striking the affidavits.

Rules 611(b) and 401 permit cross-examination about impaired capacity when that evidence tends to show a defendant did not understand his acts or distinguish right from wrong.

State v. Beach · filed 1993-06-04Rules 611(b) and 401

It was error not to allow Dr. Groce to answer this question. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) provides, “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case[.]” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 says, “ ‘[Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Evidence that a person’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law is impaired has some tendency to prove he does not know the nature and quality of his acts or the difference between right and wrong in relation thereto, which is the definition of insanity.

Rule 611 permits a court to limit cross-examination to protect a witness from harassment or undue embarrassment while keeping the questioning effective in finding the truth.

State v. Pharr · filed 1993-06-01Rule 611(a)

We conclude that the scope of the defendant’s cross-examination of Melvin Glover was appropriately limited by the trial court to “protect the witness from harassment or undue embarrassment” while making the interrogation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.

Rule 612 entitles an adverse party to production of a writing used to refresh a witness’s memory; it does not require the witness to first say that the witness cannot recall the matter.

State v. Gibson · filed 1992-12-18Rule 612

Defendant’s assertion that Rule 612 requires a witness to establish a foundation for the use of notes to refresh his memory is without merit. Rule 612 stands for nothing other than the requirement that an adverse party is entitled to production of the writing or object which a witness used to refresh his or her memory.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on any matter relevant to an issue in the case, including a witness’s credibility.

State v. McAvoy · filed 1992-06-25Rule 611(b)

Under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b), subject to certain exceptions not pertinent here, cross-examination of a witness as to any matter relevant to any issue in a case, including credibility, is proper. Hence, we conclude that this line of cross-examination was proper, as it was relevant to the issue of the credibility of defendant's testimony that he carried the gun out of fear of robbery and only carried the gun in the club.

Rule 104(e) allows a defendant to present evidence to the jury about circumstances bearing on the credibility and weight of an alleged statement, including police practices for taking statements.

State v. Hester · filed 1992-01-10Rule 104(e)

We find the reasoning in Sanchez, and its construction of N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 104(e), controlling in the instant case. Defense counsel's questions to Officer Robinson regarding policy and practice as to the taking of statements were legitimate and were directed toward eliciting evidence relevant to the credibility and weight of defendant's alleged statement.

Rule 104(e) allows a party to present evidence bearing on the weight or credibility of admitted evidence after the court has ruled it admissible.

State v. Sanchez · filed 1991-02-07Rule 104(e)

Under Rule 104(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, the preliminary determination of admissibility of evidence by the trial court "does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility."

Rule 611(c) ordinarily permits leading questions on cross-examination, including questions aimed at exposing a fabricated defense.

State v. Mitchell · filed 1986-08-12Rule 611(c)

Our Rules expressly state that: “Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(c) (Cum. Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). The prosecutor’s question here was in the nature of a leading question by which he attempted to expose a fabricated defense. As such, it was proper.

Rule 611(c) ordinarily permits leading questions on cross-examination, but allows the trial court to limit them when the witness is friendly to the examiner.

State v. Hosey · filed 1986-10-07(c)

When a party is “cross-examining” a friendly witness, it is within the discretion of the trial court to sustain objections to leading questions.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination that tests the reliability of an expert witness’s testimony on direct examination.

Green Hi-Win Farm Inc. v. Neal · filed 1986-11-04(b)

The question to which defendant Neal objects is a permissible attempt to test the reliability of the expert witness’ earlier statement made on direct examination. The question does not offend North Carolina’s “wide-open” cross-examination rule. See G.S. 8C-1, Rule 611(b) and commentary.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on any matter relevant to an issue in the case, including a witness’s credibility.

Burriss v. Von Heavner · filed 1986-12-16Rule 611(b)

G.S. 8C-1, Rule 611(b) provides that, “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” Since plaintiffs testimony on cross-examination tended to contradict her testimony on direct examination, it certainly bore upon her credibility as a witness and defendants had a right to present it.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination of a defendant who testifies on any matter relevant to an issue in the case, including credibility.

State v. Freeman · filed 1987-06-02Rule 611(b)

But when a defendant chooses to testify in his own defense he subjects himself to cross-examination “on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1986).

Rule 615 places witness sequestration within the trial judge’s discretion, and a denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

State v. Russell · filed 1987-02-17Rule 615

The North Carolina rule is that the motion to sequester witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. ... The trial court’s ruling on the motion to sequester is reviewable on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.

Rule 611(a) permits a trial court to change the usual order of presenting evidence to help ascertain the truth, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

State v. Brice · filed 1987-07-07Rule 611(a)

The trial court properly may depart from the regular order of presentation of evidence so as to make that presentation more effective for the ascertainment of the truth, and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.

Rule 611(a) permits a trial court to control which attorney makes objections during witness examination, absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Smith · filed 1987-07-28Rule 611(a)

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(a) empowers the court to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth [and] (2) avoid needless consumption of time. . . .” Promulgation of the objections rule thus fell within the trial court’s discretion. Defendant has shown no specific prejudice and thus no abuse of discretion.

Rule 611(c) generally bars leading questions on direct examination, but whether a question is leading depends on its form and context.

State v. Howard · filed 1987-10-07Rule 611(c)

Considering both the form of the question and the context in which it was put, we do not find it objectionable as a leading question. It is reasonable to assume the question was asked in order to further clarify the statement that “everybody ran.”

Rule 611(a) gives trial courts reasonable control over the order and manner of questioning witnesses and presenting evidence.

State v. Allen · filed 1988-05-03Rule 611(a)

As noted earlier, the trial court has authority to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence pursuant to G.S. 8C-1, Rule 611(a). ... Therefore, we conclude that there was no reversible error in the conduct of the trial judge.

Rule 705 permits an expert to be questioned about the facts or data underlying an opinion, including material that impeaches it.

State v. Allen · filed 1988-05-05Rule 705

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 705 provides in part that an expert may be required on cross-examination to disclose the underlying facts or data upon which he relied in forming his expert opinion. The district attorney, therefore, properly used the conclusions in the Dorothea Dix report, parts of which he read to Dr. Rose, to impeach the latter’s opinion under Rule 705 as to defendant’s ability to understand and waive her constitutional rights.

Rule 611(c) permits leading questions on direct examination when needed to develop testimony, subject to the trial judge’s discretion.

State v. Dillard · filed 1988-05-31Rule 611(c)

The rule is that “[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony.” G.S. 8C-1, Rule 611(c). The application of this rule is within the discretion of the trial judge and the ruling is reversible only for abuse of discretion. ... We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the district attorney to ask leading questions of the victim in this case.

Rule 615 leaves requests to sequester witnesses to the trial court’s discretion.

State v. Fullwood · filed 1988-11-03Rule 615

Defendant made his motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 615, and he argues that under this rule, unlike under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1225, a motion to sequester witnesses is not discretionary. We disagree. ... We conclude that the trial court retains discretion under the rule.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on any matter relevant to an issue in the case, including credibility.

State v. Speckman · filed 1988-12-20Rule 611(b)

Rule 611(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states: “(b) Scope of cross-examination. — A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1988). The cross-examination of defendant at issue in the present case related largely to financial dealings by defendant, including those associated with the waterslide operation, defendant’s dealings with Young and defendant’s financial status. As such the cross-examination of defendant was clearly within the acceptable bounds allowed by the Rules of Evidence. Therefore the trial court did not err in allowing the State to cross-examine defendant on these matters.

Rules 611(a) and 403 permit a trial court to limit cumulative character witnesses to avoid needless consumption of time.

State v. Webster · filed 1993-07-20Rules 611(a) and 403

The trial court may control the production of evidence in order to avoid “needless consumption of time,” and may exclude relevant evidence based on “considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 611(a) and 403 (1992).

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination about a witness’s credibility, subject to the trial judge’s control and a good-faith basis for the questions.

State v. Wilson · filed 1993-12-03Rule 611(b)

The Rules of Evidence permit cross-examination of a witness “on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1992). This Court has said that the scope of cross-examination is subject to the control of the trial judge and “the questions must be asked in good faith.” ... From the record, we conclude the trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s question.

Rule 611(c) permits leading questions when cross-examining an adverse witness, but counsel may not use them to distort the witness’s testimony by deliberately misconstruing answers.

State v. Sanderson · filed 1994-04-08Rule 611(c)

Though leading questions are entirely appropriate in the cross-examination of an adverse witness, N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(c) (1992), the questioner may not distort the witness’ testimony by purposely misconstruing answers and cross-examining the witness on the basis of the misconstruction.

Rule 615(3) permits a witness essential to a party’s case to remain in the courtroom while other witnesses are sequestered.

State v. Jones · filed 1994-07-29Rule 615(3)

In any event, this change in the officer’s testimony is not sufficient evidence of prejudice to justify reversing a trial court’s discretionary ruling allowing an officer to remain in the courtroom as a person essential to the presentation of the State’s case.

Rule 612 entitles an adverse party to production of a writing used to refresh a witness’s memory, but does not itself make the writing admissible.

State v. Shuford · filed 1994-09-09Rule 612(a)

Rule 612 does not provide for the admission into evidence of writings used to refresh a witness’ memory.

Rule 611(a) permits a trial judge to control witness questioning to avoid wasting time, including by asking counsel to explain the relevance of testimony.

State v. Harris · filed 1994-11-03Rule 611(a)

In comparing the events to the controlling statute, we note that the trial court is charged with "exercis[ing] reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... avoid needless consumption of time...." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(a) (1992). Judge Britt did no more in either situation than ensure that defense counsel was not consuming the court's time with irrelevant material. Once assured by counsel that the evidence had relevance, the court permitted the questioning to continue without further comment and expressed no opinion on the evidence. The court in no way abused its discretion nor approached the level of interference which would be error.

Rule 615 permits a court to sequester witnesses during testimony but does not bar counsel from interviewing witnesses together before trial.

State v. Abraham · filed 1994-12-09Rule 615

Neither Rule 615 nor the trial court’s order precluded ... counsel from interviewing witnesses together in preparation for trial.

Rule 614 permits a trial judge to question a witness to clarify testimony and determine whether the evidence supports a mitigating circumstance, without denigrating the witness or the evidence.

State v. Spruill · filed 1994-12-30Rule 614(b)

Nevertheless, “[t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 614 (1992). ... In our view, the questions did not denigrate either defendant’s witness or her evidence. Instead, the questions helped to develop testimony favorable to the defense and assist the trial court in its task of deciding whether mitigating circumstances which might later be requested by the defense were in fact supported by the evidence. Considering all the circumstances, we conclude the court did not err in asking the questions; and we overrule this assignment of error.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on relevant matters, including credibility, even when those matters are not already in evidence.

State v. Lovin · filed 1995-03-03Rule 611(b)

On cross-examination, a party is not limited to asking questions about matters in evidence. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) provides “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” The questions asked of the witness were designed to elicit testimony relevant to issues in the case.

Rule 611(b) permits questions about statements an expert reviewed but did not rely on when the answers are relevant to the expert’s credibility.

State v. Gregory · filed 1995-07-28Rule 611(b)

Evidence that Dr. Horacek reviewed these statements but chose not to rely on them as a basis for his opinion, including evidence that he knew the codefendants’ statements contained versions of the events on the night of the murders different from defendant’s statement, was relevant to impeach Dr. Horacek’s expert testimony under Rule 611(b). N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1992). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant’s objections to the prosecutor’s questions of Dr. Horacek.

Rule 705 permits cross-examination about differing diagnoses in reports an expert relied on, even if the expert did not adopt those diagnoses.

State v. Simpson · filed 1995-09-08Rule 705

Pursuant to Rule 705, Dr. Coleman was properly cross-examined about other diagnoses contained within psychiatric reports upon which she relied, although she ultimately formed a differing diagnosis.

Rule 705 permits cross-examination about statements an expert considered in forming an opinion.

State v. Lynch · filed 1995-07-28Rule 705

As statements made by Wes Hodnett were considered by both experts when they were diagnosing defendant’s mental condition, questions about this particular statement were relevant under Rule 705 and admissible under the broad scope permitted during cross-examination of expert witnesses.

Rule 614(b) permits a trial judge to question a witness to clarify potentially confusing testimony.

State v. Geddie · filed 1996-12-06Rule 614(b)

The question complained of called for clarification of potentially confusing “street” vernacular. The question was within the scope of the discretion afforded the court under Rule 614(b).

Rule 611(a) gives trial courts discretion to control the use of demonstrative evidence during trial.

Marley v. Graper · filed 1999-11-02Rule 611(a)

North Carolina Rule 611(a) is identical to its federal counterpart and regulates use of demonstrative evidence during trial.

Rule 612(b) leaves a request to inspect writings a witness used to refresh memory before testifying to the trial judge’s discretion.

State v. Griffin · filed 2000-02-15Rule 612(b)

The request to view writings used by a witness to refresh his memory prior to testifying is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. ... Upon review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on these facts.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination about another witness’s testimony to challenge a defendant’s credibility; using the testimony for that purpose does not make it hearsay under Rule 801(c).

State v. Walker · filed 2000-08-15Rule 611(b)

However, the prosecutor did not refer to Montsinger’s testimony to “prove the truth of the matter asserted” therein, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c), but for the proper purpose of challenging defendant’s credibility, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1999).

Rule 705 permits cross-examination about the facts or data underlying an expert's opinion, including reports provided to the expert.

McCarver v. Lee · filed 2000-08-28Rule 705

Under this rule, the district attorney could permissibly have asked about the Dix reports and the fill-in-the-blank responses specifically.

Rule 611(a) permits a trial court to control the manner of cross-examination, including whether a party may play a recording while questioning a witness.

State v. Mason · filed 2001-06-05(a)

In this case, the trial judge did not prevent the defendant from exploring this avenue of inquiry. The court merely ruled against the use of an audiotape for cross-examination. However, the defendant could have conducted his cross-examination about the 911 call by questioning the witness from a transcript of the call. Further, the defendant was permitted to introduce the tape during his case in chief. We hold that the court neither coerced the defendant into presenting evidence, nor abused its discretion.

Rule 614(b) permits a trial judge to question witnesses to clarify testimony, so long as the questions do not express an opinion on the facts or a witness’s credibility.

State v. Smarr · filed 2001-09-04Rule 614(b)

These questions suggest that the trial court was only trying to clarify matters of importance to the jury. The questions were within his power under Evidence Rule 614(b). Furthermore, none of the trial court’s questions explicitly or implicitly stated an opinion as to the facts or the witnesses’ credibility.

Rule 611 permits cross-examination about relevant damages calculations and gives the trial court discretion to limit that questioning.

Durling v. King · filed 2001-10-16Rule 611(a), (b)

Nichols’ calculations of her unpaid commissions were relevant to the issues of whether she was owed any unpaid commissions and, if so, in what amount. Thus, this was a proper subject for cross-examination. ... We find that the trial court neither prevented King from conducting cross-examination, nor abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination.

Rule 611(a) gives trial courts discretion to control witness questioning and the presentation of evidence.

State v. Demos · filed 2002-02-05Rule 611(a)

The determination of how best to accomplish the aims of Rule 611(a) rests in the trial court’s discretion.

Rule 611(c) permits leading questions on direct examination when a witness is hostile or unwilling, subject to the trial court’s discretion.

State v. Maddox · filed 2003-07-15Rule 611(c)

Leading questions may be .used during direct examination when a party calls a hostile or unwilling witness.

Rule 614(b) permits a trial judge to question witnesses in front of the jury to clarify evidence and testimony.

State v. MacK · filed 2003-12-16Rule 614(b)

While unusual, the court did not abuse its discretion in questioning witnesses in front of the jury to clarify the evidence and testimony being presented.

Rule 614(b) permits a trial judge to question a witness to clarify testimony when the questions do not suggest the judge’s opinion about the facts.

State v. Shepherd · filed 2004-04-20Rule 614(b)

Having reviewed the trial court’s examination of Dr. Stanley, we conclude that the trial judge questioned the witness to clarify a critical element of the case, and the jury could not reasonably infer that the judge was expressing an opinion as to the facts of the case.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on matters relevant to an issue in the case, including credibility, but allows the court to exclude irrelevant questions.

State v. Bethea · filed 2004-07-06Rule 611(b)

Rule 611(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides that "[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility." ... On these facts, we conclude that defendant's question was not relevant to any issue before the jury or to Detective Marlow's credibility.

Rule 614(b) permits a trial judge to question a witness to clarify testimony, provided the questions do not convey an opinion on the evidence or the witness's credibility.

State v. Braxton · filed 2004-09-21Rule 614(b)

Rule 614(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states that, "[t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1 (2003), Rule 614. ... In the case at bar, the trial court initiated further redirect testimony by the victim to determine more clearly how she believed defendants entered the duplex. There is no suggestion in the court's first question as to any weight that the victim's response might bring her credibility.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination about matters relevant to a witness’s credibility, including payments the witness received.

State v. Brice · filed 2004-11-16(b)

Our Rules of Evidence provide that “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (2003). Our review of the trial transcript indicates that both Jobe and Sergeant Moore were subjected to vigorous cross-examination on the issue of Sergeant Moore’s payments to Jobe.

Rule 614(b) permits a trial court to question witnesses to clarify testimony without expressing an opinion on the facts.

State v. Rios · filed 2005-04-05Rule 614(b)

“The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 614(b) (2003). ... In questioning witnesses in this case, the trial court was apparently seeking clarity and fairness, and did not express opinion.

Rule 614 permits a trial judge to question witnesses to clarify confusing or contradictory testimony.

State v. Carmon · filed 2005-04-19

Yet, even defendant concedes the trial court has the authority to question a witness. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 614 (2003). The court may question witnesses to clarify confusing or contradictory testimony. ... After considering the questions asked by the trial judge to several witnesses in their proper context, we conclude that the questions did not exceed the boundaries of clarification.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination about matters relevant to a witness's credibility, including questions that challenge a defendant's explanation of a death.

State v. Phillips · filed 2005-07-19Rule 611(b)

Testing defendant's credibility and impeaching his explanations of Bailey's cause of death is relevant evidence well within the scope of cross-examination. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b).

Rule 611(c) allows a trial court to permit leading questions on direct examination when a young witness is hesitant to answer about sexual matters.

State v. Bates · filed 2005-08-02Rule 611(c)

We therefore find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing the State to ask KG leading questions on direct examination.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on any matter relevant to an issue in the case, including credibility, with the trial court controlling its scope in its discretion.

State v. Hill · filed 2006-08-01Rule 611(b)

“A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b). The trial court’s ruling regarding the scope of cross-examination will only be disturbed upon a showing of abuse of discretion. ... Defendant does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion, and we perceive no such abuse.

Rule 614(b) permits a court to question witnesses to clarify their testimony, provided the questioning does not prejudice a party.

In Re DAS · filed 2007-05-01Rule 614(b)

"The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 614(b) (2005). ... The court's question clarified Stone's testimony and provided the court with a better understanding of Stone's recommended disposition. The juvenile has failed to show how the trial court's question prejudiced him.

Rule 614(a) permits a judge to call a witness on the court's own motion; that decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In Re LB · filed 2007-07-03Rule 614(a)

Pursuant to Rule 614 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, "[t]he court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called." ... Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calling respondent as a witness, and accordingly, respondent's assignment of error is overruled.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on matters relevant to any issue, including a witness’s credibility.

In the Matter of Dw · filed 2008-01-15Rule 611(b)

"A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility." ... We find no abuse of discretion. Respondent's letter to the WCHS attorney tended to rebut Respondent's earlier testimony that his anger toward WCHS was confined to a single incident in October 2006. The letter was also relevant to a material issue before the trial court at the termination hearing.

Rule 612(b) permits a court to order disclosure of non-privileged documents a witness reviewed to prepare for deposition testimony.

Fulmore v. Howell · filed 2008-03-04Rule 612(b)

Because Defendants generally argue that the documents reviewed by Howell are either protected by the attorney-client privilege or the doctrine of work product, without submitting the allegedly privileged documents to either the trial court, in camera, or to this Court, offering a specific explanation as to why the documents are protected, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in compelling, in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 612, the discovery of non-privileged documents Howell reviewed in anticipation of his deposition.

Rule 611(a) permits a trial judge to limit repetitive witness questioning to avoid needless consumption of time.

State v. Moore · filed 2009-01-06Rule 611(a)

Generally, the trial court has a duty to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence" in order to "avoid needless consumption of time." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 611(a) (2007). ... While counsel would have been permitted to ask clarifying questions on redirect or cross-examination, it was well within the trial judge's discretion to limit such repetitious witness inquiries. Therefore, we find no error.

Rule 611 requires trial courts to control the manner of questioning and permits cross-examination on relevant matters, including credibility.

State v. Reaves · filed 2009-05-05Rule 611(a), (b)

Under the Rules of Evidence, trial courts should “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 611(a) (2007). ... In short, the trial court sufficiently controlled the manner and scope of cross-examination, and we cannot conclude that any argumentative questions improperly influenced the verdict.

Rule 614 permits a disciplinary hearing panel to call and question a witness on its own motion, allows the parties to cross-examine that witness, and treats objections to the panel’s questions as made and overruled.

North Carolina State Bar v. Hunter · filed 2011-12-06Rule 614(a)–(c)

Accordingly, the Commission has express authority to call its own witness pursuant to Evidence Rule 614, which provides: ... Here, pursuant to statutory authority, the panel called Mr. Amini’s assistant, Ms. Tyson, on its own motion, deeming the proper objections had been made and overruled by each party. ... Therefore, we hold the Commission acted within its discretion in asking Ms. Tyson clarifying questions regarding receipt of the Sisk complaint.

Rule 612(a) permits a witness to use a writing to refresh an independent recollection and testify from memory without satisfying the requirements for a recorded recollection under Rule 803(5).

State v. Harrison · filed 2012-02-07Rule 612(a)

Her testimony shows that she was not using her prior statement as a testimonial crutch for something beyond her recall. Accordingly, the trial court properly allowed Stanco to use her statement to refresh her recollection, and when Stanco read the statement into evidence, it was not as a past recollection recorded subject to the stricter foundational requirements.

Rule 104(a) permits a judge deciding whether a confession satisfies the corpus delicti rule to consider hearsay, because the rules of evidence do not bind preliminary admissibility decisions except as to privileges.

State v. Sweat · filed 2012-06-14Rule 104(a)

In ruling on this question of admissibility, a trial court “is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 104(a) (2011). Therefore, in considering the admissibility of a defendant’s confession for a particular crime when the confession is the only evidence proffered by the State for that particular crime, hearsay statements can be considered in determining if the confession satisfies the corpus delicti rule.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination on matters relevant to an issue in the case, including credibility.

State v. Setzer · filed 2015-03-03Rule 611(b)

“A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (2013). ... In light of the “great deference” provided to the trial court on issues of relevancy, we cannot say that the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection to defendant’s line of questioning.

Rule 611 gives trial courts discretion to control the order of witness testimony, including when to hear evidence of a victim’s reputation for violence.

State v. Henry · filed 2015-10-06Rule 611(a)

Trial courts have discretion to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses” at trial.