N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1

Rule 104(c) permits a witness competency hearing before the jury unless the interests of justice require a hearing outside its presence.

State v. Baker · filed 1987-07-07(c)

Rule 104(c) requires that a hearing such as the one requested in this case be held out of the presence of the jury only when the ends of justice require it. We cannot hold it was error in this case for the court not to hold the hearing out of the presence of the jury, particularly when the defendant did not request it.

Rule 601(b) permits a child to testify when the child can express herself understandably and understands the duty to tell the truth.

State v. Rhodes · filed 1987-11-05Rule 601(b)

It was not error for the court not to disqualify the witness pursuant to Rule 601(b).

Under Rule 601(b), a child's past lies and uncertainty about dates do not alone make her incompetent to testify.

State v. Fletcher · filed 1988-06-02Rule 601(b)

The court was not required from the voir dire testimony to find that the child was incapable of expressing herself concerning the case or was incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. The fact that the child may not have told the truth in the past and was uncertain about some times and dates does not prevent her from being a competent witness.

Rule 601(b) permits a witness to testify if the witness can express himself understandably about the matter and understands the duty to tell the truth.

State v. Swann · filed 1988-07-28Rule 601(b)

We could not hold that the witness was incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth or incapable of expressing himself so that he could be understood as to the matter.

Rule 601 permits a court to determine a child witness’s competency during testimony when the timing causes no prejudice, although determining it beforehand is better practice.

State v. Reynolds · filed 1989-05-02Rule 601(b)

... we hold that this witness having been correctly determined to be competent during her testimony, the timing of the competency finding was not prejudicial error.

Rule 601(b)(1) disqualifies a witness who cannot express himself about the matter so as to be understood.

State v. Liles · filed 1989-06-08Rule 601(b)(1)

The judge’s observation supported the determination that the witness was capable of expressing himself on the witness stand concerning the matter so as to be understood as required by N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601.

Rule 601(b) disqualifies a witness who cannot understand the duty to tell the truth; a child’s uncertainty about the meaning of an oath does not alone establish incompetence.

State v. Green · filed 1989-09-19Rule 601(b)

G.S. 8C-1, Rule 601(b) provides that a person is disqualified when the court determines that the person is “incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” ... Notwithstanding the testimony relied upon by defendant, the child did testify that she knew what it meant to tell the truth and she knew the difference between right and wrong. On this record we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Rule 601 allows a child to testify when she understands the duty of a witness to tell the truth.

State v. Everett · filed 1990-04-03Rule 601(b)(2)

We hold that the victim’s testimony met the standards of Rule 601 and that the trial court did not err in finding that she was competent to testify.

Rule 602 bars a witness from testifying about another person’s intended meaning when the witness lacks personal knowledge of it.

State v. Hill · filed 1992-03-03Rule 602

We agree that the question “[w]hat did he mean by that?” addressed to Mr. Rucker was improper in that it did not address the opinion of Mr. Rucker, and Mr. Rucker had no personal knowledge of Ricky Hill’s meaning at the time Hill made this statement. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 602.

Rule 602 permits a witness to testify to facts within the witness’s personal knowledge.

State v. Wilson · filed 1994-11-03Rule 602

The trial court erred in excluding Norris’ response to defense counsel’s question, “do you know for a fact that this defendant had relatives in Warren County?” Norris’ testimony in response to this question was based on his personal knowledge and thus was competent under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 602.

Rule 602’s personal knowledge requirement is satisfied when a witness testifies that statements were made directly to him.

State v. Corbett · filed 1994-12-30Rule 602

Agent Kennedy’s testimony that the doctor and defendant made these statements directly to him establishes his personal knowledge of the subject.

Rule 601 permits a child who understands the difference between truth and lies to testify despite lacking a religious understanding of the oath; Rule 702 permits expert testimony within the witness’s expertise that assists the jury.

State v. Weaver · filed 1994-12-20Rules 601(b) and 702

Despite H.’s lack of understanding of an obligation to tell the truth from a religious point of view, she stated on direct examination an understanding of the difference between the truth and lies and the importance of telling the truth. ... Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by finding H. competent to testify. ... Expert testimony is admissible pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (1992), when such testimony can assist the jury to draw inferences from facts because the expert is better qualified. ... In this case, the testimony in question was within the realm of expertise of the witness and was of assistance to the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not err by allowing the testimony.

Rule 601(b) permits a child to testify when the trial court finds the child competent, even if inconsistent answers about telling the truth affect the child's credibility.

State v. Ward · filed 1995-04-04Rule 601(b)

Based on this testimony and our prior cases, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the victim competent to testify and allowing her to testify. Any contradictions in her testimony went to her credibility, rather than her competency to testify.

Rule 602 requires personal knowledge; a witness’s conclusion about a fact she did not observe is incompetent testimony.

State v. King · filed 1996-04-04Rule 602

Under Rule of Evidence 602, “[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that [she] has personal knowledge of the matter.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (1992). ... Thus, Tammy Peaks’ testimony that the victim did not possess a gun the day he was killed was a mere conclusion and was incompetent, as there was no showing that she had personal knowledge of such a fact.

Rule 601(b) does not disqualify a witness merely because the judge considers her of low mentality; the witness must be unable to communicate or understand the duty to tell the truth.

State v. Cox · filed 1996-07-31Rule 601(b)

We cannot say the record shows that the witness was incapable of expressing herself or was incapable of understanding her duty to tell the truth such that the court should have disqualified her as a witness on its own motion. She was able to describe her extended family and their living arrangement as well as the events of 27 January 1994. The fact that the court felt she was of low mentality did not disqualify her.

Rule 601(c) generally disqualifies an interested person from testifying about oral communications with a decedent, but § 31-10(b) permits a holographic will beneficiary to give relevant testimony bearing on the will’s validity.

In re the Will of Lamparter · filed 1997-07-01Rule 601(c)

Rule 601 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, also known as the Dead Man’s Statute, disqualifies an interested person from testifying “in his own behalf or interest. . . against the executor, administrator or survivor of a deceased person . . . concerning any oral communication between the witness and the deceased person[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601(c) (1992). ... However, we find such testimony competent, relevant, and material under G.S. § 31-10(b) as evidence of the circumstances under which the holographic writing was made. ... Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing the caveators to testify about conversations they had with decedent regarding his will.

Rule 601(c) bars beneficiaries in a will contest from testifying about oral communications with the decedent concerning plans for a new will or specific bequests.

Matter of Will of Lamparter · filed 1998-04-03(c)

Accordingly, we hold that the Dead Man’s Statute, N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601(c), prohibits beneficiaries from testifying as to oral communications they had with the decedent about his intent to make a new will or with regard to specific bequests to be contained in that will, and the trial court erred in permitting the caveators’ five interested witnesses to so testify.

Rule 601(b)(2) disqualifies a witness who cannot understand the duty to tell the truth.

State v. Andrews · filed 1998-11-17Rule 601(b)(2)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601(b) (1992) provides that “[a] person is disqualified to testify as a witness when the court determines that [she] is . . . (2) incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” ... Thus, the trial court was correct when it concluded that Kori was competent to testify.

Rule 601 permits a child to testify when she understands the duty to tell the truth, even if she cannot explain the meaning of placing her hand on the Bible.

State v. Ford · filed 2000-02-15Rule 601(b)(2)

A.C.’s testimony met the standard of Rule 601 and thus we find there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding her competent to testify.

Rule 601(b) disqualifies a witness who cannot be understood or cannot understand the duty to tell the truth, and leaves the competency decision to the trial court's discretion.

In Re Clapp · filed 2000-03-21Rule 601(b)

Rule 601(b) provides: "A person is disqualified to testify as a witness when the court determines that he is ... (1) incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter as to be understood ..., or (2) incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601(b) (Cum.Supp.1998). ... Thus, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding M.H. competent to testify based upon its observation of her testimony.

Rule 601(b) requires an inquiry sufficient to determine whether a witness can communicate about the matter and understands the duty to tell the truth.

State v. Pugh · filed 2000-05-16Rule 601(b)

Based on the exchange between the juvenile court and D.R., we conclude that the juvenile court disqualified D.R. without making an appropriate inquiry into her competency to testify. This voir dire was insufficient to allow the juvenile court to determine whether D.R. was incapable of expressing herself concerning the matter or incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth.

Rule 601(b) requires a child’s competency to testify to turn on the child’s ability to relate events and understand the duty to tell the truth, rather than the potential harm from testifying.

In Re Faircloth · filed 2000-04-04Rule 601(b)

Because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in denying, respondent father’s request to call the children as witnesses, we must reverse the adjudication order in this case and remand the matter to the District Court for a new hearing at which the competence of the children to testify, should they be called as witnesses, shall be determined in accordance with G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601.

Rule 601(c)’s protection against testimony about a conversation with a deceased person is waived when the deceased person’s representative elicits that testimony in a deposition.

Breedlove Ex Rel. Howard v. AEROTRIM · filed 2001-03-20Rule 601(c)

In the present case, defendant elicited evidence of Ms. Howard’s conversation with Mr. Gellert during their deposition of Ms. Howard. The defendant waived any protection afforded by the statute.

Rule 601 permits a child to testify if the child understands the duty to tell the truth.

State v. Beane · filed 2001-09-18Rule 601

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601, “[e]very person is competent to be a witness” unless “the court determines that he is . . . incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601 (a)(b) (1999). Accordingly, all persons, regardless of age, are qualified to testify, unless they lack the capacity to understand the difference between telling the truth and lying.

Rule 602 permits a witness to testify about how certain she is of an identification because her degree of certainty is within her personal knowledge.

State v. Cole · filed 2001-12-18Rule 602

Here, each of the State’s questions were designed to ascertain from Clapp the degree of certainty she attached to the words “sure” and “pretty sure” in relation to what she observed about defendant in Jenkins’ apartment on the evening of 22 May 1998. Such information was within her personal knowledge.

Rules 601, 605, and 403 permit a judicial official who did not preside at trial to testify, subject to the trial court’s discretion to guard against unfair prejudice.

State v. Lewis · filed 2001-11-20

Although judges are competent to testify, there is afear of unfair prejudice. Thus, it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow or not allow a judicial official to testify. ... Although a judicial official should exercise discretion when testifying, we disapprove of such testimony when it gives an opinion as to a person’s condition who had previously appeared before that judicial official. However, in the context of this case, we conclude there was no prejudicial error.

Rule 601 permits a witness who heard and understood statements made in Spanish to testify about them; whether the speaker understood the witness affects the testimony’s weight.

State v. Aquino · filed 2002-03-05Rule 601(a)-(b)

Accordingly, the question of whether Defendant actually understood Ayala is for the jury to decide and goes to the weight to be accorded this testimony, not is admissibility. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Ayala to testify concerning Defendant’s statements during the interviews.

Rule 602 permits identification testimony based on a witness’s personal perception; discrepancies in the identification affect its weight rather than its admissibility.

State v. Poag · filed 2003-08-05Rule 602

The evidence in the record shows that Mrs. Patel had personal knowledge of defendant stemming from her perception of him gained during the robbery. The extent of Mrs. Patel’s identification and the discrepancy between Mrs. Patel’s testimony regarding defendant’s height and his actual height go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissability and is a matter to be considered by the jury.

Rule 601 requires a witness to be capable of expressing himself and to understand the duty to testify truthfully.

State v. Meadows · filed 2003-06-17Rule 601

The sole test for competency is set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601, requiring the witness be capable of expressing himself and understand his duty is to testify truthfully.

Rule 602 permits testimony based on a witness's firsthand observations even when the witness is uncertain about what was perceived.

State v. Michaelis · filed 2005-02-15Rule 602

J.C.'s statements here were similarly competent and admissible, reflecting J.C.'s firsthand observations of his sister during their conversation.

Rule 602 permits a witness to identify a person based on what the witness perceived, including a familiar voice, even if the witness did not see that person.

State v. Watkins · filed 2005-04-05Rule 602

Rule 602 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence does provide that “a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (2003). ... As a result, we conclude that Walter Bigelow had sufficient personal knowledge to identify defendant and that his opinion was rationally based on his perception of the shooting.

Rule 602 permits an eyewitness to identify a person when the witness’s observations provide sufficient personal knowledge.

State v. Tuck · filed 2005-09-06Rule 602

We note that “[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (2003). ... In light of the foregoing evidence, we conclude that Pyrtle had personal knowledge of defendant stemming from her perception of him during the robbery.

Rule 601(c) bars a spouse with a legal interest in the outcome from testifying about oral communications with a decedent.

Taylor v. Abernethy · filed 2005-10-18Rule 601(c)

We therefore hold that plaintiff’s wife was an “interested person” for purposes of Rule 601(c), and as a result, the trial court erred in admitting her testimony concerning oral communications she had with Romer.

Rule 601(c), the dead man's statute, excludes evidence of a deceased person's acts or statements when that person cannot respond.

Forbis v. Neal · filed 2006-01-17Rule 601(c)

We conclude that defendant's affidavit does not violate N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601 (2001). ... Plaintiff does not explain what portions of defendant's affidavit supposedly violate the dead man's statute nor does she show that the court improperly considered incompetent evidence.

Rule 602 allows a witness to identify someone by a familiar voice heard during an event, even if the witness did not see that person.

State v. Watkins · filed 2007-02-06Rule 602

Rule 602 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence does provide that “a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (2003). ... As a result, we conclude that Walter Bigelow had sufficient personal knowledge to identify defendant and that his opinion was rationally based on his perception of the shooting.

Under Rule 601(b), a witness's contradictory statements bear on credibility rather than competency; here, they did not make the failure to hold a second competency hearing plain error.

State v. Holt · filed 2008-01-15Rule 601(b)

Q.M.'s confusion about her own prior statements regarding her father does not rise to the level of plain error. Any contradictory statements would go to her credibility as a witness, not her ability to understand and convey the truth. Considering the trial court's lengthy examination of Q.M., we cannot say that its failure to conduct a second examination amounted to plain error.

Rule 601(c) bars an interested party from testifying about oral communications with a deceased person.

Smith v. Mauldin · filed 2008-07-15Rule 601(c)

A review of the record clearly shows that the court sustained objections to plaintiff's testimony regarding his "understanding" with the decedent only on the basis of Rule 601. Having thus reviewed the record, we hold that the trial court did not err in its application of Rule 601 or regarding the admission of evidence related to plaintiff's claim that there was a failure of consideration.

Rule 601(c) permits a party to testify against his own interest and a disinterested witness to recount overheard conversations with a deceased person, but bars testimony from a spouse with a direct legal interest in the disputed property.

Salter v. Willis · filed 2008-08-05Rule 601(c)

The plain language of Rule 601(c)indicates that even if a witness is a party to the action, the witness is incompetent only if the witness testifies in his own behalf or interest. ... We likewise agree that Mr. Gilley was not disqualified under Rule 601(c) and should be permitted to testify at trial on remand regarding any communications he overheard among Plaintiff, Eugene, and Monroe. ... We therefore hold that the trial court properly excluded Ms. Salter's testimony regarding conversations she overheard among Plaintiff, Monroe, and Eugene.

Rule 602 permits a witness to testify about matters within the witness’s personal knowledge.

State v. Walston · filed 2008-10-07Rule 602

Furthermore, Detective Marshburn’s testimony of Axe’s tracking was admissible as a matter about which he had personal knowledge. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (2007) (stating that in order for a witness to testify to a matter, he must have personal knowledge of the matter). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting Detective Marshburn’s testimony about Axe’s tracking.

Rule 602 makes an impairment opinion inadmissible when it rests solely on hearsay and conjecture rather than the witness’s personal knowledge.

State v. Cook · filed 2008-10-07Rule 602

We agree with defendant that this portion of Trooper Carroll’s testimony was inadmissable because it was not based on Trooper Carroll’s personal knowledge, but based solely upon hearsay and conjecture.

Rule 601(b) permits an elderly witness to testify when the witness understands the duty to tell the truth, even if some answers are vague or unclear.

State v. Forte · filed 2010-09-07Rule 601(b)

This testimony supports the implicit finding of the trial judge — who was present and able to observe Lindsey’s demeanor firsthand — that the witness was competent. We are therefore unable to say that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding Lindsey competent to testify at trial.

Rule 601(b) allows a child to testify when the child can communicate about the matter and understands the duty to tell the truth; inconsistent or nonresponsive answers alone do not establish incompetence.

State v. Carter · filed 2011-03-01Rule 601(b)

Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that H.S. was competent to testify at trial.

Rule 602 permits testimony when evidence supports a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.

State v. Warren · filed 2013-03-05Rule 602

Patel testified to his knowledge of the duties of defendant in the position of general manager of the Comfort Inn West, and given that knowledge, his testimony that defendant generated the deposit summaries and put together the bank deposits was properly within the scope of his personal knowledge as contemplated by Rule 602.

Rule 602 permits a trial court to prevent a witness from being questioned about the contents of a report she has never seen.

State v. Oliphant · filed 2013-08-06Rule 602

We hold that the trial court’s ruling preventing the examination of the victim concerning the contents of a probation violation report that she had not previously seen was not an abuse of discretion. See N.C. Evid. R. 602 (2011) (“A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that [s]he has personal knowledge of the matter.”).

Rule 602 permits testimony about a defendant’s approximate age when a close relationship gives the witness personal knowledge of it.

State v. Macmoran · filed 2014-01-07Rule 602

Both Eric and his mother also testified from their personal knowledge regarding defendant’s age, based upon their close friendly relationship for over a year.

Rule 602 requires a witness to have personally perceived the matter testified to; speculation is inadmissible.

State v. Robinson · filed 2014-07-15Rule 602

Personal knowledge for the purposes of Rule 602 requires personal perception of an act or occurrence, not mere speculation.

Under Rule 601(b), a child who understands the duty to tell the truth may be competent to testify despite difficulty explaining that understanding.

State v. Davis · filed 2015-05-19Rule 601(b)

As the trial court noted, Nadia may have had some trouble verbalizing the concepts discussed. Nonetheless, her testimony demonstrates that she understood the concept of telling the truth versus telling a lie, as well as the ramifications of both. Given the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in determining that Nadia was competent to testify.

Rule 602 permits a witness with personal knowledge of an interview to testify about it, including by reading and clarifying portions of a transcript.

State v. Gettys · filed 2015-10-20Rule 602

An individual who has personal knowledge of a matter may testify directly about that matter at trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 ... Because Detective Carter had personal knowledge of Dunlap’s interview, we hold that the trial court did not err by allowing her to read from the transcript and clarify portions of the recording to the jury.

Rule 602 requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that a witness has personal knowledge of a matter; that knowledge may be inferred from the witness’s duties and review of records.

In re: Collins · filed 2017-02-07Rule 602

Accordingly, Martin’s affidavit was based on her personal knowledge and respondent’s argument is overruled.

Rule 602 requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that a witness has personal knowledge of the matter, but admitting testimony without that showing warrants relief only if the appellant shows prejudice.

Jarrett v. Jarrett · filed 2016-09-06Rule 602

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (2015), "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." However, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by allowing this testimony, defendant must still meet the burden of showing he was prejudiced by its admission. Here, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the admission of the challenged testimony, as the challenged testimony did not form the basis of the trial court's DVPO.

Rule 104(e) does not require a preliminary finding that a witness is credible before otherwise competent testimony may be admitted for the jury to weigh.

State v. Hyman · filed 2017-02-21Rule 104(e)

Admissibility is, of course, a separate issue but one that does not depend upon a preliminary finding by the court that a witness's testimony is credible.

Rule 601(b) does not disqualify a drug-impaired witness who can express himself understandably and understands the duty to tell the truth.

State v. Burgess · filed 2020-05-05(b)

Here, defendant has not demonstrated that Mr. Asay was incapable of expressing himself or incapable of understanding his duties to tell the truth.

Rule 602 permits a detective to testify about an extradition when his involvement in the search and oversight of the case establish sufficient personal knowledge.

State v. Graham · filed 2020-03-17Rule 602

This constitutes sufficient personal knowledge to testify concerning defendant’s extradition under Rule 602.

Rule 602 requires personal knowledge; a witness who viewed only the same surveillance footage as the jury could not testify about what the defendant was holding in it.

State v. Dove · filed 2020-12-01Rule 602

It is undisputed that Thompson’s testimony that Defendant was holding a gun at Bob’s No. 2 on the evening of Evans’s death was not based on Thompson’s firsthand knowledge or perception, but rather solely on her viewing of surveillance video footage and screen shots extracted from the video footage. ... Thus, the admission of Thompson’s testimony was error.

Rule 602 permits testimony based on a witness’s personal knowledge, including what the witness heard and observed while monitoring controlled buys.

State v. Booth · filed 2022-10-18Rule 602

However, in light of Davenport’s extensive testimony from personal knowledge, and Defendant’s ability to cross-examine Davenport regarding the contents of the search warrant, any error in the admission of Davenport’s testimony regarding the controlled buys was not prejudicial and thus, not plain error.

Rule 601(b) disqualifies a witness who cannot be understood or cannot understand the duty to tell the truth; a person competent to testify has the mental capacity to confess.

State v. Shytle · filed 1989-01-04Rule 601(b)

There is no dispute that the defendant was capable of expressing herself concerning the matter so that she could be understood. There was no evidence that she was incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. The defendant would have been competent to testify and she was competent to confess.

Rule 608(b) leaves the trial court discretion to allow cross-examination about a witness’s specific acts when they are relevant to truthfulness.

State v. Jordan · filed 1993-03-12Rule 608(b)

As the rule provides, it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination of a witness about his specific acts if the acts are relevant to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

Rule 608 bars testimony on direct examination about a witness’s specific acts offered to establish that witness’s truthfulness when character for truthfulness is not in issue.

State v. Baymon · filed 1993-01-05Rule 608(b)

Because Christina's character for truthfulness was not "in issue" in defendant's trial, and because the specific instances of Christina's conduct which illustrated Christina's character for truthfulness were related on direct examination of Christina's teacher by the State, under our Rules of Evidence, such testimony should not have been admitted.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about specific conduct bearing on a witness’s truthfulness; general misconduct complaints do not qualify, but an allegation that the witness lied to superiors does.

State v. Burton · filed 1992-12-15Rule 608(b)

We find that the first two questions were properly excluded by the trial court because they do not address Sergeant Tiffin’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The third question, however, does specifically address the question of Sergeant Tiffin’s veracity and should have been allowed.

Rule 608(b) generally excludes evidence of a witness’s sexual behavior as proof of truthfulness, but a party may open the door to questions about that behavior.

State v. Hudson · filed 1992-04-22Rule 608(b)

Indeed, such extrinsic evidence rarely will be probative of a witness’ character for truthfulness, as is required by Rule 608(b). ... Thus, seen in context, the State’s inquiries regarding defendant’s sexual proclivities were not impermissible.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination about a key witness’s suicide attempts, psychiatric history, and drug habit when that evidence bears on the witness’s credibility.

State v. Williams · filed 1992-01-27Rule 611(b)

We hold that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence because it was admissible impeachment evidence under Rule 611(b).

Rule 607 allows a party to impeach its own witness with prior inconsistent statements that concern a material issue.

State v. Goodson · filed 1991-02-19Rule 607

It is well known that the Rules of Evidence allow a witness to be impeached by his own prior inconsistent statements. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 607 (1983). ... The prior statements used by the State to impeach the witness were not collateral to the case but related directly to the connection between defendant Goodson and the victim on the day in question.

Rule 609(b) requires specific findings showing why the probative value of a conviction more than ten years old substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect before it may be used to impeach a witness.

State v. Hensley · filed 1985-10-01Rule 609(b)

We interpret this part of Rule 609(b) to mean that the trial court must make findings as to the specific facts and circumstances which demonstrate the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.

Rule 609(a) permits cross-examination about a witness’s prior convictions, including questions that clarify the nature of an admitted conviction.

State v. Rathbone · filed 1985-12-03Rule 609(a)

For purposes of impeachment, a witness, including a defendant, may be cross-examined with respect to prior convictions. ... The prosecutor’s question as to whether the assault involved a shooting was basically no more than an inquiry into whether the conviction was, in reality, one for a more serious offense, i.e., assault with a deadly weapon.

Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic evidence offered to challenge a witness’s denial of specific misconduct raised on cross-examination.

State v. McClintick · filed 1986-02-18Rule 608(b)

Moreover, the state's query into each matter ended upon the defendant's flat denial, so not only was the rule against offering extrinsic evidence to challenge defendant's denials not violated, State v. Shane, 304 N.C. 643, 653, 285 S.E.2d 813, 819; 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 111, at 410; N.C.R.Evid. 608(b), but defendant's denials were conclusive and made the questions harmless.

Rule 608(b) permits impeachment through cross-examination about a witness’s unduly litigious conduct when the circumstances suggest exaggeration.

Thompson v. James · filed 1986-05-06Rule 608(b)

An important issue in the case was the extent of plaintiff s injury and even if he had one, and contacting his lawyer before he did his doctor could indicate that his injury was not as severe as he claimed; it could also indicate, along with the other evidence discussed below, that he has an unduly litigious nature, a proper ground for impeachment, we believe, in a case based on circumstances that suggest exaggeration. 1 Brandis N.C. Evidence Sec. 43, p. 164 (2d rev. ed. 1982); G.S. 8C-1, Rule 608(b), N.C. Evidence Code.

Rule 609(a) prohibits using a conviction punishable by no more than 60 days’ confinement to attack a witness’s credibility.

Alexander v. Robertson · filed 1986-06-17Rule 609(a)

The appellant also assigns error to the defendant’s eliciting from the plaintiff testimony on cross examination that he had been convicted of speeding. This was error. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 609(a) prohibits the admission of evidence of crimes which are not punishable by more than 60 days confinement for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness. We do not believe this error was prejudicial.

A witness’s prior statement used to impeach her testimony is not substantive evidence under Rules 801 and 802.

State v. Davis · filed 1986-07-02Rules 801 and 802

Although Ms. Brown referred to a “struggle” in her initial statement to the police, that statement was used in an attempt to impeach her trial testimony and was not substantive evidence.

Section 8C-1 does not permit expert or character testimony declaring that a witness testified truthfully; assessing credibility belongs to the jury.

State v. Holloway · filed 1986-08-19Rules 702, 405(a), and 608

The evidence did not meet the requirements for expert testimony as it concerned the credibility of a witness, a field in which jurors are supreme and require no assistance, rather than some fact involving “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.” G.S. 8C-1, Rule 702, N.C. Evidence Code. And as character evidence the testimony violated the provisions of G.S. 8C-1, Rules 405(a) and 608 of the N.C. Evidence Code, as well as the holding in State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E. 2d 565 (1986).

Rule 608(b) does not permit impeachment through questions about sexual conduct that is not probative of a witness’s truthfulness.

State v. Scott · filed 1986-08-29Rule 608(b)

Thus, the testimony elicited from defendant during cross-examination, being instances of sexual relations or proclivities, falls outside the bounds of admissibility under Rule 608(b).

Rules 608(a) and 405(a) prohibit expert opinion testimony about a witness's credibility.

State v. Kim · filed 1986-11-18Rules 608(a) and 405(a)

Rules 608 and 405(a), read together, forbid an expert's opinion testimony as to the credibility of a witness.

Rule 803(4) permits a child rape victim’s statements to a physician when made for and pertinent to diagnosis or treatment; Rules 608(a) and 405(a) exclude a physician’s opinion that the child is believable.

State v. Aguallo · filed 1986-11-18

We find that the child's statements to the physician were for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment and were thus admissible under Rule 803(4) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence (N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) (Cum.Supp.1985)). Because we also find that the physician's opinion testimony as to the believability of the child should have been excluded under Rules 608 and 405(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence (N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 608 & 405(a) (Cum.Supp.1985)), we order a new trial.

Section 8C-1, Rules 405(a) and 608(a), bars expert opinion testimony about a witness’s credibility, including a child witness’s credibility.

State v. Jenkins · filed 1986-12-30Rules 405(a) and 608(a)

Rules 405(a) and 608(a), read together, forbid an expert’s opinion testimony as to the credibility of a witness. ... Dr. Coffey’s testimony in the present case is clearly expert testimony as to the credibility of the two young witnesses to which he referred. The court, therefore, erred in allowing it.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about a witness’s false sworn statement to challenge the witness’s credibility.

State v. Springer · filed 1986-12-30Rule 608(b)

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination of a witness as to specific instances of his conduct, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility. A specific instance of false swearing is clearly probative of untruthfulness. Thus, it was permissible for the prosecutor to impeach and cast doubt upon Stokes’ other testimony by cross-examining Stokes concerning his false statement under oath to the magistrate.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about specific conduct probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness.

State v. Clark · filed 1987-03-04(b)

It appears that this testimony should have been admitted under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) as probative of Givens’ character for untruthfulness.

Rule 608(a) allows a witness with personal knowledge to give an opinion about another witness’s character for truthfulness without the foundation required for reputation testimony.

State v. Morrison · filed 1987-01-20Rule 608(a)

With the introduction of Rule 608(a) of the Rules of Evidence in 1984, the long-standing North Carolina rule against allowing a witness to testify as to his own opinion of another’s character for truth and veracity was abrogated. ... In the case at bar, Ms. Hayward had formed an opinion based on personal knowledge gained in the course of her position as Ms. Jenkins’ supervisor. This threshold requirement was all that was needed in order to allow her to testify as to her opinion of the prosecutrix’ character for truth and veracity, and the trial court’s exclusion of her testimony for failure to meet a requirement was error.

Rule 610 bars using a witness’s religious beliefs to attack the witness’s credibility, even if the beliefs might bear on truthfulness.

State v. Kimbrell · filed 1987-01-20Rule 610

Accordingly, even assuming that this evidence was probative of defendant’s veracity as the State contends, it was nevertheless inadmissible under Rule 610 for that purpose.

Rule 607 permits a party to impeach its own witness, but a prior statement cannot be used for impeachment when the witness gives no testimony inconsistent with it.

State v. Platt · filed 1987-04-07Rule 607

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 607 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence a party may impeach his own witness. ... In essence, there was no testimony by Townsend for the State to impeach. We thus hold that this statement was not admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment.

Rules 608 and 609 do not permit cross-examination about possession of allegedly stolen property when the witness had no conviction and did not know the property was stolen.

Frye v. Anderson · filed 1987-06-02

Since plaintiff was not convicted of possessing stolen property, these questions were not admissible under G.S. 8C-1, Rule 609. Likewise, these questions were not admissible under G.S. 8C-1, Rule 608 since the possession of a VCR that plaintiff did not know to be stolen is not a “bad act” probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.

Rule 405(a) permits the State to cross examine a defendant’s character witness about relevant specific instances of the defendant’s conduct.

State v. Gappins · filed 1987-07-07Rule 405(a)

We note that the second sentence of subsection (a) of Rule 405 represents a departure from prior case law, in that it allows a witness who has given character evidence for the defendant to be cross examined by the State about relevant specific instances of the defendant's conduct.

Rule 608(b) permits impeachment based on a witness’s conduct indicating that an earlier claim was untrue.

McNeill v. Durham County ABC Board · filed 1987-09-01Rule 608(b)

His reversal of position about the incriminating effect of his testimony was a fair target for impeachment as conduct indicating that his earlier claim was not true. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 608(b).

Rules 610 and 403 exclude questioning about a witness’s religious beliefs when it has little probative value and risks unfair prejudice.

State v. Kimbrell · filed 1987-10-07Rules 610 and 403

The Court of Appeals found the evidence to be inadmissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 610 and 403, but held that its admission did not constitute reversible error. We agree that the evidence was inadmissible. However, we find that defendant was indeed prejudiced by its admission, and we therefore reverse.

Rule 609(b)’s limits on using older convictions to impeach credibility do not prevent use of an older conviction to directly contradict a defendant’s testimony about his record.

State v. Blankenship · filed 1988-04-05Rule 609(b)

Rule 609(b) tempers this broad rule by disallowing the admission of convictions more than ten years old except under “exceptional circumstances.” ... Here the State’s question to defendant about his 1972 conviction did not seek to impeach his character in general. The State offered the prior conviction evidence to directly impeach defendant based on an assertion made by him during direct examination. ... Applying the Johnson rationale here, we find no error in the admission of defendant’s 1972 conviction.

Rule 607 permits the State to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement when it uses the statement in good faith for impeachment.

State v. Hyleman · filed 1988-04-05Rule 607

There is no showing that the prior inconsistent statement was used for any purpose other than impeachment. The State acted in good faith, and there was no error in allowing impeachment.

Rule 405(a) permits cross-examination of a character witness about relevant specific conduct, but a mere criminal charge cannot be used to impeach the witness.

State v. Martin · filed 1988-05-05Rule 405(a)

Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant put on evidence of his good character by the testimony of Bishop Jones, we note that Rule 405(a) allows questions of a character witness on cross-examination concerning specific instances of conduct of the person whose character is in issue. ... The fact that the defendant had been charged with a crime does not show he is guilty of the crime. The objection to this question should have been sustained.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about specific conduct at the trial court’s discretion when the conduct bears on a witness’s truthfulness; evading, resisting, and assaulting an officer do not.

State v. Harrison · filed 1988-07-05Rule 608(b)

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) permits specific instances of conduct to be inquired into on cross-examination, at the trial court’s discretion, if probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. ... These acts do not involve fraud, trickery, or deceit.

Rules 608(b) and 403 permit a trial court to allow cross-examination about prior conduct that bears on a defendant’s truthfulness, subject to its discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice.

State v. Darden · filed 1988-10-06Rule 608(b); Rule 403

The accuracy of defendant’s assertion that he had not injured anyone else was probative of his truthfulness or untruthfulness, and the trial court thus could, in its discretion, allow cross-examination regarding the assertion. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1986). We find no abuse of discretion in the cross-examination allowed. We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the refusal to prohibit the cross-examination on the ground that the probative value of the evidence produced thereby was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Rule 608(b) permits inquiry into a witness's specific conduct to attack credibility only when the conduct bears on truthfulness.

State v. Clark · filed 1989-03-02Rule 608(b)

The district attorney's question was a bald attempt to attack defendant's credibility with a specific instance of reprehensible conduct short of a conviction. This is prohibited under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence except when such evidence is probative of the witness's credibility. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1988). There can be no question that defendant's admission to having smoked marijuana had no conceivable tendency to prove or disprove her truthfulness.

Rule 609(b) requires findings of specific facts and circumstances before a conviction more than ten years old may be admitted to impeach a witness.

State v. Farris · filed 1989-05-16Rule 609(b)

In the present case the trial court clearly failed to make appropriate findings of specific facts and circumstances to support its determination that the probative value of the convictions outweighs their prejudicial effect. This failure to make the necessary findings of fact amounted to reversible error.

Rule 607 permits a party to impeach its own witness with a prior statement, but courts must apply it cautiously to prevent improper use of out-of-court statements.

State v. Ayudkya · filed 1989-12-19Rule 607

As this court has stated previously, there is a danger that Rule 607, if not applied cautiously, would make “fair game” almost any out-of-court statement made by a witness. ... Though not offered as substantive evidence, the prior statement was admitted for a limited purpose, impeachment or corroboration, whichever the jury found. We find no merit in defendant’s argument that the statement was erroneously admitted.

Rule 607 allows a party to attack its own witness’s credibility, but the party may not use extrinsic evidence to contradict the witness on a collateral matter.

State v. Jerrells · filed 1990-05-01Rule 607

We are bound to follow the rule in Williams and conclude that it was prejudicial error to allow the State to use extrinsic evidence from Detective Early to impeach David Noell. As we previously noted, when a witness is cross-examined on a collateral matter, the party who draws out unfavorable answers will not be permitted to contradict them using other testimony.

Rule 608(b) permits questioning about a witness’s specific conduct to attack credibility only when the conduct bears on truthfulness; past abusive behavior does not qualify.

State v. Brooks · filed 1994-02-01Rule 608(b)

The evidence of past abusive behavior is not admissible pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b), which allows into evidence specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking his credibility, when the evidence is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.

The Rules of Evidence bar questioning about remote prior conduct when its slight probative value is outweighed by prejudice, and bar repetitive questioning that harasses a witness or needlessly consumes time.

Weston v. Daniels · filed 1994-04-19Rule 608(b), Rule 403, Rule 611(a)

These inquiries related to an extremely remote event, they were minimally probative when compared to their prejudicial effect, and were therefore proscribed by Rule 403. Further, the continued repetitive questioning regarding the B. A. S, S. tournament reflects the harassment and “needless consumption of time” that Rule 611(a) prohibits.

Rule 608(b) permits a witness’s memory to be refreshed with documents outside the jury’s presence when no extrinsic evidence of the conduct is admitted before the jury.

State v. Robertson · filed 1994-06-21Rule 608(b)

No extrinsic evidence of defendant’s pre-trial release was admitted before the jury. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was not improperly impeached under Rule 608(b).

Rule 608(b) prohibits direct testimony about specific acts offered to support a witness's character for truthfulness.

State v. Baymon · filed 1994-07-29Rule 608(b)

Under this rule direct examination of a witness concerning specific instances of conduct pertaining to a witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is prohibited.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about a witness’s specific act of deception when it bears on the witness’s truthfulness.

State v. Bell · filed 1994-12-09Rule 608(b)

This line of questioning should have been allowed as bearing on the witness’ propensity to deceive and defraud others.

Rule 608(b) permits limited cross-examination about a witness’s false statement on an affidavit when it bears on truthfulness.

State v. Larrimore · filed 1995-05-05Rule 608(b)

We hold that the limited nature of the questions permitted by the trial court fall within the parameters of Rule 608(b).

Rule 611(b) permits impeachment with evidence that a witness’s mental or physical impairment affected the ability to observe and remember events.

State v. Alkano · filed 1995-06-20Rule 611(b)

However, a witness may be impeached under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b), by evidence showing mental or physical impairment affecting his ability to observe and remember the events in question.

Rule 607 permits a party to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement when the witness unexpectedly changes her account.

State v. Williams · filed 1995-07-28Rule 607

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State was surprised at trial by Dalton’s change of her version of the facts, and the trial court properly allowed the State to impeach Dalton with her prior inconsistent statement.

Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic proof of a witness’s specific acts but permits questioning about another witness’s truthfulness when the witness under cross-examination has testified about that character.

State v. Walls · filed 1995-11-03Rule 608(b)

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) provides that specific instances of the conduct of a witness may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. However, in the discretion of the trial court, such instances of conduct may be inquired into on cross-examination when the specific instances of conduct relate to “the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b).

Rule 608(a) permits a law enforcement officer to give opinion testimony supporting a witness’s credibility after it has been attacked.

State v. Jones · filed 1996-02-09Rule 608(a)

We cannot hold that this is a sufficient reason for us to write an exception into Rule 608(a) and say the rule does not apply to law enforcement officers.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about a witness’s prior deception when it bears on truthfulness and is not too remote.

State v. Baldwin · filed 1997-03-04Rule 608(b)

The trial court, therefore, erred in denying the defendant the opportunity to examine Barren with respect to the 1992 Kennerson investigation as this evidence was admissible under both Rule 608(b) and Rule 403.

A witness’s prior statement that materially contradicts trial testimony cannot be admitted to corroborate that testimony.

State v. Frogge · filed 1997-03-07Rule 613

In the present case, we conclude that Tew’s prior statement contained information manifestly contradictory to his testimony at trial and did not corroborate the testimony. Thus, we hold that it was error for the trial court to admit Tew’s statement to the police for the purpose of corroborating Tew’s testimony.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about alleged forgery and unauthorized cashing of a check when the inquiry bears on a witness’s character for untruthfulness, subject to the trial court’s discretion.

State v. Bishop · filed 1997-07-24Rule 608(b)

The “taking” referred to by the prosecutor’s inquiry involved the allegation that defendant forged Treadway’s name on both a loan application and a check and that she cashed the check without Treadway’s permission. We conclude that the purpose of the prosecutor’s inquiry was to show conduct indicative of defendant’s character for untruthfulness and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 608(b) by allowing the inquiry.

Prior consistent statements that corroborate and add weight to a witness’s trial testimony are admissible under North Carolina’s hearsay rules.

State v. Lee · filed 1998-07-09Rule 801(c)

Contrary to defendant’s contention, all of the above statements save the first item are admissible in evidence as prior consistent statements which corroborate and add weight to the trial testimony of Brenda Finch.

Rule 806 permits an inconsistent statement to impeach a hearsay declarant even when the declarant does not testify and the statement is not otherwise admissible hearsay.

State v. Small · filed 1998-12-01Rule 806

Because the testimony could have come in had Coxum been on the stand, Rule 806 allows its admission to impeach his credibility even in his absence. Thus, regardless of whether the State’s evidence was admissible hearsay or not, the evidence was still admissible to impeach or contradict defendant’s hearsay evidence.

Rule 608(b) allows inquiry into specific conduct bearing on a witness’s truthfulness during cross-examination, but does not allow proof of that conduct through another witness’s direct testimony.

State v. Wiggins · filed 2000-03-07Rule 608(b)

Defense counsel’s inquiry into the specific instance of conduct did not occur on cross-examination, but rather on direct examination. Therefore, Hasty’s voir dire testimony was not admissible under Rule 608(b).

Rule 607 permits a witness’s prior inconsistent statements to be used for impeachment when the witness later testifies inconsistently.

State v. Miller · filed 2000-04-18

Assuming, without deciding, that this testimony should have been excluded as hearsay at the time it was offered, R.A.H.’s subsequent testimony on defendant’s behalf, during which she denied sexual contact with him prior to their marriage, rendered her earlier statements relevant and admissible as prior inconsistent statements bearing upon her credibility. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 607.

Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination about an expert witness’s compensation to explore possible bias.

State v. Lawrence · filed 2000-06-16Rule 611(b)

The subject of compensation of a defendant’s expert witness is an appropriate matter for cross-examination. Rule 611(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence permits cross-examination of a witness “on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1999).

Rules 608(b) and 611(b) permit cross-examination about prior statements relevant to a witness’s credibility.

State v. McGill · filed 2000-12-19Rule 608(b); Rule 611(b)

R.H.’s statement could have been inquired into by Defendant on cross-examination of R.H. to attack R.H.’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1999). ... G.H.’s statement to a social worker in 1994 may have been inquired into on cross-examination by Defendant. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1999).

Rule 608(b) does not permit impeachment with a witness’s burglary conduct because that conduct is not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.

State v. McEachin · filed 2001-02-06Rule 608(b)

In this case, the State attempted to impeach Wilkerson pursuant to Rule 608(b) by questioning him regarding a pending burglary charge. Wilkerson testified he broke into someone’s house during the nighttime and, as a result, was charged with burglary. Evidence of this conduct by Wilkerson was not probative of his propensity for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

A witness’s prior lie to police about another robbery is conduct probative of untruthfulness under Rule 608(b).

State v. Brown · filed 2002-02-19Rule 608(b)

Here, defendant sought to inquire as to whether an eyewitness to the robbery had, on a prior occasion, lied to police officers about his involvement in a separate robbery. Evidence of such conduct would, of course, tend to establish a witness’ character for untruthfulness.

Rule 806 permits a party to impeach a hearsay declarant with evidence that would have been proper if the declarant had testified.

State v. Canady · filed 2002-03-07Rule 806

Once the trial court permitted Carter to testify on direct examination to these details, the trial court should have permitted defendant to present any evidence that would have been proper to impeach Butler or Blackwell if either of them had testified. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 806 (1999). Accordingly, because the questions defendant proposed would have been proper if Butler or Blackwell had testified, the trial court erred in failing to allow defendant’s questions.

Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic evidence of a witness's specific conduct offered to attack credibility, apart from criminal convictions governed by Rule 609.

North Carolina State Bar v. Gilbert · filed 2002-07-16Rule 608(b)

We note that Ms. Pologruto's tax records would not have been admissible under Rule 608(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 608(b) states that apart from criminal convictions governed by Rule 609, specific instances of the conduct of a witness that are introduced to attack the witness's credibility may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. Since no criminal conviction resulted from Ms. Pologruto's alleged tax fraud, no extrinsic evidence, such as her tax records, would have been admissible.

Rule 608(a)(2) permits evidence supporting a person’s character for truthfulness after that person’s credibility has been attacked, even if the person did not testify but an admitted statement was contradicted.

State v. Marecek · filed 2002-09-03Rule 608(a)(2)

Therefore, even though defendant did not testify, his credibility was impugned, and he should have been allowed to offer evidence regarding his character for truthfulness.

Rule 613 permits a prior consistent statement to corroborate trial testimony when the statement does not manifestly contradict that testimony; the statement’s timing affects its weight rather than its admissibility.

State v. Alexander · filed 2002-09-03Rule 613

As Handy’s trial testimony was consistent with his prior statement, the statement was admissible as corroborative evidence. The fact that the prior statement was made two weeks before trial goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.

Rule 806 permits a hearsay declarant’s credibility to be attacked as if the declarant had testified, including through evidence of a prior conviction elicited from the witness who relayed the statement.

State v. McConico · filed 2002-11-05Rule 806

However, pursuant to Rule 806, once defendant’s statement was admitted into evidence through the testimony of Valentien, the State was allowed to attack defendant’s credibility the same as if defendant had testified in court. Thus, testimony of defendant’s prior conviction was not inconsistent with Rule 609(a) because it was properly elicited from Valentien, the witness who took the place of defendant offering live testimony.

Rule 608(b) does not permit cross-examination about an alleged marijuana sale when it does not bear on the witness’s truthfulness.

State v. Taylor · filed 2002-12-03(b)

In the case before us, the record fails to show the relevance of defendant’s sale of marijuana to his veracity as a witness and should have been excluded. Whether or not defendant sold marijuana to his neighbor is not probative of defendant’s truthfulness in this case.

Rule 607 permits a witness to be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, including through another witness’s testimony when the inconsistency is material to an issue at trial.

State v. Stokes · filed 2003-06-13Rule 607

We next consider whether Varner was properly called as a rebuttal witness. “Under certain circumstances a witness may be impeached by proof of prior conduct or statements which are inconsistent with the witness’s testimony.” State v. Whitley, 311 N.C. 656, 663, 319 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1984); see also N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 607 (2001). We have held that when a witness is confronted with prior statements that are inconsistent with the witness’ testimony, the witness’ answers are final as to collateral matters, but where the inconsistencies are material to the issue at hand in the trial, the witness’ testimony may be contradicted by other testimony. State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 192-93, 250 S.E.2d 197, 203 (1978). There can be no doubt that any statement defendant made to Varner about his treatment of Alex on the night of Alex’s death is material to the central issue of this trial. Moreover, the impeaching evidence pertained to the substance of defendant’s statement. See State v. Williams, 322 N.C. 452, 456, 368 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1988). Accordingly, we hold that Varner’s testimony rebutting defendant’s cross-examination responses to the prosecutor was properly admitted.

Rule 608(b) bars cross-examining a witness about another witness’s specific conduct to attack that person’s character for truthfulness unless the witness being questioned has testified about that character.

In re Oliver · filed 2003-08-05Rule 608(b)

However, Rule 608(b) prevents defendant from cross-examining Principal Person about specific instances of Umstead’s conduct for the purpose of attacking the child’s character for truthfulness if the principal has not already testified regarding that character.

Rule 608(b) prohibits using another witness’s testimony as extrinsic evidence to attack a witness’s credibility.

State v. Johnson · filed 2003-12-02Rule 608(b)

While Defendant could have used cross-examination to challenge Pegues’s credibility, North Carolina statute prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence, i.e., the testimony of another witness, to attack a witness’ credibility. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b). Therefore, we uphold the trial court’s exclusion of Lasko’s testimony.

Rule 607 permits a party to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement without a formal finding of surprise or a declaration that the witness is hostile.

State v. Jacobs · filed 2005-10-18Rule 607

However, these “technical requirements” were abolished by the adoption of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 607. ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err either by allowing Parker and Brayboy to refresh their memory through their prior custodial statements or by allowing the State to impeach them through use of the statements.

Rule 607 permits a party to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement when the witness admits making it and the statement is not collateral.

State v. Searcy · filed 2006-02-07Rule 607

First and most significantly, Katy did not deny making the prior statement. Unlike the statement of the witness in Hunt, Katy's statement was therefore not a collateral matter and could be used for impeachment purposes.

Rule 613 requires disclosure of a witness’s prior statement to opposing counsel on request; without proof of a request, failure to disclose it does not violate the rule.

State v. Turner · filed 2006-05-02Rule 613

Absent proof defense counsel asked for and failed to receive the contents of defendant's prior statement, there is no violation of N.C. R. Evid. 613.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about a witness’s false statements to police when they bear on truthfulness, but bars extrinsic evidence of those statements.

State v. Browning · filed 2006-05-16Rule 608(b)

In the present case, the State did not offer extrinsic evidence of defendant’s false statements. The State, pursuant to Rule 608(b), inquired into defendant’s false statements on cross-examination of defendant.

Section 8C-1 permits opinion testimony about a witness’s character for truthfulness when the opinion witness has personal knowledge; proof of a specific lie is unnecessary.

State v. Hernendez · filed 2007-07-03Rules 405(a) and 608(a)

Under North Carolina law, however, such a foundation is not required for opinion testimony as to a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, nor must a witness be shown to have been untruthful on a particular occasion in order to allow such testimony. Rather, Defendant needed to show only that each of the three witnesses had personal knowledge of the complaining witness and that the three had consequently formed an opinion as to her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

Rule 608 allows evidence of a witness’s truthful character after that character has been attacked; a defamation defendant’s truthfulness is at issue in the suit.

Blyth v. McCrary · filed 2007-07-17Rule 608(a)(2)

“Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608. An action for defamation necessarily alleges that the defendant has made a false statement. ... Thus, a defendant’s character for truthfulness is always at issue in a defamation suit. ... Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it admitted testimony concerning defendants’ reputations for truthfulness.

Rule 608(a) permits evidence of a witness's truthful character after cross-examination sufficiently attacks the witness's credibility.

State v. Hagen · filed 2008-01-15Rule 608(a)

Under these facts, we hold that defendant's trial counsel's attempts to impeach J.W.'s credibility through cross-examination were sufficient to constitute an attack on J.W.'s credibility such that the State was permitted to present evidence as to his truthfulness. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, much less commit plain error, under Rule 608(a).

Rule 403 does not justify excluding cross-examination about a crucial witness’s prior difficulty recalling whether events actually occurred when that evidence bears on credibility.

State v. Whaley · filed 2008-01-25Rule 403

We agree and hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding such testimony under Rule 403. ... The excluded testimony here, specifically the victim’s prior indication that she had difficulty recalling whether certain events actually occurred, was exactly such evidence and should have been admitted.

Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of conduct offered solely to attack a witness’s credibility.

State v. Lee · filed 2008-04-01Rule 608(b)

We discern no other purpose for this testimony than to attack defendant’s credibility, which brings it squarely within the prohibition of Rule 608(b) as discussed above. The admission of this testimony was error.

Rule 607 permits a party to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement, but a statement admitted solely for impeachment is not substantive evidence.

State v. Batchelor · filed 2008-05-06Rule 607

However, because the prior inconsistent statements were admitted solely to impeach Mr. Sykes’s testimony that Defendant was not involved in the robbery, Mr. Sykes’s prior inconsistent statements were not admitted as substantive evidence.

Rule 608(b) restricts extrinsic proof of specific conduct offered to attack a witness’s credibility, but does not bar evidence of that conduct admitted for another relevant purpose under Rule 404(b).

Jackson v. Carland · filed 2008-09-02Rule 608(b)

“Rule 608(b) governs reference to specific instances of conduct only on cross-examination regarding the credibility of any witness and prohibits proof by extrinsic evidence.” ... However, under Rule 404(b), “evidence regarding extrinsic acts is not limited to cross-examination and may be proved by extrinsic evidence as well as through cross-examination.” ... As we have previously discussed, the aforementioned testimony was relevant to show Chance’s motivation in leaving the scene of the accident. Therefore, we find defendants’ assignments of error to be without merit.

Rules 405(a) and 608 bar expert opinions on a witness’s credibility, but a defendant cannot obtain a new trial based on an opinion elicited by the defendant’s own cross-examination.

State v. Crocker · filed 2009-06-02Rules 405(a) and 608

“This Court has repeatedly held that N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608 and N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 405(a), when read together, forbid an expert’s opinion testimony as to the credibility of a witness.” ... Defendant’s cross-examination was designed to elicit the type of response Dr. Lowe provided; therefore, defendant cannot now contend that Dr. Lowe’s response, which might have rightfully been excluded had it been offered by the State, unfairly prejudices defendant and warrants a new trial.

Rules 405(a) and 608 bar expert testimony that vouches for a witness’s truthfulness.

State v. Webb · filed 2009-06-16Rules 405(a), 608

The Court concluded that this testimony violated Rules 405(a) and 608 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and, as such, a new trial was required. ... Thus, Dr. List’s commentary on the truthfulness of the victim was error, and its admission over objection requires a new trial.

Rule 608(b) does not permit cross-examination about alleged misconduct when the proposed evidence is not probative of the witness’s truthfulness or untruthfulness.

State v. McNair · filed 2009-08-18Rule 608(b)

Significantly, the conduct in question that defendant sought to elicit as probative of Hope's credibility is based on a statement by an unidentified witness, and as such, could not be admitted as probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Therefore, cross-examination of Hope regarding his alleged involvement in the Peele homicide would be inadmissible under Rule 608(b), and the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the cross-examination.

Rule 607 allows a party to impeach its own witness when the impeachment is genuine and relevant under Rule 403, rather than a pretext to present hearsay.

State v. Gabriel · filed 2010-10-19Rule 607

Accordingly, where a party seeks to impeach its own witness under Rule 607, that impeachment must not be a subterfuge to get hearsay statements in front of the jury and must be relevant within the meaning of Rule 403.

Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination about a witness’s conduct that shows untruthfulness, including an effort to influence a juror.

State v. Lewis · filed 2012-04-13Rule 608(b)

Accordingly, the retrial court should have permitted defense counsel to cross-examine Detective Roberts regarding his statements to Deputy Hughes for the purpose of showing Detective Roberts’ bias against defendant, and pursuant to Rule 608(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, to probe Detective Roberts’ character for untruthfulness.

Rule 608(a) permits evidence supporting a witness’s truthfulness after cross-examination attacks the witness’s character for truthfulness.

State v. Gaspar · filed 2014-05-20Rule 608(a)

Additionally, Ms. Anderson’s now-challenged testimony was offered only after defense counsel had attacked M.G.’s character for truthfulness during his cross-examination of her, which attacks were sufficient to permit the presentation of evidence as to her truthfulness in accordance with the second limitation of N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(a).

Rule 608(b) permits discretionary cross-examination about conduct probative of a witness’s truthfulness but bars extrinsic evidence of that conduct.

In re O.O. · filed 2014-07-15Rule 608(b)

Although the trial court allowed father to cross-examine O.O. regarding the prior incident, the video depicting O.O.’s conduct during the prior incident was not admissible to attack O.O.’s credibility because it was extrinsic evidence.

Rule 401 permits evidence of a witness’s hostility when it tends to show bias or undermine the witness’s credibility.

State v. Triplett · filed 2014-09-02Rule 401

Upon review in this case, we hold the message relevant to attack Ogle’s credibility and show Ogle’s bias towards defendant and defendant’s family.

Rule 608(a) does not permit testimony about a witness’s credibility merely because that witness’s credibility was challenged; the testimony must concern character for truthfulness.

State v. Taylor · filed 2014-12-16Rule 608(a)

Although the State argues that Defendant’s decision to question Ms. Medina in this manner authorized the admission of the challenged portion of Detective Tindall’s testimony pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608(a) ... we do not find this argument persuasive given that Detective Tindall’s testimony was not focused on Ms. Medina’s “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness” and given that Ms. Medina’s character, as compared to her credibility, had not been attacked.

Rule 608(b) permits a court to exclude extrinsic impeachment testimony offered to contradict a witness's denial of a prior statement when the testimony would establish only whether the statement was made.

State v. Taylor · filed 2015-07-07Rule 608(b)

Thus, although Elizabeth's allegedly inconsistent statement implicated the issue of identity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Angela's, Cotton's, and King's testimony as impeachment evidence in the instant case.

Rule 607 permits impeachment with a prior statement that omits material facts the witness would naturally have mentioned.

State v. Wyrick · filed 2018-01-16Rule 607

On cross-examination, impeachment of a witness is proper if it “merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements.” ... Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach Defendant with his inconsistent statements made at trial and two years prior to the detective.

Rule 608(b) excludes extrinsic testimony about a witness’s past conduct when that conduct is not probative of the witness’s truthfulness.

State v. Altman · filed 2019-03-05Rule 608(b)

Such testimony is not probative of Mr. McMullen's character for truthfulness and is also not admissible under Rule 608(b).

Rule 608(a) permits evidence of a witness’s truthful character after an attack on that character, but a direct assertion that the witness passed a credibility test is not such evidence.

State v. Caballero · filed 2022-12-16Rule 608(a)

In addition, the challenged portion of Deputy Teer’s testimony constituted a direct assertion that Ms. Pichardo had passed the credibility test that he had administered to her rather than “evidence of truthful character.” Thus, the admission of the challenged portion of Deputy Teer’s testimony cannot be upheld on the basis of N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(a).

Rule 608(b) permits questions about specific conduct to impeach a witness only when the conduct bears on the witness’s character for truthfulness.

State v. Hamilton · filed 2023-11-21Rule 608(b)

Therefore, the State’s inquiry into these actions was an inappropriate form of impeachment. See Morgan, 315 N.C. at 633–34, 340 S.E.2d at 89; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b).

Rule 701 excludes lay opinion testimony that vouches for another witness’s credibility when it does not explain an investigative decision.

State v. Aguilar · filed 2024-03-05

North Carolina Rule of Evidence 701 governs lay opinion testimony. ... Considering the Record before us and applicable precedent, we are persuaded the challenged portion of Detective Helms’ testimony was inadmissible. ... Therefore, the testimony impermissibly vouched for another witness’ credibility.

Rule 608(a)(2) permits evidence of a witness’s good character for truthfulness only after an attack on the witness’s general character for truthfulness; pointing out inconsistencies or suggesting bias does not suffice.

State v. Braswell · filed 2026-01-21Rule 608(a)(2)

In sum, a party only opens the door to rehabilitative testimony concerning a witness’s good character for truthfulness if he employs an impeachment method attacking the witness’s character for untruthfulness—i.e., a method implicating the witness as a liar in general.

Rule 701 bars lay opinion testimony vouching for another witness’s credibility, but the opposing party may offer rebuttal testimony when the defendant first raises that witness’s believability on cross-examination.

State v. Phillips · filed 2026-05-06Rule 701

Consequently, we hold the trial court did not err, much less plainly err, in allowing the State to offer rebuttal testimony regarding Pearl’s credibility after Defendant had opened the door.

Rule 608(b) bars cross-examination about specific conduct that resulted in a conviction.

State v. Moore · filed 2026-05-06Rule 608(b)

In this case, the actions at issue resulted in a conviction for which Hunt was awaiting sentencing, making it inadmissible under 608(b).