N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 4 permits service on a corporation through a designated delivery service; proof of delivery creates a rebuttable presumption of valid service.

Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company v. AT Denmark Investments, ApS · filed 2021-03-18Rule 4(j)(6)(d)

Thus, CBL created a rebuttable presumption of service by complying with Rule 4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.10(a)(S). ... As such, AT Denmark’ s affidavits are insufficient to rebut the presumption that CBL validly served AT Denmark.

Rule 4(j)(1)(d) permits service on an individual by designated delivery service, but a receipt that omits the defendant’s unit and does not establish that someone there signed for the summons and complaint is insufficient proof of service.

JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC. v. GFL UNITED LLC · filed 2022-12-09Rule 4(j)(1)(d)

This is insufficient proof that service was proper because there is no evidence that a suitable person residing at “UNIT G,” as opposed to another unit at that address, signed for the package containing the summons and complaint.

Rule 4(j)(1)(d) permits service on an individual through a designated delivery service when the summons and complaint are sent to the individual and a delivery receipt is obtained.

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc v. MS Management L.L.C. · filed 2023-07-28Rule 4(j)(1)(d)

Specifically, the record shows that plaintiff has shown that the two individual defendants, Larry D. Barksdale and Marcus A. Smith, have been properly served under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and North Carolina law by service by a designated delivery service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (providing that an individual may be served by following state law for serving a summons in the state where the district court is located); N.C. Gen. Stat. §1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)(d) (providing that an individual may be served by “[d]epositing with a designated delivery service authorized by pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2) a copy of the summons and complaint, addressed to the party to be served, delivering the address, and obtaining a delivery receipt”); Aff. of Service [DE-9].

Rule 41(a) permits refiling within one year after a voluntary dismissal; Rule 41(b) permits additional time after an involuntary dismissal without prejudice only if the dismissal order grants it.

Vanek v. Global Supply & Logistics, Inc. · filed 2014-04-01Rule 41(a), (b)

Rule 41(a) allows a plaintiff to file an action within one year of taking a voluntary dismissal, notwithstanding that the statute of limitations may have run on his claims since he commenced the initial action. ... Further, Rule 41(b) allows a plaintiff additional time to refile an action that is involuntarily dismissed – where the dismissal is without prejudice – if the court specifies “in its order that a new action based on the same claim may be commenced within one year or less after such dismissal.” ... Here, the Illinois court did not include in its order any provision permitting Plaintiff additional time to refile his action; and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Plaintiff made such a request. Accordingly, the savings provisions under Rule 41 are inapplicable.

Rule 41(a)(1) permits a claim dismissed without prejudice to be refiled within one year if the original action was commenced within the limitations period.

Hancox v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2022-11-22Rule 41(a)(1)

Plaintiff commenced a suit within the limitations period, but he dismissed the case against defendant State Farm and failed to refile within one year. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1-41(a)(1). Accordingly, his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Rule 32(a)(3) permits an adverse party to use a party’s deposition for any purpose even when the deponent is present and available to testify at trial.

Green v. Freeman · filed 2014-04-01Rule 32(a)(3)

The plain language of the rule permits the use of a deposition of a party by an adverse party for any purpose, regardless of “whether or not the deponent testifies.”

Rule 32(a)(4) allows a party to use a videotaped expert witness deposition as substantive evidence at trial.

Reynolds Am. Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd. · filed 2021-12-17Rule 32(a)(4)

After RAI failed to call Dr. Shivdasani, the dissenters possessed the right to introduce Dr. Shivdasani’s deposition testimony as substantive evidence at trial. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 32(a)(4) (2019) (“The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if . . . the witness is an expert witness whose testimony has been procured by videotape as provided for under Rule 30(b)(4).”).

Rule 26(d)(3)(iii) permits a physician’s deposition to be used at trial if the physician resides or maintains an office outside the county where the trial is held.

Peterson v. Johnson · filed 1976-02-18Rule 26(d)(3)(iii)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26(d) (3) (iii), provides for use of deposition at trial if the court finds that the deponent is a physician who either resides or maintains his office outside the county where the trial or hearing is held. Upon plaintiff’s motion to use this deposition at trial, the Court examined an affidavit of Dr. Keranen and allowed use of the deposition, having determined that the physician resides in Cumberland County. Furthermore, in the order on pre-trial conference filed 18 July 1974, plaintiff stated that Dr. Keranen had been deposed and his deposition would be offered at trial in the event he could not appear. We find the admission of this deposition to have been proper.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction to define its prohibited conduct with enough specificity that its scope is clear, including who and where it covers.

Fed. Point Yacht Club Ass'n, Inc. v. Moore · filed 2014-04-01Rule 65(d)

North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65 requires that “[e]very order granting an injunction . . . shall be specific in terms [and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts enjoined or restrained.” ... As such, we must hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a permanent injunction with unlimited scope.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction to specify the actions the enjoined party must take or avoid clearly enough to understand the order without consulting other documents.

Farrington v. WV Invs. · filed 2024-11-05Rule 65(d)

Accordingly, we hold that the injunction is not specific enough to comply with statutory requirements and remand for further consideration.

Rule 65(d) requires injunctions to describe the restrained conduct in reasonable detail without referring to another document; an order to stop operating identified current businesses can satisfy that requirement without defining those businesses.

South Blvd. Video & News, Inc. v. Charlotte Zoning Board of Adjustment · filed 1998-04-21Rule 65(d)

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 65(d) requires every injunction and restraining order to be specific in its terms and to describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts enjoined or restrained. ... We hold that the injunction was sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 1A-1.

Rule 9(j) permits dismissal of a medical negligence complaint when discovery shows that its claim lacks factual support, even if the complaint facially meets the pleading requirements.

Wright v. Atl. Orthopedics, P.A. · filed 2014-08-05(j)

Where discovery reveals that a claim for medical negligence is not supported by the facts, a dismissal of the claim pursuant to Rule 9(j) is appropriate.

Rule 9(j)(3) allows a medical malpractice complaint without the required certification to proceed if it successfully alleges res ipsa loquitur.

Wright v. WakeMed · filed 2014-12-31Rule 9(j)(3)

As a result, given that Plaintiff’s complaint lacks a certification in the form required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j), the trial court correctly dismissed that pleading unless Plaintiff successfully asserted a claim based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Rule 9(j)(3) requires a medical malpractice complaint relying on res ipsa loquitur to allege facts establishing negligence without the need for expert testimony.

Bluitt v. Wake Forest Univ. Baptist Med. Ctr. · filed 2018-04-17Rule 9(j)(3)

Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege facts establishing negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur pursuant to Rule 9(j)(3); thus, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 9(j).

A dismissal under Rule 9(j) based on the qualifications of a certified expert requires written findings sufficient for appellate review.

Kennedy v. DeAngelo · filed 2019-02-19Rule 9(j)(1)

As a result, we are persuaded that, on this record, the trial court could have made findings that would have supported a determination that these experts did not qualify to testify to the standard of care applicable to a general dentist. But, as Dr. Prettyman concedes, the trial court did not make the findings required by our precedent, and that, in turn, prevents this Court from engaging in meaningful appellate review of the trial court’s determination.

When a genuine factual dispute remains about whether a medical malpractice expert reviewed the required records before the complaint was filed, summary judgment for failure to comply with Rule 9(j) is improper.

Mangan v. Hunter · filed 2019-12-03Rule 9(j)(1)

Thus, we conclude it was error for the trial court to make “undisputed findings of fact” at summary judgment in this case because the trial court’s Findings actually resolved a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Szeszycki reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Rule 9(j) requires a plaintiff asserting medical malpractice to obtain an expert review before filing suit and certification that the care failed to meet the applicable standard.

Hayes v. D.P.S, NC Corr · filed 2020-07-20Rule 9(j)

Plaintiff, however, has not complied with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires plaintiffs asserting medical malpractice actions to obtain an expert review of “the medical care and all medical records” before filing a lawsuit, and for such medical expert to certify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care.

Rule 9(j) requires expert review before a medical malpractice suit is filed; failure to comply is grounds for dismissal, including in federal court.

Jasmaine f/k/a Duane L. Fox v. Haynes · filed 2020-08-10Rule 9(j)

Failure to comply with Rule 9(j) is ground for dismissal of a state medical malpractice claim filed in federal court.

Rule 9(j) requires a plaintiff asserting medical malpractice to obtain expert review of the medical care and records before filing suit.

Harding v. Schetter · filed 2021-03-10Rule 9(j)

Plaintiff, however, has not complied with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires plaintiffs asserting medical malpractice actions to obtain an expert review of “the medical care and all medical records” before filing a lawsuit, and for a medical expert to certify that.

Rule 9(j) requires dismissal of a medical malpractice claim that does not facially comply with its pleading requirement; the res ipsa loquitur exception requires adequately pleaded facts.

Lewis v. Peterkin · filed 2025-10-27Rule 9(j)

We discern no error in the district court’s determination that Lewis did not adequately plead facts showing the res ipsa loquitor exception applied to his medical malpractice claim against Kathryn McKenzie.

A summary judgment order need not include conclusions of law; if included, they are generally disregarded on appeal.

Carmichael v. Lively · filed 2014-08-05Rule 56(c)

As previously stated, we re-emphasize that the trial court was not required to enter any conclusions of law in its summary judgment order and generally, they are disregarded on appeal.

Rule 56(c) permits a trial court to make findings that explain the undisputed facts and its reasons for granting summary judgment.

Stoutamire v. Bailey · filed 2015-03-03Rule 56(c)

The trial court’s findings clarify the court’s reasoning for granting summary judgment by setting forth the undisputed facts as well as the conclusion of law regarding the reason for plaintiff’s termination. Therefore, the trial court did not err in making its findings.

Rule 56(a) does not require a court to state on the record its reasons for granting or denying summary judgment.

N.C. State Bar v. Scott · filed 2015-06-16Rule 56(a)

Although defendant contends Rule 56(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the DHC "state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion," there is no such provision in the North Carolina Rule.

Rule 56 makes detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law inappropriate in an order granting summary judgment.

Good Neighbors Or. Hill Protecting Prop. Rights v. Cnty. of Rockingham · filed 2015-07-21Rule 56

Further, it is inappropriate for the trial court's order to contain detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case decided upon a summary judgment motion.

An order denying summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists should not include findings of fact.

Kelley v. Kelley · filed 2017-04-04Rule 56(c)

However, counsel is correct that an order denying summary judgment due to “genuine issue as to any material fact” should not include any “findings of fact.”

Summary judgment orders should not include findings of fact because summary judgment requires that no genuine issue of material fact remain.

Raymond v. Raymond · filed 2018-02-06

Since summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment orders should not include findings of fact.

Findings of fact in a summary judgment order are disregarded on appeal.

NAACP v. Gaston Cnty. · filed 2026-03-04Rule 56(c)

Again, we disregard those findings on appeal from summary judgment.

Rule 12(f) permits striking affirmative defenses that were speculative when pleaded, even if discovery might later provide factual support.

Nat'l Fin. Partners Corp. v. Estate of Harry A. Stokes · filed 2014-10-13Rule 12(f)

Plaintiffs’ professed good faith belief that their presently unsupported defenses will acquire the requisite factual support through the discovery stage of these proceedings does not alter the reality that these defenses were speculative at the time Plaintiffs asserted them in their responsive pleading. ... The Court concludes that the foregoing defenses are speculative and not properly asserted at this time.

Rule 12(f) permits a court to strike a defense that lacks factual support and fails to give sufficient notice of its nature.

Merrell v. Smith · filed 2020-10-22Rule 12(f)

Thus, a defense that is “conclusory,” “contextually [in]comprehensible,” “not well-grounded in fact,” “speculative,” or otherwise devoid of any factual support may be stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f), since such a defense will ordinarily fail to give a party sufficient notice of the nature of the defense as required by Rule 8.

Rule 10(b) requires counterclaims to be pleaded in numbered paragraphs; a court may dismiss noncompliant counterclaims without prejudice and allow them to be repleaded.

Kingsdown, Inc. v. Hinshaw · filed 2015-03-25Rule 10(b)

Ms. Ray’s violation of the straightforward requirements of Rule 10(b), however, is indisputable, and the Court concludes that requiring Ms. Ray to re-plead her Counterclaims in numbered paragraphs will allow for a less confusing and more comprehensible presentation of the issues in this action. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Ms. Ray’s Counterclaims should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave for Ms. Ray to re-plead the Counterclaims that are not dismissed with prejudice in this Order in compliance with Rule 10(b).

Rule 43(c) requires a trial court in a nonjury case, on request, to take and report excluded evidence unless it is clearly inadmissible on any ground or the witness is privileged.

Daly v. Kelly · filed 2020-07-21Rule 43(c)

As we have determined there was no evidence presented nor legal basis noted for denying Father’s request to make an offer of proof, we conclude the trial court erred as counsel at trial must be allowed to make an offer of proof under these facts. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 43(c).

A proffer of excluded evidence is unnecessary when the evidence’s significance is obvious from the record.

Cash v. Cash · filed 2022-06-21Rule 43(c)

While counsel must usually make a specific offer of the excluded evidence to enable an appellate ruling, a proffer is not necessary when “the significance of the evidence is obvious from the record.” Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 99–100, 249 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1978); see also Waynick Const., Inc. v. York, 70 N.C. App. 287, 292, 319 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1984) (explaining proffer is not necessary when “record plainly discloses the significance of the evidence”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 43(c) (explaining procedure for proffer). Here, the significance of the excluded best interest evidence is obvious, and Defendant addressed this issue with the trial court several times during the hearing.

Rule 43(c) requires the record to show how excluded witnesses would have testified but does not require an offer of proof in a particular form.

State v. Martin · filed 2015-06-16Rule 43(c)

Likewise, our statutes do not require that an offer of proof be made in any particular form. For instance, Rule 43(c) of our Rules of Civil Procedure merely requires that the record be made to show how the witnesses would have testified and allows the trial court to note for the record "the form in which [the offer of proof] was offered[.]" N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 43 (2013).

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a defamation complaint to identify the alleged statements with enough particularity to assess whether they are defamatory.

Izydore v. Tokuta · filed 2015-08-04Rule 8(a)(1)

While the Court cannot say whether the alleged statements were defamatory, it can say conclusively that Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim for defamation with sufficient particularity, rendering it facially deficient.

Rule 9 does not provide an exhaustive list of matters that must be pleaded with specificity.

Martin v. Martin · filed 2018-12-18Rule 9

Section 50B-2(a) applies to any civil action or motion seeking entry of a domestic violence protective order under Chapter 50B, while Rule 9 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is a more general rule that is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of matters required to be pleaded with specificity.

Rule 41(a)(1) does not apply to petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of board of adjustment decisions.

Henderson v. The Cnty. of Onslow · filed 2016-02-02Rule 41(a)(1)

Therefore, we hold that Rule 41(a)(1) is simply not relevant to petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of decisions of a board of adjustment.

Rule 42(b)(4) does not require transfer to a three-judge panel when a constitutional challenge arises from a claim filed with the Industrial Commission rather than a complaint filed in court.

In Re Redmond Ex Rel. Nichols · filed 2017-03-17Rule 42(b)(4)

In this case claimant filed a claim with the Commission pursuant to section 143B-426.52 of the Compensation Program, and not a “complaint or amended complaint in any court in this State.” See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(4). Moreover, the Commission “is not a court” as contemplated in Rule 42(b)(4), but “primarily is an administrative agency of the state.” Hogan, 315 N.C. at 137, 337 S.E.2d at 483. Consequently, subsection 1-267.1(a1), read in conjunction with Rule 42(b)(4), does not require that claimant’s constitutional challenge be heard by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County.

Rule 42(b)(4) requires transfer of a facial constitutional challenge to a three-judge panel only when deciding the statute’s validity is necessary to resolve the action.

Byron v. Synco Props., Inc. · filed 2018-03-20Rule 42(b)(4)

In other words, facial constitutional challenges must be transferred to the three-judge panel only if the constitutionality of the statute in question must be resolved in order to conclude the action.

Rule 42(b)(4) requires a trial court to resolve issues independent of a properly raised facial challenge, then transfer the challenge to a three-judge panel if its resolution remains necessary and stay matters that depend on it.

Holdstock v. Duke Univ. Health Sys. · filed 2020-03-03Rule 42(b)(4)

If the trial court decides, after all issues not contingent on the outcome of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge are resolved, that resolution of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to Rule 9(j) is still required to permit resolution of remaining issues, it shall, “on its own motion, transfer that portion of the action challenging the validity of [Rule 9(j)] to the Superior Court of Wake County for resolution by a three-judge panel[,]” and “stay all matters that are contingent upon the outcome of the challenge to [Rule 9(j)’s] facial validity pending a ruling on that challenge and until all appeal rights are exhausted.”

A facial challenge to an act of the General Assembly properly raised in a complaint must be decided by a three-judge panel.

Holdstock v. Duke Univ. Health Sys. · filed 2020-03-03Rule 42(b)(4)

The trial court in this case had no jurisdiction to decide any facial challenge that was first “raised” in Plaintiffs’ complaint.

Rule 42(b)(4) requires the court to resolve all matters independent of a facial constitutional challenge before transferring the challenge to a three-judge panel.

Hull v. Brown · filed 2021-10-05Rule 42(b)(4)

Rule 42 requires all non-contingent matters to be resolved before the facial challenge can be resolved.

Rule 42(b)(4) leaves jurisdiction over attorney’s fees with the original trial court when a facial challenge is transferred to a three-judge panel.

Alexander v. NC State Bd. of Elections · filed 2022-02-01Rule 42(b)(4)

When the trial court transferred the facial challenge to the three-judge panel, it retained jurisdiction over the attorney’s fees pending final resolution of the facial challenge.

Rule 42(b)(4) leaves jurisdiction over attorney’s fees with the original trial court when a facial challenge is transferred to a three-judge panel.

Alexander v. NC State Bd. of Elections · filed 2022-02-01Rule 42(b)(4)

Because the trial court retained jurisdiction over the issue of attorney’s fees, the three-judge panel did not have the authority to award Plaintiffs attorney’s fees. See Holdstock, 270 N.C. App. at 272, 841 S.E.2d at 311. See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(4).

Rule 42(b)(4) requires the original court to decide Rule 12(b)(1) motions before transferring a facial constitutional challenge, while allowing it to decline only motions based solely on Rule 12(b)(6).

Lakins v. The Western N.C. Conf. of the United Methodist Church · filed 2022-05-17(b)(4)

By implication, however, Rule 42(b)(4) does not authorize a trial court to decline to rule on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, as the trial court did here.

Rule 42(b)(4) requires transfer of a facial challenge to an act of the General Assembly to a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County.

Kelly v. State of N.C. · filed 2022-10-18(b)(4)

Since Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts and circumstances sufficient to assert an as-applied challenge, we deem the complaint to be a facial challenge to the statute making transfer to a three-judge panel mandatory under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-267.1 and Rule 42(b)(4).

Rule 42(b)(4) supplies procedural criteria for a facial constitutional challenge to an act of the General Assembly, including one pleaded alongside an as-applied challenge.

Singleton v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. · filed 2024-10-18Rule 42(b)(4)

This is a crucial determination because a facial constitutional challenge to the validity of an act of the General Assembly is governed by additional jurisdictional and procedural criteria that do not apply to as-applied challenges. See N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1 (2023); N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(4) (2023).

Rule 7(a) permits a plaintiff to reply with an allegation of last clear chance when the answer alleges contributory negligence.

Davis v. Hulsing Hotels N. Carolina · filed 2016-04-05Rule 7(a)

Defendants raised contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in their 8 November 2013 answer. Therefore, Plaintiff was permitted to file a reply raising last clear chance under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 7(a).

Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court to set aside a domestic violence protective order even when the movant sought relief under Rule 60(b)(6) or another subsection.

Pope v. Pope · filed 2016-05-17(b)(5)

It follows, then, that if a trial court may set aside a DVPO sua sponte, absent a party’s motion under Rule 60(b) entirely, and a Rule 60(b) movant need not specify under which subsection it seeks relief, a trial court may set aside a DVPO pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), even where a party moved for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) or another subsection.

Rule 65(c) requires a defendant seeking recovery on a preliminary injunction bond to show that the defendant was wrongfully enjoined; a voluntary dismissal after the injunction becomes moot does not alone establish that showing.

Allen Indus., Inc. v. Kluttz · filed 2016-07-05Rule 65(c)

In order to recover the preliminary injunction bond, defendant needed to demonstrate that she was “wrongfully enjoined[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 65(c) (2013); see generally Indus. Innovators, Inc., 99 N.C. App. at 49, 392 S.E.2d at 430. ... As defendant misapprehends the law, we reject this argument and conclude that the trial court properly determined that defendant was not “wrongfully enjoined” based upon the employment contract as applied to the facts of this case.

Rule 58 does not permit a judge to enter an order nunc pro tunc unless the judge previously signed a written order.

Dabbondanza v. Hansley · filed 2016-08-16Rule 58

We hold that after the 1994 amendment to Rule 58, a judge does not have the authority to enter an order nunc pro tunc if that judge did not previously sign a written order.

Rule 9(j) requires a medical malpractice complaint to allege the required expert review; a claim arising from an x-ray technician’s clinical judgment is subject to dismissal without that allegation.

Gause v. New Hanover Reg'l Med. Ctr. · filed 2016-12-30Rule 9(j)

In sum, Plaintiffs’ claim sounds in medical malpractice and not in ordinary negligence, and it was subject to dismissal for failing to comply with Rule 9(j).

Rules 9(j) and 15 permit a medical malpractice plaintiff to amend a defective expert certification and have the amendment relate back when the expert review and certification occurred before the original complaint was filed.

Vaughan v. Mashburn · filed 2018-08-17Rule 9(j); Rule 15(a), (c)

Accordingly, we conclude that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may file an amended complaint under Rule 15(a) to cure a defect in a Rule 9(j) certification when the expert review and certification occurred before the filing of the original complaint. Further, such an amended complaint may relate back under Rule 15(c).

Rule 9(j) requires dismissal of a medical negligence claim when the plaintiff fails to meet its certification requirements.

Murdock v. McClelland · filed 2020-07-10Rule 9(j)

In sum, because Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 9(j), any state law medical negligence claim Plaintiff intended to assert must be dismissed.

Rule 9(j) requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to obtain expert review before filing suit; a claim that does not comply is dismissed without prejudice.

McClellan v. Cothron · filed 2021-04-27Rule 9(j)

Plaintiff has not complied with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires plaintiffs asserting medical malpractice actions to obtain an expert review of “the medical care and all medical records” before filing a lawsuit, and for a medical expert to certify that. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j). The Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

Rule 9(j) requires expert review before a medical malpractice complaint is filed; a later review cannot support an amended certification.

Russe v. United States · filed 2021-05-06Rule 9(j)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not seek to amend their Complaint to clarify that the expert review occurred prior to the filing of their original Complaint; instead, Plaintiffs seek to amend to add a Rule 9(j) certification relative to an expert review that occurred after the filing of the original Complaint. North Carolina law does not permit this type of post filing certification.

An extrajudicial letter requesting review of an order does not satisfy the requirements for a motion for reconsideration under Rules 59(a)(8) or 60(b).

In re: Timberlake · filed 2016-10-18Rules 59(a)(8), 60(b)

As petitioner points out, that letter failed to meet the requirements of a notice of appeal, see N.C. R. App. P. 3, or a motion for reconsideration pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 59(a)(8) or 60(b).

Rule 30 provides no private cause of action for a violation of its deposition transcript charge requirement.

Danielson v. Veritext Corp. Servs., Inc. · filed 2016-10-28(f)(2)

Neither Rule 30, nor any other Rule, provides a private cause of action for its violation.

Rule 37(a)(4) permits a court to deny expenses on a motion to compel when the opposition was substantially justified or an award would be unjust.

Transatlantic Healthcare, LLC v. Alpha Constr. of the Triad, Inc. · filed 2017-03-09Rule 37(a)(4)

The Court, in its discretion, likewise denies Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under Rule 37(a)(4), because it finds that Defendants’ opposition to the Motion to Compel was substantially justified and that, at this stage in the proceedings, an award of expenses, including attorney fees, would be unjust and not appropriate.

Rule 65(c) permits the court to condition a preliminary injunction on posting security in an amount it finds reasonable and appropriate.

Addison Whitney, LLC v. Cashion · filed 2017-03-15Rule 65(c)

This Order shall become effective upon Addison Whitney’s posting security in the amount of $5,000, which the Court concludes, in its discretion, is reasonable and appropriate as a condition of granting the preliminary injunction. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1; N.C. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

Rule 65(c) permits the court to condition a preliminary injunction on security in an amount it finds reasonable and appropriate.

Window Gang Ventures, Corp. v. Salinas · filed 2018-02-21(c)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 65(c), this Order shall become effective upon Plaintiff’s posting of security in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) (“Security”), which the Court concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, is reasonable and appropriate as a condition of granting this preliminary injunction.

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment against the moving party when judgment is appropriate.

Baker v. Bowden · filed 2017-04-03Rule 56(c)

“Summary judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered against the moving party.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c); Brooks v. Hackney, 329 N.C. 166, 170 n.2, 404 S.E.2d 854, 857 n.2 (1991). ... In sum, the Court denies the Motion and grants summary judgment in favor of non-movant Defendants that no enforceable settlement agreement was reached because Mr. Harlow’s Fourth E-mail was a valid revocation of any offer in Mr. Harlow’s Second E-mail as a matter of law.

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment for the nonmoving party when no genuine issue of material fact exists and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Micro Miniature Bearing Co., Inc. v. Barnett-Sabatino · filed 2018-02-21Rule 56(c)

Thus, under Rule 56(c), a court may grant summary judgment to the non-moving party where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the non-moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment against the moving party when appropriate.

Howard v. Iomaxis, LLC · filed 2020-05-01Rule 56(c)

Under Rule 56(c), “[s]ummary judgment may, when appropriate, be rendered against the party moving for such judgment.”

Rule 56(c) permits a court to grant summary judgment to the nonmoving party.

Slattery v. Appycity, LLC · filed 2021-03-24Rule 56(c)

In addition, “Rule 56(c) allows the trial court to grant summary judgment to the non-moving party.” Elliott v. Enka-Candler Fire & Rescue Dep’t, Inc., 213 N.C. App. 160, 170 (2011).

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment against the moving party when appropriate.

Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore · filed 2023-04-28Rule 56(c)

Because this equal protection claim lacks merit, the trial court should have granted summary judgment for defendants. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2021) (“Summary judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered against the moving party.”).

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment for a nonmoving party in appropriate cases.

McArdle Corp. v. Patterson · filed 1994-07-19Rule 56(c)

We note that summary judgment can be entered in favor of the non-movant in appropriate cases.

Rule 42(a) reserves the decision to consolidate actions for trial to the judge who will preside over the trial.

Boone Ford, Inc. v. IME Scheduler, Inc. · filed 2017-04-18Rule 42(a)

Whether two or more cases should be consolidated for trial is a decision left to the sound discretion of the judge who will preside over the trial.

Rule 4 permits service by a private process server only in the circumstances specified for when the sheriff cannot complete service; the server’s affidavit alone does not establish authority to serve.

Locklear v. Cummings · filed 2017-05-16Rule 4(a), (h), (h1)

Although Plaintiff’s process server filed the statutorily required affidavit, a self-serving affidavit alone does not confer “duly authorized by law” status on the affiant. Legal ability to serve process by private process server is limited by statute in North Carolina to scenarios where the sheriff is unable to fulfill the duties of a process server.

Rule 4 permits service by a private process server only when the sheriff is unable to perform service.

Locklear v. Cummings · filed 2018-12-04Rule 4(a), (h), (h1)

Legal ability to serve process by private process server is limited by statute in North Carolina to scenarios where the sheriff is unable to fulfill the duties of a process server.

Rule 4(h) requires a showing that the sheriff was unable to effect service before a plaintiff may seek appointment of another person to serve process.

Stratia Inc. v. Liquid Gold Hair, LLC · filed 2023-07-05Rule 4(h)

Here, the Court determines that the process server’s averment that she was “authorized by law to make service of the documents” is insufficient without a showing that the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Department was unable to effect service on Defendants, making it necessary for Plaintiff to seek appointment of some other person from the clerk of the issuing court as is permitted under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(h).

Rule 59(a) permits a trial judge to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial on all or part of the issues, but does not permit the judge to change the jury’s damages award.

Justus v. Rosner · filed 2017-06-20(a)

A trial judge has the authority and discretion to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial—in whole or in part—under Rule 59; however, that rule does not allow a trial judge presiding over a jury trial to substitute its opinion for the verdict and change the amount of damages to be recovered.

Rule 12(h)(3) requires dismissal when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Edwards v. Pfa Architects, P.A. · filed 2017-06-29Rule 12(h)(3)

“Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a court’s proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction,” Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002), and a court shall dismiss the action when it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(3).

Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Watson v. Joyner-Watson · filed 2018-12-18Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) requires the dismissal of any action “based upon a trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.”

Rule 12(h)(3) requires dismissal when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, including when the court raises the issue on its own motion.

Copeland v. Winters · filed 2019-03-18Rule 12(h)(3)

A court shall dismiss an action when it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(3). ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter to consider Plaintiff’s Second and Third Causes of Action, and therefore, pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) sua sponte DISMISSES without prejudice these claims.

Rule 12(h)(3) requires a court to dismiss an action when it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Button v. Level Four Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc. · filed 2022-03-11(h)(3)

A court shall dismiss an action when it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(3) (2019).

Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of an action when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Mauck v. Cherry Oil Co., Inc. · filed 2022-05-02(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) requires the dismissal of any action “based upon a trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1).

Rule 12(h)(3) requires dismissal when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the court may dismiss on its own initiative.

Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 2022 Ncbc 57a · filed 2022-09-27Rule 12(h)(3)

While not briefed as a basis for the Motion, the Court dismisses the unfair and deceptive trade practice claims against Piggott and Cox sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3).

Rule 12(b)(1) permits dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff lacks standing, and that dismissal is without prejudice.

United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Div. v. City of Winston-Salem · filed 2022-12-16Rule 12(b)(1)

Thus, since the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, the amended complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). ... As a result, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice and remand this case to Superior Court, Forsyth County, with instructions to dismiss the amended complaint without, rather than with, prejudice.

Rule 12(b)(1) calls for dismissal without prejudice when a plaintiff’s lack of standing deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Pugh v. Howard · filed 2023-05-02Rule 12(b)(1)

Rather, in such circumstances, the matter is properly dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

Rule 12(h)(3) requires dismissal when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; a court without jurisdiction cannot grant a motion to amend the complaint.

Integon Indem. Corp. v. Eagles · filed 2026-01-21Rule 12(h)(3)

It is of no moment that the trial court granted Integon National’s motion to amend its complaint, as the court had no jurisdiction to do so.

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice because the court cannot reach the merits.

Johnson v. Wayne Cnty. · filed 2026-06-17Rule 12(b)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). However, in that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it could not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s complaint, and therefore erred in dismissing her complaint with prejudice.

Rule 12(b)(1) allows allegations of malicious and corrupt conduct to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the complaint sufficiently pleads that conduct.

Parham v. Iredell County Department of Social Services · filed 1997-08-05Rule 12(b)(1)

The matter was before the trial court on an N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) (1990) motion to dismiss. In the record filed in this Court, no evidence appears. The only pleading considered by the trial court was the plaintiffs’ complaint. In that complaint, plaintiffs alleged false misrepresentations and fraudulent concealment of material information with the intent to deceive plaintiffs. We cannot say that these allegations fall short of being malicious and corrupt. These allegations properly survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.

Rule 12(h)(3) requires dismissal when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; an amendment cannot cure the original plaintiff’s lack of standing.

Eagles v. Integon Indem. Corp. · filed 2026-01-21Rule 12(h)(3)

“Lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court was not authorized to rule upon [Integon National]’s motion to amend, and moreover, was bound to dismiss this matter.” Intrepid Direct, 298 N.C. App. at 389, 915 S.E.2d at 199; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(3).

Rule 56 summary judgment may be premature when pending discovery could produce evidence relevant to the claims being decided.

Howse v. Bank of Am., N.A. · filed 2017-08-15Rule 56

Therefore, the appropriate disposition in the present case is to reverse the grant of summary judgment and the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to compel to allow the trial court to determine whether information relevant to any of Plaintiff’s claims could be exposed though the discovery sought in Plaintiffs’ motion to compel.

Rule 56(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for outstanding discovery when the opposing party fails to properly invoke its protections or show how the discovery would create a genuine issue of material fact.

S. Coll. St., LLC v. Charlotte Sch. of Law, LLC · filed 2018-08-10Rule 56(f)

As Defendants have failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as required by Rule 56(e), failed to point to any specific grounds for impeachment of Plaintiff’s affiant, and failed to properly invoke the protections set forth in Rule 56(f), the Court concludes that partial summary judgment against Defendants on the issue of Defendants’ liability is appropriate, notwithstanding that the discovery period has not yet expired.

A court may grant summary judgment before discovery ends when the opposing party has not shown prejudice from the timing.

Poage v. Cox · filed 2019-05-07Rule 56

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate they were prejudiced by the trial court considering and ruling upon Defendants’ summary judgment motions before the discovery period had ended.

Rule 4 due diligence requires an attempt to use a known email address when certified-mail notices are returned unclaimed before resorting to posting notice on the property.

In Re Matter of Ackah · filed 2017-09-05Rule 4

When the notice letters came back "unclaimed," Rule 4 due diligence required that the HOA at least attempt to notify Ms. Ackah directly through the email address it had for her rather than simply resorting to posting a notice on the Property.

Rule 23 permits a court to certify a settlement class when its requirements are met, subject to the court’s discretion.

In Re Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. S'holder Litig. · filed 2018-01-02Rule 23

Having thoroughly considered the materials of record, the Court finds and concludes that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met and that it should, in its discretion, certify a settlement class (“Settlement Class”).

Rule 65(d) applies to injunctions and restraining orders, not a consent order resolving all claims between the parties.

Scigrip, Inc. v. Osae · filed 2018-01-30(d)

As an initial matter, Rule 65(d) applies to orders granting an injunction and restraining orders, not a consent order resolving all claims between the parties.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction to describe the required conduct in the order itself so the enjoined party can understand it without consulting other documents.

Automobile Dealer Resources, Inc. v. Occidental Life Insurance · filed 1972-08-23Rule 65(d)

We find that the order also complies with the third mandate of Rule 65(d). The question in this connection is ... whether the party enjoined can know from the language of the order itself, and without having to resort to other documents, exactly what the court is ordering it to do.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction or restraining order to state its reasons, specify its terms, and describe the acts restrained in reasonable detail; referring to another document does not suffice.

Gibson v. Cline · filed 1976-03-03Rule 65(d)

We think it is clear that when the court grants either of the three, the order or judgment must set forth the reasons for its issuance, be specific in terms, and describe in reasonable detail the act or acts restrained or enjoined; and that reference to some other document is not sufficient to provide a description of the act or acts enjoined or restrained.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction order to state its terms directly; adopting an earlier order by reference does not suffice.

Spencer v. Spencer · filed 1984-09-04Rule 65(d)

Mere adoption by reference, as in the present case, clearly does not suffice.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction ordering repairs to identify the standards at issue and the repairs needed to meet them.

Town of Midland v. Harrell · filed 2022-03-15Rule 65(d)

While the trial court may order that Developers draft a plan for repairs, outline a review process, and impose a timeline for the work, the order must also identify which NCDOT standards are at issue and what repairs are sufficient to bring the roads into compliance.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for repeated violations of Rule 8(a)(1) after the trial court considers lesser sanctions.

Plasman v. Decca Furniture (Usa), Inc. · filed 2018-02-06Rule 8(a)(1)

We hold that the trial court’s order contains sufficient findings and conclusions, though not labeled as such, demonstrating that it had considered lesser sanctions before deciding to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for violations of Rule 8.

Rule 50 requires a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence to preserve a later JNOV motion.

Martin v. Pope · filed 2018-02-06Rule 50

We are bound by our precedent holding that a JNOV motion must be preceded by a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence; thus, we must hold that Pope’s JNOV arguments are waived on appeal.

Rule 59(a)(1) permits relief when an irregularity prevents a fair trial; denying a motion to reopen evidence can be reversed when it rests on a misapprehension of law and causes a substantial miscarriage of justice.

In re: S.G.V.S. & D.D.R.S. · filed 2018-02-20Rule 59(a)(1)

The trial court’s refusal to continue the hearing to a different day and denial of the Rule 59 motion to allow Respondent to attend and participate results from a misapprehension of the law and is an unreasonable and substantial miscarriage of justice.

A Rule 59 motion tolls the time for appeal if at least one asserted ground is a proper basis for a new trial.

Sfreddo v. Hicks · filed 2019-06-18

Thus, if at least one of the grounds asserted in Wife’s Rule 59 motion is a proper basis for new trial under Rule 59, the motion tolls the time for appeal.

Rule 13 applies to condemnation proceedings through § 136-114, allowing a court to dismiss a later direct condemnation action without prejudice to filing a counterclaim in the pending inverse condemnation action.

Dep't of Transp. v. Stimpson · filed 2018-03-20

The purpose of Rule 13(a) is just as relevant in the present case, and we hold that the trial court had the authority to enter its 23 February 2017 order dismissing DOT’s direct condemnation action “without prejudice to [DOT’s] right to file a . . . counterclaim in the Pending Action[.]”

Rule 13(g) requires a crossclaim to arise from a related underlying transaction or occurrence.

Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. All. Hosp. Mgmt., LLC · filed 2018-12-20Rule 13(g)

A related underlying transaction or occurrence is a prerequisite to the bringing of crossclaims.

A crossclaim that meets Rule 13(g)’s requirements generally survives dismissal of the original action, except when it depends on the plaintiff’s claim, as with indemnity or contribution.

Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Alliance Hosp. Mgmt., LLC · filed 2020-08-14Rule 13(g)

Accordingly, we hold that—with the exception of crossclaims such as claims for indemnity or contribution that necessarily require the continued litigation of the plaintiff’s original claims in order to remain viable—the dismissal of the original action does not, by itself, mandate the dismissal of a crossclaim so long as the crossclaim meets the Rule 13(g) prerequisites for bringing such a claim.

Rule 13(h) permits a court to join parties needed for complete relief on a counterclaim without a separate joinder motion.

Constr. Managers, Inc. of Goldboro v. Amory · filed 2019-10-14Rule 13(h)

The Court concludes that under these facts, Amory’s failure to make a motion pursuant to Rule 13(h) is not fatal to Amory’s attempt to add the Individual Defendants as counterclaim defendants in this case. ... The Court concludes that Amory can make Individual Defendants parties to his counterclaims for dissolution, and that the Individual Defendants’ presence in this case is “required for the granting of complete relief.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 13(h).

Rule 13(h) permits joinder of parties to a counterclaim; a partner who is not joined cannot be held personally liable on a judgment against the partnership.

Post & Front Properties, Ltd. v. Roanoke Construction Co. · filed 1994-11-15Rule 13(h)

In this case, Harrison was not joined as a party in the defendant’s counterclaim against the partnership, see N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 13(h) (1990) (permitting joinder of parties in counterclaim), and therefore cannot be held personally liable for the obligations of the partnership.

Rule 56(d) allows a court to identify undisputed material facts and deem them established for trial when summary judgment does not resolve the whole case.

Pender Farm Dev., LLC v. Ndco, LLC · filed 2019-11-06Rule 56(d)

In the event that summary judgment is not rendered on a whole case, the trial court may nonetheless narrow the issues for trial by setting forth in an order which material facts are undisputed in the record and therefore deemed established for trial.

Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1) requires advance disclosure of trial experts even without a discovery request, discovery plan, or court order, and leaves the remedy for inadequate disclosure to the trial court’s discretion.

Myers v. Myers · filed 2020-01-07Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1)

Upon de novo review of Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1), we hold the Rule does require advance disclosure of expert witnesses who will testify at trial, even without a discovery request, discovery plan, or court order. The trial court had inherent authority to impose a sanction for failure to disclose sufficiently in advance of trial. The trial court also has discretion to allow or to exclude Ms. Coble’s evidence or to impose another sanction for the failure to disclose, but the trial court failed to exercise this discretion and determined the testimony must be excluded based upon Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1).

Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1) requires advance disclosure of trial experts, but exclusion is not the automatic remedy for a disclosure violation.

Stowe v. Stowe · filed 2020-07-07Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s argument relies on the premise that the only remedy for a discovery violation is exclusion. ... Plaintiff misstates the remedy for this alleged discovery violation.

Rule 26(b)(4)(f)'s expert disclosure deadlines do not apply when there is no agreement, stipulation, discovery plan, or order setting disclosure timelines.

Aman v. Nicholson · filed 2023-03-07Rule 26(b)(4)(f)

In this case there was no agreement, stipulation, discovery plan, or order setting disclosure timelines, so Rule 26(b)(4)(f) is inapplicable here.

Rule 26 requires advance disclosure of expert witnesses, but failure to disclose does not automatically require exclusion; the trial court has discretion to choose a remedy.

Stowe v. Stowe · filed 2020-07-07Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1)

The court in Myers leaves the determination of the proper remedy to the discretion of the trial court. ... Plaintiff misstates the remedy for this alleged discovery violation.

Rule 68.1(b) requires a confession of judgment to be signed by someone with legal authority to act for the defendant; a confession signed without that authority is void.

Causey v. Cannon Sur. · filed 2020-01-07Rule 68.1(b)

Additionally, because McClain lacked the legal authority to sign the confession of judgment or otherwise transact any business on behalf of Cannon while the seizure order and injunction were in effect, the confession of judgment was void for “want of jurisdiction in the court to render judgment, which is apparent on the face of the proceedings.”

Rule 68.1 permits a judgment by confession for money due or money that may become due.

Electrolux North America, Inc. v. Performance Metals, Inc. · filed 2021-07-08

North Carolina law clearly permits confession of judgment.

Rule 4(j)(5)(b) requires service on a county through specified county officials; mailing process to the county department’s attorney does not satisfy that requirement.

WADE v. ALAMANCE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES · filed 2020-07-08Rule 4(j)(5)(b)

This address is apparently the address for Alamance DSS’s attorney, Ms. Jamie L. Hamlett. (Doc. 14-1). Ms. Hamlett is not any of the approved entities under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(5)(b).

Rule 4(j)(5)(b) requires service on a county through a designated county official; service on an unidentified person does not satisfy the rule.

KENYATTA v. CHALMERS-JUDD LAND ENTERPRISE, LLC · filed 2025-08-15Rule 4(j)(5)(b)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, R. Civ. P. 4(j)(5)(b). Ms. Kenyatta has not shown service by registered or certified mail, much less that service was on one of the designated persons. The attempted service is not valid under Rule 4(j)(2)(B).

Rule 9(j)(1) requires expert review of medical records available after reasonable inquiry; a provider’s incomplete response to a reasonable records request does not require dismissal.

Leonard v. Bell · filed 2020-08-04Rule 9(j)(1)

But Plaintiff’s claim is not subject to dismissal based upon DAC’s failure to give a complete response to Plaintiff’s initial request for his records, as he made “reasonable inquiry” for “all medical records pertaining to the alleged negligence” as required by Rule 9(j).

Rule 9(j) does not require an expert to review a plaintiff’s handwritten account of care when the notes were neither created by a health care provider nor based on information provided by one.

Miller v. Carolina Coast Emer. Physicians · filed 2021-05-18(j)(1)

Here, Plaintiff’s personal handwritten notes—while certainly potentially relevant information—do not constitute medical records because they were not created by a physician or other health care provider or from information provided by a physician or other health care provider.

Rule 9(j) requires a plaintiff asserting medical malpractice to obtain expert review of the medical care and records before filing suit and have a medical expert certify that review.

Hayes v. D.P.S, NC Corr · filed 2020-08-18Rule 9(j)

Plaintiff, again, has not complied with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires plaintiffs asserting medical malpractice actions to obtain an expert review of “the medical care and all medical records” before filing a lawsuit, and for a medical expert to certify that.

Rule 9(j)(1) requires a medical malpractice complaint to assert that the medical care and available records were reviewed by a person reasonably expected to qualify as a Rule 702 expert who is willing to testify that the care breached the applicable standard.

Gray v. E. Carolina Med. Servs. · filed 2022-08-02(j)(1)

The test under Rule 9(j) is whether, at the time of filing the complaint it would have been reasonable for Plaintiff to expect Dr. Hall to qualify as an expert, not whether he would actually qualify, under Rule 702.

Rule 9(j) requires a medical malpractice complaint to allege qualifying expert review before filing; failure to allege compliance requires dismissal.

Jones v. Mill · filed 2025-12-17Rule 9(j)

Consequently, Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 9(j), which mandates their dismissal.

A party seeking relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) based on fraud must prove the fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

Denver Prop. Partners, LLC v. Sisson · filed 2021-06-25(b)(3)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that, for purposes of Plaintiff’s request for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) based on alleged fraud by Sisson, Plaintiff must prove such fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure to prosecute when an unreasonable delay in service prejudices the defendant and lesser sanctions would not suffice.

Meabon v. Elliott · filed 2021-06-15Rule 41(b)

The trial court did not err and certainly did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).

Rule 41(b) requires a court dismissing a case with prejudice for failure to prosecute to explain the prejudice caused and why lesser sanctions would not suffice.

Cowperthwait v. Salem Baptist Church · filed 2023-09-05Rule 41(b)

However, the trial court could not impose dismissal with prejudice as a sanction under Rule 41(b) without explaining the prejudice Plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute caused Defendant and the reason why sanctions short of dismissal would not suffice.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure to prosecute when an unreasonable delay in service prejudices the defendant and lesser sanctions would not suffice.

Jones v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Raleigh · filed 2024-11-05Rule 41(b)

The trial court did not err nor abuse its discretion in concluding dismissal was the most appropriate sanction and granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).

Under Rule 41(b), an involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute is with prejudice unless the order specifies that it is without prejudice.

Sessoms v. Ray · filed 2025-06-18Rule 41(b)

It is clearly an order for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute, which is a dismissal with prejudice since the Order of Dismissal does not state that it is “without prejudice.”

Rule 41(b) requires the court to consider the plaintiff’s delay, prejudice to the defendant, and whether a lesser sanction would suffice before dismissing for failure to prosecute; the record may support an inference that the court considered lesser sanctions.

Winters v. Ya · filed 2025-09-17Rule 41(b)

Before doing so under Rule 41(b), the court must consider three factors: (1) whether the plaintiff’s conduct deliberately or unreasonably caused delay; (2) the extent of any prejudice to the defendant; and (3) whether a lesser sanction would suffice. ... Given plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply and the trial court’s explicit findings regarding her dilatory tactics, it is reasonable to infer that the court considered and rejected lesser sanctions before dismissing the case.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure to prosecute when plaintiffs fail to offer evidence at trial.

T&T Development Co. v. Southern National Bank of South Carolina · filed 1997-03-04Rule 41(b)

In this case because plaintiffs had no right to appeal the granting of the motion in limine, the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction and did not err in calling the case for trial and dismissing it when plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (1990) (allowing dismissal of action for failure to prosecute).

Rule 41 permits a claim dismissed for failure to prosecute to be reset for trial when the plaintiff’s failure to appear was not deliberate and justice favors a trial.

Gladden v. N.C. Department of Correction · filed 2010-02-03

Given the attendant facts and circumstances of Plaintiff's failure to appear and in the interests of justice, Plaintiff's state tort claim should be reset for trial. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41.

Rule 4(j)(5)(a) requires personal delivery of the summons and complaint to a town’s mayor, manager, or clerk to serve the town.

ALLEN v. CARY'S POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2021-08-18Rule 4(j)(5)(a)

Under North Carolina law, plaintiff may serve a “city, town or village by personally delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its mayor, city manager or clerk.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4G)(5)(a). Plaintiff's prepared summons does not comport with that requirement, as plaintiff has failed to serve the mayor, town manager, or clerk for the Town of Cary.

Rule 12(h)(1) waives an improper-venue objection that is omitted from a Rule 12 motion or not raised by motion, responsive pleading, or a permitted amendment.

In re M.R.J. · filed 2021-09-24Rule 12(h)(1)

Unlike the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time, an objection to improper venue is waived if not “taken in apt time” in the trial court. McMinn v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. 300, 301 (1877); see also N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(1) (“A defense of . . . improper venue . . . is waived (i) if omitted from a motion [made under Rule 12], or (ii) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.”). Because respondent-mother made no claim of improper venue at any time in the trial court while this matter was pending in the lower forum, the issue of venue is waived and therefore is not properly before this Court.

Rule 4 permits certified-mail service on a board of education addressed to its superintendent; misnaming the superintendent does not defeat service when the board’s identity is clear.

Gilliam v. Bertie County Board of Education · filed 2021-09-30(j)(5)(c)(iii)

However, applying the canon of liberality that North Carolina courts apply to their rules of civil procedure, Ms. Gilliam has properly served the Board without defect.

Rule 4(j)(5)(c) permits service on a county board of education through service on its chair in that capacity.

I.M. v. Granville County Board of Education · filed 2022-08-16Rule 4(j)(5)(c)

Moreover, defendants do not contest proper service upon defendant Richardson, as chair of the Granville County Board of Education, and service upon him in that capacity qualifies as service upon the Board. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(5)(c).

Rule 55(c) requires a plaintiff to post a bond before entry of a default judgment against a defendant served by publication.

Kbt Realty Servs., Inc. v. Appycity, LLC · filed 2021-09-30Rule 55(c)

The plain language of Rule 55(c), therefore, requires that Plaintiffs post a bond prior to entry of a default judgment against each Defendant, and Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise.

Under § 1A-1, denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not bar a later Rule 56 summary judgment motion, even before a different judge.

Phillips v. MacRae · filed 2021-11-02Rules 12(b)(6), 56

The subsequent allowing of a motion for summary judgment where a prior Rule 12(b)(6) motion was denied by the same or by a different judge is permitted by our longstanding precedents.

Rule 37 allows sanctions for failure to obey a discovery order without requiring a showing that the violation was willful.

Dunhill Holdings · filed 2022-03-01(b)(2)

North Carolina law does not require a party to have willfully violated a court order to justify an award of Rule 37 sanctions.

Rule 55 permits the clerk to enter default judgment for a sum certain when default is established and the amount due is proven by affidavit or verified pleading.

Unifund CCR Partners v. Young · filed 2022-03-15Rule 55(a), (b)(1)

Accordingly, after entry of default, a sum certain or sum which can by computation be made certain must be proven by affidavit or verified pleading and the limitations of Rule 8(d) regarding the admission of damages were not relevant to the analysis in Loggins or in the present case.

Rule 9(j) is a heightened pleading requirement for medical malpractice claims, rather than a substantive requirement, and cannot be applied to this FTCA claim.

Lobacz v. The United States of America · filed 2022-03-17Rule 9(j)

Under North Carolina law and the reasoning of Pledger, Rule 9(j) is not a substantive requirement for a medical malpractice claim. Rather, it is a heightened pleading requirement that this court cannot apply to Lobacz’s FTCA claim.

Section 1A-1 requires service on a state officer through the appointed process agent, or, if none exists, through the North Carolina Attorney General or a deputy or assistant attorney general.

SMITH v. LANIER · filed 2022-03-284(j)(4)(b), (c), (d)

Service on state officers must be made on the appointed process agent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, 4(j)(4)(b), (d). If a designated process agent does not exist, then process must be made on either the North Carolina Attorney General or a deputy or assistant attorney general. § 1A-1, 4(j)(4)(c).

Rule 4(j)(4)(a) requires service on a state agency’s appointed process agent.

Anderson v. DHHS/Central Regional Hospital · filed 2025-02-14Rule 4(j)(4)(a)

Under North Carolina law, service on an agency of the state must be completed on the process agent appointed by the agency. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(4)(a).

Rule 60(a) permits a trial judge to correct clerical mistakes caused by oversight or omission, but does not permit substantive changes to an entered judgment.

Daedalus · filed 2022-04-05(a)

Here, since the trial court did not include the Rule 54(b) certification in the original Order and did not have the authority under Rule 60(a) to make a substantive modification to the Order by adding a Rule 54(b) certification, the subsequent Rule 54(b) certification is ineffective to vest appellate jurisdiction.

Rule 60(a) permits correction of clerical mistakes caused by oversight or omission but does not authorize substantive changes to an entered judgment.

Daedalus · filed 2022-04-05(a)

Thus, “[w]hile Rule 60[a] allows the trial court to correct clerical mistakes in its order, it does not grant the trial court the authority to make substantive modifications to an entered judgment.”

The Rules of Civil Procedure require pleadings to give notice of the claim and to state each averment simply, concisely, and directly.

Cauley v. Bean · filed 2022-04-05Rule 8(a)(1); Rule 8(e)(1)

A complaint must contain “[a] short and plain statement of the claim sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1) (2020). Furthermore, “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. § 1A-1, Rule 8(e)(1).

Rule 10(c) makes a written instrument attached as an exhibit to a pleading part of the pleading for all purposes.

Fox v. Fox · filed 2022-05-17Rule 10(c)

In determining whether to grant a Rule 12 motion, exhibits attached to a complaint are considered a part thereof “because ‘[a] copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.’” Krawiec v. Manly, 370 N.C. 602, 606, 811 S.E.2d 542, 546 (2018) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 10(c)).

Rule 12(g) permits a party to bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion after a Rule 12(b)(3) motion and before a verdict without waiving the defense.

Osborne v. Redwood Mountain · filed 2022-04-05(g)

Defendant did not waive its right to pursue a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as such motion can be made any time prior to a verdict and may be properly made following a Rule 12(b)(3) motion.

The Rules of Civil Procedure govern civil actions and proceedings in North Carolina superior and district courts unless a statute prescribes a different procedure, and a summons must be issued when a special proceeding is filed.

In re: Pub. Records Request to DHHS · filed 2022-05-03Rule 1; Rule 4(a)

Our Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure in the superior and district courts of the State of North Carolina in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature except when a differing procedure is prescribed by statute.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 1 (2021). Accordingly, upon the filing of a special proceeding such as this, “summons shall be issued forthwith[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(a). ... Thus, the District Attorney’s Objection and Request for Temporary Protective Order was not initiated in accordance with our Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore our Courts do not have jurisdiction to consider the matter.

Rule 1 does not apply when a statute prescribes its own specialized procedure for a civil proceeding.

Causey v. Southland Nat'l Ins. Corp. · filed 2024-03-05Rule 1

For those reasons, we conclude N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 is a proceeding of a civil nature with its own specialized procedure, and therefore, it supplants the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 56(e) requires a nonmovant to provide specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and permits summary judgment against the nonmovant if they fail to respond appropriately.

Mason v. Mason · filed 2022-05-13(e)

However, the nonmovant “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of her pleading, but her response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If [the nonmovant] does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against [the nonmovant].” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e).

Rule 8(e)(2) allows a North Carolina plaintiff to plead claims in the alternative, so an express contract does not by itself preclude an unjust enrichment claim.

McCumber v. Invitation Homes Inc · filed 2022-05-31(e)(2)

But a plaintiff may plead in the alternative in North Carolina. Clark v. Burnette, 2020 WL 469428, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2020) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(e)(2)). Because North Carolina law allows Plaintiffs to plead in the alternative, this claim is not precluded by the express contract.

Rule 4G requires proper service on an LLC before default may be entered.

Lynn v. Ferster Electric, LLC · filed 2022-07-22Rule 4G

The proof of service does not specify which individual was served. Under these circumstances, where the proof of service is silent as to which individual was served on behalf of Ferster Electric, LLC, the clerk cannot find that the record establishes proper serviceon defendant - under either Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4G). Accordingly, the motion for entry of default [DE-10] is DENIED.

Rule 9(b) requires a negligent misrepresentation claim to identify the representation’s time, place, content, speaker, and the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance with particularity.

Value Health Sols., Inc. v. Pharm. Rsch. Assocs., Inc. · filed 2023-09-01Rule 9(b)

As in a fraud case, we require the plaintiff to identify this alleged negligent misrepresentation with particularity so that the defendant can understand the time, place, and content of the representation, the identity of the person making the representation, and how the plaintiff justifiably relied on that information.