N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 24(a)(2) requires a person seeking intervention as of right to show a direct and immediate interest in the action.

In re T.H. · filed 2014-01-21(a)(2)

Given that Claire’s parental rights to the four adopted juveniles have been severed, her motion to intervene in the juvenile’s dispositional hearing failed to present any direct or immediate interest such that she was entitled to intervene in the juvenile’s dispositional hearing as a matter of right.

Rule 24(a)(2) permits intervention as of right when existing parties do not adequately represent an applicant's interest in the action.

Letendre v. Currituck Cnty. · filed 2018-09-18Rule 24(a)(2)

Because defendant Currituck County admittedly cannot provide adequate representation of the Longs' interests, we conclude the Longs should have been allowed to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2).

Rule 24(a)(2) requires a proposed intervenor’s interest to be at issue when the motion to intervene is filed.

N.C. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Wake Stone Corp. · filed 2025-06-18Rule 24(a)(2)

As the Dunns were not yet parties to the contested case hearing, any interest warranting intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) must have been at issue at the time of their motion to intervene.

Rule 24(a)(2) requires a proposed intervenor to show that the action may practically impair its ability to protect its interests; valuation and distribution of a company alone does not establish that impairment.

Roesel v. Roesel · filed 2026-02-18(a)(2)

Fenix has failed to show how the valuation and distribution of the company’s assets might, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its interests. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 24(a)(2) (2023).

Rule 24(a)(2) permits timely intervention when an applicant has an interest that the action may impair and existing parties do not adequately represent that interest.

Procter v. City of Raleigh Board of Adjustment · filed 1999-05-04Rule 24(a)(2)

Once a motion is deemed timely, three prerequisites must be met for a party to establish its right to intervene: (1) an interest relating to the property or transaction, (2) practical impairment of the protection of that interest, and (3) inadequate representation of the interest by existing parties. ... In this case, proposed intervenors meet all three requirements.

When granting a preliminary injunction, the court must state its reasons, but need not make findings of fact and conclusions of law unless a party requests them or a statute expressly requires them.

Pruitt v. Williams · filed 1975-04-16Rule 52(a)(2); Rule 65(d)

Hence, absent a request by a party that the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court is required to state only the “reasons for its issuance”.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction order to state the reasons for its issuance; findings of fact and conclusions of law on a preliminary injunction are required only when an applicable statute expressly requires them or a party requests them.

Pruitt v. Williams · filed 1975-10-07Rule 65(d)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65 (d) only requires that an order granting an injunction shall set forth the “reasons for its issuance.” This the trial court did. Rule 52 provides, in part, that “ . . . findings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary on the granting or denying of a preliminary injunction or any other provisional remedy only when required by statute expressly relating to such remedy or requested by a party.” No request was made by defendants for additional findings of fact or additional conclusions of law, and without such request we know of no statute that requires a trial court to make such findings and conclusions in an order granting a preliminary injunction.

Rule 52(a)(2) requires findings of fact for a provisional remedy only when a statute expressly requires them or a party requests them.

Louis v. Shrum · filed 2015-08-04Rule 52(a)(2)

Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, "findings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary on the granting or denying of a preliminary injunction or any other provisional remedy only when required by statute expressly relating to such remedy or requested by a party." ... Here, there is no applicable statute requiring the trial court to make findings of fact under these circumstances, and plaintiffs did not request findings of fact to be made by the trial court.

Rule 54(b) makes a judgment resolving fewer than all parties’ rights interlocutory and presently unappealable when the judgment contains no determination that there is no just reason for delay.

NYTCO LEASING, INC. v. Dan-Cleve Corporation · filed 1975-05-06Rule 54(b)

Although the claims of the respective defendants against each other do not seem to affect the plaintiff’s rights, it is clear ... that under Rule 54(b) the judgment is interlocutory and not presently appealable.

Rule 54(b) permits certification of an interlocutory order for immediate appeal, and the appellate court may review whether the certification is proper.

Action Community Television Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Livesay · filed 2002-06-18Rule 54(b)

We note that a Rule 54(b) certification is reviewable by this Court on appeal because a “trial court’s denomination of its decree [as] ‘a final. . . judgment does not make it so,’ if it is not such a judgment.”

Rule 54(b) permits immediate appeal of a final order resolving fewer than all claims or parties when the trial court certifies that there is no just reason for delay.

Hudson v. McKenzie · filed 2002-06-18Rule 54(b)

A party, however, may immediately appeal an interlocutory order if: (1) the trial court has entered a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties and has certified in the order, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b), that there is no just reason to delay an appeal, id.-, N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2001); or (2) the denial of an immediate appeal would affect a substantial right, Abe, 130 N.C. App. at 334, 502 S.E.2d at 881.

Rule 54(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from a final judgment resolving fewer than all claims or parties when the action involves multiple claims or parties and the trial court certifies that there is no just reason for delay.

Wilkerson v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. · filed 2002-07-16Rule 54(b)

However, an interlocutory order may nonetheless be appealed pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure if: (1) the action involves multiple claims or multiple parties, (2) the order is “a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,” and (3) the trial court certifies that “there is no just reason for delay.” ... Here, the trial court certified that “there is no just reason for delay in the entry of a final judgment dismissing Plaintiffs claims against the City.” ... Having determined that the order and judgment fully complies with the requirements set forth in Yordy, we conclude plaintiffs appeal is properly before us and therefore turn to the merits of the case.

Rule 54(b) permits immediate review of a judgment resolving fewer than all claims only when the judgment is final and there is no just reason for delay.

Priest v. Sobeck · filed 2002-11-05(b)

Since this appeal arises from a non-final judgment, we hold that the trial court's certification under Rule 54(b) does not render it ready for appeal.

Rule 54(b) permits an immediate appeal of an order final as to some claims or parties when the trial court certifies that there is no just reason to delay the appeal.

Myers v. Mutton · filed 2002-12-31Rule 54(b)

Although there is generally no right to appeal an interlocutory order, it is immediately appealable if (1) the order is final as to some claims or parties, and the trial court certifies pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) that there is no just reason to delay the appeal, or (2) the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right that would be lost unless immediately reviewed. ... In the present case, the trial court did not certify the order for sanctions under Rule 54(b), nor do we conclude that a substantial right will be lost if the order is not immediately appealed.

Rule 54(b) makes a final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties immediately appealable when the trial court certifies that there is no just reason for delay.

N.C. Monroe Construction Co. v. State · filed 2002-12-31Rule 54(b)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2001) states that in an action involving multiple claims or parties, if the trial court enters a final judgment as to a claim or a party and certifies there is no just reason for delay, the judgment is immediately appealable, requiring appellate review.

Rule 8(e)(2) permits a party to state as many defenses as the party has, even when the defenses are inconsistent.

First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Akelaitis · filed 1975-05-07(e)(2)

A party may state as many defenses as he has regardless of consistency. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(e) (2).

Rule 12(b) requires legal defenses, subject to its exceptions, to be raised in a responsive pleading or they are waived.

Mazzocone v. Drummond · filed 1979-07-31Rule 12(b)

All legal defenses to a claim for relief, with certain exceptions not applicable to this case, must be asserted in the responsive pleading. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b). If they are not, they are waived. Since the defendant did not present his defense in a properly filed answer, his defense was waived.

Rule 8(e)(2) permits a litigant to assert multiple claims in good faith even if they are inconsistent.

Outer Banks Contractors, Inc. v. Forbes · filed 1981-04-07Rule 8(e)(2)

A fundamental principle of the Rules of Civil Procedure is that a litigant is entitled to assert as many-separate claims as he may, in good faith, have, regardless of their consistency. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8(e)(2).

Rule 12(h)(1) waives objections to process and service of process when a defendant files an answer without raising them.

Southgate v. Russ · filed 1981-06-02Rule 12(h)(1)

The questions of insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process were not presented in the 4 April 1977 notice. By filing his answer without raising these objections to jurisdiction, defendant waived these objections.

Rule 8(e)(2) permits alternative and inconsistent claims, and an insufficient alternative does not make a sufficient one insufficient.

Hendrix v. Hendrix · filed 1984-03-20Rule 8(e)(2)

Under the general rules of pleadings, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(e)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to "set forth two or more statements of a claim ... alternatively... [and] in separate counts." Further, if an alternative statement of a claim, "made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements." The Rule also sanctions the making of inconsistent claims.

Rule 8(e)(2) permits a party to state multiple claims regardless of whether they are consistent or rest on legal or equitable grounds.

BENEFICIAL MORTGAGE CO. OF NORTH CAROLINA INC. v. Barrington · filed 2004-05-04Rule 8(e)(2)

These are alternative claims: "A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(e)(2) (2003).

Under Rule 65(b), a complaint’s prayer for relief may serve as a motion for a preliminary injunction; a separate motion is not necessarily required.

Collins v. Freeland · filed 1971-10-20Rule 65(b)

It seems clear from the quoted portion of the rule that the prayer for relief in the complaint may constitute a sufficient motion for a preliminary injunction, and that a separate or additional motion is not necessarily required.

Rule 65 allows a temporary restraining order without notice under its procedural requirements, but a preliminary injunction requires notice to the adverse party and a hearing.

Lambe v. Smith · filed 1971-06-23Rule 65(a) and (b)

Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65(a) and (b), a distinction is made between a “temporary restraining order” and a “preliminary injunction.” The former may be issued without notice under the detailed procedural provisions set forth in Rule 65 (b), but the latter may only be issued after notice to the adverse party and a hearing.

Rule 65(b) requires a party seeking a preliminary injunction to show probable success on the merits and irreparable harm.

Waff Bros. v. Bank of North Carolina, N.A. · filed 1975-05-07Rule 65(b)

At a hearing on motion for a preliminary injunction pending the final hearing on the merits (See G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65 [b]), the burden is on the party seeking the injunctive relief to establish (1) that there is probable cause to believe that the party will ultimately prevail in a final determination of the case, and (2) that irreparable harm will be suffered by the party if the injunctive relief is not granted.

Rule 65(c) requires a court issuing a preliminary injunction to expressly consider whether the applicant must post a bond, even if the court ultimately requires none.

Keith v. Day · filed 1983-02-01(c)

Thus, it was reversible error, not necessarily to have failed to require bond, but to have failed expressly to consider the question of requiring a bond.

Rule 65 permits a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff shows a likelihood of success and likely irreparable loss, or when the injunction is necessary to protect the plaintiff’s rights during litigation.

A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure · filed 1983-05-31Rule 65

As a general rule, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary measure taken by a court to preserve the status quo of the parties during litigation. It will be issued only (1) if a plaintiff is able to show likelihood of success on the merits of his case and (2) if a plaintiff is likely to sustain irreparable loss unless the injunction is issued, or if, in the opinion of the Court, issuance is necessary for the protection of a plaintiff's rights during the course of litigation.

A preliminary injunction requires likely irreparable loss without it or a need to protect the plaintiff’s rights during litigation.

Robins & Weill, Inc. v. Mason · filed 1984-10-02Rule 65

The second prong of the test in granting a preliminary injunction is whether the plaintiff is likely to sustain irreparable loss unless the injunction is issued or if the issuance is necessary for the protection of the plaintiffs rights during the course of litigation.

Rule 65 requires a municipality seeking a preliminary injunction to make a clear showing of specific facts of irreparable injury.

Town of Knightdale v. Vaughn · filed 1989-09-19(b)

Although the General Assembly has given to municipalities the power to enforce ordinances through injunctive relief, a municipality must comply with the requirements of Rule 65 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a clear showing of specific facts of irreparable injury.

Rule 65 does not require a verified complaint for issuance of a preliminary injunction.

Moore v. Wykle · filed 1992-08-04Rule 65

At a show cause hearing an unverified complaint could not be treated as an affidavit, but verification of a complaint is not a condition for issuance of a preliminary injunction under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 65, or under Chapter 1, Article 37, of the North Carolina General Statutes.

Rule 65 governs entry of a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff shows a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.

Jeffrey R. Kennedy, D.D.S., P.A. v. Kennedy · filed 2003-08-19

In summary, plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its case, based upon the record evidence at this stage in the proceedings, through a showing that the restrictive covenants are reasonable and enforceable against Carroll, and that Carroll's establishment of a practice in Hillsborough violates the covenants. Plaintiff also established irreparable harm through a showing that a substantial portion of its patients have followed Carroll and Jerre to the new practice. ... The trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is hereby reversed and the matter remanded with instructions that the trial court enter an order in compliance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65, granting plaintiff a preliminary injunction enforcing the non-competition agreement.

Rule 65(a) requires notice to the adverse party before a preliminary injunction may be issued; failure to set aside an injunction entered without notice is an abuse of discretion.

Perry v. BAXLEY DEVELOPMENT, INC. · filed 2008-01-15Rule 65(a)

Accordingly, defendant never received notice as required under Rule 65 and the failure to set aside the preliminary injunction granted under that rule constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Rule 65 permits a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff shows a likelihood of success and immediate, irreparable injury without the injunction.

North Carolina Baptist Hospital v. Novant Health, Inc. · filed 2009-03-17Rule 65

We hold that the trial court correctly concluded that Baptist would suffer immediate and irreparable injury if Novant were permitted to oppose Baptist’s CON application.

Rule 65(d) requires an injunction order to state the reasons for its issuance with sufficient specificity.

Wilson v. North Carolina Department of Commerce · filed 2015-02-17Rule 65(d)

Pursuant to Rule 65(d), an order granting injunctive relief must, among other things, “set forth the reasons for its issuance [and] shall be specific in terms[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 65(d) (2013).

Rule 65(c) permits the court to set reasonable security as a condition of a preliminary injunction.

Comput. Design & Integration, LLC v. Brown · filed 2017-01-27Rule 65(c)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 65(c), this Order shall become effective u p o n Plaintiffs’ posting of security in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) (“Security”), which the Court concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, is reasonable and appropriate as a condition of granting this preliminary injunction.

A preliminary injunction is improper when a notice of lis pendens gives the plaintiff a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

Providence Volunteer Fire Department v. Town of Weddington · filed 2017-04-18Rule 65

A preliminary injunction is inappropriate where a plaintiff has filed a notice of lis pendens, thereby securing a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

Under Rule 65, a preliminary injunction requiring a party to perform a positive act is subject to the more exacting standard for mandatory injunctions.

Wheeler v. Wheeler · filed 2018-11-15Rule 65(a)

Therefore, the Court concludes that the more exacting standard applicable to mandatory injunctions applies to the Motion.

Rule 50 governs the procedural requirements for a motion for judgment after a jury's failure to agree, but it does not broaden appellate jurisdiction.

Samia v. Ballard · filed 1975-05-07Rule 50(b)(1)

Immediately following the jury’s failure to agree on a verdict the appellant, pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) (1), moved for judgment in accordance with its earlier motions for directed verdict. Without question, appellant strictly complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 50. However, Rule 50 has nothing to do with broadening appellate jurisdiction.

Rule 50 requires evidence to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Snider v. Dickens · filed 1977-02-16

Applying G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50, the evidence is to be considered in light most favorable to defendant (Dickens), the party resisting the motions.

Rule 50 permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict for a party with the burden of proof when that party’s evidence is credible as a matter of law and permits no reasonable contrary inference.

North Carolina National Bank v. Burnette · filed 1979-07-12(b)(1)

The rule itself provides that the motion for JNOV, made under the outlined circumstances, “shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.” Rule 50(b)(1), Rules of Civil Procedure. ... In such situations it is proper to direct verdict for the party with the burden of proof if the evidence so clearly establishes the fact in issue that no reasonable inferences to the contrary can be drawn.

Excessive damages are a ground for a new trial under Rule 59, not for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50.

Carawan v. Tate · filed 1982-01-12Rules 50(b)(1), 59(a)(6)

The inconsistency is that with respect to the verdict on punitive damages, His Honor purported to grant the motion for judgment N.O.V. pursuant to Rule 50; however, he gave as his reason that the verdict was excessive, part of one of the grounds for granting a new trial under Rule 59. Clearly, there is a difference in the purpose and applicability of the two rules. ... The Court of Appeals correctly held that the punitive damages issue should have been submitted to the jury and that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for judgment N.O.V.

A judgment notwithstanding the verdict follows an earlier motion for a directed verdict despite the jury’s contrary verdict.

Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co. · filed 1983-01-18Rule 50(a)

Judgment n.o.v. is entered in accordance with a movant’s earlier motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the contrary verdict actually returned by the jury.

Under Rule 50, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict renews the directed-verdict motion and is reviewed under the same standard.

Dotson v. Payne · filed 1984-12-18Rule 50(a), (b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is technically a renewal of the motion for a directed verdict. The motion asks that the judgment be entered in accordance with the movant’s earlier motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the contrary verdict rendered by the jury. Thus, the standard of our review for both motions is the same.

Rule 50(a) directed verdict motions and Rule 50(b) motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ask whether the evidence, viewed in the non-movant’s favor, is sufficient for submission to the jury.

McDaniel v. Bass-Smith Funeral Home, Inc. · filed 1986-05-20Rule 50(a), (b)

A motion for directed verdict made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a) and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) present essentially the same question, i.e., whether the evidence, taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant, is sufficient for submission to the jury.

Rule 50 requires the court to view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant on a directed verdict motion, and the same standard governs judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Cochran v. Keller · filed 1988-04-05Rule 50

On a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, resolving all conflicts in his favor and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. ... The test for granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as for granting a directed verdict.

Rule 50(a) and (b) use the same standard for evidence sufficiency: the evidence and reasonable inferences, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, must be sufficient to submit the case to the jury.

Smith v. Pass · filed 1989-09-05Rule 50(a), (b)

A motion for directed verdict pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a) presents an identical question for trial and appellate courts — whether plaintiff’s evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant and given every reasonable inference, is sufficient to submit to the jury. ... The above-cited test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is equally applicable in considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b).

Rule 50 requires courts to view evidence and resolve conflicts in the nonmovant’s favor when deciding a directed verdict motion; the same standard governs judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Russell v. Baity · filed 1989-09-05Rule 50(a), (b)

In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a), the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. ... Also, the court must resolve any contradictions, conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence in the non-movant’s favor in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. ... In determining if a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) should be granted, the same factors are considered as in the directed verdict decision.

Rule 50(a) and (b) require the same sufficiency of evidence standard when reviewing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion based on an earlier directed verdict motion.

Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co. · filed 1991-12-06Rule 50(a), (b)

Where the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a motion that judgment be entered in accordance with the movant's earlier motion for directed verdict, this Court has required the use of the same standard of sufficiency of evidence in reviewing both motions. Snider v. Dickens, 293 N.C. 356, 237 S.E.2d 832 (1977); N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(a), (b) (1990).

Rule 50(a) tests whether the evidence is legally sufficient to submit the case to the jury; the same standard applies to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Reed v. Abrahamson · filed 1992-12-15Rule 50(a)

A motion by a defendant for a directed verdict under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury and support a. verdict for the plaintiff. ... A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is essentially a renewal of an earlier motion for directed verdict, Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362, 329 S.E.2d 333 (1985), and the same standard will apply. ... We therefore find the trial court’s denial of defendant Barwick’s motions to be proper.

Rules 50(a) and (b) permit a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, fails to establish every required element of the claim.

Mecimore v. Cothren · filed 1993-04-20Rules 50(a) and (b)

Defendants are entitled to a directed verdict and, thus, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, fails to show the existence of each element required to establish an easement by prescription.

Rule 50(a) requires a directed verdict motion to state its grounds, and a party cannot raise an unasserted ground on appeal.

Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2000-08-29Rule 50(a)

Wal-Mart thus cannot assert this on appeal because it failed to raise this issue before the trial court on its motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 50(a) permits a party to seek a directed verdict based on the legal sufficiency of the evidence, and Rule 50(b) permits renewal of that motion as judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Estate of Hendrickson Ex Rel. Hendrickson v. Genesis Health Venture, Inc. · filed 2002-07-02Rule 50(a), Rule 50(b)

A defendant’s motion for directed verdict made pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(a) tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff. ... A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(b) is a renewal of an earlier motion for directed verdict. ... Therefore, the standard of review for both motions is the same, and the question presented is whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury.

Rules 50(a) and 50(b) govern motions testing whether evidence supports a verdict for the non-moving party, with Rule 50(b) renewing a directed-verdict motion.

BNT CO. v. Baker Precythe Development Co. · filed 2002-06-18Rule 50(a), Rule 50(b)

A motion for directed verdict pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(a) tests the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict for the non-moving party.

Rule 50 permits a party to move for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a jury trial.

Lee v. Rice · filed 2002-12-03Rule 50

Under Rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a jury trial.

Rule 50 provides for motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict in civil cases.

State v. Buck · filed 2007-12-18Rule 50

Motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are properly made in civil cases, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 50 (2005).

Rule 51(a) requires the trial court to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence; a charge that merely recites the evidence, the parties’ contentions, and general legal principles is insufficient.

Coble v. Martin Fireproofing Georgia, Inc. · filed 1975-05-07Rule 51(a)

The resolution of a single argument is all that is necessary for the disposition of this appeal: Did the trial court violate the mandate of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a), by failing to “declare and explain the law arising on the evidence?” We agree with defendant that it did, and order a new trial.

Rule 51(a) requires the trial court to explain the law arising from the evidence, including an applicable statutory violation; failure to do so entitles the plaintiffs to a new trial.

Swaney v. Shaw · filed 1975-12-03Rule 51(a)

The only question requiring discussion raised by the plaintiffs’ assignments of error is whether the court sufficiently declared and explained the law arising on the evidence given in the case as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a). ... Because the court ’ failed to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence given in the case with respect to the evidence tending to show that the defendant violated G.S. 106-381, the plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial.

Rule 51(a) requires the trial court to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence.

Town of Mars Hill v. Honeycutt · filed 1977-02-02(a)

Thus the Town of Mars Hill is correct in its contention that the trial court in its instructions to the jury on the issue of damages erred by not declaring and explaining the law arising on the evidence in this case because the court’s instructions give no consideration to the cost and expense to mature, care for, and market the fish which were lost as a proximate result of the Town’s negligence.

Rule 51 requires the judge to explain the law and apply it to the evidence on all substantial features of the case even without a request for special instructions.

Warren v. Parks · filed 1976-12-15

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51 imposes upon the judge a duty to explain the law and to apply it to the evidence on all substantial features of the case, even without a request for special instructions.

Rule 51(a) requires the court to charge the law applicable to the substantive features of the case without a special request and apply it to factual situations shown by the evidence.

Martin Ex Rel. Martin v. Amusements of America, Inc. · filed 1978-10-03(a)

It is the duty of the court to charge the law applicable to the substantive features of the case arising on the evidence without special request and to apply the law to the various factual situations presented by the evidence. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 51(a); Investment Properties of Asheville, Inc. v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E. 2d 342 (1972); Panhorst v. Panhorst, 277 N.C. 664, 178 S.E. 2d 387 (1971).

Rule 51 requires a judge to explain the law arising from the evidence, even without a party’s special request.

Scallon v. Hooper · filed 1980-10-07

Clearly, the judge had a duty to explain the rule of G.S. 20-71.1, even absent a special request by plaintiff, because it was the law arising from the evidence.

Rule 54(b) makes an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or parties interlocutory and not appealable unless the judgment states there is no just reason for delay.

Durham v. Creech · filed 1975-05-21(b)

In the present case, the order dismissing plaintiffs’ claim against the defendants Smith and dismissing by consent the counterclaim of the defendants Smith against the plaintiffs adjudicates fewer than all the claims of all the parties and does not contain a determination by the trial judge that there was “no just reason for delay” in entering such order. Therefore, the order is interlocutory and presently not appealable. Rule 54 (b) ; Leasing, Inc. v. Dan-Cleve Corp., supra; Arnold v. Howard, supra.

Rule 54(b) makes an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or parties interlocutory and not final when it lacks an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance · filed 1975-10-01(b)

In the absence of such an express determination in the order, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) makes “any order or other form of de-cisión, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties,” interlocutory and not final.

Rule 54(b) requires a determination that there is no just reason for delay before a judgment resolving fewer than all parties' rights can be reviewed.

Beach v. Felton · filed 1975-11-05(b)

It contains no determination by the trial judge that “there is no just reason for delay.” Therefore, this is not a final judgment and is not presently “subject to review either by appeal or otherwise.” ... Appeal dismissed.

Rule 54(b) permits a trial court to enter a final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties only when it determines there is no just reason for delay.

Wachovia Realty Investments v. Housing, Inc. · filed 1976-01-21(b)

So we have interpreted G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) to mean that if the order or judgment adjudicates fewer than all the claims, or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, and there is no determination in the order or judgment that “there is no just reason for delay,” then the order or judgment is not subject to appellate review on the ground that it affects a substantial right, or other grounds enumerated in G.S. 1-277 or G.S. 7A-27(d).

Rule 54(b) requires a determination that there is no just reason for delay before a judgment resolving fewer than all claims is appealable.

McRae v. Moore · filed 1976-05-19(b)

Since the trial court made no determination that “there is no just reason for delay,” the judgment “does not terminate the action as to any of the claims,” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), and is not now appealable.

Rule 54(b) permits final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties and preserves review of nonfinal orders allowed by other rules or statutes.

Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance · filed 1976-11-04(b)

The rule in North Carolina, as in the federal courts, is essentially remedial, and while allowing the trial court to render a final, though partial, adjudication which might not be appealable otherwise, it will not be construed to limit the effect of any other rule or statute allowing review of non-final orders or judgments. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) expands, rather than restricts, the compass of review of orders and judgments in North Carolina.

Rule 54(b) permits an immediate appeal from a final determination involving fewer than all parties only if the trial judge specifies that there is no just reason for delay.

Harris v. DePencier · filed 1981-05-19Rule 54(b)

Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, such a final determination of the rights and liabilities of one or more but less than all of the parties in a multiple party action, is immediately appealable only if the trial judge specifies in the order that “there is no just reason for delay.”

Rule 54(b) requires the trial court to determine that there is no just reason for delay before a judgment resolving fewer than all parties is immediately appealable under that rule.

Bacon v. Leatherwood · filed 1981-06-16(b)

In the trial court’s order of 18 June 1980 dismissing plaintiffs action insofar as it applied to Robert Leatherwood the court gave no indication that there was “no just reason for delay.” Therefore, under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) this appeal is interlocutory and premature.

Rule 54(b) requires a trial court determination that there is no just reason for delay before an order resolving fewer than all parties’ rights is a final judgment.

Azzolino v. Dingfelder · filed 1984-11-20Rule 54(b)

Although the court’s orders of 14 December 1982 may have been final in nature with respect to the children’s claims, such orders were not final judgments as defined by Rule 54 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure because they adjudicated the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties and did not contain a determination by the trial court that there was no just reason for delay.

Rule 54(b) requires a no-just-reason-for-delay certification before an order disposing of fewer than all claims or parties may be appealed, unless another statute expressly permits appeal.

Jenkins v. Maintenance, Inc. · filed 1985-07-16Rule 54(b)

Thus, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) does not permit appeal if fewer than all claims or parties have been disposed of unless it is provided that “there is no just reason for delay,” or when other statutes expressly provide otherwise.

Rule 54(b) allows a final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties only when the judgment determines that there is no just reason for delay.

Beam v. Morrow · filed 1985-11-19Rule 54(b)

When more than one claim for relief is presented the court may enter a final judgment as to fewer than all the claims or parties “only if there is no just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b). ... The trial court did not make the determination that there is no just reason for delay.

Rule 54(b) permits appellate review of a judgment resolving fewer than all claims when the trial court determines that there is no just reason for delay.

Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., Inc. · filed 1986-05-06Rule 54(b)

The trial court having made a determination of “no just reason for delay,” however, the matters addressed and adjudicated in the summary judgment entered by the trial court were properly before the Court of Appeals for appellate review. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b).

A Rule 54(b) finding that there is no just reason for delay does not make a nonfinal judgment immediately appealable.

Watch v. United States Fire Insurance · filed 1988-05-03Rule 54(b)

A finding that “there is no just reason for delay” under Rule 54(b) is not enough. The judgment must also be final.

Rule 54(b) requires dismissal of an appeal from an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or parties when claims against another party remain unresolved.

Duffell v. Poe · filed 1990-03-20Rule 54(b)

Thus, the order appealed from adjudicates “fewer than all of the claims or parties,” and plaintiff’s appeal will be dismissed.

Rule 54(b) requires a no-just-reason-for-delay certification for an immediate appeal from summary judgment for fewer than all defendants, unless the order affects a substantial right.

Clevenger v. Pride Trimble Corp. · filed 1989-12-19Rule 54(b)

Where summary judgment is allowed for fewer than all the defendants and the judgment does not contain a certification pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b), that there is “no just reason for delay,” a plaintiff’s appeal will be premature unless the order allowing summary judgment affects a substantial right.

Rule 54(b) allows immediate appeal of a final judgment resolving fewer than all claims or parties when the trial court certifies that there is no just reason to delay the appeal.

Mills Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n v. Whitmire · filed 2001-09-18Rule 54(b)

However, a party may appeal an interlocutory order “where the order represents a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies in the judgment that there is no just reason to delay the appeal,” or “where delaying the appeal will irreparably impair a substantial right of the party.”

Rule 54(b) permits a trial court to enter final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties when there is no just reason for delay and the judgment so states.

Raybon v. Kidd · filed 2001-12-04Rule 54(b)

Under section 1A-1, Rule 54(b), of the General Statutes of North Carolina, however, where there are multiple claims or multiple parties to an action, the trial court “may enter a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties . . . if there is no just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment.”

Rule 54(b) permits an immediate appeal only when the judgment is final as to some claims or parties and properly certified; labeling an unresolved order final does not make it appealable.

Morris Communications Corp. v. City of Asheville · filed 2001-08-21Rule 54(b)

The order appealed from in the instant case contained the trial court’s certification pursuant to Rule 54(b); however, a trial court cannot make its decree immediately appealable under Rule 54(b) by simply denominating it a final judgment if it is not such a judgment.

Rule 51(a) requires the judge to explain how the law applies to the evidence, stating the evidence only as necessary for that explanation.

Jones v. Bess · filed 1975-05-21(a)

The one question for resolution on this appeal is whether the trial, judge sufficiently and correctly declared and explained the law arising on the evidence in the case as he is required to do pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51. In declaring and explaining the law arising on the evidence in the case “[t]he judge shall not be required to state such evidence except to the extent necessary to explain the application of the law thereto . . . . ” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a), Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 51 requires jury instructions to apply the law to the evidence, including in the court's final mandate to the jury.

Fowler v. General Electric Co. · filed 1979-03-20Rule 51

In its final mandate the court should apply the law to the evidence by properly instructing the jury to answer the first issue “yes” if plaintiffs had satisfied the jury by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in designing the safety thermostat in the icemaker, and that such negligence proximately caused the fire that damaged plaintiff’s property.

Rule 51 requires the judge to explain and apply the law to the facts pertinent to an issue; a general statement of the law is insufficient.

Owens v. Harnett Transfer, Inc. · filed 1979-08-07Rule 51

This instruction is inadequate. In no part of the charge did the court give the jury a clear mandate as to what facts, for which there was support in the evidence, it would have to find in order to answer the issue either in the affirmative or in the negative. As our Supreme Court has said, Justice Moore speaking for the Court: G.S. § 1-180, as now incorporated in G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 51, required the judge to explain and apply the law to the specific facts pertinent to the issue involved. A mere declaration of the law in general terms was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute.

Rule 51(a) requires the trial judge to explain and apply the law to the specific facts relevant to a jury issue; failure to do so may require a new trial.

Harrison v. McLear · filed 1980-10-07Rule 51(a)

While we realize the instructions on the fourth issue were more complete and definitive, that portion of the instructions that the jury was not to consider the fourth and fifth issues if it answered “no” to the third issue, coupled with the court’s failure to explain and apply the law to the specific facts pertinent to the issue involved, erroneously and effectively prejudiced plaintiffs claim.

Rule 51(a) requires the trial judge to explain the law in relation to the evidence; failure to do so requires a new trial.

Hunt v. Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc. · filed 1980-12-02Rule 51(a)

Because of the failure of the trial court to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence in the case as required by Rule 51(a) in accordance with the standards established in the decisions cited and other decisions of the appellate courts of North Carolina, there must be a new trial.

Rule 9(b) requires fraud, duress, and mistake to be pleaded with particularity, while allowing malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind to be alleged generally.

Britt v. Britt · filed 1975-06-04(b)

Although the new civil rules adopt the practice of notice pleading, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 9(b), specifically provides that “[i]n all averments of fraud, duress or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.” Here plaintiff fails to allege in what respects she was induced to sign the deed of trust, or upon what misrepresentations she relied.

Rules 8 and 9 require allegations of duress to be stated with particularity.

N. C. Monroe Construction Co. v. Coan · filed 1976-10-06Rules 8 and 9

Finally, G.S. 1A-1, Rules 8 and 9 require that allegations of duress be stated with particularity.

Rule 9(b) requires allegations of fraud, duress, or mistake to state the supporting circumstances with particularity.

Cone v. Cone · filed 1981-01-20Rule 9(b)

Rule 9 (b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1, requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud, duress or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Plaintiff’s allegations do not state with particularity any circumstances amounting to fraud, duress or mistake in the execution of the agreement and amendment.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires specific findings of fact in a nonjury trial; statements that the plaintiff failed to prove its claim and that the defendants owed nothing do not suffice.

Lowe's of Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Thompson · filed 1975-06-04Rule 52(a)(1)

Thus, under the circumstances here presented, the trial judge’s statements that the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden in proving the obligation of defendants for money due and that the defendants were not indebted to the plaintiff in any amount are not findings of fact within the meaning of Rule 52(a) (1).

Rule 52(a)(1) requires a judge in a nonjury trial to make specific findings on the issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, state separate conclusions of law, and enter judgment.

Conrad v. Jones · filed 1976-10-06Rule 52(a)(1)

In all actions tried without a jury it is the duty of the trial judge to find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and enter the appropriate judgment. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a) (1). It is also the duty of the trial judge to make findings of fact determinative of the issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires a trial court hearing a case without a jury to make findings of fact.

Smathers v. Smathers · filed 1977-12-21(a)(1)

Indeed, the trial court, which heard this case without a jury, made no findings of fact whatsoever as it was required to do by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1).

Rule 52(a)(1) makes findings of fact in a nonjury hearing conclusive on appeal when supported by evidence.

Cox v. Cox · filed 1977-04-20(a)(1)

In a hearing before the trial judge without a jury, the findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though evidence may sustain findings to the contrary.

Rule 52(a)(2) does not require a judge to make findings of fact on a motion unless a party requests them.

Allen v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., NA · filed 1978-02-07(a)(2)

However, absent a request for findings of fact to support his decision on a motion, the judge is not required to find facts, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2), and it is “presumed that the Judge, upon proper evidence, found facts to support this judgment.”

Rule 52(a) requires the judge to make specific findings of fact in a trial without a jury; findings supported by competent evidence are conclusive on appeal.

Broughton v. Broughton · filed 1982-09-21Rule 52(a)

Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a), the trial judge is required to find facts specially in any action tried without a jury. “[I]f supported by competent evidence, such facts are as conclusive as the verdict of a jury.”

Rule 52(a)(1) requires a court trying facts without a jury to make its own specific findings of fact and separate conclusions of law; merely reciting the evidence is insufficient.

Chloride, Inc. v. Honeycutt · filed 1984-12-18Rule 52(a)(1)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” The court must itself determine what facts are established by the evidence rather than merely reciting what the evidence may tend to show.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires the court to find facts specially in a nonjury trial; merely reciting testimony does not satisfy that requirement.

Lee v. Lee · filed 1985-12-31Rule 52(a)(1)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts specially. . . .” The court must make its own determination as to ... what pertinent facts are established by the evidence rather than merely reciting what the evidence may tend to show.

Rule 52(a) requires findings on material issues in a nonjury trial; a judgment entered without a necessary finding may be vacated and remanded.

GUILFORD COUNTY PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT v. Simmons · filed 1991-03-19Rule 52(a)

We vacate the judgment and remand the case for additional findings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52 (1990).

Rule 52(c) applies the any competent evidence standard when reviewing findings of fact by a trial judge sitting as factfinder.

Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc. · filed 1991-04-02(c)

It is well settled that when the trial judge sits as factfinder, his findings of fact are binding [on appeal] if they are supported by any competent evidence in the record, but his conclusions of law are reviewable.” R.L. Coleman & Co. v. City of Asheville, 98 N.C. App. 648, 651, 392 S.E.2d 107, 108-09, disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 432, 395 S.E.2d 689 (1990) (emphases added); see also N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(c). Accordingly, the proper standard on appeal to challenge the trial court’s findings of fact is the “any competent evidence” standard.

In a nonjury trial, a trial judge’s finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by competent evidence.

Institution Food House, Inc. v. Circus Hall of Cream, Inc. · filed 1992-10-06(c)

As stated above, however, if there is any competent evidence to support the trial judge’s finding, it will not be disturbed on appeal.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires a trial court in a nonjury action to make specific findings of fact, state its conclusions of law separately, and enter judgment accordingly.

Fulcher v. Golden · filed 2001-11-06(a)(1)

In all actions tried without a jury, the trial court is required to make specific findings of fact, state separately its conclusions of law, and then direct judgment in accordance therewith.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires specific findings of fact and separate conclusions of law after a bench trial; reciting testimony and evidence is insufficient.

Long v. Long · filed 2003-10-21Rule 52(a)(1)

Here, the trial court’s order lacks adequate findings of fact to support a conclusion of cohabitation because the findings were mere recitations of testimony and evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) requires that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . ., the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”

Rule 52(a)(1) requires findings after a bench trial that resolve material factual conflicts, explain the judgment, and permit appellate review.

Hartwell v. Mahan · filed 2005-03-01Rule 52(a)(1)

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2003), provides that, following a bench trial, "the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." ... We conclude the trial court failed to enter the specific or ultimate findings required to (1) resolve evidentiary conflicts, (2) demonstrate the basis for its award, and (3) enable this Court to determine whether the trial court's award reflects a correct application of the law.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires findings in a nonjury trial that resolve material factual issues needed to support the court's conclusions of law.

Pegg v. Doe · filed 2006-08-01Rule 52(a)(1)

The trial court's findings fail to resolve the factual issues raised by Jones' evidence, namely (1) whether Cecil and Alease began adversely possessing the tract at issue on or before the date upon which the Peggs received title to the tract at issue, and (2)whether Cecil and Alease rejected the Peggs' attempt to convey a life estate by forcing Carl Pegg to leave the property. Without resolving these issues, the trial court's order could not properly dispose of Jones' adverse possession claim.

Rule 52(a) requires findings of material and ultimate facts in nonjury trials, including postseparation support proceedings.

Crocker v. Crocker · filed 2008-05-06Rule 52(a)

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a) requires in all non-jury trials that the trial court find specially “those material and ultimate facts from which it can be determined whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law reached.” ... We note that the general principles articulated in Quick as applied to alimony awards are equally applicable to awards of post-separation support.

Rule 52(a) requires a trial court in a nonjury trial to find the material and ultimate facts needed to review its findings and conclusions of law.

Collins v. Collins · filed 2015-11-03Rule 52(a)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a) requires in all non-jury trials, the trial court specially find “those material and ultimate facts from which it can be determined whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law reached.” Quick, 305 N.C. at 451, 290 S.E.2d at 657. ... The trial court’s order on post-separation support sufficiently addresses the issue of the parties’ accustomed standard of living established during the marriage.

Rule 52 requires a trial court in a non-jury trial to make findings of the material and ultimate facts needed to review its conclusions of law.

Carpenter v. Carpenter · filed 2016-01-19Rule 52

In all non-jury trials, the trial court must specifically find “those material and ultimate facts from which it can be determined whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law reached.” Crocker v. Crocker, 190 N.C. App. 165, 168, 660 S.E.2d 212, 214 (2008) (quoting Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 451, 290 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982); citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52 (2007)).

Rule 52(a)(1) requires findings on the ultimate facts needed to decide a nonjury case, but not a recital of every evidentiary detail.

State v. Navarro · filed 2016-06-07Rule 52(a)(1)

As in Escobar, here the trial court was not required to make “findings of fact specifying the numerous tasks completed” by surety in its effort to surrender defendant.

Rule 52(c) allows parties in a bench trial to challenge whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact.

Carolina Mulching Co. v. Raleigh-Wilmington Invs. II, LLC · filed 2021-08-13Rule 52(c)

Rule 52(c) allows parties to an action tried without a jury to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of fact.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires findings of ultimate fact specific enough for an appellate court to assess whether competent evidence supports the judgment.

Adams v. Dillon · filed 2025-09-03Rule 52(a)(1)

Under Rule 52, the trial court’s adjudication and findings of fact must contain the “specific ultimate facts sufficient for an appellate court to determine that the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.”

Rule 52(a)(1) requires a court deciding a case without a jury to make findings on material facts sufficient to permit appellate review.

Sawyer v. Billups · filed 2025-12-03Rule 52(a)(1)

Because the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding the issues raised on appeal are inadequate to permit appellate review, we remand for further fact finding on the existing record.

Rule 34 requires a party seeking discovery and production of documents or things to show good cause, which requires more than mere relevance.

Stanback v. Stanback · filed 1975-06-06Rule 34

The discovery order contested in this assignment is governed by the requirements of Rule 34 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, as it read prior to the 1973 amendment which became effective 1 January 1975. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 34 (1969). Under Rule 34 as then written a trial court may order the discovery and production of documents and things for inspection, copying or photographing upon the motion of any party showing good cause therefor. Unlike Rules 26 and 33, Rule 34 requires a party invoking the rule to show “good cause” for the production of. the items sought..

Rule 34 requires a party seeking production of documents to show good cause, including necessity and relevance.

Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1984-03-20Rule 34

When a party requests production of documents under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 34, he must show good cause, which includes the elements of necessity and relevance.

Rule 7(b)(1) requires motions made outside a hearing, trial, or specified court session to be written and to state their grounds and the relief sought.

City of Durham v. Lyckan Development Corp. · filed 1975-06-18Rule 7(b)(1)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 7(b) (1) provides that motions, unless made during a hearing or trial or at a session at which a cause is on the calendar for that session, shall be made in writing, shall state the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. While defendant failed to comply with Rule 6 of the trial court rules, it fully complied with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1).

Rule 43(e) permits a motion to be supported by affidavits and other written or documentary evidence, and verified pleadings may operate as affidavits.

Doxol Gas of Angier, Inc. v. Howard · filed 1975-12-17(e)

In an application for appointment of a receiver, the motion may be “. . . supported by affidavits and other written or documentary evidence.” Coates v. Wilkes, 92 N.C. 377, 383 (1885) ; also see G.S. 1A-1, Rule 43 (e). ... Though the parties here utilized verified pleadings, we hold that they essentially operate as affidavits in this matter and should be construed accordingly.

Rule 12(f) is not the proper motion to challenge a notice of dismissal without prejudice.

Travelers Insurance Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. · filed 1977-11-02(f)

We should note at the outset that a motion to strike “any insufficient defense or any redundant, irrelevant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(f) is not the proper motion by which to challenge a notice of dismissal without prejudice.

Rule 6(c) permits a judge to sign an order out of session.

Barbee v. Walton's Jewelers, Inc. · filed 1979-04-17Rule 6(c)

We find no error in Judge Brown’s signing the order in question out of session. This falls within the authority granted by the above rule.

A written motion satisfies Rule 7(b)(1) when it informs the opposing party of the relief sought and the reasons for it, even if inartfully drawn.

Hamlin v. Hamlin · filed 1981-04-07Rule 7(b)(1)

Since the written motion filed by defendant fully informed plaintiff of the relief he was seeking and his reasons therefor, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's motion for failure to comply with the rules of court.

Rule 43(e) permits a court to hear motions for fees on affidavits.

Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc. · filed 1983-01-18Rule 43(e)

We hold that the court under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 43(e) could hear the motions for fees on affidavits.

Rule 6(d) requires a written motion and notice of its hearing to be served at least five days before the hearing unless a different period applies; a motion presented on the hearing day may be denied as untimely and prejudicial.

Duncan v. AMMONS CONST. CO., INC. · filed 1987-11-17Rule 6(d)

Clearly, plaintiffs did not comply with the requirements of Rule 6(d). Rather, they waited to file their motion until the very day that they wished it heard. Because of the untimely manner in which the motion was presented, allowing it would have been unfair and prejudicial to defendants. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion.

Rule 7(b)(1) requires a motion to state its grounds; failing to identify the rule number is not necessarily fatal.

Home Health & Hospice Care, Inc. v. Meyer · filed 1987-12-22Rule 7(b)(1)

Defendants did not place the number of the rule pursuant to which the motion of 13 November 1986 (“motion in the cause”) was filed in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1) which requires that the grounds for the motion must be stated. While failure to give the number of the rule is not necessarily fatal, it would be of great benefit to the trial court and this appellate court for counsel to name and number the rule pursuant to which the motion is made.

Rule 7(b)(1) requires a motion to state its grounds and the relief sought; a notice requesting only whatever relief the court considers proper is insufficient.

Dobos v. Dobos · filed 1993-07-20Rule 7(b)(1)

However, despite the fact that a motion may properly be stated in a written notice of hearing on the motion, see N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1) (1990), the content of plaintiff’s notice of hearing, seeking “such relief as to the court may seem just and proper,” is insufficient to comply with the requirement that the motion state the grounds therefor and the relief or order sought.

Rule 7(b)(1) requires a motion to state its grounds; citing a rule number alone does not suffice.

Smith v. Johnson · filed 1997-03-04Rule 7(b)(1)

The mere recitation of the rule number relied upon by the movant is not a statement of the grounds within the meaning of Rule 7(b)(1). The motion, to satisfy the requirements of Rule 7(b)(1), must supply information revealing the basis of the motion.

Rule 7(b)(1) requires a motion to state the relief or order sought; a motion requesting no relief cannot support the requested order.

In Re McKinney · filed 2003-06-17Rule 7(b)(1)

To be valid, a pleading or motion must include a request or demand for the relief sought, or for the order the party desires the trial court to enter: ... Indeed, the motion fails to request any relief, judgment, or order from the trial court.

Rule 51(a) prohibits the judge from expressing an opinion about the facts, evidence weight, or witness credibility, directly or indirectly, and makes such an opinion prejudicial.

Henderson v. Matthews · filed 1975-06-18(a)

Under these circumstances where, the issues of negligence and liability depended entirely upon questions of cre'di-...bil-ity and the resolution-of conflicts in the evidence, it is our opinion that the .challenged portion of the instructions had the probable effect of influencing the jury to resolve those, questions against the defendant Matthews which is in clear violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a).

Rule 51(a) prohibits a trial judge from making remarks that tend to discredit counsel and the client’s cause in the jury’s eyes.

Board of Transportation v. Wilder · filed 1975-12-17Rule 51(a)

Closely following as it did two other sharp remarks by the court to defendants’ counsel, we think the statements tended to discredit defendants’ counsel, and hence their cause, in the eyes of the jury in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51 (a).

Rule 51 bars a trial court from expressing an opinion on damages evidence in a jury instruction; an instruction that precludes consideration of nominal damages is prejudicial error.

Lentz v. Gardin · filed 1976-08-04

Defendant contends that the trial court expressed an opinion on the evidence relating to damages, thus violating G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51. We agree. ... The instruction precluded the jury’s consideration of nominal damages, and constituted prejudicial error entitling defendant to a new trial on the issue of damages.

Rule 51(a) prohibits a judge from expressing an opinion on whether a fact is proved and requires the judge to explain the law arising from the evidence while giving equal stress to the parties' contentions.

Sims v. Virginia Homes Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1977-01-19(a)

Defendant further argues that in two places the judge misstated evidence amounting to a comment or opinion on the facts in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a). In one instance the judge stated that defendant’s own expert witness testified that the units were improperly installed, where in reality the witness had not so testified. We find no error here because the judge immediately caught his error and stated to the jury that the witness had not testified in the manner charged.

Rule 51(a) prohibits a trial judge from stating the parties’ contentions in a way that suggests the judge’s opinion on the case.

Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc. · filed 1979-03-06Rule 51(a)

Such a statement may appear to the jury as an indication of the trial court’s opinion with respect to the merits of plaintiff’s lawsuit. ... G.S. 1-180 is now embodied in substance within G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a).

Rule 51(a) forbids a trial judge from conveying an opinion about the importance or credibility of evidence, but an instruction to examine an exhibit “very carefully” was not an improper comment when considered in context.

MacK Financial Corp. v. Harnett Transfer, Inc. · filed 1979-07-03Rule 51(a)

Under G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 51(a), the trial judge is expressly forbidden to convey to the jury, in any manner, at any stage of the trial, his opinion as to the importance or credibility of any of the evidence. ... We do not think, however, that the judge’s instruction to the jury to examine the exhibit “very carefully” when considered contextually, constituted an improper comment as to the probative force of the evidence.

Rule 51(a) prohibits a trial judge from expressing an opinion on the merits of the case.

Chris v. Bruce · filed 1980-02-19Rule 51(a)

And we do not find that the trial court expressed an opinion on the merits of the case, violating G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a).

Rule 51(a) prohibits a trial judge from expressing an opinion on a witness’s credibility in the jury’s presence.

Rannbury-Kobee Corp. v. Miller MacHine Co. · filed 1980-11-04Rule 51(a)

Under these circumstances we find that the declaration of the court in the presence of the jury that Miller was an expert constituted an expression of opinion on the credibility of the witness in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a).

Rule 51(a) prohibits a trial court from expressing an opinion in its jury instructions; the charge is considered as a whole.

Sugg v. Parrish · filed 1981-05-05Rule 51(a)

Nor do we find merit in defendants’ contention that the instructions, taken as a whole, constituted an expression of opinion by the court in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a).

Rule 51(a) prohibits a trial judge from expressing an opinion in the presence of a jury; the prohibition does not apply to a trial without a jury.

Consolidated Systems, Inc. v. Granville Steel Corp. · filed 1983-08-02Rule 51(a)

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that both G.S. § 1-180 and its replacement, Rule 51(a), proscribe expressions of opinion in the presence of a jury, and understandably so, since most juries lack the training needed to consider only relevant and competent evidence without guidance.

Rule 51(a) permits a judge to declare a nonparty witness an expert in the jury’s presence when the declaration does not address a question the jury must decide and causes no prejudice.

In re Proceedings for Condemnation of a Fee Simple Interest in Land Owned by Lee · filed 1984-07-03Rule 51(a)

Here, the witness involved was not a party to the litigation and declaring him to be an expert in no way touched upon any question which the jury had to decide.

Rule 51(a) prohibits a trial judge from commenting on what the evidence has shown; prejudicial comments can warrant a new trial.

Russell v. Town of Morehead City · filed 1988-07-19Rule 51(a)

As a result of these considerations, the rule in this State is that the trial judge is prohibited from making comments at any time during the trial which amount to expressions of opinion as to what has or what has not been shown by the evidence. ... See also G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a). ... As a result of the cumulative prejudicial effect of Judge Bailey’s remarks on defendants’ case, defendants are entitled to a new trial.

Rule 51(a) prohibits a judge from expressing an opinion on whether a fact has been sufficiently proved; the propriety of a judge’s remarks depends on their circumstances.

Ward v. McDonald · filed 1990-10-02(a)

After considering the complained of remarks made by the trial judge and the circumstances in which they were made, we find them to be something other than opinions.

Rule 51(a) bars a judge from expressing an opinion about whether a fact has been fully or sufficiently proved.

Bowden v. Bell · filed 1994-08-16(a)

Rule 51(a) provides in part that “a judge shall not give an opinion as to whether or not a fact is fully or sufficiently proved.” ... We conclude that when the instruction on last clear chance is viewed in the context of the entire charge, the instruction could not be seen by the jury as an expression of an opinion by the court. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.

Rule 30(b) allows protective orders to prevent disclosure of trade secrets for good cause, but does not treat confidential commercial information the same way.

Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co. · filed 1975-07-02Rule 30(b)

It is our opinion that there is a distinction. under our discovery rules between the traditional notion of a “trade secret” and “confidential commercial information.” Whereas G.S. 1A-1, Rule 30(b) recognizes that protective orders may be issued to prevent disclosure of trade secrets for good cause shown, “confidential commercial information” is not so treated.

Rule 26(c) allows a court issuing a protective order to require a different method of discovery when justice requires it.

Weaver v. Weaver · filed 1988-02-16Rule 26(c)

A trial court, when considering a motion for a protective order may, “make any order which justice requires . . . including . . . (in) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery”; N.C.R. Civ. Pro. 26(c).

Rule 26(c) permits a court to grant relief from discovery for good cause to prevent unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.

Puckett v. Kpmg, LLP · filed 2007-02-13Rule 26(c)

Rule 26(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court, for good cause shown, to grant a party relief from discovery so as to prevent “unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” N.C.G.S. §1A-1, Rule 26(c) (2007).

Rule 26(c) allows a trial court, upon good cause shown, to limit discovery through protective orders, but the limits must respect due process and be narrowly tailored.

Hall v. Wilmington Health · filed 2022-04-05(c)

Under Rule 26(c), a trial court has discretion, upon good cause shown, to enter orders to protect a party or person from “unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” including an order “(v) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c). ... Thus, the trial court had discretion to enter an order limiting discovery under Rules 26 and 30, for good cause shown, but the question presented here is whether those limitations went so far as to infringe upon Defendant’s due process rights to representation by counsel in the depositions of its own employees and expert witnesses.

Rule 18(b) permits a counterclaim even when it does not arise from the transaction or occurrence underlying the opposing party’s claim.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 1975-07-02Rule 18(b)

This argument is feckless. The cases cited by plaintiff as authority for his argument were written long before the adoption of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and do not support, his contentions. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 18(b) provides: “Permissive counterclaim. — A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.”

Rule 68.1 permits confession of judgment in alimony cases, but the judgment cannot impose terms without the other party’s consent.

Yarborough v. Yarborough · filed 1975-10-01Rule 68.1

While we recognize that judgment may be confessed in alimony cases pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 68.1, and such a procedure may be desirable in many cases to avoid the public airing of domestic problems, we do not perceive that such procedure should be used to deprive a litigant of his or her day in court, or to impress on an unsuspecting party terms and conditions to which the party did not specifically agree.

A judgment by confession under Rule 68.1 resolves all issues raised in the complaint; an action seeking relief already granted should be dismissed.

Pierce v. Pierce · filed 1982-09-21Rule 68.1

We hold it was error not to dismiss the action to enforce the separation agreement. A judgment by confession had been entered against the defendant pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 68.1. This gave the plaintiff a judgment on all issues raised in the complaint.

A general reference to a transaction does not permit a court to consider a related document on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

WACHOVIA INS. SERVS., INC. v. McGUIRT · filed 2006-12-19Rule 12(b)

Since a general reference to the stock purchase transaction, without more, does not allow me to consider the Stock Purchase Agreement without converting the Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss into Rule 56 motions for summary judgment, the Court declines, at this time, to consider the legal effect, if any, of the Stock Purchase Agreement on the continued validity of the Amended Employment Agreement.

Rule 12(b) requires a reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to a motion when a motion to dismiss is treated as one for summary judgment.

Smith v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1976-01-29(b)

Rule 12(b) G.S. 1A-1. Assuming that, pursuant to Rule 12(b), the Superior Court considered Ford’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, which does not appear from the record, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the parties were given reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to such a motion as Rule 12(b) requires. Furthermore, the pleadings present genuine and material issues of fact between the plaintiff and Ford so summary judgment could not properly have been entered on the ground of the absence of such issues. These are for determination by a jury, assuming evidence be offered in support of the plaintiff’s allegations.

Rule 56(e) requires an adverse party responding to a supported summary judgment motion to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, or have judgment entered if appropriate.

State v. West · filed 1976-11-17(e)

“[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.”

Rule 56(e) requires an adverse party responding to a supported summary judgment motion to set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, or face judgment if appropriate.

Pitts v. Village Inn Pizza, Inc. · filed 1978-02-07(e)

Defendant’s motion and exhibits required plaintiff to respond to set forth specific facts establishing that there was a genuine issue as to the existence of probable cause. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(e).

When matters outside the pleadings are presented on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

Booker v. Everhart · filed 1977-07-14Rule 12(b)(6)

Since matters outside the pleadings were presented to the trial court, the motion under Rule 12(b) (6) is treated as one for summary judgment under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56, and the test then is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact and whether movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A ruling that requires consideration of matters outside the pleadings is a summary judgment ruling rather than a Rule 12(b)(6) ruling.

Snyder v. Freeman · filed 1979-03-20Rule 12(b)(6)

Since matters outside the pleadings had to be considered in order to resolve the question of whether the cause of action was time-barred, this was not a ruling on a G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 12(b)(6) requires a motion to dismiss to be treated as a summary judgment motion when the court considers material outside the pleadings.

Shoffner Industries, Inc. v. W. B. Lloyd Construction Co. · filed 1979-07-17Rule 12(b)(6)

In light of the last sentence in Rule 12(b), we must assume that the court did exclude all matter outside the pleadings. That sentence provides that when outside matter is presented to and not excluded by the court on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it should be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as a summary judgment motion when the court considers matters outside the pleadings.

Smith v. Independent Life Insurance · filed 1979-10-16Rule 12(b)(6)

Since in the present case the order of the trial court clearly stated it had considered affidavits and discovery in addition to the pleadings, we treat the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) defense which that court sustained as having been converted and merged into defendants’ motion for summary judgment.