N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 12(c) requires a party seeking judgment on the pleadings to show that it is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law, even when the facts and permissible inferences are viewed favorably to the opposing party.

Whitaker v. Clark · filed 1993-03-16Rule 12(c)

The movant under section (c) must show, even when viewing the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that he is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

When a court considers materials outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(c) motion, the matter is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

Floraday v. Don Galloway Homes, Inc. · filed 1994-04-05

Since the court considered affidavits and photographs as well as the pleadings, we will treat plaintiff’s appeal as an appeal from summary judgment under Rule 56. ... Thus, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 12(c) requires a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be treated as a summary judgment motion when the court considers material outside the pleadings.

Floraday v. Don Galloway Homes, Inc. · filed 1995-05-05Rule 12(c)

Although defendant’s motion was made under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court correctly treated it as a motion for summary judgment since plaintiffs filed affidavits and photographs which were not excluded by the trial court.

Rule 12(c) requires the court to accept the nonmovant's allegations as true; judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate if the pleadings raise a factual issue.

Thompson v. Town of Warsaw · filed 1995-10-17Rule 12(c)

For purposes of defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, we must accept the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint as true. ... If the pleadings present any issues of fact, then judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when the material facts are admitted and only questions of law remain.

Garrett v. Winfree · filed 1995-11-07Rule 12(c)

Where all the material allegations of fact are admitted, only questions of law remain and no question of fact is left for jury determination, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper.

Rule 12(c) requires a party moving for judgment on the pleadings to accept the opposing party’s well-pleaded facts and permissible inferences as true.

Hedrick v. Rains · filed 1996-02-06Rule 12(c)

A party who moves for judgment on the pleadings admits two things: (1) the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the non-movant’s pleading, together with all permissible inferences to be drawn from such facts; and (2) the untruth of his own allegations in so far as they are controverted by the non-movant’s pleading.

Rule 12(c) requires a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be treated as a summary judgment motion when the court considers matters outside the pleadings.

Helms v. Holland · filed 1996-12-03Rule 12(c)

Because matters outside the pleadings were considered by the court in reaching its decision on the judgment on the pleadings, the motion will be treated as if it were a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 12(c) allows judgment on the pleadings only when a party moves for it.

In Re Thrift · filed 2000-04-18Rule 12(c)

According to Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court may, upon motion of any party, enter judgment solely on the pleadings. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (1999).

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings only when a party moves for it.

Thrift v. Buncombe County Department of Social Services · filed 2000-04-18(c)

The trial court was not authorized to enter judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) because neither party moved for judgment on the pleadings. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c).

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when all material facts are admitted and only legal questions remain, viewing facts and permissible inferences favorably to the non-moving party.

Gore v. NATIONSBANC INS. CO., INC · filed 2002-10-15Rule 12(c)

Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), is appropriate ‘ “when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.” ’ The trial court must ‘ “view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[],” ’ taking all well-pleaded factual allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true.

Rule 12(c) requires the movant to show that no material fact issue exists and that the non-movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Lovelace v. City of Shelby · filed 2002-10-15(c)

As noted above, in order to succeed on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c), the movant bears the burden of proving, after viewing the facts and permissible inferences in a light most favorable to the non-movant, that there are no material issues of fact and the non-movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 12(c) limits judgment on the pleadings to the pleadings and attached exhibits, which become part of the pleadings.

Powell v. Bulluck · filed 2002-12-31Rule 12(c)

In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court “is to consider only the pleadings and any attached exhibits, which become part of the pleadings.” Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 78, 318 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1984); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2001).

Rule 12(c) limits judgment on the pleadings to the pleadings and attached exhibits.

Lambert v. Cartwright · filed 2003-08-19Rule 12(c)

In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court is to consider only the pleadings and any attached exhibits, which become part of the pleadings. ... We conclude that the trial court considered only the pleadings and the attached exhibits in ruling on defendant’s motion.

Rule 12(c) does not convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a summary judgment motion merely because the court receives outside evidence without considering or relying on it.

Davis v. Durham Mental Health/Development Disabilities/Substance Abuse Area Authority · filed 2004-07-06Rule 12(c)

Merely receiving evidence, without considering or relying on it, does not convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 12(c) permits a party to seek judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings close and functions to dispose of baseless claims or defenses revealed by the pleadings.

Skinner v. Quintiles Transnational Corp. · filed 2004-12-21(c)

The function of this section of the rule is to dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit.

Rule 12(c) permits a party to seek judgment on the pleadings after a responsive pleading is filed when the pleadings show that claims or defenses are baseless.

Toomer v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. · filed 2005-06-21Rule 12(c)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2003) permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings, after the filing of a responsive pleading, where the formal pleadings reveal that certain claims or defenses are baseless.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when no material factual issue remains and only questions of law remain.

Coker v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2005-08-16Rule 12(c)

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when all of the material issues of fact are admitted in the pleadings, and only questions of law remain.

Rule 12(c) does not permit judgment on the pleadings when the pleadings present a genuine issue of material fact.

Ripellino v. N.C. School Boards Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2006-03-07Rule 12(c)

In this case, judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate because there are genuine issues of material fact presented by the pleadings as to whether defendants applied an appropriate, non-arbitrary criteria on an equal basis to all claimants.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when no material factual issue remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Webb Ex Rel. Bumgarner v. Nicholson · filed 2006-07-05Rule 12(c)

We review such a grant by determining “whether the moving party has shown that no material issue of fact exists upon the pleadings and that he is clearly entitled to judgment.”

A motion based solely on the pleadings, without affidavits or other evidence, is treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).

State Auto Insurance v. Blind · filed 2007-09-04Rule 12(c)

Because defendant based his argument solely on the pleadings and submitted no affidavits or documentary evidence in support of his position, defendant’s motion is properly classified as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c).

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when no material factual issue remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Harrington v. Gerald · filed 2008-04-01Rule 12(c)

Review of the entire judgment shows that the trial court employed the correct standard in its ruling. The trial court explicitly stated that "no material issue of fact remains" and that Defendant was entitled to judgment "as a matter of law." In doing so, the trial court acted within its "inherent power to render judgment on the pleadings where the facts shown and admitted by the pleadings entitle a party to such judgment." Wilson v. Development Co., 276 N.C. 198, 206, 171 S.E.2d 873, 878 (1970).

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when all material facts are admitted and only questions of law remain.

Washburn v. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2008-05-06Rule 12(c)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is authorized by Rule 12(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2005). ... “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the proper procedure when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain. When the pleadings do not resolve all the factual issues, judgment on the pleadings is generally inappropriate.” ... In the cases at bar, all material allegations of fact were admitted in the pleadings.

Rule 12(c) limits consideration on a motion for judgment on the pleadings to allegations in the pleadings, excluding statements in the parties' briefs.

Eason v. CLEVELAND DRAFT HOUSE, LLC · filed 2009-03-17Rule 12(c)

In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court's consideration is limited to allegations in the pleadings, not the parties' briefs.

Rule 12(c) does not permit judgment on the pleadings when a material factual issue prevents the movant from showing a clear entitlement to judgment.

EAST CAMP, LLC v. Spruill · filed 2009-06-02Rule 12(c)

Therefore, because Plaintiff is not "clearly entitled to judgment" based on the pleadings, the trial court's judgment on the pleadings dismissing Defendants' counter claims to quiet title and for breach of contract was error and is reversed.

Rule 12(c) permits the court to consider a document attached to the complaint when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Builders Mutual Ins. v. Glascarr Properties, Inc. · filed 2010-02-02Rule 12(c)

“In deciding such a motion, the trial court looks solely to the pleadings. The trial court can only consider facts properly pleaded and documents referred to or attached to the pleadings.” ... We conclude that the trial court properly considered the policy in its ruling.

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court decides legal conclusions rather than accepting them as true.

North Carolina Concrete Finishers, Inc. v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 2010-02-02Rule 12(c)

Plaintiff’s allegation, that its loss was covered by the policy, is a legal conclusion which the court properly determined de novo.

Rule 12(c) does not supply the standard of review for a nonjury declaratory judgment when the trial court considered matters beyond the pleadings.

First Charter Bank v. American Children's Home · filed 2010-05-04Rule 12(c)

Respondent-appellant asserts petitioner-trustee's Motion to Ascertain Remainder Beneficiaries "was, in effect, a motion for judgment on the pleadings under [N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c),] because no matters outside the pleadings were presented to or considered by the trial court." (Emphasis added.) However, in its 23 February 2009 Order and Judgment from which respondent-appellant appeals, the trial court clearly asserts that it "carefully reviewed the pleadings and the attached exhibits as well as all other matters of record and adjudicative facts. " (Emphasis added.) The record reveals that the trial court considered matters presented by the parties beyond the pleadings, and made specific findings and conclusions of law in consequence thereof. Thus, we review this matter according to the standard of review for an order or judgment in a nonjury declaratory judgment action as described above.

Rule 12(c) permits a court deciding a judgment-on-the-pleadings motion based on estoppel to consider pleadings from an earlier lawsuit involving the same parties and subject matter.

Estate of Means Ex Rel. Means v. Scott Electric Co. · filed 2010-11-02Rule 12(c)

The trial court did not err by considering pleadings filed in a previous lawsuit concerning the same parties and subject matter in determining whether to grant a Rule 12(c) motion on the basis of collateral or judicial estoppel.

Under Rule 12(c), considering an insurance policy referenced in the complaint and central to the action does not convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a summary judgment motion.

Erie Insurance Exchange v. Builders Mutual Insurance · filed 2013-05-21Rule 12(c)

Thus, the trial court’s consideration of defendant’s insurance policy in making its Rule 12(c) determination was proper and did not convert plaintiffs’ Rule 12(c) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

Rule 12(h)(2) permits a court to consider whether a pleading states a claim on a Rule 12(c) motion.

Powell v. Dunn · filed 2014-01-28Rule 12(h)(2)

The court may consider whether a pleading states a claim upon which relief may be granted on a Rule 12(c) motion.

Rule 12(c) requires a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be treated as a summary judgment motion when deciding it requires matters outside the pleadings, with a reasonable opportunity for the parties to submit pertinent material.

Taidoc Tech. Corp. v. Ok Biotech Co., Ltd. · filed 2015-03-16Rule 12(c)

As a result, the Court concludes that the documents upon which OK Biotech relies in the Motion are “outside the pleadings” and may not be considered by the Court under Rule 12(c). E.g., Weaver, 187 N.C. App. at 205, 652 S.E.2d at 708 (document “attached to” pleading “must be disregarded when it was not the subject of any admission by the non-moving” party) (citation and quotations omitted). Rule 12(c) therefore requires that the Motion “shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56; see Horne, 732 S.E.2d at 617.

An order granting judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) receives de novo appellate review.

Ocracomax, LLC v. Davis · filed 2016-08-02Rule 12(c)

We review a trial court’s order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when no material fact is disputed and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, without considering evidence outside the pleadings.

Doe v. Catawba Coll. · filed 2017-03-07Rule 12(c)

Thus, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially a motion for summary judgment without the consideration of evidence, or other matters outside the pleadings.

A Rule 12(c) motion must be filed after the pleadings close; a motion filed earlier is considered under Rule 12(b)(6).

Timbercreek Land & Timber Co. v. Robbins · filed 2017-07-28Rule 12(c)

A Rule 12(c) motion may only be made after the pleadings are closed. ... As such, the Motion was filed before the pleadings were closed and, accordingly, the Court considers the Motion as one made solely pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Rule 12(c) does not permit judgment on the pleadings when material facts remain in dispute.

Finkel v. Palm Park, Inc. · filed 2018-10-24Rule 12(c)

The Court agrees with Defendants that there are facts in dispute at this time, including the appropriateness of dissolution and the effect of the TONG OA and its recommended valuation procedure, such that an immediate determination of the proper valuation method of TONG pursuant to Rule 12(c) is inappropriate.

When the trial court considers documents outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(c) motion, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 on appeal.

NationStar Mortg. LLC v. Curry · filed 2018-11-06Rule 12(c)

With these documents outside the pleadings being considered, the 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings will be treated for review as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 on appeal.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when, taking well-pleaded factual allegations as true, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Purnima Sanghrajka, & Cary Foods, Inc. v. Family Fare, LLC · filed 2019-02-05Rule 12(c)

However, "taking all well-pleaded factual allegations in [Plaintiffs'] pleadings as true," Defendant was "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" pursuant to Rule 12(c).

A breach of settlement agreement claim survives judgment on the pleadings when its allegations state a valid claim and the pleadings do not establish the asserted defense.

Le Rmah v. United Statesa Cas. Ins. Co. · filed 2019-02-05Rule 12(c)

Based upon our review of the allegations in Rmah's amended complaint under basic principles of notice pleading, we are satisfied that he has pled a valid claim for breach of settlement agreement.

Rule 12(c) does not permit a court to consider disputed documents outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Albright v. Vining-Sparks Secs., Inc. · filed 2019-12-31Rule 12(c)

The Court concludes that it cannot properly consider the Consent Signatures when ruling on the Rule 12(c) motion under either Reese or Oberlin, and even if consideration were proper, the parties continue to contest the accuracy and significance of the signatures, which is a dispute that cannot be properly resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Under Rule 12(c), affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for judgment on the pleadings do not convert it to a motion for summary judgment when the court excludes them from consideration.

Sauls v. Barbour · filed 2020-09-01Rule 12(c)

Accordingly, although the affidavits were presented to the trial court, they were excluded by the trial court from consideration in its ruling. The motion was therefore not converted into one for summary judgment.

Rule 12(c) requires a court considering judgment on the pleadings to view facts and permissible inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, accepting that party’s factual allegations as true.

Newman v. Stepp · filed 2020-12-18Rule 12(c)

As the non-moving party, plaintiffs are entitled to have the trial court to view the facts and permissible inferences from plaintiffs’ complaint in the light most favorable to them, with plaintiffs’ factual allegations taken as true and defendants’ opposing responses taken as false.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when the pleadings admit all material facts and only legal questions remain.

DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. · filed 2020-12-18Rule 12(c)

The purpose of N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) “is to dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit” and is appropriately employed where “all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.” Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974).

Rule 12(c) permits a court to take judicial notice of appropriate matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

PF Dev. Grp. · filed 2020-12-31Rule 12(c)

To be clear, a court may take judicial notice of matters outside the pleadings, where appropriate, without causing the proceeding to convert from a Rule 12(c) motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

On a Rule 12(c) motion, a court may take judicial notice of appropriate matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

Anderson Creek Partners · filed 2020-12-31Rule 12(c)

To be clear, a court may take judicial notice of matters outside the pleadings, where appropriate, without causing the proceeding to convert from a Rule 12(c) motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

Rule 12(c) requires a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be treated as a motion for summary judgment when the court considers matters outside the pleadings.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Orsbon & Fenninger · filed 2021-07-06Rule 12(c)

We note that where “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,” a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings must be treated as a motion for summary judgment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2018). Because the trial court explicitly stated that it considered matters outside the pleadings, it was improper to grant judgment on the pleadings in the alternative.

Rule 12(c) requires a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be treated as a motion for summary judgment when the court considers matters outside the pleadings.

McElhaney v. Orsbon & Fenninger · filed 2021-07-06Rule 12(c)

We note that where “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,” a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings must be treated as a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 12(c) does not permit judgment on the pleadings when the allegations support an inference that the limitations period has not expired.

Benigno v. Sumner Constr. · filed 2021-06-15Rule 12(c)

Benigno’s allegations are sufficient to support an inference that the limitations period has not expired and, as such, Riggan is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

Rule 12(c) does not permit judgment on a counterclaim before the plaintiff replies to it and the pleadings close.

Maynard v. Crook · filed 2023-06-20Rule 12(c)

Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs’ Rule 12(c) motion purported to move for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendant’s counterclaims, dismissing Defendant’s counterclaims under Rule 12(c) was improper because Plaintiffs had not replied to Defendant’s counterclaims, and thus the pleadings had not yet closed.

On a Rule 12(c) motion, the court treats well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views the facts and permissible inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.

Farmers & Merchs. Bank v. Henley · filed 2025-08-20Rule 12(c)

In ruling on a 12(c) motion, the trial court views the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, treating the well-pleaded factual allegations as true.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when the pleadings reveal that a claim or defense lacks merit.

Cassida v. Cassida · filed 2026-05-06Rule 12(c)

The “function” of Rule 12(c) “is to dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit.”

Rule 12(c) does not permit judgment on the pleadings when the complaint and attached agreement sufficiently allege a contract.

Graywater Traders, Inc. v. B & B on Beach, Inc. · filed 2007-08-21Rule 12(c)

Because we hold that the pleadings, which includes the alleged contract, are sufficient to allege the existence of a contract, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of this matter on the pleadings.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings when the material facts are admitted and only questions of law remain, with the facts and permissible inferences viewed in favor of the nonmoving party.

Shehan v. Gaston County · filed 2008-06-03Rule 12(c)

Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), is appropriate when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain. Judgments on the pleadings are disfavored in law, and the trial court must view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Rule 12(c) allows judgment on the pleadings only when no material issue of fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Walker v. Wake Cty. Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2022-08-02Rule 12(c)

But for the purpose of the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings, Sheriff Defendants have failed to show that, regarding the issue of public official immunity, no material issue of fact exists and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 12(c) permits judgment on the pleadings only when the pleadings establish no material factual issue and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Walker v. Wake Cty. Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2022-08-02Rule 12(c)

Sheriff Defendants have failed to establish that, based solely on the pleadings and as a matter of law, qualified privilege precludes liability for Curry’s email to Crump.

A reply is required to a counterclaim denominated as such, but the trial court has discretion to admit evidence and allow the reply to be filed.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1972-03-29Rule 7(a)

The North Carolina Rules provide that a reply must be filed to any counterclaim denominated as such, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 7 (a), and averments to which a responsive pleading is required are deemed to be admitted when not denied. ... In the case before us we hold that the trial court was within its discretion in admitting plaintiff’s evidence and allowing plaintiff to file a reply.

Rule 7(a) does not recognize a “Reply to a Reply” as a pleading.

Barnes v. Rorie · filed 1972-06-28Rule 7(a)

While there is no such pleading as a “Reply to a Reply,” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 7(a), we perceive no harm to plaintiff in this case in the order allowing defendants to file such a document.

Rule 12(a)(1)(a) gives a defendant 20 days after notice that a motion challenging venue was denied to serve an answer.

Moseley v. BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY · filed 1973-08-01Rule 12(a)(1)(a)

Under Rule 12(a) (1) (a) defendant had 20 days to answer from the time of notice of the court’s 20 March 1972 denial of his motion to remove because of improper venue. The court’s order — also made on 20 March 1972 — setting aside the entry of default and allowing defendant 20 days to answer merely vacated an erroneous entry of default and allowed the same length of time to answer which defendant already had by statute.

Rule 6(b) permits an extension of an expired answer deadline upon a finding of excusable neglect, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Johnson v. Hooks · filed 1974-06-05Rule 6(b)

Although the order allowing such extension was not couched in the specific language of Rule 6 (b), we hold that the finding of the trial court was tantamount to a finding of excusable neglect, and there having been no showing of abuse of discretion, the exercise of the trial court’s discretionary power in allowing defendant to file his answer is not reviewable upon this appeal.

Rule 12(a)(1) requires a defendant to serve an answer within thirty days, while Rule 5(d) sets no deadline for filing it with the court.

Quaker Furniture House, Inc. v. Ball · filed 1976-10-06Rule 12(a)(1)

We hold that service of the answer is both a “pleading” and an “appearance” for the purpose of Rule 55. ... Rule 12(a)(1) requires only that the defendant serve his answer within thirty days. There is nothing in Rule 5(d) that requires the defendant to file his answer with the court within thirty days as well. Rule 5(d) does not provide any period in which the filing must take place.

Rule 8(d) treats allegations in a pleading as denied or avoided when no responsive pleading is required or permitted, allowing the opposing party to meet them at trial as if a reply had been allowed.

Malloy v. Malloy · filed 1977-04-20Rule 7(a); Rule 8(d)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(d) provides in pertinent part that “Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.” Under Rule 8(d) plaintiff-husband’s allegations of adultery were deemed denied. A party who is not permitted to file a responsive pleading may meet the allegations at trial in any manner that would have been proper had a reply been allowed.

After a court denies a Rule 12 motion to strike, Rule 12(a) permits a responsive pleading within 20 days of notice without Rule 15(a) permission, insofar as it responds to the challenged allegations.

Brenner v. Little Red School House, Ltd. · filed 1981-02-02Rule 12(a)(1)a

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(a)(l)a provides that when the court denies a motion permitted under Rule 12, a responsive pleading may be served within 20 days after notice of the court’s action. Defendant’s amended answer, which was the first responsive-pleading to paragraph five of the complaint, was filed well within the 20 day limit. Thus, although Rule 15(a) mandates that defendant could only amend his answer after obtaining the court’s permission or plaintiff’s written consent, Rule 12(a)(l)a expressly authorized defendant to file without permission those portions of his amended answer which were a responsive pleading to the paragraphs of the complaint subject to defendant’s motion to strike.

Rule 7(a) gave the plaintiff no right to file a responsive pleading to the answer in this case.

Sunamerica Financial Corp. v. Bonham · filed 1991-02-07Rule 7(a)

Although plaintiff had no right to file a responsive pleading to the answer in this case, see N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 7(a), plaintiff did have a continuing duty to review the appropriateness of persisting in litigating a claim which was alleged to be time-barred.

Rule 8(d) does not require a responsive pleading to a prayer for relief because it is not an averment.

Dep't of Transp. v. Adams Outdoor Adver. of Charlotte Ltd. · filed 2016-04-19Rule 8(d)

However, the prayer for relief is not an “averment” for which a responsive pleading is required.

Rule 8(b) treats a response that a party lacks enough information to admit or deny an allegation as a denial.

Estate of Schwarz v. Schwarz · filed 2016-12-30Rule 8(b)

A response stating that Plaintiff does not have information adequate to admit or deny Defendant’s allegations “has the effect of a denial.”

Rule 26 does not permit discovery of opinions or reports prepared by an expert retained in anticipation of litigation who is not expected to testify at trial.

Daywalt v. Norandal USA, Inc. · filed 2006-09-19Rule 26(b)(4)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1 A-1, Rule 26 does not allow for discovery of opinions or reports prepared by experts who are retained in anticipation of litigation but who are not expected to testify at trial.

Rule 26(b) permits discovery of the existence and contents of liability insurance agreements.

Marks v. Thompson · filed 1972-04-26Rule 26(b)

We think the rule definitely and plainly allows discovery in the instant case of information sought in plaintiff’s additional interrogatories regarding the existence and contents of any liability insurance agreements.

Rules 33 and 26(b) do not allow one spouse to compel the other to answer interrogatories about adultery during their marriage in an action between them.

Wright v. Wright · filed 1972-05-10Rules 33 and 26(b)

In our view, the General Assembly, in enacting the Rules of Civil Procedure, did not contemplate that Rules 33 and 26 (b) would enable the husband and the wife in actions between them to require the other to answer interrogatories relating to acts of adultery or conduct from which adultery might be implied during the subsistence of their marriage.

Rule 26(b) gives a party the right to discover the existence and contents of an insurance agreement; a judge may control the time, place, and circumstances of that discovery.

Marks v. Thompson · filed 1972-11-15Rule 26(b)

We hold that the 1971 amendment to Rule 26(b) confers upon a party the legal right to obtain discovery of the existence and contents of insurance agreements referred to therein. When a party elects to exercise this legal right, the discretionary authority conferred upon the judge by Rule 30(b) and (d) relates only to the time, place and circumstances of such discovery.

The Rules of Civil Procedure require a fair opportunity to complete discovery before summary judgment when pending interrogatories may lead to evidence on a material fact.

Harris v. Parker · filed 1973-03-28Rules 26(b), 33

In our opinion, and we so hold, the trial court committed error in granting summary judgment under the circumstances of this case without first affording defendants an adequate opportunity to complete their discovery proceedings which had been initiated by the filing of interrogatories.

Rule 33 ordinarily treats an untimely objection to interrogatories as waived, but that rule yields to the privilege against self-incrimination.

Golding v. Taylor · filed 1973-08-22Rule 33

While we agree that ordinarily, in the absence of an extension of time, failure to object to interrogatories within the time fixed by the rule is a waiver of any objection, we hold that this principle must yield to the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Rule 37(d) permits dismissal when a party fails without good cause to answer properly served interrogatories; the dismissal is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Hammer v. Allison · filed 1974-02-06Rule 37(d)

Unquestionably, the court had the right to dismiss plaintiff’s action. The record before us reveals nothing which would be sufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion.

Rule 37(d) permits default judgment sanctions for failure to appear at a deposition without a finding of willfulness or good cause.

Cutter v. Brooks · filed 1978-05-02(d)

Furthermore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by ordering the default judgment without finding that defendant Brooks had wilfully failed to appear at his deposition. The 1975 amendment to Rule 37(d) omitted the requirement that sanctions be leveled against a party who failed to respond to pretrial discovery “without good cause.”

Rule 37(d) allows a judge to default a claim as a sanction when a party fails to appear for a deposition after proper notice, without requiring a finding that the refusal was willful.

American Imports, Inc. v. G. E. Employees Western Region Federal Credit Union · filed 1978-07-11Rule 37(d)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(d) allows a judge to default a claim as a sanction for failure to appear for a deposition after having been given proper notice. The imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(d) is in the sound discretion of the trial judge. Hammer v. Allison, 20 N.C. App. 623, 202 S.E. 2d 307 (1974), cert. den., 285 N.C. 233, 204 S.E. 2d 23. Although defendant McQueen contends that the court must find that her refusal to attend was willful before it imposes sanctions, the language of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(d) requires no such finding.

Rule 37(b)(2) permits a court to impose just sanctions, including establishing facts or limiting claims, when a party disobeys a discovery order.

F. E. Davis Plumbing Co. v. Ingleside West Associates · filed 1978-07-11(b)(2)

Rule 37 contemplates that these objectives can be accomplished only if the court has the means and power to compel recalcitrant parties to abide by the rules of discovery. Thus, the trial judge has broad discretion in imposing sanctions to compel discovery under Rule 37.

Rule 37(b)(2)c permits a court to strike pleadings and enter default judgment as a discretionary sanction for disobeying a discovery order.

Laing v. LIBERTY LOAN CO. OF SMITHFIELD, ETC. · filed 1980-04-01(b)(2)c

The issue raised by this case is whether the trial court acted properly in striking defendant’s answer and entering judgment by default. We hold the trial court properly applied the discretionary powers of sanction for discovery abuse provided in Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 26(b)(1) does not entitle a party to search an entire file for potentially relevant evidence without identifying the information sought.

Dworsky v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1980-11-04Rule 26(b)(1)

While some relevant and material evidence may be contained in the file, plaintiffs are not entitled to a fishing expedition to locate it.

Rule 37(a)(4) requires an award of reasonable attorney’s fees when a motion to compel discovery is granted unless the opposition was substantially justified or other circumstances make the award unjust.

Kent v. Humphries · filed 1981-02-17Rule 37(a)(4)

Since the asserted justification bears no relation whatsoever to the matter before the court on the hearing on the motion to compel, the court was required by the mandatory language of Rule 37(a)(4) to order defendant to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.

Rule 37(b) permits a court to strike an answer and enter default for failure to obey a discovery order; asserting the privilege against self-incrimination does not make those sanctions an abuse of discretion.

Stone v. Martin · filed 1981-09-01Rule 37(b)

Judge Lee’s order and judgment which (1) struck defendant’s answer, (2) ordered that defendant not oppose any claim or allegation set out in plaintiffs’ complaint, and (3) adjudged defendant to be in default and ordered judgment of default against him, clearly fell within these provisions. ... It is not an abuse of discretion, however, to refuse to allow that privilege to serve also as a sword, with potential to defeat civil actions which may likewise ensue from those acts and omissions.

Rule 37(b)(2)(B) permits a discovery sanction only when a party fails to comply with a court order compelling discovery.

Stilley v. Automobile Enterprises of High Point, Inc. · filed 1981-12-01Rule 37(b)(2)(B)

Through this motion in limine defendant sought imposition of a Rule 37(b)(2)(B) sanction. Such sanction may only be imposed for failure of a party to comply with a court order compelling discovery. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)(B); W. Shuford, N.C. Civil Practice and Procedure § 37-3 (2d ed. 1981). Defendant did not obtain an order compelling plaintiffs to supplement their answers to the interrogatories referred to above. Because plaintiffs had not failed to comply with a discovery order, the court improperly granted defendant’s motion in limine.

Rule 37 permits sanctions, including a default judgment, when a party fails to comply with a proper discovery order.

Stone v. Martin · filed 1982-04-06Rule 37(b)(2)

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the order requiring defendant to comply with discovery. Because defendant failed to comply with that order, we find no abuse of discretion in the order imposing sanctions and judgment by default.

Rule 37(b)(2) discovery sanctions do not eliminate the need for a hearing and findings on parental fitness before awarding permanent custody.

Story v. Story · filed 1982-06-01Rule 37(b)(2)

Even if the trial court exercised the Rule 37 options alleged by plaintiff, the paramount question of the best interests of the child remained unanswered. Dismissing defendant’s counterclaim for custody and refusing to allow him to oppose plaintiff’s custody claim did not resolve the issue of plaintiff’s fitness to have custody or obviate the need for a hearing and findings of fact on that issue.

Rule 37 permits contempt as a sanction for wilfully disobeying a discovery order entered with jurisdiction, even if the order was erroneous.

Midgett v. Crystal Dawn Corp. · filed 1982-09-07Rule 37

When a party wilfully disobeys an order entered with personal and subject matter jurisdiction, a judgment of contempt (a permissible Rule 37 sanction) is appropriate even if the order was erroneously issued.

Rule 37(d) permits default judgment as a sanction for failing to attend a properly noticed deposition.

Adair v. Adair · filed 1983-06-07Rule 37(d)

Rule 37(d) allows a judge to enter default judgment as a sanction for failure to appear for a deposition after having been given proper notice.

Supplemental answers identifying expert witnesses are not seasonable when they come so close to trial that the requesting party cannot prepare adequately despite due diligence.

Willoughby v. KENNETH W. WILKINS, MD, PA · filed 1983-12-20Rule 26(e)(1)(ii)

While we decline to state a mathematical formula to determine what is “seasonable,” we find that supplemental answers to interrogatories are not seasonable when the answers are made so close to the time of trial that the party seeking discovery thereby is prevented from preparing adequately for trial, even with the exercise of due diligence.

Rule 26(c) gives the court discretion to permit discovery when it denies a protective order in whole or in part.

Ritter v. Kimball · filed 1984-03-20Rule 26(c)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26(c) clearly grants discretion to permit discovery when the court fully or partially denies a motion for a protective order, and neither the record nor the briefs contain any basis for finding an abuse in the exercise of that discretion to permit the limited discovery provided for here.

Rule 37 permits attorney's fees as a discovery sanction, and a court's apportionment of costs on motions granted in part is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Miller v. Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1984-04-17Rule 37

Plaintiff also alleges error in the court's refusal to award him attorneys' fees as a discovery sanction pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 37. His motions were, however, granted in part and denied in part; he has not shown that the court abused its discretion in apportioning costs. This assignment is also without merit.

Rule 26(e)(1) requires expert-witness disclosures to be supplemented early enough for the receiving party to prepare for trial; the disclosing party's good faith alone does not make a late response seasonable.

Green by Green v. Maness · filed 1984-07-03Rule 26(e)(1)

Defendant's supplemental response to interrogatories was not rendered "seasonable" within the meaning and intent of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26(e)(1), however, by the mere fact that there was no occasion for imposition of sanctions. In Willoughby this Court defined "seasonable" in terms of the ability of the receiving party to prepare for trial, not in terms of whether the party providing supplemental information acted in good faith.

The Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery in annexation review when it may illuminate the issues the reviewing court is authorized to decide.

Campbell v. City of Greensboro · filed 1984-09-04

Nevertheless, since the court reviewing annexation proceedings is explicitly authorized to receive evidence as to the City’s compliance with the various procedures prescribed, as to its annexation plan meeting the requisites of G.S. 160A-47, and as to the area involved being eligible for annexation under G.S. 160A-48, it seems plain to us that in those instances where discovery may illuminate these issues that it is authorized under the rules of civil procedure.

Rule 37 does not authorize striking pleadings or entering default as a discovery sanction when the party did not fail to produce requested documents or violate a production order.

Carrigan v. Shenandoah Transplants of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1985-01-15Rule 37(b)(2)(c)

If this is the case there was sufficient evidence for the Court to find that the defendants had failed to produce documents as ordered by the Court and the defendants would be subject to sanctions under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)(c). ... We do not believe the defendants failed to produce requested documents or violated Judge Martin’s order after the third motion for sanctions. It was error to strike the defendants’ pleadings and to enter a default judgment. Because it was error to enter this judgment it was also error to order the defendants to pay attorney fees.

Rule 37(d) permits sanctions for failure to answer interrogatories without a finding of willfulness; the noncomplying party must show justification to avoid sanctions.

Hayes v. Browne · filed 1985-07-16Rule 37(d)

The 1975 amendment to Rule 37(d) deletes the specific reference to “willful” from the rule. If a non-complying party wishes to avoid court-imposed sanctions for his failure to answer interrogatories, the burden is upon him to show that there is justification for his noncompliance.

Rule 37(b)(2)(E) permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees caused by unjustified failure to obey a discovery order.

Vick v. Davis · filed 1985-10-15(b)(2)(E)

In addition to striking the disobedient party's pleadings and entering default judgment, among other possible sanctions, the court is authorized to "require the party failing to obey the order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)(E). We have already determined that the trial court properly found the defendant's noncompliance unjustified. Therefore the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff was appropriate.

Rule 37(c) requires the trial court to make findings concerning the rule’s four exceptions when deciding a motion for expenses after a failure to admit.

Watkins v. Hellings · filed 1986-12-02Rule 37(c)

While the rule itself does not require the trial court to make negative findings with respect to the four exceptions set out in the rule, one recognized authority has stated that it is the better practice to do so. ... Because of the risk to litigants of substantial monetary awards against them in the application of the Rule, as reflected by the trial court’s order in this case, we adopt the Shuford “better practice” approach as a requirement in such cases, and accordingly order that on retrial, the trial court make such findings in disposing of defendant’s motion for expenses.

Rule 37(b) permits dismissal for failure to comply with a discovery order without a separate motion for sanctions.

McCraw v. Hamrick · filed 1988-01-05Rule 37(b)

The court below also had express authority under Rule 37(b)(2)(c) to sanction plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s order to produce the film by dismissing plaintiff’s action. After a motion and order compelling discovery, defendants were not required to file a motion requesting such sanctions as plaintiff implies in her brief. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(b).

Rule 26(b)(1) excludes privileged matters from discovery, and filing a verified answer does not waive the privilege against self-incrimination.

Gunn v. Hess · filed 1988-05-03Rule 26(b)(1)

Under our discovery rules of civil procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,” . . . (emphasis added). G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1). ... Defendant, not having waived her right to the privilege against self-incrimination, could and did properly assert that right. It was therefore error for the trial court to overrule defendant’s objection and to compel her to answer plaintiffs interrogatories 14 and 15.

Rule 26(b)(4) treats a physician who learned the facts while treating a patient, rather than in preparation for litigation, as an ordinary witness when testifying about that treatment.

Turner v. Duke University · filed 1988-10-04Rule 26(b)(4)

Duke did not retain Dr. Schereer for the purpose of litigation. He personally treated plaintiff's wife and his knowledge of her case arose before her death and before this litigation. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that in deposing Dr. Schereer after 17 June 1987 Duke did not violate the order requiring identification and deposition of expert witnesses prior to that date.

Rule 26’s recognized discovery methods must be used to obtain information from a plaintiff’s nonparty treating physicians unless the plaintiff expressly consents to a private interview.

Crist v. Moffatt · filed 1990-03-01(a)

We thus hold that defense counsel may not interview plaintiff’s nonparty treating physicians privately without plaintiff’s express consent. Defendant instead must utilize the statutorily recognized methods of discovery enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 26.

Rule 37 does not require a party seeking discovery sanctions to show prejudice from the opposing party’s conduct.

Roane-Barker v. Southeastern Hospital Supply Corp. · filed 1990-06-19Rule 37(b)(2)

However, Rule 37 does not require the plaintiff to show that it was prejudiced by the defendant’s actions in order to obtain sanctions for abuse of discovery.

Rule 26(f) leaves whether and when to convene a discovery conference to the trial judge’s discretion.

Gibbons v. CIT GROUP/SALES FINANCING, INC. · filed 1991-02-05Rule 26(f)

Such permissive language makes it clear that the determination of whether and when to convene a discovery conference is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge.

Rule 37(b)(2)(C) permits a trial judge to enter a default judgment as a discretionary sanction for repeated failure to comply with discovery requests.

Jennings v. Jessen · filed 1991-08-20(b)(2)(C)

In the instant case, it was within the trial judge's discretion to enter a judgment by default for defendant's repeated failure to comply with discovery requests. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)(C).

Rule 37(b)(2) permits a judge to impose sanctions, including dismissal, when a party fails to comply with a discovery order.

In re the Paper Writing of Vestal · filed 1991-12-17(b)(2)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2) provides that upon a party’s failure to comply with the court’s order, “the judge may make such orders in respect to the failure to answer as are just.” The choice of sanctions to be imposed having been left by the rule in the court’s discretion, we may not overturn the court’s decision unless an abuse of that discretion is shown. Rule 37(b)(2) provides further that “[t]he relief granted may include . . . c. An order . . . dismissing the action.”

Rule 34(a) requires requested documents to be designated, within the scope of Rule 26(b), and in the responding party's possession, custody, or control; Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of nonprivileged matter reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

Adams v. Lovette · filed 1992-01-07Rule 34(a) and Rule 26(b)(1)

Rule 34 requires that as a prerequisite of production, documents must be (1) `designated,' (2) `within the scope' of Rule 26(b), and (3) in the `possession, custody, or control' of a party from whom they are sought. The party seeking production must show that these prerequisites are satisfied.

Rule 34 permits discovery of documents in another party’s possession, custody, or control when they are relevant to the case and reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

Kirkhart v. Saieed · filed 1992-08-18Rule 34(a)

Plaintiff contends, and we agree, that the documents requested are discoverable pursuant to Rule 34. Plaintiff, a party, has requested documents within the possession, custody, or control of defendants, that are relevant to the case and reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

A party’s failure to supplement a discovery response can justify excluding evidence the party did not disclose.

Bumgarner v. Reneau · filed 1992-11-19Rule 26(e)(2)

A party’s failure to comply with the limited duty imposed by Rule 26(e) is a ground for the trial court to impose such sanctions as exclusion of evidence, continuance, of other appropriate measures on the defaulting party. ... Under these circumstances, this Court finds no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s ruling excluding the Hall-Arnold deed from evidence.

Rule 35 allows a defendant to seek an independent medical examination during pretrial discovery; a trial court may refuse the request after trial when the defendant chose not to exercise that right earlier.

Abels v. Renfro Corp. · filed 1992-12-01Rule 35

During pretrial discovery, defendant had the right to compel plaintiff to undergo an independent medical examination under Rule 35 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 35. Knowing the possible consequences of G.S. § 97-6.1 if plaintiff was successful, defendant chose not to exercise that right. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to order an independent medical examination of plaintiff.

Rule 26 generally does not require a party to disclose its intended trial witnesses or exhibits through discovery, although a particular need may justify requiring disclosure.

King v. Koucouliotes · filed 1993-02-02Rule 26(b)(1)

Plaintiff has made no showing that he had a special need for the defendant’s list of witnesses and exhibits ten months prior to the trial. Accordingly, the information sought was not discoverable and defendant’s failure to provide such information cannot preclude him from presenting witnesses and exhibits at the trial.

Rule 26(b)(1) excludes privileged matters from civil discovery, allowing a party to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination during a deposition.

Cantwell v. Cantwell · filed 1993-03-16Rule 26(b)(1)

Therefore, the defendant could properly invoke the privilege in the course of her deposition testimony. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (1990) (in a civil action parties may obtain discovery regarding relevant matters except those that are privileged).

Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes discovery sanctions that establish a party’s negligence and bar evidence disputing it.

Smitheman Ex Rel. Godwin v. National Presto Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-04-20Rule 37(b)(2)a., -b.

(4) Presto argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sanction establishing Presto’s negligence and prohibiting the introduction of any evidence on the issue of negligence. Presto’s main argument is that the general purpose of the North Carolina Rules is to encourage trial on the merits. While this may be true, the Rules specifically authorize the imposition of such sanctions. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)a., -b. We find nothing in this argument indicating the trial court abused its discretion.

Rule 37(d) requires a trial court to consider less severe sanctions before dismissing an action for a discovery violation.

Goss v. Battle · filed 1993-07-20Rule 37(d)

The same policy requires the trial court consider less severe sanctions before dismissing pursuant to Rule 37(d).

Rule 37(d) permits sanctions for failing to respond to a Rule 34 production request without an order compelling discovery.

Pugh v. Pugh · filed 1994-01-18

Having determined that defendants were able to proceed under Rule 37(d) without an order compelling discovery, we consider whether or not plaintiff, through Brown, was justified in failing to produce the requested documents.

Rule 26(b) allows discovery of unprivileged matter relevant to the action and reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, while Rule 37(a) permits a motion to compel after a failure to respond or a specific objection.

Wagoner v. Elkin City Schools' Board of Education · filed 1994-02-15Rule 26(b); Rule 37(a)

Under the rules governing discovery, a party may obtain discovery concerning any unprivileged matter as long as relevant to the pending action and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b) (1990). If defendant fails to respond or specifically object to a request within forty-five days, or such other time the court states otherwise, Rule 84,/ the serving party, upon reasonable notice, may move to compel discovery under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(a) (1990). Whether or not the party’s motion to compel discovery should be granted or denied is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

Rule 37 does not authorize an order compelling an interrogatory answer when no discovery request remains unsatisfied.

Hamilton v. Memorex Telex Corp. · filed 1995-02-21Rule 37

Therefore, so long as the class continued to be defined as it was in the 18 November 1991 order, there were no unsatisfied discovery requests. The trial court erred in ordering defendant to produce the information.

Rule 37 sanctions cannot establish an uninsured motorist’s liability by striking defenses when that would prevent an insurer that timely answered from presenting its defenses.

Abrams v. Surrette · filed 1995-06-06Rule 37(b)(2)(c)

Failing to “provide or permit discovery,” pursuant to Rule 37, can also result in “an order striking out pleadings” or entry of a “judgment by default.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)(c). ... The order thus precluded State Farm from presenting its defenses, is inconsistent with Section 20-279.21(b)(3)(a) and must be reversed.

Rule 37 gives trial courts discretion to impose sanctions for discovery abuses, and an abuse does not always require sanctions.

Rose v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., Inc. · filed 1995-09-19Rule 37

Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure grants the court discretionary power to impose sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests. ... While the abuse of discovery rules here would support the imposition of sanctions, we hold that on this record the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose sanctions.

Rule 37(b)(2)(c) permits a court to strike counterclaims for failure to obey a discovery order after considering available sanctions.

Hursey v. Homes by Design, Inc. · filed 1995-12-19Rule 37(b)(2)(c)

We believe it may be inferred from the record that the trial court considered all available sanctions, including the two alternatives proposed by plaintiffs, in arriving at its decision, and the trial court’s action did not violate the rule set forth in Goss. We hold that the sanctions imposed were appropriate in light of defendants’ actions in this case.

Rule 37 permits sanctions for untimely discovery responses if the responses are served after the motion seeking sanctions is served, but not if they are served before the motion is made or served.

Cheek v. Poole · filed 1996-01-16Rule 37(d)

We see no reason to construe Rule 37 differently from Rule 55 and therefore hold that the untimely service of discovery responses cannot support sanctions if the discovery responses are served prior to the making [1] or service of a motion requesting sanctions. It follows, of course, that untimely discovery responses served after the service of a motion seeking sanctions on this basis can support sanctions.

Rule 37 permits sanctions for discovery violations, but remittitur was not a just sanction where withheld information prejudiced the opposing party's ability to contest causation.

Gardner v. Harriss · filed 1996-06-18Rule 37(d)(iii)

Remittitur is not, however, an enumerated sanction provided under Rule 37. While the sanction provisions permit the imposition of non-enumerated sanctions, the choice of sanctions must be "just" under the circumstances of each case. ... Such a remedy did not ensure a trial on the merits and was not "just" under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it decided to remit a portion of the verdict rather than granting defendants' motion for a new trial.

Rule 37(d) permits a default judgment for failure to answer interrogatories, but when joint liability is alleged, judgment against a defaulting defendant must await adjudication of the nondefaulting defendant’s liability.

Moore v. Sullivan · filed 1996-08-20Rule 37(d)

Rendering a judgment by default is an appropriate sanction for failure to answer interrogatories. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(d). However, in the default judgment situation when a plaintiff has alleged joint liability, a default judgment should not be entered against the defaulting defendant if one or more of the defendants do not default. Instead, “entry of judgment should await an adjudication as to the liability of the non-defaulting defendant(s).” Harris v. Carter, 33 N.C. App. 179, 182, 234 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1977). Because we have determined that entry of default against Mary Lou Sullivan was error, the trial court should have adjudicated Mary Lou Sullivan’s liability before determining whether to enter a default judgment against Frank Sullivan.

Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of information about a parent's interests in trusts and businesses when it may lead to evidence of the parent's ability to pay child support.

Shaw v. Cameron · filed 1997-03-04Rule 26(b)(1)

The terms of business associations and trusts in which defendant might possess an interest also would appear to be discoverable, if only under the rubric of being “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” regarding defendant’s financial circumstance and resultant ability to pay child support.

Rule 26(b)(3) protects documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, but a routine accident report made under a business reporting policy is discoverable absent other facts showing it was prepared because of prospective litigation.

Cook v. Wake County Hospital System, Inc. · filed 1997-03-18Rule 26(b)(3)

Pursuant to the rules of discovery outlined by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3), documents prepared "in anticipation of litigation" are afforded a qualified immunity from discovery by the party seeking those documents. ... Here, absent any other salient facts, it cannot be fairly said that the employee prepared the accident report because of the prospect of litigation.

Rule 26 requires a defendant to use authorized discovery procedures to obtain a plaintiff's medical records from a nonparty physician after the plaintiff waives the physician-patient privilege, unless the plaintiff authorizes disclosure.

Jones v. Asheville Radiological Group, P.A. · filed 1998-05-19Rule 26

The confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship extends beyond the time of the waiver by the patient, Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 334, 389 S.E.2d 41, 46 (1990), and a defendant "must utilize the statutorily recognized methods of discovery enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 26" to obtain a plaintiff's medical information, id. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47; see also N.C.G.S. ch. 1A, art. 5 (1990). ... It follows that, even after plaintiff's waiver, the films could only be disclosed pursuant to statutorily authorized discovery procedures or plaintiff's authorization.

Documents an insurer prepares before denying a claim generally do not receive work product protection, though the insurer may show that it reasonably anticipated litigation earlier.

Evans v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 2001-02-06Rule 26(b)(3)

Thus, documents prepared before an insurance company denies a claim generally will not be afforded work product protection.

Rule 26(b)(3) protects materials prepared for litigation, allowing discovery upon substantial need and undue hardship while shielding attorney mental impressions and legal theories.

Velez v. Dick Keffer Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc. · filed 2001-07-03(b)(3)

The protection given to matters prepared in anticipation of trial, or “work product,” is not a privilege, but a “qualified immunity.” ... If a document is created in anticipation of litigation, the party seeking discovery may access the document only by demonstrating a “substantial need” for the document and “undue hardship” in obtaining its substantial equivalent by other means. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b) (3). ... Furthermore, work product containing the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation in which the material is sought” is not discoverable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b) (3); ... Since the trial court put stringent safeguards in place to protect against abuse and discovery orders are within the trial court’s discretion, on this record, we hold that the trial court did not err in compelling discovery of Centura’s factual work product.

Rule 26(e)(1) requires a party to seasonably supplement discovery responses about expert witnesses, including their identity, subject matter, and testimony.

Hill v. Williams · filed 2001-06-05(e)(1)

It is well established that the purpose and intent of Rule 26(e)(1) is to prevent a party who has discoverable information from making evasive, incomplete, or untimely responses to requests for discovery. ... Imposition of sanctions pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 37(d) (1999) for failure to comply with Rule 26 (e) is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Rule 26 permits discovery of relevant, nonprivileged information when it is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence and permits a protective order when no privilege applies.

Miles v. Martin · filed 2001-11-20Rule 26(b)(1), (c)

Rule 26(b) allows the type of discovery the motion to compel addressed. There is no requirement of notice or an opportunity to be heard. The test of relevancy set out in Rule 26(b)(1) is much less stringent than the standard of relevancy found in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401. For discovery purposes, information need only be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26. In the absence of privilege, the remedy is a protective order under Rule 26(c), which would also be determined in the trial court’s discretion.

Rule 26(b)(1) limits discovery to matters reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

North Carolina State Bar v. Gilbert · filed 2002-07-16(b)(1)

Since Ms. Pologruto's tax records would have been inadmissible for impeachment purposes and the records sought do not appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the DHC did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to compel. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2001).

Rule 26(b)(4) limits interrogatories about the substance of an expert opinion but permits questions about whether the opinion exists.

Long v. Joyner · filed 2002-12-31Rule 26(b)(4)

Rule 26(b)(4) limits the amount of information a litigant can obtain through interrogatories concerning the substance of an expert opinion, but does not limit the request for information regarding the opinion’s existence.

Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of relevant, unprivileged matter; relevant matter protected by a privilege is generally not discoverable.

Mims v. Wright · filed 2003-04-15Rule 26(b)(1)

Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2001). Any unprivileged matter that is relevant is thus discoverable. On the other hand, if the matter of which discovery is sought is privileged, it is not discoverable, even if relevant, “unless the interests of justice outweigh the protected privilege.”

Rule 26 permits an order compelling a defendant to provide relevant, nonduplicative medical records in its possession or control.

Bunch v. N.C. D.O.C. · filed 2003-07-14Rule 26

Defendant should be compelled to provide plaintiff's medical records that may be in possession or control of defendant from the date of plaintiff's first surgery in 1995 through 1996 that are not duplicative of the medical records already presented. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 26.

Rule 37 permits the Industrial Commission to compel discovery in Tort Claims Act proceedings when the Rules of Civil Procedure are consistent with the Act.

Jane Doe 1 v. SWANNANOA VALLEY DEV. CENTER · filed 2004-03-02Rule 37(a)

Moreover, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure apply in tort claims before the Commission, to the extent that such rules are not inconsistent with the Tort Claims Act, in which case the Tort Claims Act controls. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-300; 4 NCAC 10B.0201(a). Pursuant to Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the Commission may enter an order compelling discovery and may impose sanctions on a party refusing to comply with such order.

Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of nonprivileged matters relevant to the action, and a trial court’s relevance determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Maxwell v. Michael P. Doyle, Inc. · filed 2004-05-18Rule 26(b)(1)

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2003). A trial court’s determination regarding relevance for purposes of discovery may be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.

Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of nonprivileged matters relevant to the pending action and allows the court to limit discovery that is cumulative, duplicative, burdensome, or expensive.

Joyce v. Joyce · filed 2004-12-07(b)(1)

With respect to the scope and limits of discovery, our Legislature has provided, in pertinent part, as follows: ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2003). "Whether or not the party's motion to compel discovery should be granted or denied is within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." ... We are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to compeldiscovery. Accordingly, plaintiff's first assignment of error is without merit.

After a complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff is not entitled to seek discovery.

Dove v. Harvey · filed 2005-03-01Rule 12(b)(6)

In this case, the parties’ dispute was resolved by the trial court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). ... Finally, as the trial court properly dismissed the complaint, plaintiff was not entitled to seek discovery.

Rule 26 permits a court to deny a motion to compel while allowing document inspection; a party challenging the inspection period must show why it was insufficient.

Phelps-Dickson Builders, LLC v. Amerimann Partners · filed 2005-08-16Rule 26

While denying the motion and allowing the inspection may appear, on the surface, to be contradictory, we have found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying plaintiffs motion to compel, and plaintiff cannot be heard to complain that it was, nonetheless, granted one of the expressly denominated means of discovery under Rule 26. Moreover, regarding the twenty-four hour time period permitted by the trial court, plaintiff has presented no argument as to why that amount of time was insufficient to conduct the review; accordingly, plaintiff has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion.

The Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to produce discoverable documents and supplement discovery responses when required by discovery requests and court orders.

Melton v. Tindall Corp. · filed 2005-09-20

Further, we conclude that there was no error in Judge Spainhour’s conclusion that Melton’s failure to produce the 2001 state return violated his duties to produce discoverable documents and supplement discovery responses as mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 26 and 37, as well as CMOs Nos. 1 and 5.

Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of relevant, nonprivileged matters, but discovery may be limited after default admits the complaint’s allegations and bars a defense on the merits.

Blankenship v. Town and Country Ford, Inc. · filed 2005-12-06Rule 26(b)(1)

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2003). As discussed, after an entry of default against a defendant, he or she “is deemed to have admitted the allegations in plaintiffs complaint, and is prohibited from defending on the merits of the case.” ... We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting discovery.

Rule 26 permits discovery of relevant, nonprivileged matter; discoverability is determined separately from admissibility at trial.

Midkiff v. Compton · filed 2010-05-18(b)(1)

As a preliminary matter, we stress that, while the two are related, a determination of whether materials are subject to discovery is separate and independent of whether that evidence will later be admissible at trial.

Rules 26 and 37(a) permit relevant jurisdictional discovery by deposition and allow a party to move to compel deposition answers.

K2 Asia Ventures v. Trota · filed 2011-03-01

Under the Rules, Plaintiffs are permitted to obtain by depositions discovery “regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26 (2009). Plaintiffs may also move the trial court to compel Appellants to answer questions in depositions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(a) (2009). Further, the trial court is permitted to exercise its control over discovery by ordering Appellants to submit' to depositions requested by Plaintiffs.

Rule 34(b) requires a party objecting to a document request to state the objection and its reason with the particular request; a blanket privilege objection is insufficient.

K2 Asia Ventures v. Trota · filed 2011-09-06Rule 34(b)

We conclude that the blanket general objection provided by the Philippine Defendants based on “the attomey/client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or doctrine” does not comply with Rule 34 by “stating the objection and the reason therefor either in the space following the request or following the restated request.”

Rule 26(b)(1) does not make information undiscoverable merely because it is available from another source.

Young v. KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP. · filed 2012-02-21(b)(1)

The availability of information from another source is not a ground for objection under Rule 26(b)(1), which sets forth limitations on the extent of discovery.

Rule 34(b) requires a party seeking a forensic examination of an opponent’s electronic records to give a specific reason beyond general suspicion to doubt the production and to show that direct access is reasonable in the circumstances.

Tumlin v. Tuggle Duggins P.A. · filed 2018-05-22Rule 34(b)

The Court is also guided by Rule 26(b)(1a), which directs that the Court can limit discovery that is “unduly burdensome and expensive” in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, and the comments to Rule 34(b), which provides that a party seeking a forensic examination of opposing party’s database from which it has already received information must provide a “specific reason, beyond general suspicion, to doubt the information and that the burden of providing direct access is reasonable in light of the importance of the information and the circumstances of the case.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b) cmt. (2011). ... The Court concludes that Tumlin has not demonstrated a reason, beyond general suspicion, to justify a forensic examination of Tuggle Duggins’ e-mail server.

Rule 34(a)(i) permits a court to require inspection of electronic systems as a way to produce requested documents when a party fails to comply with a production request.

Feeassco, LLC v. Steel Network, Inc. · filed 2019-03-19Rule 34(a)(i)

The trial court’s order did not compel Defendant to allow Plaintiffs’ entry upon Defendant’s property for “inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property . . . [,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 34(a), but instead compelled Defendant to allow electronic systems inspection as an alternative manner for ensuring the production of the documents requested. The trial court was well-within its discretion to order this alternative means of production.

Rule 12 does not treat a request for more time under Rule 6(b) as a waiver of the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.

Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown · filed 1972-05-24Rule 12(h)(1)

Defendants’ request for an enlargement of time was not a motion made under Rule 12 but was a request permitted by Rule 6(b). Also, no responsive pleading has yet been filed by defendants. Therefore, no waiver to assert the objection has occurred.

A defendant who has submitted to personal jurisdiction through a general appearance cannot later assert lack of personal jurisdiction by motion or answer under Rule 12(b).

Simms v. MASON'S STORES, INC.(NC-1) · filed 1974-04-10Rule 12(b)

However, as heretofore pointed out, after a defendant has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by conduct constituting a general appearance, he may not assert the defense that the court has no jurisdiction over his person either by motion or answer under Rule 12 (b).

A defendant who obtains more time to plead before asserting lack of personal jurisdiction makes a general appearance and submits to the court’s jurisdiction.

Philpott v. Kerns · filed 1974-04-10Rule 12(b), (g), and (h)(1)

Defendants in this case, before asserting their defense that the court had obtained no jurisdiction over their persons by answer or pre-answer motion as provided by Rule 12(b), (g), and (h) (1), secured an enlargement of time in which to plead. By so doing they made a general appearance, thereby submitting themselves to the court’s jurisdiction and obviating the necessity of any service of summons.

A defendant waives Rule 12(b) objections to personal jurisdiction, process, and service of process by seeking a discretionary venue change before raising those defenses.

Humphrey v. Sinnott · filed 1987-02-03Rule 12(b)(2), (4) and (5)

We hold that defendant Sinnott, by moving for a discretionary change of venue pursuant to G.S. 1-83(2) without first or simultaneously asserting his Rule 12(b) defenses relating to jurisdiction and process, made a general appearance and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

A sovereign immunity challenge is treated as a personal jurisdiction challenge under Rule 12(b)(2), making denial of the motion immediately appealable.

Zimmer v. North Carolina Department of Transportation · filed 1987-09-15Rule 12(b)(2)

This Court has held on two occasions that the doctrine of sovereign immunity presents a question of personal jurisdiction. ... Therefore, we follow the precedent of Stahl-Rider and Sides and hold that the present appeal is properly before us.

Rule 12(h) waives a personal jurisdiction objection when a defendant answers without raising it.

Stern v. Stern · filed 1988-04-19(h)

In defendant’s answer, filed in 1978, he made a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), and a res judicata motion, without making a motion to contest personal jurisdiction. By filing his answer without contesting personal jurisdiction, his right to challenge the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him was waived.

Rule 12(h)(1) waives a party's personal jurisdiction defense if the party files an answer without raising it and did not raise it in a prior motion.

Grimsley v. Nelson · filed 1994-12-20Rule 12(h)(1)

Thus, the filing of an answer by the defendant's attorney (which constitutes a general appearance) which does not include the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction constitutes a waiver by the defendant of this defense if the defense had not been raised in a prior motion. Id. at 790, 266 S.E.2d at 28; N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(1) (1990) (defense must be raised in pre-answer motion or in the answer).

On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, uncontroverted complaint allegations and uncontested affidavit statements can establish a prima facie basis for personal jurisdiction.

Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs · filed 1998-11-03Rule 12(b)(2)

Therefore, based upon the uncontroverted allegations contained in plaintiff’s complaint and the uncontested statements in Martin’s affidavit, plaintiff came forward with a prima facie showing sufficient to subject Combs and Petree to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina under either G.S. § l-75.4(4)(a) or G.S. § l-75.4(5)(a)&(b).

Rule 12(h) waives defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient process or service unless they are raised in an answer or pre-answer motion.

In Re Howell · filed 2003-12-16Rule 12(h)

Respondent failed to raise the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process in either her answer or in a pre-answer motion in the termination proceeding and waived these defenses.