N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, assumes its alleged facts are true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Byington v. North Sea Assoc., LLC · filed 2025-12-31(a)(7)

'On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Martinez v NYC Health & Hosps. Corp. , 223 AD3d 731, 732, quoting Watts v City of New York , 186 AD3d 1577, 1578).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Dorio v. Community Hous. Mgt. Corp. · filed 2026-01-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "the facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, the plaintiff is given the benefit of every possible favorable inference," and the court must determine simply "whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory."

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint’s facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cahn v. Chapler · filed 2026-01-09(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory."

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true, draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and determine whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Shibley v. City of New York · filed 2026-01-12(a)(7)

Turning now to Motion Seq. 003, on a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR § 3211 (a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994][citations omitted]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Krakovski v. Stavros Assoc., LLC · filed 2026-01-14(a)(7)

The amended complaint stated a viable cause of action alleging private nuisance. "On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Saadia v National Socy. of Hebrew Day Schs., Inc. , 225 AD3d 806, 808; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true despite conflicting assertions in the defendant’s affidavit.

Macru v. Shorefront Operating, LLC · filed 2025-12-24(a)(7)

Further, many of the assertions of the defendant's administrator were contradicted by the allegations in the complaint, which on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) must be accepted as true.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), bare legal conclusions without factual specificity are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Costiera v. MMR Care Corp. · filed 2025-12-31(a)(7)

With respect to the plaintiff's cause of action alleging gross negligence, the allegations are no more than "bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity[, which] are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss" ( Pinkesz v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 234 AD3d 886, 888 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3211[a][7]; Hasan v Terrace Acquisitions II, LLC , 224 AD3d 475, 478; Whitehead v Pine Haven Operating LLC , 222 AD3d 104, 111).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a pleading that puts the defendant on notice of the claims can withstand dismissal; the defendant may seek further detail through a bill of particulars.

M.T. v. Yeshiva Univ. · filed 2026-01-15(a)(7)

The pleading is sufficient to put Hirt on notice of the claims against him, and he can seek amplification in a bill of particulars ( see John Doe - 18126 v Young People's Chorus of N.Y. City , 238 AD3d 633, 634 [1st Dept 2025]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal of an adequately pleaded declaratory judgment claim when the agreement's terms remain open to interpretation.

Alphasense, Inc. v. Financial Tech. Partners LP · filed 2026-01-15(a)(7)

As the motion court correctly determined, the "key man" provision, on its face, fails to resolve plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim. Since it was adequately asserted, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 § (a)(7) would be premature.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, assumes the alleged facts are true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Ramirez v. Issa · filed 2026-01-21(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Weinstein v Levitin , 208 AD3d 531, 532 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see 25-86 41st St., LLC v Guzman , 234 AD3d 649, 650).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hello Beautiful Salons, Inc. v. Dimoplon · filed 2026-01-21(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Hughes v Vento , 226 AD3d 753, 754; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Chamale-Eustace v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook · filed 2026-01-21(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true, provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and "determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman , 31 NY3d 30, 38).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Barrack v. Village of Piermont · filed 2026-01-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141).

Section 3211(a)(7) tests whether a complaint states a cause of action; the court does not decide at this stage whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the claim.

Landscape Details, Inc. v. Bernard · filed 2026-01-28(a)(7)

"Whether a complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)" ( Bailey v City of New York , 228 AD3d 713, 715; see Maursky v Latham , 219 AD3d 473, 475).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a pre-answer motion to dismiss a legal malpractice claim should be denied when the complaint sufficiently pleads the claim, even though proximate cause remains to be proved.

Park W. Exec. Servs., Inc. v. Gallo Vitucci & Klar, LLP · filed 2026-01-29(a)(7)

However, at this pre-answer motion to dismiss stage of the litigation, plaintiffs have sufficiently plead a claim for legal malpractice.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the petition's allegations as true, construes them in the petitioner's favor, and affords every reasonable inference.

Miracle Temple Apostolic Holiness Church of Am., Inc. v. Mack · filed 2026-02-03(a)(7)

Given that the court must deem the allegations of the petition as true and construe them in Petitioner's favor, affording Petitioner the benefit of "every reasonable inference," ( Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman , 31 NY3d 30, 38 [2018]), the court finds that, even with this standard of review, Respondent has met their burden under CPLR §3211(a)(7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Worob v. Campbell · filed 2026-02-11(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Tsamasiros v Jones , 232 AD3d 816, 817; see Whelan v Cuomo , 220 AD3d 979, 980).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the pleadings liberally, accepts the allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Gregg v. Community Care Companions, Inc. · filed 2026-02-11(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), [this Court] must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff . . . the benefit of every possible favorable inference" ( Van Ostrand v Latham , 222 AD3d 1382, 1383 [4th Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint fails to state a cause of action when its alleged facts, accepted as true with favorable inferences, do not fit a cognizable legal theory.

Weaver v. Krakoviak · filed 2026-02-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction ( see id. § 3026) and the court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). ... With respect to the first and second causes of action, Weaver failed to state a cause of action.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Premium Prods., Inc. v. O'Malley · filed 2026-02-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, presumes its allegations true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Doe v. Grant Wilfley Casting, Inc. · filed 2026-02-25(a)(7)

"'On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Mohammad v Rehman , 236 AD3d 892, 893, quoting Weinstein v Levitin , 208 AD3d 531, 532).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, conclusory allegations without factual specificity are insufficient.

Sacchi v. Ribbon Worldwide LLC · filed 2026-02-25(a)(7)

However, "conclusory allegations -- claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity - are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss" (Barnes v Hodge, 118 AD3d 633, 633 [1st Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Mamoon v Dot Net Inc., 135 AD3d 656, 658 [1st Dept 2016]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to draw reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor and deny dismissal when the alleged facts state a cognizable claim.

Bodenchak v. 5178 Holdings LLC · filed 2026-02-25(a)(7)

In resolving “all reasonable inferences [in petitioner’s] favor” as required at this motion to dismiss stage, plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for dissolution (Gorelik v Mount Sinai Hosp. Ctr., 19 AD3d 319, 319 [1st Dept 2006] [a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim “must be denied if from the pleading’s four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law”] [internal quotations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kong v. Laundress, LLC. · filed 2026-02-26(a)(7)

When it considers a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the facts in the complaint as true, gives plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determines only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Hernandez v. Laundress, LLC · filed 2026-02-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference.

Section 3211(a)(7) applies a more lenient pleading standard than the federal Rule 12(b) plausibility standard.

Baron v. Laundress, LLC · filed 2026-02-26(a)(7)

In both cases, though, the motions were brought under the stricter "plausibility" standard of Rule 12 (b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures than what is required under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Doe v. Sweet Green, Inc. · filed 2026-03-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a)(7), the Court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the alleged facts as true, accord plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court broadly construes the complaint and gives deference to its factual allegations.

County of Westchester v. McKinsey & Co., Inc. · filed 2026-03-03(a)(7)

It is critical to note that this Court's decision was made through the prism of a CPLR 3211 pre-answer motion. In this procedural context, the law mandates that the complaint be broadly construed, and with extreme deference to the facts as alleged therein.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Grauer v. Westhampton Beach Sch. Dist. · filed 2026-03-04(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Gould v Decolator , 121 AD3d 845, 846-847).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the claimant every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Axos Bank v. Michael Gangi Plumbing & Heating Contrs., Inc. · filed 2026-03-04(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and "determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A. , 159 AD3d 962, 963 [internal quotation marks omitted], affd 34 NY3d 250; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the movant shows that the pleading fails to state a cause of action.

People v. VDARE Found., Inc. · filed 2026-03-05(a)(7)

A court will dismiss a cause of action when the movant demonstrates that “the pleading fails to state a cause of action” (CPLR § 3211(a)(7)).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rojan Mgt., Inc v. Melville Massage & Acupuncture, PLLC · filed 2026-03-09(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( see Hughes v Vento, 226 AD3d 753, 754 [2d Dept 2024], citing Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88, 638 NE2d 511 [1994]; Hello Beautiful Salons, Inc. v Dimoplon, 245 AD3d 800 [2d Dept 2026]; Jesberger v CVS Health Solutions, LLC, 222 AD3d 849, 849-850 [2d Dept 2023]). ... This Court finds without question that the amended verified complaint states a cause of action for breach of contract and therefore denies the motion to dismiss as to the first cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal when the complaint’s factual allegations adequately state a cause of action.

Levien v. Mancorp Realty Co. L.L.C. · filed 2026-03-10(a)(7)

However, Mancorp has not demonstrated an entitlement to dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7). The factual allegations contained in the complaint adequately state a cause of action for breach of contract.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) applies in Family Court proceedings; on a motion to dismiss, the court liberally construes the petition, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Matter of Devlin v. Eriksson · filed 2026-03-11(a)(7)

"When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), which is proper in Family Court proceedings because they are civil in nature, we afford the petition a liberal construction, accept the allegations contained therein as true, and grant the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference" ( id. ; see Matter of Xin Li v Ramos , 125 AD3d 681, 682). ... Therefore, the Family Court properly granted the mother's motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the father's petition and dismissed the petition ( see Matter of Tomomi N. v Michael G. , 237 AD3d at 437; Matter of Koska v Koska , 226 AD3d at 782-783).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint's facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Brown v. Register · filed 2026-03-11(a)(7)

"'On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( We Transp., Inc. v Westbury Union Free Sch. Dist. , 219 AD3d 865, 866, quoting Shah v Exxis, Inc. , 138 AD3d 970, 971; see CPLR 3211[a][7]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court gives the complaint a liberal construction and the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a claim.

Ramos v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. · filed 2026-03-12(a)(7)

Affording plaintiff’s complaint a liberal construction and affording plaintiff’s allegations every favorable inference, as required on a CPLR § 3211(a)(7), motion to dismiss, the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action under Labor Law § 740 (see Gruessner v State, 232 AD3d 743 [2d Dept 2024] [Labor Law § 740 claim sufficiently plead when plaintiff alleges policies in violation of regulations, which were investigated by governmental agencies]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the pleadings state a cause of action.

Meirowitz v. Pizzaro · filed 2026-03-12(a)(7)

When assessing the adequacy of a pleading in the context of a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court’s role is “to determine whether [the] pleadings state a cause of action” (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gluck v. Richter · filed 2026-03-16(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court ... is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (IPA Asset Mgmt., LLC v Schuman, 239 AD3d 619, 620–21 [2d Dep’t 2025], quoting Martinez v NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 223 AD3d 731, 732 [2d Dep’t 2024]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept the pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and ask whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Azhar v. BlackRock Inc. · filed 2026-03-16(a)(7)

When reviewing a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Henriquez v. City of New York · filed 2026-03-17(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]), we must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Vig v New York Hairspray Co., L.P. , 67 AD3d 140, 144-145 [1st Dept 2009]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires dismissal when the alleged facts do not fit any cognizable legal theory.

Schweitzer v. Vincent · filed 2026-03-17(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), a claim must be dismissed when the facts alleged do not fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87–88 [1994]).

A challenge to whether a derivative complaint adequately pleads demand futility is analyzed under CPLR 3211(a)(7) as a failure to state a cause of action.

Sawyer v. 1120 Fifth Ave. Corp. · filed 2026-03-17(a)(7)

As an initial matter, defendants’ argument that plaintiff’ complaint does not set forth why a demand would be futile will be analyzed under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), rather than under CPLR § 3212 since by arguing that the complaint is deficient, defendants posit that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action on which the relief sought can be granted (see Bansbach v Zinn, 1 NY3d 1 [2003] [analyzing whether plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently stated that demand upon board would be futile, under a CPLR § 3211(a)(7) standard]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

People v. VDARE Found., Inc. · filed 2026-03-17(a)(7)

A court will dismiss a claim when the movant demonstrates that “the pleading fails to state a cause of action” (CPLR § 3211(a)(7)).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Adel Wine & Liqs., Inc. v. Randy's 925 Corp. · filed 2026-03-19(a)(7)

It is well-settled that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

L.G. v. S.V. · filed 2026-03-24(a)(7)

CPLR §3211(a)(7) provides, in part, that a party can seek dismissal of a legal matter if the pleadings fail to state a cause of action. When such is the case, as it is here, the Court must give the pleadings liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

McIntosh v. City of New York · filed 2026-03-25(a)(7)

"On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Bernstein v Jacobson , 238 AD3d 1102, 1103 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Doe v. Yeshiva of Brooklyn · filed 2026-03-25(a)(7)

"'In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleadings are afforded a liberal construction, the facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, and the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference'" ( Georgiou v Sacred Patriarchal & Stravropegial Orthodox Monastery of St. Irene Chrysovalantou , 242 AD3d 950, 951, [*2]quoting Mera v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. , 220 AD3d 668, 668-669).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cacace v. Grandell Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., Inc. · filed 2026-03-25(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Gorbatov v Tsirelman , 155 AD3d 836, 837).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, bare legal conclusions without specific supporting facts do not suffice to preserve a claim.

Estate of Middleton v. CLR Troy LLC · filed 2026-03-26(a)(7)

Neither of plaintiff's remaining claims for gross negligence and pre-COVID negligence — the only claims which would otherwise survive EDTPA immunity — are supported by more than "bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity" as required to survive defendant's motion to dismiss ( Godfrey v Spano , 13 NY3d 358, 373 [2009]; see Byington v North Sea Assoc., LLC , 244 AD3d at 1179; Costiera v MMR Care Corp. , 244 AD3d at 1182; Estate of Pierro v Carmel Richmond Healthcare & Rehabilitation Ctr. , 241 AD3d at 647; Hyman v Richmond Univ. Med. Ctr. , 239 AD3d at 618-619; Whitehead v Pine Haven Operating LLC , 222 AD3d at 110-111). Accordingly, Supreme Court similarly erred in denying defendant's motion seeking to dismiss these claims.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

M.P. v. Wilson · filed 2026-04-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, presumes its allegations true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Chen v. Zum Dev., Inc. · filed 2026-04-01(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference in deciding whether the alleged facts support a cognizable claim.

Weiss v. Fran Corp. · filed 2026-04-08(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Clevenger v Yuzek, 222 AD3d 931, 934 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Pergament v Government Empls. Ins. Co. ["GEICO"], 225 AD3d 799, 800).

When a court considers evidence on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion without converting it to summary judgment, dismissal requires showing that a material fact alleged by the plaintiff is not a fact at all and that no significant dispute exists about it.

Benjamin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. · filed 2026-04-08(a)(7)

"Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one, and unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate"

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a Family Court violation petition may be dismissed without a hearing if its allegations, accepted as true and liberally construed, lack facts that could support relief.

Matter of Marisol Y. v. Steven Z. · filed 2026-04-09(a)(7)

"When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), which is proper in Family Court proceedings because they are civil in nature, we afford the petition a liberal construction, accept the allegations contained therein as true, and grant the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference" (Matter of Koska v Koska, 226 AD3d 780, 782 [2d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Dismissal without a hearing is warranted when the petition fails to set forth sufficient facts that, if established at a hearing, would provide a basis for granting the relief sought (see Matter of Tonya YY. v James ZZ., 220 AD3d at 1150).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, draws every favorable inference for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Boyd v. Village of Mamaroneck · filed 2026-04-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a reviewing court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Barbetta v NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 227 AD3d 763, 765; O'Neill v Wilder, 204 AD3d 823, 823).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wimbish v. Crema-Samalya · filed 2026-04-29(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept pleaded facts as true, draw favorable inferences, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rosario v. Town of Mount Kisco · filed 2026-04-29(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in a complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 NY3d 137, 141).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Harbord v. A.J. Richard & Sons, Inc. · filed 2026-05-06(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction and the court must 'accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" (Ramirez v Donado Law Firm, P.C., 169 AD3d 940, 941, quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cammarato v. 16 Admiral Perry Plaza, LLC · filed 2026-05-13(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Oberlander v. Simon · filed 2026-06-03(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Barbetta v NBCUniversal Media, LLC , 227 AD3d 763, 765 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ofman v Richland , 234 AD3d 865, 866).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

McNeil v. World Class Sec. Servs. Holdings, LLC · filed 2026-06-10(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Brophy v Big Bros. Big Sisters of Am., Inc. , 224 AD3d 866, 868).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal is warranted when the complaint’s alleged facts and favorable inferences do not support an element of the claim or an enforceable right to recovery.

Voltaire v. Northwell Health, Inc. · filed 2026-06-17(a)(7)

"Dismissal of the complaint is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" ( Walrond v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. , 240 AD3d 933, 934 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Soloviev v Ross Sch. , 227 AD3d 746, 747).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Concerned Citizens of Forest Hills, Inc. v. West Side Tennis Club · filed 2026-06-17(a)(7)

Generally, on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is afforded a liberal construction, the allegations are accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court determines whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Connolly v Long Is. Power Auth. , 30 NY3d 719, 728; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss, section 3211 requires the court to construe the petition liberally, accept its allegations as true, give the petitioner every favorable inference, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable theory.

Matter of Michele D. v. Jessica F. · filed 2026-06-18(a)(7)

When analyzing a pre-answer motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, we must construe the petition liberally, "accept the facts as alleged in the petition as true, accord the petitioner the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable theory" ( Matter of Romena Q. v Edwin Q. , 133 AD3d 1148, 1149 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter of Wayman v Ramos , 88 AD3d 1237, 1239 [3d Dept 2011], lv dismissed 18 NY3d 868 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts pleaded facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the nonmoving party, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Draina v. Town of Ballston · filed 2026-06-18(a)(7)

"When presented with a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, this Court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Estate of Middleton v CLR Troy LLC , 247 AD3d 1422, 1423 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint's facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a recognized legal theory.

Guercia v. Gao · filed 2026-06-24(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Old Republic Natl. Title Ins. Co. v 1152 53 Mgt., LLC , 227 AD3d 824, 826 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the claimant every favorable inference.

Bellstell 140 E. 56th St. LLC v. Ferreira · filed 2026-06-24(a)(7)

Civil Court properly denied petitioner's CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss respondents' counterclaim for harassment. Accepting the facts as alleged in the counterclaim as true and affording respondents the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. , 226 AD3d 60, 87-86 [2024]), we agree that respondents stated a cause of action for harassment (NY City Administrative Code [Administrative Code of NY] § 27-2004 [a] [48] [a-1] & [g]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint's facts as true, gives the nonmoving party every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a viable legal theory.

Town of Petersburgh v. 3M Co. · filed 2026-06-25(a)(7)

"When presented with a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, we must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Singe v Bates Troy, Inc. , 206 AD3d 1528, 1530 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Brown v University of Rochester , 224 AD3d 1180, 1181 [3d Dept 2024]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cause of action.

Kowalski v. Familia · filed 1974-02-04(a)(7)

In our opinion, the order under review should have conformed to Special Term’s decision, which hot only denied plaintiff’s cross motion but granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211, subd. [a], par. 7).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a defendant to raise failure to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense in the answer.

Paolucci v. Damini · filed 1976-12-17(a)(7)

Thus, there is a failure to allege a cause of action for breach of contract. As his first affirmative defense in his answer to the complaint, defendant timely raised the defense that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211, subd [a], par 7).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not warrant dismissal of a medical malpractice claim alleging that a patient relied to his detriment on a doctor's negligent advice.

Hickey v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1990-06-25(a)(7)

These assertions demonstrate the existence of triable issues of fact, and we therefore conclude that Dr. Hutton’s motion for summary judgment, and, a fortiori, his motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), should have been denied.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations of an oral agreement covering specific properties and its breach can sufficiently state a cause of action.

Edward S. Gordon Co. v. Tucker Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc. · filed 1990-06-26(a)(7)

The complaint, amplified by affidavit, alleges that by agreeing to “cover” and “protect” plaintiff with respect to specific properties introduced to defendant by plaintiff, an exclusive brokerage agreement was formed as to those properties. The facts pleaded sufficiently state a cause of action for breach of the claimed oral agreement.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a breach-of-employment-contract claim to proceed when the complaint sufficiently alleges a policy limiting termination and a conflicting disclaimer cannot be resolved as a matter of law.

Aharanwa v. Trustees of Columbia University · filed 1990-07-03(a)(7)

Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Eugene Nardelli, J.), entered on November 30, 1988, September 28, 1989 and October 30, 1989, respectively, which, inter alia, denied defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and pursuant to CPLR 3212, only insofar as the complaint alleged a claim for breach of an employment contract, and which granted plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs or disbursements. ... Here, contrary to defendants’ assertions, the IAS court did not err in determining that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a contractual limitation on defendants’ right to terminate his at-will employment based upon policy numbers 113 and 113.3 of the Columbia Personnel Policy Manual, which provided that "officers of administration” would not be terminated except for "cause”, as well as policy guidelines for termination of employment. Moreover, any conflict between these provisions and the disclaimer in the introduction cannot be resolved as a matter of law.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), an allegation that defendants failed to diagnose a brain tumor states a medical malpractice cause of action.

Wengrover v. Glass · filed 1990-11-16(a)(7)

Supreme Court properly denied the motion of defendants North Shore University Hospital and Roger Hyman to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of action for medical malpractice based upon defendants’ alleged failure to diagnose a brain tumor (see, Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129).

A complaint alleging domination and control of a corporation and fraudulent conveyances sufficiently states a veil-piercing claim under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Chase Manhattan Bank v. 264 Water Street Associates · filed 1991-06-20(a)(7)

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eve M. Preminger, J.), entered August 2, 1990, which, inter alia, denied the motion of defendants-appellants Broadstone Group, Inc. and Philip Levien to dismiss the amended complaint against them for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), unanimously affirmed to the extent appealed from, with costs. ... Further, plaintiff alleged sufficient allegations to sustain a cause of action to pierce the corporate veil by alleging that the individual defendant dominated and controlled the corporation and caused the corporation to make fraudulent conveyances (see, A/S Domino Mobler v Braverman, 669 F Supp 592, 594).

A breach of contract claim concerning a physician’s medical services is legally sufficient when it alleges an express special promise to effect a cure or achieve a definite result.

Nicoleau v. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Center · filed 1994-02-14(a)(7)

It is well settled that a breach of contract claim in relation to the rendition of medical services by a physician will withstand a test of its legal sufficiency only when based upon an express special promise to effect a cure or to accomplish some definite result (Robins v Finestone, 308 NY 543; McCarthy v Berlin, 178 AD2d 584; Mitchell v Spataro, 89 AD2d 599). Under the circumstances of this case, we find that a cause of action is stated based on the plaintiffs’ allegation that the patient entered into an oral agreement with her attending physician pursuant to which she agreed to retain his services in exchange for his specific promise to deliver her baby without the administration of blood, which treatment was contrary to her religious beliefs, and that the breach occurred when he administered blood transfusions to her after she gave birth to her child by Cesarian section.

Section 3211(e) allows a failure-to-state-a-cause-of-action defense to be raised at any time, so the defense should not be stricken while other affirmative defenses remain legally sufficient.

17 East 101st Street Associates v. Huguenin · filed 1994-07-01(e)

The Appellate Division, First Department, has held that, unless all other affirmative defenses are determined to be legally insufficient, such a defense should not be stricken, as it can be asserted at any time, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (e). ... Such a determination is not being made here (see discussion below).

A petition fails to state a cause of action when it does not plainly allege the services on which its claim depends.

In re the Estate of Warhol · filed 1994-12-06(a)(7)

—Order of the Surrogate’s Court, New York County (Eve Preminger, S.), entered on or about June 7, 1994, denying respondent-appellant’s motion, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), to dismiss the first four counts of the petition and further restraining respondent-appellant from paying himself any further commissions until final settlement of the Estate, is unanimously modified, on the law, to dismiss the first four counts of the petition, and otherwise affirmed, without costs or disbursements. ... Petitioner does not plainly allege that he rendered services which the executor was legally bound to perform nor does he specify what those services were. Thus, this count also fails to state a cause of action.

A complaint alleging that a liquidator wrongly retained money after denying a requested setoff states a cause of action for restitution.

Liquidation of Realex Group, N. V. Chesapeake Insurance v. Curiale · filed 1994-12-13(a)(7)

In the complaint, the plaintiff asserts that it timely requested setoff pursuant to section 7427 but that defendant Liquidator improperly denied the request based on an erroneous interpretation of that section of the Insurance Law, and therefore wrongfully received and retained $853,000 to which plaintiff is entitled. This validly pleads a cause of action for restitution.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cause of action.

Gaylor v. Rose · filed 1995-01-30(a)(7)

Review of the record demonstrates that the court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

A complaint that states a cause of action against the defendants survives a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Nyack Waterfront Associates · filed 1995-02-27(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly determined that the amended complaint states a cause of action against the appellants (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; see also, Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700, 707, 709; Gordon v De Laurentiis Corp., 141 AD2d 435, 436; Reade v Sullivan, 259 App Div 229).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), pleaded facts receive favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims contradicted by documentary evidence do not.

Stuart Lipsky, P. C. v. Price · filed 1995-05-02(a)(7)

Although on a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims either inherently or flatly contradicted by the documentary evidence are not entitled to such consideration (Mark Hampton, Inc. v Bergreen, 173 AD2d 220, Iv denied 80 NY2d 788).

A defamation complaint that sufficiently pleads an actionable claim withstands a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Wasserman v. Haller · filed 1995-06-05(a)(7)

We therefore find that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

A CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss is properly denied when the complaint states a cause of action.

Witter v. City of New York · filed 1995-07-10

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants New York City Transit Authority and Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Greenstein, J.), dated April 6, 1994, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against them or, pursuant to CPLR 3211, to dismiss the complaint insofar as it is asserted against them. ... Therefore, since the complaint states a cause of action and there are questions of fact as to the plaintiff’s allegations, the court properly denied the appellants’ motion (see, Dursi v New York City Tr. Auth., 198 AD2d 470).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a fraud counterclaim that fails to state a cause of action.

Salvatore and Catherine Pepe v. Miller & Miller Consulting Actuaries, Inc. · filed 1995-11-20(a)(7)

Further, the appellant’s counterclaims alleging fraud were properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a tort claim that fails to plead the unavailability of workers’ compensation coverage.

Corp v. State · filed 1999-01-07(a)(7)

Finally, claimant’s contention that the Court of Claims erred in treating the State’s llth-hour motion as a motion to dismiss rather than a motion for summary judgment is without merit. CPLR 3211 (a) (7) provides that ... “the pleading fails to state a cause of action”. ... Where lack of workers’ compensation coverage is not pleaded, dismissal is proper (see, O’Rourke v Long, supra, at 226).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when a claimant does not plead that workers’ compensation coverage is unavailable.

Antoinetta Corp. v. State · filed 1999-01-07(a)(7)

The Court of Claims found that the pleading did not state a cause of action because claimant failed to plead the unavailability of workers’ compensation benefits. Where lack of workers’ compensation coverage is not pleaded, dismissal is proper (see, O’Rourke v Long, supra, at 226).

Failure to plead an exception to CPLR article 16 does not warrant dismissal of the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Stevens v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2001-11-26(a)(7)

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to plead any exception to CPLR article 16. While the defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the complaint on this basis, CPLR article 16 is applicable herein.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint’s allegations must be taken as true.

Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue · filed 2007-08-23(a)(7)

The allegations of the complaint, which must be taken as true on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]), are as follows.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits a defendant to plead failure to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense.

Old Williamsburg Candle Corp. v. Seneca Insurance · filed 2009-10-06(a)(7)

About one year later, on November 18, 2008, this Court issued an opinion stating, inter alia, that Plemmenou and similar cases did not articulate the correct legal standard that CPLR 3211 (a) (7) expressly permits a defendant to raise in a pleading the defense that a complaint does not state a cause of action and, therefore, those cases should no longer be followed (see Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145 [2008]). ... Accordingly, that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first affirmative defense should have been denied.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe a pleading liberally when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Cueto v. Hamilton Plaza Co. · filed 2009-11-10(a)(7)

In affording the allegations in the complaint and bill of particulars the required liberal construction as required (see Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d at 703), we find that they sufficiently alleged that Cueto suffered a “grave injury,” and, consequently, that the Supreme Court properly denied Special Trades’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action in the third-party complaint for common-law indemnification and contribution (see Wilt v Brunswick Plaza, 281 AD2d 840, 841 [2001]).

On a motion to dismiss, a contract claim need not be pleaded with particularity, and an unjust enrichment claim may remain alongside it at the pleading stage.

Shilkoff, Inc. v. 885 Third Avenue Corp. · filed 2002-11-21(a)(7)

Defendants’ contention that the breach of contract cause of action is insufficiently pleaded would hold plaintiff to particularity in a contract pleading that is not required; their contention that the unjust enrichment claim cannot stand in light of a contract cause of action is, among other reasons, premature (see Wilmoth v Sandor, supra). Accordingly, we modify to reinstate these causes of action.

Section 3211 (a) (7) permits dismissal of a tortious interference claim when conclusory allegations lack facts showing that the defendant caused the contract breach.

Ferrandino & Son, Inc. v. Wheaton Builders, Inc. · filed 2011-03-22(a)(7)

Here, the plaintiff merely asserted, in a conclusory manner and without the support of relevant factual allegations, that HE2’s actions caused Wheaton to breach the subcontract. Additionally, the plaintiff failed to allege that, but for HE2’s actions, Wheaton would have continued the subcontract. Consequently, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of HE2’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) which were to dismiss the cause of action to recover damages for tortious interference with contract insofar as asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, but a complaint survives when its allegations adequately state a claim.

Selechnik v. Law Office of Birnbach · filed 2011-03-22(a)(7)

Based on these allegations, the complaint adequately states causes of action to recover damages from the law office for the torts allegedly committed by Tolisano under the doctrine of respondeat superior and on the theory of negligent hiring and retention, which are not required to be pleaded with specificity (see Porcelli v Key Food Stores Co-Op., Inc., 44 AD3d 1020 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Baron v. Galasso · filed 2011-04-05(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “ ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ”

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to allege a cognizable cause of action.

Williams v. Long Island College Hospital · filed 2011-04-12(a)(7)

Applying these principles here, the plaintiffs have failed to allege a cognizable cause of action to recover damages for emotional distress against the hospital. ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the hospital’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint’s allegations, accepted as true with favorable inferences, state a recognizable cause of action.

Peery v. United Capital Corp. · filed 2011-05-24(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the motion of the United defendants, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, allegations of bad faith can prevent dismissal under the business judgment rule when its protection cannot be determined from the pleadings.

Gochberg v. Sovereign Apartments, Inc. · filed 2014-07-03(a)(7)

Further, whether the business judgment rule protects defendants’ actions cannot be determined as a matter of law on the pleadings since defendants’ alleged action in going behind Mr. Gochberg’s back to have EMSL’s analysis delivered to SAI instead of Mr. Gochberg smacks of bad faith (Ackerman v 305 E. 40th Owners Corp., 189 AD2d 665, 667 [1st Dept 1993]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts the alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Bannister v. Agard · filed 2015-02-18(a)(7)

Affording the amended complaint a liberal construction, ... and granting the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the amended complaint, as augmented by the plaintiffs affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635 [1976]), failed to plead the requisite elements of fraud as against the corporate defendants.

A civil management petition alleging an alcohol related diagnosis in addition to antisocial personality disorder survives a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

State v. Raymundo V. · filed 2015-02-24

The first motion seeks an order pursuant to CPLR 3211 dismissing the petition for failure to state a cause of action. Each of the examiners diagnosed Raymundo V. with an alcohol related diagnosis in addition to antisocial personality disorder, therefore this case is distinguishable from the respondents in Matter of State of New York v Donald DD. and it cannot be said as a matter of law that petitioner has failed to state a cause of action.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a defamation complaint survives dismissal when it sufficiently alleges the elements of a viable claim.

ACCADIA SITE CONTRACTING, INC. v. SKURKA, JEFFREY · filed 2015-06-12(a)(7)

“The elements of a cause of action for defamation are a false statement, published without privilege or authorization to a third ... party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se” (D’Amico v Correctional Med. Care, Inc., 120 AD3d 956, 962 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and we conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleges those elements and, thus, states a viable cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the facts alleged in a complaint do not state a legally recognized claim.

Perretta v. Perretta · filed 2016-10-19(a)(7)

The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action to recover unpaid rent, use, and occupancy. ... Here, the complaint failed to allege either ouster or the existence of any agreement that required the defendants to pay rent, use, and occupancy.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of discrimination claims when the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case.

McCabe v. Consulate Gen. of Can. · filed 2019-03-07(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan M. Kenney, J.), entered January 23, 2017, which, inter alia, granted defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs. ... The court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's causes of action alleging sex and age discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Laws, as plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for these causes of action (Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8—107[1][a]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference when assessing the complaint.

EVEMeta, LLC v. Siemens Convergence Creators Corp. · filed 2019-06-18(a)(7)

Granting the plaintiff every possible favorable inference ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), at this pleadings stage, the complaint states a claim for unfair competition.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

DeMartino v. Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP · filed 2020-12-02(a)(7)

However, the complaint failed to state a cause of action ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]).

A private nuisance claim alleging that excessive equipment noise interferes with a neighbor’s use and enjoyment of property states a cause of action that survives dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Curry v. Matranga · filed 2021-05-26(a)(7)

Here, the plaintiff stated a cause of action to recover damages for private nuisance by alleging that the defendants' air conditioning and condenser units generated a noise level exceeding that permitted by the Code of the Town of Hempstead ( see Code of the Town of Hempstead §§ 144-3, 144-5), which interfered with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his bedroom, garden, and patio, and diminished his property value ( see Massaro v Jaina Network Sys., Inc. , 106 AD3d at 703; Broxmeyer v United Capital Corp. , 79 AD3d at 781; JP Morgan Chase Bank v Whitmore , 41 AD3d 433, 434; Mandel v Geloso , 206 AD2d 699; but see Adams v Berkowitz , 212 AD2d 557, 558). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a third-party complaint states a cause of action for indemnification or contribution when it alleges that the third-party defendant's act proximately caused the injury for which the defendant may be liable.

Han v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2021-12-28(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Suzanne J. Adams, J.), entered on or about January 4, 2021, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied third-party defendant's (Davis) motion to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously affirmed, without costs. The motion court correctly found that the third-party complaint states a cause of action by alleging that if New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) is found liable to plaintiffs, it will be entitled to indemnification or contribution from Davis because Davis pushed plaintiff's decedent onto the subway tracks where the decedent was hit by a train, and thus Davis's act was a proximate cause of the accident.

A conversion complaint survives a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion when it alleges an identifiable fund, a superior right to possess it, and interference with that right.

Grocery Delivery E-Servs. USA, Inc. v. Flynn · filed 2022-01-27(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Margaret Chan, J.), entered on or about June 3, 2021, which denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously affirmed, with costs. ... The complaint states a cause of action for conversion by alleging that the proceeds paid by the insurance company to Mariner for plaintiff's claim constitutes a specific, identifiable fund, that plaintiff has a superior right of possession to the fund, and that defendant interfered with plaintiff's right of possession ( see Lucker v Bayside Cemetery , 114 AD3d 162, 174 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 24 NY3d 901 [2014]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a constructive eviction claim when the complaint fails to plead adequate facts supporting it.

Valentino U.S.A., Inc. v. 693 Fifth Owner LLC · filed 2022-03-08(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Andrew S. Borrok, J.), entered January 27, 2021, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7), unanimously affirmed, without costs. ... The motion court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claim for constructive eviction on the ground that plaintiff failed to plead adequate facts in support of the claim.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed when the complaint alleges the fiduciary relationship, misconduct, and resulting damages with sufficient particularity.

Board of Mgrs. of Van Wyck Glen Condominium v. Van Wyck at Merritt Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. · filed 2022-12-14(a)(7)

Contrary to the defendants' contention, the second cause of action in the complaint alleges with sufficient particularity (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by Costa and Hack, and (3) damages directly caused by that misconduct ( see CPLR 3016[b]; Mann v Sasson , 186 AD3d 823, 824), and, therefore, states a cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty insofar as asserted against Costa and Hack. ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing [*3]the second cause of action insofar as asserted against Costa and Hack.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of home improvement contract and quasi-contract claims when the complaint does not allege compliance with licensing requirements.

Thomas Lavin Constr., LLC v. Epstein · filed 2024-04-24(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3015(e), a complaint that seeks to recover damages for breach of a home improvement contract or to recover under a quasi-contractual theory for home improvement services is subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) if it does not allege compliance with the licensing requirement ( see Cunningham v Nolte , 188 AD3d 806, 807; Emergency Restoration Servs. Corp. v Corrado , 109 AD3d 576, 577; ENKO Constr. Corp. v Aronshtein , 89 AD3d 676, 677).

Lack of discovery does not excuse conclusory allegations when a claim faces dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Art Capital Bermuda Ltd. v. Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Ltd. · filed 2019-02-07(a)(7)

The fact that the Bank had not had discovery at the time of the motion does not excuse its failure to plead more than conclusory allegations ( see e.g. East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc. , 66 AD3d 122, 128-129 [2d Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a fiduciary duty claim can survive dismissal when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant law firm represented him individually.

Devlin v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP · filed 2019-06-11(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), which, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied. The court dismissed the fiduciary duty claim on the ground that there was no fiduciary relationship between the parties. However, plaintiff alleges that he — as well as Fiore Films LLC — was defendant's client.

On a motion to dismiss a defamation claim, the court considers the statements in the context of the entire publication and asks whether they could reasonably carry a defamatory meaning.

3P-733, LLC v. Davis · filed 2020-10-27(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a defamation claim, the court must decide whether the statements, considered in the context of the entire publication, are 'reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation,' such that the issue is worthy of submission to a jury" ( Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co. , 120 AD3d at 34). At this stage, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a cause of action for defamation and that claim should be reinstated, but only to the extent that it relies upon allegations surrounding the publication of the August 2017 letter to an unrelated third party.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe a complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every possible inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Cohen v. 57 Ann St. Realty Assoc., Inc. · filed 2025-03-11(a)(7)

It is well-settled that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

A CPLR 3211(a) dismissal may be affirmed when the record does not suggest that the court failed to consider the plaintiff's opposition papers.

Anonymous v. Packer · filed 2026-05-20(a)

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the court declined to consider the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Emigrant Funding Corp. v Kensington Realty Group Corp., 178 AD3d 1020, 1022).

On appeal from a CPLR 3211 dismissal, the facts are taken from the complaint’s allegations and documents incorporated by reference.

Glenmede Trust Co., N.A. v. Infinity Q Capital Mgt. LLC · filed 2026-04-16

Because this is an appeal from a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (defendants did not specify the subsection under which they moved), the facts herein are taken from the allegations of the amended complaints and the face of the documents incorporated by reference therein (*see**Edwards v Nicolai*, 153 AD3d 440, 440-441 [1st Dept 2017]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a defendant’s evidentiary submissions warrant dismissal when they conclusively establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Berl v. CNH Operating, LLC · filed 2026-04-15(a)(7)

Submissions by the defendant on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) "will seldom if ever warrant [dismissal] unless [they] establish conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action" (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636; see Lawrence v Graubard Miller, 11 NY3d 588, 595).

Supporting documentary evidence on a motion to dismiss may be submitted through an attorney’s affidavit; an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge is not required.

Trummer Hospitality Holdings LLC v. 287 PAS LLC · filed 2026-02-21

At the outset, Trummer’s argument that the motion must be denied as lacking affidavits by individuals with personal knowledge is without merit. Supporting proof may be considered when placed before the Court via an attorney’s affidavit annexing the documentary evidence relied upon (Olan v Farrell Lines Inc., 64 NY2d 1092 [1985]; Weingarten v Marcus, 118 AD2d 640 [2d Dept 1986]).

When a court considers evidentiary material on a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), it asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not merely whether the complaint states one.

Claude Mayo Constr. Co., Inc. v. Barclay Damon LLP · filed 2025-06-27(a)(7)

In evaluating whether a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) in a case where the court has considered evidentiary material in support of or in opposition to the motion, "the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether [the proponent] has stated one" ( Leon , 84 NY2d at 88 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 3211(c) permits, but does not require, a court to consider affidavits to remedy defects in a complaint.

N47 Assoc. LLC v. Jemsco Realty LLC · filed 2025-05-01(c)

CPLR § 3211(c) does use the discretionary word “may” when stating that a court can consider affidavits to remedy any potential defects in a complaint. Plaintiff has not cited to any authority holding that it is mandatory for a court to consider such affidavits, but the Court will do so here in the interests of full consideration on the merits.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court may consider the defendant’s evidence; if it does, the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, rather than whether the complaint states one.

Ciafone v. Jobs for NY, Inc. · filed 2020-11-18(a)(7)

"A court is, of course, permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181; see CPLR 3211[c]). "If the court considers evidentiary material, the criterion then becomes 'whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] [*2]has stated one'" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d at 1181-1182, quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when exhibits attached to the complaint conclusively disprove a material pleaded fact and no significant dispute remains.

EnergyMark, LLC v. New Wave Energy Corp. · filed 2020-08-20(a)(7)

It is well settled that "[a] motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) may be granted when exhibits attached to the complaint conclusively establish[ ] that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and that no significant dispute exists regarding it" ( McMahan v McMahan , 131 AD3d 593, 594 [2d Dept 2015] [emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Omar v Moore , 171 AD3d 1533, 1533-1534 [4th Dept 2019]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), materials submitted in opposition may remedy a defect in allegations made on information and belief.

Board of Mgrs. of the Walton Condominium v. 264 H2O Borrower, LLC · filed 2020-02-27(a)(7)

Although the complaint does not specify the source of its on-information-and-belief allegations ( see DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C. , 78 AD3d 442, 443 [1st Dept 2010]), plaintiff remedied this defect in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss ( see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co. , 40 NY2d 633, 635-636 [1976]).

A plaintiff may submit an opposition affidavit to cure defects in an inartfully pleaded complaint on a CPLR 3211 motion, and the affidavit must receive its most favorable reading.

Ivory Development, LLC v. Roe · filed 2016-01-21

A plaintiff may submit affidavits in opposition to a CPLR 3211 motion to rectify defects in an inartfully pleaded complaint, and such affidavits must be "given their most favorable intendment" (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), affidavits may supplement a complaint to remedy pleading defects and show that a cause of action is valid.

National Puerto Rican Day Parade, Inc. v. Casa Publications, Inc. · filed 2010-12-21(a)(7)

Under CPLR 3211, affidavits are not to be examined for the purpose of determining whether there is evidentiary support, but rather, are to be examined for the limited purpose of remedying any defects in the pleadings and may be considered as supplementary to the complaint to show that the cause of action is valid (see Finkelstein Newman Ferrara LLP v Manning, 67 AD3d 538 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, reports attached to the complaint may conclusively establish that an alleged material fact is not a fact at all.

Laxer v. Edelman · filed 2010-07-20(a)(7)

Consequently, those reports, which became part of the ... complaint, and were submitted in support of the Sotheby’s defendants’ motion to dismiss, conclusively established that “a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all” and that “no significant dispute exists regarding it” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Sonne v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Suffern, 67 AD3d 192, 200 [2009]; Fishberger v Voss, 51 AD3d 627, 628 [2008]).

Section 3211(c) does not require notice before a court considers nondocumentary evidence to decide facts on a motion to dismiss under section 3211(a)(5).

Suss v. New York Media, Inc. · filed 2010-01-05(c)

We also reject plaintiffs argument that unless the court gives CPLR 3211 (c) notice of its intention to do so, it may not consider nondocumentary evidentiary materials for fact-finding purposes on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) (see Alverio v New York Eye & Ear Infirmary, 123 AD2d 568 [1986]; Lim v Choices, Inc., 60 AD3d 739 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, opposing affidavits may amplify the complaint’s allegations.

Eastern Consolidated Properties, Inc. v. Lucas · filed 2001-07-26(a)(7)

Based on this standard of review, we find that the complaint, coupled with the plaintiff’s opposing affidavits, which can be considered to amplify the pleadings (see, Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635; Magarian & Co. v Timberland Co., 245 AD2d 69), alleges that certain defendants had the authority to act on behalf of all of the defendants in the underlying real estate transaction.

Section 3211 permits a court to consider allegations in an affidavit opposing a motion to dismiss.

LeBeau v. Hulse · filed 2001-02-26(c)

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly considered the allegations in the plaintiff’s affidavit which was submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), (7) and 3016 (b) (see, Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635; CPLR 3211 [c]; see also, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, answering affidavits may cure a missing allegation of compliance with a prior written notice requirement.

Gilmore v. City of Rochester · filed 1995-01-06(c)

Second, in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, answering affidavits may remedy deficiencies in the pleadings (see, CPLR 3211 [c]), and prior notice may be established thereby ... Thus, failure to plead compliance, in and of itself, will not support a motion to dismiss.

On a motion to dismiss that has not been converted to summary judgment, affidavits may be used to remedy defects in a complaint and preserve potentially meritorious claims.

Pietrosanto v. NYNEX Corp. · filed 1993-07-22(c)

As correctly contended by plaintiff, "where a motion to dismiss is not converted to a summary judgment motion, as here, affidavits may be received for the limited purpose of remedying defects in the complaint and, thus, to preserve inartfully pleaded but potentially meritorious claims” (Rotanelli v Madden, supra, at 816).

Section 3211(c) permits the court to consider undisputed facts in affidavits on a motion to dismiss while assuming the complaint’s allegations are true.

Epps v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc. · filed 1964-01-16(c)

For the purposes of this motion the court, as it must, assumes the foregoing facts as alleged in the complaint to be true together with those undisputed facts contained in the affidavits, which are now permissible under the new procedural rules (CPLR 3211, subd. [c]).

Section 3211(c) authorizes the use of affidavits and other documents on a motion to dismiss.

Zablow v. Incorporated Village of Freeport · filed 1964-01-20(c)

The plaintiff’s cross motion to strike the reference in the moving papers to the decision of Mr. Justice Farley is also denied. The use of affidavits and other documents on a motion to dismiss is now authorized (CPLR 3211, subd. [c]).

Section 3211 permits a court deciding a motion challenging a pleading’s sufficiency to give effect to undisputed facts.

Rager v. Lefkowitz · filed 1964-04-21

On a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a pleading we may give effect to undisputed facts. (CPLR 3211.)

Section 3211 permits a court deciding a motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency to consider undisputed facts in affidavits.

Epps v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc. · filed 1964-06-10(e)

... and from undisputed facts contained in the affidavits which are now permissible on such a motion (CPLR 3211, subd. [e]), it appears that the first cause of action seeks to recover from defendant the amount due on a readily identifiable, winning pari-mutuel ticket stolen from plaintiff, which amount was paid by defendant to a third person upon presentation and surrender of the ticket, despite due notice from plaintiff of the theft of the ticket and his claim to the winnings.

Section 3211 permits a court considering a motion to dismiss a defense to grant accelerated judgment dismissing the complaint.

Smith v. Helbraun · filed 1964-06-24

Under the practice prevailing prior to the new statute’s effective date, a motion to dismiss a defense searched the sufficiency of the complaint as well (Rules Civ. Prae., rule 109). We may apply the same practice to the disposition of this appeal (CPLR 10003). In any event, we consider that our power to grant an accelerated judgment is no less broad (CPLR 3211). Since under the allegations presented in the complaint the defendants have an absolute privilege, we dismiss the complaint.

Section 3211(c) permits a court to examine a plaintiff’s affidavit when determining whether a complaint states a cause of action.

McCann v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1964-09-16(c)

The affidavit submitted by the plaintiff which may be examined to determine the sufficiency of a complaint (CPLR 3211, subd. [c]) shows that the defendant had ... made payment to the insured under the terms of the policy until October 15, 1962; that since then plaintiff has continued to pay to the defendant the premiums required under the terms of the policy.

When a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion is joined with a summary judgment motion, the court may consider submitted papers beyond the petition to cure a pleading defect.

Thaler v. Stern · filed 1964-10-16(a)(7)

While former restrictive practice dictated that only the petition was to be considered upon a motion addressed to the legal sufficiency of that pleading, the increased liberality of the CPLR regarding such motions generally (CPLR 3211, subd. [a], par. 7), and the conjoining of a motion for summary judgment, have inclined the court to consider all the papers submitted herein. Having acceded to the parties’ own efforts to broaden the scope of this judicial inquiry, the court finds, in papers dehors the pleadings, sufficient to cure a rather glaring defect in the petition, namely, its failure to supply a source or basis for allegations made merely on information and belief.

Section 3211(a)(1) gives documentary evidence a liberal interpretation and permits consideration of legislative materials whose genuineness is uncontested.

Gauthier v. Gabel · filed 1964-12-03(a)(1)

Under CPLB 3211 (subd. [a], par. 1), in keeping with the spirit of the remedy of summary judgment before answer to avoid a needless trial, a liberal interpretation is given to the term ‘ ‘ documentary evidence ”, and in the absence of any issue raised as to the genuineness thereof, the court accepts the documented legislative considerations submitted by the defendant.

Section 3211(c) contemplates only the usual hearing when the motion is returnable.

State National Bank of Connecticut v. Laura · filed 1965-01-23(c)

Furthermore, OPLR 3211 (subd. [c]) does not contemplate a ‘ ‘ hearing ’ ’ other than the usual hearing had upon the return of the motion.

Section 3211(c) permits a court to consider affidavits on a motion to dismiss as it would on a motion for summary judgment.

City or Mount Vernon v. East Hudson Parkway Authority · filed 1965-02-10(c)

At the outset the court notes that while it is generally true that on a motion to dismiss a complaint because of legal insufficiency on its face, the court must accept the allegations contained therein as true and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, yet, in passing upon such branch of the motion the court has taken into consideration the affidavits submitted by both sides. These affidavits may be considered by the court in the same manner as they could be considered on a motion for summary judgment. In fact, the court may treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment (CPLR 3211, subd. [c]).

CPLR 3211 permits dismissal when uncontroverted documentary evidence establishes a defense, but factual questions requiring trial prevent dismissal.

Dayton v. Amity Estates, Inc. · filed 1965-06-21(a)(1)

Defendant Waisman moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, on the ground, inter alia, that documentary evidence established his defense to the action. The copies of a recorded deed and a lease signed by the adult plaintiff revealed the corporate defendant Amity Estates, Inc., to he the owner and landlord of the subject premises. This evidence was not controverted by plaintiffs. Nor did they advance any theory under which this defendant could be held liable. Accordingly, as to this defendant we are required to dismiss the complaint (Wall v. Lo Verde, 23 A D 2d 572). The evidence submitted on behalf of the corporate defendant does not justify a dismissal of the complaint as to it. Questions of fact are present which may only be determined at trial.

Documentary evidence does not warrant dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(1) when it fails to establish the asserted defense as a matter of law.

Kagen v. Kagen · filed 1965-11-26(a)(1)

The text of the document, however, at best indicates a possible prior oral modification, the terms of which are not fully set forth. In any event, upon all of the evidence presented, the court cannot say as a matter of law that the separation agreement was modified as contended by the defendant or that the defendant has complied with the terms of the separation agreement.

An attorney’s affidavit lacking personal knowledge is insufficient to establish disputed facts on a defendant’s motion under § 3211(a)(7).

Whitree v. State · filed 1965-12-22(a)(7)

Indeed, the moving affidavit of an Assistant Attorney-General who does not have personal knowledge of these facts is legally insufficient when summary judgment is sought by a defendant.

Section 3211(e) permits a court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to consider evidence beyond the complaint, including the parties’ answers.

Hamilton Printing Co. v. Ernest Payne Corp. · filed 1966-10-21(e)

CPLR 3211 (subd. [e]) makes available on motions such as the instant one all manner of extrinsic proof and it, therefore, follows that the answers here involved could properly be considered (...).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit a court to resolve factual issues about agency on a motion to dismiss.

Scarvalone v. Kowalewicz · filed 1966-10-27(a)(7)

Thus issues of agency are raised which cannot be resolved on the instant motion.

Section 3211(c) permits summary judgment on a motion to dismiss, but it must be denied when sufficient triable issues exist.

Shapolsky v. Shapolsky · filed 1966-12-20(c)

That branch of defendants’ motion for summary judgment under CPLR 3211 (subd. [c]) is denied. There are sufficient triable issues.

Documentary evidence does not warrant dismissal under § 3211(a) unless it establishes a complete defense.

Sheehan v. Amity Estates, Inc. · filed 1966-12-22(a)

The documentary evidence presented does not constitute a complete defense.