N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally cognizable cause of action.

Liptis Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Liptis for Pharms. & Med. Prods., SAE · filed 2024-06-26(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly directed dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). In reviewing a motion to dismiss a counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "a court must accept as true the facts as alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Burton v Porcelain , 223 AD3d 775, 776 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wand, Powers & Goody, LLP v Yuliano , 144 AD3d 1017, 1018).

Section 3211 allows dismissal based on conclusive documentary evidence or failure to state a cognizable cause of action.

Rondinone v. McClintock · filed 2024-06-26(a)(1) and (a)(7)

Under CPLR 321 l(a)(7), the applicable standard "is whether, within the four comers of the complaint, any cognizable cause of action has been stated" (Scott v Bell Atl. Corp., 282 AD2d 180, 183 [1st Dept 2001], ajfd as mod sub nom. Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 98 NY2d 314 [2002]). ... Under CPLR 3211 (a)(l ), dismissal is granted only if documentary evidence conclusively shows a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law (see Leon, 84 NY2d at 88). ... Here, defendant has not met his burden for dismissal under either CPLR 321 l(a)(l) or CPLR 3211 (a)(7).

CPLR § 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Board of Mgrs. of the Philip House Condominium v. 141 E. 88th St., LLC · filed 2024-06-27(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss based upon CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the alleged facts as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the facts alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Gordon v. Vladislav Tsirkin CPA & Co., LLC · filed 2024-07-03(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts therein must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference" ( Angeli v Barket , 211 AD3d 896, 897; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept the complaint's facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide only whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Burns v. C.R.B. Holdings, Inc. · filed 2024-07-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, we must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the] plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co. , 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept the complaint's facts as true and decide whether they fit any legal theory.

17 Lexington Ave., LLC v. Alison Six Star, LLC · filed 2024-07-10(a)(7)

"[O]n a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Rochdale Vil., Inc. v. Hallerdin-Grant · filed 2024-07-10(a)(7)

Respondent now moves to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action. ... For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted and this proceeding is dismissed without prejudice.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and determine whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Nemeroff v. Hamptons Little Neck, LLC · filed 2024-06-20(a)(7)

"In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Fough v August Aichhorn Ctr. for Adolescent Residential Care, Inc. , 139 AD3d 665, 666).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action and sets the standards for evaluating that motion.

Barbaro v. Eger Health Care & Rehabilitation Ctr. · filed 2024-07-11(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) for a failure to state a cause of action, a complaint is given a liberal construction, the facts alleged therein are presumed to be true and the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with the complaint construed liberally and its allegations accepted as true.

Ben-Dor v. Alchemy Consultant LLC · filed 2024-07-11(a)(7)

Crediting plaintiff's factual allegations, construing the complaint liberally, and according it the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Doe v Bloomberg, L.P. , 36 NY3d 450, 454 [2021]; 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]), we find that the complaint adequately pleaded that Chase assumed a duty to abide by the anti-fraud procedures that it publicized.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Veras v. City of New York · filed 2024-07-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR §3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994][citations omitted]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a breach of contract claim survives dismissal when it sufficiently alleges the elements of the claim.

Tzu Yen Cheung v. Dolar Shop Rest. Group, LLC · filed 2024-07-24(a)(7)

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the first cause of action sufficiently alleges the elements of a breach of contract cause of action necessary to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see JM UC Group, LLC v Precious Care Mgt., LLC , 221 AD3d at 879).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Town of Riverhead v. Kar-McVeigh, LLC · filed 2024-07-24(a)(7)

In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint, the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable reasonable inference.

Brown v. Riverside Church in the City of N.Y. · filed 2024-07-25(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, we give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true, and accord the plaintiff every favorable reasonable inference ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Moore Charitable Found. v PJT Partners, Inc ., 40 NY3d 150, 153 [2023]; Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc ., 29 NY3d 137, 141-142 [2017]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true and give the non-moving party every possible inference when deciding whether a pleading states a cause of action.

Doe v. Doe · filed 2024-07-25(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the Court must accept as true the facts alleged in the pleading and grant the non-moving party every possible inference (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires liberal construction of the complaint, presumes the alleged facts true, and affords the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether a cause of action is stated.

Gillis v. Carmel Richmond Nursing Home Inc. · filed 2024-07-29(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), for a failure to state a cause of action, a complaint is liberally construed, the facts alleged therein are presumed to be true and the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court reads the complaint liberally and accepts its allegations as true.

Elio v. Putnam County N.Y. · filed 2024-07-30(a)(7)

Here, reading the allegations in the complaint liberally and accepting them as true, the Court finds that the alleged conduct of the County defendant does not rise to the level of being "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community" ( Marmelstein v Kehillat New Hempstead: Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue , 11 NY3d 15, 22 [2008] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted]; see Drimer v Zionist Org. of Am. , 194 AD3d 641, 642 [1st Dept 2021]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Waluyn v. Access-A-Ride · filed 2024-07-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the court must accept all facts alleged in the pleading to be true, accord [the] plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Benjamin v Yeroushalmi , 212 AD3d 758, 760 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true and favorable inferences, but permits dismissal when the allegations do not support an element or an enforceable right of recovery.

Soltanian v. LACYNDA, LLC · filed 2024-07-31(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss . . . pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Ikezi v 82nd St. Academics , 221 AD3d 986, 987 [internal quotation marks omitted]). ... Here, the Supreme Court properly directed dismissal of the first cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and calls for liberal construction of the pleading.

Urena v. State of New York · filed 2024-07-31(a)(7)

It is well settled that when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 on the ground that the claim fails to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept the complaint's allegations as true and determine whether they fit within any cognizable legal theory.

Watkins v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2024-08-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged therein to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see id. § 3026; Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp. , 96 NY2d 409, 414; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept complaint facts as true, give plaintiffs favorable inferences, and decide whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

McCarthy v. County of Nassau, N.Y. · filed 2024-08-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Benjamin v Yeroushalmi , 212 AD3d 758, 760 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally cognizable cause of action, with allegations liberally construed and favorable inferences drawn for the nonmoving party.

Matter of Plumbers Local Union No. 1 v. New York City Dept. of Bldgs. · filed 2024-08-12(a)(7)

When assessing the adequacy of a pleading in the context of a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court's role is "to determine whether fthe] pleadings state a cause of action" (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co,, 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept the complaint's alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

AA Med., P.C. v. Keane · filed 2024-08-12(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in [a] complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141 [2017]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action.

Dawkins v. Bailey House, Inc. · filed 2024-08-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR §3211 (a)(7), courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and give the pleadings the benefit of every possible favorable inference.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts complaint facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decides whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Spina v. Browning Hotel Props., LLC · filed 2024-08-14(a)(7)

When considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, "a court must 'accept the facts [*2]as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Davila v Orange County , 215 AD3d 632, 633, quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, the court accepts pleaded facts as true and gives the claimant favorable inferences, but may dismiss a slander of title claim that does not adequately allege special damages caused by the challenged conduct.

Irizarry v. Rosselli · filed 2024-07-31(a)

Here, accepting the facts alleged in the third-party complaint as true and according Rosselli the benefit of every possible favorable inference, Rosselli failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for slander of title, as she failed to adequately allege that special damages resulted from the Passalacquas' allegedly tortious conduct ( see White Knight of Flatbush, LLC v Deacons of the Dutch Congregation of Flatbush , 159 AD3d 939, 941; Waste Distillation Tech. v Blasland & Bouck Engrs. , 136 AD2d 633, 634). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the Passalacquas' motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss Rosselli's slander of title cause of action insofar as asserted against them.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts alleged facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a recognizable cause of action.

Conti v. Marino · filed 2024-08-12(a)(7)

Courts will only ... grant a motion ... to dismiss under ... CPLR 3211(a)(7) ... "taking all facts alleged ... as true and according them every ... possible inference ... favorable to the plaintiff, ... the complaint ... states ... in some recognizable form ... any cause of action ... known to our ... law" ... omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the claimant every possible favorable inference.

A.J. v. State of New York · filed 2024-08-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a claim, we afford the pleading a liberal construction and accept the facts alleged as true, according the claimant the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Garofolo v State of New York , 80 AD3d 858, 860 [3d Dept 2011]; Trump on the Ocean, LLC v State of New York , 79 AD3d 1325, 1326 [3d Dept 2010], lv dismissed & denied 17 NY3d 770 [2011]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to read pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and determine whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Deeton v. Ruckus 85 Corp. · filed 2024-08-21(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the pleading must (1) be liberally interpreted, (2) accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, (3) give plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and (4) determine whether the facts alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), pleadings receive a liberal construction and the plaintiff receives every possible favorable inference.

Bedin v. Verni · filed 2024-08-21(a)(7)

In any event, in considering a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s pleadings should be given a “liberal construction” and the court should afford the plaintiff “the benefit of every possible favorable inference” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]). Accordingly, this “theft of property” or “conversion” claim should not be dismissed at this juncture.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion in a special proceeding, the court treats the petition’s allegations as true and gives the petitioner every favorable inference, but does not defer to bare legal conclusions.

People v. Abraham Operations Assoc. LLC · filed 2024-08-23(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 404 (a) and 3211 (a) (7), only the petition is considered, all of its allegations are deemed true, and the petitioner is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference" (Cardinale, 204 AD3d at 997-998, citing Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 NY3d 137, 142 [2017]). However, bare legal conclusions are not entitled to such deference.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the movant must show that the complaint, liberally construed in the plaintiff’s favor, states no legally cognizable cause of action.

Doe v. Garfinkel · filed 2024-08-23(a)(7)

It is the movant who has the burden to demonstrate that, based upon the four corners of the complaint liberally construed in favor of the Plaintiff, the pleading states no legally cognizable cause of action (see Leon, 84 NY2d at 87-88; Guggenheimer, 43 NY2d at 275).

A motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss an aiding and abetting fraud claim should be denied when the complaint sufficiently alleges that claim.

Schiano v. Harsanyi · filed 2024-08-28(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of Castro's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the second cause of action in the third-party complaint, alleging aiding and abetting fraud against Castro.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Bistrian v. Gibson · filed 2024-08-28(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable theory" ( Watts v City of New York , 186 AD3d 1577, 1578; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the pharmacy's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Tsung Tsin Assn., Inc. v. Ango Mgt. Inc · filed 2024-08-28(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Feldman v. Nassau Life Ins. Co ., 224 AD3d 801, 803 [2nd Dept. 2024]). ... In this case, Petitioner's evidence of a similar sale of a single marijuana cigarette to a 19-year old, in addition to allegations of repeated verbal complaints from community members, is sufficient to defeat Undertenant's motion to dismiss.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives plaintiffs favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Seitz v. Marcum LLP · filed 2024-08-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accords plaintiffs the benefit of any possible favorable inference, and determines only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Cianflone v. Carmel Richmond Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 2024-08-30(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 [a] [7] to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( see Green 333 Corp. v RNL Life Science, Inc. , 186 AD3d 1334 [2d Dept 2020] citing Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman , 31 NY3d 30 [2018]; Korsinsky v Rose , 120 AD3d 1307 [2d Dept 2014]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, draw favorable inferences, and ask whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Doe v. Doe · filed 2024-09-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR§ 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, "the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Hughes v. Vento, 226 AD3d 753, 754 (2d Dept 2024)).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the nonmovant favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

BT Supplies W., Inc. v. Brookline, LLC · filed 2024-09-04(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (7), the court "must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord [the non ·movant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'' ( Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]; accord Pavich v Pavich, 189 AD3d 548, 549 [1st Dept 2020]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, the pleading receives a liberal construction.

Madry v. Ice Rink Events of N.Y. LLC · filed 2024-08-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction."

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Imperium Blue Acquisition Partners, LLC v. Marathon Asset Mgt., L.P. · filed 2024-08-28(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true and provide the plaintiffs with "the benefit of every possible favorable inference" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the complaint’s factual allegations are true.

Ria R Squared, Inc. v. DW Partners, LP · filed 2024-09-05(a)(7)

For the purposes of this appeal from a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), all facts stated are allegations taken from the first amended complaint, which we assume to be true at this stage of the proceedings ( see Greystone Funding Corp. v Kutner , 121 AD3d 581, 583 [1st Dept 2014]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss to accept pleaded facts as true, draw favorable inferences for the nonmoving party, and determine whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hunold v. City of New York · filed 2024-09-10(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), a court must accept the factual allegations of the pleadings as true, affording the non-moving party the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determining "only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( see D.K. Prop., Inc. v Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh , 168 AD3d 505 [1st Dept 2019]; Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP v Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. , 10 AD3d 267 [1st Dept 2004]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Gaviola v. City of New York · filed 2024-09-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR §3211 (a)(7), courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference.

Section 3211(a) permits dismissal of retaliation claims when the petition or complaint fails to sufficiently allege potentially actionable retaliatory conduct.

Matter of Local 621, S.E.I.U. v. New York City Fire Dept. · filed 2024-09-11(a)

Moreover, the court properly granted those branches of the respondents/defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of NYSHRL and NYCHRL, as the petition/complaint failed to sufficiently allege potentially actionable retaliatory conduct ( see Matter of Local 621, S.E.I.U. v New York City Fire Dept. , ___ AD3d ___ [Appellate Division Docket No. 2021-07965]; Kwong v City of New York , 204 AD3d 442, 443; see also Brightman v Prison Health Serv., Inc. , 108 AD3d 739, 742; McKenzie v Meridian Capital Group, LLC , 35 AD3d 676, 677; cf. Kassapian v City of New York , 155 AD3d 851, 853).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleaded causes of action fail because they are time-barred, moot, or brought by a plaintiff without standing.

Finkel v. Dwyer · filed 2024-09-17(a)(7)

Ultimately, the plaintiff’s causes of action fail on the grounds of statute of limitations (despite amending the complaint to include the word ‘fraud’), mootness, and lack of standing. As such, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s pleading has failed to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court gives the plaintiff favorable inferences and denies dismissal when the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Pascall v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2024-09-18(a)(7)

Here, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the MTA defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior insofar as asserted against them. Affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the plaintiff alleged facts that fit within the cognizable legal theory of respondeat superior ( see R.H. Sanbar Projects v Gruzen Partnership , 148 AD2d 316, 318).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Matter of Francis v. Bourke Francis & Padraig Francis Irrevocable Trust · filed 2024-09-18(a)(7)

"'In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Bono v Stim & Warmuth, P.C. , 215 AD3d 911, 911, quoting Langley v Melville Fire Dist. , 213 AD3d 748, 750).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court must accept the complaint’s alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Schwartz v. Fallah · filed 2024-09-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Cantor v Villucci , 212 AD3d 765, 766; Gorbatov v Tsirelman , 155 AD3d 836, 837).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a wrongful death claim commenced before an administrator is appointed because the cause of action did not yet exist.

Barreto v. Richmond Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Specialty Healthcare · filed 2024-09-20(a)(7)

Therefore, the fact that Plaintiff was issued letters of administration after she commenced the instant action does not cure the defect that a cause of action did not exist at the time this action was commenced ( see Caracciolo v Solar , 16 Misc 3d 1127[A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]). ... Plaintiff's wrongful death cause of action is hereby dismissed with prejudice pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Plymouth Capital, LLC v. Montage Fin. Group, Inc. · filed 2024-09-25(a)(7)

Further, when reviewing a "motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Fox Paine & Co., LLC v Houston Cas. Co. , 153 AD3d 673, 676; see Himmelstein, McConnel, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. , 37 NY3d 169, 175).

CPLR 3211 requires a court to construe the pleading liberally on a motion to dismiss.

United Legwear Co., LLC v. All in the Cards, Inc. · filed 2024-09-06

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, draws reasonable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wu v. Wunderkind Corp. · filed 2024-09-26(a)(7)

In addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction and the court should accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord the pleading the benefit of every reasonable inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (See Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

P.F. v. Brown · filed 2024-09-27(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, "the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. The plaintiff's ultimate ability to prove those allegations is not relevant" ( Arnone v Burke , 211 AD3d 998 [2d [*3]Dept 2022]; and see , Long Island Thoracic Surgery, P.C. v Building Serv. 32BJ Health Fund , 215 AD3d 942 [2d Dept 2023]; Waterbury v New York City Ballet , 205 AD3d 154 [2d Dept 2022]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts liberally construe the complaint, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Mateo v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-01(a)(7)

Likewise, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR §3211 (a)(7), courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

J. B. v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. , 222 AD3d 706, 707 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a fraud complaint that fails to adequately allege justifiable reliance.

Gordon v. Connie Profaci Realty, LLC · filed 2024-10-02(a)(7)

Since the plaintiff failed to adequately allege justifiable reliance, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint ( see Benjamin v Yeroushalmi , 178 AD3d at 654).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Parham v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR §3211 (a) (7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994][citations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the petition receives a liberal construction and the petitioner receives every favorable inference.

Ash Ave LLC v. Wilder · filed 2024-10-07(a)(7)

On a CPLR § 3211(a)(7) motion for failure to state a cause of action, the petition "is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the [petitioner] is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory." Watts v. City of New York , 186 AD3d 1577, 1578 [2d Dept 2020].

When evidence is considered on a § 3211(a)(7) motion, the question is whether the petitioner has a cause of action, not merely whether the petition states one.

Ash Ave LLC v. Wilder · filed 2024-10-07(a)(7)

When evidentiary material is offered and considered on such a motion, "the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one[.]" Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]. In considering respondent's assertion that he is a tenant, rather than a licensee, the court finds that respondent has not established upon the instant motion that he is a tenant such that petitioner lacks a cause of action based on him being a licensee.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts support a cognizable legal theory.

Sherpa v. VW Credit Leasing Ltd. · filed 2024-10-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

DMKA LLC v. Guerrero · filed 2024-10-07(a)(7)

CPLR 3211 (a) ... (7), ... court ... accept ... facts as alleged ... as true, ... favorable ... inference, ... determine ... only whether ... the facts ... alleged fit within any ... cognizable legal theory ... 2010]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe a pleading liberally when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Simmons v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a)(7), for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of an age discrimination claim when the petition fails to plead facts supporting the claim.

Coles v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-08(a)(7)

Dismissal pursuant to CPLR 321 l(a)(7) is proper in age discrimination cases where petitioner has failed to successfully plead a cause of action (see e.g. Murphy v Department of Educ. of the City of NY., 155 AD3d 637, 638 [2d Dept 2017] [affirming motion to dismiss age discrimination action where plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts for cause of action]). ... Applying this standard, Coles' allegation that he was discriminated against because of his age does not survive Respondent's motion to dismiss.

Under CPLR 3211(a), conclusory discrimination allegations unsupported by sufficient facts fail to state a cause of action.

Shahid v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-09(a)

The plaintiff's conclusory assertions that the City discriminated against him based upon race and/or national origin were unsupported by sufficient factual allegations to state a cause of action ( see Kamen v Berkeley Coop. Towers Section II Corp. , 98 AD3d 1086, 1087; Goldin v Engineers Country Club , 54 AD3d 658). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the City's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, the court reads the complaint liberally and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Sakandar v. American Tr. Ins. Co. · filed 2024-10-02(a)

In reading the third cause of action, alleging bad faith, liberally and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action alleging bad faith, as "there is no separate cause of action in tort for an insurer's bad faith failure to perform its obligations" under an insurance contract ( Zawahir v Berkshire Life Ins. Co. , 22 AD3d 841, 842 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Continental Cas. Co. v Nationwide Indem. Co. , 16 AD3d 353, 355).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Delaney v. RELX, Inc. · filed 2024-10-10(a)(7)

When reviewing a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]). ... Here, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the defendants have failed to establish that the statements are not “of and concerning” plaintiff.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court does not assess the plausibility of the complaint’s factual allegations.

Batista v. PhotonLight.com, Inc. · filed 2024-10-15(a)(7)

First, the defendant's request for this court to effectively engage in a plausibility analysis to analyze the plaintiff's factual allegations, this is not the function of the court when addressing a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; cf. Fed Rules Civ Pro rule 12 [b] [6]; Bell Atl. Corp. v Twombly , 550 US 544, 554-557 [2007]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Spira v. National Council of Young Israel · filed 2024-10-16(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Brophy v Big Bros. Big Sisters of Am., Inc. , 224 AD3d 866, 868).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kings Harbor Multicare Ctr. v. Townes · filed 2024-10-16(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true and give favorable inferences, but permits dismissal when the pleading fails to state a cognizable claim.

Children's Aid Socy. v. Integrated Aquatics Engg., Inc. · filed 2024-10-21(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss based upon CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the alleged facts as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the facts alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory.

A motion to dismiss under section 3211(a)(7) may be denied when factual questions prevent the court from deciding whether a municipality acted in a governmental or proprietary capacity.

Earl v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-22(a)(7)

Thus, while the Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to establish a special duty, the City's argument regarding its governmental function cannot be resolved as a matter of law, and the motion to dismiss under CPLR §321 l(a)(7) is denied.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal is warranted when the pleaded facts do not support an element of a claim or an enforceable right to recovery.

Delanerolle v. St Catherine of Sienna Med. Ctr. · filed 2024-10-23(a)(7)

Further, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is warranted when "the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" ( Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 142).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Total Asset Recovery Servs. LLC v. Metlife, Inc. · filed 2024-10-23(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory." (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [citation omitted].)

CPLR 3211(a)(1) permits dismissal when documentary evidence conclusively refutes the allegations, while CPLR 3211(a)(7) asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gee v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. · filed 2024-10-29(a)(1), (a)(7)

These assertions present factual issues not properly determined on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211. (see Ryan v Kellogg Partners Inst. Servs., 19 NY3d 1 [2012]; Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. , 115 AD3d 128, 134 [1st Dept 2014] (noting that "the documentary evidence simply raises 'disputed issues of fact,' which is not enough for a dismissal under CPLR 3211[a][7]"). Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim pursuant to CPLR sections 3211(a)(1) and (7) is denied.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cause of action.

Kessler v. Yeshiva of Cent. Queens · filed 2024-10-30(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Davila v Orange County , 215 AD3d 632, 633).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff favorable inferences, and decide only whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Aptos, LLC v. Forman Mills Inc. · filed 2024-10-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 321l(a)(7), the court "must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, LP. v Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action; a counterclaim pleaded with sufficient detail survives the motion.

Ingram Yuzek Gainen Carroll & Bertolotti, LLP v. McCullar · filed 2024-10-31(a)(7)

The court correctly denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). Defendant pleaded with sufficient detail his counterclaim that plaintiff committed legal malpractice by, among other things, failing to respond to a cease-and-desist letter, failing to move to dismiss the guardianship petition, and failing to negotiate a more favorable settlement ( see IMO Indus. v Anderson Kill & Olick , 267 AD2d 10, 11 [1st Dept 1999]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Fouad v. Milton Hershey Sch. & Sch. Trust · filed 2024-10-31(a)(7)

To the extent there was a proper jurisdictional basis for the assertion of a claim against New York-based defendant David Saltzman, or for any of the other claims asserted in the original complaint or in the proposed amended complaint, we further find that other causes of action are all subject to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleaded facts do not support an element of a claim or an enforceable right of recovery.

People v. PepsiCo, Inc. · filed 2024-10-31(a)(7)

Dismissal of the complaint is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Eloquence Corp. v. Elba Jewelry Servs., LLC · filed 2024-10-31(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss based upon CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the Court must accept the alleged facts as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the facts alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to accept the plaintiff's allegations as true, give favorable inferences, and decide whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Caracappa v. Westhampton Beach Sch. Dist. · filed 2024-11-06(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true, afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Clarson v City of Long Beach , 132 AD3d 799, 800; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY 2d 83, 87).

Subsection 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept complaint allegations as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and determine whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

USRC Forest Hills, LLC v. 68-60 Austin St. Realty Corp. · filed 2024-11-13(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( New Hackensack Realty, LLC v Lawrence Dev. Realty, LLC , 226 AD3d 799, 800-801).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true and give the claimant every favorable inference when deciding whether the pleading states a cause of action.

Gruessner v. State of New York · filed 2024-11-13(a)(7)

Here, "accept[ing] the facts as alleged in the complaint as true" and "accord[ing] [the claimant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87), as we must on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the claimant stated cognizable claims pursuant to Labor Law §§ 740 and 741.

Section 3211 does not require dismissal of a breach of contract claim solely because the complaint alleges no actual damages; nominal damages may be available.

Roytman v. Gluzman · filed 2024-10-29

However, the absence of actual damages is hot a basis upon which to dismiss the breach of contract cause of action. Therefore, the motion seeking to dismiss the first cause of action is denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Pollack v. Kling · filed 2024-11-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Tsamasiros v. Jones · filed 2024-11-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must [*2]liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Sternberg v Wiederman , 225 AD3d 820, 821).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint's allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kushner v. Naso · filed 2024-11-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), "[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Jason v Krey , 60 AD3d 735, 736).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts pleaded facts as true and determines whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

McKinley v. Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist. · filed 2024-11-20(a)(7)

The court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint’s allegations, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, fit a cognizable legal theory.

Springfield Group Inc v. Olympic Pita of Coney Is. Corp · filed 2024-11-24(a)(7)

Since "Olympic Pita" is printed on every invoice at issue, defendant Olympic Pita of Coney Island Corp failed to demonstrate its entitlement to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) — that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, accept allegations as true, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

OCFBrook Holdings, LLC v. TKS Brooklyn Ctr. Holding, LLC · filed 2024-11-25(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), "pleadings are to be afforded a liberal construction, allegations are taken as true, the plaintiff is afforded every possible inference, and a determination is made only as to whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory."

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable cause of action.

SWKI 1 Doe v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Socy. of Pa. · filed 2024-11-27(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the sole criterion is whether from the complaint's 'four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law'" ( Gale v Animal Med. Ctr. , 108 AD3d 497, 499 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Kowalski v. Gold Benes, LLP · filed 2024-11-27(a)(7)

Here, the Supreme Court erred in granting dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint states a cause of action for legal malpractice ( see Ofman v Tenenbaum Berger & Shivers, LLP , 217 AD3d 960, 962).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

D'Adamo v. Cohen · filed 2024-11-27(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Langley v Melville Fire Dist. , 213 AD3d 748, 750; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court reads a pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they state a cognizable claim.

Bryan v. Slothower · filed 2024-12-03(a)(7)

To dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7), the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, "accept the facts as alleged in the [pleading] as true, accord [the claimant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87—88 [1994]; CPLR 3211(a)(7)).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the question is whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

IMS Engineers-Architects, P.C. v. State · filed 2008-05-29(a)(7)

Where, as here, the motion is premised upon claimant’s failure to state a claim (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), ... the dispositive inquiry is whether it has a cause of action and not whether one has been stated, i.e., “whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; accord Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d at 827).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be liberally construed, its allegations assumed true, and the pleader given every favorable inference.

Levine v. Long Island Lighting Co. · filed 1973-11-30(a)(7)

Since each of the defendants has moved, pursuant to paragraph 7 of subdivision (a) of CPLR 3211 for a judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be liberally construed and the court must assume the truth of the allegations and give the pleader the benefit of every favorable inference (Kober v. Kober, 16 N Y 2d 191; ... Lavigne v. Allen, 36 A D 2d 981; Rainbow Shop Patchogue Corp. v. Roosevelt Nassau Operating Corp., 34 A D 2d 667).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint receives liberal construction, but vague and conclusory allegations and bare legal conclusions do not suffice.

MCFADDEN, REGINALD v. SCHNEIDERMAN, ESQ., ERIC T. · filed 2016-03-18(a)(7)

“Although the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 . . . , the allegations in a complaint cannot be vague and conclusory . . . , and ‘[b]are legal conclusions’ will not suffice” (Rios v Tiny Giants Daycare, Inc., 135 AD3d 845, ___; see Williams v Maddi, 306 AD2d 852, 852-853, lv denied 100 NY2d 516, cert denied 541 US 960).

On a motion to dismiss under section 3211(a)(7), factual allegations receive favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by the record do not.

Cruciata v. O'Donnell & McLaughlin, Esqs. · filed 2017-04-26(a)(7)

Although the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, “bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration” (Everett v Eastchester Police Dept., 127 AD3d 1131, 1132 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts factual allegations as true and asks whether the pleading states a cause of action.

Cartagena v. City of New York · filed 2024-02-13(a)(7)

The standard of review to be used in determining whether a ... motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 3211 should be granted is as follows: "Accepting the allegations as true, [the] sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action" (Polonetsky v. Better Homes Depot Inc., 97 NY2d 46, 54 [2001]; Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., IO NY3d 70, 79 [2008]; see also CPLR § 3026 ["(p )leadings shall be liberally construed"]).

A motion arguing that an Article 78 petition fails to state a cause of action against the named respondents belongs under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Matter of Dzaferovic v. New York City Dept. of Fin. · filed 2024-06-26(a)(7)

Since the respondents, in effect, argue that the petition fails to state a cause of action against them ... they should have moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action; disputed contractual rights need not be resolved at the pleading stage.

AlphaSense, Inc. v. Financial Tech. Partners LP · filed 2024-12-06(a)(7)

Furthermore, regardless of the parties' pre-contractual statements, the Court cannot resolve the parties' legal rights as relates to the Key Man Provision and whether AlphaSense's alleged termination of the Agreement is valid and enforceable at this stage in the litigation. Accordingly, the Court determines that the Complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action for declaratory judgment.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true.

Horvath v. Horvath · filed 1991-11-18(a)(7)

Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint, as we must for the purposes of a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 ... (a) (7) (see, Grand Realty Co. v City of White Plains, 125 AD2d 639), we conclude that the court erred in denying that branch of the defendant husband’s motion which was to dismiss the plaintiff wife’s first cause of action, alleging cruel and inhuman treatment.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a conclusory allegation of intent unsupported by facts does not state an unlawful imprisonment claim.

Shah v. Remedy Place Flatiron LLC · filed 2024-12-12(a)(7)

On a motion brought under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff [] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). ... Defendant thus demonstrates that plaintiffs failed to state a claim of unlawful imprisonment against it as they have insufficiently alleged that the unlawful confinement was intentional, rather than accidental.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court asks whether the pleading states a cause of action without requiring evidentiary support.

Garcia v. Best Professional Home Care Agency Inc. · filed 2024-12-17(a)(7)

"[T]he issue on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is limited to ascertaining whether the pleading states any cause of action, and not whether there is evidentiary support for the complaint" ... Contrary to Defendants' contention, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a cause of action for fraud.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ackerson v. Restani Constr. Corp. · filed 2024-12-18(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Antoine v Kalandrishvili , 150 AD3d 941, 941; see Eccles v Shamrock Capital Advisors, LLC , 42 NY3d 321, 342).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations state a cognizable cause of action.

Ostrander v. Mullen · filed 2024-12-20(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true and according plaintiffs the benefit of every possible inference, as we must ( see Nowlin v Schiano , 170 AD3d 1635, 1635 [4th Dept 2019]), we conclude that plaintiffs' factual allegations with respect to the Judiciary Law § 487 cause of action are sufficient to survive Moore's motion to dismiss, and we therefore modify the order accordingly.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Cicciu v. 411 E. 57th Corp. · filed 2024-12-23(a)(7)

It is well-settled that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cell Tower Lease Acquisition LLC v. Oceanview Manor Acquisition I, LLC · filed 2024-12-23(a)(7)

“In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Fox Paine & Co., LLC v Houston Cas. Co., 153 AD3d 673, 676 [2d Dept 2017]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Pressley v. City of New York · filed 2024-12-24(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Langley v Melville Fire Dist. , 213 AD3d 748, 750).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts support a cognizable claim.

Carey v. Carmel Richmond Nursing Home, Inc · filed 2024-12-30(a)(7)

In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [1] and CPLR 3211 [a] [7] , the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory, in doing so the complaint sets forth the requisite elements that would permit the trier of fact to determine whether the Defendants' conduct rose to the levels to constitute gross negligence, thus exempting the Defendants from the immunity under EDTPA .

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Acrisure, LLC v. Woodruff-Sawyer & Co. · filed 2024-12-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), “pleadings are to be afforded a liberal construction, allegations are taken as true, the plaintiff is afforded every possible inference, and a determination is made only as to whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.”

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true and resolves reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor.

Residence on Madison Condominium v. W.T. Gallagher & Associates, Inc. · filed 2000-04-04

Taking the allegations of the complaint as true and resolving all inferences reasonably flowing from those allegations in the pleader’s favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 ... we conclude, as did the ... motion court, that plaintiffs second and third causes of action for fraudulent concealment and fraudulent misrepresentation sufficiently state the essential elements of the claims ... and adequately apprise defendants of “the circumstances constituting the wrong,” as required by CPLR 3016 (b) ... 231 AD2d 314, 320).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint may be dismissed if it states no cognizable cause of action even after all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor.

Davis v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2024-12-31(a)(7)

The court correctly granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. Even drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiff ( see Held v Kaufman , 91 NY2d 425, 432 [1998]), we do not find any cognizable cause of action in the complaint.

Under § 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, with the pleaded facts construed favorably to the plaintiff.

Gao v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. · filed 2025-01-02(a)(7)

The criterion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the pleading alleges a cognizable legal theory.

Nicolaides v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc · filed 2025-01-06(a)(7)

In considering a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the court is to determine whether the pleading alleges a "cognizable legal theory" ( Sokoloff v Harriman Estate Dev. Corp. , 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not warrant dismissal of a complaint or cross-claims that state a cause of action.

Smith v. Kixby Hotel · filed 2025-01-07(a)(7)

Finally, the court properly declined to dismiss the complaint and all cross-claims against Kixby pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) because a cause of action was stated.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations of a breach of agreed work or obligations can suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Gibraltar Contr., Inc. v. Tully Constr. Co. Inc. · filed 2025-01-07(a)(7)

To the extent defendant also moves to dismiss plaintiff's four causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the allegations in each cause of action sufficiently allege breach of an agreement to perform specific work and/or to fulfill specified agreed-upon obligations.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable claim.

Reboh v. 173-74 Owners Corp. · filed 2025-01-07(a)(7)

But because this is a motion to dismiss, the relevant analysis is whether “factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law.” Guggenheimer, at 275.

When a court considers evidence beyond the complaint on a motion to dismiss, dismissal requires showing that a material alleged fact is not a fact at all and that no significant dispute exists about it.

Irish v. Isabella Geriatric Ctr., Inc. · filed 2025-01-07(a)(7)

Where, however, the court considers evidentiary material beyond the complaint, as it does here, the criterion becomes “whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d at 275), but dismissal will not eventuate unless it is “shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all” and that “no significant dispute exists regarding it” (id.).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Green v. Overwatch Servs. LLC · filed 2025-01-07(a)(7)

Therefore, taking Green's allegations as true, as the Court must on a motion pursuant to CPLR 321 l(a)(7), and considering Green's complaint under the liberal pleading standards, the Court finds that Green adequately pleaded a cause of action for violation of 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 142, Section 3.5(c) as Overwatch did not pay for, nor reimburse Green for the washing and upkeep of her work uniform - provided by Overwatch - that she (and the putative class) were required to wear.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Global Merchant Cash Inc. v. Trapp Constr. & Remodeling, LLC · filed 2025-01-07(a)(7)

Pursuan t to CPLR 3211 (aJ(7), the courttnu staccept the facts alleged in the complain t as true, afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determin e only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to allege facts supporting material elements of the claims against a defendant.

Neneb Pte. Ltd. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2025-01-09(a)(7)

As such, dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) is warranted, with respect to HSBC Bank, because the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of material elements of each of its claims as to this defendant.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to construe the complaint liberally, presume its alleged facts true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determine whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

McQueen v. City of New York · filed 2025-01-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), "the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Cantor v Villucci , 212 AD3d 765, 766 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; B&B Maintenance Servs., Inc. v Town of Oyster Bay , 228 AD3d 808, 808 [2d Dept 2024]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hudson ES LLC v. First Franklin Fin. Corp. · filed 2025-01-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accords plaintiffs the benefit of any possible favorable inference, and determines only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Campbell v. Authentic Brands Group LLC · filed 2025-01-15(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Breiterman v. 89th & Madison Owners Corp. · filed 2025-01-16(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the relevant pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction, and the Court must accept the facts alleged therein as true, accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true.

Doe v. Clark · filed 2025-01-21(a)(7)

On this motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), taking the allegations of the second amended complaint as true, "there may be grounds to impute the complained of conduct" by Clark to Goodyear based on Clark's "high level position" ( Randall v Tod-Nik Audiology, Inc. , 270 AD2d at 39).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts construe the pleading liberally, accept alleged facts as true, draw favorable inferences, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Pinkesz v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. · filed 2025-01-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "'the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Neurological Surgery, P.C. v Group Health Inc. , 224 AD3d 697, 698, quoting Bono v Stim & Warmuth, P.C. , 215 AD3d 911, 911).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint's allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Ofman v. Richland · filed 2025-01-22(a)(7)

However, the Supreme Court should have denied dismissal of the third cause of action, which sought to recover damages for legal malpractice, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). ... Here, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action alleging legal malpractice.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

KSFB Mgt., LLC v. Focus Fin. Partners, LLC · filed 2025-01-22(a)(7)

A party may move for dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when a pleading "fails to state a cause of action." On such a motion, the court "must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc. , 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Pet Turtle Branding LLC v. Iwanyk · filed 2025-01-27(a)(7)

It is well-settled that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (Avgush v Town of Yorktown, 303 AD2d 340, 755 N.Y.S.2d 647 [2d Dept 2003]; Bernberg v Health Mgmt. Sys., 303 AD.2d 348, 756 N.Y.S.2d 96 [2d Dept 2003]).

On a motion under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Lsirowkop, LLC v. Behr · filed 2025-01-29(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Meyer v North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc. , 137 AD3d 880, 880-881).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded allegations as true and decide whether they state a legally cognizable claim.

Kovacs v. AudioEye, Inc. · filed 2025-01-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), “pleadings are to be afforded a ... liberal construction, allegations are taken as true, the plaintiff is afforded every possible inference, and a determination is made only as to whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.” CSC Holdings, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 146 N.Y.S.3d 17, 18 (2021) (internal citations omitted).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint states a cognizable cause of action.

M.N. v. Presbyterian Church (USA) · filed 2025-01-31(a)(7)

That said, a motion to dismiss under CPLR § 3211(a)(7) must be denied if the complaint states a cognizable cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a claim to proceed when its allegations, viewed in the claimant’s favor, would entitle the claimant to relief if proven.

A.T. v. Presbyterian Church U.S.A. · filed 2025-01-27(a)(7)

Regarding the sufficiency of the pleadings, the court evaluates the Third-Party Complaint under CPLR § 3211(a)(7). To survive dismissal, the pleading must allege facts that, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. West End asserts that the Presbytery had notice of Reverend Warren's misconduct and failed to act in accordance with its governance responsibilities. These allegations, when construed in the light most favorable to West End, are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Troise v. NYC Dept. of Bldgs. · filed 2025-02-05(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Jesberger v CVS Health Solutions, LLC , 222 AD3d 849, 849 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kwan v Kuie Chin Yap , 220 AD3d 715, 716).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and ask whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Curto v. Curto · filed 2025-02-05(a)(7)

"'In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Bono v Stim & Warmuth, P.C. , 215 AD3d 911, 911, quoting Langley v Melville Fire Dist ., 213 AD3d 748, 750; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a CPLR 3211 motion for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally.

Edwards v. State of New York · filed 2025-02-10

It is also well settled that when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 on the ground that the claim fails to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

K.D. v. City of New York · filed 2025-02-13(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( New York State Div. of Human Rights v Town of Oyster Bay , 177 AD3d 893, 894; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts factual allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but does not credit bare legal conclusions.

Doe v. Educational Inst. Oholei Torah · filed 2025-02-19(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Rubin v Poly Prep Country Day Sch. , 227 AD3d 741, 742). However, "allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions . . . are not entitled to any such consideration" ( Simkin v Blank , 19 NY3d 46, 52 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Doe v Hauppauge Union Free Sch. Dist. , 213 AD3d 809, 810).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

25-86 41st St., LLC v. Chong · filed 2025-02-19(a)(7)

"In assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and afford the plaintiff 'the benefit of every possible favorable inference'" ( TV Tech Mgrs., Inc. v Cohen , 227 AD3d 838, 839, quoting J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co. , 21 NY3d 324, 334).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

NYU Langone Hosps. v. Attentive Homecare Agency, Inc. · filed 2025-02-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff’s factual allegations must be taken as true, and they must be given every favorable inference. Plaintiff has sufficiently pled enough facts that, given every favorable inference, the PHS clients such as Defendants (both of ... whom are alleged to have a contractual relationship with PHS) would have contractual obligations to pay the PHS rates and therefore the first cause of action stands.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cronemeyer v. City of New York · filed 2025-02-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR § 3211 (a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994][citations omitted]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, accept their allegations as true, and determine whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

ADP, Inc. v. E. Armada Inc. · filed 2025-02-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), “pleadings are to be afforded a liberal construction, allegations are taken as true, the plaintiff is afforded every possible inference, and a determination is made only as to whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.” CSC Holdings, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 146 N.Y.S.3d 17, 18 (2021) (internal citations omitted).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a pre-answer negligent hiring or supervision claim can proceed when allegations that the defendant knew or should have known of an employee’s criminal proclivities give sufficient notice of the claim; additional specific facts about notice are not required at that stage.

Fields v. General Conference of the United Methodist Church · filed 2025-02-20(a)(7)

As to the merits, plaintiff stated a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or direction, as the allegations that appellants "knew or should have known" of the boxing instructor's criminal proclivities sufficiently placed appellants on notice of the claim. At the pre-answer stage of the litigation, plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to put appellants on notice of this claim, and plaintiff was not required to allege additional specific facts regarding notice ( see e.g. SHC-MG-25 Doe v Archdiocese of N.Y. , 223 AD3d 579, 580 [1st Dept 2024]; Ark 55 v Archdiocese of N.Y. , 222 AD3d 572, 572 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding whether a pleading states a cause of action to accept its alleged facts as true, construe it liberally, and give the petitioner favorable inferences.

Lurie v. New York City Dept. of Educ. · filed 2025-02-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR § 3211, the Court must accept the facts alleged as true from the four comers of the complaint, affording it liberal construction and according petitioner the benefit of favorable inference, to determine whether the facts alleged sufficiently states a cause of action (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Rovella v. Orofino Realty, 40 NY2d 633 [1976]). The allegations in the Amended Petition do not raise a question as to whether the DOE acted in violation of the law and fails to state a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of objections seeking a constructive trust when the alleged facts are insufficient to support that remedy.

Matter of Igleburger · filed 2025-02-25(a)(7)

The court, therefore, finds that Paragraphs "2" through "13" of the respondents objections are of insufficient merit so as to excuse their late filing and are otherwise subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action to read its allegations liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Walls v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-04(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), courts interpret the pleadings liberally, accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and extend to the plaintiff every favorable inference available (Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; JF Capital Advisors, LLC v. Lightstone Group, LLC, 25 NY3d 759, 764 [2015]).