N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true and gives the defendant every favorable inference.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ranalli · filed 2025-03-05(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court "must accept as true the facts as alleged" in the counterclaim, accord the defendant "the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Twitchell Tech. Prods., LLC v Mechoshade Sys., LLC , 227 AD3d 45, 51 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc. , 20 NY3d 59, 63).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ramirez-Gomez v. Empire Today, LLC · filed 2025-03-05(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Olsen v Butler , 227 AD3d 916, 918).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action to accept the pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determine whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Crawford v. Integrated Asset Mgt. Servs., LLC · filed 2025-03-12(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Marinelli v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C. , 205 AD3d 714, 715; see Gorbatov v Tsirelman , 155 AD3d 836, 837).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint's facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Bayron Chay Mo v. Ultra Dimension Place, LLC · filed 2025-03-12(a)(7)

Additionally, the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendants' motion should be denied. On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Davila v Orange County , 215 AD3d 632, 633).

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Lilly v. State of New York · filed 2025-02-24(a)(7)

Because this motion to dismiss has been made pre-answer, the procedural posture requires that the facts alleged in the complaint be accepted as true (Davis v Boeheim, 24 NY3d 262 [2014]).

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion to dismiss, the court assumes the facts alleged in the claim are true.

Cooper v. State of New York · filed 2025-03-12(a)

Contrary to the State's contention that the claimant's judgment of conviction was not vacated under a ground enumerated by Court of Claims Act § 8-b(3)(b)(ii), for the purposes of the motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a), assuming the facts alleged in the claim as true ( see Reed v State of New York , 133 AD2d 105, 106; Grimaldi v State of New York , 133 AD2d 97, 100), the claimant stated a cause of action pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8-b(3)(b)(ii).

A crossclaim supported only by conclusory allegations is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Arzeno v. Kennedy Constr. Servs. · filed 2025-02-24(a)(7)

These conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand Manes' motion to dismiss.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a legal malpractice claim is properly dismissed if the alleged conduct, accepted as true, does not establish negligence.

Guzman-Martinez v. Rosado · filed 2025-03-14(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a cause of action for legal malpractice is properly dismissed where the conduct alleged in the complaint, "even if accepted as true[,] does not establish negligence" ( Leder , 9 NY3d at 837; see generally Bua v Purcell & Ingrao, P.C. , 99 AD3d 843, 847 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 857 [2013]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, presumes its allegations true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Mohammad v. Rehman · filed 2025-03-19(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Weinstein v Levitin , 208 AD3d 531, 532 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Clevenger v Yuzek , 222 AD3d 931, 934).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and may consider the plaintiff's affidavits to remedy defects in the complaint.

Hurley v. Rochester Regional Health Aco, Inc. · filed 2025-03-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and determine whether they fit into any cognizable legal theory ( see Lawrence v Graubard Miller , 11 NY3d 588, 595 [2008]; Matter of Machado v Tanoury , 142 AD3d 1322, 1323 [4th Dept 2016]). Affidavits submitted by a plaintiff may also be considered to remedy any defects in the complaint ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), an opposing affirmation can supply missing details in a counterclaim and provide sufficient notice to avoid dismissal.

1110-1130 Stadium Owners Corp. v. Bronx 1 LLC · filed 2025-03-21(a)(7)

The Court finds that affording the allegations in the first counterclaim, as supplemented by Mr. Johnson's affirmation, their most favorable intendment, Defendant sufficiently alleged a breach of contract cause of action. To the extent that Defendant failed to identify particular apartments in the counterclaim this was cured through the details provided by Mr. Johnson. Together they give sufficient notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences intended to be proved.

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the court construes the petition liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the petitioner every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

RP Wimbledon Owner, LLC v. Chisholm · filed 2025-03-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the court must afford pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the petition as true, accord the petitioner every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit into a cognizable legal theory ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations that a defendant induced a property purchase by misrepresenting facts about the mortgage can state a fraudulent inducement claim.

Loan Funder, LLC v. Suffolk Home Rehab, LLC · filed 2025-03-26(a)(7)

Here, the allegations that Javaid induced the appellants to enter into a contract to purchase the subject property by misrepresenting facts regarding, inter alia, the mortgage, were sufficient to state a cross-claim alleging fraudulent inducement ( see New Hackensack Realty, LLC v Lawrence Dev. Realty, LLC , 226 AD3d 799, 801).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Ferdous v. Hasan · filed 2025-03-26(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit [*2]within any cognizable legal theory" ( Floral Park Ophthalmology, P.C. v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, LLP , 216 AD3d 1136, 1136 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court views the allegations favorably to the plaintiff and gives them every possible favorable inference.

Alexandre v. Verizon N.Y. · filed 2025-03-26(a)(7)

Here -- viewing employee's allegations in their most favorable light and according them every possible favorable inference -- she sufficiently sets forth this claim.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims survive dismissal when the complaint’s allegations are facially sufficient to state causes of action.

Pierluissi v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-26(a)(7)

Construing the claims in the generous matter to which they are entitled, this court finds that the allegations set forth in the complaint are facially sufficient to state causes of action for employment discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a retaliation claim survives dismissal when its allegations, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, sufficiently plead retaliatory acts.

Alexandre v. Verizon N.Y. Inc. · filed 2025-03-26(a)(7)

Given the governing standard on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, employee also sufficiently pleads that, after the grievance filing and the meeting on January 26, 2021, Verizon engaged in retaliatory acts.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to accept the complaint’s allegations as true and give the plaintiff every reasonable inference.

Sean Serv. v. Nexstar Media Group Inc. · filed 2025-03-28(a)(7)

When reviewing a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a legally cognizable theory.

Stone v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. · filed 2025-03-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court “must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any legally cognizable theory” (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to construe a pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give it every reasonable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Pacheco v. Catholic Guardian Servs. · filed 2025-04-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, and the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord the pleading the benefit of every reasonable inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) based on a claimed vehicle sale fails when the movant does not establish the transfer of ownership.

Diallo v. Todria · filed 2025-04-03(a)(7)

Wilberger's tnotion to dismiss is denied based on the failure to submitthe results of a New York and Texas DMV title· search for the vehicle irt question to determine the owner of the. vehicle on the date of the accident.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts deciding a failure-to-state-a-cause-of-action motion to construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Belplain Realty Co. Inc v. Caro · filed 2025-04-03(a)(7)

To prevail on a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gardner v. GoDaddy.Com, LLC · filed 2025-04-04(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in [a] complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137 [2017]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703 [2008]).

A petition may be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when its allegations are vague and conclusory and fail to state a cause of action.

Matter of Khatari v. Metro Mgt. & Dev. Inc. · filed 2025-04-06(a)(7)

CPLR § 3211 (a) (7) permits a party to move for dismissal where the pleading fails to state a cause of action. ... "However, the allegations in the pleading cannot be vague and conclusory" as they are in this petition ( Phillips v Trommel Const. , 101 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2d Dept 2012]).

Under § 3211(a)(7), a petition’s allegations are accepted as true and read in the petitioner’s favor, but dismissal is warranted if the petition fails to state a legally cognizable claim.

Sammy Group LLC v. Parks · filed 2025-04-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, the complaint (or petition, as here) “must be construed in the light most favorable to [petitioner] and all factual allegations must be accepted as true.” ... Nonetheless, dismissal will result when the plaintiff or petitioner “has not stated a claim cognizable at law.” ... Accordingly, as petitioner misstated the basis for its claimed regulatory exemption in the petition and has not sought amendment, respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, evidence submitted in opposition may cure a missing allegation of prior written notice.

Mendez v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-08(a)(7)

“The evidence submitted by plaintiff in opposition to the City's motion may be considered to correct the deficiency in the pleadings regarding prior written notice” (Bchakjan v City of New York, 210 AD3d 519, 519 [1st Dept 2022]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts state a cognizable claim.

Cuatetl v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR § 3211 (a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [citations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true and does not dismiss based on the defendant’s factual denial.

ZuMedia, Inc. v. Fuchs · filed 2025-04-09(a)(7)

While this may or may not be so, dismissal of the complaint at this stage for these grounds would be premature. The allegations in the complaint are deemed to be true on a motion to dismiss.

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations state a cognizable claim.

Aponsah v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-09(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR § 3211 (a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [citations omitted]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Khurana v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-10(a)(7)

When reviewing a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the complaint liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Geltzer v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-16(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Langley v Melville Fire Dist. , 213 AD3d 748, 750).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Drive N.J. Ins. Co. v. RT Hospitality Group, LLC · filed 2025-04-16(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Antoine v Kalandrishvili , 150 AD3d 941, 941; see Eccles v Shamrock Capital Advisors, LLC , 42 NY3d 321, 342).

Section 3211(a)(7) tests whether the pleading states a cause of action.

Barzilay v. Hairline Ink, LLC · filed 2025-04-17(a)(7)

When a party moves pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss an action, the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action ( see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]).

Under § 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal if its factual allegations, taken together, state a cognizable cause of action.

Reinvent Golden Ridge LLC v. Kaliner · filed 2025-04-17(a)(7)

For motions to dismiss under this provision, “[i]nitially, the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law.”

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court construes the pleading liberally and gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and inherently incredible or documentarily contradicted claims do not suffice.

Sandman v. City of Ithaca · filed 2025-04-17(a)(7)

"When considering whether to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to be true and the plaintiff[ ] [is] to be afforded every favorable inference. This liberal standard, however, will not save allegations that consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence or are inherently incredible" ( DerOhannesian v City of Albany , 110 AD3d 1288, 1289 [3d Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; accord Hyman v Schwartz , 127 AD3d 1281, 1283 [3d Dept 2015]).

Under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), a breach of contract claim survives dismissal when the complaint's factual allegations adequately state the claim.

Sleepyheadsyo, LLC v. Ilias Inc. · filed 2025-04-21(a)(7)

Rather, defendants' assertion is belied by the detailed allegations in plaintiff's Complaint, which adequately state a claim for breach of contract for purposes of surviving a CPLR § 3211(a)(7) motion.

Under § 3211(a)(7), a motion to dismiss fails if the pleading, given favorable inferences, states a recognizable cause of action.

JS Realty Inv. LLC v. Izquierdo · filed 2025-04-22(a)(7)

Thus, a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) will fail if, after giving petitioner the benefit every favorable inference, the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law.

Under § 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal if its factual allegations state any legally cognizable cause of action.

Fizz Social Corp. v. Flower Ave, Inc. · filed 2025-04-23(a)(7)

For motions to dismiss under this provision, “[i]nitially, the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law.”

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court construes the pleading liberally, assumes the alleged facts are true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory without deciding whether they can ultimately be proved.

Whitfield v. Law Enforcement Employees Benevolent Assn. · filed 2025-04-23(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory, without regard to whether the allegations ultimately can be established" ( Minico Ins. Agency, LLC v AJP Contr. Corp. , 166 AD3d 605, 606).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true and draw favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions without factual specificity do not withstand dismissal.

Zielinski v. State of New York · filed 2025-04-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a claim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must afford the pleading a liberal construction by accepting the facts alleged as true, according the pleading "the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determin[ing] only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Carlson v American Intl. Group, Inc. , 130 AD3d 1479, 1480 [4th Dept 2015]). Notwithstanding the favorable treatment of such pleading, bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity do not suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action ( see Matter of Holterbosch , 216 AD3d 783 [2d Dept 2023]; Barnes v Hodge , 118 AD3d 633 [1st Dept 2014]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Park W. Exec. Servs., Inc. v. Gallo Vitucci & Klar, LLP · filed 2025-04-25(a)(7)

When reviewing a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), evidentiary submissions warrant dismissal only if they conclusively establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Sweatman v. The Hurlbut · filed 2025-04-25(a)(7)

Thus, "[s]ummary dismissal is appropriate under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) when the defendant[s'] evidentiary submissions 'establish conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action' " ( Liberty Affordable Hous., Inc. v Maple Ct. Apts. , 125 AD3d 85, 87 [4th Dept 2015], quoting Rovello v Orofino Realty Co. , 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to plead the elements of a cause of action, including injury.

Rittenhouse v. Beaumont Prods. Inc. · filed 2025-04-29(a)(7)

Upon the following papers read on defendants motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7): NYSCEF documents 1 thru 18; it is hereby ORDERED defendants motion to dismiss is granted. ... Thus, to avoid dismissal, plaintiff must adequately plead each of these elements. ... Accordingly, plaintiff has not properly pled injury.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a breach of fiduciary duty claim that lacks facts supporting a fiduciary relationship or misconduct.

Rhodes v. Tow Auth. Inc. · filed 2025-05-05(a)(7)

Here, plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship between herself, Lander, Garcia and Clark or to allege sufficient facts to support an element of misconduct by said defendants (see generally People v King, 188 AD3d 721, 722 [2d Dept 2020]). In this regard, that portion of the City defendants' cross-motion to dismiss the complaint herein as asserted against Lander, Garcia and Clark for failure to state a cause of action on the grounds that there is no cognizable cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is granted.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action must be denied if the complaint’s factual allegations state any legally cognizable claim.

Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Century Indem. Co. · filed 2025-05-06(a)(7)

“A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action must be denied if the factual allegations contained within the four corners of the pleading manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (M&E 73-75 LLC, 189 AD3d at 5).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and may consider evidence submitted in opposition to remedy defects in the complaint.

Warmbier v. City of New York · filed 2025-05-07(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and liberally construe the complaint, according it the [*2]benefit of every possible favorable inference" ( Dee v Rakower , 112 AD3d 204, 208; see 1470 39th St., LLC v Goldberg , 226 AD3d 853, 854). Further, "[e]videntiary material submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to such a motion may be considered to remedy defects in the complaint" ( NFA Group v Lotus Research, Inc. , 180 AD3d 1060, 1061).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff's alleged facts as true, construes the complaint liberally, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Umoh v. Zunz · filed 2025-05-07(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and liberally construe the complaint, according it the benefit of every favorable inference" ( Dee v Rakower , 112 AD3d 204, 208; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Davids v State of New York , 159 AD3d 987, 989).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint receives a liberal construction, its alleged facts are presumed true, and the plaintiff receives every favorable inference.

Langton v. Sussman & Watkins · filed 2025-05-07(a)(7)

"'On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Clevenger v Yuzek , 222 AD3d 931, 934, quoting Gorbatov v Tsirelman , 155 AD3d 836, 837).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleadings, accepts the allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff all possible favorable inferences.

Estate of Jones v. Parkview Operating Co., LLC · filed 2025-05-13(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must [*4]liberally construe the pleadings, accept the allegations as true and accord the plaintiff all possible favorable inferences.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference when deciding whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Paltzer v. Hejailan-Amon · filed 2025-05-13(a)(7)

“[A]ccepting the facts as ... alleged in the complaint as true, [and] accord[ing] the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference” as required on review of a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, plaintiff has adequately stated cause of action to recover his allegedly unpaid fees (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, draws every favorable inference for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Canty v. Burns · filed 2025-05-14(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in [the] complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Maursky v Latham , 219 AD3d 473, 474 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Zuniga v BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. , 147 AD3d 882, 883). ... Here, contrary to the contentions of Burns and MERS, the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action to quiet title based on the invalidity of the 1996 deed.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the facts state a cognizable claim.

Core Scaffold Sys. Inc. v. City Wide Bldrs. Grp Inc. · filed 2025-05-14(a)(7)

Moreover, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint and plaintiff's affidavit as true and according· plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the facts fit within a cause of action for breach of contract (see Leonv Martinez, 84 NY2d 88; CPLR § 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, but a pleading survives if its factual allegations together establish any legally cognizable claim.

Mediapro US Prod. Servs., LLC v. A1 Padel, LLC · filed 2025-05-15(a)(7)

For motions to dismiss under this provision, “[i]nitially, the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law.”

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the allegations state a claim.

Matulewicz v. Sullivan Papain Block McGrath Coffinas & Cannavo, P.C. · filed 2025-05-21(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Clevenger v Yuzek , 222 AD3d 931, 934 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Pergament v Government Empls. Ins. Co. ["GEICO"] , 225 AD3d 799, 800). ... Here, even accepting the facts in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, the plaintiff cannot establish that, but for the defendant's alleged negligence, the plaintiff would have been successful in her appeal in the underlying action ( see id. ).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the pleadings state a cognizable cause of action or defense.

Idehen v. Stoute-Phillip · filed 2025-05-21(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), the court must determine whether the pleadings state a cognizable cause of action or defense.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint's allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Redd v. Brooklyn Friends Sch. · filed 2025-05-28(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Brophy v Big Bros. Big Sisters of Am., Inc. , 224 AD3d 866, 868).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court may consider the plaintiff’s affidavit to remedy defects in the complaint.

Lapin v. Verner · filed 2025-05-28(a)(7)

"In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), [*2]however, a court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d at 88; see Pierce Coach Line, Inc. v Port Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist. , 213 AD3d 959, 960). ... Here, affording the allegations in the complaint, as supplemented by the plaintiff's affidavit, their most favorable intendment ( see 1470 39th St., LLC v Goldberg , 226 AD3d at 854), the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for fraud.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, draws favorable inferences, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Lev Realty Group, LLC v. Nassar · filed 2025-05-28(a)(7)

When considering a motion under CPLR § 3211, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction. The court must deem the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

Section 3211(a) permits dismissal when the complaint's allegations fail to state the asserted causes of action.

Looks Great Servs., Inc. v. Roosevelt · filed 2025-06-04(a)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a defendant’s evidentiary submissions warrant dismissal only if they conclusively establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Hyman v. Richmond Univ. Med. Ctr. · filed 2025-06-04(a)(7)

Submissions by the defendant on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) "will seldom if ever warrant [dismissal] . . . unless [they] establish conclusively that [*2]plaintiff has no cause of action" ( Rovello v Orofino Realty Co. , 40 NY2d 633, 636; see Lawrence v Graubard Miller , 11 NY3d 588, 595).

Under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the petition states a cause of action, not whether the petitioner can ultimately prove it.

Inga v. Revenco · filed 2025-06-04(a)(7)

In assessing a motion under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the criterion is whether the petitioner has stated a cause of action, not whether petitioner actually has one.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading and draws every inference in favor of the party who filed it.

Kings Vil. Corp. v. Pascal · filed 2025-06-04(a)(7)

Considering that Respondent has submitted a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), the Court must [*3]liberally construe the petition and draw every inference favorable to the Petitioner.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts liberally construe a complaint, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every possible inference when deciding whether it states a cognizable claim.

Lambos v. Karabinis · filed 2025-06-05(a)(7)

"When considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a cause of action, courts must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, confer on the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Pierce v Archer Daniels Midland, Co. , 221 AD3d 1382, 1383 [3d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

A CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion tests whether the pleading states a cause of action; a petition that fails to plead a tenant's protected regulatory status may be dismissed.

Westchester Capital Co., LLC v. Richardson · filed 2025-06-05(a)(7)

In assessing a motion under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the criterion is whether the petitioner has stated a cause of action, not whether petitioner actually has one. ... In light of the foregoing, the court finds petitioner's failure to plead that respondent is a non-purchasing tenant who is protected under the Martin Act requires dismissal of the instant proceeding.

On a motion under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, draws favorable inferences, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Bain v. Strulovitch · filed 2025-06-06(a)(7)

As the Second Department held very recently, "On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory." Kisla v. Jefferson , 237 AD3d 1082, 1083 (2d Dept. April 23, 2025). ... These statements appear to indicate a reluctant willingness to participate in the Brooklyn arbitration — a finding that the Court does not, on this motion to dismiss, make. Instead, it finds that this is not a valid basis for dismissing the petition.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the nonmoving party every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Jersen Constr. Group, LLC v. Cranesville Block Co., Inc. · filed 2025-06-06(a)(7)

Specialty Products now seeks to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7). On such a motion, the Court must accept the facts as alleged in the third-party complaint as true, accord the non-moving party the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141 [2017]; see also CPLR 3026).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff reasonable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cueto v. Jura Pentium Inc. · filed 2025-06-13(a)(7)

When reviewing a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]).

Under § 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Monarch Condominium v. Bloom & Streit, CPAs, LLP · filed 2025-06-16(a)(7)

It is well-settled that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Koffler v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. · filed 2025-06-18(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( S.P. v Dongbu Ins. Co. , 174 AD3d 911, 912; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint’s allegations as true, give the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and decide whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

130 E. 18 Owners Corp. v. Axelrod · filed 2025-06-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, the court “must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024]). Under this lenient standard, plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for legal malpractice.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Simmons v. Baccarat Inc. · filed 2025-06-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the Court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true, and grant the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman, 31 NY3d 30 [2018]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Burns v. City of New York · filed 2025-06-25(a)(7)

When it considers a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the facts in the complaint as true, gives plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determines only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc., 26 NY3d 137, 141 [2017]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept the pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wodzenski v. Di Pippo · filed 2025-06-25(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state [*2]a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Brophy v Big Bros. Big Sisters of Am., Inc. , 224 AD3d 866, 868).

A plaintiff alleging written demands for payment need not provide copies of invoices to survive a motion to dismiss an account stated claim.

Tam-Zegarra v. Pleroma Mgmt, LLC · filed 2025-06-26(a)(7)

Defendants have not established that providing copies of the invoices in question is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint, liberally construed, alleges no facts supporting a viable cause of action.

Govea v. Albert · filed 2025-06-26(a)(7)

Therefore, since the third~party complaints do not allege thatthe plaintiffs' personal property was in Albert's care, custodyand control, or state facts that could be liberally construed as such, these complaints failto state any viable and cognizant causes of action covered by the policy of insurance arisingout of the 8/12/2022 fire (Leonv Martinez, 84 NY2d 88; CPLR § 32·11 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Nazario v. ByteDance Ltd. · filed 2025-06-27(a)(7)

When reviewing a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]).

On a motion under section 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true when deciding whether it pleads a viable cause of action.

Jacob Feinberg Katz & Michaeli Consulting Group, LLC v. Bazurto · filed 2025-06-30(a)(7)

While of course, Schwab still has the opportunity to provide defenses to these allegations and show that the checks were either not effective, or that pursuant to NY UCC § 3-419(3) it acted “in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business” at this pre-answer juncture to the litigation, where courts must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, plaintiff has properly plead a cause of action and the allegations involving the “outbound” checks will not be dismissed.

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Williams v. DSS-HRA · filed 2025-07-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; JF Capital Advisors, LLC v Lightstone Group, LLC, 25 NY3d 759, 764 [2015]).

Section 3211(a)(7) tests whether a pleading states a legally cognizable claim; the plaintiff need not prove the allegations at the dismissal stage.

Wilburger v. Ava Labs, Inc. · filed 2025-07-03(a)(7)

Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not considered when determining a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when a plaintiff fails to comply with a statutory notice of claim requirement.

Dibble v. Schroedel · filed 2025-07-09(a)(7)

"Failure to comply with a statutory notice of claim requirement is a ground for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action" ( Parpounas v Ohagan , 216 AD3d 985, 986; see Singh v City of New York , 189 AD3d 1697, 1699, affd 40 NY3d 138).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

D&W Design, Inc. v. 360 Johnson, LLC · filed 2025-07-09(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Antoine v Kalandrishvili , 150 AD3d 941, 941; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court determines whether the pleaded allegations state a cause of action without deciding whether they are true.

Minhas v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. · filed 2025-07-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a plaintiffs claim pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court is not called upon to determine the truth of the allegations (see, Campaign/or Fiscal Equity v State, 86 NY2d 307,317 [1995]; 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander's, Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 509 [1979]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matyas v. Spitzer · filed 2025-07-16(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Saadia v National Socy. of Hebrew Day Schs., Inc. , 225 AD3d 806, 808; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint omits essential elements of a cause of action or relies on conclusory or speculative theories unsupported by operative facts.

Andersen v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon · filed 2025-07-16(a)(7)

A complaint may be dismissed under CPLR § 3211 [a] [7] where it fails to allege essential elements of a cause of action or rests upon conclusory or speculative theories unsupported by operative facts. Here, even taking Plaintiff's allegations at face value, the Complaint fails to state any cognizable claim under New York law.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every reasonable favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cabrita v. Vitabyte, Inc. · filed 2025-07-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the Court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, afford every reasonable favorable inference to the plaintiff, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY , 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Galeas v. Socarras · filed 2025-07-23(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Langley v Melville Fire Dist. , 213 AD3d 748, 750; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Canfield Funding, LLC v. Focalpointe Group, LLC · filed 2025-07-25(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, we must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the] plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co. , 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the plaintiff’s alleged facts as true, construes the complaint liberally, and gives it every favorable inference.

Singh v. 96 16th St., LLC · filed 2025-07-30(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and liberally construe the complaint, according it the benefit of every favorable inference" ( Dee v Rakower , 112 AD3d 204, 208; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Louis Monteleone Fibres, Ltd. v Hudson Baylor Brookhaven, LLC , 228 AD3d 641, 643).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint's allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Poltorak v. Clarke · filed 2025-07-30(a)(7)

"'In considering a motion to dismiss . . . pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Ikezi v 82nd St. Academics , 221 AD3d 986, 987, quoting Buchanan v Law Offs. of Sheldon E. Green, P.C. , 215 AD3d 790, 791; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference in deciding whether a cause of action is adequately pleaded.

659 Holding LLC v. L&L Assoc. Holding Corp. · filed 2025-07-30(a)(7)

That branch of the Naderi defendants' cross-motion which is pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss so much of the second third-party cause of action as alleges unjust enrichment must be denied as, accepting the facts alleged as true and according L&L the benefit of every favorable inference, this cause of action was adequately pleaded ( see generally Kalmon Dolgin Affiliates, Inc. v Tonacchio , 110 AD3d 848, 851 [2d Dept 2013]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Away Envtl., Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown · filed 2025-08-06(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Pergament v Government Empls. Ins. Co. ["GEICO"] , 225 AD3d 799, 800 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Clevenger v Yuzek , 222 AD3d 931, 934).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Stinnett v. Derek Smith Law Group, PLLC · filed 2025-08-13(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Templeton v Roach , 228 AD3d 796, 797).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the complaint liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Robert S. v. New York Archdiocese · filed 2025-08-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; JF Capital Advisors, LLC v Lightstone Group, LLC , 25 NY3d 759, 764 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, but dismissal is warranted when the allegations do not support an element of the claim.

Oak Beverages, Inc. v. D.G. Yuengling & Son, Inc. · filed 2025-08-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Currid v. City of New York · filed 2025-08-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the [*2]benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. , 222 AD3d 706, 707).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court may consider a plaintiff's opposition affidavit along with the complaint.

Trepeta v. Mobiquity Tech., Inc. · filed 2025-08-27(a)(7)

Here, the complaint, considered in conjunction with the allegations contained in the plaintiff's affidavit submitted in opposition to the defendants' motion, failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for fraudulent inducement with respect to the release.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the complaint liberally, presume its allegations true, give the plaintiff favorable inferences, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Nazath v. Our Lady of Consolation Nursing & Rehabilitative Care Ctr. · filed 2025-08-27(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Gorbatov v Tsirelman , 155 AD3d 836, 837; see Silvers v Jamaica Hosp. , 218 AD3d 817, 818).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint and gives the plaintiff every possible beneficial inference.

Salamone v. Deily & Glastetter, LLP · filed 2025-09-04(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]), we liberally construe the pleading and afford plaintiff every possible beneficial inference in determining whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal if its factual allegations, taken together, state any legally cognizable claim.

A&J Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. 5 Harvest Dr. LLC · filed 2025-09-09(a)(7)

If from the four corners of the complaint factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law, a motion to dismiss will fail (511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144; Cooper, 242 AD2d at 360).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, materials submitted by the defendant must conclusively establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Schapers v. West Lawrence Care Ctr., LLC · filed 2025-09-10(a)(7)

"Although a court may consider materials submitted by the defendant in support of its motion, the materials must establish conclusively that the plaintiff has no cause of action" ( USCHAG Corp. v Flagstar Bank, FSB , 220 AD3d 823, 824).

When a court considers evidence on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion without converting it to summary judgment, it determines whether the counterclaim has a cause of action, rather than merely whether it states one.

Kay v. Heavenly Events & Catering Corp. · filed 2025-09-10(a)(7)

However, "[w]here evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the [pleader] has a cause of action, not whether the [pleader] has stated one, and unless it has been shown that a material fact claimed by the [pleader] to be one is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate" ( id. at 52 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Clevenger v Yuzek , 222 AD3d 931, 934). Here, the plaintiffs established that Heavenly did not have a cause of action against them alleging anticipatory breach of contract, and therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss Heavenly's counterclaim.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Holman v. St. John's Episcopal Hosp. · filed 2025-09-10(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), 'the complaint must be accorded a liberal construction, the facts as alleged therein must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference'" ( Rigwan v Neus , 205 AD3d 1062, 1063, quoting Elow v Svenningsen , 58 AD3d 674, 674; see New Hackensack Realty, LLC v Lawrence Dev. Realty, LLC , 226 AD3d 799, 800-801).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

GLD3, LLC v. Albra · filed 2025-09-10(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Albra's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint filed by the GLD3 plaintiffs insofar as asserted against him. When considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, "the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Jennings v Metropolitan Transp. Auth. , 226 AD3d 662, 663 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sander v Westchester Reform Temple , 228 AD3d 688, 689, lv granted 42 NY3d 910).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Celauro v. Celauro · filed 2025-09-10(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Jesberger v CVS Health Solutions, LLC , 222 AD3d 849, 849 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal is warranted when the complaint lacks facts supporting an element of a claim or its allegations and inferences do not support an enforceable right of recovery.

Moscatelli v. Woodbury Med. Practice, P.C. · filed 2025-09-17(a)(7)

"Dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) 'is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery'" ( Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co. Inc. , 37 NY3d 169, 175, quoting Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 142).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the pleadings, accepts the allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Donaldson v. Martuscello · filed 2025-09-23(a)(7)

The CPLR R 3211 (a) (7) review standard requires that a Court "must give the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true and accord the Petitioners every possible favorable inference" ( Chanko v. Am. Broad Companies, Inc ., 27 NY3d 46, 52 [2016]; see also, Conklin v Laxen , 180 AD3d 1358, 1362 [4th Dept. 2020]; Piller v Tribeca Dev. Group LLC , 156 AD3d 1257, 1261 [3d Dept. 2017]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to accept the complaint’s facts as true, draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

C.R. v. Episcopal Diocese of N.Y. · filed 2025-09-25(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the pleader every favorable inference.

Matter of Harbourview Realty, LLC v. Village of Roslyn · filed 2025-10-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, "the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the [pleader] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Stewart v Fein Such & Crain, LLP , 236 AD3d 959, 961 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Twitchell Tech. Prods., LLC v Mechoshade Sys., LLC , 227 AD3d 45, 50).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Perry v. Pickett · filed 2025-10-02(a)(7)

The CPLR R 3211 (a) (7) review standard requires that a Court "must give the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true and accord the Petitioners every possible favorable inference" ( Chanko v. Am. Broad Companies, Inc ., 27 NY3d 46, 52 [2016]; see also, Conklin v Laxen , 180 AD3d 1358, 1362 [4th Dept. 2020]; Piller v Tribeca Dev. Group LLC , 156 AD3d 1257, 1261 [3d Dept. 2017]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts state a cognizable claim.

Peckham Asphalt Resale Corp. v. Gorman · filed 2025-10-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). ... Accordingly, the branch of the motion seeking dismissal of the warranty claims for pleading insufficiency is denied.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

McWilliams v. Thomsen · filed 2025-10-08(a)(7)

"On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true, provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, presumes its allegations true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Jobble, Inc. v. CF Alerts Corp · filed 2025-10-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Cantor v Villucci , 212 AD3d 765, 766 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts state a cognizable claim.

Duncan v. Town of Greece · filed 2025-10-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Here, we conclude that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Pecchia v. Neifeld · filed 2025-10-15(a)(7)

"When deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Popal v DiLorenzo , 231 AD3d 1067, 1068 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Makransky v. Makransky · filed 2025-10-15(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Jesberger v CVS Health Solutions, LLC , 222 AD3d 849, 849 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Templeton v Roach , 228 AD3d 796, 797).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Congregation Erech Shai Bais Yosef, Inc. v. Werzberger · filed 2025-10-15(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Gorbatov v Tsirelman , 155 AD3d 836, 837; see Sullivan v St. Ephrem R.C. Parish Church , 214 AD3d 751, 752). ... Here, affording the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, the facts asserted in the fourth cause of action fit within a cognizable legal theory alleging fraud ( see Sullivan v St. Ephrem R.C. Parish Church , 214 AD3d at 752; Gorbatov v Tsirelman , 155 AD3d at 837).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of those facts.

IntegrateNYC, Inc. v. State of New York · filed 2025-10-23(a)(7)

Our role in considering the sufficiency of a pleading on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is well-defined. We must determine only "whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated" ( Aristy-Farer v State of New York, 29 NY3d 501, 509 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Marcigliano v. Coulianidis · filed 2025-10-29(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Tsamasiros v Jones , 232 AD3d 816, 817; see Oluwo v Mills , 228 AD3d 879, 880).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, assumes its alleged facts are true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

4 Colonial Dr., LLC v. Suburban Consultants, Ltd. · filed 2025-10-29(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Gorbatov v Tsirelman, 155 AD3d 836, 837; see MJ Lilly Assoc., LLC v Ovis Creative, LLC, 221 AD3d 805, 807).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gubenko v. Maderni · filed 2025-10-31(a)(7)

When a party moves pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss an action, the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action ( see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]). In deciding the motion, the court must accept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Capital One Bank, N.A. v. Wisdom · filed 2025-11-07(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the court will "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Coniglio v. Dansker & Aspromonte Assoc. · filed 2025-11-12(a)(7)

"When deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Ofman v Richland , 234 AD3d 865, 866 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Rudovic v Law Off. of Timothy A. Green , 200 AD3d 814, 815).

When a court considers evidentiary material on a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), it asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, rather than whether the complaint states one.

Matter of Jaloza v. New York City Dept. of Educ. · filed 2025-11-19(a)(7)

Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one ( see Margarita v Mountain Time Health, LLC , 240 AD3d 584, 585). Here, the petitioner's conclusory assertions that the City respondents discriminated against her based on her religion and disability were unsupported by factual allegations sufficient to sustain a cause of action under either the New York State Human Rights Law or the New York City Human Rights Law ( see Shahid v City of New York , 231 AD3d 888, 888).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint’s factual allegations, read together, state a legally cognizable cause of action.

City of New York v. Tuesdai Family Irrevocable Living Trust · filed 2025-11-19(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law[,] a motion for dismissal will fail" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint and accepts as true the facts alleged in it and in submissions opposing dismissal.

Berman v. Sosman · filed 2025-11-19(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "'the court should liberally construe the complaint, and accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and any submissions in opposition to the motion to dismiss'" ( Benjamin v Yeroushlami , 212 AD3d 758, 760, quoting Houtenbos v Fordune Assn., Inc. , 200 AD3d 662, 664).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept the pleaded facts as true and determine whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Sapp v. Annucci · filed 2025-11-20(a)(7)

As to the claims made against the Acting Commissioner, "[o]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a claim, the facts as alleged by petitioner in the pleading are accepted as true, and the court must determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Matter of White v Annucci , 161 AD3d 1428, 1429 [3d Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Johnson v Bruen , 187 AD3d 1294, 1294 [3d Dept 2020]). ... Accordingly, insofar as DOCCS's only option "is to comply with the plain terms of the last commitment order received" ( Matter of Murray v Goord , 1 NY3d at 32), we agree with Supreme Court that the petition fails to state a cause of action against the Acting Commissioner.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its factual allegations as true, and asks whether they state any cognizable cause of action.

Richardson v. Tops Mkts., LLC · filed 2025-11-21(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law[,] a motion for dismissal will fail" ( McCarthy v Shah , 162 AD3d 1727, 1728 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Lee v. Sapphire Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing of Cent. Queens, LLC · filed 2025-11-26(a)(7)

Generally, on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is afforded a liberal construction, the allegations are accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court determines whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Connolly v Long Is. Power Auth. , 30 NY3d 719, 728; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ho v. Sapphire Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing of Cent. Queens, LLC · filed 2025-11-26(a)(7)

Generally, on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is afforded a liberal construction, the allegations are accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court determines whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Connolly v Long Is. Power Auth. , 30 NY3d 719, 728; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Burke v. Sapphire Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing of Cent. Queens, LLC · filed 2025-11-26(a)(7)

Generally, on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is afforded a liberal construction, the allegations are accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court determines whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Connolly v Long Is. Power Auth. , 30 NY3d 719, 728; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

J.K. v. Viscardi Ctr., Inc. · filed 2025-12-03(a)(7)

"'[O]n a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Bernstein v Jacobson , 238 AD3d 1102, 1103, quoting 17 Lexington Ave., LLC v Alison Six Star, LLC , 229 AD3d 484, 486; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the pleader every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Heres v. Reese · filed 2025-12-03(a)(7)

"In reviewing a motion to dismiss a counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must accept as true the facts as alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Liptis Pharms. USA, Inc. v Liptis for Pharms. & Med. Prods., SAE , 228 AD3d 927, 928 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Calixto v. A. Balsamo & Rosenblatt, P.C. · filed 2025-12-03(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

ANS 1 Corp. v. Yosef · filed 2025-12-03(a)(7)

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, "the court must 'accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Rudovic v Law Off. of Timothy A. Green , 200 AD3d 814, 815, quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to construe the pleading liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the nonmovant every favorable inference.

Ark Rests. Corp. v. Bryant Park Corp. · filed 2025-12-08(a)(7)

"When reviewing a [party's] motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action [pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7)], a court must give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true and provide [the non-movant] with the benefit of every favorable inference."

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Remy v. Bellone · filed 2025-12-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "'the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Neurological Surgery, P.C. v Group Health Inc. , 224 AD3d 697, 698, quoting Bono v Stim & Warmuth, P.C. , 215 AD3d 911, 911).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), each allegation in a child protective petition need not establish the entire cause of action, but allegations must relate to the child's abuse or neglect.

Matter of H.R. (L.R.) · filed 2025-12-12(a)(7)

While the court agrees with the AFC that not every paragraph in the allegations has to support the entire cause of action, the allegations do need to relate to the abuse or neglect of the child. ... Based on the foregoing, the motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is granted in that the allegations in paragraphs 3(d) & (e) are dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal is warranted when the alleged facts and reasonable inferences do not support an enforceable cause of action.

Todd R. v. Rensselaer City Sch. Dist. · filed 2025-12-17(a)(7)

Dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is warranted if Plaintiffs fail to assert facts in support of an element of the claim or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn therefrom do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery ( see Connaughton , 29 NY3d at 142; see also Horowitz v Fallon , 204 AD3d 1177, 1178 [3d Dept 2022]). ... Given the facts as alleged in the Verified Complaint and the liberal construction that must be afforded to a pleading on a motion to dismiss, the Court finds that the Verified Complaint is not defective insofar as intent can be inferred and ascertained from the facts and circumstances as described by Plaintiffs.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Thomson v. Watchtower Bible · filed 2025-12-17(a)(7)

"In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Bono v Stim & Warmuth, P.C. , 215 AD3d 911, 911 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept the complaint's facts as true, give the nonmoving party every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

De La Roca v. Schacht · filed 2025-12-18(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss, courts "must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Van Amburgh v Boadle , 231 AD3d 187, 189 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations receive every favorable inference; allegations adequately connecting wrongdoing to abuse of the corporate form can withstand dismissal.

Owens v. New Empire Corp. · filed 2025-12-04(a)(7)

Giving plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference at the pleading stage, these allegations adequately connect the alleged wrongdoing to abuse of the corporate form and are therefore sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts a counterclaim’s alleged facts as true and decides whether they fit a cognizable legal theory; vague and conclusory allegations of an implied contract do not suffice.

Oppenheimer v. Machinist · filed 2025-12-22(a)(7)

As the Second Department held recently, "On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint [or counterclaim] as true, afford the plaintiff [or defendant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory." ... Moreover, defendant's allegations of "oral and written communications" are too vague and conclusory to create an implied contract.

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the court gives the complaint every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Keenan v. Bloomberg L.P. · filed 2025-12-23(a)(7)

Affording plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference on this pre-answer motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7), the complaint states a cause of action for discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of the New York State and New York City Human Rights laws ( see Ferraro , 115 AD3d at 497).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept the complaint’s facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

White Mgt. Corp. v. Mountain Mart 105, LLC · filed 2025-12-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wade v. County of Monroe · filed 2025-12-23(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), '[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any [*2]cognizable legal theory' " ( Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill , Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141 [2017], quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Trinh v. Nguyen · filed 2025-12-23(a)(7)

With respect to the alternative grounds for dismissal that the court appropriately considered pursuant to our remittal directive, "when a court rules on a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, it 'must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory' " ( Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners , L.P. v Superior Well Servs. , Inc. , 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]; see Bisimwa v St. John Fisher Coll. , 194 AD3d 1467, 1469 [4th Dept 2021]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court views the complaint and any submitted evidence in the plaintiff's favor and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Aguilar v. Wishner · filed 2025-12-24(a)(7)

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and according it every possible favorable inference, as we must, we find that the complaint, as supplemented by the extrinsic material proffered by Wishner and HMG, states a cause of action upon which the relief sought may be granted ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]; People v Torres , 220 AD3d at 515).

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court construes the petition favorably to the petitioner and accepts its factual allegations as true.

Yorkville Plaza Assoc. LLC v. Guo · filed 2025-12-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the petition "must be construed in the light most favorable to [petitioner] and all factual allegations must be accepted as true." ( Burrows v 75-25 153rd St., LLC , 44 NY3d 74, 83 [2025]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the alleged facts state a cause of action, accepting them as true and drawing favorable inferences for the plaintiff.

Raphael v. Schwan's Consumer Brands, Inc. · filed 2025-12-30(a)(7)

When a party moves pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss an action, the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action ( see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]). In deciding the motion, the court must accept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see IntegrateNYC, Inc. v State of NY , — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 05870, *2 [2025]; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), counterclaims survive dismissal when their allegations sufficiently apprise the parties and the court of the matters in controversy.

Best Work Holdings (N.Y.), LLC v. Jia (Ivy) Ma · filed 2025-12-30(a)(7)

The allegations supporting the counterclaims were sufficient to apprise the parties and the court of the matters in controversy so as to survive dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Foley v D'Agostino , 21 AD2d 60, 64-66 [1st Dept 1964]).