N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3126

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer for incomplete discovery when the record supports an inference that the failure was willful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Marrero v. City of New York · filed 2001-10-11

In this medical malpractice/wrongful death action, the motion court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendants’ answer since the record before the court did not justify the inference that defendants’ failure to complete discovery had been willful, contumacious or in bad faith (see, Tsai v Hernandez, 284 AD2d 116).

An inadequate discovery response without a showing of willful or contumacious conduct can support a conditional order striking an answer if the party fails to provide the required disclosure.

Abbadessa v. Sprint · filed 2002-02-04(3)

Although Sprint’s response was inadequate, there was no showing that it was guilty of willful or contumacious behavior (see, Martin v Hall, 283 AD2d 615; Mohammed v 919 Park Place Owners Corp., 245 AD2d 351; Sparacino v Minnet, 212 AD2d 522; Gross v Edmer Sanitary Supply Co., 201 AD2d 390; Goens v Vogelstein, 146 AD2d 606).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party’s failure to obey disclosure orders is willful and contumacious.

Emanuel v. Broadway Mall Properties, Inc. · filed 2002-04-29

Here, Broadway’s failure to comply with two court orders directing disclosure, and its protracted delay in providing a partial response to the plaintiffs discovery demands, which were not adequately explained by the additional facts submitted on renewal, supported an inference that its failure to provide disclosure was willful and contumacious (see Brandes v Pirnie-Baker, J.V., 288 AD2d 413; Poulas v U-Haul Intl., supra; Nicoletti v Ozram Transp., supra; Kingsley v Kantor, 265 AD2d 529). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking Broadway’s answer.

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when repeated failures to comply with disclosure orders are willful and the party offers no reasonable excuse.

Montgomery v. City of New York · filed 2002-07-01(3)

Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the answer should have been granted in its entirety, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for an inquest on the issue of damages.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for willful failure to disclose, but a party’s inability to obtain a file from another law firm does not warrant that remedy.

Schrader v. Sunnyside Corp. · filed 2002-08-26

Here, the lack of requested information was due to the defendant’s inability to obtain a specific file located in another law firm’s office in Louisiana, and not a willful or contumacious refusal on defendant’s part. Accordingly, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading would have been inappropriate, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs cross motion to strike the defendant’s answer.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading when a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Penafiel v. Puretz · filed 2002-10-15

“While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of the Supreme Court’s discretion (see, Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806; Soto v City of Long Beach, 197 AD2d 615, 616), striking a pleading is appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith” (Birch Hill Farm v Reed, 272 AD2d 282).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party willfully fails to comply with a disclosure order; repeated failures to appear for a deposition with inadequate excuses can establish that conduct.

Bates v. Baez · filed 2002-11-12

To invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, the Supreme Court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent. The willful and contumacious character of a party’s conduct can be inferred from his or her repeated failures to appear for examination before trial, coupled with inadequate excuses for these defaults.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to comply with court-ordered discovery demands.

Robertucci v. Heier · filed 2002-11-12

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a defendant’s answer for ignoring orders directing disclosure.

Automotive Manufacturing & Supply Co. v. Saccullo · filed 2002-12-02

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 which was to strike the answer of the defendant Salvatore Saccullo for failure to comply with discovery demands, since Saccullo ignored the orders of the Supreme Court directing disclosure (see CPLR 3126; Montgomery v City of New York, 296 AD2d 386; Lavi v Lavi, 256 AD2d 602).

Striking a pleading under CPLR 3126(3) requires a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Hollymount Corp. v. Myung J. Park Corp. · filed 2002-12-16(3)

The drastic remedy of striking a pleading is inappropriate, however, absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Barth v City of New York, 294 AD2d 386, 387; Kaplan v Emmett, 265 AD2d 307).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a complaint when plaintiffs refuse to obey an order directing disclosure.

Gomez v. Gateway Demolition Corp. · filed 2002-04-22(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the motion of the defendants Gateway Demolition Corp. and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (hereinafter the defendants), which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) to strike the complaint insofar as asserted against them for refusal to obey an order directing disclosure.

Section 3126 does not warrant striking an answer unless the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Foncette v. LA Express · filed 2002-06-17

The “drastic remedy” of striking an answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 is unwarranted absent a “clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious or in bad faith” (Fellin v Sahgal, 268 AD2d 456; see Poulas v U-Haul Intl., 288 AD2d 202; Patterson v Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 284 AD2d 382).

CPLR 3126 gives courts discretion to strike an answer when a party repeatedly disobeys disclosure orders or fails to appear for depositions without adequate excuse.

Alizio v. Alizio · filed 2002-12-23

The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 against a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” is a matter within the discretion of the Supreme Court (CPLR 3126; see Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711). The wilful and contumacious conduct of the defendant Joseph Alizio may be inferred from his repeated failure, over a period of three years, to comply with numerous court orders requiring production of documents and his failure to appear at depositions without adequate excuse (see Dacey v Horror Café, 293 AD2d 511; Nowak v Veira, 289 AD2d 383). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to strike the answer of the defendant Joseph Alizio.

Section 3126 does not support striking an answer for failure to appear at a deposition without a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Balla v. Jones · filed 2002-12-30

Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 seeking to strike the answer of defendant in the event that she failed to appear for a deposition within 30 days of the court’s order directing her to comply with plaintiff’s notice of deposition and in denying defendant’s cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a) seeking a protective order. ... Here, there was no “clear showing that [defendant’s] failure to comply with [the notice of deposition was] willful, contumacious, or in bad faith” (Birch Hill Farm v Reed, 272 AD2d 282, 282).

Section 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands when the failure is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Bach v. City of New York · filed 2003-04-21(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the answer of the defendants City of New York and New York City Police Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as the City) for the City’s failure to comply with discovery demands (see CPLR 3126 [3]). Actions should be resolved on their merits whenever possible, and the drastic remedy of the striking of a pleading should not be employed without a showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Byrne v City of New York, 301 AD2d 489 [2003]; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]; Cruzatti v St. Mary’s Hosp., 193 AD2d 579 [1993]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s pleading for refusing to comply with disclosure orders or wilfully failing to disclose required information.

Cespedes v. Mike & Jac Trucking Corp. · filed 2003-05-15(3)

CPLR 3126 (3) allows a court to sanction a party that refuses to comply with disclosure orders or wilfully fails to disclose information that the court concludes should have been disclosed, including the sanction of striking that party’s pleadings.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands when there is a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad faith conduct.

Mylonas v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 2003-05-19

Here, while the Supreme Court took note of several factors which raised an inference that Hampton Coach’s destruction of the subject evidence and resulting inability to comply with discovery demands were deliberate, there was insufficient proof to conclusively establish that it acted willfully, contumaciously, or in bad faith.

Section 3126(3) gives the trial court discretion to strike a pleading for failure to provide discovery.

Pashayan v. Corson · filed 2003-06-02(3)

It is well settled that the determination of whether or not to strike a pleading lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see CPLR 3126 [3]).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike counterclaims in part when a party willfully refuses to permit an inspection ordered during discovery.

Lakewood Construction Co. v. Brody · filed 2003-11-21(3)

Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in striking the counterclaims in part as a sanction for Brody’s willful refusal to permit an inspection of the laundry room floor, as directed in the prior order of discovery (see CPLR 3126 [3]; see generally Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122 [1999]; Leone v Esposito, 299 AD2d 930 [2002], lv dismissed 99 NY2d 611 [2003]; Blake v Chawla, 299 AD2d 437, 440 [2002]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading or precluding evidence for failure to comply with a disclosure order only when the conduct is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Mangiapane v. Brookhaven Beach Health Related Facility · filed 2003-05-27

However, to invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, or of preclusion, a court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see Patterson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 284 AD2d 516 [2001]; Cianciolo v Trism Spedalized Carriers, 274 AD2d 369 [2000]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to conditionally strike a defendant’s answer for failing to appear for a deposition, while allowing time to comply.

Sedano v. Campos · filed 2003-08-14(3)

The plaintiff moves for an order striking the defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) for the defendants’ alleged refusal to obey a prior order of this court. ... The refusal of defendant Eisenhower Ortega to appear for deposition, while perhaps strategically sound, has been clearly willful. The plaintiffs motion is therefore conditionally granted.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for willful failure to comply with disclosure orders.

Dweck Law Firm v. Mann · filed 2003-12-09

The court properly exercised its discretion in striking the answer and affixing the lien based on defendant Mann’s willful failure to comply with numerous disclosure orders (CPLR 3126; Emanuel v Broadway Mall Props., 293 AD2d 708 [2002]; Ortiz v Weaver, 188 AD2d 290 [1992]).

CPLR 3126 permits an answer to be stricken for willfully and contumaciously withholding documents and defying a discovery order; the party seeking that sanction bears the burden of proof.

Briggs v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2003-11-10

In addition, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of its motion which was to strike Allstate’s answer pursuant to CPLR 3126. The plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of proving that Allstate willfully and contumaciously withheld documents and defied a discovery order (see Patterson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 284 AD2d 516 [2001]; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]; Parish Constr. Corp. v Franlo Tile, 215 AD2d 545 [1995]).

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for a discovery violation only when the failure to comply was willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Concordia General Contracting Co. v. Roberta · filed 2004-02-23

However, to invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, the Supreme Court must determine that the failure to comply with discovery was willful, deliberate, and contumacious (see Olmoz v Town of Fishkill, 258 AD2d 447 [1999]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party’s failure to comply with discovery is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Beneficial Mortgage Corp. v. Lawrence · filed 2004-03-01

Although striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467 [1997]).

Section 3126 requires a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad faith discovery noncompliance before a court strikes a pleading.

Gentle v. State · filed 2004-04-16

“To impose the drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126, there must be a clear showing that a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith” ... Accordingly, upon consideration of the oral argument and review of the papers submitted, claimant’s motion is denied to the extent that it seeks to strike defendant’s answer.

CPLR 3126 allows a court to strike an answer for a discovery failure only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Morano v. Westchester Paving & Sealing Corp. · filed 2004-05-03

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 are matters of discretion (see Birch Hill Farm v Reed, 272 AD2d 282 [2000]), “the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith” (Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374, 375 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467 [1997]).

Section 3126 authorizes a court to strike a party’s pleadings for refusing to obey a disclosure order or willfully withholding information the court finds should have been disclosed.

Alto v. Gilman Management Corp. · filed 2004-05-17

A court is authorized to strike the pleadings of a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when repeated failures to obey disclosure orders establish willful and contumacious conduct and the party offers no reasonable excuse.

Mendez v. City of New York · filed 2004-05-24(3)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the motion of the defendant Varsity Transit, Inc. (hereinafter Varsity), and the plaintiffs cross motion which were to strike the answer of the defendants City of New York and Board of Education of the City of New York (hereinafter collectively the City). The City’s willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from its repeated failure to comply with court orders directing disclosure, and the inadequate excuses offered for its default (see Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806 [1999]).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike a complaint when a party’s continued failure to comply with discovery requests and a court-ordered stipulation is willful, contumacious, and in bad faith.

My Carpet, Inc. v. Bruce Supply Corp. · filed 2004-06-01(3)

The plaintiff’s continued failure to comply with discovery requests, and a so-ordered stipulation to satisfy those requests, was willful, contumacious, and in bad faith (see Beneficial Mtge. Corp. v Lawrence, 5 AD3d 339 [2004]). Therefore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking the plaintiffs complaint as a sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) (see Yona v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 285 AD2d 460, 461 [2001]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer and enter judgment for willful and contumacious discovery noncompliance.

Whitley v. Industrial Funding Corp. · filed 2004-06-14

We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in denying her motion to strike the amended answer of Kenneth Fieri (defendant) pursuant to CPLR 3126 and for judgment against him, and thus we modify the order accordingly.

CPLR 3126 gives a court discretion to deny a motion to strike an answer for failure to comply with discovery orders when the moving party waived the deposition at issue by filing a note of issue without leave to take it afterward.

Malloy v. Madison Forty-Five Co. · filed 2004-12-02

HRH and Madison moved for summary judgment and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and for an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 striking defendants’ answers for failing to comply with discovery orders. ... For similar reasons, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to strike defendants’ answers for failure to comply with discovery orders.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when the moving party clearly shows willful, contumacious, or bad-faith failure to comply with disclosure and the opposing party offers no reasonable excuse.

Reidel v. Ryder TRS, Inc. · filed 2004-12-16(3)

A court may strike an answer only when the moving party establishes “a clear showing that the failure to comply is willful, contumacious or in bad faith” (Palmenta v Columbia Univ., 266 AD2d 90, 91 [1999]). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a reasonable excuse (Furniture Fantasy v Cerrone, 154 AD2d 506, 507 [1989]; see Williamson v City of New York, 249 AD2d 248 [1998]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with disclosure orders only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious; repeated noncompliance can support that inference.

Lanc v. Donnelly · filed 2004-12-27

It is well established that the striking of pleadings and dismissal of an action pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Rowell v Joyce, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]). Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs repeated failure to comply with orders directing disclosure supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike an answer when a party’s failure to comply with discovery is willful and the party offers no reasonable excuse.

Hill v. Tejbir Singh Oberoi, D.D.S. · filed 2004-12-30(3)

Plaintiff met her initial burden of establishing willful, contumacious or bad faith conduct by defendant, thereby shifting the burden to defendant to offer a reasonable excuse (see Herrera v City of New York, 238 AD2d 475, 476 [1997]). Defendant failed to meet his burden (see Nunn v GTE Sylvania, 251 AD2d 1089, 1091 [1998]). Thus we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion by striking the answer.

Striking a pleading under section 3126 is a drastic discovery sanction warranted when a party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Suto v. Folkes Heating, Cooling & Burner Service, Inc. · filed 2005-02-14

Striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy which is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful and contumacious ... In the instant case, the Supreme Court did not find that the plaintiffs’ conduct was willful and contumacious, nor would such a finding be supported by the record.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for willful and contumacious discovery noncompliance, which may be inferred from repeated failures to comply and inadequate explanations.

Schwartz v. Suebsanguan · filed 2005-02-22

Although dismissal of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Rowell v Joyce, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]; Beneficial Mtge. Corp. v Lawrence, 5 AD3d 339 [2004]; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467 [1997]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Lombardo v. St. Francis Hospital Rehabilitation Services · filed 2005-03-07

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking the complaint absent a clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Centerport Ins. Agency v Atlantic Fabricators of Rhode Is., 277 AD2d 414 [2000]; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663 [1995]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading as a discretionary sanction for willful failure to provide discovery or obey a disclosure order.

Devito v. J & J Towing, Inc. · filed 2005-04-25(3)

A court may, inter alia, strike the “pleadings or parts thereof’ (CPLR 3126 [3]) as a sanction against a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed [upon notice]” (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 (3) permits a court to strike a pleading for nondisclosure only when the discovery default is conclusively shown to be deliberate or contumacious.

Wetzler v. Sisters of Charity Hospital · filed 2005-04-29(3)

It is well established that the sanction of striking a pleading for nondisclosure pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) “should be granted only where it is conclusively shown that the discovery default was deliberate or contumacious” (Gadley v U.S. Sugar Co., 259 AD2d 1041, 1042 [1999]; see Osinski v Taefi, 13 AD3d 1205, 1206 [2004]; Netti v Auburn Enlarged City School Dist., 309 AD2d 1143 [2003]). No such showing was made here.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading when a party’s failure to comply with discovery is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Frost Line Refrigeration, Inc. v. Frunzi · filed 2005-05-23

Although striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic ...remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Beneficial Mtge. Corp. v Lawrence, 5 AD3d 339 [2004]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for discovery noncompliance, but that sanction requires a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith conduct.

Kuzmin v. Visiting Nurse Service · filed 2005-10-17(3)

In this case, the record does not reveal willful and contumacious disobedience of a prior court order respecting discovery and therefore the extreme relief granted by the Supreme Court was inappropriate (see Vogel v Benwil Indus., 267 AD2d 232 [1999]).

Section 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for a discovery failure only upon a showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Euro-Central Corp. v. Dalsimer, Inc. · filed 2005-10-31(3)

Upon reargument and renewal, the plaintiffs cross motion to strike the appellant’s answer based upon his failure to comply with discovery demands should have been denied (see CPLR 3126 [3]). Actions should be resolved on their merits whenever possible, and the drastic remedy of the striking of a pleading should not be employed without a showing that the failure to comply with, discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Rowell v Joyce, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]; Beneficial Mtge. Corp. v Lawrence, 5 AD3d 339 [2004]; Bach v City of New York, 304 AD2d 686 [2003]; Byrne v City of New York, 301 AD2d 489 [2003]).

Section 3126 permits preclusion of evidence for a pattern of noncompliance with discovery orders, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Du Valle v. Swan Lake Resort Hotel, LLC · filed 2006-02-09

Here, based upon plaintiffs pattern of noncompliance, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the order of preclusion.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery when the resisting party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Ashkenazy v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2006-03-14

The drastic remedy of striking a party’s pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with a discovery order or request should be granted where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713 [1986]; cf. Xina v City of New York, 13 AD3d 440, 441 [2004]; Kroll v Parkway Plaza Joint Venture, 10 AD3d 633, 633-634 [2004]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer and counterclaims as a discretionary sanction.

Saberhagen v. Sweeney · filed 2006-04-25(3)

Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendants’ answer and counterclaims (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kim v Harrison, 287 AD2d 547, 548 [2001]; Nicoletti v Ozram Transp., 286 AD2d 719 [2001]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Mawson v. Historic Properties, LLC · filed 2006-06-13

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking the complaint and reply to the counterclaims absent a clear showing that the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Lombardo v St. Francis Hosp. Rehabilitation Servs., 16 AD3d 385 [2005]; Centerport Ins. Agency v Atlantic Fabricators of Rhode Is., 277 AD2d 414 [2000]; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party’s failure to comply with discovery is willful and contumacious.

Powell v. Cipollaro · filed 2006-11-14

Although striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Beneficial Mtge. Corp. v Lawrence, 5 AD3d 339 [2004]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Russo v. Tolchin · filed 2006-12-05

Thus, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff s motion which was to vacate so much of the order dated March 9, 2005, as granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to preclude him from introducing evidence in support of his claims or defenses and to dismiss the complaint.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Nieves v. City of New York · filed 2006-12-12

The drastic remedy of striking a pleading is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious (see Jenkins v City of New York, 13 AD3d 342 [2004]; Simpson v City of New York, 10 AD3d 601, 603 [2004]; Decavallas v Pappantoniou, 300 AD2d 617, 618 [2002]; Mohammed v 919 Park Place Owners Corp., 245 AD2d 351, 352 [1997]).

Striking a pleading under CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with discovery demands requires a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

E.W. Howell Co. v. S.A.F. La Sala Corp. · filed 2007-01-16

In order to impose the drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126, there must be a clear showing that a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Pulsone v North Shore Towers Apts. Inc., 29 AD3d 883 [2006]; Pepsico, Inc. v Winterthur Intl. Am. Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 742 [2005]; Assael v Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 4 AD3d 443 [2004]; Mylonas v Town of Brookhaven, 305 AD2d 561 [2003]). Here, the appellants failed to make such a showing.

Striking a complaint under § 3126(3) is unwarranted when the plaintiff substantially complies with discovery and the record shows no willful or contumacious failure to comply.

Newell v. Ford Motor Credit Co. · filed 2007-01-16(3)

The drastic remedy of striking the complaint was not warranted here because the plaintiff substantially complied with the notice of discovery and inspection of the defendant J.R.’s Towing and Recovery Incorporated, and the record does not show that the plaintiff willfully or contumaciously failed to comply with the court’s order entered October 17, 2005 (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643, 643-644 [2005]; Pascarelli v City of New York, 16 AD3d 472 [2005]; Diel v Rosenfeld, 12 AD3d 558, 559 [2004]; Byrne v City of New York, 301 AD2d 489, 490 [2003]; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]).

Section 3126 does not warrant striking an answer for destroyed evidence when proof of wilful and contumacious conduct is insufficient.

Friel v. Papa · filed 2007-01-23

Moreover, dismissal was also unwarranted pursuant to CPLR ... 3126, as there was insufficient proof to conclusively establish that the defendants acted wilfully and contumaciously (see Kerman v Martin Friedman, C.P.A., P.C., 21 AD3d 997 [2005]; Mylonas v Town of Brookhaven, supra at 563; Klein v Ford Motor Co., supra at 378).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s pleading when the party willfully fails to comply with disclosure obligations.

Nunez v. City of New York · filed 2007-02-06(3)

A court is authorized to strike the pleadings of a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126 [3]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading when a party willfully and contumaciously refuses to comply with court-ordered disclosure.

Nicolia Ready Mix, Inc. v. Fernandes · filed 2007-02-13(3)

A court is authorized to strike the pleadings of a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126 [3]). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking the defendant’s answer since the defendant’s refusal to comply with the court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious.

CPLR 3126 dismissal requires a showing that the party wilfully and contumaciously failed to comply with a discovery order or delayed discovery.

Chrostowski v. Chow · filed 2007-02-20

The court also properly denied that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126, as the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiffs wilfully and contumaciously failed to comply with the compliance conference order or delayed the progress of discovery (see Faulkner v City of New York, 32 AD3d 452 [2006]; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643, 643-644 [2005]; Pascarelli v City of New York, 16 AD3d 472 [2005]).

CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery demands before a court strikes a pleading.

Bjorke v. Rubenstein · filed 2007-03-13

To impose the drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126, there must be a clear showing that a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious (see Mylonas v Town of Brookhaven, 305 AD2d 561, 562-563 [2003]). Here, the appellants failed to make such a showing.

Striking a pleading under CPLR 3126(3) requires a conclusive showing that the discovery default was deliberate or contumacious; a lesser sanction may be imposed when that showing is absent.

Hussain v. Nowak · filed 2007-03-16(3)

“It is well established that the sanction of striking a pleading for nondisclosure pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) ‘should be granted only where it is conclusively shown that the discovery default was deliberate or ...contumacious,’ ” and plaintiffs failed to make that showing (Wetzler v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 17 AD3d 1088, 1089 [2005], amended on rearg on other grounds 20 AD3d 944 [2005]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s pleadings for willful and contumacious failure to comply with document discovery orders.

Santoli v. 475 Ninth Avenue Associates, LLC · filed 2007-03-27

We conclude that the IAS court properly exercised its discretion under CPLR 3126 in declining to vacate the striking of VJB’s answer and third-party complaint.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the conduct is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Carbajal v. Bobo Robo, Inc. · filed 2007-03-27

Before invoking the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, however, the “court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent” (Reyes v Vanderbilt, supra at 392; see CPLR 3126; Viteritti v Gelfand, 289 AD2d 566, 567 [2001]; Solomon v Horie Karate Dojo, 283 AD2d 480, 480-481 [2001]; Cianciolo v Trism Specialized, Carriers, 274 AD2d 369, 370 [2000]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Prappas v. Papadatos · filed 2007-03-27(3)

“[The] drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious”

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when repeated failures to obey disclosure orders and inadequate excuses show willful and contumacious conduct.

Maiorino v. City of New York · filed 2007-04-10(3)

Here, the defendant’s willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from its repeated failures to comply with court orders directing disclosure (see Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806 [1999]; see also Kryzhanovskaya v City of New York, 31 AD3d 717, 718 [2006]; Careccia v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 18 AD3d 793 [2005]; Montgomery v City of New York, 296 AD2d 386, 386-387 [2002]) and the inadequate excuses offered to justify the defaults (see Porreco v Selway, 225 AD2d 752, 753 [1996]). Accordingly, that branch of the plaintiff’s subsequent motion which was to strike the answer should have been granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for an inquest on the issue of damages.

Section 3126(3) does not warrant striking an answer for failure to answer interrogatories without a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Gateway Title & Abstract, Inc. v. Your Home Funding, Inc. · filed 2007-05-22(3)

The drastic remedy of striking the defendants’ answer was not warranted because, among other things, there was no clear showing that the defendants’ failure to timely answer the plaintiffs first set of interrogatories was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; ...).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands absent a showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Tine v. Courtview Owners Corp. · filed 2007-05-22

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint absent a showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Lombardo v St. Francis Hosp. Rehabilitation Servs., 16 AD3d 385, 386 [2005]; Centerport Ins. Agency v Atlantic Fabricators of Rhode Is., 277 AD2d 414, 415 [2000]; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]).

Striking an answer under CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Gillen v. Utica First Insurance · filed 2007-06-19

While the nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed is a matter that rests within the court’s discretion (see Soto v City of Long Beach, 197 AD2d 615, 616 [1993]; Spira v Antoine, 191 AD2d 219 [1993]), “striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands [was] willful, contumacious or in bad faith” (Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]). Here, contrary to the contention of the plaintiff, he failed to make a clear showing that the defendant’s failure to answer the interrogatories was in bad faith.

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike an answer for a sustained pattern of noncompliance with discovery demands and court orders.

Dyer v. Armor Kone Elevator, Inc. · filed 2007-06-26(3)

The motion court properly exercised its discretion in striking third-party defendant’s answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) in light of that party’s pattern of noncompliance with court orders and discovery demands over a six-year period (see Jones v Green, 34 AD3d 260 [2006]; Goldstein v CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 30 AD3d 217 [2006]; Min Yoon v Costello, 29 AD3d 407 [2006]; see also Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]).

Section 3126 does not warrant striking a party’s answer for failing to produce records the party never possessed and had no duty to preserve or control.

Lewis v. City of New York · filed 2007-09-14

Since he had no responsibility or control over the preservation, maintenance and storage of these records and was never in possession of a copy, it would be manifestly unjust to dismiss his answer or to impose any sanction.

Section 3126 does not warrant striking an answer for failure to provide disclosure without a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Voutsinas v. Voutsinas · filed 2007-09-25

While the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant had not yet provided some of the mandated disclosure in this action, the drastic remedy of striking the defendant’s answer was not warranted because there was no clear showing that his failure to do so was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Gateway Tit. & Abstract, Inc. v Your Home Funding, Inc., 40 AD3d 919 [2007]; Tine v Courtuiew Owners Corp., 40 AD3d 966 [2007]; Torres v Lowinger, 12 AD3d 363 [2004]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal for a discovery violation only when the failure to comply is willful and contumacious.

Joe DeMartino Mason Contractors & Sons, Inc. v. Main Plaza Realty Co. · filed 2007-10-09(3)

The record does not support the moving defendants’ contentions that the plaintiffs failure to respond to their demand for documents and to their notice to take a deposition was the result of willful and contumacious conduct. Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the respondents.

Section 3126 does not permit striking a pleading or precluding evidence when the unanswered discovery demands are improper.

Alpha Funding Group, Inc. v. Continental Funding, LLC · filed 2007-10-23

A motion to strike a pleading or for an order of preclusion or to compel discovery must be denied where discovery demands are overbroad, burdensome, or lack specificity, or seek irrelevant or confidential information (see Community Dev. Assn. v Warren-Hoffman & Assoc., 4 AD3d 755, 755 [2004]; Brandes v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 1 AD3d 550, 551 [2003]; Latture, 304 AD2d at 536; Gonzalez, 236 AD2d at 364).

Section 3126 permits striking a party’s answer for failure to comply with discovery orders when willful or contumacious conduct is clearly shown.

Delgado v. City of New York · filed 2008-01-29

The drastic remedy of striking defendants’ answers was properly denied for lack of a clear showing that defendants’ failure to comply with the court’s prior discovery orders was willful or contumacious (see CPLR 3126; see also Frye v City of New York, 228 AD2d 182 [1996]; Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459 [1987]).

Section 3126 permits striking a complaint for failure to comply with a discovery order only when the nondisclosure was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith.

Weissman v. 20 East 9th Street Corp. · filed 2008-02-07

The remedy of striking a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with a discovery order is appropriate only where the moving party demonstrates that the nondisclosure was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith (see Cespedes v Mike & Jac Trucking Corp., 305 AD2d 222 [2003]; Christian v City of New York, 269 AD2d 135 [2000]; McGilvery v New York City Tr. Auth., 213 AD2d 322, 324 [1995]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for repeated, unjustified noncompliance with discovery orders.

Couri v. Siebert · filed 2008-02-28(3)

Plaintiffs conduct in this litigation has been “dilatory, evasive, obstructive and ultimately contumacious” ... and, in the absence of any semblance of an excuse for his noncompliance with defendants’ legitimate discovery demands, warrants striking his pleading (CPLR 3126 [3]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for a discovery failure only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful or contumacious.

Anonymous v. Duane Reade, Inc. · filed 2008-03-04(3)

However, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading is not appropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful or contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]). Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, it has failed to make a clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to be deposed was willful or contumacious.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a defendant’s answer for failure to comply with discovery orders.

Carabello v. Luna · filed 2008-03-18(3)

Thus, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the answer of the defendant Delawar for failure to comply with discovery orders.

Section 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for a discovery violation only when there is a clear showing that the failure to comply was willful or contumacious.

Rocco v. Family Foot Center · filed 2008-03-25(3)

However, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading is not appropriate where, as here, there is no clear showing that the alleged failure to comply with discovery demands was willful or contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s pleadings for willful failure to comply with disclosure orders and discovery demands.

Colley v. Romas · filed 2008-04-17(3)

Accordingly, we conclude that Supreme Court acted within its broad discretion by first granting a conditional order of dismissal, and later finally dismissing his answer and counterclaims (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]; Du Valle v Swan Lake Resort Hotel, LLC, 26 AD3d 616, 617-618 [2006]; compare Matter of SDR Holdings v Town of Fort Edward, 290 AD2d 696, 698 [2002]).

Section 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for discovery noncompliance only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Novikov v. Maimonides Medical Center · filed 2008-04-22(3)

On the record presented, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the answer and amended answer of the defendant Maimonides Medical Center (hereinafter Maimonides) as they did not establish that Maimonides willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with discovery orders or demands, or delayed the progress of discovery.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for willful and contumacious discovery conduct; revoking an authorization in reliance on recent appellate authority did not warrant that remedy.

Braganza v. Harding · filed 2008-04-29

The injured plaintiffs revocation of his authorization permitting defense counsel to interview Dr. Sands, based upon recent appellate authority, did not constitute willful and contumacious conduct warranting the drastic remedy of the striking of a pleading (see CPLR 3126; A.F.C. *1079Enters., Inc. v New York City School Constr. Auth., 33 AD3d 737 [2006]; Bach v City of New York, 304 AD2d 686 [2003]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for a discovery violation only upon a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Cambry v. Gardens · filed 2008-04-29(3)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking the answer of the defendant Lincoln Gardens for failure to comply with discovery. A court in its discretion may strike the pleading of a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126). However, such a sanction is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful or contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643 [2005]; Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806 [1999]).

Section 3126(3) does not permit striking a pleading without a clear showing that the party failed to comply with discovery demands.

Arcade Contracting & Restoration, Inc. v. 24 Aqueduct Lane Condominium Ass'n · filed 2008-05-06(3)

However, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading is not appropriate where, as here, there is no clear showing of a failure to comply with discovery demands, much less a willful or contumacious failure to comply (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Dean v Usine Campagna, 44 AD3d 603, 605 [2007]; Estate of Ort v Ort, 41 AD3d 777 [2007]).

Section 3126(3) does not permit striking an answer without a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful or contumacious.

Melvin v. 24 Aqueduct Lane Condominium · filed 2008-05-13(3)

However, the drastic remedy of striking an answer is not appropriate where there is no clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful or contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]).

Section 3126 permits striking a complaint for discovery noncompliance only upon a clear showing that the conduct was willful or contumacious.

Myung Sum Suh v. Kim · filed 2008-05-20

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking the complaint, as there was no clear showing that the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with certain discovery demands and court-ordered discovery was willful or contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Manko v Lenox Hill Hosp., 44 AD3d 1014 [2007]; Mawson v Historic Props., LLC, 30 AD3d 480, 481 [2006]; Lombardo v St. Francis Hosp. Rehabilitation Servs., 16 AD3d 385, 386 [2005]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Novick v. DeRosa · filed 2008-05-20(3)

The drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Martin v City of New York, 46 AD3d 635, 636 [2007]; Bomzer v Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner Lambert Co., 41 AD3d 522 [2007]; cf. Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]).

Section 3126(3) gives trial courts discretion to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery orders.

Barniak v. Richter · filed 2008-06-17(3)

The determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery orders lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Maignan v Nahar, 37 AD3d 557 [2007]; Matter of Cohn, 15 AD3d 655 [2005]; Bates v Baez, 299 AD2d 382 [2002]; Patterson v Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 284 AD2d 382, 383 [2001]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for willful failure to disclose evidence, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Ernie Otto Corp. v. Inland Southeast Thompson Monticello, LLC · filed 2008-07-17(3)

Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion in striking the subject pleadings (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a complaint for failure to provide disclosure when the failure is willful or contumacious.

Steven L. Levitt & Associates, P.C. v. Balkin · filed 2008-08-19

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, there was no showing that the respondents willfully or contumaciously failed to comply with the appellants’ requests for disclosure so as to warrant the striking of the complaint (see CPLR 3126; Conciatori v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 46 AD3d 501 [2007]; Sau Ting Cheng v Prime Design Realty, Inc., 44 AD3d 644 [2007]; Resnick v Schwarzkopf, 41 AD3d 573 [2007]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading when repeated, unjustified noncompliance with disclosure orders supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Doherty v. Schuyler Hills, Inc. · filed 2008-10-30(3)

Defendant engaged in a pattern of noncompliance, without any suitable excuse, giving rise to an inference of willfulness and contumaciousness, thus justifying Supreme Court’s order striking the answer and entering a default judgment in plaintiffs’ favor (cf. Du Valle v Swan Lake Resort Hotel, LLC, 26 AD3d at 617-618; Cavanaugh v Russell Sage Coll., 4 AD3d at 660; compare Fraracci v Lasouska, 283 AD2d 735, 736-737 [2001]).

Section 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Comprehensive Care v. Romero · filed 2008-11-12(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the cross motion which was to strike the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with certain discovery demands. ... Here, the defendants failed to make a clear showing that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with certain discovery demands was willful and contumacious.

Section 3126 permits striking a defendant’s answer for a discovery failure only upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Argo v. Queens Surface Corp. · filed 2009-01-20(3)

Striking a defendant’s answer is a drastic remedy which is “inappropriate absent a clear showing that failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious” (Paca v City of New York, 51 AD3d 991, 993 [2008], quoting Brandes v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 22 AD3d 778 [2005]; see Jenkins v City of New York, 13 AD3d 342 [2004]).

Section 3126(3) does not warrant striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands absent a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad faith conduct.

Weber v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. · filed 2009-01-20(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) to strike the defendants’ answers and affirmative defenses for failure to comply with discovery demands.

Striking a complaint under CPLR 3126 can be too drastic a sanction for improper conduct at a deposition.

Parker v. Ollivierre · filed 2009-03-31

While the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to strike the complaint, as that remedy was too drastic a sanction (see Bjorke v Rubenstein, 38 AD3d 580, 581 [2007]), under the circumstances, the alternative branch of the cross motion, which was to compel the further deposition of the plaintiff under the supervision of a referee (see CPLR 3104), should have been granted.

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for willful failure to disclose, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Olmsted v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc. · filed 2009-04-23(3)

Finally, given these facts, we are unable to conclude that the remedy fashioned was an abuse of discretion (see CPLR 3126 [3]; see e.g. Adamski v Schuyler Hosp., Inc., 36 AD3d at 1200; O’Brien v Clark Equip. Co., 25 AD3d 958, 960 [2006]; Cavanaugh v Russell Sage Coll., 4 AD3d at 661).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders without reasonable excuse.

Savin v. Brooklyn Marine Park Development Corp. · filed 2009-04-28

Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking the appellants’ answer. The appellants repeatedly failed to comply with court orders directing the production of discovery documents and witnesses for examinations before trial, and failed to provide reasonable excuses to justify those failures.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with disclosure obligations only upon a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith conduct.

Gibbs v. St. Barnabas Hospital · filed 2009-04-30

Accordingly, the drastic sanction of striking a pleading is inappropriate without a clear showing that the failure to comply with disclosure obligations was willful, contumacious, or the result of bad faith (see Cespedes v Mike & Jac Trucking Corp., 305 AD2d 222 [2003]).

Section 3126 permits an answer to be struck when a party fails to adequately explain its failure to comply with discovery demands and court directives.

Caprio v. 1025 Manhattan Avenue Corp. · filed 2009-06-02

The defendants also failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense to the motion to strike their answers by offering an adequate explanation for their failure to fully and timely respond to the plaintiffs’ discovery demands and court directives requiring compliance with such demands (see Howe v Jeremiah, 51 AD3d 975 [2008]; Watson v Hall, 43 AD3d 435, 436 [2007]; Devito v J & J Towing, Inc., 17 AD3d 624 [2005]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint when repeated failure to comply with discovery demands and orders, without a reasonable excuse, supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Northfield Insurance v. Model Towing & Recovery · filed 2009-06-09

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendant Model Towing and Recovery which was to strike the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is granted.

CPLR 3126(3) gives the trial court discretion to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure.

Fishbane v. Chelsea Hall, LLC · filed 2009-09-15(3)

The determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Mir v Saad, 54 AD3d 914 [2008]; Bates v Baez, 299 AD2d 382 [2002]; Patterson v Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 284 AD2d 382 [2001]). Here, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendants’ answer.

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to deny dismissal for failure to comply with discovery.

Yanovsky v. 833 Flatbush, LLC · filed 2009-10-06

Further, the denial of Comjem’s motion to dismiss based upon a failure to comply with discovery was not an improvident exercise of discretion (see Cafaro v Emergency Servs. Holding, Inc., 11 AD3d 496 [2004]).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude evidence when repeated discovery noncompliance supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

In re the Estate of Scaccia · filed 2009-10-29

CPLR 3126 authorizes a trial court “to fashion an appropriate remedy when a party refuses to obey an order of disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information” (Cavanaugh v Russell Sage Coll., 4 AD3d 660, 660 [2004]; see Myers v Community Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County, 51 AD3d 1359, 1360 [2008]). ... Accordingly, we conclude that Surrogate’s Court acted within its broad discretion to sanction respondent with an order of preclusion (see Olmsted v Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 61 AD3d 1238, 1242 [2009]; Colley v Romas, 50 AD3d 1338, 1339 [2008]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike pleadings for willful and contumacious noncompliance with discovery demands and court orders.

B.E.N. Trading Corp. v. Shirley Import, Inc. · filed 2009-12-22

Defendants’ failure to offer a reasonable excuse for their noncompliance with discovery demands, court orders and the court’s rules gives rise to an inference of willful and contumacious conduct (Siegman v Rosen, 270 AD2d 14, 15 [2000]). The striking of their answer and third-party complaint was a proper exercise of judicial discretion in light of such conduct (CPLR 3126; see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party willfully, contumaciously, or in bad faith fails to obey a discovery order and offers no reasonable excuse.

Household Finance Realty Corp. v. Robinson · filed 2009-12-30

We also affirm the judgment insofar as it granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as a sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126. Defendant met his initial burden by establishing that plaintiff engaged in willful, contumacious or bad faith conduct by failing to comply with a court order concerning outstanding discovery demands, thereby shifting the burden to plaintiff to offer a reasonable excuse for its noncompliance, and plaintiff failed to meet that burden (see Hill v Oberoi, 13 AD3d 1095 [2004]).

Section 3126 permits striking a complaint for willful failure to comply with discovery deadlines.

Gal-Ed v. 153rd Street Associates, LLC · filed 2010-05-04

The striking of the complaint for willful failure to comply with discovery deadlines (CPLR 3126)—e.g., the July 11, 2007 preliminary conference order, the November 27, 2007 stipulation and the court’s February 13, 2008 directive—as well as defendants’ and the court’s repeated efforts to obtain discovery, was appropriate.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to deny a motion to strike a pleading when the discovery demands are overly broad, burdensome, and irrelevant.

Tornheim v. Blue & White Food Products Corp. · filed 2010-05-04(3)

Here, the plaintiffs discovery requests were overly broad and unduly burdensome. The plaintiff sought large numbers of documents that were irrelevant to his causes of action. The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s answer on the ground that the defendant failed to fully comply with these burdensome demands.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Lomax v. Rochdale Village, Inc. · filed 2010-09-21(3)

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122-123 [1999]; Bernal v Singh, 72 AD3d 716, 717 [2010]), the drastic remedy of striking a pleading is not appropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful or contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Moray v City of Yonkers, 76 AD3d 618 [2010]).

Serious illness that prevents a party from participating in litigation can warrant denial of a motion to strike under CPLR 3126.

Armin A. Meizlik Co. v. L&K Jewelry Inc. · filed 2009-12-15

The record also shows that at oral argument of the CPLR 3126 motion, cocounsel was prepared to immediately produce documents purportedly responsive to defendants’ demands, which documents were attached to defendants’ motion to vacate. The evidence of the individual defendant’s illness shows that she has been unable to participate in the litigation, and warrants denial of plaintiffs’ motion to strike (see Grabow v Blue Eyes, 123 AD2d 155 [1986]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer and counterclaim for wilful failure to comply with a disclosure order.

Youni Gems Corp. v. Bassco Creations Inc. · filed 2010-02-09(3)

The court properly struck defendants’ answer and counterclaim for their wilful failure to comply with the court’s disclosure order (see CPLR 3126 [3]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when the moving party clearly shows that failure to comply with disclosure orders was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Rodriguez v. United Bronx Parents, Inc. · filed 2010-02-16(3)

A court may strike an answer only when the moving party establishes “a clear showing that the failure to comply is willful, contumacious or in bad faith” (see Palmenta v Columbia Univ., 266 AD2d 90, 91 [1999]). ... Here, plaintiff established that defendant’s failure to comply was willful and contumacious, given its repeated and persistent failure to comply with five successive disclosure orders (see Goldstein v CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 30 AD3d 217 [2006]; Min Yoon v Costello, 29 AD3d 407 [2006]; compare Pascarelli v City of New York, 16 AD3d 472 [2005]).

CPLR 3126 (3) allows a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Pirro Group, LLC v. One Point Street, Inc. · filed 2010-03-02(3)

The drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Novick v DeRosa, 51 AD3d at 885; Suazo-Alvarez v Nordlaw, LLC, 48 AD3d 670 [2008]; McArthur v New York City Hous. Auth., 48 AD3d 431 [2008]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for refusal to obey a disclosure order or willful failure to disclose, but requires a clear showing of willful or contumacious noncompliance for that sanction.

Mazza v. Seneca · filed 2010-04-13

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion of the plaintiff Vincent Impeduglia (hereinafter the plaintiff), inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants’ answer. A court may strike an answer as a sanction if a defendant “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits striking an answer for discovery failures only upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Kitt v. Podlofsky · filed 2010-04-27(3)

We agree with the defendant that on the instant record, his conduct did not rise to the level of willful and contumacious, and that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) to strike the defendant’s answer should have been denied.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for significant discovery noncompliance without giving a further warning.

Fish & Richardson, P.C. v. Schindler · filed 2010-05-25

Defendant points to no authority holding that a court must issue such a “last chance” warning or order in all cases before exercising its discretion to strike a pleading. CPLR 3126 permits the court to “make such orders ... as are just,” and it may, in an appropriate case, determine that the pattern of noncompliance is so significant that a severe sanction is appropriate.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for a discovery violation, but that sanction requires a clear showing of willful or contumacious noncompliance.

Palomba v. Schindler Elevator Corp. · filed 2010-06-15

However, the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the defendant’s failure to comply with discovery demands was willful or contumacious (see Moray v City of Yonkers, 72 AD3d 766 [2010]; Pirro Group, LLC v One Point St., Inc., 71 AD3d 654, 655 [2010]; Dank v Sears Holding Mgt. Corp., 69 AD3d 557 [2010]).

CPLR 3126 allows a court, in its discretion, to strike an answer as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery.

Paterno v. Carroll · filed 2010-07-27

Contrary to Paterno’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of his cross motion which was to strike the Carrolls’ answer as a sanction for their alleged “willful and contumacious” failure to comply with discovery (see Negro v St. Charles Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., 44 AD3d 727, 728 [2007]; Gillen v Utica First Ins. Co., 41 AD3d 647, 648 [2007]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s answer for failing to appear at a court-ordered deposition, even if the party is outside New York and unavailable.

Riccuiti v. Consumer Product Services, LLC · filed 2010-03-09

The mere fact that Kowalski may have been outside the state of New York, and had made himself unavailable, did not preclude the Supreme Court from striking the answer insofar as interposed by him for failure to appear at a court-ordered deposition (see Carabello v Luna, 49 AD3d 679, 680 [2008]; Maignan v Nahar, 37 AD3d 557 [2007]).

CPLR 3126(3) does not warrant striking an answer for failure to attend a deposition without evidence of willful and contumacious nonappearance; preclusion of trial testimony may be appropriate.

Cobenas v. Ginsburg Development Companies, LLC · filed 2010-06-29(3)

In the absence of evidence that the appellant willfully and contumaciously failed to appear for an examination before trial, the Supreme Court should not have stricken his answer (see Cambry v Lincoln Gardens, 50 AD3d 1081 [2008]; Conciatori v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 46 AD3d 501 [2007]). The appropriate remedy was to preclude the appellant from offering any testimony at trial (see Patel v DeLeon, 43 AD3d 432 [2007]; Williams v Ryder TRS, Inc., 29 AD3d 784 [2006]).

Section 3126(3) does not warrant striking an answer for failure to appear for examinations before trial when the failure does not appear willful and contumacious.

Boeke v. Our Lady of Pompei School · filed 2010-05-11(3)

Contrary to OLP’s contention, the extreme sanction of striking the answer of the third-party defendants was not warranted because it does not appear that the third-party defendants willfully and contumaciously failed to appear for the examinations before trial (see Cestaro v Chin, 20 AD3d 500 [2005]; CPLR 3126 [3]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully and contumaciously fails to comply with court-ordered discovery.

Rawlings v. Gillert · filed 2010-11-09(3)

Contrary to the contention of the defendant Joseph C. Gillert (hereinafter the defendant), the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking his answer with counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Daniels v. City of New York · filed 2010-11-16(3)

“The drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party ... is shown to be willful and contumacious”

Section 3126 permits dismissal for repeated failure to comply with court-ordered discovery when the failure is clearly shown to be willful and contumacious.

Morgenstern v. Jeffsam Corp. · filed 2010-11-16

The dismissal of a complaint for a plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with court-ordered discovery is warranted upon a clear showing that the failure to comply was willful and contumacious (see Workman v Town of Southampton, 69 AD3d 619 [2010]; Northfield Ins. Co. v Model Towing & Recovery, 63 AD3d 808 [2009]; Rowell v Joyce, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]; My Carpet, Inc. v Bruce Supply Corp., 8 AD3d 248 [2004]).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer when a party fails to meaningfully respond to discovery demands despite ample opportunity and offers no cogent excuse.

VanEtten Oil Co. v. Exotic Flora & Fauna, Ltd. · filed 2010-11-24(3)

Here, despite being given ample opportunity to respond to plaintiffs demands — as evidenced by the prior motion to strike and resulting compliance conference and stipulated order — defendants nonetheless failed to respond in any meaningful way to plaintiffs requests and offered no cogent excuse for failing to do so. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting plaintiffs motion to strike defendants’ answer.

Section 3126 does not permit dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery unless a motion seeks that relief and the party has an opportunity to be heard.

Mitskevitch v. City of New York · filed 2010-11-30

Moreover, contrary to the appellant’s contention, this action could not have properly been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3126 based upon the plaintiffs failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, since there was no motion requesting this relief and the plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to be heard on this issue (see CPLR 3124, 3126; Xand Corp. v Reliable Sys. Alternatives Corp., 35 AD3d 849 [2006]; Postel v New York Univ. Hosp., 262 AD2d 40, 42 [1999]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for discovery failures only when the failure to comply is clearly willful and contumacious.

Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v. Rosenthal · filed 2010-12-14(3)

Accordingly, the “drastic remedy” ... of the striking of a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be imposed unless the failure to comply with discovery demands or orders is clearly willful and contumacious (see Lomax v Rochdale Vil. Inc., 76 AD3d at 999; Cobenas v Ginsburg Dev. Cos., LLC, 74 AD3d 1269 [2010]; Xiao Yang Chen v Fischer, 73 AD3d 1167 [2010]; Voutsinas v Voutsinas, 43 AD3d 1156, 1157 [2007]).

Section 3126 does not warrant striking an answer when a party adequately responds to discovery demands and its failure to produce records is not willful and contumacious.

Glaser v. City of New York · filed 2010-12-21

The motion court properly found that the City defendants (the City) did not engage in willful and contumacious conduct in failing to produce records reflecting a street repair made at the location of injured plaintiff’s fall (see generally CPLR 3126; Catarine v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 290 AD2d 213, 215 [2002]). The record reflects that the City adequately responded to discovery demands, albeit in response to several orders calling for production, as well as motions to strike.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for disobeying a disclosure order or willfully withholding required information, but substantial compliance despite delay may make that sanction improper.

Mironer v. City of New York · filed 2010-12-28

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in conditionally granting that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants’ answer. ... A court in its discretion may strike the pleading of a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when repeated discovery noncompliance without a reasonable excuse supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Turk Eximbank-Export Credit Bank of Turkey v. Bicakcioglu · filed 2011-02-15(3)

Appellants’ repeated failure to offer a reasonable excuse for their noncompliance with discovery requests gives rise to an inference of willful and contumacious conduct that warranted the striking of the answer (see Figiel v Met Food, 48 AD3d 330 [2008]; CPLR 3126 [3]).

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands or orders only when that failure is clearly willful and contumacious.

Rock City Sound, Inc. v. Bashian & Farber, LLP · filed 2011-04-05

However, the “drastic remedy” (Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v Rosenthal, 79 AD3d 798, 800 [2010]) of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be imposed unless the failure to comply with discovery demands or orders is clearly willful and contumacious (see Lomax v Rochdale Vil., Inc., 76 AD3d 999 [2010]; Moray v City of Yonkers, 76 AD3d 618, 619 [2010]; Cobenas v Ginsburg Dev. Cos., LLC, 74 AD3d 1269, 1270 [2010]; Xiao Yang Chen v Fischer, 73 AD3d 1167 [2010]).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking an answer for a missed deposition when counsel’s serious illness explains the failure and the failure was not willful and contumacious.

Di Mascio v. Friedman · filed 2011-04-26

The record in this case demonstrates that the defendant’s failure to appear for a deposition was attributable to the undisputed lengthy and serious illness of his former counsel, and was not willful and contumacious ... Accordingly, and in view of the strong public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits ... the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the answer.

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking a complaint when delayed compliance with discovery requests is neither willful nor contumacious.

L&L Auto Distributors & Suppliers Inc. v. Auto Collection, Inc. · filed 2011-06-07

The plaintiffs also demonstrated that they had a potentially meritorious opposition to the defendants’ motion, as their delay in fully complying with the defendants’ discovery requests was neither willful nor contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Negro v St. Charles Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., 44 AD3d 727, 728 [2007]; Resnick v Schwarzkopf, 41 AD3d 573 [2007]; Prappas v Papadatos, 38 AD3d 871, 872 [2007]; Russo v Tolchin, 35 AD3d 431 [2006]).

Section 3126 does not justify striking a complaint for failure to comply with discovery demands without a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

47 Thames Realty, LLC v. Rusconie · filed 2011-06-14

To the extent the Supreme Court struck the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the defendants’ discovery demands, it was an improvident exercise of discretion, as the defendants failed to show clearly that the plaintiffs conduct was willful and contumacious (see Lomax v Rochdale Vil., Inc., 76 AD3d 999 [2010]; Iscowitz v County of Suffolk, 54 AD3d 725 [2008]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a defendant’s answer when repeated failures to comply with discovery orders support an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Elias v. City of New York · filed 2011-08-25

Over a three-year period, the City has repeatedly failed to provide discovery, despite nine court orders and sanctions imposed by this Court. These circumstances “create[ ] an inference of willful and contumacious conduct” (Brewster v FTM Servo, Corp., 44 AD3d 351, 352 [2007]) and warrant the ultimate sanction of striking defendant’s answer.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for a disclosure violation only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Thompson v. BBQ · filed 2011-05-24(3)

The drastic remedy of striking a pleading is not appropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kyung Soo Kim v Goldmine Realty, Inc., 73 AD3d 709 [2010]; Moray v City of Yonkers, 72 AD3d 766 [2010]).

Section 3126 permits striking a complaint for discovery noncompliance only upon a clear showing that the plaintiff’s conduct was willful and contumacious.

Polsky v. Tuckman · filed 2011-06-07

The defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint upon the plaintiff’s failure to appear at a court-ordered deposition should have been denied.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery, which may be inferred from a pattern of noncompliance.

Sugar Foods De Mexico v. Scientific Scents, LLC · filed 2011-10-27(3)

In our view, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion or err in granting plaintiffs motion to strike the answer and entering a default judgment against defendant.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for discovery noncompliance, but denial is within the court’s discretion when the movant fails to show a violation or willful or contumacious noncompliance.

Caval v. City of New York · filed 2011-11-15

The plaintiff failed to show that the defendants violated a conditional order of preclusion, that they otherwise failed to comply with the plaintiffs discovery demands, or that, if they did fail to so comply, such failure was willful or contumacious. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants’ answer (see Morano v Westchester Paving & Sealing Corp., 7 AD3d 495, 496 [2004]; see also Mazza v Seneca, 72 AD3d 754 [2010]; Steven L. Levitt & Assoc., P.C. v Balkin, 54 AD3d 403, 406 [2008]; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643, 644 [2005]).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious noncompliance with disclosure requests or court-ordered discovery.

Docteur v. Interfaith Medical Center · filed 2011-12-20

Furthermore, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126, since there has been no clear showing of a willful and contumacious pattern of noncompliance with disclosure requests or court-ordered discovery on the part of the plaintiff (see e.g. Polsky v Tuckman, 85 AD3d 750 [2011]; Comprehensive Care of N.Y., P.C. v Manuel A. Romero, P.C., 56 AD3d 510 [2008]; cf. Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]; Umar v Ohrnberger, 72 AD3d 1066 [2010]; Suazo-Alvarez v Nordlaw, LLC, 48 AD3d 670 [2008]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for discovery noncompliance when the failure is clearly willful and contumacious.

Orgel v. Stewart Title Insurance · filed 2012-01-31

Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 which were to strike the defendant’s answer or direct it to provide additional discovery.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery obligations without a reasonable excuse.

Tos v. Jackson Heights Care Center, LLC · filed 2012-01-31

In the instant case, for over 21 months, the plaintiff failed to comply with two court orders, a so-ordered stipulation, and two other stipulations, whereby she had been directed by the Supreme Court to provide responses to the defendant’s discovery demands or had agreed to provide the disclosure. Moreover, the plaintiff offered no excuses for her failure to provide the disclosure. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands upon a clear showing that the failure was willful or contumacious.

Chong v. Chaparro · filed 2012-04-10

The striking of a pleading is appropriate upon a clear showing that a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands is willful or contumacious (see Workman v Town of Southampton, 69 AD3d 619, 620 [2010]; Canaan v Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc., 49 AD 3d 583, 584 [2008]; Goldstein v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 39 AD3d 816, 817 [2007]; Russo v Tolchin, 35 AD3d 431, 434 [2006]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for willful discovery misconduct, but the sanction should not extend to defendants who never sought disclosure or dismissal.

Wang v. Lin · filed 2012-04-10(3)

Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the motion of the defendant Tsu Y. Wang which was to strike the complaint insofar as asserted against him. ... The Supreme Court erred in granting those branches of the motion which were to strike the complaint insofar as asserted against the three remaining defendants. Although these defendants were similarly affected by the plaintiffs’ actions, the record contains no evidence that they ever sought orders either compelling disclosure or striking the complaint.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint when repeated, unexcused failures to comply with discovery demands and orders support an inference of willful or contumacious conduct.

Montemurro v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center · filed 2012-04-24

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendant Michael Melgar, and the defendants Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Memorial Hospital for Cancer and Allied Disease, and Manjit S. Bains, which were , to strike the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them by the appellant pursuant to CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike pleadings when a party repeatedly fails to produce documents despite court orders and an express warning.

Oasis Sportswear, Inc. v. Rego · filed 2012-05-10

Given that defendants had been ordered on three prior occasions to produce certain documents, and had been expressly warned that failure to do so again would result in the striking of their pleadings, the IAS court did not abuse its discretion in striking the pleadings, under CPLR 3126, when defendants again failed to produce the requested records (De Socio v 136 E. 56th St. Owners, Inc., 74 AD3d 606 [2010]).

Substantial compliance with discovery demands can defeat a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3126.

Infante v. Breslin Realty Development Corp. · filed 2012-05-15

Moreover, the plaintiff demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious opposition to Breslin’s motion to dismiss the complaint based upon his substantial compliance with discovery demands (see Newell v Ford Motor Credit Co., 36 AD3d 675, 675-676 [2007]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading when a party’s failure to comply with discovery is willful or contumacious and the party offers no reasonable excuse.

HANN, RICHARD v. BLACK, STEPHEN R. · filed 2012-06-08(3)

We further conclude that defendants failed to meet their burden of offering a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the court’s order to produce Black for a deposition or to provide the photographs of the accident scene in a timely manner (see Hill, 13 AD3d at 1096).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading and dismiss claims when a party willfully refuses to appear for a court-ordered deposition.

Weinstein v. Gindi · filed 2012-02-16

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in striking plaintiff Weinstein’s pleading and dismissing his claims based on his willful refusal to appear for deposition in this action (CPLR 3126; Fisk & Richardson, P.C. v Schindler, 75 AD3d 219, 220 [2010]).

A court may decline to strike a complaint under CPLR 3126 without abusing its discretion.

Tapia v. Schindler Elevator Corp. · filed 2012-05-01

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]; Polsky v Tuckman, 85 AD3d 750 [2011]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a complaint for inadequate discovery only upon a clear showing that the plaintiff’s conduct was willful and contumacious.

Bernardis v. Town of Islip · filed 2012-05-15

Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the motion of the defendants Judith Stein, David S.J. Neufeld, Gwendolyn Zegel, and Kenneth Stein III (hereinafter collectively the appellants) which was to strike the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs’ expert disclosure served pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) was inadequate, as the appellants failed to make a clear showing that the plaintiffs’ conduct was willful and contumacious (see Polsky v Tuckman, 85 AD3d at 750; Comprehensive Care of N.Y., P.C. v Manuel A. Romero, P.C., 56 AD3d 510 [2008]; Anonymous v Duane Reade, Inc., 49 AD3d 479, 480 [2008]).

Striking or dismissing a complaint under CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious noncompliance with discovery requests or orders.

Rodriguez v. Big Ben Associates I · filed 2012-05-15

However, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the separate cross motions of the City and the Church which were to strike or dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for a discovery violation only when there is a clear showing that the failure to comply was willful and contumacious.

Liang v. Yi Jing Tan · filed 2012-08-22

Here, there was no clear showing that the defendants willfully and contumaciously failed to disclose the individual tax returns of the defendant Yi Jing Tan for 2007 and 2008.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when repeated failures to provide discovery support an inference of willful or contumacious conduct.

Flynn v. City of New York · filed 2012-12-12

The willful or contumacious character of a party’s conduct can be inferred from the party’s repeated failure to respond to demands or to comply with discovery orders (see Montemurro v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 94 AD3d at 1066). ... Accordingly, upon renewal, that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to strike the defendant’s answer should have been granted.