N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3126

Section 3126 gives trial courts discretion to choose the nature and degree of a penalty when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose required information.

Bodine v. Ladjevardi · filed 2001-06-11

It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed against a party who "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126; see, DeJulio v Wulf, 260 AD2d 425; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374; Soto v City of Long Beach, 197 AD2d 615).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party willfully fails to meet court-ordered disclosure deadlines.

John R. Souto, Co. v. Coratolo · filed 2002-04-04

The action, which was commenced in 1989, was properly dismissed upon a finding that plaintiff willfully failed to comply with the disclosure deadlines in the preliminary conference order of April 7, 2000 (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 does not justify dismissing a complaint for failure to provide a Social Security number and affidavit of merit when requiring those disclosures was improper.

Bibeau v. Cantiague Figure Skating Club, Inc. · filed 2002-05-28

Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint based upon the plaintiffs failure to disclose her Social Security number and submit an affidavit of merit (see CPLR 3126; Kihl v Pfeffer; 94 NY2d 118).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from denying a fact when it fails to comply with discovery orders without a reasonable explanation.

Caldwell v. Party Rental Ltd. · filed 2002-04-25

The challenged sanction was properly imposed in the absence of a reasonable explanation for defendant’s noncompliance with court orders directing production of its routing sheet for the day of the accident (see, Sanchez v City of New York, 266 AD2d 127).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for willful and contumacious failure to comply with disclosure orders.

Pierre v. Delish Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2002-05-13(3)

We agree with the Supreme Court that Browen’s failure to appear for a deposition, despite three previous court orders compelling him to do so, was willful and contumacious. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly struck his answer (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Owolabi v Fairview Nursing Home, 209 AD2d 678).

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to choose a just discovery sanction, including preclusion of testimony instead of striking an answer.

Brothers v. Bunkoff General Contractors · filed 2002-07-18

Under CPLR 3126, the trial court may make such orders “as are just,” and it has the discretion to decide the type and degree of sanction (see, Osterhoudt v Wal-Mart Stores, 273 AD2d 673, 674; Nabozny v Cappelletti, 267 AD2d 623). ... In our view, as no subsequent preclusion order was issued indicating that the passage of time had increased the potential sanction, under the particular facts herein presented, preclusion of Hatch’s testimony at trial is the more appropriate sanction.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party willfully disobeys a conditional disclosure order and frustrates disclosure.

McNamara v. Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n · filed 2003-02-10

Therefore, the court properly adhered to its prior determination granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff clearly disobeyed the court’s conditional order, and, by her willful conduct, frustrated disclosure (see Cronin v Perry, 269 AD2d 351; Arcuri & Sons v Alfonsi, 242 AD2d 313).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for failure to disclose only when the failure was willful or contumacious.

Avenue C Construction, Inc. v. Gassner · filed 2003-06-30

“Although the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is generally a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, the penalty of striking an answer for failure to disclose is extreme and should only be levied where the failure has been willful or contumacious” (Brennan v McCarthy, 255 AD2d 477 [1998]; see DeCintio v Ahmed, 276 AD2d 463, 464 [2000]; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]).

Section 3126 generally leaves the choice of penalty for failure to disclose to the trial court’s discretion and permits dismissal of a damages demand for willful nondisclosure.

DePierro v. Bank of New York · filed 2003-09-08

The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter generally left to the discretion of the Supreme Court (see Kingsley v Kantor, 265 AD2d 529, 530 [1999]; Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806 [1999]). Here, the plaintiffs’ willful failure to disclose certain tax information warranted the dismissal of their demand for consequential damages (cf. Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711 [1986]).

CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct before a court strikes an answer, enters a default judgment, or precludes evidence as a discovery sanction.

Kinge v. State · filed 2003-02-06

Hence, before striking an answer, entering a default judgment or issuing a preclusion order, there must be a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct (see Osterhoudt v Wal-Mart Stores, supra at 675; Nabozny v Cappelletti, 267 AD2d 623, 625).

Section 3126 leaves the nature and degree of a penalty for failure to disclose to the trial court’s discretion.

Robinson v. Pediatric Associates of Irwin Avenue · filed 2003-08-25

The nature and the degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 for a party’s failure to disclose is within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Lavi v Lavi, 256 AD2d 602 [1998]; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374 [1997]).

CPLR 3126 leaves the nature and degree of a penalty for failure to provide disclosure to the trial court’s sound discretion.

Beizer v. Schwartzben · filed 2003-11-03

It is well settled that the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to provide disclosure is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see Lavi v Lavi, 256 AD2d 602 [1998]; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374 [1997]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a defense if the party fails to produce documents material and necessary to that defense.

Samide v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 2004-03-08

If Daily fails to provide those materials, his defense pursuant to Not-for-Profit Corporation Law § 720-a shall be stricken.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to disclose only when the failure is willful or contumacious.

Felipe v. 2820 West 36th Street Realty Corp. · filed 2004-05-03

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is generally a matter left to the sound discretion of the court, the penalty of dismissing a complaint for failure to disclose is extreme and should only be levied where the failure has been willful or contumacious (see Avenue C Constr. v Gassner, 306 AD2d 506 [2003]; DeCintio v Ahmed, 276 AD2d 463, 464 [2000]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff repeatedly and without explanation fails to provide requested information despite court orders.

Valladares v. Moutopoulos · filed 2004-08-02

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and as a matter of discretion, without costs or disbursements, the branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

CPLR 3126 permits preclusion and default judgment when a party contumaciously fails to provide disclosure.

Cahen-Vorburger v. Vorburger · filed 2004-11-23

The IAS court’s issuance of an order of preclusion and default judgment was supported by ample evidence of defendant’s contumacious failure to provide disclosure (CPLR 3126), and the court’s valuations of his financial interests are supported by a fair interpretation of the available evidence (see 300 E. 34th St. Co. v Habeeb, 248 AD2d 50, 54-55 [1997]).

CPLR 3126 permits preclusion or striking pleadings for wilful failure to disclose information ordered or otherwise determined to be discoverable.

Tomkins v. Armstrong · filed 2005-01-19

CPLR 3126 includes preclusion and striking of the pleadings or parts thereof as sanctions for the wilful failure to disclose information pursuant to an order or that the court determines ought to have been disclosed.

Section 3126 permits preclusion when a party willfully refuses to provide properly demanded documents.

Spector v. Spector · filed 2005-05-26

The court properly entered an order of preclusion. The record overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that defendant willfully failed and refused to provide plaintiff with documents properly demanded (see CPLR 3126; Miller v Xiao Mei, 295 AD2d 144 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 502 [2003]).

CPLR 3126 permits a preclusion order only when the moving party shows that the failure to disclose was willful and contumacious.

Anthony v. Anthony · filed 2005-12-27

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of discretion for the court (see Castellano v Mainco El. & Elec. Corp., 292 AD2d 556 [2002]; Polanco v Duran, 278 AD2d 397 [2000]), an order of preclusion should only be imposed where the moving party establishes that the failure to disclose is willful and contumacious (see Mangiapane v Brookhaven Beach Health Related Facility, 305 AD2d 642 [2003]; Klutchko v Baron, 1 AD3d 400 [2003]).

CPLR 3126 permits sanctions, including striking a pleading, for willful failure to disclose evidence; an appellate court will disturb the sanction only for a clear abuse of discretion.

O'Brien v. Clark Equipment Co. · filed 2006-01-19

Supreme Court has discretion to impose sanctions—including striking a party’s pleading—for the willful failure to disclose evidence and, absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the sanctions imposed will not be disturbed on appeal (see CPLR 3126; Appler v Riverview Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 9 AD3d 577, 578 [2004]; Cippitelli v County of Schenectady, 284 AD2d 823, 825 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 606 [2001]; Cafferty v Thomas, Collison & Place, 282 AD2d 959, 961 [2001]).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 for failure to provide disclosure may be unwarranted under the particular circumstances of a case.

Mercedes v. Wyckoff Heights Medical Center · filed 2006-02-14

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Steinhardt, J.), dated July 9, 2004, which granted the respective motions of the respondents Wyckoff Heights Medical Center and Yong Wang, and Jung K. Sung, which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to provide disclosure and denied the plaintiffs’ cross motion to restore the action to the trial calendar. ... Under the particular circumstances of this case, the dismissal of the complaint as to the respondents, and the denial of the plaintiffs’ cross motion to restore the action, were not warranted.

CPLR 3126 does not warrant dismissal for a disclosure failure when the record does not support a finding that the failure was willful or contumacious.

Garan v. Don & Walt Sutton Builders, Inc. · filed 2006-03-14

The record does not support a finding that the plaintiffs failure to comply with disclosure was willful or contumacious. Thus, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing the drastic remedy of dismissing the complaint based on such failure (see CPLR 3126; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643 [2005]; Sowerby v Camarda, 20 AD3d 411 [2005]).

CPLR 3126 permits sanctions for willful and contumacious nondisclosure even when a party has produced some documents.

Waltzer v. Tradescape & Co., LLC · filed 2006-07-20

A complete failure to disclose is not a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions pursuant to CPLR 3126, the relevant factor being whether the failure to disclose relevant documents at issue was willful and contumacious.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a pleading when repeated, unexplained failure to obey disclosure orders supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Dinstber v. GEICO Insurance · filed 2006-09-19

Dismissal of a party’s pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is within the discretion of the Supreme Court where, as here, the party’s repeated failure to comply with orders of the court directing disclosure, without excuse, supports an inference that the failure to provide disclosure was willful and contumacious (see Ranfort v Peak Tours, 250 AD2d 747 [1998]; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467 [1997]; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374 [1997]).

A party seeking dismissal under CPLR 3126 must show that the opposing party’s failure to disclose was willful and contumacious.

34-35th Corp. v. 1-10 Industry Associates, LLC · filed 2007-01-30

Ordered that the order dated November 1, 2005 is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3126 is denied. Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant did not sustain its burden of demonstrating that any failure of the plaintiff to engage in disclosure was willful and contumacious.

Section 3126 allows evidence preclusion for a disclosure failure, but the moving party must prove the failure was wilful.

Donskoi v. Donskoi · filed 2007-03-20

Finally, the Supreme Court did not err in denying that branch of the plaintiff wife’s motion which was, inter alia, to preclude the defendant from introducing evidence in support of his claims or defenses because the plaintiff wife failed to prove that he wilfully failed to disclose relevant information (see CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 dismissal for failure to disclose is an improper sanction after trial when the defendant did not move to strike the complaint for noncompliance with a discovery order.

Leasecomm Corp. v. Long Island Cellular Ltd. · filed 2007-03-28

The court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126, after trial, on the ground that plaintiff failed to disclose to defendant the aforementioned stipulated final judgment and order was an improvident exercise of the court’s discretion since defendant did not move to strike the complaint for noncompliance with a discovery order (see Simpson v City of New York, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when persistent failure to provide court-ordered disclosure supports an inference of willful noncompliance and the withheld material is needed to assess the claim.

Brewster v. FTM Servo, Corp. · filed 2007-10-04

The persistent failure to submit medical records relating to Brewster’s previous automobile accident warranted dismissal of his portion of the complaint, since such material was necessary to ascertain whether any of his purported injuries might have been caused by that earlier accident.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to disclose only when the moving party conclusively shows bad faith or willful, contumacious conduct.

O'Connor v. Syracuse University · filed 2009-10-22

Turning to plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 for sanctions against Syracuse University for failing to produce a statement allegedly submitted to its officials by an eyewitness to the altercation, it cannot be said that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying the motion. The law is settled in favor of resolving actions on the merits whenever possible, and the drastic remedy of striking a pleading is appropriate only where the moving party conclusively demonstrates bad faith or willful, contumacious conduct by the nondisclosing party (see Cafferty v Thomas, Collison & Place, 282 AD2d 959, 961 [2001]).

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion for failure to disclose only when the party’s lack of cooperation was willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Blauman-Spindler v. Blauman · filed 2009-12-22(2)

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the discretion of the court (see Kingsley v Kantor, 265 AD2d 529 [1999]), in order “[t]o invoke the drastic remedy” of preclusion for failure to disclose pursuant to CPLR 3126 (2), the court “must determine that the offending party’s lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious” (Pryzant v City of New York, 300 AD2d 383 [2002]; see Kelleher v Mt. Kisco Med. Group, 264 AD2d 760 [1999]; Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448 [1997]). In this case, the father served responses and objections to the mother’s discovery demands. While the mother was clearly dissatisfied with the objections and responses to her demands, there was no showing of a pattern of willful failure to respond to discovery demands or comply with disclosure orders, so as to justify an order of preclusion.

Section 3126 does not permit sanctions or dismissal when disclosure is timely under the applicable order and there is no showing of refusal or willful failure to disclose.

Kane v. Utica First Insurance · filed 2009-12-30

Thus, because plaintiffs disclosure was timely under the only scheduling order in place, there was no basis for the imposition of any sanction under CPLR 3126 and thus no basis for dismissal of the amended complaint (see generally Green v Kingdom Garage Corp., 34 AD3d 1373 [2006]).

Section 3126 requires a finding of willful and contumacious failure to disclose before a court strikes a pleading or precludes testimony.

Greene v. Mullen · filed 2010-02-23

However, to invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, or of preclusion, a court must determine that the party’s failure to disclose is willful and contumacious (see Anthony v Anthony, 24 AD3d 694 [2005]; Mangiapane v Brookhaven Beach Health Related Facility, 305 AD2d 642, 643 [2003]; Patterson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. [Queens Hosp. Ctr.], 284 AD2d at 517).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for refusing to obey a disclosure order or willfully withholding required information, but dismissal requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Rini v. Blanck · filed 2010-06-08

A court may dismiss an action as a sanction if a plaintiff “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126). However, the drastic remedy of dismissal is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with disclosure obligations was willful and contumacious (see Kesar v Green Ridge Enters. Corp., 30 AD3d 471 [2006]; Blake v Chawla, 299 AD2d 437, 440 [2002]; Yona v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 285 AD2d 460, 461 [2001]). Here, the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiffs failure to disclose certain information was willful and contumacious.

Section 3126(3) leaves the nature and degree of a discovery penalty to the trial court’s discretion.

Bernal v. Singh · filed 2010-04-13(3)

It is settled that the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Joseph v Iannace, 6 AD3d 502, 503 [2004]; Ordonez v Guerra, 295 AD2d 325, 326 [2002]; Yona v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 285 AD2d 460, 461 [2001]).

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to deny a request for further discovery when a party fails to comply with discovery deadlines.

Pierson v. North Colonie Central School District · filed 2010-06-24

The record demonstrates that plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the court’s scheduling orders caused more than a minimal delay. In our view, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion (see CPLR 3126; Congleton v United Health Servs. Hosps., 67 AD3d at 1150).

Section 3126 leaves the remedy for failing to comply with a discovery order to the motion court’s discretion, including an adverse inference charge.

Gogos v. Modell's Sporting Goods, Inc. · filed 2011-06-23

It is not the function of this Court to micromanage discovery proceedings in the trial parts, particularly where, as here, the remedy for nondisclosure is entrusted to the discretion of the motion court (CPLR 3126), and the order issued was well within the province of the court’s discretion.

CPLR 3126 permits sanctions when a party fails to appear for a court-ordered deposition, taking the history of the action into account.

Ravnikar v. Skyline Credit-Ride, Inc. · filed 2010-12-28

Given the plaintiffs failure to appear for continued deposition by the date set by the Supreme Court, and the history of this action, the imposition of sanctions upon the plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 3126 was appropriate (see Carbajal v Bobo Robo, Inc., 38 AD3d 820 [2007]; Makris v Westchester County, 21 AD3d 931 [2005]).

Section 3126 permits preclusion when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose required information; the party seeking preclusion must show that conduct.

Maybaum v. Maybaum · filed 2011-11-01

The plaintiff failed to show that the defendant “refuse[d] to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fail[ed] to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed pursuant to this article” (CPLR 3126; see Donskoi v Donskoi, 38 AD3d 708, 709 [2007]).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 requires a conclusive showing that the failure to disclose was wilful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Ellis v. Park · filed 2012-03-15

since defendants failed to “show[ ] conclusively that [plaintiffs] failure to disclose was wilful, contumacious or in bad faith” (Christian v City of New York, 269 AD2d 135, 137 [2000]; see also Mateo v T & H Enters., 60 AD 3d 411 [2009]).

CPLR 3126 gives a trial court discretion to impose appropriate sanctions when a party misses a court-set expert disclosure deadline.

Rivers v. Birnbaum · filed 2012-10-17

Moreover, where a trial court sets a specific deadline for expert disclosure, it has the discretion, pursuant to CPLR 3126, to impose appropriate sanctions if a party fails to comply with the deadline (see MacDonald v Leif, 89 AD3d 995 [2011]; Pirro Group, LLC v One Point St., Inc., 71 AD3d 654 [2010]; Bomzer v Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner Lambert Co., 41 AD3d 522 [2007]; Maiorino v City of New York, 39 AD3d 601 [2007]).

A failure to provide discovery that is not willful and contumacious weighs against dismissal under CPLR 3126.

Smyth v. Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. · filed 2013-02-20

The plaintiff demonstrated that his failure to provide the outstanding discovery was not willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Wagner v 119 Metro, LLC, 59 AD3d at 533; Gironda v Katzen, 19 AD3d at 645; Halikiopoulos v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 284 AD2d at 374).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading or preclude evidence for discovery noncompliance when the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery is shown to be willful and contumacious.

Neenan v. Quinton · filed 2013-10-23

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants did not comply with a court order directing discovery. Further, the record does not support the plaintiff’s contention that the defendants willfully, contumaciously, and repeatedly failed to respond to the plaintiff’s discovery demands. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion by, in effect, denying the plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to impose the drastic remedies of striking the answer or precluding evidence (see Korchak v Santana, 102 AD3d 928 [2013]; Zakhidov v Boulevard Tenants Corp., 96 AD3d at 739).

Section 3126 permits a court to reject a party’s account of his finances when he fails to comply with discovery requests.

Johnston v. Nakis · filed 2014-10-28

Given the abundant proof of marital waste and dissipation of assets, the extent of which must be inferred to be greater than that defendant accounted for in his trial testimony (numerous discovery requests aimed at nailing the matter down were not heeded by defendant), CPLR 3126, and the numerous mistakes and omissions on defendant’s statement of net worth (SNW), admitted on cross-examination, the court is not bound to accept defendant’s account of his finances.

CPLR 3126 gives the motion court broad discretion to choose the nature and degree of a sanction for failure to disclose.

Schiano v. Mijul, Inc. · filed 2015-09-23

The nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is within the broad discretion of the motion court (see Wolf v Flowers, 122 AD3d 728, 728 [2014]; Dokaj v Ruxton Tower Ltd. Partnership, 91 AD3d 812, 814 [2012]).

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading or precluding evidence for failure to comply with discovery demands or orders only when the failure is clearly willful and contumacious.

6 Harbor Park Drive, LLC v. Town of North Hempstead · filed 2015-04-22

However, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading or even precluding evidence pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be imposed unless the failure to comply with discovery demands or orders is clearly willful and contumacious (see MacKenzie v City of New York, 125 AD3d 821 [2015]; Palmieri v Piano Exch., Inc., 124 AD3d at 612; Gutman v Cabrera, 121 AD3d 1042, 1043 [2014]). Here, the plaintiff failed to make such a showing.

Section 3126 penalties for nondisclosure are restricted when news defendants do not exploit or benefit from the unavailable evidence.

Baines v. Daily News L.P. · filed 2015-07-13

Penalties as prescribed by CPLR 3126 against the Daily News defendants for nondisclosure also are restricted (Oak Beach Inn Corp. v Babylon Beacon, 62 NY2d at 168) as long as defendants do not exploit or benefit from the unavailability of the undisclosed evidence (id. at 166; Sands v News Am. Publ., 161 AD2d 30, 37, 42 [1st Dept 1990]; Collins v Troy Publ. Co., 213 AD2d 879, 881 [3d Dept 1995]).

Section 3126 permits a court to impose a sanction proportionate to a party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order.

Matter of Jesse E. v. Lucia F. · filed 2016-12-29

Family Court may, in its discretion, impose sanctions upon a party that fails to comply with a disclosure order (see CPLR 3126; Matter of Landrigen v Landrigen, 173 AD2d 1011, 1012 [1991]).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude evidence for a willful failure to disclose; whether to impose that sanction rests in the trial court’s discretion.

Graham v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2017-10-26

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a trial court may preclude a party from producing certain evidence if it determines that the party “wil[l] fully failfed] to disclose information which . . . ought to have been disclosed.” ... Under these circumstances, Supreme Court found that there had been no showing of willfulness, and we decline to disturb the court’s determination to deny plaintiff’s cross motion to preclude the affidavits (see Armstrong v Armstrong, 72 AD3d 1409, 1410 [2010]; compare Boyer v Kamthan, 130 AD3d 1176, 1178-1179 [2015]).

Section 3126 permits a court to compel discovery responses and an examination before trial when a party fails to provide requested discovery.

TAM Med. Supply Corp. v. Country Wide Ins. Co. · filed 2017-07-14

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied and the branch of defendant's cross motion seeking, in the alternative, to strike the complaint and dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3126 is granted to the extent of compelling plaintiff to provide responses to defendant's demand for interrogatories, demand for discovery and inspection, and demand for expert disclosure within 60 days of the date of the order entered hereon, and by further compelling plaintiff to appear for an examination before trial within 30 days thereafter, or on such other date to which the parties shall agree, but in no event later than 60 days thereafter.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party willfully refuses to provide court-ordered discovery and offers no reasonable excuse.

Masigla v. United Servs. Auto. Assn. · filed 2017-12-01

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy but is warranted where a party's conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious or in bad faith ( see Rock City Sound, Inc. v Bashian & Farber, LLP , 83 AD3d 685 [2011]). ... Consequently, the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude testimony for failure to comply with disclosure and gives the court discretion to choose that sanction instead of dismissal.

Jj & R Chiropractic, P.C. v. Interboro Mut. Indem. Ins. · filed 2017-09-15(2)

Upon a review of the record before us, we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to dismiss the complaint and, instead, precluding plaintiff's testimony at trial with respect to the medical necessity of the services rendered and whether the claims had been properly billed in accordance with the workers' compensation fee schedule ( see CPLR 3126 [2]).

Section 3126(1) permits a court to resolve relevant factual issues against a party that fails to comply with discovery orders without a reasonable excuse.

Husovic v. Structure Tone, Inc. · filed 2019-04-18(1)

Accordingly, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in resolving limited factual issues in favor of plaintiff (CPLR 3126[1];Rogers v Howard Realty Estates, Inc., 145 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2d Dept 2016]).

Section 3126 permits evidence preclusion for willful discovery noncompliance, but striking a complaint may be too drastic when the unfinished discovery concerns only newly alleged injuries.

Turiano v. Schwaber · filed 2020-02-19(2), (3)

Even so, given that the plaintiff had complied with disclosure except for completing the continued deposition relating to newly alleged injuries, we find that the striking of the complaint was too drastic a remedy. Accordingly, we modify the order appealed from by deleting the provision thereof granting the defendant's motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint, and substitute therefor a provision granting the defendant's motion only to the extent of precluding the plaintiff from offering evidence at trial with respect to any of the new injuries alleged in the plaintiff's supplemental verified bill of particulars dated March 16, 2015 ( see CPLR 3126[2]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for failure to disclose when the failure is shown to be willful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Benson v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. · filed 2020-11-12

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to strike the answers, as there was no showing that defendants' failure to provide the requested video footage was willful, contumacious or in bad faith ( see Parkinson v FedEx Corp ., 184 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2020]).

Section 3126 permits sanctions when a party’s willful failure to disclose relevant information can be inferred from repeated opportunities to supplement discovery and the absence of an adequate explanation.

Matter of Carol Mallon Revocable Trust · filed 2021-04-28

Here, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the willful and contumacious character of his conduct could properly be inferred from his failure to provide relevant discovery information pertaining to his own potential self-dealing, despite multiple opportunities to supplement his original discovery response, without any adequate explanation ( see Pastore v Utilimaster Corp. , 165 AD3d at 687). ... Accordingly, the Surrogate's Court providently exercised its discretion in sanctioning the petitioner pursuant to CPLR 3126, and surcharging him in the amount of $236,355.

CPLR 3126 permits discovery sanctions for willful failure to produce relevant material; unsupported relevance objections alone do not establish the conduct needed for sanctions.

ASM Capital, LP v. Four Wood Capital Partners LLC · filed 2023-04-28

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose sanctions upon a party where it has willfully failed to produce relevant discovery. CPLR 3126 sanctions require a willful refusal on the part of the adverse party to disclose information before the drastic remedy of dismissal or defense preclusion will be ordered ( Queens Farms Dairy, Inc. v Consol. Edison Co. of New York , 63 AD2d 696, 698 [2nd Dept 1978]). Although unsubstantiated, defendants' objections on the basis of "relevancy" do not rise to the level of willful or contumacious conduct sufficient to impose sanctions.

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude photographs that were not disclosed during discovery when the late disclosure prejudices the opposing party and no explanation is offered.

Passarelli v. Board of Mgrs. of Bridge Tower Place · filed 2024-10-11

Here, there is no dispute that the photographs of the alleged accident area taken by Jimmy A. Munoz on February 22, 2019 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 55) and photographs taken by John Afrides on March 9, 2019 (NYSCEF Doc No. 52) are prejudicial to the defendants as they were not previously exchanged during discovery.

A court may deny a request to strike pleadings for failure to disclose when both sides have delayed discovery for years.

State of N.Y. Mtge. Agency v. 936-938 Cliffcrest Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. · filed 2024-12-23

ORDERED that the motion brought by order to show cause dated January 1, 2024, pursuant to CPLR 3126, of third party defendant City of New York to compel discovery and for a protective order, and the cross motion of third party plaintiff to strike the pleadings of third party defendant City of New ... York for its failure to disclose (mot seq no 031) are denied; ... Therefore, with respect to depositions and any other remaining paper discovery, the court holds that the parties have each waived any further rights to do so.

Section 3126 leaves the choice of discovery penalty generally to the trial court’s discretion, but the Appellate Division may substitute its own discretion even without an abuse of discretion.

Jordan v. New York City Hous. Auth. · filed 2025-01-22

Although the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter generally left to the discretion of the Supreme Court ( see Jurlina v Town of Brookhaven , 215 AD3d 936, 937), "the Appellate Division is vested with its own discretion and corresponding power to substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court, even in the absence of abuse" ( Harris v City of New York , 117 AD3d 790, 791).

Section 3126 permits a court to resolve a disputed fact in the prejudiced party’s favor when discovery orders are disobeyed; limited discovery sought may not warrant striking an answer.

Moreno v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2025-05-02

However, because the discovery sought is so limited, the drastic sanction of striking defendants’ answer is not warranted.

CPLR 3126 gives courts discretion to sanction discovery noncompliance, but dismissal may be too severe despite a party’s refusal to comply with discovery demands.

S.W. v. Mount Sinai Hosp. · filed 2025-07-07

CPLR 3126 vests in this Court broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions for those who disobey discovery orders or obligations. ... While plaintiff’s failure and refusal to comply with reasonable discovery demands is concerning, the Court finds that the sanction of dismissal is too severe at this juncture.

CPLR 3126(c) permits preclusion when a party willfully withholds requested evidence until after a deposition and the delay prejudices the opposing party.

Larue v. 1201-31 Lafayette Ground Gowner LLC · filed 2025-11-25(c)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alison Y. Tuitt, J.), entered on or about May 9, 2025, which denied plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 (c) to strike defendants' answer or preclude defendants from introducing surveillance video of plaintiff's accident, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion to preclude defendants' from introducing the surveillance video of plaintiff's accident granted. ... Given the totality of the circumstances, Supreme Court should have granted the lesser sanction of preclusion ( see Tai Tran v New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 99 NY2d 383, 389-390 [2003]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a support petition when the petitioner fails to provide a required financial statement after having adequate time to do so.

Charles v. Charles · filed 1986-04-11

Here, petitioner had from December 18, 1985 when the trial date was set until January 8, 1986 to produce a financial statement, well in excess of the 10 days from the time that the trial date was set in this matter. (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [4].) Accordingly, the hearing examiner was correct in dismissing the petition pursuant to the statutory scheme. (Family Ct Act § 424-a; Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [4]; CPLR 3126.)

Section 3126 permits the court to deny a request for a default judgment or reinstatement as a disclosure sanction.

Brecker v. Smith · filed 1977-11-15

Motion for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3126, rendering a default judgment against respondents or to reinstate petitioner to his former position, in all respects denied.

Section 3126 allows a court to deny a sanctions motion without prejudice to renewal after corrected interrogatories are served.

Charlotte Lake River Associates v. American Insurance · filed 1978-01-27

The motion of American for sanctions pursuant to CPLR 3126 is denied without prejudice to renewal within 45 days after service of the corrected interrogatories.

CPLR 3126(3) governs requests to strike a complaint as a sanction for failure to provide disclosure.

Gatehouse v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2013-08-07(3)

Furthermore, we reject the city defendants’ contention that the order appealed from should be affirmed on the alternate ... theory that the complaint should have been stricken as a sanction for the plaintiffs alleged failure to provide disclosure (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Docteur v Interfaith Med. Ctr., 90 AD3d 814 [2011]; cf. Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815 [1988]).

Section 3126(3) gives the trial court discretion to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure.

Mir v. Saad · filed 2008-09-23(3)

The determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Bates v Baez, 299 AD2d 382 [2002]; Patterson v Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 284 AD2d 382 [2001]). In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint was a provident exercise of discretion.

Section 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Martin v. City of New York · filed 2007-12-11(3)

The drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR ... 3126 (3) for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Bomzer v Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner Lambert Co., 41 AD3d 522 [2007]; Goldstein v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 39 AD3d 816 [2007]; cf. Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]).

Section 3126 does not warrant striking an answer for disclosure failures absent a showing that they were willful or contumacious.

Canaan v. Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc. · filed 2008-03-11

There was no showing that the defendants willfully or contumaciously failed to comply with the plaintiffs’ requests for, or court orders directing, disclosure (see CPLR 3126; Conciatori v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 46 AD3d 501 [2007]; Sau Ting Cheng v Prime Design Realty, Inc., 44 AD3d 644 [2007]; Resnick v Schwarzkopf, 41 AD3d 573 [2007]).

CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious noncompliance before a court strikes a complaint for failure to provide court-ordered disclosure.

Manko v. Lenox Hill Hospital · filed 2007-10-30

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking the complaint absent a clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Mawson v Historic Props., LLC, 30 AD3d 480, 481 [2006]; Lombardo v St. Francis Hosp. Rehabilitation Servs., 16 AD3d 385, 386 [2005]; Centerport Ins. Agency v Atlantic Fabricators of Rhode Is., 277 AD2d 414, 415 [2000]).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike an answer when defendants repeatedly fail to comply with discovery orders.

Jones v. Corley · filed 2006-08-29(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) to strike the answer since the defendants repeatedly failed to comply with court orders directing them to provide discovery (see Matter of Cohn, 15 AD3d 655 [2005]; Bates v Baez, 299 AD2d 382 [2002]; Patterson v Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 284 AD2d 382 [2001]; Town of Southampton v Salten, 186 AD2d 796 [1992]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for willful and contumacious failure to disclose.

Soto v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2006-01-10(3)

The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate willful and contumacious conduct on the part of the defendant which would warrant striking the answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a defendant’s answer for failure to disclose only when the failure was willful, contumacious and deliberate.

Williams v. Ryder TRS, Inc. · filed 2006-05-16

To invoke the drastic remedy of striking an answer, it must be shown that a defendant’s failure to comply with disclosure was the result of willful, contumacious and deliberate conduct (see CPLR 3126; Cianciolo v Trism Specialized Carriers, 274 AD2d 369, 370 [2000]; Vaneott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]). In our opinion, the plaintiffs did not make this showing.

Section 3126(3) requires a clear showing that a discovery failure was willful and contumacious before an answer may be struck.

Pulsone v. North Shore Towers Apartments Inc. · filed 2006-05-23(3)

The drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery is willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Jenkins v City of New York, 13 AD3d 342 [2004]). Here, the plaintiff failed to make such a showing.

CPLR 3126 gives the trial court discretion over discovery penalties; striking an answer requires a clear showing that the failure to comply was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Denoyelles v. Gallagher · filed 2006-06-06

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to strike the answer since there has not been “a clear showing” ... that the defendant’s conduct, and in particular his late disclosure of certain medical records, was either willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Section 3126(3) permits an answer to be struck for discovery misconduct when the moving party establishes willful, contumacious, or bad faith conduct.

Faulkner v. City of New York · filed 2006-08-15(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to strike the defendant’s answer because the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant willfully, contumaciously, or in bad faith failed to comply with a discovery order or delayed the progress of discovery (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643, 643-644 [2005]; Pascarelli v City of New *453York, 16 AD3d 472, 472-473 [2005]; Diel v Rosenfeld, 12 AD3d 558, 559 [2004]).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer for failure to provide discovery only when the moving party clearly shows willful and contumacious conduct.

Zouev v. City of New York · filed 2006-09-12(3)

In addition, the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful and contumacious (see Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]; Pascarelli v City of New York, supra at 473; Lestingi v City of New York, 209 AD2d 384 [1994]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose information that should have been disclosed.

W.O.R.C. Realty Corp. v. Assessor · filed 2005-12-05(3)

A court is authorized to strike the pleadings of a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126).

A court may decline to strike an answer for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the plaintiff delays challenging the defendant’s compliance and shows no misrepresentation.

Ortiz v. Board of Education · filed 2006-02-02

Given plaintiffs three-year delay in challenging the December 2000 affidavit that defendant provided in connection with that order, and the absence of a showing that the representations made in that affidavit, or in defendant’s opposition to the instant motion elaborating upon that affidavit, are false, further consideration of defendant’s compliance efforts with the August 1998 order is not warranted (cf. Frye v City of New York, 228 AD2d 182 [1996]).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for willful and contumacious noncompliance with disclosure directives.

Rakauskas v. Grace Olivia, LLC · filed 2006-05-09

Defendants’ noncompliance with the Special Referee’s repeated directives to produce the QuickBooks data was willful and contumacious and warrants the striking of their answer (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s pleading for refusing to obey a disclosure order or willfully failing to disclose required information.

Kryzhanovskaya v. City of New York · filed 2006-07-25(3)

A court is authorized to strike the pleadings of a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126 [3]).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer for failure to provide discovery only upon a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith conduct.

Pascarelli v. City of New York · filed 2005-03-14(3)

In addition, “the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith” (Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]; see Lestingi v City of New York, 209 AD2d 384 [1994]).

Section 3126 permits striking an answer and granting a default judgment for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery only when the default is clearly shown to be deliberate and contumacious.

Sayomi v. Rolls Kohn & Associates, LLP · filed 2005-03-18

Here, the failure to complete the depositions of defendant’s principals was neither deliberate nor contumacious. Under the circumstances, the denial of plaintiffs’ motion was an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion (see CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking an answer for late insurance disclosure when the failure was not willful, contumacious or due to bad faith.

Olszewski v. Park Terrace Gardens, Inc. · filed 2005-05-24

The owners’ motion to strike the employer’s answer for failure to timely disclose the existence of insurance was properly denied on the ground that such failure was not willful, contumacious or due to bad faith (see Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459, 460 [1987]).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike an answer when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders.

In re the Estate of Cohn · filed 2005-02-28(3)

The Surrogate’s Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to strike the defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3), since the defendants repeatedly failed to comply with court orders with respect to discovery (see Bates v Baez, 299 AD2d 382 [2002]; Patterson v Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 284 AJD2d 382 [2001]; Town of Southampton v Salten, 186 AD2d 796 [1992]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to dismiss a complaint when a party fails to comply with court-ordered discovery, subject to the trial court’s discretion.

Woolard v. Suffolk County Water Authority · filed 2005-03-21

Since the plaintiffs did not appear for depositions, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with court-ordered discovery.

Section 3126(2) permits an evidence preclusion order when a party fails to comply with a discovery order; the precluded party cannot use that evidence to rebut a summary judgment motion.

Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Albany Capitaland Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2005-05-05(2)

Given defendant’s failure to abide by Supreme Court’s conditional discovery order and its resulting inability to contravene the payroll figures articulated in plaintiffs notice to admit, we conclude that defendant failed to rebut plaintiffs prima facie case (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; cf. Winslow v Pyramid Co./Aviation Mall, 248 AD2d 922, 923 [1998]; Burton v Ertel, 107 AD2d 909, 910 [1985]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a party’s claims when it defaults on a discovery motion and fails for a year to comply with discovery orders.

NYAT Operating Corp. v. GAN National Insurance · filed 2005-05-18

As NYAT has defaulted in appearance on this motion and has failed over the course of a year to comply with the orders of this court, dismissal of NYAT’s causes of action, numbered one through four in the amended complaint, is appropriate under CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike pleadings when a party fails to obey orders to answer interrogatories.

Kastrat v. Wynnykiw · filed 2005-10-06(3)

The subject order was properly based on defendants’ noncompliance with court orders directing it to answer plaintiffs’ interrogatories (CPLR 3126 [3]; see Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711 [1986]).

Striking an answer under CPLR 3126 requires a showing of willfulness.

Brice v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2004-12-21

Concerning the disclosure motion, while plaintiffs fail to show the requisite willfulness warranting relief under CPLR 3126, they may be entitled to further disclosure, and we remand for a decision on that aspect of their motion.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a complaint when a party fails to comply with court-ordered disclosure.

Beizer v. Schwartzben · filed 2004-12-06(3)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking her complaint for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure (see CPLR 3042 [d]; 3126 [3]; Krisztin v Oak Beach Inn Corp., 306 AD2d 249 [2003]; Gonzalez v Guirguis, 264 AD2d 813 [1999]; Zirin v Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 216 AD2d 461, 462 [1995]).

An order striking a defendant’s answer under CPLR 3126 is equivalent to a default in answering.

Fappiano v. City of New York · filed 2004-03-22

Entry of an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 striking an answer is the equivalent of a default in answering (see Rokina Opt. Co. v Camera King, 63 NY2d 728, 730 [1984]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a defendant’s answer for willful failure to comply with discovery demands and court orders.

Brooks v. City of New York · filed 2004-04-19

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants’ answer.

Section 3126 permits a court to deny a motion to strike an answer when the record does not establish that the defendant willfully and deliberately failed to produce a deposition witness.

Rivera v. Torah · filed 2004-09-27

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendant’s answer. The record does not support a finding that the defendant willfully and deliberately failed to produce its witness for a deposition (see CPLR 3126; Byrne v City of New York, 301 AD2d 489, 490-491 [2003]; Ciánciolo v Trism Specialized Carriers, 274 AD2d 369, 370 [2000]; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438 [2000]; Brown v United Christian Evangelistic Assn., 270 AD2d 378, 379 [2000]).

CPLR 3126 permits an answer to be struck unconditionally for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery only when the default is clearly deliberate and contumacious.

Nudelman v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1991-04-01

The drastic sanction of unconditionally striking an answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery should not be invoked unless the resisting party’s default is clearly shown to be deliberate and contumacious. The plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing willfulness in the failure of the defendant’s employee to appear at a court-ordered examination before trial.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully and contumaciously fails to comply with discovery requests.

McDonald v. Mid County Transit Mix · filed 1991-06-10

Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking the defendants’ answers in Action Nos. 1 and 2 based on their willful and contumacious behavior in failing to comply with the respective plaintiffs’ discovery requests (Moriates v Powertest Petroleum Co., 114 AD2d 888; Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Center, 141 AD2d 815).

Section 3126 permits an answer to be struck for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery only when the default is clearly shown to be deliberate and contumacious.

Forman v. Jamesway Corp. · filed 1991-07-25

The drastic sanction of unconditionally striking an answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery should not be invoked unless the resisting party’s default is clearly shown to be deliberate and contumacious (Read v Dickson, 150 AD2d 543, 544; see, Linwood Roofing & Contr. Co. v Olit Assocs., 123 AD2d 840).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike an answer for willful failure to comply with discovery.

Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Valenzano · filed 1991-08-01(3)

The IAS court acted within its discretion in striking the answer for willful failure to comply with discovery (CPLR 3126 [3]).

Section 3126 permits striking an answer when a party willfully fails to respond to disclosure demands and timely comply with an order enforcing them.

Waters v. City of New York · filed 1991-12-23

The City’s failure to respond to the plaintiff’s demands for disclosure and refusal to timely comply with the order issued enforcing such demands were so willful as to warrant the sanction of striking its answer (see, CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a defendant’s answer for repeated, willful failure to comply with orders to appear for depositions.

Bono v. Nanco Contracting Corp. · filed 1991-04-01

On this record, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing the drastic sanction of striking the answers of the individual defendants upon their repeated, willful failure to comply with numerous orders directing them to appear for depositions (see, CPLR 3126; Rubin v Pan Am. World Airways, 128 AD2d 765).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for willful failure to disclose unless the party complies with required examinations before trial.

Burt Millwork Corp. v. Irpinia Construction Corp. · filed 1991-05-06

Moreover, we find that the respondents’ failure to disclose was willful, and accordingly direct that their answer be stricken unless they appear for examinations before trial (see, Read v Dickson, 150 AD2d 543, 544; see also, Schoelier v Pulitzer, 130 AD2d 977, 978).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party fails to appear for a court-ordered deposition and does not show a good-faith effort to comply.

Montgomery v. Colorado · filed 1992-01-09

While plaintiffs concede that the motion was erroneously mislabeled as brought pursuant to CPLR 3215 rather than CPLR 3126, the court could properly disregard such mistake as harmless error as appellants never raised the issue in opposition and, in fact, responded appropriately to the substantive relief sought ... The court did not abuse its discretion in striking the answer herein (Reitte v Entermy Cab Corp., 162 AD2d 259).

Section 3126 permits a sanction for failure to appear at depositions, but striking an answer is unduly harsh without evidence that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Tosado v. Martin · filed 1992-01-16

As to the merits, while, clearly, some sanction was warranted because of the appealing defendants’ failure to appear at depositions, we find that, in the absence of any evidence showing that such failure was “willful, contumacious or due to bad faith” (Bassett v Bando Sangsa Co., 103 AD2d 728), the more appropriate remedy was the one imposed on defendant Martin, whose counsel submitted virtually identical evidence in opposition to the original motion to strike the answers of both defendants. We therefore find that the same sanction should be imposed on the defendants Bermudez.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for a disclosure default only when the default is deliberate and contumacious.

Mayers v. Consolidated Charcoal Co. · filed 1989-10-23(3)

Moreover, the drastic sanction of striking a pleading should not be invoked unless the resisting party’s default is shown to be deliberate and contumacious (see, Read v Dickson, 150 AD2d 543; Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., supra; Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 AD2d 580).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike a complaint when a party’s pattern of obstruction and disregard of discovery orders shows willful failure to disclose.

Capoccia v. Brognano · filed 1989-04-27(3)

Plaintiffs’ sole argument on appeal is that, in fact, they have substantially complied with the various orders compelling disclosure and that any remaining noncompliance did not reach the level of willfulness necessary under CPLR 3126 (3) to justify imposition of the ultimate sanction of striking the complaints. We disagree. ... Plaintiffs continued to disregard the order compelling disclosure of the transcripts with full awareness of Supreme Court’s May 1987 decision that noncompliance with discovery in any single action would be applied against all the complaints in the consolidated action. ... Accordingly, we find no reason to disturb Supreme Court’s order.

Section 3126 permits striking an answer for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery only when the moving party shows the default was willful.

Read v. Dickson · filed 1989-05-15

Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden of showing willfulness in the defendants’ failure to appear at their court-ordered examinations before trial.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for willful failure to respond to discovery, but the court may deny that remedy when the party has sufficiently complied by the time of the motion.

A. T. v. M. K. · filed 1989-10-20

Petitioner has moved, in the alternative, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 striking respondent’s answer herein for willful failure to respond to a notice for discovery and inspection. As respondent has sufficiently complied with the requests for discovery at this time, said motion is denied.

CPLR 3126 leaves the decision whether to strike an answer as a discovery sanction to the court’s discretion.

Piampiano v. Irving Trust Co. · filed 1989-03-06

Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to impose the harsh sanction of striking the defendant’s answer (cf., Corona v A-B-C Packaging Mach. Corp., 129 AD2d 762; Ricco v Deep-dale Garden Apts. Corp., 113 AD2d 822; Ferraro v Roncal Assocs., 97 AD2d 429).

Section 3126 permits striking an answer for a deliberate or contumacious failure to provide disclosure; the party seeking the sanction must show willfulness, and the nonresponding party must offer an excuse.

Van Wert v. Green-Pepper · filed 1989-06-15

The party seeking disclosure has the burden of showing willfulness under CPLR 3126 and the party failing to respond must demonstrate an excuse (Capoccia v Brognano, 142 AD2d 819, 820). The striking of an answer should not be imposed unless the default is deliberate or contumacious (Obrenski v Tushinsky, 63 AD2d 695).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer only on a conclusive showing that the party’s noncompliance was willful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Lowitt v. Korelitz · filed 1989-07-27(3)

For this court to uphold a sanction under CPLR 3126 (3), however, there must be a conclusive showing that the noncomplying party’s conduct was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith.

Section 3126 permits a court to conditionally strike an answer for failure to comply with a discovery order, taking the circumstances of the failure into account.

Mendizabal v. Nabila · filed 1990-04-16

Nevertheless, under the particular circumstances of this case, and in light of the obvious practical difficulties which would impede any attempt to comply with the order of November 28, 1989, we do not believe that striking the answer as asserted on behalf of Nabila is an appropriate punishment (see, CPLR 3126). Instead, we believe that the answer as asserted on behalf of Nabila should be stricken conditionally, that is, unless Nabila appears at the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a deposition at least 20 days prior to the commencement of trial (cf., Marine Midland Natl. Bank v Houston, 30 AD2d 610).

Section 3126 allows a court to give a party one final chance to disclose records instead of striking its answer when it has produced relevant documentation.

Tschernia v. Embanque Capital Corp. · filed 1990-05-07

However, the drastic sanction of striking the defendants’ answer is inappropriate at this juncture. ... While the record supports an inference of deliberate and dilatory conduct, the defendants nevertheless produced relevant documentation pertaining to "closed” loan files.

CPLR 3126 permits a request to strike an answer and impose sanctions; denial of that relief may be affirmed when there is no basis to disturb it.

Cassidy v. County of Nassau · filed 1989-01-17

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, we find no basis for disturbing the Supreme Court’s denial of that branch of the plaintiff’s motion, pursuant to CPLR 3126, which was for an order striking the answer of all the defendants except Eisenstein and imposing sanctions against all the defendants except Eisenstein.

CPLR 3126 allows a court to strike a pleading for failure to disclose, but that harsh sanction generally requires willful or contumacious conduct; the remedy should be no greater than necessary to protect the requesting party.

Gaylord Bros. v. RND Co. · filed 1987-11-10(3)

On remittitur, the court should fashion a more reasonable remedy for defendant’s inability to produce the requested documents which, in its view, would be just and proper under the circumstances (see, CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 requires a willful or contumacious refusal to disclose before a court may strike a party’s answer.

Wohlgemuth v. Logan · filed 1988-10-20

However, CPLR 3126 requires a willful or contumacious refusal on the part of an adverse party to disclose the requested information before the drastic remedy of striking an answer will be ordered by the courts (see, Bassett v Bando Sangsa Co., 103 AD2d 728; Queens Farms Dairy v Consolidated Edison Co., 63 AD2d 696, 698). Upon the entire record before us, we are not satisfied that defendant’s conduct can be termed so willful as to justify such a harsh penalty.

A court may decline to strike an answer under CPLR 3126(3) when the record does not show willful and contumacious failure to disclose.

Haney v. O'Connell · filed 1988-12-08(3)

Based upon our review of the record, we disagree with plaintiff’s contention that defendants have acted in a willful and contumacious manner in failing to comply with the demand for disclosure. Rather, it appears that at the time the O’Connells were deposed, each erroneously assumed that certain records had in fact been maintained and were in the possession of the other. Furthermore, there is no evidence that defendants deliberately destroyed the evidence sought in an attempt to undermine or frustrate plaintiff’s case.

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike a party’s answer and enter a default judgment when the party willfully fails to provide required disclosure.

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Abad · filed 1987-06-04(3)

Supreme Court properly struck defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126. The defendants had failed to appear for examination before trial on six different dates, two of which had been court ordered. No acceptable excuses had been tendered for these repeated failures. In fact, defendants defaulted in answering the plaintiff’s motion for an order striking their answer. CPLR 3126 (3) authorizes a court to render judgment by default against a party who refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed. There can be no question that the failures to appear for examination before trial in the instant case were willful.

Striking an answer for failure to disclose requires a showing that the party willfully failed to comply with the disclosure order.

Munafo v. Power Authority · filed 1987-10-15(3)

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that PASNY willfully failed to comply with the disclosure order.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party destroys evidence despite knowing of an order compelling its inspection.

Corona v. A-B-C Packaging Machine Corp. · filed 1987-04-27

The court properly ordered that Coca-Cola’s answer be stricken pursuant to CPLR 3126 because Coca-Cola was aware of a prior order of the same court (Sullivan, J.), compelling the inspection of the machine but, nevertheless, had it destroyed (see, Miller v County of Orange, 120 AD2d 713).

Section 3126 does not warrant striking a defendant’s answer for discovery misconduct without a finding that the misconduct was deliberate.

Paris v. Waterman Steamship Corp. · filed 1987-08-20

As noted, the court made no actual finding that defendant’s attorney had deliberately engaged in falsification, or that the medical records had been obtained with his knowledge. Without such a finding, the sanction of striking a defendant’s ... answer is not warranted.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully fails to comply with a disclosure order.

Valmar Enterprises v. Rutigliano · filed 1987-11-02(3)

Since the evidence clearly shows that the defendants’ conduct was willful, the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the severe penalty of striking their answer (see, Will v County of Nassau, 90 AD2d 795; CPLR 3126 [3]; see also, Reynolds Sec. v Underwriters Bank & Trust Co., 44 NY2d 568).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party repeatedly fails to comply with orders to produce discovery materials without a satisfactory explanation.

Horowitz v. Camp Cedarhurst & Town & Country Day School, Ltd. · filed 1986-04-07

The camp’s continuous failure to comply with numerous court orders directing the production of certain discovery materials justified striking its answer.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for failure to disclose only sparingly and upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Grabow v. Blue Eyes, Inc. · filed 1986-12-18

Although the penalty to be imposed for failure to disclose (CPLR 3126) is largely within the discretion of Special Term (Associated Mut. Ins. Co. v Dyland Tavern, 105 AD2d 892, 893), the imposition of the penalty of striking a defendant’s answer for failure to comply with notices or orders for discovery is to be used sparingly and only upon a clear demonstration that the failure to disclose was willful and contumacious (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3126:7, p 646; Mancusi v Middlesex Ins. Co., 102 AD2d 846).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to disclose only when the failure is deliberate or contumacious.

Mancusi v. Middlesex Insurance · filed 1984-06-11

This provision has consistently been read as meaning that a pleading will not be struck as a penalty for failure to comply with disclosure, unless it has been shown that the failure was deliberate or contumacious (Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833).

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with a disclosure order only when the failure is willful or contumacious.

Delaney v. Automated Bread Corp. · filed 1985-04-08(3)

The penalty of striking a pleading for failure to comply with an order of disclosure (CPLR 3126 [3]) is an extreme one which is warranted only where the failure has been willful or contumacious (Bassett v Bando Sangsa Co., 103 AD2d 728; Oppenheim & Macnow v Worth, 103 AD2d 687; Joseph v Roller Castle, 100 AD2d 839; Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833; cf. Baumann v Dee, 100 AD2d 504).

A party opposing a CPLR 3126 motion to strike a pleading need not show a meritorious claim or defense when the failure to disclose was not deliberate or contumacious.

Battaglia v. Hofmeister · filed 1984-04-02

One will look in vain through the statute itself or at the cases interpreting it for any additional requirement that a party opposing a motion under CPLR 3126 must show that he has meritorious claim or defense in order to survive the motion, once it appears that the failure of discovery was not deliberate and contumacious.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for discovery failures, but the drastic nature of that sanction can warrant a further reasonable opportunity to comply.

DeFilippis v. Traian · filed 1982-11-22

However, in view of the drastic nature of the striking of a pleading, we afford a further opportunity to produce the defendants for examination before trial within a reasonable time.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer and enter a default judgment on liability for willful refusal to obey discovery orders.

Reynolds Securities, Inc. v. Underwriters Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1978-06-13

Defendant does not, and indeed cannot successfully, quarrel with the order to the extent that it struck the answer and directed the entry of a default judgment on liability, for the court was more than eminently justified in following that ... course (CPLR 3126; cf. Laverne v Meehan, 18 NY2d 635, app dsmd 386 US 682).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party’s failure to comply with disclosure obligations is deliberate and contumacious.

Will v. County of Nassau · filed 1982-11-01

Under the circumstances, defendants’ default in disclosure was clearly deliberate and contumacious. Thus, the extreme sanction of striking defendants’ answer is warranted (see CPLR 3126; Beetz v City of New York, 73 AD2d 925), and Special Term erred in failing to impose this sanction in accordance with the parties’ September 19, 1979 stipulation (see Nishman v De Marco, 76 AD2d 360).

CPLR 3126 allows a court to deny a motion to strike an answer when the discovery failure was not willful, while permitting renewal if noncompliance continues.

Branker v. County of Nassau · filed 1982-11-22

Under the circumstances, the failure of defendants to produce employees with knowledge of the facts on the date scheduled by the order of Special Term dated October 21,1981, was not willful. ... In the event of noncompliance, plaintiff may, if she be so advised, renew her motion to strike.

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking an answer when the failure to appear for an examination is not sufficiently willful and contumacious.

La Manna Concrete, Inc. v. Friedman · filed 1970-03-30

We are of the opinion that the conduct of defendants and their counsel was not so willful and com tumacious as to warrant the striking out of defendants’ answer under CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to conditionally strike an answer when a party fails to produce records ordered in discovery.

S. H. Kress-Shoreview, Inc. v. Kleiman · filed 1977-07-07(3)

Special Term properly exercised its discretion in conditionally striking the answer (CPLR 3126, subd [3]).

Section 3126 does not permit striking an answer for failure to appear at a pretrial examination without a record basis for finding willfulness.

Stockman v. Marks Polarized Corp. · filed 1966-05-23

In our opinion, there is no basis in the record for holding that the failure of Mrs. Marks to appear for examination was that willful failure contemplated by the statute; and defendants’ answer should not have been struck out, even on condition (Livingstone v. Mayes, 23 A D 2d 814; Nomako v. Ashton, 22 A D 2d 683; Mack v. Edell, 284 App. Div. 1022).

Section 3126 does not warrant striking a defendant’s answer for refusing an examination in these circumstances when the plaintiff has refused to answer proper factual questions; the plaintiff must answer those questions.

Schwartz v. Marien · filed 1972-12-12

Orders unanimously reversed, with costs, and defendants’ cross motion granted. Memorandum: Plaintiff obtained an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 striking the answer of the defendants on the ground that they willfully refused to obey an order directing them to submit to an oral examination before trial and denying defendants’ cross motion for an order directing plaintiff to answer questions asked of her at an oral examination. ... Thesé questions did not call for legal conclusions but werp inquiries concerning facts and plaintiff should answer them.

Section 3126 does not warrant the drastic sanction of striking an answer when the discovery conduct is not clearly willful or contumacious.

Shamash v. Ohrbach's Inc. · filed 1977-04-19

In the circumstances, it does not appear that defendant’s conduct was clearly willful or contumacious (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for discovery noncompliance, but dismissal is an improper exercise of discretion when the record does not show willful or contumacious disregard and indicates an inability to comply and an apparent good faith effort.

Mountain Equities, Inc. v. Insurance of North America · filed 1977-10-13

Upon the entire record before us, we are not satisfied that there was a willful or contumacious disregard by plaintiff of the discovery order. There was a certain degree of inability to comply with the order and apparently a good faith attempt, prima facie, to comply therewith.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party’s dilatory, evasive, and obstructive conduct warrants that discovery sanction.

Sony Corp. of America v. Savemart, Inc. · filed 1977-10-13

Under CPLR 3126, if one "party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information, the court may order the pleadings struck” ... The record before us discloses that defendant engaged in a course of conduct which was dilatory, evasive and obstructive, impelling plaintiff to proceed with six successive motions over a period of about a year and a half in an attempt to obtain discovery. Accordingly, defendant’s behavior justified striking the answer.

Section 3126 does not warrant striking a party’s answer and counterclaim for discovery noncompliance when the failure was not willful or due to bad faith or fault.

Newman v. Chartered New England Corp. · filed 1978-05-18

It appearing on this record that the failure to comply was not willful or due to bad faith or fault, reason and regard for orderly procedure dictate that defendants be afforded a further opportunity to comply.

CPLR 3126 permits an answer to be struck for failure to comply with a deposition order, but an unresolved dispute over an agreed deadline extension can warrant denying that sanction.

Dowlitt v. City of New York · filed 1985-09-19

When defendants-appellants failed to produce two nurses for deposition by 10:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984 as they were ordered to do by Justice Cohen, plaintiff moved for and obtained the order under appeal. We reverse solely because there is an unresolved factual dispute whether the parties mutually agreed to extend the deadline to 2:00 p.m.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint when repeated discovery delays and failure to obey a discovery order support an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Henderson v. Stilwell · filed 1986-01-16(3)

The foregoing facts contained in the moving affidavits clearly supported an inference that plaintiffs’ conduct was, under the circumstances, willful and contumacious (see, Shakerley v St. Peter’s Hosp., 91 AD2d 759; Will v County of Nassau, 90 AD2d 795; Goldner v Lendor Structures, 29 AD2d 978) and justified the extreme sanction of striking plaintiffs’ complaint (Will v County of Nassau, supra).

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to decide whether discovery delay warrants striking a defendant’s answer.

River Park Associates v. Meyerbank Electric Co. · filed 1986-01-27

While we agree with Special Term that the striking of defendant’s answer was not an appropriate sanction in this case (CPLR 3126), we do find that the conduct of defendant’s former attorney in impeding and unduly delaying the discovery process warrants the imposition of a financial sanction against him (Goldstein v Peter C. Barbone, P. C, 114 AD2d 837; Mineroff v Macy’s & Co., 97 AD2d 535).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant unconditionally striking an answer when the failure to comply with discovery was not willful, deliberate, or contumacious.

Bernstein v. Burson · filed 1987-01-20

Under the circumstances, it does not appear that the defendant’s conduct was willful, deliberate, or contumacious, and, thus, the drastic sanction of unconditionally striking his answer is not warranted (see, Plainview Assoc. v Miconics Indus., 90 AD2d 825; Cinelli v Radcliffe, 35 AD2d 829).

CPLR 3126(3) does not warrant striking an answer for failure to comply with a discovery order while that order is stayed pending appeal.

Craigie v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1987-02-02(3)

Trial Term did not err in denying the plaintiffs motion to strike the answer of the defendant City of Yonkers based on its failure to comply with a prior order of the same court dated March 15, 1985, directing disclosure. The provisions of that earlier order were stayed by reason of the city’s filing of a notice of cross appeal from said order (see, CPLR 5519 [a] [1]; see also, Matter of Willoughby Nursing Home v Axelrod, 113 AD2d 617).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery only when the moving party conclusively shows that the failure was willful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Dauria v. City of New York · filed 1987-02-05

Although CPLR 3126 provides that a court may strike a party’s pleadings for failure to comply with a discovery order or request, the extreme and drastic sanction of striking a party’s pleadings is only justified where the moving party shows conclusively that the failure to disclose was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith.

CPLR 3126 permits striking pleadings for failure to comply with discovery orders only when the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Lull v. Breiter · filed 1987-02-24

Under the circumstances present here, it was an abuse of discretion to impose the ultimate sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126, viz., unconditional striking of the pleadings, for the alleged failure of defendants Throop and Francht to appear for depositions. ... The harshest available sanction for failure to comply with discovery orders, the striking of pleadings, should not be applied unless the failure to comply was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery obligations.

Homburger v. Levitin · filed 1987-05-26

Such willful and contumacious conduct warrants the imposition of such a harsh sanction (see, CPLR 3126; Horowitz v Camp Cedarhurst & Town & Country Day School, 119 AD2d 548; Anteri v NRS Constr. Corp., 117 AD2d 696).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when repeated refusal to comply with discovery demands and disclosure orders is willful and contumacious.

Alcindor v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 1988-05-23

We note that the plaintiff has clearly established that the defendants’ repeated refusal to comply with her discovery demands and court orders directing disclosure was willful and contumacious, thereby justifying the court’s order striking their answer (see, CPLR 3126; Chase Manhattan Bank v Abad, 131 AD2d 312; Perritt v Smithtown Gen. Hosp., 122 AD2d 256, lv dismissed 68 NY2d 997; Henderson v Stilwell, 116 AD2d 861).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s pleading for failing to produce a witness for examination.

Small v. Suffolk County Honda · filed 1988-06-28(3)

One of the penalties that may be imposed for failure to produce a witness for examination is striking the offending party’s pleading. (CPLR 3126 [3].) We believe that if Honda faces the striking of its answer as a penalty, it may be more inclined to comply with the IAS court’s order to produce a witness for examination, and we accordingly modify the order below to so provide.

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking a complaint when a party deliberately ignores a clear order to answer interrogatories and offers no valid excuse.

Capoccia v. Brognano · filed 1988-07-14(3)

Striking plaintiffs’ complaint was an appropriate sanction in these circumstances (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Chase Manhattan Bank v Abad, 131 AD2d 312, 313; Lobo Equities v North Riv. Ins. Co., 124 AD2d 647).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking a pleading merely because a party is dissatisfied with interrogatory answers; willful and contumacious noncompliance must be shown.

E.K. Construction Co. v. Town of North Hempstead · filed 1988-11-14

We find that in light of the defendant’s assertion that it was unable to amplify its responses to certain interrogatories the court properly permitted the responses to stand.