N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3126

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders over an extended period without a reasonable excuse.

Elaine Farsiso, LLC v. Long Is. Compost Corp. · filed 2024-05-15

Here, the defendants demonstrated that, over the course of almost six years, the plaintiff failed to comply both with multiple court orders regarding outstanding discovery requests and with the Supreme Court's direction to promptly serve any nonparty discovery demands. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to offer a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply. ... Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing dismissal of both of the plaintiff's complaints.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when repeated, prolonged failures to comply with discovery obligations without an adequate excuse show willful and contumacious conduct.

Muhammad v. Ramadan · filed 2024-06-05

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants' answer. The defendants' willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from their repeated failures over an extended period of time to comply with court-ordered discovery and the parties' discovery stipulation and to respond to the plaintiffs' demands for discovery without an adequate excuse ( see Morales v Valeo , 218 AD3d at 678; Allstar Elecs., Inc. v DeLuca , 188 AD3d at 1122).

Section 3126(3) allows a court to deny a request to strike an answer and compel discovery responses, while permitting a renewed request if the party fails to comply.

Ludlow St. Dev., LLC v. Gomez · filed 2024-02-20(3)

However, because it is in the best interests of justice to reach the merits of cases Ms. Fleming's answer will not be striken and instead she will be compelled to provide full responses to the discovery demands and interrogatories. However, if Ms. Fleming does not provide the relevant discovery within the required time period, her answer may be stricken.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint when repeated, unexcused failures to comply with discovery demands and orders show willful and contumacious conduct.

Taglianetti v. Bay Ridge Med. Imaging, P.C. · filed 2024-07-03

Here, the plaintiff's willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from his repeated failure to timely and fully comply with the defendant's discovery demands and court-ordered discovery, without an adequate excuse ( see Hongyan Sun v Lee , 212 AD3d 717, 719; Sheikh v Poplardo , 207 AD3d 775, 776). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to obey a disclosure order when the moving party clearly shows that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

2118 Group LLC v. Lior Group LLC · filed 2024-07-08(3)

Such action is appropriate "only when the moving party [for such relief] establishes 'a clear showing that the failure to comply is willful, contumacious or in bad faith'" (Rodriguez 70 AD3d at 492 [internal citation omitted]). ... While the Court denies striking defendants' answer and issuing a default against defendant, such denial shall be without prejudice.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for discovery noncompliance, but that severe sanction requires a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Rampersaud v. Dumanyan · filed 2024-07-09

Here, plaintiff has not made a clear showing that defendant's failure to comply with the September 17, 2022 order was willful or contumacious to \Varrant a severe sanction of striking defendant's answer (Hogin v City of New York, 103 AD3d 419,420 [1st Dept 1998]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when repeated failure to obey discovery orders supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Reyes v. U.S. Sec. Assoc. Aviation Servs., Inc. · filed 2024-08-21

Here, the willful and contumacious character of the defendant's conduct can be inferred from its failure to comply with multiple court orders directing it to produce a witness for a deposition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3126, to strike the defendant's answer.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a party's pleading for willful, contumacious failure to comply with discovery orders.

Five Star Elec. Corp. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. · filed 2024-09-30

While generally true, CPLR § 3126 and New York case law equally allow courts to exercise their discretion and to strike a party's pleadings when a party's discovery rise to the level of being ... willful, contumacious, and in bad faith (Rosenfeld, 161 AD2d at 374; Williams, 102 AD3d at 598).

Section 3126 authorizes sanctions, including striking a pleading, for willful, contumacious, or bad faith failure to comply with discovery.

Healy Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Palace Elec. Contrs., Inc. · filed 2024-11-04

While trial courts have broad authority under CPLR 3126 where a party’s failure to comply with a discovery request was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith, “[e]xtreme conduct is required before imposition of the ultimate penalty -- striking the answer in this instance” (Dauria v New York, 127 AD2d 459, 460, 511 NYS2d 271 [1st Dept 1987]). Clearly, although Palace missed deadlines related to document production, Palace has produced some documents and has not wholly ignored its obligations. Therefore, the Court is unable to find that the drastic remedy of striking its pleading is appropriate.

Section 3126 allows a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery demands or orders when the failure is clearly willful and contumacious.

Louis v. Hudson 36 LLC · filed 2024-11-26

... [T]he drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be imposed unless the failure to comply with discovery demands or orders is clearly willful and contumacious.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party's pleadings for a wilful failure to disclose information that should have been disclosed, but striking requires willful and contumacious conduct in bad faith without a reasonable excuse.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 2024-12-16(3)

A court may penalize any party who "wilfully fails to disclose infonnation which the court finds ought to have been disclosed," including by striking the party 's pleadings. See CPLR § 3126(3). ... Striking is appropriate "only upon a clear showing that the party's conduct was willful and contumacious,'' CEMD El. Corp., 141 AD3d at 453, and "in bad faith" and without "a reasonable excuse." Crooke v Bonofacio, 14 7 AD3d 510, 510 (1st Dep't 2017). ... And the Court does not find that Defendants' behavior rises to such levels, as would be needed to warrant the drastic remedy of striking their answer. Thus, Plaintiffs' cross-motion to strike Defendants' answer must be denied.

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for willful failure to comply with discovery orders without a reasonable excuse.

Abuzaid v. Almayouf · filed 2025-01-06(3)

The defendant has thus repeatedly failed to comply with court orders, been afforded multiple opportunities to bring herself into compliance, and received multiple warnings regarding the potential consequences of her failures to do so. She has, nevertheless, chosen to continue not to comply, without reasonable excuse. This is the very definition of willfulness and warrants the striking of the defendant’s answer.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party fails to comply with a discovery order and offers no reasonable excuse.

Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP v. Marcus & Cinelli L · filed 2025-01-28

This lack of opposition leaves the Court to infer that the Marcus Defendants failed to comply with this Court’s order and so the Court must strike their answer.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for discovery failures when the conduct is shown to be willful and contumacious.

Farrell v. Keldiyarov · filed 2025-01-29

Here, the plaintiff failed to sufficiently demonstrate willful or contumacious conduct on the part of Keldiyarov ( see Candela v Kantor , 154 AD3d 733, 734; Kanic Realty Assoc., Inc. v Suffolk County Water Auth. , 130 AD3d 876, 877). Under the circumstances, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading was not appropriate ( see Ye Wu v Xiao Qing Li , 173 AD3d 1124, 1125; Campbell v New York City Tr. Auth. , 109 AD3d 455, 456). Moreover, no other remedy was warranted. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike Keldiyarov's answer.

Section 3126(3) allows a court to deny a request to strike an answer for failure to provide discovery and direct the parties to complete the outstanding discovery.

Eisenberg v. Amazon Logistics, Inc. · filed 2025-01-30(3)

This Court finds that the portion of plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike the defendant’s Answer is denied, and the portion of plaintiff’s cross-motion to compel is granted to the extent that the parties are directed to complete a compliance conference order within 30 days of this Order with the outstanding discovery, including scheduling outstanding deposition of the parties and for defendant Wilson to submit the names of his witnesses as soon as the names become available.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for repeated failure to obey disclosure orders, but the court may first warn the party and give it a final chance to comply.

Dwyer v. 99 Canal Realty Inc. · filed 2025-01-30

However, as 99 Canal had not previously been warned that its answer would be stricken if it failed to produce a witness as directed (See Armstrong v. B.R. Fries & Assoc., Inc., 95 AD3d 697, 698 [1st Dept 2012] [“extreme” penalty of dismissal should not be imposed absent prior notice such a sanction “might be imminent”]), the Court grants plaintiff’s motion to the limited extent that 99 Canal is directed to produce its witness for a deposition on or before March 7, 2025 and further orders that should Canal fail to appear for this deposition its answer will be automatically stricken.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for willful and contumacious discovery noncompliance; delayed responses that do not justify dismissal may warrant compelled further disclosure.

Alhanafi v. City of New York · filed 2025-02-03

Striking a pleading is a drastic remedy appropriate only for willful and contumacious noncompliance (see Lobo Equities, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 124 AD2d 647 [2d Dept 1986]). Here, although Plaintiff’s responses have been delayed, they are not so profoundly deficient as to justify dismissal; however, a less severe remedy—compelled further disclosure—is warranted.

A court may deny a CPLR 3126 motion to strike an answer when the movant fails to clearly show willful or contumacious disobedience of a discovery order or bad faith.

Borchkhadze v. McMahon · filed 2025-02-26

Here, the plaintiff failed to make a clear showing that the defendants willfully or contumaciously disobeyed a discovery order or acted in bad faith ( see Finely v ZSN, LLC , 221 AD3d 970, 971; Rojas v Hazzard , 171 AD3d 819, 820). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion by, in effect, denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants' answer.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading when a party willfully delays discovery and ignores court orders.

Fusion Funding v. All Pro Preparation, Inc. · filed 2025-04-08(3)

The Court must conclude that the defendants engaged in willful delay of the discovery process. Here, given the willful delay by the defendants, and their intentional ignoring of the Court's previous orders, the appropriate remedy is striking the defendants' answer.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for refusal to obey a disclosure order or willful failure to disclose; a party does not act willfully by failing to follow a case scheduling order that does not exist.

Barbieri v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-08

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a Court may strike a party’s pleading if that party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information that should have been disclosed. ... The City has not acted willfully given that there is no CSO to follow and this motion is denied as premature.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for refusal to obey a disclosure order or willful failure to disclose; the sanction is premature when no case scheduling order exists and the party has not acted willfully.

Perdomo v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-09

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a Court may strike a party’s pleading if that party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information that should have been ... disclosed. ... The defendant City has not acted willfully given that there is no CSO to follow and this motion is denied as premature.

Section 3126 sanctions such as preclusion or striking a complaint may be denied as too drastic at the current stage of discovery.

FR v. AR · filed 2025-04-15

The Court, however, finds the drastic remedy of preclusion and/or the striking of the Plaintiff's Complaint to be extreme at this time.

Section 3126 does not warrant striking a pleading or precluding evidence for missed discovery deadlines when the parties agreed to extend the response deadline.

Rios v. Addams · filed 2025-01-13

The Court cannot strike a pleading or impose the drastic remedy of preclusion where the parties agreed to a new deadline for responses, even where prior deadlines may have passed.

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer for a discovery violation, but that remedy is unwarranted without a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Scala v. Lopez · filed 2025-05-07(3)

Moreover, plaintiff did not make a clear showing that the defendants' failure to comply with her discovery demands in supplying the updated release authorizations was willful, contumacious, or done in bad faith. Nor did plaintiff evince a pattern of repeated noncompliance giving rise to an inference of willfulness or contumacious conduct in relation to the additional release authorizations ( see generally Watson v Esposito , 231 AD2d 512, 515 [2d Dept 1996], lv dismissed 89 NY2d 915 [1996]). At this juncture, it would be an improvident exercise of judicial discretion to strike the defendants' answer ( see Jackson v Hunter Roberts Constr. Group, L.L.C. , 139 AD3d at 429).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint for willful and contumacious discovery noncompliance, with substantial deference given to the court’s choice of penalty.

Five Star Elec. Corp. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. · filed 2025-05-13

We give "substantial deference" to the motion court's "considerable discretion" to impose penalties pursuant to CPLR 3126, and "absent clear abuse," will not disturb such a penalty ( Arts4All, Ltd. v Hancock , 54 AD3d 286 [1st Dept 2008], affd 12 NY3d 846 [2009], affd 13 NY3d 812 [2009]). Here, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking plaintiff's complaint ( see e.g. Williams v Shiva Ambulette Serv. Inc. , 102 AD3d 598, 599 [1st Dept 2013]). ... This pattern of years-long delay demonstrated that plaintiff's noncompliance was willful and contumacious ( see Henderson-Jones v City of New York , 87 AD3d 498, 504 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Harris v Kay , 168 AD3d 419, 419 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 903 [2019]).

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for egregious discovery misconduct, but the sanction requires deliberate noncompliance and prejudice.

Plana v. United Christian Evangelistic Assn. · filed 2025-05-13

In sum, under CPLR § 3126, striking a pleading is reserved for truly egregious discovery misconduct. Here, the City repeatedly complied with every court directive, conducted exhaustive searches, and provided sworn proofs of non‑existence. Plaintiff’s motion—filed only after leave was granted—fails to demonstrate any deliberate refusal or prejudice justifying the striking of the City’s answer.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a party's answer when the party fails to produce documents required by a discovery order.

Tyson v. Diallo · filed 2025-05-14

Further, in light of the Uber defendants' failure to thereafter produce the documents referenced in the affidavit as directed by the order dated December 20, 2022, the court, upon reargument, providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's second motion to strike ( see L. K. v City of New York , 210 AD3d 753, 754; 255 Butler Assoc., LLC v 255 Butler, LLC , 208 AD3d at 834; Montgomery v City of New York , 296 AD2d 386, 386-387).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for refusing to obey a disclosure order or willfully withholding required information; the sanction was premature where no case scheduling order existed and the defendant had not acted willfully.

Lehman v. City of New York · filed 2025-06-09

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a Court may strike a party's pleading if that party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information that should have been ... disclosed. ... The City has not acted willfully given that there is no CSO to follow and this motion is denied as premature.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for willful failure to disclose, but the court may decline that sanction as too harsh even when its requirements are met.

Markosyan v. City of New York · filed 2025-06-11

Although all factors under CPLR 3126 have been met, striking the complaint may be too harsh at this moment. Accordingly, rather than strike plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3124, it is clear plaintiff failed to respond or comply with discovery demands, and so, a directive to compel plaintiff to produce any outstanding discovery is more appropriate.

Section 3126 permits a court to deny a motion to strike pleadings as premature when the record does not yet establish fraud on the court and further discovery is needed.

Austin Schuster Group, LLC v. Extell Dev. Co. · filed 2025-06-16

Extell is not yet entitled to the Court striking the complaint (see CPLR § 3126; Husovic v Structure Tone, Inc., 171 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2019]; Sanchez v City of NY, 266 AD2d 127 [1st Dept 1999]). The record does not yet evidence a “fraud on the court.”

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery demands without a reasonable excuse.

Manno v. Hayes Law Practice, PLLC · filed 2025-07-16

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. ... "The court has broad discretion to determine the nature and degree of any sanction to be imposed under CPLR 3126 for the failure to comply with discovery demands or orders" ( Reyes v U.S. Sec. Assoc. Aviation Servs., Inc. , 230 AD3d 708, 709 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Pfeiffer v Shouela , 206 AD3d 941, 942). ... Here, the defendants demonstrated that, from October 2018 through July 2019, the plaintiffs did not comply with the defendants' discovery demands, object to them, or seek to be relieved from the obligation to comply with them ( see Follors v TI Ozone Park Stor., LLC , 209 AD3d 843, 845).

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for a discovery violation upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious noncompliance; dissatisfaction with the opposing party's responses is insufficient.

Zensky v. Clipper Equity, LLC · filed 2025-08-06

Since public policy strongly favors the resolution of actions on the merits, the drastic remedy of dismissal of a complaint is not warranted unless there is a clear showing that a party's failure to comply with discovery demands or orders was willful and contumacious ( see CPLR 3126; Wanliss v Retina Assoc. of N.Y., P.C. , 230 AD3d 1270, 1271; Lopez v Maggies Paratransit Corp. , 210 AD3d at 1067). ... Here, the plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the responses and objections proffered by the defendants was insufficient to establish that the defendants willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with discovery ( see Roel v Hsu , 185 AD3d at 1078). Thus, the Supreme Court providently denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to strike the defendants' answer and counterclaim for their alleged willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to deny a request to strike a pleading despite significant delays in complying with discovery demands and court-ordered deadlines.

C.M. v. City of New York · filed 2025-10-01

Here, although the defendants were significantly delayed in complying with discovery demands and court-ordered discovery deadlines, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants' answer ( see Plenty v New York City Tr. Auth. , 229 AD3d at 573; Aldo v City of New York , 210 AD3d 833, 835).

Section 3126 gives courts discretion over discovery sanctions; striking a pleading or precluding evidence requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious failure to comply with court-ordered discovery.

Kuznitz v. Funk · filed 2025-09-10

"Actions should be resolved on their merits whenever possible, and the drastic remedy of striking a pleading or the alternative remedy of precluding evidence should not be employed without a clear showing that the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious" ( Edwards v Freedom Church of Revelation , 230 AD3d at 741 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hawkins v City of New York , 237 AD3d 1069, 1069-1070). Here, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with their discovery obligations or that their conduct was willful and contumacious. ... Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint or, in the alternative, to preclude the plaintiffs from introducing evidence on the issue of damages at trial ( see 22 NYCRR 202.17[b][1]; Gibson v Delemos , 231 AD3d 710, 712; Preferred Westchester Props., Inc. v Fay Realty, LLC , 226 AD3d at 836; Gregorian v New York Life Ins. Co. , 211 AD3d 706, 708).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s answer if the party fails to provide required discovery responses by a court-ordered deadline.

Simply Funding LLC v. Brannon Elec. LLC · filed 2025-10-09

The Court has discretion to impose discovery sanctions, including the striking of a pleading or the preclusion of evidence, where a party refuses to obey a discovery order or willfully fails to disclose information that ought to have been disclosed. ... ORDERED that in the event the Defendants do not comply with the 30 day deadline for responses, their joint Answer will be STRUCK without the necessity of any further motion.

CPLR 3126(3) allows a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with discovery orders, but a brief delay followed by responses before discovery closes may not warrant that sanction.

McWilliams v. Empire Agric. Sys., LLC · filed 2025-11-18(3)

Here, while Plaintiffs have made a showing that Defendants have failed to timely comply with discovery deadlines and the Court’s discovery orders, the Court does not find that this conduct warrants the “severe sanction” of striking Defendants’ Answer. ... Ultimately, Defendants’ delay in complying with the Court’s June 2025 Order was only a matter of days—and their responses were provided before the deadline for all discovery. Accordingly, in light of the Court’s preference to decide cases on the merits, the motion to strike is denied.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for discovery violations only upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Casillas v. Moore · filed 2025-11-26(3)

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose discovery sanctions, including the striking of a pleading, where a party "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed" ( see CPLR 3126[3]; Sanabria v NYSARC, Inc. , 204 AD3d 716, 717). ... Here, the record does not establish a clear showing of willfulness and contumacious [*2]conduct necessary to justify the striking of the defendants' answer, as the defendants have provided significant documentation and additional depositions regarding the accident ( see Malek v Malek , 208 AD3d at 774-775; Johnson v Ortiz Transp., LLC , 205 AD3d at 700).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for discovery misconduct, but that sanction requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Meraj v. Walgreens Co. · filed 2025-12-10

Here, nothing in the record supports a conclusion that any discovery delays were due to willful and contumacious conduct of the plaintiffs ( see Palmieri v Piano Exch., Inc. , 124 AD3d 611, 612; Zakhidov v Boulevard Tenants Corp. , 96 AD3d 737, 738-739). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the cross-motions of the Unicorp defendants and Reed-Mackinnon pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a party's pleadings when unexplained failures to comply with discovery demands or attend a deposition support an inference of willful or contumacious conduct.

Matter of Selma V. Kelter Trust · filed 2025-12-31

Under those circumstances, it was a provident exercise of the Surrogate's Court's discretion to grant that branch of the petitioner's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike Patricia's pleadings ( see Hongyan Sun v Lee , 212 AD3d at 719; Apladenaki v Greenpoint Mtge. Funding, Inc. , 117 AD3d at 977).

Section 3126 permits striking pleadings for discovery misconduct when the conduct is clearly willful and contumacious.

Naramore v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc. · filed 2026-01-20

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' pleadings (CPLR 3126; see Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v Occidental Gems, Inc. , 11 NY3d 843, 845 [2008]; Han v New York City Tr. Auth. , 169 AD3d 435, 435 [1st Dept 2019]). ... The record does not demonstrate that defendants' conduct was clearly willful and contumacious so as to warrant such a harsh sanction ( see Spitzer v 2166 Bronx Park E. Corps. , 284 AD2d 177, 177 [1st Dept 2001]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer for discovery failures only upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Akther v. Jabyali · filed 2026-01-21

Here, the plaintiff failed to make a clear showing of a pattern of willful and contumacious conduct by the defendants so as to warrant the striking of their answer ( see Farmer v Gazebo Contr., Inc. , 218 AD3d 644, 647; Burrell v Baptista , 180 AD3d 988, 988).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party willfully fails to comply with discovery demands or orders.

Hicks v. Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. · filed 2026-02-11

We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for sanctions pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits disclosure sanctions, but striking pleadings is unwarranted where the movant failed to follow court rules and the circumstances favor deciding the case on its merits.

Smith v. Founders Entertainment, LLC · filed 2026-02-17

CPLR § 3126 authorizes the court to sanction a party who "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed." ... Given Mountain Productions' failure to follow Part rules, and in light of the strong judicial preference to resolve cases on the merits, the harsh penalty of striking the pleadings is not warranted here (see Bassett v Banda Sangsa Company, Ltd., 103 A.D.2d 728,728 [1st Dept 1984]).

Section 3126(3) allows a court to strike pleadings for willful failure to comply with disclosure orders without first issuing another order to compel production.

Ballon Stoll P.C. v. 162 Utica Ave, Inc. · filed 2026-02-20(3)

CPLR § 3126(3) provides that the Court may strike a pleading when it finds, inter alia, that a party has refused to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information that ought to have been disclosed. ... Ballon Stoll’s contention that its pleadings cannot be stricken at this juncture, and that the Court must first compel production of the contract, is without merit.

CPLR § 3126 permits a court to strike pleadings when repeated, unexplained failures to obey discovery orders establish willful and contumacious noncompliance.

Aurora Tourism Servs., LLC v. Go N.Y. Tours, Inc. · filed 2026-02-25

Based on such dilatory conduct and Aurora’s failure to comply with multiple Court Orders, forcing Top View to submit pre-motion letters, discovery letters, and make motions seeking discovery, the Court deems it appropriate, in its discretion, to grant Top View’s motion to strike Aurora’s pleadings and enter judgment in the amount of $41,219.85 per the October 9, 2025 Supplemental Order.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party deletes essential evidence and prejudices an opponent’s ability to defend the case.

King v. Hayes · filed 2026-03-11

By deleting essential evidence contained within her social media and YouTube accounts, plaintiff prejudiced defendants’ ability to defend this action concerning whether she sustained a permanent disability as defined by Insurance Law § 5102. ... ORDERED that defendant THE NEW YORK FOUNDLING to strike plaintiff’s complaint per CPLR § 3126 is GRANTED, and this action is dismissed as against defendant THE NEW YORK FOUNDLING only (MS 005).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading or entering a default judgment for failure to comply with a disclosure order when willful and contumacious conduct is clearly shown.

Xie v. Chen · filed 2026-03-25(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants' answer and counterclaims and for leave to enter a default judgment against them. ... Here, the plaintiff failed to make a clear showing that the defendants' failure to produce the tax returns on or before December 14, 2022, was the result of willful and contumacious conduct ( see id. ).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party's failure to comply with court orders, without adequate excuses, supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Couteller v. Mamakos · filed 2025-12-16

The court providently exercised its discretion by striking defendant's answer based on her "failure to comply with court orders, in the absence of adequate excuses," which permits an inference of willful and contumacious behavior ( Henderson-Jones v City of New York , 87 AD3d 498, 504 [1st Dept 2011]; see also CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s pleadings and enter a default judgment for repeated failure to provide ordered discovery.

Scaglia v. Haart · filed 2026-04-09

The court providently exercised its discretion in striking the husband's pleadings, finding him in default, and awarding the wife a judgment of divorce on her counterclaims (see Berk v Berk, 5 AD3d 165, 166 [1st Dept 2004]; Hwang v Tam, 72 AD3d 741, 742 [2d Dept 2010]). The record establishes the husband's repeated violations of the court's orders, including his failure or refusal to provide ordered discovery, court-ordered counsel fees, forensic expert and special masters fees, and his failure to attend conferences.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for a long-standing pattern of willful or contumacious discovery noncompliance, which the moving party must establish.

Vera v. Xolle Demo LLC · filed 2026-04-14

Striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a "drastic remedy" justified by a "long-standing pattern of willful or contumacious failure to comply with discovery demands or orders" (Farrell Limousine Serv. LLC v Macro Consultants LLC, 231 AD3d 667, 668 [1st Dept 2024]). The burden is on the moving party to establish that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful (see Pimental v City of New York, 246 AD2d 467, 468 [1st Dept 1998]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for discovery noncompliance only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

American Tr. Ins. Co. v. MZY Acupuncture, P.C. · filed 2026-04-15

Here, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff's conduct was willful or contumacious (see Edwards v Freedom Church of Revelation, 230 AD3d 740, 742; Ferjuste v 437 BMW, LLC, 219 AD3d 1308, 1310; PAL Envtl. Servs., Inc. v LJC Dismantling Corp., 157 AD3d 808, 809-810; Singer v Riskin, 137 AD3d 999, 1001).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for discovery noncompliance only upon a clear showing that the conduct was willful and contumacious.

American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Hackensack Surgery Ctr., LLC · filed 2026-04-15

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant's prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint and, upon reargument, properly vacated so much of the August 2023 order as granted that branch of the defendant's prior motion and thereupon, denied that branch of the defendant's prior motion.

A pleading should not be struck under CPLR 3126 for incomplete interrogatory responses when the applicable order required supplementation only to the extent possible and the party did not violate that order.

Lee v. Luk · filed 2026-04-16

We also reject defendant's assertion that the amended complaint should have been struck under CPLR 3126 based on plaintiff's failure to respond to certain interrogatories. The court's June 14, 2014 compliance conference order only required plaintiff to supplement his interrogatory responses "to the extent he is able," and plaintiff asserted that demands for expert disclosures from his expert forensic accountant had not yet been served. Thus, there was no court order to which plaintiff failed to adhere to.

Section 3126 allows a court to strike an answer for discovery misconduct when the record shows willful and contumacious noncompliance or false and fraudulent information supplied during discovery.

Kakuriev v. Baffone Transp., Inc. · filed 2026-05-13

The Supreme Court further properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3124 and 3126 to strike the defendants' answer. ... Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants willfully and contumaciously refused to comply with discovery demands and orders or otherwise "supplied false and fraudulent information" during discovery (Garnett v Hudson Rent A Car, 258 AD2d 559, 559) that would warrant the drastic sanction of striking the defendants' answer.

Section 3126 does not justify striking an answer for failure to produce former employees who are outside the party's control.

Amirov v. Turtle Bay Tavern Corp. · filed 2026-05-14

The motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking defendants' answer for failing to produce a witness with knowledge of the facts concerning an alleged assault at defendants' premises and defendant's internal policies and procedures related to security and the service of alcohol to intoxicated patrons.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading or preclude evidence when a party refuses a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose information the court finds should have been disclosed.

Gonzalez v. City of New York · filed 2026-05-20

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose discovery sanctions, including the striking of a pleading or preclusion of evidence, where a party "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed."

Section 3126 did not warrant striking a complaint for missing a scheduling deadline after the court mistakenly marked the action disposed, where the plaintiff had complied with all other court orders.

Ochoa v. C.I. Lobster Corp. · filed 2026-05-26

In light of the court's error in marking this action disposed, as well as the absence of plaintiff's failure to comply with any court orders other than the initial scheduling order, the sanction of striking plaintiff's complaint was unwarranted ( see Elizabeth Canal , 236 AD3d at 583; see also Youwanes v Steinbrech , 193 AD3d 492, 493 [1st Dept 2021] ["strong preference in our law that matters be decided on their merits"]; Lee v 13th St. Entertainment LLC , 161 AD3d 631, 632 [1st Dept 2018]).

A plaintiff who has not defaulted on a disclosure order has a meritorious defense to a motion to strike its complaint under section 3126(c).

Cornwall Warehousing, Inc. v. Lerner · filed 2019-04-16(c)

Plaintiffs then moved to vacate the order entered on their default, showing that they had a meritorious defense to the underlying motion to strike their complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (c), since they were not in default of any disclosure order ( see John Quealy Irrevocable Life Ins. Trust v AXA Equit. Life Ins. Co. , 151 AD3d 592, 593 [1st Dept 2017], lv dismissed 30 NY3d 1091 [2018]; DaimlerChrysler Ins. Co. v Seck , 82 AD3d 581, 582 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 3126(3) allows an answer to be struck for failure to provide discovery; the absence of evidence that the failure was willful or contumacious supports opposition to that sanction.

210 E. 60 St., LLC v. Rahman · filed 2019-12-18(3)

The defendants also demonstrated that they had a potentially meritorious opposition to the plaintiff's motion, given the absence of evidence that the defendants' failure to timely respond to the plaintiff's notice of discovery and inspection was willful or contumacious ( see Madonna Mgt. Servs., Inc. v R.S. Naghavi, M.D., PLLC , 172 AD3d 845; Peterson v Estate of Rozansky , 171 AD3d 805, 808; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Oscar , 161 AD3d 1055, 1057).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer when a party repeatedly disobeys discovery orders and fails to provide discovery.

Teshabaeva v. Family Home Care Servs. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. · filed 2023-03-07(3)

Similarly, "Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in striking [defendants'] answer based on a pattern of disobeying court orders and failing to provide discovery" ( Fish & Richardson, P.C. v Schindler , 75 AD3d 219, 220 [1st Dept 2010]; see CPLR 3126[3]). ... Defendants' conduct indicates that the "failure to comply [was] willful, contumacious [and] in bad faith" ( Reidel v Ryder TRS, Inc. , 13 AD3d 170, 171 [1st Dept 2004][internal citations omitted]).

Section 3126 permits preclusion of testimony for failure to provide discovery when that failure is shown to be willful and contumacious.

Wagner v. 119 Metro · filed 2009-02-10

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion in limine to the extent of precluding the defendants from testifying at trial, as there was no showing that the defendants’ failure to provide discovery was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; cf. Klutchko v Baron, 1 AD3d 400, 404 [2003]; Goens v Vogelstein, 146 AD2d 606 [1989]; Tine v Courtview Owners Corp., 40 AD3d 966 [2007]).

CPLR 3126 permits a tailored preclusion sanction for dilatory and contumacious failure to comply with disclosure orders.

Baldwin v. Gerard Avenue, LLC · filed 2009-01-15

Although Austin’s conduct was sufficiently dilatory and contumacious to warrant a CPLR 3126 sanction, the court, instead of striking the answer, issued a more lenient sanction, precluding Austin from contesting the existence of the missing file and the fact that repairs were made, and from offering the testimony of the project manager.

Section 3126 does not support preclusion of examinations before trial where the record does not show willful and contumacious obstruction of disclosure.

Redmond v. Jamaica Hospital Medical Center · filed 2009-05-19

The record does not demonstrate that the plaintiffs counsel willfully and contumaciously obstructed the progress of disclosure with respect to the examinations before trial of the defendants Kenneth Fretwell and Jeffrey Chan (hereinafter the defendant doctors) (see Maceno v Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr., 14 AD3d 663, 664 [2005]; Santigate v Linsalata, 304 AD2d 639, 641 [2003]; Gorokhova v Belulovich, 267 AD2d 202, 203 [1999]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in, sua sponte, imposing the sanction of preclusion with respect to the examination before trial of the defendant doctors (see CPLR 3126; cf. Mahopac Ophthalmology, P.C. v Tarasevich, 21 AD3d 351, 352 [2005]), and in denying the plaintiffs motion to vacate the order imposing that sanction.

Section 3126 permits discretionary discovery sanctions, but precluding evidence requires willful, deliberate, and contumacious noncompliance.

Kumar v. Kumar · filed 2009-06-04

Therefore, the order precluding the wife from offering any evidence at trial is reversed and, as a result, the amended judgment in the husband’s favor must be vacated.

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion for a disclosure failure only when the party’s lack of cooperation was willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Allen v. Calleja · filed 2008-11-12(2)

To warrant preclusion, “the Supreme Court must determine that the offending party’s lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious” (Assael v Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 4 AD3d 443, 443 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3126 [2]; Moog v City of New York, 30 AD3d 490 [2006]).

Preclusion under CPLR 3126 requires a willful, deliberate and contumacious failure to comply with a disclosure order.

Holliday v. Jones · filed 2007-01-30

In order to invoke the drastic remedy of ...preclusion (CPLR 3126), the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was willful, deliberate and contumacious (Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524 [1994]).

CPLR 3126 permits preclusion when a party willfully obstructs court-ordered discovery and offers no reasonable excuse.

Green v. Green · filed 2006-09-19

Here, the defendants engaged in a pattern of conduct over a period of time which evidenced an intent to willfully and contumaciously obstruct and delay the progress of disclosure. Moreover, the defendants failed to proffer any reasonable excuse for their default in complying with the court’s discovery orders. Accordingly, under the circumstances, the remedy of preclusion was warranted (see Precise Ct. Reporting v Karten, 6 AD3d 412, 414-415 [2004]).

Section 3126 allows preclusion for a disclosure failure, but the court may deny it when the witness cannot recall the information and willful or bad-faith nondisclosure has not been established.

Sagiv v. Gamache · filed 2006-02-14

The Supreme Court also providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was to compel disclosure of the medical literature Dr. Gamache referenced, but was allegedly unable to specifically recall, during his deposition (see CPLR 3124) or, in the alternative, to preclude the defendants from relying upon that information at trial (see CPLR 3126). It cannot be presently determined as a matter of law whether the witness’ failure to identify a particular source was either willful or in bad faith.

Section 3126 permits a court to limit preclusion at trial to matters for which a party failed to provide demanded particulars when the party substantially complied with a disclosure order.

Whitfield v. State · filed 2006-04-11

The defendant also substantially complied with that portion of the order dated February 28, 2005 which conditionally precluded it from offering evidence at trial regarding matters of which particulars were not given pursuant to written demands by serving a bill of particulars (see Barlow v Werner Co., 295 AD2d 381 [2002]; Papis v St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr. of Richmond, 227 AD2d 601, 602 [1996]). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Claims providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the claimant’s motion which was to preclude the defendant from offering evidence at trial only to the extent of precluding those matters of which particulars demanded were not given in the bill of particulars served by the defendant.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to preclude further deposition when a party misses a scheduled deposition without obtaining the court’s consent to adjourn it.

Schneider v. Schneider · filed 2005-03-21

Determinations with respect to CPLR 3126 are generally left to the sound discretion of the motion court ... The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from further deposing the defendant. The plaintiff was aware of the deadlines set by the court, and had been informed that the defendant’s counsel would not agree to an adjournment of the scheduled deposition without the prior consent of the court. The plaintiff was unable to obtain the court’s consent, but still did not appear at the scheduled continuation of the deposition.

Section 3126 permits preclusion of an examination before trial as a disclosure sanction, but the record must support a finding of willful and contumacious obstruction.

Maceno v. Franklin Hospital Medical Center · filed 2005-01-31

The Supreme Court providently imposed the sanction of preclusion with respect to the examination before trial of the defendant Franklin Hospital Medical Center (see CPLR 3126; cf. Precise Ct. Reporting v Karten, 6 AD3d 412 [2004]). However, the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff willfully and contumaciously obstructed the progress of disclosure with regard to the examination before trial of the defendant Jeffrey Shapiro (see Santigate v Linsalata, 304 AD2d 639, 641 [2003]; Gorokhova v Belulovich, 267 AD2d 202, 203 [1999]).

CPLR 3126 leaves the nature and degree of a sanction for willful failure to disclose to the court’s discretion, including preclusion of evidence.

Milbrandt & Co. v. Griffin · filed 2005-06-27(2)

The nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 for a party’s willful failure to disclose information lies within the sound discretion of the court (see CPLR 3126 [2]; Ordonez v Guerra, 295 AD2d 325, 326 [2002]). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in imposing the sanction of preclusion.

Section 3126 does not warrant preclusion or dismissal for delayed expert disclosure without a showing of willfulness or prejudice beyond fading memories from the passage of time.

Leeds v. Lenox Hill Hospital · filed 2004-04-13

Finally, the IAS court properly denied defendants’ motion for preclusion or dismissal under CPLR 3126, there being no showing that plaintiffs delay in providing expert disclosure was willful or that defendants suffered any prejudice other than fading memories due to the passage of time (see Colome v Grand Concourse 2075, 302 AD2d 251 [2003]).

A party that claims a nonparty witness is outside its control may be precluded from calling that witness at trial unless it first allows the opposing party to complete the witness’s deposition.

Vera v. Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 1991-08-08

Plaintiffs assert that the non-party witness, who is the sister of plaintiff Josephine Vera, is not in their control within the meaning of CPLR 3126. Fairness dictates that, having taken such position, plaintiffs not be allowed to maintain the option of simply producing the witness at trial to testify in their behalf if at a future time they should obtain control over her, without first allowing the defendants to complete her pre-trial deposition, which was terminated after one day.

Section 3126 does not permit an order of preclusion against a nonparty that was not served with the interrogatories.

ABC Meats, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank · filed 1990-02-02

Second, the interrogatories were not served upon Wholesale Foods, and Wholesale Foods was not a party to the action. Wholesale Foods was not subject to a CPLR 3126 order of preclusion (see, Durst, Fuchsberg and Kleiner, Modern New York Discovery § 16:17).

Preclusion under CPLR 3126 was an improvident sanction where there was no evidence of willful noncompliance, intentional destruction of evidence, or an effort to thwart disclosure.

Goens v. Vogelstein · filed 1989-01-17

CPLR 3126 provides that "the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or refusal as are just” where any party "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information”. There is no evidence in this case to suggest that the plaintiff willfully failed to comply with the preliminary conference order, or that the plaintiff deliberately and intentionally discarded or destroyed evidence, or otherwise thwarted the defendants’ attempts at disclosure. Accordingly, it was an improvident exercise of discretion to impose the sanction of preclusion (see, Ferraro v Koncal Assocs., 97 AD2d 429; see also, Ramos v DeMond, 127 AD2d 751; cf., Sawh v Bridges, 120 AD2d 74, appeal dismissed 69 NY2d 852).

Section 3126 permits dismissal or preclusion for discovery violations, but a court may deny those sanctions when the failure to comply was not willful or contumacious.

Wolfson v. Calamel · filed 1990-06-22

The record does not establish that plaintiff’s failure to comply with defendant’s discovery demands or the trial court’s discovery order was ... willful or contumacious; therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint or preclude plaintiff from introducing any medical evidence (see, CPLR 3126; ...).

Section 3126 permits a court to conditionally preclude evidence when a party fails to provide adequate discovery responses, giving the party time to cure the failure.

Saar v. Brown & Odabashian, P. C. · filed 1988-03-31

The motion is granted, without costs, and the defendant is precluded from offering any evidence as to the decedent’s contributory negligence unless the defendant serves an amended bill of particulars within 30 days of the service of a copy of the order to be entered herein with notice of entry.

Section 3126(2) allows a court to decline to exclude undisclosed evidence when the failure to disclose was negligent rather than willful and an adjournment addresses potential prejudice.

Ramos v. DeMond · filed 1987-02-17(2)

The trial court further correctly exercised its discretion under CPLR 3126 by denying the plaintiffs’ application to exclude from evidence two documents which Aetna should have provided pursuant to a pretrial discovery request.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s answer when the party deliberately destroys evidence needed for inspection.

Hyosung (America), Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc. · filed 1984-12-13

Where a party deliberately destroys evidence, the penalties set forth in CPLR 3126 may be applied. ... Defendant’s actions in connection with this matter have been reprehensible, and the severe sanction of striking defendant’s answer is warranted.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike pleadings and dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff willfully destroys evidence covered by a preservation order without a reasonable explanation, thereby preventing the opposing party from pursuing a potentially complete defense.

Miller v. County of Orange · filed 1986-05-27

Special Term correctly determined that a sanction should be imposed upon the plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 3126, since the evidence established that the plaintiff was aware of the order of preservation and that he willfully ordered the destruction of the evidence sought to be preserved, and the plaintiff offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to comply with the order (see, Olshansky v Ravera, 107 AD2d 740; Ferraro v Koncal Assoc., 97 AD2d 429). In addition, the sanction imposed, although harsh, was not an abuse of discretion since the plaintiff’s willful conduct effectively foreclosed the respondent from pursuing what may have been a meritorious and complete defense (see, Hyosung [Am.], Inc. v Woodcrest Fabrics, 106 AD2d 298, appeal dismissed 64 NY2d 934).

A preclusion order under CPLR 3126 bars a party from introducing evidence on matters covered by the discovery demand.

Burton v. Ertel · filed 1985-01-17

Initially, we note that, contrary to Simons’ suggestion, the preclusion order prohibits Simons from entering into evidence any matter that was the subject of the discovery and inspection demand (see CPLR 3126; Siegel, NY Prac, § 367, pp 462-465).

CPLR 3126 permits unconditional preclusion when a party willfully and contumaciously obstructs discovery.

Ferraro v. Koncal Associates · filed 1983-10-11

Such willful and contumacious conduct warrants the imposition of an unconditional order of preclusion, pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits sanctions for dilatory discovery responses, but precluding an essential defense is too drastic when the conduct is not willful or contumacious.

Donner v. 50 Tom Corp. · filed 1984-01-16

The record does not establish that the conduct of defendants or their counsel was willful or contumacious. Therefore it was an improvident exercise of discretion to employ the drastic remedy of precluding defendants from denying certain allegations essential to their defense (see Szczepanski v Security Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 66 AD2d 818).

CPLR 3126 permits a preclusion order if a party fails to provide required particulars after having an opportunity to obtain the information through disclosure.

De Vincent v. Porsche-Audi Manhattan, Inc. · filed 1981-10-26

Since plaintiff asserts that she is not in present possession of the required information, she should be given a full opportunity to acquire it through disclosure proceedings. Once these are completed, however, appellant is entitled to the protection of a preclusion order if the information is not provided.

Section 3126 permits a court to sanction prejudicial withholding of a document by denying a defense based on it and precluding the document from evidence.

Morgen v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. · filed 1972-11-30

Accordingly, since we cannot countenance the prejudicial withholding of the subject document, under the circumstances of this case, we feel justified in invoking the sanctions prescribed by CPLR 3126 ... And we modify the order appealed from, on the law and on the facts, to the extent of denying the defendants’ application to amend their answer so as to add a fourth separate and complete affirmative defense based on the document admitted into evidence during the trial as Exhibit I, and we further direct that the document be precluded from presentation in evidence at the new trial, and otherwise we affirm, without costs or disbursements.

CPLR 3126 does not warrant preclusion when responses to interrogatories are responsive and do not amount to a willful failure to disclose.

Rinaldo v. Syracuse University · filed 1976-01-16

We agree with Special Term that third-party plaintiffs responses to interrogatories served upon it by third-party defendants were not unresponsive nor may they be construed to be a willful failure to disclose information sufficient to impose the drastic remedy of preclusion (CPLR 3126; see Livingston v Mayes, 23 AD2d 814; Practice Commentary, Siegel, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3126, p 646-650).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from offering proof when it willfully fails to provide discovery and prejudices its opponent.

Meaney v. Loew's Hotels, Inc. · filed 1966-10-11

In any event, we hold defendant Loew’s is estopped by reason of its conduct from submitting proof in support of its denials of ownership and operation of the Americana Hotel. It had adequate opportunity to come forward with its proof and willfully failed to do so to the detriment of plaintiffs who because of the applicable Statute of Limitations may be unable to proceed against the true owner if the said defendant is now permitted to make such proof.

Section 3126 permits preclusion of expert findings after a failure to provide ordered disclosure when the party had declared readiness for trial without an expert report.

Miceli v. Van Curler Motor Co. · filed 1984-10-25

By filing a note of issue (and presumably a certificate of readiness [see 22 NYCRR 103.1; 861.10 (a)]) at a time when no expert’s report had been prepared, plaintiff indicated that he was ready for trial without such information (see, e.g., 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Frac, par 3402.10). Thus, we agree with Special Term’s assessment that plaintiff would not be prejudiced if precluded from introducing any evidence with respect to any expert’s findings.

CPLR 3126 (2) permits a court to preclude a party from offering evidence it willfully failed to produce despite discovery orders.

Crowley v. Montefiore Hospital & Medical Center · filed 1987-03-17(2)

In view of defendant hospital’s willful failure to comply with the resulting court orders directing discovery, Special Term was justified in exercising its discretion and precluding defendant from offering these documents into evidence pursuant to CPLR 3126 (2).

CPLR 3126 generally leaves discovery penalties to the trial court’s discretion, but preclusion is an extreme penalty for willful or contumacious failure to disclose, and a client should not be punished for counsel’s oversight.

In re Estate of Piscionere · filed 1990-05-07

The court did not err in refusing to strike the objectant’s affirmative defenses or in refusing to preclude the testimony of the objectant’s witnesses. ... Additionally, in the context of CPLR 3126, a client should not be punished for the oversights of his attorney (see, e.g., Laurie v State of New York, 49 Misc 2d 413).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from using undisclosed evidence when that relief is reasonably necessary to protect the opposing party.

Sands v. News America Publishing Inc. · filed 1990-09-11

In that context, it would appear that the appropriate remedy here, as authorized by CPLR 3126, would be a protective order preventing defendants from using as a sword the information which they are shielding from disclosure. Thus, we hold that defendants should be precluded from introducing into evidence confidential information or documentation known to defendant Pileggi prior to publication of the article, as requested in interrogatories Nos. 6 and 8, unless such information has been disclosed to plaintiff at least 10 days prior to trial.

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from offering proof if it fails to produce demanded documents by a specified deadline.

Mobil Health, Inc. v. State · filed 1990-12-07

The State will therefore be precluded from proving payment with respect to any of the services claimant allegedly provided unless it produces and delivers to claimant such proof not less than 15 days before trial.

CPLR 3126 permits sanctions when evidence is destroyed before a formal notice or order to produce, but preclusion should be limited to the evidence made unavailable.

Strelov v. Hertz Corp. · filed 1991-03-05

That the car was destroyed before a formal notice or order to produce was served does not preclude sanctions under CPLR 3126 (3A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 3126.05, at 31-476.24 — 31-476.25). We nevertheless find the preclusion order to be overly broad in view of the fact that the car’s tires were retained for inspection. The order is accordingly modified to limit the preclusion order only to possible defects in the automobile component parts that are no longer available for inspection, and otherwise affirmed.

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion of a party’s expert evidence when the party willfully prevents inspection of material evidence and thereby prejudices its opponents.

State Universal Construction Fund v. Turner Construction Co. · filed 1992-07-23(2)

Nor can it be said—given the record evidence that, after examination of the tower was sought and before it was obtained, plaintiff willfully allowed the stucco to be entirely removed, effectively destroying the evidence central to defendants’ defenses—that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in ordering preclusion of plaintiff’s expert testimony (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Strelov v Hertz Corp., 171 AD2d 420, 421; Acolyte Elec. Corp. v City of New York, 165 AD2d 802, 803; Sawh v Bridges, 120 AD2d 74, 78-79, appeal dismissed 69 NY2d 852; Ferraro v Koncal Assocs., 97 AD2d 429; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3126:7, at 757-758).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant precluding expert evidence without a showing that the expert willfully destroyed or altered evidence to frustrate disclosure.

Prasad v. B.K. Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1992-06-15

The record fails to support the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs’ expert willfully destroyed or altered the subject vehicle so as to warrant the granting of an order of preclusion as a sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 does not require automatic preclusion when a party fails to comply with a discovery notice.

Chapman v. State · filed 1993-01-28

Because the conclusion that claimants failed to comply with the State’s discovery notice does not require the unconditional grant of the State’s preclusion motion, we remit the matter to the Court of Claims for determination thereof (see, CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from offering proof on an issue when its failure to comply with discovery does not justify striking its answer.

Virola v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1992-07-02

A more appropriate sanction under these circumstances would be preclusion of proof by the defendant on the issue of notice and such sanction is hereby imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126.

To avoid an order of preclusion under CPLR 3126, a party must show both a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious claim.

Bender & Bodnar v. Nankin · filed 1992-10-05

In order to avoid the adverse impact of an order of preclusion, the affected party must establish both a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious claim (see, Donovan v Getty Petroleum Corp., 174 AD2d 706; Mariani v Fleishman, 160 AD2d 911).

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion of expert testimony when a party delays disclosure until the eve of trial without good cause.

Vigilant Insurance v. Barnes · filed 1993-12-06(2)

Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s order of preclusion cannot be deemed an improvident exercise of discretion ... CPLR 3126 [2]).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude evidence supporting a claim unless the party appears for a scheduled examination before trial.

9th Street Estates, Inc. v. Rohatycka · filed 1994-03-09

Under the circumstances, in light of the Appellate Term’s order and to move this proceeding along toward trial, petitioner’s motion is being granted, pursuant to CPLR 3126, to the extent that respondent will be precluded from introducing any evidence tending to support her claim of occupancy or primary residence at the subject premises unless she appears for her examination before trial on March 18, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. or at any other date agreed to in writing by the attorneys for the parties.

Section 3126 leaves the nature and degree of a disclosure penalty to the court’s discretion and permits preclusion of financial evidence for continuous, willful noncompliance.

Serdaroglu v. Serdaroglu · filed 1994-11-21

It is well settled that "[t]he nature and the degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter lying soundly within the discretion of the court to which the application has been made (Associated Mut. Ins. Co. v Dyland Tavern, 105 AD2d 892, 893). In view of Mustafa’s continuous, willful failure to comply with the compulsory financial disclosure requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (4), the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in precluding him from offering evidence at trial with regard to his finances (Kandel v Kandel, 129 AD2d 617).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from relying at trial on confidential sources it refuses to disclose.

Collins v. Troy Publishing Co. · filed 1995-03-16

The CPLR 3126 protective order fashioned by Supreme Court is "no more [relief] than is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests” (Sands v News Am. Publ., 161 AD2d 30, 37; see, Oak Beach Inn Corp. v Babylon Beacon, 62 NY2d 158, 167, cert denied 469 US 1158) and appropriately prevents defendants "from using as a sword the information which they are shielding from disclosure” (Sands v News Am. Publ., supra, at 37; see, Feingold v Walworth Bros., 238 NY 446).

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to impose discovery penalties, but preclusion should not be imposed without evidence that a party deliberately destroyed or discarded evidence to thwart disclosure.

Ashline v. Kestner Engineers, P. C. · filed 1995-09-22

In reaching this conclusion we recognize that Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed where a party has refused to comply with discovery demands (see, CPLR 3126; Matter of Landrigen v Landrigen, 173 AD2d 1011). Nevertheless, as we have recently noted, "[ajbsent record evidence that a party deliberately and intentionally discarded or destroyed evidence in an attempt to thwart disclosure, the sanction of preclusion should not be imposed” (Berwecky v Montgomery Ward, 214 AD2d 936, 937, lv dismissed 86 NY2d 837; see, Shapiro v Rose, 195 AD2d 935).

Section 3126 permits a conditional preclusion order when a party fails to appear for a rescheduled examination within the time set by the court.

9th Street Estates, Inc. v. Rohatycka · filed 1994-08-18

Orders dated February 28, 1994, modified to the extent of granting landlord’s cross motion for preclusion pursuant to CPLR 3126 unless respondent appears at a rescheduled examination within 30 days after service of a copy of this order with notice of entry; as modified, orders affirmed, without costs.

CPLR 3126 does not warrant precluding a party’s examination of another party when counsel’s failure to attend a deposition was not willful, deliberate, or contumacious.

Barbiere v. Motamed · filed 1994-11-07

Under the circumstances of this case, the conduct of defendant Farrell’s attorneys, in connection with their failure to attend the deposition of codefendant Motamed, was not willful, deliberate, or contumacious, and thus the drastic sanction of precluding Farrell’s examination of Motamed was not warranted (see, CPLR 3126; see also, Oak Beach Inn Corp. v Babylon Beacon, 62 NY2d 158, cert denied 469 US 1158).

CPLR 3126 permits conditional preclusion of evidence when the party seeking a more drastic sanction has not established willful, deliberate, and contumacious nondisclosure.

Parish Construction Corp. v. Franlo Tile, Inc. · filed 1995-05-15

The motion papers fail to establish such conduct. Accordingly, it was not an improvident exercise of the court’s discretion to grant the motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 only to the extent of conditionally precluding certain evidence.

CPLR 3126 permits the court to admit undisclosed evidence when the failure to disclose was not willful and the opposing party could review it at the hearing.

In re Anthony G. · filed 1995-12-14

The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in admitting, over objection, three form letters from the caseworker which the agency failed to turn over (see, CPLR 3126) as the failure was not willful (see, Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v Valenzano, 175 AD2d 687), the exhibits were brief and capable of review at the hearing, and there was no request for a continuance (see, Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117, 123-124).

CPLR 3126 permits a conditional order of preclusion for a discovery failure when the circumstances warrant it.

Ferguson v. Belair Construction Corp. · filed 1996-03-04

Under the circumstances of this case, the court’s conditional order of preclusion was appropriate (see, CPLR 3126).

Section 3126(2) permits a conditional preclusion order that gives a party refusing disclosure another chance to comply before the sanction takes effect.

Casas v. Romanelli · filed 1996-10-15(2)

A conditional order is an appropriate remedy when it affords the party who is refusing to comply with a disclosure order an additional opportunity to comply prior to the imposition of the final sanction (see, Gamble v Anlynne, Inc., 199 AD2d 303; see also, Gonzalez v National Car Rental, 178 AD2d 116; Briley v Morriseau, 99 AD2d 524).

Section 3126 permits preclusion when a party’s failure to comply with discovery supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Tleige v. Pediatrics · filed 1997-03-13

Under these circumstances, willfulness and contumacious conduct can be inferred from plaintiffs action and justify preclusion (see, Wolford v Cerrone, 184 AD2d 833, 834; Mills v Ducille, 170 AD2d 657, 658; Brandi v Chan, 151 AD2d 853, 854, appeal dismissed 75 NY2d 789).

Preclusion under Section 3126 is improper when the record shows no willful failure to disclose and no prejudice to the requesting party.

Conrad v. United States of America, Inc. · filed 1997-08-18

The record on the defendant’s motion to preclude does not demonstrate that the plaintiffs willfully failed to disclose information (see, CPLR 3126; Goens v Vogelstein, 146 AD2d 606). Further, the defendant has not been prejudiced because the material it sought contained the same information which was fully explored and disclosed at Katherine Conrad’s deposition.

Section 3126(2) limits preclusion of a nonparty witness’s affidavit when the witness is outside the party’s control.

Ludwigsen v. American Transport Lines, Inc. · filed 1997-09-08(2)

The record does not support the conclusion that the nonparty witness, Walter Killian, was under the plaintiffs control. Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion when it precluded the plaintiff from relying upon the affidavit of the nonparty witness in opposing the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Thomas v Queens Tr. Corp., 59 AD2d 620).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to infer willful and contumacious nondisclosure from repeated failures to comply with disclosure requests and a court-ordered stipulation, supporting preclusion of evidence.

Cano v. BLF Realty Holding Corp. · filed 1997-10-28

Defendants’ affidavits fully demonstrated plaintiffs’ dilatory conduct and failure to comply with disclosure requests, and, given that history and the court’s involvement in the process, which included ample opportunities for plaintiffs’ compliance with the court-ordered stipulation that was to govern disclosure, the court could infer that plaintiffs’ failure to disclose was willful and contumacious (see, CPLR 3126; Tleige v Troy Pediatrics, 237 AD2d 772; Garcia v Kraniotakis, 232 AD2d 369).

Section 3126 permits a court to bar a party from introducing documents it should have disclosed.

Covington v. Covington · filed 1998-04-16

Since the trial court has broad authority to “make such orders * * * as are just” with respect to a party’s failure to disclose information that “the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126; see, Herzog v Progressive Equity Funding Corp., 199 AD2d 897, 898), there is no reason to interfere with Supreme Court’s resolution of these issues.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from using requested documents that it failed to produce on time, and the court may adjust the preclusion date to reflect the course of discovery.

Red Apple Supermarkets, Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc. · filed 1998-06-09

Order, same court and Justice, entered January 26, 1998, which granted defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike plaintiffs’ third amended complaint to the extent of precluding plaintiffs from introducing into evidence any documents requested by defendants but not produced prior to January 24, 1996, unanimously modified, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, to grant the motion only to the extent of precluding plaintiffs from introducing into evidence any documents requested by defendants but not produced prior to December 3, 1997, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

CPLR 3126 leaves the decision whether to order preclusion to the court’s discretion.

Baker v. Boston Land Co. · filed 1998-07-13

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion, inter alia, for an order of preclusion (see, Heffran v St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 236 AD2d 367).

CPLR 3126(2) permits precluding trial evidence when a party knowingly and willfully withholds information that prevents the opposing party from inspecting relevant evidence.

Dalton v. Nalven · filed 1997-12-29(2)

The Supreme Court acted providently in precluding the appellants from offering evidence at trial with respect to the condition of the staircase on which the plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell. The record supports the conclusion that the appellants knowingly and willfully withheld information from the plaintiff concerning the contract of sale and transfer of ownership of the subject premises in which the allegedly defective staircase was located.

CPLR 3126 (2) permits preclusion when a party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Andruszewski v. Cantello · filed 1998-02-04(2)

The court properly determined that plaintiffs failure to comply with the preclusion order was the “result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent” (Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524, 525; see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Beard v Peconic Foam Insulation Corp., 149 AD2d 555, 556).

Section 3126 permits preclusion for failure to comply with a discovery order, but that drastic remedy requires extreme conduct.

Ronan v. Northrup · filed 1997-12-31

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for preclusion (see, CPLR 3126; see generally, Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713). The record does not support the conclusion that the failure of plaintiffs to comply with the court’s order requiring them to respond fully to defendants’ interrogatories was the kind of “[e]xtreme conduct” necessary to grant the drastic remedy of preclusion (Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459, 460; see, Cooper v Drobenko Bros. Realty, 200 AD2d 415).

Under CPLR 3126(2), preclusion is a drastic discovery sanction reserved for willful and contumacious noncompliance; a court may instead impose a monetary sanction and require disclosure.

Rankin v. Miller · filed 1998-07-23(2)

It is well settled that the trial court “has broad discretion in determining the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed where a party has refused to comply with discovery demands” (Ashline v Kestner Engrs., 219 AD2d 788, 790; see, CPLR 3126 [2]). It is further noted that preclusion is a drastic remedy which should be invoked only where a party’s noncompliance with discovery demands is willful and contumacious (see, Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448; Brady v County of Nassau, 234 AD2d 408). ... Although we do not find that Supreme Court abused its discretion, under the particular circumstances of this case, instead of penalizing plaintiffs for their counsel’s failure to comply with the discovery demands, we exercise our discretion and vacate the order of preclusion on the conditions that plaintiffs’ counsel pays to defendant a monetary sanction of $4,000 and complies with all discovery demands outstanding at the time of the motion (see, King v Jordan, 243 AD2d 951, 953).

Section 3126(2) permits a court to admit a report when the party seeking its exclusion has not shown willful failure to produce it or a production order.

Williams v. State · filed 1998-10-02(2)

The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence a fight investigation report concerning the prior incident. Claimant failed to establish that the State willfully failed to produce the report for pretrial discovery or that the State had been ordered to produce the report (see, CPLR 3126 [2]).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to preclude evidence when a party twice denies its existence under oath and produces it only after a nonparty deposition establishes that it exists.

Sau Thi Ma v. Lien · filed 1999-04-20

The IAS Court’s pretrial order precluding defendants from offering at trial an audiotape of a conversation with plaintiff was an appropriate sanction in view of the fact that the principal defendant twice denied the existence of the recording under oath and finally produced it only when its existence was subsequently established during a nonparty deposition.

Section 3126(2) permits a court to restrict a party’s use of evidence it failed to disclose during discovery.

Kriesel v. May Department Stores Co. · filed 1999-05-07(2)

The failure to comply with that section may result in sanctions to the withholding party, which may include precluding the nondisclosing party from using the evidence in any manner during the trial (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Northway Eng’g v Felix Indus., 77 NY2d 332, 335). We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in redacting those words under the circumstances herein (see, Xerox Corp. v Town of Webster, 206 AD2d 935; PCB Piezotronics v Change, 163 AD2d 829), and that a new trial of all issues is not required.

CPLR 3126(2) permits preclusion of evidence for willful, deliberate, and contumacious failure to cooperate with disclosure; unexplained delay and failure to object can support an inference of willfulness.

Robustelli v. Robustelli · filed 1999-06-07(2)

“In order to invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion, the court must determine that the offending party’s lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious” (Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448, 449; see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524). The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in precluding the appellant from introducing evidence as to his finances at trial (see, Maillard v Maillard, supra; Brady v County of Nassau, 234 AD2d 408; Kivo v Kivo, 193 AD2d 585). The absence of any excuse for the defendant’s delay in responding to the plaintiff’s discovery demands, and his failure to object to the demands, supports the inference that the defendant’s conduct was willful (see, Brady v County of Nassau, supra).

Section 3126 does not warrant preclusion of evidence without a showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Madonna v. Madonna · filed 1999-10-18

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, he did not show that the defendant’s conduct during this action was willful or contumacious. Therefore, the drastic remedy of preclusion of evidence was not warranted (see, CPLR 3126; Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448).

Section 3126 permits sanctions for failure to provide ordered particulars, but preclusion should be limited to the claims or defenses affected by the missing information.

Tempforce, Inc. v. Municipal Housing Authority · filed 1999-07-29(1), (2)

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, the court may make “an order that the issues to which the information is relevant shall be deemed resolved for purposes of the action in accordance with the claims of the party obtaining the order” or an “order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses” (CPLR 3126 [1], [2]). ... McNar’s defense to SMHA’s cross claim only required a general denial and there was no alleged willful or contumacious disregard of discovery by McNar pertaining to SMHA’s cross claim. Based on the foregoing, Mc-Nar’s answer to SMHA’s cross claim should not have been dismissed.

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion when a party’s failure to cooperate with disclosure is willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Kelleher v. Mt. Kisco Medical Group, P. C. · filed 1999-09-20(2)

“In order to invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion, the court must determine that the offending party’s lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious” (Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448, 449; CPLR 3126 [2]; Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524; see also, Beard v Peconic Foam Insulation Corp., 149 AD2d 555). Here, the defendants’ repeated failure to comply with discovery directives, and their statement that the requested records had been fully disclosed when, in fact, they possessed additional relevant material which was not provided until almost one year thereafter, constituted conduct sufficient to warrant preclusion (see, Maillard v Maillard, supra).

CPLR 3126 permits an answer to be struck for failure to comply with discovery when there is a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Kaplan v. Emmett · filed 1999-10-04

The Supreme Court properly denied the motion, inter alia, to strike the defendants’ answers, as there was no clear showing that their failure to comply with discovery was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 (2) permits preclusion of evidence when repeated, unexplained failures to meet discovery obligations support an inference of willful and contumacious noncompliance.

Sanchez v. City of New York · filed 1999-11-23(2)

Accordingly, the IAS Court properly precluded plaintiff, pursuant to CPLR 3126 (2), from introducing or from relying upon the aforementioned evidence in her case against Mystic.

CPLR 3126 gives trial courts broad discretion to preclude evidence when a party violates a scheduling order.

Cicardi v. Cicardi · filed 1999-12-23

We next address the order of preclusion entered against petitioner for his violation of the scheduling order. Concerning the evidence precluded, there appears to be no contention that petitioner was prepared to call witnesses who could have authenticated or laid a proper foundation for the admission of these exhibits; instead, he chose to call only respondent in addition to testifying on his own behalf. Recognizing that trial courts exercise broad discretion in this area (see, CPLR 3126; Rankin v Miller, 252 AD2d 863, 864), we find no abuse of such discretion by Family Court here.

Section 3126 permits preclusion for failure to comply with a disclosure order only when the failure is willful or contumacious.

Gorokhova v. Belulovich · filed 1999-12-06

The extreme penalty of preclusion for failure to comply with an order of disclosure is warranted only when the failure has been willful or contumacious (see, Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448; Brady v County of Nassau, 234 AD2d 408; CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands when the failure is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Fellin v. Sahgal · filed 2000-01-18

The drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendants’ answer (see, CPLR 3126; ...).

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer for a discovery failure only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Segarra v. City of New York · filed 2000-02-14

It is well established that the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, CPLR 3126; Smith v Bynum, 260 AD2d 626). In this case, the plaintiff failed to make such a showing.

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion for a discovery failure that the court determines was willful, deliberate and contumacious.

Siegman v. Rosen · filed 2000-03-02(2)

It is well settled that in order to impose the drastic remedy of preclusion, the court must determine that the offending party’s failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, deliberate and contumacious (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Dexter v Horowitz Mgt., 267 AD2d 21; Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448).

Section 3126 does not authorize preclusion of a nonparty’s testimony when the proper procedures for nonparty discovery were not followed.

Blaisdell v. Huntington Hospital · filed 2000-03-20

However, there was a complete failure to follow the proper procedures for conducting nonparty discovery as provided in the CPLR (see, CPLR 3106 [b]; 3101; Anderson v Kamalian, 231 AD2d 659), and no basis for the imposition of the drastic sanction of preclusion pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(2) permits a court to preclude evidence when a party’s willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery orders thwarts meaningful pretrial discovery.

Caccioppoli v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center · filed 2000-04-17(2)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in issuing a preclusion order (see, CPLR 3126 [2]). The appellant’s willful and contumacious conduct was intended to thwart the plaintiffs right to meaningful pretrial discovery.

Section 3126 leaves discovery sanctions to the trial court’s discretion, but preclusion was unwarranted where the failure to produce a witness was not shown to be willful or contumacious.

Anagnostaros v. 81st Street Residence Corp. · filed 2000-02-03

While we are aware that the imposition of sanctions for discovery misfeasance is a matter best left to the trial court’s discretion (CPLR 3126; Gomez v New York City Hous. Auth., 217 AD2d 110, 114; Tavarez v DeLange, 190 AD2d 568), we find that the IAS Court improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to consider the affidavit of plaintiffs witness. We are not convinced that plaintiffs failure to produce the witness, of whom she was allegedly unaware, at an earlier stage of the proceedings was willful or contumacious and warranted the penalty of preclusion (Fama v Marchetti, 215 AD2d 721; Pena v City of New York, 261 AD2d 373).

Section 3126 permits preclusion of evidence for refusal to obey a disclosure order or wilful failure to disclose required information, but not for a misrepresentation about missing a court appearance.

Pena v. Diaz · filed 2000-08-21

However, the Family Court granted the application based on the father’s misrepresentation as to why he missed a scheduled court appearance, rather than because the father refused to obey an order for disclosure or failed to disclose information which ought to have been disclosed.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from offering evidence on financial issues at trial for failing to provide discovery.

Perell v. Krause · filed 2000-11-06

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to preclude the defendant from offering evidence on the financial issues to be litigated at trial based upon his failure to provide discovery (see, CPLR 3126; Fucci v Fucci, 166 AD2d 551; Hubbard v Hubbard, 113 Misc 2d 763).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from offering evidence on liability after repeated failures to comply with a discovery order.

Trammell v. Rockaway One Co. · filed 2000-12-18

Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the defendant from offering evidence at trial on the issue of liability because of its repeated failures to produce a witness for an examination before trial in violation of a preliminary conference order (see, Garcia v Kraniotakis, 232 AD2d 369; Lavi v Lavi, 256 AD2d 602; Kingsley v Kantor, 265 AD2d 529).

Section 3126 did not warrant precluding expert testimony where the disclosure was sufficient and there was no willful or intentional failure to comply with discovery obligations.

Deitch v. May · filed 2000-08-24

Based on the foregoing, as well as the lack of any willful or intentional failure by the defendant to comply with discovery obligations (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [2d Dept 1993]), grounds for preclusion of expert testimony under CPLR 3126 have not been established.

CPLR 3126 permits preclusion of evidence on financial issues for persistent, unexplained failures to comply with disclosure obligations.

Miller v. Mei · filed 2002-06-06

Defendant was properly precluded from producing evidence on financial issues upon a record showing her persistent and unexplained failures to comply with long-standing disclosure obligations (CPLR 3126; see, Sanchez v City of New York, 266 AD2d 127).

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude evidence for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the conduct is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Gold v. Naudus · filed 2002-06-24

“In order to invoke the drastic remedy of a preclusion order * * * the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent” (Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524, 525; see Parish Constr. Corp. v Franlo Tile, 215 AD2d 545, 546). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the proffered evidence.

Section 3126(1) permits a court to preclude trial testimony and medical evidence for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, even when a party has made himself unavailable.

Islam v. Nathan Katz Realty Co. · filed 2002-07-29(1)

Therefore, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion ... which was to preclude the plaintiffs from testifying at trial or introducing any medical evidence with respect to the infant plaintiff (see CPLR 3126 [1]).

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion of evidence when a party’s failure to cooperate with disclosure is willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Pryzant v. City of New York · filed 2002-12-09(2)

To invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion, the Supreme Court must determine that the offending party’s lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious (see CPLR 3126 [2]; Kelleher v Mt. Kisco Med. Group, 264 AD2d 760; Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448).

Preclusion under CPLR 3126 requires the moving party to show that the failure to disclose was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Castellano v. Mainco Elevator & Electrical Corp. · filed 2002-03-25

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of discretion for the court (see Polanco v Duran, 278 AD2d 397), an order of preclusion should only be imposed where the moving party establishes that the failure to disclose is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Scardino v Town of Babylon, 248 AD2d 371).

Preclusion under CPLR 3126 requires a prior motion to compel with a good-faith affirmation and a showing that the failure to disclose was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Charter One Bank, FSB v. Houston · filed 2002-12-16

The appellants were not entitled to sanctions under CPLR 3126 without first moving to compel accompanied by an affirmation that they made a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute (see 22 NYCRR 202.7 [a]; Barnes v NYNEX, Inc., 274 AD2d 368; Kovacs v Castle Restoration & Constr., 262 AD2d 165), and showing that the plaintiffs failure to serve the bill of particulars was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Castellano v Mainco El. & Elec. Corp., 292 AD2d 556).

To vacate a preclusion order imposed for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure, a party must show both a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense.

Ehler v. New York Congregational Nursing Center · filed 2002-06-03

In support of its motion to vacate the order of preclusion, Strescon failed to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for its failure to timely comply with court ordered disclosure and a meritorious defense (see Alphonse v, UBJ Inc., 266 AD2d 171; cf. Gorokhova v Belulovich, 267 AD2d 202, 203). Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying such relief (see CPLR 3126; cf. Brown v United Christian Evangelistic Assn., supra).

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion of expert testimony on matters a party failed to disclose despite repeated warnings and an opportunity to supplement its disclosure.

McCarthy v. Handel · filed 2002-08-15(2)

Based upon the foregoing, the court justifiably concluded that plaintiffs’ prolonged failure to supplement their CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) disclosure by, inter alia, specifying the alleged defects, justified precluding plaintiffs’ expert from testifying regarding such nondisclosed matters (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Walsh v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 289 AD2d 842, 843; Cramer v Englert, 289 AD2d 617, 618-619, Iv denied 98 NY2d 604; Qian v Dugan, 256 AD2d 782; Chapman v State of New York, 189 AD2d 1075; see also, Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122-123).