N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3126

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to obey a disclosure order when the failure is willful, deliberate and contumacious or its equivalent.

Beard v. Peconic Foam Insulation Corp. · filed 1989-04-17

It is well established that in order to invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for noncompliance with a court order for disclosure, the court must determine that the parties’ failure to comply was the result of willful, deliberate and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 AD2d 580; Horowitz v Camp Cedarhurst & Town & Country Day School, 119 AD2d 548; Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833).

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for nondisclosure only when the moving party conclusively demonstrates that the nondisclosure was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith.

Remuneration Planning & Services Corp. v. Berg & Brown, Inc. · filed 1989-06-08

The law is settled that an action should, if at all possible, be resolved on the merits and that the drastic remedy of striking a party’s pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with a discovery order or request is appropriate only where the moving party conclusively demonstrates that the nondisclosure was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith (Gaylord Bros, v RND Co., 134 AD2d 848; Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459; Miller v Duffy, 126 AD2d 527; Delaney v Automated Bread Corp., 110 AD2d 677; Bassett v Bando Sangsa Co., 103 AD2d 728).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading unconditionally when a party’s discovery default is deliberate and contumacious.

Furniture Fantasy, Inc. v. Cerrone · filed 1989-10-16

It is well settled that the drastic sanction of unconditionally striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be invoked unless the resisting party’s default is shown to be deliberate and contumacious (see, Read v Dickson, 150 AD2d 543; Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., 147 AD2d 690; Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 AD2d 580).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when a party's bad-faith failure to comply with discovery orders warrants that drastic remedy.

Malpica v. City of New York · filed 1990-05-24(3)

We find that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in striking defendant Belco’s answer, pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3), since the record demonstrates that Belco’s noncompliance with prior orders of the court to produce a witness for examination for trial was the result of bad faith (Lowitt v Burton I. Korelitz, M.D., P. C., 152 AD2d 506, 507).

CPLR 3126 gives courts discretion to decline to strike an answer for alleged failure to comply with discovery orders.

Dunefsky v. Montefiore Hospital Medical Center · filed 1990-06-21

Moreover, the court’s decision not ... to strike defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 for alleged failure to comply with discovery orders was clearly within its discretion.

Section 3126 permits a court to deny a motion to strike answers while directing the defendants to produce the requested documents.

Internor Trade, Inc. v. Goldmark Plastic Compounds · filed 1990-10-09

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Burton S. Sherman, J.), entered on or about March 30, 1990, which, ... denied plaintiff’s ... motion, pursuant to CPLR 3126, to strike defendants’ answers, and directed defendants to produce documents requested by plaintiff within 60 days of the date of the order, unanimously affirmed, without costs and without disbursements.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when repeated failure to comply with discovery orders supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Fucci v. Fucci · filed 1990-10-15(3)

Under the circumstances of this case it is evident that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion when it ordered that the defendant’s answer be stricken, after she had repeatedly failed to comply with the plaintiff’s discovery request, even after several court orders.

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a plaintiff disobeys a conditional discovery order without a satisfactory excuse.

Picinic v. Seatrain Lines, Inc. · filed 1991-01-08

Since plaintiff was well aware of the terms of the conditional order of dismissal, and no satisfactory excuse has been proffered for his noncompliance, dismissal of the complaint was proper.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party willfully disobeys a discovery order.

Mills v. Ducille · filed 1991-02-25

CPLR 3126 provides that when a discovery order is willfully disobeyed, the court may "make such orders * * * as are just”, including "an order striking out pleadings”.

CPLR 3126 leaves the decision to strike an answer for failure to comply with a deposition order to the court’s discretion, including whether the circumstances excuse a technical default.

Salaris v. Jamaica Hospital · filed 1991-06-17

Under these and all the other circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for an order striking the answers of the defendants Jamaica Hospital and Dr. L. Hoffman (CPLR 3126; see generally, Lowitt v Korelitz, 152 AD2d 506; Stathoudakes v Kelman Contr. Corp., 147 AD2d 690; Wolper v LaGuardia Med. Group, 143 AD2d 830; De Joy v L & T Tavern Corp., 89 AD2d 613; Cinelli v Radcliffe, 35 AD2d 829).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike pleadings for willful obstruction of discovery, but one defendant’s conduct cannot be imputed to another.

Bay Ridge Lumber Co. v. Groenendaal · filed 1991-07-01(3)

The striking of the answer and counterclaims of the corporate defendants and Peter Groenendaal, pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3), was a proper exercise of the court’s discretion given Peter Groenendaal’s willful failure to permit the plaintiffs to conduct a meaningful oral examination of him in his capacities as an individual defendant as well as an officer of the defendant corporations (see, Homburger v Levitin, 130 AD2d 715, 717). However, Peter Groenendaal’s recalcitrant behavior may not be imputed to the individual defendant Joyce Groenendaal.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for a discovery failure only when the moving party establishes that the failure was willful, contumacious or in bad faith, assuming compliance was possible.

Ahroni v. City of New York · filed 1991-08-05

We agree with the contention of the defendant City of New York (hereinafter the City) that the court improvidently exercised its discretion by striking part of its answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 due to defaults in responding to requests for discovery. ... Accordingly, as the movants did not establish that the City’s discovery defaults were willful, contumacious or in bad faith, it was an improvident exercise of the court’s discretion to strike stated portions of the City’s answer.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when prolonged, deliberately evasive failure to comply with discovery demands and directives frustrates disclosure.

Carven Associates, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Corp. · filed 1991-08-05

The Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint for their failure to comply with discovery demands and directives over a period of approximately two years.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party continues to disregard discovery directions after repeated opportunities to comply.

Kogan v. Royal Indemnity Co. · filed 1992-01-09

A conditional order of dismissal was issued pursuant to CPLR 3126 and discovery was continued before the appointed Referee. ... Accordingly, the dismissal of the complaint was in all respects proper.

Section 3126 does not warrant dismissal for discovery delays without proof of a willful refusal to comply with discovery orders or notices.

Markarian v. Hundert · filed 1992-02-24

Under these and all of the other circumstances of this case, we find that the appellant failed to prove that the plaintiff willfully refused to comply with discovery orders or notices, and we therefore conclude that the extreme sanction of dismissal is not warranted pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see, Read v Dickson, supra).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a party’s pleadings for failure to comply with disclosure only when the failure is clearly willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Herbert H. Post & Co. v. Sidney Bitterman, Inc. · filed 1992-02-27

The drastic sanction of striking a party’s pleadings is not justified unless that party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order or request is clearly willful, contumacious or due to bad faith (Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading unconditionally when a party’s discovery default is deliberate and contumacious.

Bigman v. Dime Savings Bank · filed 1992-03-02

Although the sanction of unconditionally striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be invoked unless a party’s default is shown to be deliberate and contumacious (see, Read v Dickson, 150 AD2d 543, 544), the record before us provides ample support for the court’s application of that sanction.

Section 3126 does not warrant dismissal for failure to comply with discovery demands when willfulness, contumacious conduct, or bad faith has not been satisfactorily shown.

Sunshine v. Danbury · filed 1992-03-26

Nor is dismissal of the complaint for noncompliance with CPLR 3126 warranted. ... However, the Shiners have not satisfactorily shown that plaintiffs’ failure to comply was "willful, contumacious or due to bad faith” (Remuneration Planning & Servs. Corp. v Berg & Brown, 151 AD2d 268, 269; see, 22 NYCRR 202.7).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for discovery noncompliance only when willful conduct is shown.

Bazzini v. Hertz Corp. · filed 1992-05-04

... the plaintiffs themselves did not engage in the sort of willful behavior which must be demonstrated before the ultimate sanction of dismissal may properly be imposed.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to comply with discovery despite prior court orders.

Kirkland v. Community Hospital of Brooklyn, Inc. · filed 1992-11-16

Additionally, the sanction of dismissal of the complaint insofar as it is asserted against the defendant Community Hospital of Brooklyn, Inc., was proper pursuant to CPLR 3126, as the plaintiff, despite prior court orders, failed to comply with discovery (see, Gonzalez v Paniccioli, 174 AD2d 709; Mills v Ducille, 170 AD2d 657).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for deliberate and contumacious failure to comply with a disclosure order, but the remedy should be used sparingly.

Ortiz v. Weaver · filed 1992-12-01

While the striking of a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with an order of disclosure is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be employed sparingly, its use here was eminently proper where it clearly appears that defendants’ default was deliberate and contumacious (Arantes v Gotham Taxi Corp., 116 AD2d 539, 540).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 is generally unwarranted unless the failure to comply was willful or contumacious.

Van Inwegen v. Lucia · filed 1993-04-15

Despite plaintiff’s unexplained delay in submitting a response to defendants’ discovery demands, it was within Supreme Court’s discretion to deny defendants’ motions for dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, there being no showing that the delay was willful. "[Ajbsent a showing that the noncomplying party’s conduct was willful or contumacious, the harsh sanction of dismissal of a complaint will generally not be warranted” (Sawh v Bridges, 120 AD2d 74, 78, appeal dismissed 69 NY2d 852; see, CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party allows evidence subject to an inspection order to be disassembled and offers no reasonable explanation for its loss.

O'Keefe v. Uniondale Fire District of Uniondale · filed 1993-11-15

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to strike the answer of the defendant Uniondale Water District of the Town of Hemp-stead pursuant to CPLR 3126 because the respondent-appellant was aware of a prior order of the same court compelling the inspection of two temporary fire hydrants but nevertheless allowed them to be disassembled (see, Miller v County of Orange, 120 AD2d 713). The explanation provided in the affidavit of an employee of the respondent-appellant as to the loss of the evidence is not a reasonable one under the circumstances.

A court may deny a motion to strike pleadings for failure to comply with discovery when the party gives a reasonable excuse, shows a meritorious defense, and provides the requested responses.

Atlas Door Corp. v. Barline Contracting Crane Service, Inc. · filed 1993-12-27

However, contrary to the plaintiffs contentions, the court did not err in granting the motion and in denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s answer and counterclaim. The defendant offered a reasonable excuse for its default and made an adequate showing of the merits of its defense (see, Elliot v New York City Hous. Auth., 187 AD2d 410; cf., Duque v Ortiz, 154 AD2d 333, supra). Also, we note that the defendant attached to its motion its responses to the plaintiff’s discovery demands (see, Chaisson v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 188 AD2d 632).

Section 3126(3) permits striking a complaint when a plaintiff repeatedly fails to produce a witness for examination and offers a fabricated excuse.

Rafael Diamond Jewelry Import, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London · filed 1993-01-12(3)

Supreme Court was therefore justified in concluding that the assertion in opposition to the motion to strike was a fabrication and thus in striking the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with disclosure orders when persistent delay is not reasonably excused.

Vandelli v. Vandelli · filed 1993-01-25(3)

Although "[t]he penalty of striking a pleading for failure to comply with an order of disclosure (CPLR 3126 [3]) is an extreme one” ... the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking the defendant wife’s answer in the instant case.

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for failure to disclose only upon a showing of deliberate or willful refusal.

Cruzatti v. St. Mary's Hospital · filed 1993-05-03(3)

It is well settled that an action should be resolved on the merits wherever possible, and the harsh remedy of the striking of a pleading should not be employed without a showing of a deliberate or willful refusal to disclose.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to disclose only upon a clear showing of deliberate and willful refusal.

Washington v. Alco Auto Sales · filed 1993-12-21

In furtherance of the policy favoring the resolution of actions on the merits, it is well settled that the harsh remedy of striking a pleading should not be employed without a clear showing of a deliberate and willful refusal to disclose (Cruzatti v St. Mary’s Hosp., 193 AD2d 579). No such showing was made here with respect to the failure to implement the preliminary conference order.

CPLR 3126 gives courts broad discretion over discovery sanctions; striking an answer requires a deliberate or contumacious failure to comply with a discovery order.

Shapiro v. Rose · filed 1993-07-29

It is well settled that Supreme Court has broad discretion to determine motions made pursuant to CPLR 3126 and that the harsh remedy of an order striking a party’s answer is justifiable only where the failure to comply with a discovery order is deliberate or contumacious (see, Forman v Jamesway Corp., 175 AD2d 514, 515; Strauss v Vladeck, 173 AD2d 1063, 1064).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for willful and contumacious failure to comply with disclosure demands and court orders.

Rivers v. Embassy Club · filed 1994-09-26

We find that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits striking an answer for failure to produce a witness, but that extreme penalty requires evidence of willful or contumacious conduct.

Jeffcoat v. Andrade · filed 1994-06-16

The IAS Court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant MJI’s answer as such penalty is extreme and there was no evidence that MJI’s failure to produce a witness was willful or contumacious (Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., 147 AD2d 690, 691).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully and contumaciously fails to obey orders to appear for a deposition.

Arnoff v. Lorio · filed 1994-10-11(3)

Upon our review of the record, we agree with the Supreme Court that the defendant’s failure to appear for a deposition, despite two previous court orders compelling her to do so, was willful and contumacious. Thus, the court was justified in striking the answer (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Fucci v Fucci, 166 AD2d 551).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer when a party willfully fails to appear for a deposition despite court orders compelling it to do so.

Owolabi v. Fairview Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 1994-11-28(3)

Upon our review of the record, we agree with the Supreme Court that the appellant’s failure to appear for a deposition, despite two previous court orders compelling it to do so, was willful and contumacious. Thus, the Supreme Court properly struck the appellant’s answer (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Arnoff v Lorio, 208 AD2d 581; Fucci v Fucci, 166 AD2d 551).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer and direct a default judgment when a party willfully refuses discovery and offers no reasonable excuse.

McCue v. Battaglia · filed 1995-01-09

The record before us establishes that the appellant’s failure to respond to the plaintiff’s demands for discovery and the appellant’s refusal to be deposed were willful and contumacious. Since the appellant has offered no reasonable excuse for his disobedient conduct, the Supreme Court acted within its discretion in striking the appellant’s answer, in directing the entry of a default judgment, and in imposing sanctions against the appellant’s attorney in the amount of $127.50, the cost of the court reporter’s bill for services rendered at the deposition (see, CPLR 3126; McDonald v Mid County Tr. Mix, 174 AD2d 614; Fucci v Fucci, 166 AD2d 551; Preferred Equities Corp. v Ziegelman, 190 AD2d 659).

Section 3126 permits striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Harris v. City of New York · filed 1995-01-17

It is well settled that the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith ... No such showing has been made in this case.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery only when the moving party conclusively shows that the nondisclosure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

McGilvery v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1995-03-28

Moreover, it is well settled that the drastic remedy of striking a party’s pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with a discovery order or request is appropriate only where the moving party conclusively demonstrates that the non-disclosure was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith (see, Remuneration Planning & Servs. Corp. v Berg & Brown, 151 AD2d 268, 269).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for willful and contumacious failure to comply with disclosure orders.

Vega v. 265 West 37 Street Corp. · filed 1996-01-09(3)

The imposition of the drastic remedy of striking appellants’ answer was proper (see, CPLR 3126 [3]), as the record is replete with examples of their willful and contumacious behavior.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for disobeying a discovery order, but that sanction requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious noncompliance.

Athanasiou v. First National City Bank US Corp. · filed 1996-03-25

CPLR 3126 allows the court to "make such orders * * * as are just”, including an order striking out pleadings when a party willfully disobeys a discovery order. ... On this record, the plaintiffs failed to clearly show that the defendant willfully and contumaciously refused to comply with the court’s order dated January 13, 1995, directing it to produce a witness with knowledge of certain facts.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for discovery noncompliance when the default is deliberate and contumacious.

Argenio v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. · filed 1996-05-28

The drastic sanction of unconditionally striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be invoked unless the resisting party’s default is shown to be deliberate and contumacious (see, Forestire v Inter-Stop, Inc., 211 AD2d 751, 755; Eagle Star Ins. Co. v Behar, 207 AD2d 326).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply adequately with discovery demands and a discovery stipulation.

Watson v. Esposito · filed 1996-09-09

...we find no improvident exercise of discretion in the dismissal of the action based on the plaintiffs failure to adequately comply with the terms of the stipulation (see, CPLR 3126; Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer and resolve liability against a party whose failure to comply with discovery is willful and contumacious.

Cauley v. Long Island Railroad · filed 1996-12-02

Its conduct was willful and contumacious, and the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking the defendant’s answer and resolving all issues of liability in favor of the plaintiff (see, CPLR 3126; McCue v Battaglia, 211 AD2d 625; Mills v Ducille, 170 AD2d 657; Fucci v Fucci, 166 AD2d 551; Chase Manhattan Bank v Abad, 131 AD2d 312).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to deny a motion to strike a complaint for delayed compliance with a preclusion order when the claim is potentially meritorious, the delay caused no substantial prejudice, and the plaintiffs had a reasonable excuse.

Brand v. Gleit · filed 1996-12-16

In view of the existence of a potentially meritorious claim, as evinced by the verified bill of particulars (see, Weber v Victory Mem. Hosp., 98 AD2d 719), the lack of substantial prejudice to the appellant emanating from the delay, and the reasonable excuse demonstrated by the plaintiffs for the delay, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in relieving the plaintiffs of their default in complying with the preclusion order (see, Wilenski v Auricchio Monuments, 102 AD2d 824). Accordingly, the appellant’s motion for summary judgment and to strike the complaint was properly denied.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to obey a disclosure order when the failure is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Caruso v. Malang · filed 1996-12-23

It is well settled that in order to invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for noncompliance with a court order for disclosure, the court must determine that the parties’ failure to comply was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, Lestingi v City of New York, 209 AD2d 384; Eagle Star Ins. Co. v Behar, 207 AD2d 326; Beard v Peconic Foam, Insulation Corp., 149 AD2d 555).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when a party’s repeated failure to comply with discovery orders shows willful and contumacious conduct and the party offers no reasonable excuse.

Herrera v. City of New York · filed 1997-04-21(3)

The defendant’s willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from its repeated failure to comply with court orders directing disclosure, including an order of this Court (see, Herrera v City of New York, 211 AD2d 759), and the inadequate excuses offered to excuse the defaults (see, Porreco v Selway, 225 AD2d 752; DeGennaro v Robinson Textiles, 224 AD2d 574). Thus, the plaintiff satisfied his initial burden of proving willfulness, shifting the burden to the defendant to offer a reasonable excuse for its default (see, Furniture Fantasy v Cerrone, 154 AD2d 506, 507; Read v Dickson, 150 AD2d 543, 544). At no time did the defendant offer a reasonable excuse for its repeated failures to comply with the plaintiffs outstanding discovery demands and court orders directing disclosure. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant’s answer is granted and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Queens County, for an inquest of damages.

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer when a party fails to comply with a so-ordered discovery stipulation.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 1997-05-05

The failure of the appellants to abide by the so-ordered stipulation dated September 7, 1995, warranted the agreed-upon sanction of striking their answer (see, CPLR 3126; Will v County of Nassau, 90 AD2d 795; Pan World Constr. Corp. v 791 Park Ave. Corp., 185 AD2d 105, 107).

Section 3126 does not support striking an answer for violating a purported discovery directive when the record does not establish what was directed or whether it was breached.

Brown v. 303 West 42nd Street Realty Corp. · filed 1997-06-12

Under the circumstances, there is no basis upon which this Court may make a determination regarding the substance of the Special Master’s directive, whether defendants breached that order and whether the IAS Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the drastic remedy of striking defendants’ answer based upon this purported order. "Since there was no willful disobedience of a prior court order respecting discovery, and since there was no willful disobedience of a specific notice for discovery, the sanction imposed by the Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR 3126 was unwarranted as a matter of law, and a fortiori, as a matter of discretion” (American Reliance Ins. Co. v National Gen. Ins. Co., 174 AD2d 591, 592).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer for a discovery violation, but that drastic sanction was unwarranted where the defendant had produced the required documents and a proposed concession might make the deposition unnecessary.

Glaser v. Fugazy Limousine, Ltd. · filed 1996-05-02(3)

Nor was the drastic remedy of striking Fugazy’s answer warranted in the circumstances.

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer when prolonged noncompliance with disclosure orders and inadequate excuses show willful and contumacious conduct.

Wexler v. Malpeso · filed 1996-12-17

The willful and contumacious character of defendant’s failure to disclose can be inferred from his protracted noncompliance with three separate orders directing disclosure, and inadequate excuses therefor (Glasburgh v Port Auth., 193 AD2d 441).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when failure to comply with ordered discovery is willful, contumacious and evasive.

Austin v. Coin Devices Corp. · filed 1996-12-17

—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alan Saks, J.), entered May 29, 1996, which granted plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike defendant’s answer, unanimously affirmed, with costs. ... Defendants’ failure to advise the court and plaintiffs any time prior to the motion to strike of the routine destruction of documents they had been ordered to produce, or to proffer any excuse for their failure to comply with the court-ordered discovery, indicates willful, contumacious and evasive conduct with respect to plaintiffs’ discovery rights (Anteri v NRS Constr. Corp., 117 AD2d 696, 698).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a defendant’s answer for a discovery default only when the defendant’s conduct is willful or contumacious.

Smith v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1997-01-27

It is well settled that the harsh remedy of striking a defendant’s answer because of discovery defaults should only be imposed when that defendant is shown to be guilty of willful or contumacious conduct (see, Athanasios v First Natl. City Bank US Corp., 225 AD2d 726; Sparacino v Minnet, 212 AD2d 522; Nudelman v New York City Tr. Auth., 172 AD2d 503). In light of the ultimate, albeit begrudging, compliance with the court-ordered discovery by the defendant New York Telephone Company, Inc., the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by declining to strike its answer.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for failure to comply with a disclosure order; the court may decline to do so when the failure was not willful or contumacious.

McCarthy v. Klein · filed 1997-04-28(3)

The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s answer for failure to comply with the prior order of the court directing certain disclosure (see, CPLR 3126 [3]). The record does not reveal that the defendant’s failure was willful or contumacious (see, Nudelman v New York City Tr. Auth., 172 AD2d 503; Mancusi v Middlesex Ins. Co., 102 AD2d 846; Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for willful failure to comply with disclosure orders; repeated failures without a reasonable excuse can establish willfulness.

Kubacka v. Town of North Hempstead · filed 1997-06-02(3)

In the instant case, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking the appellant’s answer, following the failure to comply with an order dated December 6, 1995, which directed the appellant to serve and file an amended bill of particulars and responses to combined demands within 10 days or face the penalty of having its answer stricken.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a cross claim when a party willfully frustrates disclosure.

La Valle v. City of New York Department of Sanitation · filed 1997-06-23

Consequently, on this third motion by the appellant pursuant to CPLR 3126, in this third order dealing with the failure of the City of New York Department of Sanitation to comply with disclosure demands, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to strike the cross claim of the City of New York Department of Sanitation against it. The conduct of the City of New York Department of Sanitation in frustrating disclosure was willful, justifying such relief (see, Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for prolonged failure to make full pretrial disclosure, including noncompliance with multiple prior orders.

Fappiano v. City of New York · filed 1997-07-21(3)

Considering all of the circumstances surrounding the appellants’ inordinate procrastination in making full pretrial disclosure, including their noncompliance with multiple prior orders, we conclude that the order striking the appellants’ ... answer (CPLR 3126 [3]) was properly made on the exercise of the “broad discretion of the trial court” (Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713, citing Reynolds Sec. v Underwriters Bank & Trust Co., 44 NY2d 568; Laverne v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, 18 NY2d 635, 637-638; Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833, 834; see also, Herrera v City of New York, 238 AD2d 475; Sindeband v McCleod, 226 AD2d 623; Town of Southampton v Salten, 186 AD2d 796; 7A Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac § 42:494).

Section 3126 permits striking a defendant’s answer for a discovery default only when the default is clearly deliberate and contumacious.

Johnson v. Brown · filed 1997-09-15

In the case at bar, the defendant Kerala Transportation Corp. demonstrated in its papers that it made diligent efforts to secure the attendance of its driver, the defendant Vladimir Fridman, at an examination before trial. Accordingly, the failure of Kerala Transportation Corp. in this regard cannot be considered to be “deliberate and contumacious”.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party willfully fails to comply with repeated demands for disclosure and depositions.

Amato v. County of Westchester · filed 1997-10-20

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against the County defendants pursuant to CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of counterclaims when a party repeatedly refuses a court-ordered examination.

Bingham v. Struve · filed 1997-12-18

Here, defendant’s repeated, adamantine refusal to submit to court-ordered examination by plaintiffs’ expert provided ample justification—particularly under the circumstances of this case in which defendant had herself placed her psychiatric condition in issue—for the motion court’s dismissal of defendant’s counterclaims.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party’s failure to comply with discovery is deliberate and contumacious.

Pimental v. City of New York · filed 1998-01-27

Unconditionally striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is appropriate where the resisting party’s default is deliberate and contumacious (see, Furniture Fantasy v Cerrone, 154 AD2d 506).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for failure to comply with discovery orders.

Sandcham Realty Corp. v. Sonnenschine · filed 1998-01-29(3)

The IAS Court properly exercised its discretion in striking defendants’ answer for their noncompliance with the prior so-ordered stipulation directing production of all documents pursuant to demands to which no objections had been made, and with the prior court orders ruling on defendants’ claims of privilege and directing production of nonprivileged documents.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint for willful failure to provide discovery directed by a conditional order of dismissal.

Kami & Sons, Inc. v. Pipe · filed 1998-03-31

Plaintiffs conclusory denial of defendants’ detailed factual presentation demonstrating plaintiffs willful failure to provide discovery, as directed in a conditional order of dismissal, was insufficient to raise a factual issue requiring a hearing, and striking the complaint was a proper exercise of discretion (see, Perez v New York City Hous. Auth., 229 AD2d 310; Doino v Meltzer, 208 AD2d 798).

Section 3126 permits striking an answer when a party fails to comply with a discovery stipulation that provides for that sanction.

Ferrantello v. St. Charles Hospital & Rehabilitation Center · filed 1998-04-06

The Supreme Court properly concluded that the defendants failed to comply with the stipulation dated September 27, Í996, thereby warranting the agreed-upon sanction of striking their answer (see, CPLR 3126; Smith v City of New York, 239 AD2d 337; Pan World Constr. Corp. v 791 Park Ave. Corp., 185 AD2d 105, 107; Will v County of Nassau, 90 AD2d 795).

CPLR 3126 does not justify dismissal when a party lacks the requested material despite reasonable efforts to obtain it and has not willfully disregarded a court order.

LaManna v. MJ Cahn Woolen Co. · filed 1998-04-20

Further, because the plaintiff is not in possession of the transcript at issue, despite her reasonable diligence in attempting to obtain it, the plaintiff has not exhibited a contumacious or willful disregard of the court order, justifying dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see, Porreco v Selway, 225 AD2d 752; Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524; Citibank v Johnson, 206 AD2d 942; Ahroni v City of New York, 175 AD2d 789; McDonald v Mid County Tr. Mix, 174 AD2d 614).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s answer as a sanction for willful and contumacious failure to provide discovery.

Chiambalero v. Waldbaum's Supermarket, Inc. · filed 1998-05-05

We differ with the motion court and find Best’s conduct to be willful and contumacious, warranting sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see, Ritter Found. v Tebele, 222 AD2d 355; Stanfill Plumbing & Heating Corp. v Dravo Constructors, 216 AD2d 101; Beatty v First Atl. Hous. Corp., 209 AD2d 658; Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure when the conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Ranfort v. Peak Tours, Inc. · filed 1998-05-18

The drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

A party seeking to strike an answer under section 3126 must show that the opposing party’s noncompliance was willful or contumacious.

Thomas v. McGuire Service Corp. · filed 1998-06-18

Striking the answer here was an improvident exercise of discretion where plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing Chemical’s conduct to be willful or contumacious (see, Frye v City of New York, 228 AD2d 182; Bako v V.T. Trucking Co., 143 AD2d 561, 562).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading when a party willfully fails to comply with discovery obligations.

Gall v. Summit Rovins & Feldesman · filed 1998-10-06

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered on or about July 14, 1997, which, inter alia, granted defendants’ CPLR 3126 motion, to strike plaintiffs’ reply to defendants’ counterclaims to recover legal fees, unanimously affirmed, with costs. ... We agree with the motion court that plaintiffs’ claim that the criminal trial rendered their compliance impossible, which the April 21 order forewarned would be rejected, “is couched in the most general terms”, and should be rejected.

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Mohammed v. 919 Park Place Owners Corp. · filed 1997-12-08(3)

In addition, while the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Herrera v City of New York, 238 AD2d 475; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 662, 663; Soto v City of Long Beach, 197 AD2d 615, 616).

Section 3126 permits striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands when the default is clearly deliberate or contumacious.

Cantos v. Castle Abatement Corp. · filed 1998-06-04

This Court has consistently held that “[t]he striking of an answer is an extreme and drastic penalty, and should not be invoked where the moving affidavit fails to show conclusively that the default was clearly deliberate or contumacious” (supra, at 374, citing Cinelli v Radcliffe, 35 AD2d 829).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to decline to strike a party’s answer for failure to comply with discovery orders when the party ultimately complies.

Lawrence v. City of New York · filed 1998-07-06

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to strike the defendants’ answers in light of the ultimate compliance with the court-ordered discovery by the defendant City of New York (see, Smith v New York Tel. Co., 235 AD2d 529).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a defendant’s answer for failing to appear at a deposition even if the defendant has disappeared or become unavailable.

Torres v. Martinez · filed 1998-05-18

The fact that a defendant has disappeared or made himself unavailable provides no basis for denying a motion to strike his answer for failure to appear at a deposition (see, Dash v DK Tr., 239 AD2d 313; Rowe v Lee Gee Sook, 224 AD2d 404; Spataro v Ervin, 186 AD2d 793; Foti v Suero, 97 AD2d 748).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a defendant’s answer when the defendant disappears or makes himself unavailable for scheduled examinations before trial.

Aliano v. Lamaina · filed 1998-11-02

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant’s answer since the defendant had disappeared or made himself unavailable for scheduled examinations before trial (see, Cavallino v Sonsky, 251 AD2d 361; Dash v DK Tr., 239 AD2d 313; Rowe v Lee Gee Sook, 224 AD2d 404; Boera v Batz, 236 AD2d 349; Spataro v Ervin, 186 AD2d 793).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike a party’s pleadings for wilful failure to comply with disclosure orders.

DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc. · filed 1998-12-28(3)

Clearly, on the facts of this case, it is appropriate to strike the answer of UPS and cross claims against CA under CPLR 3126 (3).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a complaint when a plaintiff defaults on a conditional order requiring timely answers to interrogatories.

Kihl v. Pfeffer · filed 1998-12-28

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied vacatur of the plaintiffs default in timely serving interrogatories and granted the motion of Honda Motor Co., Inc., to strike the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s answer for refusing to obey a disclosure order or willfully failing to disclose required information.

Lavi v. Lavi · filed 1998-12-31(3)

A court may strike “pleadings or parts thereof’ as a sanction against a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126 [3]). ... In the instant case, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking the defendants’ answer following the defendants’ failure, for at least five months, to make themselves available to conclude an examination before trial.

CPLR 3126 gives courts discretion to deny a motion to strike a complaint for failure to provide discovery.

Chevannes v. Lexington Garden Associates · filed 1999-03-22

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to strike the complaint ... (see, Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467).

CPLR 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for a discovery default only when the default is conclusively shown to be deliberate or contumacious.

Gadley v. U.S. Sugar Co. · filed 1999-03-31(3)

While the relief granted to plaintiff and third-party defendant is a sanction available to the court upon defendant’s failure to comply with discovery requests (see, CPLR 3126 [3]), it is well settled that the harsh remedy of striking an answer should be granted only where it is conclusively shown that the discovery default was deliberate or contumacious (see, Quinn v Broder, 225 AD2d 1110; Gaylord Bros, v RND Co., 134 AD2d 848).

Section 3126 does not warrant dismissal for discovery noncompliance when the record does not show a willful or intentional failure to comply.

Cruz v. Edwards · filed 1999-04-05

The record does not demonstrate that the plaintiffs willfully or intentionally failed to comply with any court orders or their discovery obligations or that they misrepresented their readiness for trial (see, CPLR 3126; Peck v Tired Iron Transp., 209 AD2d 979; Marra v Hensonville Frozen Food Lockers, 189 AD2d 1004; cf., Cutolo v Khalife, 242 AD2d 661; DeGennaro v Robinson Textiles, 224 AD2d 574).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff’s pattern of delay in crucial discovery prejudices the defendants.

Gale v. Delmonico Hotel Co. · filed 1999-04-22

The court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126, since plaintiff had engaged in a pattern of delay on crucial aspects of the case, resulting in prejudice to defendants.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for repeated, unexplained failures to attend court-ordered depositions.

Varvitsiotes v. Pierre · filed 1999-04-27

Uncontested evidence of discovery noncompliance by defendant, including his repeated and unexplained failures to attend court ordered depositions, warranted the striking of his answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see, Kutner v Feiden, Dweck & Sladkus, 223 AD2d 488, Iv denied 88 NY2d 802).

Section 3126 does not warrant striking a pleading for a discovery default that is not willful.

First Bank of the Americas v. Motor Car Funding, Inc. · filed 1999-05-11

Striking of pleadings is too drastic a remedy where the party’s default is not willful (Newman v Chartered New England Corp., 63 AD2d 617).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike pleadings when a party deliberately destroys financial records crucial to the defense.

Sonmez v. World on Columbus, Inc. · filed 1999-05-13

The Sonmez’s complaint and the answer of third-party defendant LCK Restaurant Group, Inc., an entity controlled by plaintiff Kemal Sonmez, were properly struck pursuant to CPLR 3126 by reason of Kemal Sonmez’s deliberate destruction of financial records crucial to the defense of the action (see, Hyosung [Am.] v Woodcrest Fabrics, 106 AD2d 298, appeal dismissed 64 NY2d 934).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to decline to strike an answer when a party ultimately complies with discovery requests and offers an adequate excuse for its delay.

Kamar v. City of New York · filed 1999-06-08

Finally, the motion court’s refusal to strike defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 was proper under all the circumstances, including defendant City’s ultimate compliance, albeit tardy, with plaintiff’s discovery requests (see, Lawrence v City of New York, 252 AD2d 482), for which delay an adequate excuse was offered.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to disclose when the failure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Krajca v. Panza · filed 1999-06-28

While the drastic remedy of striking a pleading for failure to disclose should not be imposed unless the party’s failure to comply was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, Beard v Peconic Foam Insulation Corp., 149 AD2d 555), the record supports the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s failure in this case warranted dismissal of the complaint.

Failure to offer a valid excuse for disobeying discovery orders or to object to discovery demands permits an inference of willful noncompliance under CPLR 3126(3).

Smith v. Eastern Long Island Hospital · filed 1999-07-12(3)

The plaintiffs failure to proffer a valid excuse for her noncompliance with the orders, as well as her failure to object to the discovery demands, permits an inference that her noncompliance was willful (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint for failure to provide discovery, subject to a deadline for compliance.

Dore v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 1999-09-27

In an action to recover the proceeds of an automobile insurance policy, the defendant Allstate Indemnity Company appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Bernhard, J.), dated April 30, 1998, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Ordered that the order is reversed, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Allstate Indemnity Company is stricken, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed, unless the plaintiff complies with the demand of Allstate Indemnity Company for discovery and inspection of the specified income tax returns, bank account information, and employment records; and it is further, Ordered that the plaintiffs time to comply with the demand for discovery and inspection is extended until 30 days after service upon her of a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry.

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s answer when repeated failures to comply with disclosure orders show willful or contumacious conduct and the party offers no reasonable excuse.

Espinal v. City of New York · filed 1999-09-27(3)

At no time did the defendants offer a reasonable excuse for their repeated failures to comply with the plaintiff’s outstanding discovery demands and the orders directing disclosure. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to strike the answer is granted and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Kings County, for an inquest as to damages.

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to deny a motion to strike an answer when a defendant fails to submit to an examination before trial.

Bushansky v. Equity Transportation Co. · filed 1998-11-23

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the respondents’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 based upon the failure of the defendant James Clarence Junior to submit to an examination before trial.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully obstructs meaningful pretrial discovery.

Tellas v. City of New York · filed 1998-12-14

The record amply demonstrates that the appellant has engaged in willful and contumacious conduct intended to thwart the plaintiffs right to meaningful pretrial discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion to strike the appellant’s answer (see, Fappiano v City of New York, 241 AD2d 509; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374; Herrera v City of New York, 238 AD2d 475; Cauley v Long Is. R. R. Co., 234 AD2d 252).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Selamaj v. City of New York · filed 1999-01-19(3)

It is well settled that the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, CPLR 3126; Parish Constr. Corp. v Franlo Tile, 215 AD2d 545; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663). In this case, the plaintiffs failed to make such a showing.

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery only upon a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith conduct.

Garcia v. First Spanish Baptist Church of Islip · filed 1999-03-01(3)

The drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith ... The record herein fails to support a finding that any failure by the defendants to comply with discovery was willful.

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer for a discovery failure only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Smith v. Bynum · filed 1999-04-26

It is well established that the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, CPLR 3126; Olmoz v Town of Fishkill, 258 AJD2d 447; Selamaj v City of New York, 257 AD2d 616). In this case, the plaintiffs failed to make such a showing.

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when a party fails to comply with discovery demands.

McKithen v. City of New York · filed 1999-06-28(3)

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendants’ answer based upon their failure to comply with the plaintiffs discovery demands (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; DiDomenico v C & S Aeromatick Supplies, 252 AD2d 41; Ferraro v Koncal Assocs., 97 AD2d 429).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking a complaint for failure to produce an item when there is no indication that the plaintiffs possessed it or that their inability to produce it was willful, deliberate, or contumacious.

Raymond v. Glabman, Rubenstein & Reingold · filed 1999-06-28

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion. There is no indication that the plaintiffs or their present counsel ever possessed the subject X-ray or that their inability to produce it was the result of willful, deliberate, or contumacious conduct.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s pleadings for persistent failure to produce documents demanded in disclosure and ordered by the court.

Helms v. Gangemi · filed 1999-10-14

Defendant’s pleadings were properly struck because of his repeated failure to comply with plaintiffs disclosure demands, as directed by the IAS Court.

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading when a party willfully fails to obey a disclosure order and frustrates disclosure.

Hempstead Union Free School District v. Buzzeo · filed 1999-11-01(3)

The Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion, inter alia, by granting the parties’ respective motions to strike each other’s pleadings in light of their willful and contumacious behavior in failing to obey a court order and conduct which frustrated the disclosure scheme provided by the CPLR (see, *190CPLR 3126 [3]; Garcia v First Spanish Baptist Church, 259 AD2d 465; Garnett v Hudson Rent A Car, 258 AD2d 559; Lavi v Lavi, 256 AD2d 602; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for deliberate or contumacious discovery misconduct, but the sanction is discretionary.

Paull v. First UNUM Life Insurance · filed 1999-12-30

We disagree with the contention of UNUM that the court’s discovery sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126 constitutes an abuse of discretion. ... We conclude that some of UNUM’s interrogatory and document discovery responses constitute deliberate and contumacious disregard of the March 16, 1998 order. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion pursuant to our coordinate authority with the trial court (see, Rankin v Miller, 252 AD2d 863, 865) and modify the order by vacating the first ordering paragraph.

Section 3126 permits striking a party’s pleadings for discovery failures only upon a clear showing of willfulness or bad faith.

Cigna Property & Casualty Co. v. Decoration & Design Building Partnership · filed 2000-01-06

In furtherance of the policy favoring resolution of actions on the merits, the drastic remedy of striking a party’s pleadings should only be imposed upon a clear showing of willfulness or bad faith (Corner Realty 30/7 v Bernstein Mgt. Corp., 249 AD2d 191); otherwise, dismissal is not warranted (Kaplan v KCK Studios, 238 AD2d 264).

CPLR 3126 leaves discovery penalties to the court’s discretion, but striking a pleading requires a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith noncompliance.

Novis v. Benes · filed 2000-01-18

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of discretion, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully frustrates discovery by failing to comply with a direction to produce a knowledgeable witness for deposition.

Toribio v. J.D. Posillico, Inc. · filed 2000-01-27

In light of defendant Derez’s failure to timely and satisfactorily explain its longstanding noncompliance with the court’s direction that it produce a knowledgeable witness for deposition, the motion court justifiably concluded that Derez was willfully frustrating the conduct of discovery and properly granted plaintiffs motion to strike Derez’s answer (see, Seamon v Apel, 191 AD2d 406).

Section 3126 permits the drastic sanction of striking pleadings only when the moving party conclusively shows that the failure to disclose was wilful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Christian v. City of New York · filed 2000-02-01

In view of the absence of any demonstration of wilful and contumacious conduct by On-Site, this imposition of the harshest penalty available to the court was an improvident exercise of discretion.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Payne v. Rouse Corp. · filed 2000-02-22

The striking of a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure is a drastic remedy ...and a motion to strike should be granted only where the conduct of the nonmoving party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands when the failure is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Ferrarese v. USAA Casualty Insurance · filed 2000-04-03

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, to strike the defendant’s answer since the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the defendant’s failure to comply with any discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, CPLR 3126; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467; see also, Garcia v First Spanish Baptist Church, 259 AD2d 465; Garnett v Hudson Rent A Car, 258 AD2d 559; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374; Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with a disclosure order only upon a finding of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent.

Martignetti v. Ricevuto · filed 2000-04-10

To invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, CPLR 3126; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664; Lestingi v City of New York, 209 AD2d 384). Here, the record does not support a finding that the appellant willfully and deliberately failed to comply with the court’s directive that depositions be completed by December 16, 1998.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading when a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands is clearly willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Birch Hill Farm, Inc. v. Reed · filed 2000-05-01(3)

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of the Supreme Court’s discretion (see, Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806; Soto v City of Long Beach, 197 AD2d 615, 616), striking a pleading is appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664; accord, Lestingi v City of New York, 209 AD2d 384).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court orders and gives inadequate excuses for failing to comply with discovery demands.

Marks v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 2000-05-01

In addition, dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 was warranted given the plaintiffs repeated noncompliance with court orders and his inadequate excuses for his failure to comply with discovery demands (see, Castrignano v Flynn, 255 AD2d 352; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467).

CPLR 3126 cannot sustain a dismissal based on discovery noncompliance when neither the parties nor the court relied on that noncompliance.

Hodge v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2000-06-08

On appeal, defendant Health and Hospitals Corporation argues that the dismissal can be sustained on the alternative ground (CPLR 3126) of plaintiff’s failure to comply in a timely fashion with earlier discovery deadlines imposed by other Judges. This cannot avail, given the fact that neither the parties nor the court ever adverted to, or rested upon, any such noncompliance.

Section 3126(3) gives courts discretion to strike an answer for a disclosure failure; delayed notice of evidence does not automatically require that sanction.

Nabozny v. Cappelletti · filed 1999-12-09(3)

While it would have been better practice to immediately notify Supreme Court and plaintiffs’ counsel of the existence of the venogram — instead of waiting for plaintiffs to rest their case — we find that under the facts of this case, the failure to so notify does not require the striking of defendant’s answer, nor warrant a new trial.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer when repeated failures to obey disclosure orders and inadequate excuses show willful and contumacious conduct.

Hudson v. City of New York · filed 1999-12-20(3)

The defendant’s willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from its repeated failures to comply with orders directing disclosure and the inadequate excuses offered to excuse its failure to comply (see, Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806).

Section 3126(3) gives courts discretion to deny a motion to strike an answer as a discovery sanction.

Siegel v. City of New York · filed 2000-04-24(3)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendant’s answer (see, CPLR 3126; Fellin v Sahgal, 268 AD2d 456; Kamar v City of New York, 262 AD2d 57; Smith v New York Tel. Co., 235 AD2d 529).

Section 3126 permits striking an answer and precluding participation at an inquest as the maximum penalty for repeated, willful disobedience of disclosure orders.

Settembrini v. Settembrini · filed 2000-03-20

For more than a year, the defendant had willfully disobeyed a multitude of court orders. He repeatedly frustrated disclosure, purloined marital assets, falsified financial documents, refused to appear for an examination before trial, and defied requests for medical records to substantiate his claims of ill health. Although the defendant was able to travel to Italy, Portugal, and Canada, he claimed to be too ill to make any court appearances, including an appearance on the date which was scheduled for trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly imposed the maximum penalty on the defendant pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see, e.g., Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713; Brady v County of Nassau, 234 AD2d 408; Eagle Star Ins. Co. v Behar, 207 AD2d 326; see also, Maillard v Maillard, 243 AD2d 448; Beard v Peconic Foam Insulation Corp., 149 AD2d 555).

Section 3126(3) permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with discovery only when the party’s conduct is shown to be willful or contumacious.

Kominik v. Rodriguez · filed 2000-06-19(3)

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellants’ motion which sought to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) based upon the plaintiffs failure to comply with certain discovery requests. The harsh remedy of striking a pleading should only be imposed when the conduct of a party is shown to be willful or contumacious ... Such a showing was not made in this case.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike pleadings when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or wilfully fails to disclose required information.

Waterman v. County of Westchester · filed 2000-07-24(3)

A court may strike pleadings or parts of pleadings as a sanction against a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126 [3]; see also, Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374, 375).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Fox v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 2000-09-29

The extreme sanction of dismissal is warranted only where there is a clear showing that plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious or in bad faith (see, Corner Realty 30/7 v Bernstein Mgt. Corp., 249 AD2d 191, 193; see also, Gadley v U.S. Sugar Co., 259 AD2d 1041, 1042). No such showing was made here.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when failure to provide ordered disclosure supports an inference of willful and contumacious noncompliance.

DeCicco v. Nassau Radiological Group · filed 2000-10-16

The plaintiffs conduct in this case supports an inference that her noncompliance was willful and contumacious. Consequently, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint (see, Ranfort v Peak Tours, 250 AD2d 747; Geltman v St. Agnes Hosp., 186 AD2d 534; DeMasi v Dine, 155 AD2d 583).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a complaint for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Centerport Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Atlantic Fabricators of Rhode Island, Inc. · filed 2000-11-27

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking the complaint absent a clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, CPLR 3126; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663).

CPLR 3126(3) leaves dismissal of a pleading to the trial court’s discretion when a party disobeys a disclosure order and frustrates discovery.

Parente v. New York Times Co. · filed 2000-11-27(3)

It is well settled that “where a party disobeys a court order, and by his or her conduct frustrates the disclosure scheme provided by the CPLR, dismissal of a pleading is within the broad discretion of the trial court” (Castrignano v Flynn, 255 AD2d 352, 353; see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Ranfort v Peak Tours, 250 AD2d 747; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for persistent noncompliance with discovery.

Gaye v. Adnom Realty, Inc. · filed 2000-12-07

Accordingly, in view of plaintiffs persistent noncompliance with discovery, the complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for a discovery violation when the failure to comply is clearly shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Polanco v. Duran · filed 2000-12-18(3)

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the discretion of the court (see, Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, 240 AD2d 374; Herrera v City of New York, 238 AD2d 475, 476), striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Birch Hill Farm v Reed, 272 AD2d 282; Little v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 231 AD2d 496, 497; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading and enter judgment on liability when a party willfully destroys documents it was ordered to produce.

A Creations, Inc. v. Allison Che Fashions, Inc. · filed 2001-02-20(3)

As the motion court held, plaintiffs claim, in opposition to the motion, that the documents sought by defendant either no longer exist or were never kept in the first place is thoroughly undermined by plaintiffs principals’ earlier deposition testimony that such documents do exist and indeed some were even examined subsequent to the commencement of the action. The inference is inescapable that at some point after the first of those depositions the documents in question were willfully destroyed in contumacious disobedience of the two court orders that directed their production (see, Siegman v Rosen, 270 AD2d 14).

Section 3126 allows a court to decline to strike a pleading for a discovery failure and direct a conference instead.

Caggiano v. Glengariff Corp. · filed 2001-02-26

Furthermore, there is no basis upon which to strike the plaintiff’s reply to the counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3126. The Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in directing a conference in lieu of the more drastic relief demanded by the defendant.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Ali v. Lazerovitch · filed 2001-03-19

Dismissal of a complaint is appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

A court may deny a motion to strike an answer for discovery noncompliance when the moving party certified that no discovery remained outstanding and failed to tell the court otherwise.

Wang v. Forty Second Street Development Corp. · filed 2001-04-19(3)

The motion court did not misapprehend the nature of plaintiffs’ motion, but rather, specifically and accurately noted that it was one to strike the answers pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3). The motion was properly denied, since, four days before bringing the motion, plaintiffs had certified in a note of issue that there was no outstanding discovery, and the day before making the motion had failed to alert the court during a conference that the circumstances were otherwise than as represented in the note of issue.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for willful failure to comply with a discovery order.

Hudson View II Associates v. Miller · filed 2001-04-19

Accordingly, the motion court properly exercised its discretion when, as a sanction for such willful noncompliance, it granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant-appellant’s answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see, Furniture Fantasy v Cerrone, 154 AD2d 506).

Section 3126 permits sanctions for discovery noncompliance, but striking an answer requires a conclusive showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith conduct.

Colucci v. Jennifer Convertibles, Inc. · filed 2001-05-10

Defendants’ noncompliance with court orders and plaintiffs demands for disclosure, while undeniably sanctionable (CPLR 3126), was not shown conclusively to be willful, contumacious or in bad faith, and thus constitutes something less than the “[e]xtreme conduct” required before the ultimate penalty of striking the answer is imposed (see, Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459, 460).

Section 3126(3) permits striking an answer for failure to comply with a disclosure order only upon a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Fraracci v. Lasouska · filed 2001-05-10(3)

In any event, the drastic sanction of dismissal of an answer should only be imposed where the moving party makes a clear showing that the defendant willfully or contumaciously failed to comply with an order for disclosure ... The record fails to establish such conduct in this case.

A court may deny a CPLR 3126 motion to strike an answer for delayed discovery when there is no showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Black v. Bronx Lebanon Special Care Center, Inc. · filed 2000-06-13

Although defendant Bronx Lebanon delayed in producing certain witnesses for deposition, the court properly exercised its discretion (see, Cherry v Herbert & Co., 212 AD2d 203, 209) in denying plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike Bronx Lebanon’s answer, since there was no showing that its delay was the product of willful or contumacious conduct (see, Hanson v City of New York, 227 AD2d 217).

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer when a party fails to provide agreed-to disclosure and a so-ordered stipulation provides for that remedy.

Yellow Trading Ltd. v. Fratelli Ricatto Import & Export Co. · filed 2001-01-22

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err in granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike its answer, pursuant to the terms of a so-ordered stipulation providing for such a remedy, after the defendant failed to timely provide agreed-to disclosure (see, CPLR 3126; cf., Sandcham Realty Corp. v Sonnenschine, 246 AD2d 477).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer for willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery, which may be inferred from repeated noncompliance and an inadequate excuse.

Quinn v. Menzel · filed 2001-04-09(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the motion of the third-party plaintiff to strike the answer of the third-party defendant (see, CPLR 3126 [3]). The willful and contumacious conduct of the third-party defendant can be inferred from its repeated failure to comply with court-ordered discovery and the demands of the third-party plaintiff as well as the inadequate excuse offered for its failure to comply (see, Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully and contumaciously fails to appear for a court-directed deposition.

Levy v. Salkind · filed 2000-10-05

While defendant’s failure to appear for deposition, as directed by the IAS Court, in the New York offices of plaintiffs counsel, was not excused by the fact that he faced arrest on a bench warrant issued by the same court for his failure to appear at a different deposition, and the court, accordingly, properly struck defendant’s answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 by reason of his contumacious and willful conduct ... plaintiff was not entitled to recover from defendant the amount awarded in the appealed judgment.

Section 3126(3) permits striking a party’s answer and entering a default judgment for willful and contumacious failure to obey repeated deposition orders.

AG v. Geecee Exportaciones LTDA. · filed 2000-11-02(3)

Defendants’ failure to comply with three court orders issued during a two-and-a-half year period directing them to appear for depositions in New York, including an order, entered February 11, 1999, conditionally striking their answers and awarding plaintiff a default judgment in the event they failed to appear for depositions commencing March 25, 1999, was properly found by the IAS Court to constitute willful and contumacious conduct warranting the default sanction finally imposed (CPLR 3126 [3]; see, Brady v Zambrana, 221 AD2d 171).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer if a party fails to comply with a deposition order by a specified deadline.

Parkhill v. Cleary · filed 2000-11-13

We thus modify the order by granting plaintiffs’ motion and striking the answer unless defendants, within 30 days of service of a copy of the order of this Court with notice of entry, comply with the order entered May 4, 1999.

CPLR 3126(3) gives courts discretion to deny a motion to strike a complaint as a discovery sanction.

Vasquez v. Sokolowski · filed 2000-11-20(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to strike the complaint (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Kingsley v Kantor, 265 AD2d 529).

CPLR 3126 allows a default judgment for failure to provide disclosure when the moving party clearly shows willfulness or bad faith.

Cafferty v. Thomas, Collison & Place · filed 2001-04-26

In order to invoke the drastic remedy of granting a default judgment against a party on a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3126, the moving party must make a clear showing of willfulness or bad faith (see, Shapiro v Rose Textiles Indus., 195 AD2d 935, 935-936).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading only when the party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Sanders v. City of New York · filed 2001-05-21

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126. The harsh remedy of striking a plead...ing should be imposed only when the conduct of a party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith ... No such showing was made in this case.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to conditionally strike a defendant’s answer for willful failure to appear for a deposition.

Rocco v. KCL Protective Services, Inc. · filed 2001-05-24

Under such circumstances, the court has broad discretion (CPLR 3126) to impose an appropriate sanction, which includes the striking of the defendant’s responsive pleading (Toribio v J.D. Posillico, Inc., 268 AD2d 394; Lehman Govt. Sec. v Enhanced Treasury Returns Corp., 216 AD2d 255). The court’s conditional order, striking Montalvo’s answer unless he appeared by a date certain, was a reasonable exercise of that discretion (Besson v Beirne, 188 AD2d 330).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with a disclosure order only when the failure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious or equivalent conduct.

Martin v. Hall · filed 2001-05-29

To invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for noncompliance with a court order for disclosure, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, Caruso v Malang, 234 AD2d 496). The plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing that the defendant’s default was willful, deliberate, and contumacious (see, Nudelman v New York City Tr. Auth., 172 AD2d 503).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery only when the conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Halikiopoulos v. New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens · filed 2001-06-11

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint based on a plaintiffs failure to comply with court-ordered discovery should be granted only where the conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith. Where a plaintiff disobeys a court order and by his or her conduct frustrates discovery, dismissal is proper (see, CPLR 3126; Cronin v Perry, 269 AD2d 351).

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party repeatedly fails, without an adequate explanation, to produce an essential witness for examination before trial.

Patterson v. Greater New York Corp. · filed 2001-06-11

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking the appellants’ answer based upon their repeated and inadequately explained failure to produce an essential witness for an examination before trial.

Section 3126 leaves discovery penalties to the court’s discretion; striking a pleading requires a clear showing that the failure to comply was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Guiliano v. Carlisle · filed 2001-08-20

... and the harsh penalty of striking a pleading is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, DeCintio v Ahmed, 276 AD2d 463; Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806; Smith v Eastern Long Is. Hosp., 263 AD2d 477). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to strike the respondent’s answer and cross claims.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike an answer and enter a default judgment when a party willfully and in bad faith fails to comply with court-ordered discovery.

Kim v. Harrison · filed 2001-10-15(3)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendants’ answer, for leave to enter a default judgment on the issue of liability, and to direct an inquest on the issue of damages (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Kubacka v Town of N. Hempstead, supra).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a complaint when a plaintiff repeatedly fails, without an adequate explanation, to appear for court-ordered physical examinations.

Poulas v. U-Haul International Inc. · filed 2001-11-05

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint for the plaintiff’s repeated and inadequately explained failure to appear for court-ordered physical examinations.

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Reid v. Schoenthal · filed 2001-11-05

The remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Section 3126 permits striking an answer for willful failure to obey a discovery order, but the sanction should be limited to issues related to the withheld evidence.

Diane v. Ricale Taxi, Inc. · filed 2002-02-26

Since the witness whom Ricale failed to producé pursuant to the April 2000 order would have provided testimony relevant solely to the issue of liability, Ricale’s answer should have been stricken solely as to that issue.

CPLR 3126 leaves discovery penalties to the trial court’s discretion, but striking a pleading or imposing equivalent preclusion requires a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith noncompliance.

Grisales v. City of New York · filed 2002-03-11

The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is generally a matter left to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, and the harsh penalty of striking a pleading, or preclusion, which effectively results in the striking of a pleading, is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Guiliano v Carlisle, 286 AD2d 417; Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524)..

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer for failure to comply with a disclosure order only upon a showing of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent.

Solomon v. Horie Karate Dojo · filed 2001-05-14

To invoke the drastic remedy of striking an answer, it must be shown that the defendant’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, CPLR 3126; Ciandolo v Trism Spedalized Carriers, 274 AD2d 369; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663). This was not shown here.

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer for failure to comply with a disclosure order only when the failure is willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Viteritti v. Gelfand · filed 2001-12-31

To invoke the drastic remedy of striking an answer, it must be shown that a defendant’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct (see, CPLR 3126; Solomon v Horie Karate Dojo, 283 AD2d 480; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438). No such showing was made here.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for failure to comply with discovery directives only when the noncompliance is clearly deliberate and contumacious.

Catarine v. Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 2002-01-03

It is well settled that a court should not resort to striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery directives unless noncompliance is clearly established to be both deliberate and contumacious (Corner Realty 30/7 v Bernstein Mgt. Corp., 249 AD2d 191, 193; Frye v City of New York, 228 AD2d 182, 182-183).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to strike a complaint when plaintiffs fail to furnish court-ordered discovery.

Reed v. Jaspan, Ginsberg, Schlesinger, Silverman & Hoffman · filed 2001-05-29(3)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to strike the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) based upon the plaintiffs’ failure to furnish court-ordered discovery.

Section 3126 permits preclusion for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the conduct is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Patterson v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2001-06-25

However, to invoke the “drastic remedy of preclusion, which effectively results in the striking of a pleading, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent” (Cianciolo v Trism Spedalized Carriers, 274 AD2d 369, 370; see, Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438; Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands when the failure is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Nicoletti v. Ozram Transportation, Inc. · filed 2001-09-17

While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the discretion of the court, the drastic remedy of striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Polanco v Duran, 278 AD2d 397). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking the answer.