N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101

Section 3101(a)(4) permits the oral deposition of a person treated as a nonparty witness when his eyewitness testimony is needed to prepare for trial.

Siffin v. Rambuski · filed 1982-04-02(a)(4)

Inasmuch as Drum clearly is entitled to the relief requested and there is no. prejudice, Rambuski should be treated as a nonparty witness and an order should be issued for his oral deposition pursuant to CPLR 3101 (subd [a], par [4]) (CPLR 2001; see Matter of Davie Co., 80 AD2d 994).

Section 3101(a)(4) permits further nonparty disclosure when an examination of the opposing party shows that it is warranted.

Braga v. Braga · filed 1981-06-02(a)(4)

Until such an examination is held, it cannot be determined whether it is necessary for plaintiff to examine all the nonparty witnesses upon whom subpoenas duces tecum have been served. In order to avoid unneeded expense for both the parties and nonparties at this disclosure stage, defendant’s motion for a protective order quashing the subpoenas is granted. After the defendant has been examined, the plaintiff may move before Special Term for such further disclosure as is warranted under CPLR 3101 (subd [a], par [4]).

Section 3101 permits discovery of eyewitnesses’ names and addresses when they are material and necessary to an action.

Allsbrooks v. McCrory's, Inc. · filed 1981-06-22(a)

Since the names of the eyewitnesses to the occurrence in question are material and necessary to the prosecution of this action, plaintiffs are entitled to discover them and the addresses of witnesses.

Section 3101(a) requires a party to disclose a known witness and to advise the opposing party in writing if the party learns of the witness later; failure to do so may result in preclusion of the witness’s testimony.

Roman v. Shik · filed 1982-07-01(a)

Even if plaintiff was unaware of the witness at that time, which is unlikely, he had a continuing responsibility to advise defendant in writing when he did learn of the witness. Therefore, defendant’s motion to preclude the witness from testifying is granted.

Section 3101(a)(4) does not warrant disclosure from a party’s former counsel when the evidence is available from public documents and no special circumstances exist.

MacKay v. Pierce · filed 1982-07-06(a)(4)

Accordingly, there are no special circumstances extant which would warrant disclosure from plaintiff’s now former counsel (see CPLR 3101, subd [a], par [4]).

Section 3101(c) protects materials uniquely produced by a lawyer’s learning and professional skills, but does not shield the identities of witnesses to a defective condition or notice of it.

Bombard v. County of Albany · filed 1983-05-26(c)

Identification of this type of witness by a party need not subject an attorney’s trial strategy to undue disclosure and, further, has the salutary effect of limiting an attorney’s work product exemption under CPLR 3101 (subd [c]) to those materials which are uniquely the product of a lawyer’s learning and professional skills (see Hoffman v Ro-San Manor, 73 AD2d 207).

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a showing of special circumstances to examine a party’s expert about the chain of custody of evidence.

Nagel v. Metzger · filed 1983-07-11(a)(4)

We find no special circumstances which justify oral examination of plaintiff’s expert to determine the chain of custody.

CPLR 3101 (a) requires disclosure of a witness’s name before trial when the witness has material evidence bearing on liability.

Hughes v. Elias · filed 1986-05-27(a)

We, therefore, find that the plaintiffs had an obligation to disclose the officer’s name prior to trial.

Section 3101(a)(4) permits further discovery of witnesses when their names are disclosed shortly before trial.

Sidbury v. Great Bear Spring Co. · filed 1987-06-25(a)(4)

They should have the right to whatever further discovery is necessary. Any other result would reward respondent’s lawyers for their tardy submission of a list of witnesses, and violate the well-established rules allowing liberal discovery of witnesses.

Section 3101(a)(4) does not allow a party to compel another party to authorize disclosure of a nonparty’s records; the nonparty must provide the authorization.

Muniz v. Preferred Associates · filed 1993-01-28(a)(4)

With respect to the mother’s academic records, while this material is not privileged, only the mother, a nonparty to this action, can provide the authorization sought by defendants (see, CPLR 3101 [a] [4]).

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a subpoena to a nonparty to include notice stating the circumstances or reasons the disclosure is sought or required.

Rickicki v. Borden Chemical · filed 1993-07-16(a)(4)

It is undisputed that the subpoena served upon the nonparty doctor did not contain nor was it accompanied by a notice stating "the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required” (CPLR 3101 [a] [4]). Thus, the subpoena was facially defective and may not be enforced (see, Matter of Yost v Douris, 151 AD2d 489; Bigman v Dime Sav. Bank, 138 AD2d 438).

Section 3101(a)(4) permits disclosure from a nonparty closely related to a party without a showing of special circumstances.

BAII Banking Corp. v. Northville Industries Corp. · filed 1994-05-26(a)(4)

Obviously, inasmuch as the "circumstances” no longer have to be "special”, the interpretation of the amended paragraph (4) should be even more generous (see, Siegel, NY Prac § 345, at 494 [2d ed]). In this case, plaintiff and Banque Arabe are, at the very least, closely related, if not corporate alter egos.

Section 3101(a)(4) permits examination of a nonparty witness when the subpoena adequately states the need for disclosure.

Plotnik v. Greenberg · filed 1994-07-15(a)(4)

The subpoena directing a non-party witness to appear for examination before trial adequately stated the need for such disclosure (see, CPLR 3101 [a] [4]; Wiseman v American Motors Sales Corp., 103 AD2d 230, 240; Kenford Co. v County of Erie, 41 AD2d 586), and the court properly denied defendant Green-berg’s motion for a protective order.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of a witness whose testimony concerns whether a defendant had notice of an alleged defective condition.

Skowronski v. F & J Meat Packers, Inc. · filed 1994-12-19(a)

Disclosure of witnesses whose testimony relates to whether a defendant had notice of a defective condition falls within the scope of disclosure under CPLR 3101 (a) (see, Zayas v Morales, 45 AD2d 610).

Section 3101(a)(4)’s notice requirement protects the nonparty asked to disclose information; someone whose documents that nonparty holds cannot challenge the subpoena solely for inadequate notice to the nonparty.

Oncor Communications, Inc. v. State · filed 1995-04-20(a)(4)

While the court holds that Oncor has standing to the extent the subpoena requires Oncor’s own documents to be produced, this does not mean that Oncor may challenge the subpoena as being defective on its face for failing to comply with the notice requirement of CPLR 3101 (a) (4).

A court may permit an undisclosed witness to testify despite a CPLR 3101 demand when the failure to disclose was not willful or contumacious and caused minimal prejudice.

Gutz v. County of Monroe · filed 1995-11-22

While plaintiff’s counsel should have complied with defendant’s demand (see, Hughes v Elias, 120 AD2d 703, 705), there is no proof that her failure to do so was willful or contumacious. Moreover, any prejudice suffered by defendant was minimal as it had notice of the subject matter of Rhodes’ testimony and did not present any evidence contravening it. Accordingly, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the challenged testimony (see, Burton v New York City Hous. Auth., 191 AD2d 669, 671; Locastro v Horn, 138 AD2d 358, 359; Smith v Saviolis, 136 AD2d 621, 622).

Section 3101(a) can warrant a new trial when a court allows a witness to testify despite the witness’s nondisclosure under discovery demands and a pretrial order.

Kavanaugh v. Kuchner · filed 1997-10-06(a)

In view of the discovery demands served by the defendants and the pretrial discovery order in this case, the trial court erred in allowing a witness who had never been disclosed to testify for the plaintiffs (see, CPLR 3101 [a]). Under the circumstances of this case, a new trial is warranted (see generally, Skowronski v F & J Meat Packers, 210 AD2d 392).

Section 3101(a)(3) permits a party to depose a nonparty witness who resides and practices outside New York.

Jones v. Sherpa · filed 2004-03-22(a)(3)

Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs were properly permitted to depose Dr. Corcoran, a physician who resides and practices in Pennsylvania (see CPLR 3101 [a] [3]), and to use his deposition testimony at trial as evidence-in-chief (see CPLR 3117 [a] [3] [ii]; [4]; Goldblatt v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 223 AD2d 670 [1996]).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to refuse to consider an undisclosed notice witness’s affidavit when the party offers no valid excuse for failing to disclose the witness.

Gallway v. Muintir, LLC · filed 2016-09-14(a)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to consider the affidavit of the plaintiff’s granddaughter, who was having dinner with the plaintiff in the restaurant on the evening of the accident. The plaintiff failed to disclose the witness to the defendants as a notice witness and did not offer a valid excuse for that failure (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Henry v Higgins, 117 AD3d 796, 796 [2014]; Zoyas v Morales, 45 AD2d 610, 612 [1974]).

Section 3101 requires disclosure of the names and addresses of witnesses with knowledge of the events at issue.

Free Park Associates v. Cepeda · filed 2017-01-12

Pursuant to CPLR 3101, petitioner is required to produce the names and addresses of witnesses who have knowledge of the events and/or what happened.

Section 3101(a) permits a court to preclude a known fact witness when a party persistently disregards its obligation to disclose the witness’s identity before trial.

SLOMCZEWSKI, DOROTHY v. ROSS, JAMES A. · filed 2017-03-24(a)

Here, in view of defendants’ prolonged and almost complete disregard of their pretrial disclosure obligations with regard to the identity of a known fact witness, it was reasonable for the court to preclude the individual from testifying as a fact witness.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of a witness’s birth date when it may help locate the witness, but a social security number may be withheld because of its heightened confidentiality.

Lane v. City of New York · filed 2023-12-19(a)

A plaintiff is entitled to "open and far-reaching pretrial discovery" ( DiMichel v South Buffalo Ry. Co. , 80 NY2d 184, 193, cert. denied 510 US 816 [1993]; see also CPLR 3101[a]), although such discovery requests are "evaluated on a case-by-case basis" ( Forman v Henkin , 30 NY3d 656, 662 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]). ... Disclosure of his date of birth may assist plaintiff in identifying and locating the witness. Defendants are not required to provide the witness's social security number, however, as courts have recognized a heightened level of confidentiality with respect to an individual's social security number.

Section 3101(a) requires full disclosure of material and necessary evidence; a court may preclude witnesses withheld despite repeated discovery demands.

Gerasimowicz v. Aslanis · filed 2024-02-01(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides "there shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." ... Plaintiff is barred from calling seven witnesses -- defendants' employees or former employees (NYSCEF 234, Newman aff ,i15) - because he failed to disclose the names of those witnesses during discovery in this 2013 case when he was specifically and repeatedly asked to identify witnesses.

Section 3101(a) requires parties to disclose notice witnesses during discovery; a court cannot consider an undisclosed witness’s affidavit on summary judgment.

Fox v. Empire ECS LLC · filed 2024-06-06(a)

CPLR 3101(a) requires "full disclosure of all [evidence] material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof". Affidavits of purported witnesses cannot be considered when determining a motion for summary judgment when the witness was not properly disclosed as a notice witness during discovery. ... Accordingly, this Court will not consider such affidavits as there is no evidence that the identity of these witnesses was properly disclosed during discovery.

Section 3101(a) permits a court to refuse affidavits from undisclosed notice witnesses when the party offers no valid excuse for failing to disclose them.

Krehl v. Siberio · filed 2024-06-20(a)

Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to consider the affidavits of two notice witnesses submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendants' motions.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of other alleged victims’ names and contact information when their allegations concern the same abuser and are relevant to notice, absent an overriding privilege.

Maida v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2025-11-19(a)

CPLR 3101(a) directs that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." ... Applying the same principles to this action, all of the individuals' names and contact information at issue relate specifically to abuse allegedly committed by O'Brien and, absent any overriding privilege here, are discoverable, without redaction, as relevant to issues of actual or constructive notice of that priest's alleged propensity for abuse and what steps the Diocese took to prevent children from being abused by him ( see C.T. v Diocese of Brooklyn , 239 AD3d 784, 786; Halloway v Orthodox Church in Am. , 232 AD3d at 774-775).

Section 3101(d)(2) does not exempt a defendant’s statement to an insurance claims adjuster from disclosure merely because it was given before litigation.

Calace v. Battaglia · filed 1964-09-28(d)(2)

In view of the judicial conflict as to the interpretation of CPLR 3101 (subd. [d], par. 2) and of its applicability to a statement such as is here involved, any doubt upon this score should be resolved in favor of a construction which will be consonant with and promote the general policy of maximum disclosure. I conclude that the statement in question is subject to disclosure.

Section 3101 permits disclosure of a defendant’s pre-suit statements to an insurance carrier under subsection (a)’s full disclosure rule, rather than subsection (d)’s limits on material prepared for litigation.

Speight v. Allen · filed 1965-01-05(a), (d)

Although the question is a close one, as shown by the conflict in decisions, it is deemed more appropriate and in keeping with the broad underlying policy stated in Bios v. Donovan (supra) to hold that disclosure of such statements should, be determined not by the restrictive conditions of CPLR 3101 (subd. [d]) but by the liberal provision of CPLR 3101 (subd. [a]) for full disclosure.

Section 3101 conditionally protects a defendant’s statement to an insurer from disclosure to the plaintiff, even if the statement was made before the action began.

Gugluizza v. Gugluizza · filed 1965-04-01(d)(2)

The court held that the statement given by the defendant to his insurer was not available for discovery under the statute (CPLR 3101) and that the ‘ ‘ relative dates of the delivery of the statement and of the commencement of the action are immaterial ... A definitive statement on this subject by the Appellate Division of this Department would control the dispositions of motions of this nature by this court, but in the absence of such the cited authorities are controlling and will be followed. ... Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Statements an insured gives to an insurer are material prepared for litigation, and their disclosure requires proof that they cannot be duplicated because conditions have changed and that withholding them would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Cohen v. Hardy · filed 1965-04-26(d)(2)

In our opinion, the record fails to show that the statement and reports which plaintiffs seek to discover can no longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and that withholding them will result in injustice or undue hardship. In the absence of such proof, and since the statements given by an insured to his own insurer constitute material prepared for litigation regardless of when the statements are given or whether an action is then pending, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the discovery and inspection sought (Finegold v. Lewis, 22 A D 2d 447; TL andel v. Tocher, 22 A D 2d 513; CPLR 3101, subd. [d], par. 2).

Subsection (d) excludes statements made to an insurer from disclosure, though disclosure may be permitted when denying it would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Mosier v. Van Der Horst Research Corp. · filed 1966-05-19(d)

For this reason statements made to the carrier come under the exclusion found in CPLR 3101 (subd. [d]). It may well he that disclosure of such a statement might be permitted in a particular case where the circumstances demonstrate that a denial of disclosure would result in injustice or undue hardship. It is not necessary to determine that question here for no such showing has been made.

Reports prepared to help an insurer decide whether to pay a claim are discoverable as ordinary business records; reports prepared after rejection to resist the claim are protected as litigation materials.

Millen Industries, Inc. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance · filed 1971-10-07(d), (e)

Consequently, reports which aid it in the process of deciding which of the two indicated actions to pursue are made in the regular course of its business. However, once it has rejected the claim, reports made to it to aid in the resistance of the claim are made for the purposes of litigation and are protected by CPLR 3101 (subds. [e], [d]).

Section 3101(f) permits pretrial discovery of the existence and contents of a liability insurance agreement.

Rautine v. Preston · filed 1975-10-24(f)

The above section is a part of the general provisions of the CPLR pertaining to the scope of pretrial discovery. Its purpose was to permit discovery of the existence and contents of a liability insurance agreement.

Section 3101(f) permits discovery of an insurance agreement in a pending action even when the statement of readiness predates the subsection’s enactment.

Rubenstein v. Devoe · filed 1975-12-02(f)

After a note of issue and statement of readiness was filed by the plaintiff on April 9, 1975, CPLR 3101 was amended by chapter 668 of the Laws of 1975 (eff Aug. 6, 1975) by adding subdivision (f) which provides for the discovery of the contents of an insurance agreement. ... It is the determination of this court that the enactment of such procedural remedy subsequent to the filing of the statement of readiness constitutes such unanticipated change of conditions within the meaning of section 675.7 of the Appellate Division, Second Department rules (22 NYCRR 675.7), as would warrant the court to permit the plaintiff to pursue such remedy. ... Unless specifically excluded by the language of the enactment, all remedial statutes are deemed to apply to all pending actions.

Subdivision (f) applies to pending actions when disclosure of liability and indemnity insurance will not affect prior proceedings or work an injustice.

Verley v. Trudeau · filed 1975-11-13(f)

CPLR 3101 (subd [f]) merely expands the scope of disclosure to allow discovery of a defendant’s liability and indemnity insurance coverage. It is an aid in settlement of actions and in that sense it is remedial. It has no legal effect upon the trial of actions. It will not affect any prior proceedings taken in this action nor work an injustice.

CPLR 3101(f) permits disclosure of insurance coverage after trial while an action remains pending and applies retroactively.

Monell v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1976-01-16(f)

There is nothing in the language of 3101 (subd [f]) which limits the relief available to a particular time or stage of the proceedings. ... CPLR 3101 (subd [f]) should be liberally construed and should be available so long as there remains the prospect of facilitating the settlement of a pending action by the disclosure it provides.

CPLR 3101(f) permits discovery of the number and amounts of other claims against a policy and the total paid on them to assess the coverage available for a judgment.

Folgate v. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital · filed 1976-01-23(f)

The phrase "to satisfy part or all of a judgment” surely suggests that the legislative intent was to make possible a realistic assessment of the available insurance coverage. ... Since the objections to plaintiff’s motion seem to be more fanciful than real and the discovery sought is within the spirit of the statute, it will be permitted.

Section 3101(d) protects witness statements from disclosure when the requesting party has not shown that the statements cannot be duplicated and that withholding them would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Dworkin v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 1976-11-08(d)

Plaintiffs have not shown that the statements which the court ordered disclosed cannot be duplicated (the statements were taken from three friends of the infant plaintiff) and that the withholding of them will result in injustice or undue hardship.

Section 3101(f) allows disclosure of insurance coverage at any time, including after a statement of readiness is filed.

Pandori v. Fortune · filed 1978-06-30(f)

Moreover, there is nothing in the language of CPLR 3101 (subd [f]) which limits disclosure of insurance coverage to a particular time or stage of the action.

Section 3101(f) permits a plaintiff to discover a defendant’s liability insurance policy but does not require disclosure of a plaintiff’s first-party insurance policy to defendants.

Spotlight Co. v. Imperial Equities Co. · filed 1981-01-27(f)

Clearly, then, both the language and the history of CPLR 3101 establish beyond peradventure that CPLR 3101 (subd [f]) was intended to apply only where it is plaintiff who seeks to discover the terms of defendant’s liability insurance. Here, where the reverse is the case, and defendants seek divulgence of plaintiff’s first-party policy, the limited exception carved out by CPLR 3101 (subd [f]) allowing disclosure of defendants’ policy should be respected, and policies not required to be disclosed by that statute should be immune from discovery.

Section 3101(f) requires disclosure of primary and excess insurance coverage, including policies in force for other vehicles owned by the defendants on the accident date.

Love v. Meisner · filed 1981-02-24(f)

The disclosure of insurance information pursuant to CPLR 3101 (subd [f]) includes all primary and excess coverage and, in this case, all policies in force on the date of the accident for vehicles owned by Algernon C. Meisner and Geraldine M. Meisner.

CPLR 3101(f) permits a plaintiff to inspect and copy a defendant’s liability insurance policies and obtain information about claims made and sums paid during the applicable policy period.

Kimbell v. Davis · filed 1981-05-11(f)

Plaintiff is entitled (1) to examine and copy the original liability insurance policies of defendants and (2) to discover the number of claims against defendants during the applicable policy period, the amount sought in each such claim and the total of the sums paid out against the policies (see CPLR 3101, subd [f]; Folgate v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp., 86 Misc 2d 191).

Subdivision (g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business but does not cover statements obtained from independent witnesses.

Williams v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1982-11-16(g)

It is the opinion of this court that there is a difference between an accident report prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices of any firm, corporation, association or other public or private entity and the procuring of a statement from an independent witness to the accident. The first is governed by CPLR 3101 (subd [g]) and the latter is excluded.

Section 3101(f) provides for pretrial disclosure of a defendant’s liability insurance limits to help parties negotiate settlement.

Russo v. Rochford · filed 1984-01-16(f)

The purpose behind passage of CPLR 3101 (subd [f]) was to accelerate settlement of claims by affording the plaintiff knowledge of the limits of defendant’s liability policies (Siegel, NY Prac, § 344, p 422; NY Legis Ann, 1975, p 59).

Section 3101(d) exempts insurance carrier accident reports prepared exclusively for litigation from disclosure.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Williams · filed 1984-05-10(d)

The court agrees that decedent’s insurance carrier’s reports are not discoverable. ... Such material is exempt from disclosure by virtue of CPLR 3101 (subd [d]).

Section 3101(f) permits disclosure of insurance agreements that may satisfy a judgment, but does not require disclosure of a policy canceled before the accident.

Krogh v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1985-02-07(f)

Since plaintiff’s alleged fall occurred on December 19, 1980, the only relevant insurance is that contained in the policy issued by National Union. CPLR 3101 (f) clearly states that “[a] party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person * * * may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action”. Clearly, the insurer which issued the canceled Birmingham policy cannot be liable to satisfy any judgment entered against K-Mart.

Section 3101(f) does not apply to a demand for a plaintiff’s insurance coverage when that coverage is irrelevant to the case.

Cooky's Island Steak Pub, Inc. v. Yorkville Electric Co. · filed 1986-01-24(f)

Here, information regarding the plaintiff’s insurance coverage is of no relevance to this case. CPLR 3101 (f) is not applicable.

Section 3101(f) requires disclosure of other insurance policies that may provide coverage for a party’s liability in the action.

Sprague v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1986-05-05(f)

Special Term should also have directed Shaker to produce copies of any other insurance policies it possesses, which may provide insurance benefits to IBM for any damages that may be imposed against IBM in this action.

Section 3101(f) entitles a plaintiff to disclosure of the defendant’s insurance coverage limits.

Peterson v. Long · filed 1987-08-27(f)

The limits of insurance coverage which plaintiffs’ attorney sought is information to which he is entitled as a matter of statutory right.

Section 3101(f) permits a party to demand disclosure of insurance agreements and to compel a response to an unopposed demand.

Dunn v. Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children · filed 1989-01-11(f)

Finally, that branch of plaintiffs motion seeking to compel defendants to respond to plaintiffs demand for insurance agreements pursuant to CPLR 3101 (f) is granted in the absence of any opposition by defendants.

Section 3101(d)(2) protects a liability insurer’s files from disclosure as material prepared for litigation, whether created before or after suit begins, unless an exception applies.

Lamberson v. Village of Allegany · filed 1990-02-02(d)(2)

The files of a liability insurance carrier are deemed to be material prepared for litigation whether the material was prepared before or after suit commences and are protected from disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (2).

Section 3101(d)(2) requires a party seeking investigators’ reports made after an insurance claim is rejected to meet its burden for disclosure.

Friendship, Inc. v. Wu · filed 1995-10-16(d)(2)

Plaintiff served a demand for an authorization to obtain the entire claims file of defendants’ insurance company, including reports of independent investigators. ... Those made after a claim is rejected are not, unless a party can meet its burden under CPLR 3101(d) (2). Plaintiffs demand is over-broad and cannot be enforced.

Section 3101(d)(2) conditionally protects accident reports made to a liability insurer or attorney unless the requesting party cannot obtain a substantial equivalent by other means without undue hardship.

Recant v. Harwood · filed 1995-12-28(d)(2)

In any event, the applicable rule is that an accident report, made by a defendant to his liability insurance carrier or to his attorney with respect to a plaintiffs claim, is conditionally privileged, which is to say that it is immune from discovery unless it can be established that a substantial equivalent of the material cannot be obtained by other means without undue hardship (CPLR 3101 [d] [2]).

Section 3101(g) does not shield a defendant’s statement to the defendant’s insurance carrier from disclosure.

Meiliken v. Hart · filed 1999-05-03(g)

We agree with the Supreme Court that the statement of the defendant Patricia Hart to the defendants’ insurance carrier is not privileged from disclosure (see, CPLR 3101 [g]; Agovino v Taco Bell 5083, 225 AD2d 569).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of an insurer’s claim investigation materials prepared before it decides whether to pay or reject a claim when the materials are not primarily legal in character.

Advanced Chimney, Inc. v. Graziano · filed 2017-08-02(a)

Here, the Supreme Court properly compelled disclosure, as the material sought by GNY was prepared by KBR as part of Tudor’s investigation into the claim, and was not primarily and predominantly of a legal character (see Melworm v Encompass Indem. Co., 112 AD3d at 795; Bertalo’s Rest. v Exchange Ins. Co., 240 AD2d 452, 454 [1997]).

Section 3101(d)(2) conditionally protects accident statements given to a liability insurer unless the requesting party shows substantial need and cannot obtain their substantial equivalent without undue hardship.

Fusco v. Hansen · filed 2024-06-14(d)(2)

The statements sought in plaintiff's cross-motion constitute materials "produced solely in connection with the report of an accident to a liability insurance carrier . . . with respect to plaintiff's claim [that] are not discoverable under CPLR 3101 (g), but rather are conditionally immunized from discovery under CPLR 3101 (d) (2)" ( Beaumont v Smyth , 306 AD2d 921, 922 [4th Dept 2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally Johnson v Murphy , 121 AD3d 1589, 1590 [4th Dept 2014]). Plaintiff failed to establish either that he has a "substantial need of the materials" or that he is "unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means" (CPLR 3101 [d] [2]; see Color Dynamics, Inc. v Kemper Sys. Am., Inc. , 186 AD3d 1024, 1025-1026 [4th Dept 2020]; see generally Micro-Link, LLC v Town of Amherst , 155 AD3d 1638, 1643 [4th Dept 2017]).

Section 3101 allows disclosure of insurance claim records prepared in the ordinary course of evaluating claims unless the party resisting disclosure establishes a basis for protection.

Paul v. Davidson · filed 2025-02-14(d)

Here, many of the provided documents are related to the insurance claims and reflect insurers doing their business of evaluating claims.

Section 3101 permits discovery of accident reports prepared before suit and outside trial preparation, while work product is not subject to disclosure.

Bloom v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1964-02-04

Item 1 refers to the accident report or reports obtained prior to the institution of suit, and not made in preparation for trial, while items 6 and 7 refer to the reports of the accident prepared by the engineer and conductor, respectively, of defendant shortly after the accident. These are proper items for discovery. ... Items 2 and 3 may properly be considered work products and are not subject to disclosure.

CPLR 3101 permits discovery of accident reports obtained before suit and not prepared for trial.

Williams v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1964-07-09(d)

Among the records sought to be discovered are accident reports prepared by the Transit Authority and defendant driver of the bus which were obtained prior to the institution of suit and not in preparation for trial. ... These are proper items for discovery.

Section 3101 protects statements obtained to defend a claim, but allows disclosure of an employee’s accident investigation made in the regular course of employment.

Scheer v. City of Syracuse · filed 1964-02-21(d)(2)

Clearly, statements obtained by the defendant in preparation to defend against the claim, may not be inspected by the plaintiff. ... However, in the proper pretrial preparation of an action, reports and statements of defendant’s employees pertaining to an accident made in the regular course of their employment may be examined by the plaintiff.

Section 3101 does not permit discovery of a defendant’s statement to an insurance broker investigating the accident.

Ehrlich v. Kubis · filed 1965-04-19

In our opinion, the written statement which the individual defendant Edward Kubis gave to the insurance broker during the course of the latter’s investigation into the circumstances of the accident here involved is not available for discovery under CPLR 3101 (Fmegold v. Lewis, 22 A D 2d 447; Kcmdel v. Tocher, 22 A D 2d 513; Zamaglia v. Engert, 23 A D 2d 790).

Section 3101(a) permits discovery of an employee’s accident reports even if the reports themselves are inadmissible, unless the employer establishes an exception to disclosure.

Quirino v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1969-04-10(a)

This court finds, however, that the cases relied on by the defendant are no longer the law and that these reports are encompassed by CPLR 3101 (subd. [a]). Defendant fails to set forth any facts to demonstrate that they are privileged, constitute attorney’s work product or are material prepared for litigation.

Section 3101 permits discovery of an insurer’s investigation reports prepared in the ordinary course of handling a property damage claim.

Rodolitz v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance · filed 1975-07-07

The Finegold-Kandel rule applies only to liability insurance. (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3101:32, p. 36.) ... Plaintiff’s interrogatories seek to ascertain the basis of defendant’s defense through the reports and statements collected by expert investigators prepared in the ordinary course of business in the investigation of such type of large property damage losses. Here, the defendant was clearly gathering such material for its own benefit and not as a representative of the insured; therefore, discovery is allowed (Collins v Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Misc 2d 964, 967).

Section 3101 permits disclosure of casualty-policy investigation reports when the party resisting disclosure has not shown they are privileged litigation materials or protected work product.

C & H Refining Co. v. Holmes Protection, Inc. · filed 1976-09-23

Plaintiff’s contention that the documents in question are protected from disclosure must be rejected. Plaintiff has not shown that these are privileged documents especially prepared for litigation or that they are protected work products. (See CPLR 3101.) Rather they are reports and papers resulting from an investigation under a casualty policy following the burglary of plaintiffs premises and are discoverable.

CPLR 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business, even if they may also be used to prepare for litigation.

Chaplin v. Pathmark Supermarkets · filed 1980-12-22(g)

So, if the accident report is prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices the report is discoverable and it is no longer necessary for the courts to hold hearings to determine “its use and intended use”.

Section 3101(d)(2) protects material prepared for litigation, but an employer’s accident report may be disclosed if its use or intended use extends beyond litigation.

Carlo v. Queens Transit Corp. · filed 1980-06-02(d)(2)

Thus, the simple fact that a report is submitted to an employer is not dispositive of its nature as privileged material. Its use and intended use, which are issues of fact, will be determinative.

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business, even when they were prepared exclusively for litigation.

Pataki v. Kiseda · filed 1981-04-13(g)

The answer, in our view, is that when subdivision (d) (par 2) and subdivision (g) come in direct conflict, subdivision (g) is to be controlling. All accident reports, whether or not prepared exclusively in preparation for litigation, are discoverable.

Written accident reports prepared in the regular course of business are subject to disclosure.

Vavallo v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1981-08-31(g)

Written accident reports prepared in the regular course of business are subject to disclosure (see CPLR 3101, subd [g]; Pataki v Kiseda, 80 AD2d 100).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared for multiple purposes, while reports prepared solely for litigation remain protected.

Ellis v. County of Broome · filed 1981-12-30(g)

Viewing the addition of CPLR 3101 (subd [g]) in the light of the legislative purpose now revealed through publication of the memorandum accompanying the bill (Matter of Fisher v New York State Employees’ Retirement System, 279 App Div 315, 318, affd 304 NY 899), we conclude that it was the intent of the Legislature, upon its adoption, to codify existing case law. As a consequence, we apply the views expressed by the court in Carlo v Queens Tr. Corp. (supra) prior to amendment to determine whether the accident reports sought here — or some of them — were “multimotivated” and therefore subject to disclosure, or whether they were prepared solely for litigation, and thus privileged.

Section 3101(g) does not require disclosure of a party’s accident report given to a liability insurer.

Masters v. Hassenpflug · filed 1981-10-06(g)

Addressing the issue raised by this motion, the court holds that the enactment of CPLR 3101 (subd [g]) was not intended to subject to discovery a party’s report of an accident given to his liability insurer, and such accident reports retain the privilege accorded by decisional law.

Subdivision (g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business, even where subdivision (d) would otherwise protect materials prepared for litigation.

Andrews v. Regional Transit Service · filed 1982-05-21(g)

The trial court erred in prohibiting disclosure and use of the accident report prepared by defendant’s safety officer. CPLR 3101 was amended in 1980 to add a new subdivision (g) which provides that: “Except as is otherwise provided by law, in addition to any other matter which may be subject to disclosure, there shall be full disclosure of any written report of an accident prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices of any person, firm, corporation, association, or other public or private entity, unless prepared by a police or peace officer for a criminal investigation or prosecution and disclosure would interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution” (CPLR 3101, subd [g], L 1980, ch 283, eff Sept. 1, 1980).

Section 3101(g) makes a written statement describing the facts of an accident discoverable as a report prepared in the regular course of business, whether furnished to an employer or an insurance carrier.

Montag v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n · filed 1982-07-29(g)

However, a written statement which relates the facts of an accident is subject to discovery within the limitations of CPLR 3101 (subd [g]) whether furnished to the employer or the insurance carrier and shall be considered in either case a report prepared in the regular course of business.

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business even when prepared exclusively for litigation.

Louis v. All City Elevator, Inc. · filed 1982-09-09(g)

Consequently, any written accident report prepared in the regular course of business, not for use in a criminal investigation is subject to full disclosure notwithstanding that it was prepared exclusively for use in litigation.

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business even if they were prepared for litigation, subject to its criminal investigation exception.

Smith v. Young · filed 1982-10-16(g)

Read together, the two subdivisions proclaim: “Materials prepared for litigation are not obtainable, except for [noncriminal] accident reports prepared in the regular course of business.”

CPLR 3101(d) protects an accident report only if it was prepared exclusively for litigation; a report made for multiple purposes is not immune from disclosure.

Vandenburgh v. Columbia Memorial Hospital · filed 1982-12-02(d)

An additional reason which compels our affirmance of the order is that defendant has failed to demonstrate that the subject report falls within the privilege conferred by CPLR 3101 (subd [d]) as a report prepared exclusively for litigation (Koump v Smith, 25 NY2d 287; Zimmerman v Nassau Hosp., 76 AD2d 921; Carlo v Queens Tr. Corp., 76 AD2d 824). It is not unreasonable to conclude that the report was “multi-motived”, thereby not warranting immunity (Chaplin v Pathmark Supermarkets, 107 Misc 2d 541, 542; Siegel, New York Practice, § 348, p 430).

Section 3101(g) does not require disclosure of an accident report prepared exclusively for litigation; subdivision (d)(2) protects it from disclosure.

Harris v. Processed Wood, Inc. · filed 1982-10-29(d)(2), (g)

Clearly the decisional law that existed when subdivision (g) was proposed, exempted from disclosure reports prepared exclusively for litigation.

Section 3101(d)(2) does not exempt a report from disclosure when it was prepared both to evaluate an insurance claim and for possible litigation.

Hawley v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · filed 1982-10-29(d)(2)

Mixed purpose reports are not exempt from disclosure under CPLR 3101 (subd [d], par 2) (New England Seafoods of Amherst v Travelers Cos., 84 AD2d 676; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3101:38, p 42).

Section 3101(g) permits disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business, but does not remove the conditional protection for reports made to a liability insurer.

Vernet v. Gilbert · filed 1982-11-29(g)

There is a sharp distinction to be recognized between accident reports which result from the regular internal operations of any enterprise, authority or business, and those which are made or produced in connection with the report of an accident to a liability insurer. There is no indication that the Legislature, in enacting CPLR 3101 (subd [g]) intended to obviate the long-standing decisional rule applicable in the latter instance.

Section 3101(g) does not make a party’s accident report to a liability insurer or attorney discoverable.

Weiser v. Krakowski · filed 1982-11-29(g)

The enactment of CPLR 3101 (subd [g]), was not intended to subject to discovery the report of an accident given by a party to his liability insurer or his attorney.

Section 3101(g) makes employee accident reports prepared in the regular course of business discoverable even when intended solely for litigation.

Stein v. Trump Village Section No. 4, Inc. · filed 1983-03-22(g)

Reports made by the defendant’s employees of an accident, even after the spectre of litigation has arisen, are reports taken in the regular operation of business and will be available for discovery. This is so whether or not that report is to be used solely for defense litigation (Pataki v Kiseda, supra; Chaplin v Pathmark Supermarkets, 107 Misc 2d 541).

Section 3101(g) leaves accident reports prepared for an insurer conditionally exempt from discovery.

Vogl v. Joyce Kilmer Realty Corp. · filed 1983-04-06(g)

Accordingly, in this department at least, accident reports prepared for an insurer are conditionally exempt from discovery.

Section 3101(g) permits discovery of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business.

Viruet v. City of New York · filed 1983-10-11(g)

On the record before us, Special Term correctly concluded that the accident reports were prepared as a result of the regular business operations of defendant Tufaro Transit Co., Inc. As such, the reports are discoverable under CPLR 3101 (subd [g]) (see Pataki v Kiseda, supra).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of a routine accident report unless the company shows it was prepared exclusively for its insurer and used for no other business purpose.

Blasi v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1983-10-25(g)

This court holds instead that a company which has a regular reporting practice carries the burden of showing that an accident report was made exclusively for the insurer, and not for any other business purpose.

Section 3101(g) makes an employee’s accident report discoverable when it was prepared in the regular course of the corporation’s business operations or practices.

Matos v. Akram & Jamal Meat Corp. · filed 1984-01-23(g)

Not all written statements about an accident by an employee of a corporate defendant are discoverable pursuant to CPLR 3101 (subd [g]). To be discoverable the accident report must have been “prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices of [the] * * * corporation” (CPLR 3101, subd [g]).

Accident reports made to a liability insurer are conditionally exempt from disclosure as litigation materials under subdivision (d); subdivision (g) does not remove that protection.

Schneider v. Schneider · filed 1983-05-02(d), (g)

Any written reports which may have been made by the defendant to his liability carrier and/or its representatives with respect to the underlying claim, constitute, at the minimum, materials prepared for litigation and are conditionally exempt from disclosure under CPLR 3101 (subd [d]) ... There is a sharp distinction to be recognized between accident reports which result from the regular internal operations of any enterprise, authority or business, and those which are made or produced in connection with the report of an accident to a liability insurer. There is no indication that the Legislature, in enacting CPLR 3101 (subd [g]), intended to obviate the long-standing decisional rule applicable in the latter instance.

Section 3101(d) does not exempt reports prepared in the ordinary course of an insurer’s business from discovery merely because litigation was also a motive.

Westhampton Adult Home, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh Pa. · filed 1984-11-13(d)

It is clear that these reports were prepared, at least in part, to assist the defendants in determining whether to accept or reject plaintiff’s claim and to evaluate the extent of plaintiff’s loss. Material such as this, prepared in the ordinary course of business, is not entitled to exemption from discovery.

Section 3101(g) does not require disclosure of an accident report prepared solely at counsel’s request for counsel’s use, outside the regular course of business.

Goldstein v. News York Daily News · filed 1984-12-18(g)

The report is not rendered subject to disclosure by CPLR 3101 (subd [g]). ... This report was not prepared in “the regular course of business Operations or practices” of the News, but only at the request of its attorneys for the use of the attorneys.

Section 3101(d) permits disclosure of an expert’s factual observations when the evidence can no longer be duplicated and withholding them would cause hardship, but does not require disclosure of the expert’s opinions in those circumstances.

Anastasia v. Barnes · filed 1985-03-11(d)

Rather, only the factual data contained therein, and not the opinions of plaintiff’s expert, need be revealed, because it is only the former that can no longer be duplicated by reason of the unavailability of the subject vehicle for the movants’ inspection (see, Terwilliger v Leach Co., supra; see also, Ortung Piano & Organ Co. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 75 AD2d 845).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of an accident report prepared in the regular course of business when the party resisting disclosure fails to show it was prepared exclusively for litigation.

Ruff v. Golub Corp. · filed 1985-07-22(g)

The accident report is, therefore, subject to disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (g) and Golub has failed to sustain its burden to demonstrate that the report was prepared exclusively for litigation so as to be immune from disclosure under CPLR 3101 (d) (2) (see, Graf v Aldrich, 94 AD2d 823, 824).

Section 3101(g) permits disclosure of an accident report prepared in the regular course of business even if it was made solely for litigation.

Miranda v. Blair Tool & Machine Corp. · filed 1985-11-18(g)

Taken together, the effect of the two subdivisions is to authorize disclosure of an accident report made in the regular course of business even if it is made solely for purposes of litigation (Pataki v Kiseda, 80 AD2d 100, lv dismissed 54 NY2d 831; Matos v Akram & Jamal Meat Corp., 99 AD2d 527; Viruet v City of New York, 97 AD2d 435).

Section 3101(g) covers formalized accounts of accidents, but does not require disclosure of an attorney’s informal notes evaluating a possible criminal prosecution.

Martinez v. State · filed 1985-06-14(g)

Finally, we observe that the items in question are not subject to disclosure under CPLR 3101 (g) dealing with “any written report of an accident” generally, or that of “a police or peace officer”. For the purposes of this statute, the word “report” should be deemed to mean that the-document in question be a formalized account of an event recorded in an organized fashion. The cryptic impressions, observations and notes made by an attorney in the process of evaluating a possible criminal prosecution do not come within its purview.

Section 3101(g) permits discovery of written accident reports prepared in the regular course of business.

D'Alessio v. Nabisco, Inc. · filed 1986-10-27(g)

Further, with respect to those items which sought discovery of information with respect to the defendant Nabisco’s postaccident investigation, it is clear that any written report of an accident prepared in the regular course of business is properly discoverable (CPLR 3101 [g]; Vernet v Gilbert, 90 AD2d 846).

Section 3101(g) permits disclosure of accident reports when the party claiming an exemption under subsection (d) fails to establish it.

Schreiner v. Long Island Lighting Co. · filed 1986-11-03(g)

We find, as did Special Term, that the information encompassed in items Nos. 11 and 12 of the plaintiffs’ notice for discovery and inspection is subject to disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (g). ... LILCO has simply failed to sustain its burden of demonstrating that the reports prepared by employees of its claims department immediately following the accident, and long before any lawsuit was commenced, constitute material which remains immune from disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d).

Section 3101(g) does not require disclosure of reports prepared solely in anticipation of litigation rather than in the regular course of business.

Berliner v. Thompson · filed 1987-03-30(g)

The court has received no factual demonstration by way of affidavit that the reports were submitted for more than one purpose, as preparation for litigation. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot rely upon CPLR 3101 (g) or upon the "multi-motivated” report exception to the immunity rule.

Section 3101(d)(2) does not protect an insurer’s investigation reports from disclosure when they were prepared both to evaluate a claim and in anticipation of litigation.

Landmark Insurance v. Beau Rivage Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1986-12-22(d)(2)

Since mixed purpose reports are not exempt from disclosure under CPLR 3101 (d) (2) ... the reports of the adjuster and arson investigator are subject to disclosure.

Section 3101(d)(2) protects a liability insurer’s investigation prepared in contemplation of litigation unless the requesting party shows substantial need and undue hardship, even if the claim has not yet been rejected.

DiNova v. Sunnyview Hospital & Rehabilitation Center · filed 1987-06-17(d)(2)

A review of court exhibit A clearly establishes that the investigation at issue was made by the defendant’s liability insurer in contemplation of litigation. Such investigation was not undertaken by the defendant as part of its ordinary business routine. The fact that the plaintiffs had not made a formal claim or that their claim had not been rejected are of no significance in this situation. The plaintiffs are clearly not entitled to the product of the investigation of defendant’s insurer without establishing a requisite showing of substantial need and undue hardship required by CPLR 3101 (d) (2). No such showing has been tendered.

Section 3101(g) permits discovery of an accident report made under a routine reporting policy when the party resisting disclosure fails to show it was prepared exclusively for litigation.

McKie v. Taylor · filed 1989-01-19(g)

As such, we consider the report discoverable within the ambit of CPLR 3101 (g) (see, Merrick v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 144 AD2d 878; Vandenburgh v Columbia Mem. Hosp., 91 AD2d 710, 711).

Accident reports prepared in the regular course of business are discoverable even if prepared solely for litigation.

Crazytown Furniture, Inc. v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. · filed 1988-12-29(d)(2), (g)

Taken together, the effect of CPLR 3101 (d) (2) and 3101 (g) is to authorize the disclosure of an accident report made in the regular course of business even if it has been made solely for purposes of litigation (Miranda v Blair Tool & Mach. Corp., 114 AD2d 941, 942; Pataki v Kiseda, 80 AD2d 100, Iv dismissed 54 NY2d 831).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business when they were motivated at least in part by a business concern other than litigation.

Calkins v. Perry · filed 1990-12-21(g)

Conversely, there must be full disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business that were motivated at least in part by a business concern other than preparation for litigation (see, Harris v Processed Wood, 89 AD2d 220, 222).

Section 3101(g) makes an accident report prepared in the regular course of a defendant’s business subject to disclosure.

Friedman v. Thruway Super Duper, Inc. · filed 1993-02-05(g)

Although an accident report prepared in the regular course of defendant’s business operations is subject to disclosure (see, CPLR 3101 [g]), defendant advised the court that a report of the alleged accident did not exist.

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business unless the party withholding them shows they were prepared exclusively for litigation.

Moore v. Cayuga Bulk Service, Inc. · filed 1993-12-29(g)

Third-party defendants are entitled to disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business (CPLR 3101 [g]), unless third-party plaintiffs demonstrate that the reports were prepared exclusively for purposes of litigation (see, Calkins v Perry, 168 AD2d 999; Harris v Processed Wood, 89 AD2d 220).

Section 3101(g) makes accident reports prepared in the regular course of business discoverable even when made solely for litigation.

Vivitorian Corp. v. First Central Insurance · filed 1994-04-18(g)

Pursuant to CPLR 3101 (g), accident reports prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices are discoverable, even if made solely for the purpose of litigation (see, Crazy-town Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., supra; Miranda v Blair Tool & Mach. Corp., 114 AD2d 941; Pataki v Kiseda, 80 AD2d 100).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of an accident report prepared in the ordinary course of business when the party withholding it fails to show it was prepared solely for litigation.

Davis v. Wilson Farms, Inc. · filed 1993-10-01(g)

Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant to disclose an accident report prepared by defendant’s employees and forwarded to the Risks Management Department of defendant’s parent company. The accident report was prepared in the ordinary course of defendant’s business (CPLR 3101 [g]) and defendant failed to prove that the report was not "motivated at least in part by a business concern other than preparation for litigation” (Cal-kins v Perry, 168 AD2d 999; see also, Harris v Processed Wood, 89 AD2d 220, 222).

Section 3101(g) requires full disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business when they were motivated at least in part by a business concern other than litigation.

Wylie v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1993-11-19(g)

Thus, "there must be full disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business that were motivated at least in part by a business concern other than preparation for litigation” (Calkins v Perry, 168 AD2d 999; see, Harris v Processed Wood, 89 AD2d 220, 222).

Section 3101 requires disclosure of investigative reports when the party resisting disclosure fails to show they were prepared solely in anticipation of litigation rather than in the regular course of business.

Galyas v. Giordano · filed 1997-07-28(d)(2); (g)

BUG failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the reports were not prepared in the regular course of business but were prepared solely in anticipation of litigation (see, Vivitorian Corp. v First Cent. Ins. Co., 203 AD2d 452; Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 145 AD2d 402; CPLR 3101 [d] [2]; [g]; see also, Agovino v Taco Bell 5083, 225 AD2d 569).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of an accident report prepared in the regular course of business when its preparation was motivated at least in part by a business concern other than litigation.

Blakesley v. State · filed 1997-11-19(g)

The accident report was prepared in the regular course of business of the DOT (see, CPLR 3101 [g]), and defendant failed to establish that the report was not “motivated at least in part by a business concern other than preparation for litigation” (Calkins v Perry, 168 AD2d 999).

Section 3101 permits discovery of reports of prior similar accidents in a negligence action when they are relevant to a dangerous condition and the defendant’s notice of it.

Coan v. Long Island Rail Road · filed 1998-01-20(a), (g)

CPLR 3101 (a) requires “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action”. This includes written accident reports prepared in the regular course of business (see, CPLR 3101 [g]). Records of prior similar accidents are admissible and discoverable in a negligence action since they are relevant in establishing that a particular condition was dangerous and that the defendant had notice of that condition (see, Klatz v Armor El. Co., 93 AD2d 633, 637-638; Lestingi v City of New York, 209 AD2d 384, 385; Taylor v Doe, 167 AD2d 984).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of records of prior similar accidents when they may show notice of a dangerous condition.

Hall v. 130-10 Food Corp. · filed 1998-10-01(a)

The sought-after discovery material, documentation of prior accidents similar to that at issue here, should have been granted. It was relevant in this negligence action to establish that third-party defendant had notice of a particular, dangerous condition (Coan v Long Is. R. R., 246 AD2d 569).

Section 3101(g) entitles a party to disclosure of incident reports prepared in the regular course of business.

Culbert v. City of New York · filed 1998-10-19(g)

With respect to the material demanded in item numbered 6, the plaintiffs are entitled to disclosure of any written reports of the incident in question prepared by the defendants in the regular course of business (see, CPLR 3101 [g]).

Section 3101 requires production of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business when the party resisting disclosure fails to establish that they were prepared exclusively in anticipation of litigation.

Tenebruso v. Toys "R" Us—NYTEX, Inc. · filed 1998-12-31(d)(2), (g)

The court further erred in denying that part of plaintiffs’ cross motion to compel production of accident reports concerning this incident that were prepared in the regular course of defendant’s business.

Section 3101(g) requires full disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business; failure to disclose may justify sanctions, including limits on using the withheld evidence at trial.

Kriesel v. May Department Stores Co. · filed 1999-05-07(g)

CPLR 3101 (g) provides that “there shall be full disclosure of any written report of an accident prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices”. The failure to comply with that section may result in sanctions to the withholding party, which may include precluding the nondisclosing party from using the evidence in any manner during the trial (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Northway Eng’g v Felix Indus., 77 NY2d 332, 335). We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in redacting those words under the circumstances herein (see, Xerox Corp. v Town of Webster, 206 AD2d 935; PCB Piezotronics v Change, 163 AD2d 829), and that a new trial of all issues is not required.

Section 3101(g) permits disclosure of accident reports prepared in the regular course of business, even if made solely for litigation.

Powell v. County of Westchester · filed 2000-02-07(g)

The plaintiff is entitled to disclosure of the “witness/courtesy” cards which were collected by the defendant bus driver, Richard A. Lauricella, from passengers following the accident in which the plaintiff was allegedly injured. Lauricella collected the cards in the regular course of his business as a bus driver for the defendant Liberty Lines Transit, Inc. “Pursuant to CPLR 3101 (g), accident reports prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices are discoverable, even if made solely for the purpose of litigation” (Vivitorian Corp. v First Cent. Ins. Co., 203 AD2d 452, 453; Culbert v City of New York, 254 AD2d 385).

Section 3101(g) permits discovery of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of investigative duties even when preparation for litigation was also a purpose.

State v. Sand & Stone Associates · filed 2001-04-26(g)

De Cicco’s affidavit does not exclude the possibility that these documents constitute or include accident reports prepared in the normal course of DEC’s investigative duties, and would be discoverable pursuant to CPLR 3101 (g) even though one of their purposes was preparation for litigation (see, McKie v Taylor, 146 AD2d 921, 922; Merrick v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 144 AD2d 878, 878-879; see also, Recant v Harwood, 222 AD2d 372, 373-374).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business; reports prepared in anticipation of litigation receive conditional protection under section 3101(d)(2).

Beaumont v. Smyth · filed 2003-06-13(g)

Upon our in camera review of that report, we conclude that it was not “prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices of’ Fed Ex (CPLR 3101 [g]), but rather was “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial” (3101 [d] [2]).

Section 3101(g) requires disclosure of written accident reports prepared in the regular course of business, even when prepared for litigation.

Jacaruso v. Keyspan Energy Corp. · filed 2013-08-21(g)

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to compel BUG to disclose the written post-accident statements made by Smith and Hunter. CPLR 3101 (g) provides, in relevant part, that “there shall be full disclosure of any written report of an accident prepared in the regular course of business operations of any person, firm, corporation, association or other public or private entity . . . .”

Section 3101(a) does not require disclosure of prior accident reports that are irrelevant to the negligence claim pleaded.

Schonbrun v. DeLuke · filed 2018-04-05(a)

Furthermore, the prior accident reports at issue "[are] not otherwise relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to evidence relevant to the issue of [Morin]'s purported negligence" ... Consequently, plaintiff's motion to compel disclosure of the prior accident reports should have been denied.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of prior school assault reports when they may show that school officials had notice of similar conduct.

M.C. v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-05(a)

Pursuant to CPLR 3101(a), "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution . . . of an action." ... Thus, reports of prior incidents at a school may be material and necessary to determine whether school officials had actual or constructive notice of conduct similar to the subject incident ( see Culbert v City of New York , 254 AD2d 385, 388). We disagree with the Supreme Court's determination that the defendants were only required to provide records pertaining to "assaults of a sexual nature" and "all assaults of any nature between" the infant plaintiff and the student alleged to have sexually assaulted the infant plaintiff.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of information about a physician’s prior patient injuries that is material to a negligent credentialing claim and was acquired outside protected credentialing and quality assurance processes.

Crysler v. Erk · filed 2024-05-03(a)

With respect to appeal No. 2, it is well settled that "there shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action" (CPLR 3101 [a]). ... While Public Health Law § 2805-m and Education Law § 6527 (3) protect from disclosure the proceedings and records relating to Kaleida Health's quality assurance and medical malpractice prevention program, which include its credentialing and recredentialing process, "[t]here are many ways in which [a] hospital might have acquired knowledge of the alleged prior negligence of [a] defendant doctor wholly apart from any review committee meeting [and] [s]uch information is discoverable by [a] plaintiff as is information as to whether, armed with such knowledge, the hospital took any action to limit staff privileges extended to" the defendant doctor ( Byork v Carmer , 109 AD2d 1087, 1088 [4th Dept 1985]; cf . Jousma v Kolli , 149 AD3d 1520, 1521 [4th Dept 2017]). ... Contrary to defendants' contention, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying that part of their reargument motion seeking, upon reargument, a protective order imposing additional restrictions upon the deposition of a Kaleida Health representative with respect to prior incidents and complaints involving injuries to patients as a result of operations performed by Erk.

Section 3101(d)(2) requires a party claiming trial preparation protection to show that the documents were prepared primarily in anticipation of litigation.

Urban v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. · filed 2026-05-14(d)(2)

The Marist Brothers failed to show that documents summarizing and memorializing reports of abuse against the Brother were prepared primarily in anticipation of litigation (see CPLR 3101[d][2]; James v Metro N. Commuter R.R., 166 AD2d 266, 268 [1st Dept 1990]).

Section 3101(d) permits discovery of a laboratory report prepared for litigation when the opposing party cannot conduct a comparable test, subject to production of the tested item instead.

Sherman v. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. · filed 1964-04-28(d)

“In the opinion of the court the laboratory report constitutes material prepared fof litigation (CPLR 3101, subd. [d]) and not the work product of an attorney.” ... Assuming, as plaintiffs contend, that the pair purchased by plaintiff Ernest Sherman is similar to the original one, the affidavit of defendant Company’s president, submitted on this motion, is sufficient to demonstrate its inability to conduct laboratory tests upon similar pairs of pajamas. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to vacate defendant Company’s notice is granted to the extent of modifying it as follows: Plaintiffs shall produce the pair of pajamas tested for inspection, as well as furnish upon request a portion thereof to defendant Company unless plaintiffs produce a copy of their laboratory report for discovery. In the event plaintiffs no longer have the pair of pajamas tested, they shall produce a copy of the laboratory report for discovery.

Section 3101(d) can protect material prepared for earlier litigation from disclosure in a later action.

Frey v. First National Bank · filed 1964-05-06(d)

While the material sought was prepared not in this action but in the bankruptcy proceeding it is equally if not more confidential in this action than in the prior proceeding as here not only solvency but also malice and probable cause are issues.

Section 3101(d) protects material prepared for litigation from discovery unless it can no longer be duplicated and withholding it would cause hardship or injustice.

Renwal Products, Inc. v. Kleen-Stik Products, Inc. · filed 1964-06-22(d)

All of these cases, however, were decided before the effective date of CPLR 3101 (subd. [d]) which grants immunity to material prepared for litigation unless it be shown that the material is no longer duplicable and withholding it would cause hardship or injustice. Defendant is free to conduct its own tests and the fact that it is a smaller company than plaintiff and would like to avoid the expense of its own tests is not a sufficient showing of hardship.

Section 3101 protects an insurer’s accident investigation report prepared for litigation unless withholding it would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Maiden v. Aid Carpet Service, Inc. · filed 1964-07-29

On the basis of that legislative history, the court concludes that plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of the investigation report of defendant’s insurance carrier unless withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship.

Section 3101 protects an insured’s statement to a liability insurer prepared for litigation unless changed conditions prevent its duplication and withholding it would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Braxton v. Batey · filed 1964-09-18(d)(2)

As material prepared for litigation, the statement is not obtainable unless the court finds that the material can no longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and that withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship. (CPLR 3101, subd. [d].) Such is not the case here.

Section 3101(d) permits disclosure of material prepared for litigation when changed conditions prevent its duplication and withholding it would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Montgomery Ward Co. v. City of Lockport · filed 1964-12-30(d)

However, the court finds that the “ limited privilege ” granted the said report no longer exists since the material can no longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and that withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship.

Section 3101(d) permits disclosure of material prepared for litigation when changed conditions prevent duplication and withholding it would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Baczmaga v. Reynolds · filed 1965-01-02(d)

The cause before the court appears to fall clearly within the provision granting disclosure of material prepared for litigation where the same can no longer be duplicated because of a change of conditions and where the withholding of the same will result in injustice or undue hardship (CPLR 3101, suibd. [d]).

Section 3101(d)(2) protects an insured’s statement to his insurer when made in preparation for litigation, even if the statement predates the lawsuit.

Finegold v. Lewis · filed 1965-02-01(d)(2)

The statement is not available for discovery under the statute (CPLR 3101). The statement was given by an insured to his insurer, who is a defendant in a very real sense, as part of the latter’s preparation for trial, should a trial ensue. The relative dates of the delivery of the statement and of the commencement of the action are immaterial.

Section 3101(d) conditionally protects accident reports and statements prepared for an automobile liability insurer in anticipation of litigation unless the required showing of hardship is made.

Kandel v. Tocher · filed 1965-03-04(d)

The order should be reversed and the motion for a protective order granted. The material sought is material prepared for litigation conditionally excepted by subdivision (d) of CPLB 3101 and may even be privileged under subdivision (b) or excluded as an attorney’s work product under subdivision (c) of that section.

Section 3101(d)(2) permits disclosure of accident-scene photographs prepared for litigation when the scene cannot be duplicated and withholding the photographs would cause injustice.

Reese v. Railroad · filed 1965-03-29(d)(2)

Viewed from the standpoint of material prepared for litigation which enjoys a limited privilege (CPLR 3101, subd. [d], par. 2), the photographs should be made available to the plaintiff. The photographs are of'the accident scene, a sétting which obviously cannot be duplicated.

Section 3101(d) excepts an engineer’s report prepared for litigation from disclosure.

Silberberg v. Hotpoint Division of General Electric Co. · filed 1965-04-29(d)

That this report was prepared for litigation is too clear for discussion. So likewise is it clear that it is excepted from disclosure (CPLR 3101, subd. [d]).

Section 3101(d)(2) protects a defendant’s reports to an insurer and witness statements obtained by the insurer as material prepared for litigation, even if obtained before the action began.

Zavaglia v. Engert · filed 1965-04-19(d)(2)

Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of reports by a defendant to his insurance carrier or of statements obtained by the carrier from witnesses, even though they were obtained prior to the commencement of the action; such reports and statements are material prepared for litigation (Finegold v. Lewis, 22 A D 2d 447; Kandel v. Tocher, 22 A D 2d 513; Ehrlich v. Kubis, 23 A D 2d 782; CPLR 3101, subd. [d], par. 2). Nor is there any showing here that the material in question can no longer be duplicated and that withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship.

Section 3101(d) exempts material prepared for litigation from disclosure.

Donnelly v. County of Nassau · filed 1965-06-02(d)

Under the circumstances of this case these writings correspond, respectively, to reports made to an insurance carrier under a liability policy by an insured and by an investigator, and are therefore exempted from disclosure under CPLR 3101 (subd. [d]) as material prepared for litigation (Finegold v. Lewis, 22 A D 2d 447; Kandel v. Tocher, 22 A D 2d 513).

Section 3101(d)(2) protects materials created for a party in preparation for litigation, but an accident report made in the regular course of a public carrier’s business is not protected merely because it is sent to counsel.

O'Neill v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority · filed 1965-09-07(d)(2)

The question is whether in fact it was made as an internal business report in the regular course of business of the public carrier (with possible use in eventual litigation, that may ensue) or if in fact it was made in preparation for litigation. ... No sufficient proof has been adduced by defendant that the report in this case was in fact prepared for litigation. ... It appears to be nothing more than a report prepared by the defendant’s employee in the regular course of his employment in the regular course of defendant’s business. ... The mere fact that it is forwarded to defendant’s counsel, “ to the legal representative of a potential defendant,” and not to the Authority is not sufficient reason for distinguishing this case from the holding of the Appellate Division, First Department, in Bloom v. New York City Tr. Auth. (supra).

Section 3101(d) permits disclosure of materials prepared for litigation when they can no longer be duplicated.

Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 3 v. Ace Test Boring, Inc. · filed 1965-09-23(d)

In any event, the report and pictures can no longer be duplicated and so are excepted from the statutory provision relating to the nondisclosure of such materials anyway (CPLR 3101, subd. [d]; Baczmaga v. Reynolds, 44 Misc 2d 997).

Section 3101(d)(2) protects a report prepared by a party or its agent for litigation from discovery and inspection.

Gunther v. Roaman's, Inc. · filed 1965-10-14(d)(2)

Under the decisions in Kandel v. Tocher (22 A D 2d 513) and Finegold v. Lewis (22 A D 2d 447) such a report must be considered as a writing created for or by a party or his agent in preparation for litigation pursuant to CPLR 3101 (subd. [d], par. 2).

Section 3101(d) does not protect a passenger's identity as material prepared for litigation when the passenger's presence was unrelated to trial preparation.

Spano v. Fralick · filed 1965-11-12(d)

This is not a question which could be properly called a ‘ ‘ fishing-expedition ” nor is it “ material prepared for litigation ” since the passenger’s presence in the automobile was not in any way part of the preparation for the trial of the action.

Section 3101(d) protects material prepared for litigation until it can no longer be duplicated because of changed conditions and withholding it would cause injustice and undue hardship.

Parker v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1965-12-30(d)

In our view, these statements are material prepared for litigation and therefore must be withheld until it is shown that such material can no longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and that withholding it will result in injustice and undue hardships (CPLR 3101, subd. [d]).

Section 3101(d) conditionally protects litigation preparation materials unless they can no longer be duplicated and withholding them would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Meadow Brook National Bank v. Lerner · filed 1966-01-10(d)

Until defendant, if so advised, attempts to pursue his right to examine the person who prepared the memorandum he will be unable to show that the material contained therein can no longer be duplicated, whether because of the absence of the witness, failure to remember, or some other reason. Without this showing, defendant cannot satisfy the first requirement for obtaining conditionally protected material under CPLR 3101 (subd. [d]) (see Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc 2d 757).

Section 3101(d) protects material prepared for litigation from disclosure unless changed conditions make it impossible to duplicate and withholding it would cause injustice or undue hardship.

Ruggeiro v. Board of Education · filed 1966-03-16(d)

CPLR 3101 (subd. [d]), provides that material created by or for a party or his agent in preparation for litigation shall not be obtainable unless the court finds that the material can no longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and that withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship. ... It is the opinion of this court that although CPLR 3101 commences with a mandate of full disclosure, the statute specifically excludes material prepared for litigation, except under special circumstances as stated therein.

Section 3101(d)(2) protects materials prepared for the current litigation but does not immunize materials prepared for prior litigation from disclosure.

Bennett v. Troy Record Co. · filed 1966-04-29(d)(2)

The statute itself, CPDR 3101 (subd. [d], par. 2) which grants immunity to “any writing or anything created by or for a party or his agent in preparation for litigation” does not prohibit discovery of material relating to previous claims. In our opinion, the phrase “in preparation for litigation” refers exclusively to the instant litigation and does not grant immunity from disclosure to material prepared for prior litigation.

Section 3101 requires disclosure of material and necessary information while protecting materials prepared for litigation.

Linton v. Lehigh Valley Railroad · filed 1966-05-06(a), (d)

There is no showing that these reports were material prepared for litigation (Kandel v. Tocher, 22 A D 2d 513; CPLR 3101, subd. [d]). ... Both reports (item 7 and item 8) sought by plaintiff may show the existence of a condition requiring repair (see Annino v. City of Utica, 276 N. Y. 192) and therefore be deemed “ material and necessary ” within the meaning of CPLR 3101 (subd. [a]).

Section 3101 protects attorney work product and materials prepared solely for litigation, but does not protect regular business records or employee accident reports made in the regular course of business.

Weisgold v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc. · filed 1966-08-01(c), (d)

Where an accident report made by an employee to his employer in the regular course of business is also designed to provide information in case of possible litigation, it should be deemed to be in the former category for disclosure purposes so as to be available for disclosure regardless of the provisions of CPLR 3101 (subd. [d]) (Kandel v. Tocher, 22 A D 2d 513, 515-516, 516-517, supra-, Supplementary Practice Commentary by Professor Siegel, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 7B, CPLR, pp. 12-13,1965 cumulative pocket part; 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 3101.50).