N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101

Section 3101(a) does not require disclosure of information about an unrelated transaction between nonparties when its relevance to the case has not been shown.

First Commerce Bank v. B&T Hillel, LLC · filed 2025-09-10(a)

B & T failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that its demands for discovery, which related to a sale transaction between nonparties involving property not at issue in this case, were relevant to this case within the meaning of CPLR 3101(a) ( see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Wentworth , 211 AD3d at 686).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of nonparty employees’ qualifications, certifications, and training relevant to the patient’s care, but does not require production of their complete personnel files when the demand is overbroad and seeks protected information.

Feng v. Wong · filed 2026-03-11(a)

ORDERED that that Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted only to the extent that, within thirty (30) days of service of this Order with Notice of Entry, Defendants shall produce documentation limited to the qualifications, certifications, and specialized training of non-parties Karen Zhang and Emily Chang specifically pertaining to post-anesthesia monitoring and patient supervision as of August 29, 2020 (CPLR 3101 (a); see Allen v Crowell-Collier Pub!. Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]; D'Alessio v Nabisco, Inc., 123 AD2d 816 [2d Dept 1986]; see also Orner v Mount Sinai Hosp., 305 AD2d 307 [l st Dept 2003]); and it is further ... ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's motion seeking the production of the complete, unredacted personnel files of Karen Zhang and Emily Chang is denied, as the Court finds the demand is overbroad and seeks information protected by NY Education Law 6527(3) and NY Public Health Law 2805-m; and it is further ... This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Section 3101(a) requires the party seeking disclosure to show that the requested discovery is reasonably calculated to yield information bearing on the claims.

Aberbach-Marolda v. Cherner · filed 2026-04-08(a)

Accordingly, as the defendant failed to show how his request for authorization to release certain emails was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the causes of action, we perceive no reason to disturb the court's determination to deny this request.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material relevant to preparing an affirmative defense, including material that may help establish fraudulent inducement.

Trump v. Trump · filed 2026-04-30(a)

CPLR 3101(a) directs "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action," and is to be "interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening issues and reducing delay and prolixity" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). These principles entitle defendant to the requested discovery material to establish her affirmative defense (see Rivera v NYP Holdings Inc., 63 AD3d 469, 469 [1st Dept 2009]; Roman Catholic Church of Good Shepherd, 202 AD2d at 257-258).

Section 3101 permits disclosure of material that may help uncover evidence needed to prosecute or defend an action.

Groben v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · filed 1965-12-13

That right of disclosure extends not only to matter which may be primary evidence but also to all evidence which may be relevant in discovering evidence necessary to the prosecution and defense of the action.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to a claim or defense; demands seeking irrelevant, overly broad, or burdensome information may be denied.

Accent Collections, Inc. v. Cappelli Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2011-05-31(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.”

CPLR 3101 requires disclosure of material and necessary matters, but does not allow unlimited discovery.

Matter of Nicholson · filed 2024-05-20

The statutory mandate that all matters "material and necessary" which bear on the controversy be disclosed (CPLR 3101) is construed liberally, but a party is not entitled to "unlimited, uncontrolled, unfettered disclosure" (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v RLC Med., P.C., 150 AD3d 1034, 1035 [2d Dept 2017} [internal quotations marks and citations omitted]; Matter of Eckert, 60 Misc 3d 1007 [Sur Ct, Queens County 2018] [court has broad power to regulate discovery]).

Section 3101(a) permits broad disclosure of material necessary to an action, including records that may lead to admissible evidence.

ARK564 Doe v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2025-01-13(a)

The discovery rules promote broad "disclosure of all matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action" (CPLR 3101 [a]). ... The Diocese of Brooklyn shall produce the documents to the Court for in camera review within 20 days of the date of this order.

Section 3101 requires full disclosure of information material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action.

Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Monte Carlo, LLC · filed 2025-04-11

CPLR 3101 requires full disclosure of all material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.

CPLR 3101 permits discovery relevant to a finance company’s claimed holder-in-due-course status but excludes irrelevant or overly broad requests.

Avco Security Corp. v. Post · filed 1973-10-26(a)

Any material relevant to AYCO’s holder in due course status should be discoverable. ... The information sought in the other paragraphs is either not pertinent or the requests are couched in such broad, vague and general language that they are outside the scope of discovery as indicated by CPLR 3101 and also by the Allen case (supra).

Section 3101(a) requires interrogatories to seek material and necessary information and permits exclusion of unduly burdensome questions.

Vaccaro v. Vaccaro · filed 1979-02-22(a)

This court has carefully examined the challenged interrogatories to determine if they meet the standards of materiality and necessity which are required by this statute (CPLR 3101, subd [a]). The court has determined that the following interrogatories are unduly burdensome and not sufficiently in accord with the requirements of this statute: interrogatories 36-39, 44-48 and 52-55.

Section 3101 does not permit interrogatories that are irrelevant and unduly burdensome.

Giffords Oil Co. v. Spinogatti · filed 1983-08-08

Special Term’s order entered August 27, 1982 is affirmed on the additional ground that defendant’s interrogatories were improperly burdensome and irrelevant.

Section 3101 permits discovery of material and necessary information, but interrogatories seeking performance details from unrelated contracts are overbroad when relevant information can be obtained directly.

Seltel, Inc. v. Channel Communications, Inc. · filed 1986-08-07

While the disclosures sought may incidentally yield relevant information as to the extent of plaintiffs national resources, defendant’s inquiries invariably call for concomitant disclosures respecting plaintiffs performance under other contracts with other clients, which disclosures are neither material nor necessary to its defense. Defendant’s interrogatories are thus overbroad.

Section 3101 permits discovery of vehicle maintenance records that are material and necessary to the action and not unduly burdensome to produce.

Giacalone v. Hicksville Concrete Corp. · filed 1987-11-23

Production of those records would not be unduly burdensome and the information contained therein is both material and necessary to the plaintiffs’ prosecution and the county’s defense of this action. Thus, those records are discoverable (see, CPLR 3101).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary evidence, but overbroad interrogatories seeking irrelevant information may be stricken as unduly burdensome.

Lopez v. Huntington Autohaus Ltd. · filed 1989-05-30(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides that "[tjhere shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action”. ... The subject interrogatories are so overbroad and seek so much irrelevant and immaterial information that they are unduly burdensome and oppressive.

Section 3101(a) does not permit disclosure demands that are overly broad or seek personal information unrelated to the issues in the case.

Walter Karl, Inc. v. Wood · filed 1990-05-21(a)

The challenged items in the plaintiff’s notice for discovery and inspection on the whole are overly broad and not relevant to the issues in the case to the extent that the information sought infringes upon personal areas unrelated to the breach of an alleged employment agreement (CPLR 3101 [a]; 3103; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to limit disclosure when the demand is unduly burdensome or concerns matters preceding the transactions at issue.

Lapidus v. Hiltzik · filed 1990-04-02(a)

Further, the court properly limited the plaintiff’s disclosure to a period beginning six months before he received the stock certificate from his uncle. ... However, discovery is generally not permitted concerning matters which occurred prior to the transactions which are the subject of the action (see, Weis v Coe, 40 NYS2d 222). Under the circumstances of this case, the disclosure demanded by the plaintiff was unduly burdensome (see, Van Eycken v Van Eycken, 142 AD2d 576).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary evidence, but permits courts to limit overly broad or harassing demands.

Harrison v. Bayley Seton Hospital, Inc. · filed 1995-09-11(a)

Many of the plaintiffs’ demands were overly broad and vexatious and tended to confuse, rather than sharpen, the central issue of negligence. Accordingly, we remit this matter to the Supreme Court and direct it to limit the plaintiffs’ demands only to evidence that is material and necessary (see, CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) requires full disclosure of material and necessary matter, but disclosure is not unlimited and trial courts have discretion to supervise it.

City of Mount Vernon v. Lexington Insurance · filed 1996-10-07(a)

While it is true that CPLR 3101 (a) provides for "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (see also, Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407; Lopez v Huntington Autohaus, 150 AD2d 351, 352), it is equally true that "unlimited disclosure is not permitted” (Ackerman v Landes, 125 AD2d 620) and that the supervision of disclosure is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, Kaplan v Herbstein, 175 AD2d 200).

Section 3101(a) allows full disclosure of material and necessary matter, but disclosure is not unlimited, and a protective order may be granted when the requesting party has not shown that the records exist.

Argumedo v. 303 Tenants Corp. · filed 1998-01-26(a)

While CPLR 3101 (a) provides for full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, City of Mount Vernon v Lexington Ins. Co., 232 AD2d 358). In light of the fact that the appellants have not made a showing that the records at issue even exist, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order (see, Fascaldi v Fascaldi, 209 AD2d 578).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary information when a request is useful and reasonable; irrelevant or overbroad and burdensome requests may be denied.

Mitchell v. Stuart · filed 2002-04-18(a)

We perceive no such predicate for disclosure in CPLR article 31, which mandates “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (CPLR 3101 [a]). ... We also are of the view that these revised demands are not overburdensome and, therefore, Supreme Court’s denial of plaintiffs motion to compel as to revised demand Nos. 21 and 22 constituted an abuse of discretion.

Section 3101(a) calls for disclosure of material and necessary evidence, but does not require unlimited disclosure and leaves supervision to the trial court’s discretion.

Blagrove v. Cox · filed 2002-05-28(a)

While CPLR 3101 (a) provides for full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the trial court’s broad discretion (see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406; Argumedo v 303 Tenants Corp., 246 AD2d 616; City of Mount Vernon v Lexington Ins. Co., 232 AD2d 358; Buonaccorso v City of New York, 208 AD2d 791).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary items when the responding party has not shown that the requests are overly broad or unduly burdensome.

Munoz v. 147 Corp. · filed 2003-10-23(a)

The items sought in the supplemental demand for discovery and inspection are “material and necessary in the prosecution or defense” of the instant action (CPLR 3101 [a]), and the City has not shown that the requests are overly broad or unduly burdensome.

Section 3101(a) requires requested records to be material and necessary to the action; a court may quash an overly broad subpoena for records that do not meet that standard.

Young v. Baker · filed 2005-08-22(a)

Baker failed to show that the records of the child support proceeding involving James Young approximately 10 years earlier were “material and necessary” to the defense of the action against him (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]; Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417 [2004]).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to deny disclosure demands that are overly broad and vexatious despite its general rule of full disclosure.

Optic Plus Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc. · filed 2006-12-22(a)

Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof,” “[a] party’s right to discovery is not unlimited, . . . and may be curtailed when it becomes an unreasonable annoyance and tends to harass and overburden the other party [or parties]” (Harrison v Bayley Seton Hosp., 219 AD2d 584, 584 [1995]). Here, the demands at issue are “overly broad and vexatious and tend[ ] to confuse, rather than sharpen, the central issue [s],” and thus the court properly refused to grant plaintiffs motion (id.).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to an action, but courts may limit demands that are irrelevant, confidential, overbroad, or burdensome.

Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v. Walsh · filed 2007-11-07(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) requires, in pertinent part, “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” However, the principle of “full disclosure” does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure, and the trial courts have “broad power to regulate discovery to prevent abuse” (Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 76 AD2d 873, 874 [1980]).

CPLR 3101(a) does not require disclosure in response to demands that are unduly burdensome, lack specificity, and seek irrelevant or immaterial information.

Harris v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. · filed 2008-02-19(a)

However, in light of the allegations contained in the plaintiffs bill of particulars, it is evident that these demands were unduly burdensome, lacked specificity, and sought irrelevant and immaterial information, and therefore should have been stricken (see Lopez v Huntington Autohaus, 150 AD2d 351, 352 [1989]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to an action, but does not entitle a party to unlimited discovery.

Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Sharf · filed 2009-02-03(a)

Although CPLR 3101 (a) requires “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,” a party does not have the right to “uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure” (Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531, 531 [2007]).

Section 3101(a) provides for full disclosure of material and necessary matter, but does not permit unlimited disclosure.

Wander v. St. John's University · filed 2009-11-17(a)

“While it is true that CPLR 3101 (a) provides for ‘full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,’ it is also true that unlimited disclosure is not permitted” (Silcox v City of New York, 233 AD2d 494 [1996], quoting CPLR 3101 [a]). ... Here, given the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the motion to quash or limit the contested subpoenas duces tecum at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary evidence, but does not require unlimited disclosure or compliance with overly broad, burdensome, or irrelevant demands.

Euba v. Euba · filed 2010-11-09(a)

While CPLR 3101 (a) provides for full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the trial court’s broad discretion. ... The plaintiff failed to show that additional discovery was material and necessary to her prosecution of this action.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of telephone records material and necessary to a defense, while an overly broad and burdensome request may be narrowed.

Ford v. Rector, Church-Wardens, Vestrymen of Trinity Church · filed 2011-02-15(a)

While defendants’ discovery request for all plaintiffs home and cellular telephone records dating from six years before the sending of the anonymous faxes that purportedly led to her termination was overly broad and unnecessarily burdensome, the denial of the request in its entirety was inappropriate, given defendants’ showing of the need for the discovery.

CPLR 3101(a) permits disclosure of material and necessary evidence, but trial courts may quash overly broad discovery requests.

Conte v. County of Nassau · filed 2011-08-09(a)

While CPLR 3101 (a) provides for full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the trial court’s broad discretion (see Constantino v Dock’s Clam Bar & Pasta House, 60 AD3d 612 [2009]; Youngquist v Youngquist, 44 AD3d 1034, 1035 [2007]; Auerbach v Klein, 30 AD3d 451, 452 [2006]; Silcox v City of New York, 233 AD2d 494 [1996]; NBT Bancorp v Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 192 AD2d 1032, 1033 [1993]). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised it discretion in quashing the nonparty subpoenas, as the plaintiffs overly broad discovery requests were neither material nor necessary to the prosecution of the action (see Young v Baker, 21 AD3d 550, 550-551 [2005]; White Bay Enters. v Newsday, Inc., 288 AD2d 211, 212 [2001]; Myrie v Shelley, 237 AD2d 337, 339 [1997]; Ayubo v Eastman Kodak Co., 158 AD2d 641, 642 [1990]).

Section 3101(a) allows broad disclosure of material and necessary matter, while permitting courts to reject irrelevant or overbroad requests.

Krystal G. v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 2011-10-14(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) grants litigants a broad scope in discovering materials by providing that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.”

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of material and necessary information, but does not require disclosure of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly burdensome information.

Breytman v. Olinville Realty, LLC · filed 2012-10-03(a)

Here, while the plaintiffs demand for information concerning subsequent rentals of his former apartment was material and necessary to his defense against one of the defendant’s counterclaims, his remaining unfulfilled discovery demands were unduly burdensome, and sought irrelevant and immaterial information.

CPLR 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary matter, but its full disclosure rule does not entitle a party to uncontrolled or unfettered disclosure.

AAA Vascular Care, PLLC v. Integrated Healthcare Management, LLC · filed 2012-10-03(a)

The principle of “full disclosure,” however, does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure (JFK Family Ltd. Partnership v Millbrae Natural Gas Dev. Fund 2005, L.P., 83 AD3d 899, 900 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531 [2007]).

Section 3101(a)’s principle of full disclosure does not entitle a party to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure.

Farrell v. E.W. Howell Co., LLC · filed 2013-02-20(a)

However, the principle of “full disclosure” does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Romance v Zavala, 98 AD3d 726, 728 [2012]; D’Adamo v Saint Dominic’s Home, 87 AD3d 966, 969-970 [2011]; JFK Family Ltd. Partnership v Millbrae Natural Gas Dev. Fund 2005, L.P., 83 AD3d 899, 900 [2011]).

Section 3101(a) permits full disclosure of material and necessary matters, but courts may deny overbroad and burdensome document demands.

Greenfield v. Board of Assessment Review for Town of Babylon · filed 2013-05-15(a)

In any event, that branch of the motion was properly denied because the document demands, even limited to those concerning tax years 2008/2009, 2010/2011, and 2011/2012, were of an overbroad and burdensome nature.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary matter, subject to applicable confidentiality restrictions.

Bibbins v. Sayegh · filed 2014-07-17(a)

Accordingly, this court’s power, in the context of civil discovery, to order the production of “all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (CPLR 3101 [a] [emphasis added]) is constrained, under the circumstances, by the restrictions on confidentiality set forth in Social Services Law § 422.

Section 3101(a) limits disclosure when the burden and invasion of privacy outweigh the need for the information.

Kennedy v. Mahopac Central School District · filed 2014-09-24(a)

Further, in the context of this case, the burden of subjecting the parents to psychiatric examinations, which would involve private and highly personal matters, outweighs the alleged necessity for the information sought (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 747 [2000]; Kavanagh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., 92 NY2d 952, 954 [1998]).

Section 3101(a) requires full disclosure of matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, but does not require a party to respond to overbroad discovery demands.

BATTEASE, PHILLIP P. v. STATE OF NEW YORK · filed 2015-06-19(a)

“Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides for ‘full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,’ it is well settled that a party need not respond to discovery demands that are overbroad” (Kregg v Maldonado, 98 AD3d 1289, 1290).

CPLR 3101(a) does not require a party to answer vague, overbroad disclosure demands; such demands may be vacated without prejudice to narrower requests.

Battease v. State · filed 2015-06-19(a)

“Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides for Tull disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,’ it is well settled that a party need not respond to discovery demands that are overbroad” (Kregg v Maldonado, 98 AD3d 1289, 1290 [2012]). We agree with defendant that demand Nos. 5 through 8 and 10 through 12 are vague and overbroad, and thus “the appropriate remedy is to vacate [them in their entirety] rather than to prune [them]” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 3101(a) allows a trial court to vacate discovery demands that are overly broad and largely irrelevant without narrowing them for the requesting party.

Catskill Mountain Railroad Company, Inc. v. County of Ulster · filed 2016-04-21(a)

Contrary to defendant's argument, Supreme Court was not obligated to "prune" the discovery requests for defendant as it was within its discretion to vacate the overly broad and largely irrelevant demands (see Payne v Enable Software, 229 AD2d 880, 882 [1996]).

CPLR 3101(a) requires a party seeking to compel discovery to show that the requested method would disclose relevant evidence or was reasonably calculated to lead to information bearing on the claims.

Pesce v. Fernandez · filed 2016-11-02(a)

Here, the defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the method of discovery sought would result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Reid v Soults, 138 AD3d 1091, 1092 [2016]; Quinones v 9 E. 69th St., LLC, 132 AD3d 750 [2015]; Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417, 418 [2004]).

Section 3101(a) does not support an order compelling further discovery when the movant fails to identify the discovery sought or show that a proper discovery demand was ignored.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Brewton · filed 2016-08-31(a)

However, the Supreme Court improvidently granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to compel further unspecified discovery, as the defendant failed to identify what discovery he sought or establish that the plaintiff had ignored a proper discovery demand (see CPLR 3101 [a]; see also CPLR 3124; Altonen v Kmart of NY Holdings, Inc., 94 AD3d 920 [2012]; cf. U.S. Bank N.A. v Ventura, 130 AD3d 919 [2015]).

CPLR 3101(a) does not require a party to answer interrogatories that are overly broad and burdensome.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Levenson · filed 2017-04-26(a)

The motion also was properly denied on the ground that the interrogatories were of an over-broad and burdensome nature (see Matter of Greenfield v Board of Assessment Review for Town of Babylon, 106 AD3d at 908; Accent Collections, Inc. v Cappelli Enters., Inc., 84 AD3d at 1284).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to strike an entire discovery demand when many requests are overbroad and burdensome, even if some seek relevant information.

Stepping Stones Associatess, L.P. v. Scialdone · filed 2017-03-08(a)

Here, many of the 266 requests made in the defendants’ first demands for discovery were of an overbroad and burdensome nature, and were palpably improper. ... Therefore, even though some of the defendants’ requests may have sought relevant information, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was to strike, in their entirety, the defendants’ first demands for discovery, and denying that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to compel the plaintiffs to respond to those demands.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary matter, but demands seeking irrelevant information or imposing overbroad and burdensome requests may be struck.

Pascual v. Rustic Woods Homeowners Assn., Inc. · filed 2019-06-05(a)

CPLR 3101(a) requires, in pertinent part, "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." ... Here, the discovery demands at issue were palpably improper in that they sought irrelevant information, or were overbroad and burdensome ( see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Levenson , 149 AD3d 1053, 1055; Diaz v City of New York , 117 AD3d 777, 778; Kamanou-Goune v Swiss Intl. Airlines , 100 AD3d 968, 969).

Section 3101(a) permits denial of a request for forensic access to devices when the requesting party does not substantiate that discoverable material was withheld and the request would expose extensive irrelevant material.

Matter of Malitz Family Trust. · filed 2020-10-14(a)

Here, in light of the objectant's failure to substantiate her claim that the petitioner did not produce all the discoverable material in her possession, and the breadth of irrelevant material the petitioner would be required to turn over to satisfy the objectant's request, the Surrogate's Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the objectant's motion, inter alia, to compel discovery ( see Buxbaum v Castro , 82 AD3d at 925).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to a claim or defense, but does not permit unlimited disclosure.

Lombardi v. Lombardi · filed 2021-01-27(a)

CPLR 3101(a) requires, in pertinent part, "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." However, "[a] party is not entitled to unlimited, uncontrolled, unfettered disclosure" ( Geffner v Mercy Med. Ctr. , 83 AD3d 998, 998; see Kiernan v Booth Mem. Med. Ctr. , 175 AD3d 1396, 1398).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of material and necessary matter, but an overbroad discovery demand should be vacated in full rather than narrowed.

Lomeli v. Falkirk Mgt. Corp. · filed 2020-01-08(a)

CPLR 3101(a) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof." Where discovery demands are overbroad, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the entire demand rather than prune it ( see Scorzari v Pezza , 111 AD3d 916; Matter of Greenfield v Board of Assessment Review for Town of Babylon , 106 AD3d 908, 908). Here, the information sought by the plaintiff in her first set of interrogatories and first request for the production of documents was largely burdensome or immaterial, and consequently, palpably improper ( see Accent Collections, Inc. v Cappelli Enters., Inc. , 84 AD3d 1283, 1283-1284).

Section 3101(a) allows disclosure of material and necessary matter, but demands for irrelevant information may be denied as overbroad or burdensome.

Bennett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. · filed 2020-12-02(a)

CPLR 3101(a) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof." ... Here, insofar as the plaintiffs sought discovery as to prior business dealings among the defendants, and information as to remediation projects performed by the defendants at sites other than the subject property, the demands sought irrelevant information and were overbroad and/or burdensome in nature ( see Knickerbocker Vil., Inc. v Lexington Ins. Co. , 178 AD3d 607; see also Gray v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co. , 157 AD3d 938, 940, 941).

Section 3101(a) allows broad disclosure of material necessary to an action, subject to the court's discretion to control discovery.

Sims v. Reyes · filed 2021-05-07(a)

The CPLR provides for "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof" (CPLR 3101 [a]). Although the statute establishes a right to broad discovery, that right is not unlimited ( see Forman v Henkin , 30 NY3d 656, 661-662 [2018]). ... When such a dispute arises, its resolution falls comfortably within the court's " 'broad discretion to control discovery,' " and, unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the court's ruling ( Voss v Duchmann , 129 AD3d 1697, 1698 [4th Dept 2015]; see Forman , 30 NY3d at 662; Lisa I. v Manikas , 183 AD3d 1096, 1097 [3d Dept 2020]; Hann v Black , 96 AD3d 1503, 1504 [4th Dept 2012]).

Section 3101(a) permits full disclosure of material and necessary matter, but a party need not respond to overbroad discovery demands.

Stern v. Golub Corp. · filed 2022-07-01(a)

"Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides for 'full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,' it is well settled that a party need not respond to discovery demands that are overbroad" ( Kregg v Maldonado , 98 AD3d 1289, 1290 [4th Dept 2012]; see Battease v State of New York , 129 AD3d 1579, 1580 [4th Dept 2015]). We conclude that plaintiff's demands for reports of every motorized shopping cart accident in every Price Chopper store for the 10 years preceding the accident and for the Price Chopper defendants' entire claim file were properly denied as overbroad ( see generally Matter of Greenfield v Board of Assessment Review for Town of Babylon , 106 AD3d 908, 909 [2d Dept 2013]; Kregg , 98 AD3d at 1290).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to an action, but an overbroad discovery demand may be vacated in its entirety.

Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v. Filardo · filed 2023-05-10(a)

CPLR 3101(a) requires, in pertinent part, "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." ... Thus, the appropriate remedy for an overbroad discovery demand is to vacate the entire demand rather than to prune it ( see Fox v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. , 202 AD3d at 1062; Lombardi v Lombardi , 190 AD3d at 966; Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 189 AD3d 749, 750).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to vacate an overbroad and burdensome discovery demand in its entirety rather than narrow it.

Pergament v. Government Empls. Ins. Co. ("GEICO") · filed 2024-03-20(a)

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that items 18 and 19 in the plaintiff's discovery demand dated December 18, 2019, were overbroad and burdensome. Having made that determination, the court should have vacated items 18 and 19, instead of pruning them ( see id. at 1062-1063; Lombardi v Lombardi , 190 AD3d 964, 966; Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 189 AD3d at 750-751).

Section 3101(a) limits pretrial disclosure to facts bearing on the dispute and excludes requests aimed only at locating assets to satisfy a future money judgment.

Arlus Owner LLC v. 829 Mad. Ave. LLC · filed 2024-06-03(a)

In addition to the above referenced Rules of the Commercial Division, the plaintiffs are referred to CPLR 3101 (a) which explains the purpose of discovery as requiring disclosure only of "facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity." Osowski v AMEC Constr. Mgt., Inc., 69 AD3d 99, 106 (1 st Dept. 2009) quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407 (1968). Notably, it does not include facts which bear only on the identity and location of assets that may serve to satisfy a money judgment entered after the trial, i.e post-judgment discovery governed by CPLR article 52.

Section 3101(a) allows disclosure of material and necessary information but does not permit an overly broad demand for all project documents.

1461-1469 Third Ave. Owner LLC v. Lux Group Holdings Ltd. · filed 2024-07-25(a)

The branch of the defendants' motion that seeks an order compelling the defendant to provide all Procure documents is denied, without prejudice, as the request is overly broad. ... While some documents would likely be material and necessary, the defendants are not entitled to a fishing expedition.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary matter, but it does not entitle a party to unlimited disclosure or require original pathology slides to be sent to an expert for offsite inspection.

Oleynik v. Rozenfeld · filed 2024-09-11(a)

CPLR 3101(a) requires, in pertinent part, "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." A party, however, "is not entitled to unlimited, uncontrolled, unfettered disclosure" ( Fox v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. , 202 AD3d 1061, 1062 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lombardi v Lombardi , 190 AD3d 964, 966). ... Nevertheless, in balancing the competing interests of the parties, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was to compel BIMC to comply with the subpoena duces tecum and provide the original pathology slides for inspection by the plaintiffs' expert in Massachusetts and granting that branch of the defendants' cross-motion which was for a protective order limiting disclosure of the original pathology slides to an onsite inspection of the slides at a BIMC facility ( see Lucarello v North Shore Univ. Hosp. , 184 AD2d 623; Cruz v [*3]Elhosseiny , 148 AD2d 412; Paterna v Zandieh , 130 AD2d 471).

Section 3101(g) supports disclosure of covered materials despite a request for a protective order.

Karagianis v. City of Yonkers · filed 1987-10-13(g)

Under the circumstances, Special Term did not err when it granted the plaintiffs’ motion for renewal, and, upon renewal, granted them discovery with respect to items Nos. 12, 13, 15, 16 and 19 in their notice for discovery and inspection dated October 17, 1983 (see, CPLR 3101 [g]; Miranda v Blair Tool & Mach. Corp., 114 AD2d 941; Matos v Akram & Jamal Meat Corp., 99 AD2d 527; Pataki v Kiseda, 80 AD2d 100, lv dismissed 54 NY2d 606).

Section 3101(a) does not exclude libel actions from full pretrial disclosure based on the type of action.

Roma v. Newspaper Consolidated Corp. · filed 1963-11-07(a)

Subdivision (a) of section 3101 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, although maintaining certain distinctions, as between witnesses and parties and between material and nonmaterial evidence, clearly makes no differentiation as to full disclosure based upon the type of action involved.

Section 3101 permits pretrial examination in a stockholder derivative action when special circumstances provide a basis for inquiry, including an undisputed, continuing conflict of interest.

Pearson v. Rosenberg · filed 1964-12-23

Because the two corporations involved engage in similar sales transactions with the same customers, suggesting a conflict of interest in the interlocking administrations of the two corporations, there are special circumstances warranting the allowance to plaintiff of an examination before trial.

Section 3101 permits general examinations before trial in defamation actions, subject to protective orders when discovery is abusive or otherwise unwarranted.

Nomako v. Ashton · filed 1964-02-27

The new enactment starts with the assumption of full disclosure, and then provides for protective orders in the event the discovery sought is found abusive or otherwise unwarranted (see CPLR 3101, 3103). The repealing of the restrictive rules was intended to conform to the larger purpose of the new procedural enactment. Consequently, there should no longer be any special rule against examinations before trial in defamation actions.

Section 3101 does not permit a general pretrial examination in a matrimonial action, but permits examination on particular issues when special circumstances warrant it.

O'Donovan v. O'Donovan · filed 1963-12-05(a)(4)

Accordingly, the notice is modified and plaintiff limited to an examination of the defendant upon the factual matters alleged in paragraphs 12 through 16 of the complaint which defendant has put in issue. Sufficient special circumstances exist to warrant such an examination and the matters upon which examination is permitted have been stated with sufficient particularity in the relevant paragraphs of the complaint to make it unnecessary to relegate plaintiff to a motion for such relief. (See CPLR 3101, subd. [a], par. [4].)

In an accounting proceeding, section 3101(a) requires objections to the account before witnesses may be examined, because the objections define what is material and relevant.

In re the Estate of Welsh · filed 1964-10-14(a)

Until objections are filed to an account which may cover an extended period of years, nothing is material and relevant until objected to. The requirement that objections should first be filed narrows the issues and consequently the area of examination.

Section 3101 permits disclosure of relevant facts and circumstances in a matrimonial action after required conciliation, though a party need not testify about an adultery counterclaim when legally incompetent to do so.

Dunlap v. Dunlap · filed 1970-05-21

Since laws now in force (Domestic Relations Law, §§ 170, 215, 215-e) require matrimonial actions to go forward only after submission to conciliation, the reasons for restricting use of disclosure in matrimonial actions have been substantially diminished. In our Opinion the order properly permitted disclosure of all relevant facts and circumstances in connection with plaintiff’s action, but disclosure by defendant on the issue of the adultery alleged in his counterclaim should not be required because he is not competent to testify on that issue. (CPLR 4502.)

Section 3101 permits disclosure in matrimonial actions to the same extent as in other actions.

Lachoff v. Lachoff · filed 1972-03-06

Therefore, there is no valid reason why disclosure procedures should not be fully available to a party in a matrimonial action to the same extent as any other action.

Section 3101 permits pretrial disclosure in Family Court filiation proceedings when special circumstances justify it.

Green v. Brown · filed 1970-12-09

Despite the general liberality intended by ... CPLR 3101 and 3102 as to disclosure, a rule of caution continues with respect to the grant of disclosure in matrimonial actions and in analogous proceedings in the Family Court (Matter of Rann v. Rann, 54 Misc 2d 704; Nomako v. Ashton, 20 A D 2d 331). ... In the instant proceeding, the respondent has met the burden of showing special circumstances and. is entitled to the relief requested.

Section 3101(a) permits pretrial discovery of a spouse’s finances in a contested matrimonial action when the information is material, pertinent, and not already disclosed.

Schaeffer v. Schaeffer · filed 1972-08-18(a)

Accordingly, the wife in this case is entitled to pretrial discovery, although, like any pretrial disclosure procedure, the interrogatories must seek information that its material, pertinent and not already disclosed by the party to be questioned. (CPLR 3101, subd. [a].)

Section 3101 permits disclosure in matrimonial actions on issues about which the person being deposed is competent to testify, subject to protection against abuse.

Maxwell v. Maxwell · filed 1976-11-22

That present-day procedural concepts require disclosure in matrimonial cases, as in other litigated causes, in respect of all the issues upon which the party deposed is competent to testify, seems clear; recognizing that protection — perhaps even special protection — will always be afforded by the court’s inherent and statutory authority to intervene, even after the taking of the deposition shall have been commenced, to prevent abuse of the procedure or an interrogation found in a particular case to be offensive to recognized public policy. The motion must, therefore, be denied insofar as it seeks to vacate the notice of deposition as unauthorized.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure relevant to class certification before a class is certified.

Vallone v. Delpark Equities, Inc. · filed 1978-06-14(a)

The great bulk of the information sought by plaintiffs relates to the requisites for class action status and the merits of the underlying claim. As discussed above, such disclosure, including specifically, information with regard to the elements listed in CPLR 901 and 902, is appropriate at this stage and should be granted under the liberal principles of CPLR 3101 (subd [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits financial disclosure material and necessary to a constructive-trust counterclaim in a divorce action, limited to the issues raised by that counterclaim.

Sumereau v. Sumereau · filed 1980-04-29(a)

The financial disclosure sought by the husband is not requested pursuant to section 250 of the Domestic Relations Law, but under CPLR 3101 (subd [a]) as "material and necessary” to proving his counterclaim. The husband points out that he would be able to obtain the examination he seeks if the counterclaim herein were to be brought in a separate action. He should be able to proceed in a like manner in this case. The notice to examine was framed in general terms, however, and not specifically limited to the issues raised in his counterclaim. Our decision provides this limitation.

Before class certification, disclosure under Section 3101(a) may be limited to facts concerning the tour and hotel shared by the plaintiffs and the proposed class.

Reiken v. Nationwide Leisure Corp. · filed 1980-04-24(a)

We conclude that at this stage of the proceeding, defendant should only be required to respond to disclosure demands which relate specifically to the accommodations, transportation and incidentals (discount books, dining vouchers, free memberships and the like), promised or afforded to the persons who traveled on the particular tour in which plaintiffs participated and on that tour lodged at the same hotel as plaintiffs.

CPLR 3101 generally allows broad disclosure, but an individual defendant in a shareholder derivative action cannot be examined before trial without an evidentiary showing of special circumstances.

Condren v. Slater · filed 1981-12-01

Although, ordinarily, the disclosure provisions of CPLR 3101 are liberally construed and applied, the rule in shareholder derivative actions is that an individual defendant should not be examined before trial, absent an evidentiary showing of special circumstances.

Section 3101(a) permits pretrial examination of a civil assault plaintiff’s sexual conduct only upon a showing of special circumstances.

Mason v. Cohn · filed 1981-04-29(a)

I conclude that such pretrial examinations as to sexual conduct as sought herein should only be granted in the exercise of discretion upon the strongest showing of special circumstances. ... For the same reasons, I conclude, that to examine plaintiff as to her subsequent sexual conduct on the issue of damage, there must be a showing of special circumstances.

Section 3101’s disclosure limits do not automatically restrict access to agency records under the Freedom of Information Law.

Lawler, Matusky & Skelly Engineers v. Abrams · filed 1981-10-06

Petitioner seeks to incorporate into the FOIL exemptions, restrictions upon disclosure found in other areas of the law; specifically, the attorney-client privilege found in CPLR 4503 and the provisions relating to disclosure found in CPLR 3101 (subd [b]; privileged matter); 3101 (subd [c]; attorney’s work product) and 3101 (subd [d]; material prepared for litigation). ... This court declines to adopt the sweeping argument advanced by petitioner to the effect that the limitations upon disclosure found in the CPLR apply equally to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law.

Section 3101(d)'s conditions for disclosing material prepared for litigation do not apply to a valid Grand Jury subpoena duces tecum.

In Re an Application to Quash a Subpoena Duces Tecum in Grand Jury Proceedings · filed 1982-06-17(d)

Additionally, the conditional bar to discovery of material prepared for litigation provided by CPLR 3101 (subd [d]) does not apply in the face of a valid Grand Jury subpoena duces tecum.

Section 3101 allows discovery of medical reports, but a plaintiff need not bear the cost of the defendant’s obtaining them.

Close v. Schaeffer · filed 1982-10-29

Although it is true that medical reports are subject to discovery and defendant has a right to them (Calhoun v Pickett, 52 NY2d 605), it does not necessarily follow that a plaintiff must bear the cost of defendant’s exercising that right.

Section 3101 permits pretrial disclosure on the merits of a divorce claim because matrimonial actions are subject to full disclosure of material and necessary evidence.

Lemke v. Lemke · filed 1984-03-06

H CPLR 3101 requires full disclosure by a party of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.

Section 3101(a) limits article 31 disclosure to judicial proceedings unless a statute expressly authorizes its use elsewhere.

Spiotta v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1983-08-15(a)

The obvious conclusion one can draw from reading these sections together is that unless otherwise expressly authorized by statute, article 31 is limited in scope to utilization in judicial proceedings.

Section 3101(a)'s limit on discovery to material and necessary evidence does not make government records exempt from disclosure under FOIL.

Farbman v. NYC HEALTH & HOSPS. · filed 1984-05-10(a)

No such intention can be gleaned from the declaration of CPLR 3101 (subd [a]) that only evidence "material and necessary" to an action be produced.

Section 3101(a)’s limit on litigation discovery to material and necessary evidence does not restrict a litigant’s access to agency records under FOIL.

M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. New York City Health · filed 1984-05-10(a)

No such intention can be gleaned from the declaration of CPLR 3101 (subd [a]) that only evidence “material and necessary” to an action be produced. In the absence of indication from the Legislature, we refuse to read into FOIL the restriction that, once litigation commences, a party forfeits the rights available to all other members of the public and is confined to discovery in accordance with article 31.

Section 3101(a)(1) permits disclosure about a seat belt defense relevant to damages, including alcohol or drug consumption insofar as it bears on seat belt use.

Bongianni v. Vlasovetz · filed 1984-05-29(a)(1)

Consequently, the order granting the instant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability did not preclude an examination before trial of the plaintiff with respect to what is commonly known as the seat belt defense which is relevant to the issue of damages. Since the consumption of alcoholic beverages or drugs may affect one’s ability to properly fasten a seat belt, disclosure of such information is also proper only insofar as it pertains to the seat belt defense.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery in aid of a motion because a motion is part of an action.

Martinez v. Patel · filed 1985-01-07(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) allows discovery in the prosecution or defense of an action. A motion is a part of an action. Thus, under the CPLR provision full discovery may be utilized in aid of motions.

Section 3101(a)’s full disclosure rule supports requiring a bill of particulars alongside answered financial interrogatories in a divorce action.

Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld · filed 1985-11-25(a)

...to permit "full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (CPLR 3101 [a]), particularly in regard to the discovery of financial information in actions for divorce and equitable distribution (Domestic Relations Law §236 [B] [4]; CPLR 3130 [2]; see also, Van Ess v Van Ess, 100 AD2d 848), we exercise our discretion to require plaintiff to serve a bill of particulars in addition to his responses to the interrogatories.

Section 3101 (a)’s general disclosure provisions yield to CPLR 6220’s specific rule for attachment discovery.

Carteret Savings Bank v. East-West Associates Limited Partnership · filed 1988-10-27(a)

Moreover, the specific provision of CPLR 6220 must be read to take precedence over the general disclosure provisions of CPLR 3101 (a).

CPLR 3101 requires separate discovery demands for records held by independent municipal planning and zoning boards outside a city’s control.

Spa Realty Associates v. Springs Associates · filed 1991-12-26

In our view, Supreme Court properly concluded that the City’s planning and zoning boards are sufficiently separate entities to require that they be made recipients of separate discovery demands pursuant to CPLR 3101.

Section 3101 does not expand the scope of an examination governed by CPLR 3121.

D'Amico v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. · filed 1992-04-14

Nor does CPLR 3101 operate to expand the scope of an examination governed by CPLR 3121.

Section 3101(a) does not permit a mental health examination to pursue neglect allegations that do not involve sexual abuse or otherwise raise questions about the respondent’s mental health.

In re R./G. Children · filed 1994-09-08(a)

In contrast to the foregoing, a mental health examination is not "material and necessary” (CPLR 3101 [a]) to the prosecution of the separate neglect allegations against corespondent Rosemarie L. because the allegations against her do not involve sexual abuse or otherwise raise questions as to her mental health.

Section 3101(e) applies to a court-appointed law guardian in a custody case just as it applies to an attorney for any other party.

Keisic v. Keisic · filed 1994-10-04(e)

In particular, the provisions of the CPLR compelling disclosure, i.e., section 3101 (e), apply with equal force to a Panel Law Guardian appointed by the court to act on behalf of the child where custody of that child is a matter awaiting the court’s ultimate decision.

CPLR 3101 (a)’s general disclosure provisions yield to CPLR 6220 when a party seeks disclosure in aid of attachment.

Ferriter v. Cook · filed 1996-09-27(a)

Although plaintiff contends that discovery is permissible under CPLR 3101 (a), the disclosure provision of CPLR 6220 must be read to take precedence over the general disclosure provisions of CPLR 3101 (a) (see, Carteret Sav. Bank v East-West Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, supra, at 613).

Section 3101’s protection for materials prepared for litigation does not bar production of nonprivileged materials under a trial subpoena.

Barnes v. New York State Thruway Authority · filed 1998-03-04(d)(2)

With regard to the first question, the court concludes that unless the material sought can be shown to be privileged matter, it must be produced pursuant to the subpoena. CPLR article 31 governs the disclosure process, not the question of what is relevant and admissible at trial. Accordingly, the cases relied upon by counsel with respect to the limited protection for attorney work product and materials prepared in anticipation of litigation are not relevant.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of records material and necessary to prosecute a contempt motion.

Brad H. v. City of New York · filed 2001-06-26(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides: “There shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” ... As stated above, the documents that plaintiffs are seeking would be material and necessary to the prosecution of their motion for contempt against defendants, because it is difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to determine who were members of the plaintiff class, and find and communicate with them in order to prosecute the contempt motion.

Section 3101(i)'s disclosure rule for surveillance videotapes does not bind the Workers’ Compensation Board.

Claim of De Marco v. Millbrook Equestrian Center · filed 2001-10-25(i)

Accordingly, we find that the amendment to CPLR 3101 is not binding on the Board.

Section 3101(a)’s broad disclosure rule permits pretrial disclosure of a court-appointed neutral forensic psychologist’s notes and raw data in a custody case only upon a showing of special circumstances, such as a deficient report or potential bias.

Ochs v. Ochs · filed 2002-07-09(a)

Thus, such requests should be evaluated in the same manner as requests for additional psychological examinations, and should be granted only upon a showing, on the basis of the report itself or through extrinsic evidence, of special circumstances, such as a deficiency in the report, a potential bias or other cause.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery about an earlier assault at a nearby building when its circumstances may be relevant to whether the assault at issue was foreseeable.

Mayer v. 486 Associates, Inc. · filed 2006-12-05(a)

The plaintiff should have been permitted to conduct discovery with respect to the sexual assault that occurred at the building located at 231 Ocean Avenue because the location of that building was sufficiently proximate to that of the subject building and the circumstances surrounding that incident may be relevant to the foreseeability of the sexual assault at the subject building ... Accordingly, the court should have permitted the plaintiff to question Cooper about the 231 Ocean Avenue building.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery about mitigation of damages because that issue is material to the action.

Blair v. Otto Brehm, Inc. · filed 2008-09-09(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides that there “shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution ... of an action” (see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). The issue of mitigation of damages was material and thus the defendant is entitled to discovery on the issue.

CPLR 3101 allows a court to limit financial discovery in a divorce action to a neutral evaluator’s review of a business for a specified period.

Rosner v. Rosner · filed 2010-05-25

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to compel the plaintiff to provide him with financial discovery up until the time of trial, but only to the extent of directing the neutral forensic evaluator, David Gresen, to conduct an evaluation of Napoli Marble and Granite, the plaintiffs business, for the period from June 28, 2006, to December 12, 2008 (see Sanford v Sanford, 146 AD2d 622 [1989]; Tallering v Tallering, 129 AD2d 696 [1987]).

Section 3101(a) does not ordinarily permit discovery into marital fault for equitable distribution unless the alleged conduct is egregious, though rare exceptions may apply.

Howard S. v. LILLIAN S. · filed 2010-04-29(a)

Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides for "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action," Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) is the specific statutory provision that governs equitable distribution in marital actions. Despite the general policy in favor of liberal discovery, this Court has interpreted the more specific section of the Domestic Relations Law to allow for consideration of marital fault in only a limited set of circumstances involving egregious conduct. In the absence of those circumstances, liberal discovery on issues of marital fault...should not ordinarily be permitted, though there may be exceptions in rare circumstances ( see e.g. Anonymous v Anonymous, 71 AD2d 209, 214 [1st Dept 1979]).

Section 3101(a) permits preclass certification discovery, but a request for records about employees generally may be overbroad when the proposed class is narrower.

Rodriguez v. Metropolitan Cable Communications · filed 2010-12-14(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) broadly mandates “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” ... Similarly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Metro’s motion which was for a protective order striking document request number 5 from the plaintiffs second request for the production of documents served upon Metro, as it is over-broad in seeking documents regarding Metro employees generally, not merely those who might fall within the proposed class defined in the complaint (cf. Gewanter v Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 87 AD2d 970 [1982]; Smith v Atlas Intl. Tours, 80 AD2d at 764).

Section 3101 permits discovery of marital fault when the alleged conduct could affect equitable distribution.

Eileen G. v. Frank G. · filed 2011-11-30

This is one of those rare instances in which a court should permit discovery of marital fault as a potential factor in equitable distribution.

Section 3101(a)'s material-and-necessary disclosure standard yields to the compelling-need standard for confidential HIV-related information under Public Health Law § 2785.

Terzo v. Hospital for Special Surgery · filed 2012-05-10(a)

By operation of the “notwithstanding” clause in Public Health Law § 2785 (1), all other provisions of law, including the “material and necessary” standard under CPLR 3101 (a), are explicitly preempted by the “compelling need” standard under Public Health Law § 2785 (2) (see e.g. Matter of Melendez v Wing, 8 NY3d 598, 609-610 [2007]; Matter of State of New York v Zimmer, 63 AD3d 1563, 1563-1564 [2009]).

Section 3101(a) entitled the appellants to particulars concerning the property owners’ SEQRA based declaratory judgment claim after that claim was remitted for further proceedings.

24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. v. Heaship · filed 2012-12-19(a)

... the Supreme Court erred in finding that the appellants were not entitled to particulars as to the property owners’ cause of action for a judgment declaring LL No. 4 invalid based on the appellants’ alleged failure to comply with SEQRA requirements (see CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits discovery about marital fault for equitable distribution only in limited circumstances involving egregious conduct.

Mujahid v. Mujahid · filed 2013-10-16(a)

Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides for “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,” discovery concerning marital fault with regard to equitable distribution is permitted “in only a limited set of circumstances involving egregious conduct” ... Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant’s allegation that the plaintiff infected her with genital herpes more than 20 years prior to her motion was insufficient to warrant discovery of, inter alia, the plaintiffs confidential medical records (see Howard S. v Lillian S., 14 NY3d at 435-436).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to deny compelled genetic testing when the requesting party’s demonstrated need does not outweigh the special burden on the person to be tested.

Rogers-Duell v. Chen · filed 2013-11-04(a)

With no precedent controlling defendants’ genetic test demand, CPLR 3101 (a) provides the general statutory authority applicable to defendants’ demand. ... On this record, because defendants failed to demonstrate that their need for genetic testing outweighs the special burden it would place on plaintiff, defendants’ application for compelled genetic testing of plaintiff is denied.

Section 3101(a) permits pretrial DNA testing when it is material, relevant and necessary to the issues in the proceeding.

Matter of Lewis · filed 2016-04-08(a)

Therefore, pretrial DNA testing should be allowed as the testing is material, relevant and · necessary to the issues presented in these proceedings (see Matter of ... Williams, 26 Misc 3d at 680, citing CPLR 3101 [a]; Matter of Morningstar. 17 AD3d at 1060).

CPLR 3101(a)'s broad disclosure standard governs discovery about the size of a proposed class, subject to protective orders to prevent abuse.

Matter of Stewart v. Roberts · filed 2018-06-21(a)

Petitioner's request for discovery on the issue of numerosity is governed by "the broad disclosure standard articulated in CPLR 3101 (a) encompassing 'all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action', balanced by the court's ability to issue a protective order to prevent abuse" ( Casey v Prudential Sec. , 268 AD2d 833, 834 [2000, Graffeo, J.], quoting CPLR 3103 [a]). ... Accordingly, respondent failed to establish that the requested discovery should be denied, and Supreme Court erred in denying petitioner's motion for class certification without first granting her request for discovery on the issue of numerosity.

Section 3101(a) does not require a medical examination when the requesting party fails to show that it would produce useful evidence for the defense.

Andrade v. Frog Hollow Indus., Inc. · filed 2022-06-29(a)

Under CPLR 3101(a), parties are entitled to "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." ... The defendants made no showing that an examination of the type normally performed by an obstetrician or a gynecologist could produce any useful evidence regarding the effect that the plaintiff's bone fractures will have on her future childbearing ability. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in determining that a medical examination of the plaintiff by "an OB/GYN physician" was not material and necessary to the defense of this action, and the court properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was, in effect, to compel the plaintiff to submit to such an examination.

Section 3101(a) permits inspection of an accident site when it may yield information relevant to a party’s defense, even if a change to the site makes useful evidence less likely.

Balsamello v. Structure Tone, Inc. · filed 2024-04-25(a)

CPLR 3101(a) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." The Court of Appeals has directed that the phrase "material and necessary" in this statute should be "interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity" ( Kapon v Kapon , 23 NY3d 32, 38 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Under this standard, S&F is entitled to inspect the site of the incident giving rise to plaintiff's allegedly serious injuries.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of a company's members' identities when that information is material and necessary to an alter ego liability theory.

RCC Ventures LLC v. RW Foods, LLC · filed 2024-06-27(a)

As to interrogatory number 5, plaintiff is entitled to a response, as the identity of the members of RW Foods will be "material and necessary" (CPLR 3101 [a]) to determine the facts necessary to propound plaintiff's theory of alter ego liability, and the request is reasonable ( see Allen ).

CPLR 3101(a) permits disclosure of files concerning allegations against an accused priest, including the identities of other alleged victims of that priest, when the information may lead to relevant evidence.

T.B. v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. · filed 2025-04-15(a)

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in directing disclosure of the IRCP files, "regardless of when created or gathered" ( McNierney v Archdiocese of N.Y. , 221 AD3d 489, 489 [1st Dept 2023]; see generally CPLR 3101[a]). ... The motion court also providently exercised its discretion in directing the disclosure of the names and identifying information of other alleged victims of abuse by the same priest accused by plaintiff ( id. ).

Section 3101(a), together with EPTL former 4-1.2(a)(2)(C), gives a surrogate's court power to compel DNA testing in a proper parentage case.

Matter of McGuire · filed 2025-07-25(a)

We conclude that CPLR 3101 (a), coupled with EPTL former 4-1.2 (a) (2) (C), also provides a surrogate's court with the power to compel a DNA test in the proper case.

Section 3101(a) requires full disclosure of material and necessary evidence without regard to the burden of proof, allowing one codefendant to examine another before trial without a cross claim.

Lombardo v. Pecora · filed 1965-07-19(a)

We believe that the text of the present statute (CPLR 3101, subd. [a]), which provides for full disclosure without regard to burden of proof, has rendered obsolete our decision in the Johansen case and that its rule should be discarded. We also believe that, in the interest of achieving uniformity of practice in the several judicial departments of the State, we should now hold that full pretrial examinations of codefendants inter sese should be allowed with respect to all evidence which is material and necessary, even in the absence of a cross claim by the moving codefendant against the codefendant sought to be examined.

Section 3101 requires a showing that testimony sought before trial is material and necessary and that the witness is about to leave the state or other adequate special circumstances exist.

McElligott v. Harper Vending Inc. · filed 1965-11-23

There was no sufficient showing that the testimony of the witness is “material and necessary in the prosecution” of the action; nor is there a proper factual showing that the witness is “ about to depart from the state ” or that there exists other “ adequate special circumstances ” for the taking of his testimony in advance of the trial. (See CPLR 3101.)

Section 3101 permits a defendant to obtain discovery from a codefendant even when neither has asserted a claim against the other.

Schwartz v. Public Administrator · filed 1969-02-20

Moreover, in preparing for the trial, each defendant now has full discovery against his ...codefendant whether or not there is a claim between them (CPLR 3101; Lombardo v. Pecora, 23 A D 2d 460).

Section 3101 permits a plaintiff in a consolidated action to examine coplaintiffs about material and necessary matters, particularly when their interests may conflict.

Rosado v. Valvo · filed 1969-01-15(a)(1)

This court now goes one step further and holds that in a consolidated action the plaintiff may examine coplaintiffs with respect to material and necessary matters, particularly where it appears that all the plaintiffs are possibly not united in interest, or potentially or actually hostile to each other, and where the factual situation might not be the same with respect to all plaintiffs.

Section 3101(a) permits examination of an accounting party in an individual capacity when special circumstances warrant disclosure of material and necessary evidence.

In re the Estate of Reis · filed 1965-11-15(a)

The objections filed herein in essence charge the executrix with having omitted from the account estate assets to which the executrix had access prior to her appointment. Special circumstances, therefore, exist warranting the examination of the-accounting party in her individual capacity as a witness as well as in her capacity as executrix (CPLR 3101, subd. [a], par. [1] and par. [4]; Matter of Moody, 34 Misc 2d 727, 728).

Section 3101(a)(1) does not require a party to produce former employees for examination as its employees.

Lewis v. Jewish Guild for the Blind · filed 1969-04-28(a)(1)

Under the circumstances, appellants’ applications for relief therefrom should have been granted by the learned Special Term to the extent herein indicated, particularly since the persons named, except Ada Kozier, were not longer in appellants’ employment (McGowan v. Eastman, 271 N. Y. 195.; Milnes Co. v. Staten Is. Bd. of Jewish Educ., 26 A D 2d 831; Vosburgh v. McLean Trucking Co., 19 A D 2d 666; CPLR 3101, subd. [a], par. [1]).

Section 3101(a)(1) permits examination of a corporate defendant’s employee about material and necessary facts observed shortly after an accident when no disclosure exception is claimed.

Norman v. Otis Elevator Co. · filed 1969-04-28(a)(1)

There being no claim by defendant that the testimony of Steinauer is excepted from disclosure because of privileged matter, attorney’s work product, and material prepared for litigation (CPLR 3101, subds. [b], [c], [d]), interrogation of him before trial should be allowed as to all material and necessary matters (CPLR 3101, subd. [a], par. [1]; ...).

Section 3101 applies the rules for examining corporations to unincorporated associations, so the association should first be examined through an officer.

Smith v. Robilotto · filed 1967-01-09(a)(1)

CPLR 3101 should be considered in this manner, and the same rules followed in examinations of corporations should be applied in actions against unincorporated associations. The defendant should, therefore, first be examined through one of its officers.

Section 3101(a) permits an examination on damages after summary judgment on liability when the examination is material and necessary.

Appeal Printing Co. v. Levine · filed 1971-12-08(a)

In view of the fact that a large sum of money is claimed, $8,872.20, and it was not the defendant who personally ordered the printing, I am permitting him to examine the plaintiff but only as to damages.

Section 3101(a)(1) requires a showing that physicians are sufficiently related to and controlled by a defendant before they may be examined as its agents.

Ludden v. Erie Lackawanna Railway Co. · filed 1972-01-20(a)(1)

While we agree with the court below that the opposing affidavit by an attorney is entitled to little weight, nevertheless, it was error to direct the examination upon plaintiff’s affidavit which fails to show a relationship between the physicians and defendant justifying disclosure under CPLR 3101 (subd. [a], par. [1]).

Section 3101(a)(1) does not permit a hospital to be ordered to produce a nurse for examination as its employee when the patient retained and paid the nurse for exclusive service.

Rainey v. Persse · filed 1972-01-20(a)(1)

Plaintiffs obtained an order directing defendant hospital to produce the nurse for an examination relative to her duties, care, attendance and responsibilities to and for the decedent, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (subd. [a], par. [1]) which authorizes the examination of the employee of a party. ... The order should not have been granted, since the nurse was not an employee of the hospital at the time of the incident. A nurse specifically retained and paid by a patient to render exclusive service to that patient is an employee of the patient and not the hospital.

Section 3101(a) permits examination of a party’s members who witnessed an accident and were at the scene.

Santagato v. Town of Malta · filed 1972-06-29(a)

It is significant that the persons plaintiffs seek to examine are representatives of defendant who were witnesses to the accident and at the scene. In our opinion, this is enough to bring them within the broad and liberalized provisions of CPLR 3101 (subd. [a]) requiring a full disclosure by the “ officer, director, member, agent or employee of a party”.

Section 3101(a)(1) requires a party to produce an employee under its control for examination when the employee has material and necessary personal knowledge.

Gallup v. Dybas · filed 1973-08-17(a)(1)

His testimony is material and necessary, and, as an employee of Sears, Francis Savage’s examination is mandated by CPLR 3101 (subd. [a], par. [1]), which must be liberally interpreted.

Section 3101(a)(4) permits examination of parties in a jointly tried action when special circumstances warrant disclosure on subjects not covered by an earlier examination.

Nussdorf v. Howell · filed 1974-11-06(a)(4)

Since it appears that the areas upon which he seeks now to examine these two plaintiffs are different from the subject upon which they had previously been examined and since there are ‘ ‘ special circumstances ’ ’ present in this matter,, the examination of these parties should, in the interest of justice, be permitted, and accordingly this branch of the motion is granted.

Section 3101(a)(1) and (2) permits examination of a person who previously possessed a cause of action or is a hostile witness.

Lascaris v. Hyatt · filed 1975-02-13(a)(1), (a)(2)

As to the contention that the said Bertha Fowler is not the petitioner in this action, but merely a witness, this court takes the position that the said Bertha Fowler is the real party in interest. CPLR 3101 (subd [a], pars [1], [2]), states that a person who previously possessed a cause of action as a hostile witness, is a proper subject to be examined. The mother of the child in question, Bertha Fowler, can be classified in either category.

Section 3101(a)(1) permits a claimant to examine the State through people with knowledge of the matters at issue.

Klevens Construction Co. v. State · filed 1976-05-12(a)(1)

Accordingly, pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 17 of the Court of Claims Act and CPLR 3101 (subd [a], par [1]), the State is directed to produce for oral examination a person or persons with knowledge of the items listed in paragraphs "1” through "15” of the notice of motion herein and, pursuant to CPLR 3111, the State is also directed to produce thereat all plans, records, documents, drawings, record plans, diaries, force accounts and other papers in its possession or control containing data or entries relevant to the aforesaid items.

Section 3101 permits examination of a third-party defendant and, in these circumstances, its former employee.

DeJohn v. D. W. Winkelman Co. · filed 1976-07-12(a)(1), (a)(4)

In its remaining status as a third-party defendant, Martino is nonetheless subject to examination (Rizzo v Steiner, 20 AD2d 909; CPLR 3101, subd [a], par [1]; 3A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3101.24), as, in these circumstances, is its prior employee (CPLR 3101, subd [a], par [4]; 3A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3101.28).

Section 3101(a)(1) requires disclosure by a party and its officers, directors, members, agents, and employees; a request to examine someone claimed to be under a party’s control must identify that person.

Della Valle v. City of Niagara Falls · filed 1976-11-05(a)(1)

CPLR 3101 (subd [a], par [1]) requires disclosure by a party, officer, director, member, agent or employee of a party. The proper procedure by plaintiffs would be to request an examination of a specific individual whose testimony is necessary for legitimate discovery purposes and who plaintiffs claim is under the control of defendant city.

Section 3101 permits examination of a cofiduciary in her individual capacity.

In re the Estate of Meisler · filed 1977-05-05

The cofiduciary may be examined in her individual capacity pursuant to CPLR 3101, and in this respect the court directs that the examination proceed by interrogatories.

Section 3101(a) permits further disclosure from corporate employees when their testimony is material and necessary to a claim and the corporation’s initial witness is inadequate.

Lounsbury v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. · filed 1978-04-17(a)

In this case it appears that the testimony of the two linemen who responded to the scene of the accident 45 minutes after it took place is material and necessary to the prosecution of the claim.

Section 3101(a)(4) permits a party to seek an examination of a former employee as a witness.

Frankel v. French & Polyclinic Medical School & Health Center · filed 1979-06-25(a)(4)

Plaintiffs may seek to examine the former employees as witnesses (see CPLR 3101, subd [a], par [4]; 3106, subd [b]; McGowan v Eastman, supra; Schmitt v Neapolitan Ice Cream Co., 213 App Div 884; 7 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac, § 42.80).

Section 3101(a) permits examination of a defendant’s employee about material and necessary evidence, including a diagnosis or opinion based on facts the employee knows from treating the patient.

Glass v. Rochester General Hospital · filed 1980-02-20(a)

Plaintiff is entitled to examine defendant through its employees as to "all evidence material and necessary” to the prosecution of the action (CPLR 3101, subd [a]).

Section 3101(a)(2) permits examination of a bankrupt corporation through an officer because the corporation remains a person that possessed the asserted cause of action.

Engelhart v. Kas Carpets, Inc. · filed 1980-05-05(a)(2)

Disclosure must be made by any "person who possessed a cause of action or defense asserted in the action”. (CPLR 3101, subd [a], par [2].) Chatsworth, a corporation, is a "person” who can be examined before trial. ... Accordingly, the trustee is ordered to produce an officer of the bankrupt corporation at the office of the Clerk of Special Term, Part 2, on the fifth floor of this courthouse, on a date and at a time to be set forth in the order to be entered hereon.

Section 3101(a)(1) allows a party to examine an opposing party through an employee likely to know facts material to preparing for trial.

Gregoritsch v. John T. Mather Memorial Hospital · filed 1982-06-28(a)(1)

There is, therefore, a substantial likelihood that she possesses knowledge of, facts bearing on the controversy which will assist plaintiff in preparing for trial (cf. Allen v Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406), and accordingly the branch of plaintiff’s motion which sought leave to examine the hospital by her should have been granted (cf. Schiffer v Central Gen. Hosp., 71 AD2d 1018).

CPLR 3101 permits a corporation to designate an agent with knowledge for its initial deposition; the examining party must question that person before seeking further discovery based on inadequate knowledge.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. New York Property Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1982-11-01

We note that the notice to depose stated, in conformity with CPLR 3101, that the person to be deposed should be “an officer, agent, servant or employee with knowledge of the facts” (emphasis supplied).

Section 3101(a)(1) permits examination of a party’s agents or employees on notice without a court order.

People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. · filed 1983-05-31(a)(1)

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the other individuals noticed for depositions other than the District Attorney are agents or employees of the plaintiff and as such are subject to examination upon notice and without the necessity of a court order (CPLR 3101, subd [a], par [1]).

Section 3101(a)(1) permits disclosure from a corporate party’s employees without the additional showing required for nonparty witnesses, but does not make those employees parties.

Swiers v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. · filed 1983-06-02(a)(1)

This section merely means that for purposes of disclosure, where a party is a corporation, the additional showing required for disclosure from a nonparty witness (see CPLR 3101, subd [a], pars [3], [4]) does not apply to the corporate party’s employees (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3101:19, p 21).

Section 3101(a)(1) requires disclosure of material and necessary evidence from a party’s employee.

Garcia v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1983-10-19(a)(1)

CPLR 3101 (subd [a], par [1]) provides for full disclosure of all material and necessary evidence, regardless of burden of proof, by “a party or the officer, director, member, agent or employee of a party”. Marsala is clearly subject to disclosure as the employee of the defendant, Transit Authority.

Section 3101 entitles a party to examine a corporate codefendant before trial through an officer or employee who can address relevant facts and available documents.

Holloway v. Cha Cha Laundry, Inc. · filed 1983-10-20

Bermil, as a party, is entitled to have its codefendant CTC, a corporation in existence now as well as at the time it manufactured the washing machine in question, produce for examination before trial an officer or other employee with knowledge of the facts and issues involved in this action to furnish and explain what relevant documents may or may not be presently available.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery of an infant plaintiff’s testimony if the child is competent.

Muscoreil v. Pool Mart, Inc. · filed 1985-01-29(a)

There is no question that the testimony of the eight-year-old plaintiff, if he is ...competent, would properly be discoverable (CPLR 3101, subd [a]).

Section 3101(a)(1) does not allow a court to compel a party to produce for deposition a person who is neither its agent nor within its control.

Broyles & Broyles, Inc. v. Rainbow Square, Ltd. · filed 1986-12-19(a)(1)

There is no proof that defendant retained control over Halpern when he performed his energy analysis and, since there is no showing that he is an agent of defendant, his examination could not be directed under CPLR 3101 (a) (1) (see, Ludden v Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co., 38 AD2d 783).

CPLR 3101(a) permits discovery of an infant plaintiff’s testimony if she is competent to testify.

Almy v. Pappas · filed 1987-11-10(a)

There is no question that the testimony of the infant plaintiff, ... would properly be discoverable if she is competent (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits a further deposition when it is material and necessary to full disclosure.

Mosley v. Alexanders, Inc. · filed 1988-02-11(a)

Parties to a litigation are entitled to "full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (CPLR 3101 [a]). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion to the extent of permitting an additional deposition of plaintiff Kenyetta Mosley.

Section 3101(a)(1) permits the deposition of a person whose corporate alter ego is a party.

Lasidi, S. A. v. Financiera Avenida, S. A. · filed 1989-03-28(a)(1)

Therefore, the Shaikh was a proper party for a deposition under CPLR 3101 (a) (1).

Section 3101 permits an attorney’s deposition when a party affirmatively puts the attorney’s knowledge of relevant facts or communications at issue.

American Reliance Insurance v. National General Insurance · filed 1989-04-17

We find, as did the Supreme Court, that the defendants are entitled to depose the attorney who represented the plaintiff in connection with the negotiation and settlement of the lawsuit upon which this action is based, since the plaintiff has affirmatively placed in issue its attorney’s knowledge of facts or communications which might tend to prove bad faith on the part of the defendants (see, Slabakis v Drizin, 107 AD2d 45; Matter of Civil Serv. Employees Assn. v Ontario County Health Facility, 103 AD2d 1000; Glen 4912 Corp. v Strauss, 44 AD2d 582).

Section 3101(a) permits a further deposition when new allegations warrant it, but questioning may be limited to those allegations to avoid repeating earlier discovery.

Bumbulsky v. McCarthy · filed 1989-06-15(a)

Given that this was indeed contrary to defendant’s statement at the first deposition to the effect that plaintiff followed her advice, a third deposition is necessary. However, it should nevertheless be limited to the matters concerning the followup care specifically alleged by defendant in her bill of particulars.

Section 3101(a)(1) requires employees under a defendant employer’s control to submit to disclosure, but that obligation does not make them parties.

Naatz v. Queensbury Central School District · filed 1990-10-25(a)(1)

However, as we noted in Swiers, the fact that the employees of a defendant must submit to disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (a) (1) because they are considered to be under the control of their employer does not mean that they must be treated as parties (see, supra; see also, Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3101:19, at 21-22).