N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) sets no fixed deadline for expert disclosure, and noncompliance does not warrant preclusion without intentional or willful nondisclosure and prejudice.

Brand Med. Supply, Inc. v. Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. · filed 2020-06-05(d)(1)(i)

"CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute, unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party" ( Cutsogeorge v Hertz Corp. , 264 AD2d 752, 753-754 [1999] [internal quotation marks omitted]). ... However, since defendant's witness was the doctor who had prepared the peer review reports upon which the denials of the claims were based, his name was listed as such in each of the denial of claim forms, and his report was attached to defendant's motion for summary judgment, it is clear that plaintiff was not prejudiced ( see id. ).

Section 3101(d) permits an expert whose disclosure lacks specificity to testify on the subjects listed in the exchange rather than be precluded entirely.

Cabrera v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. · filed 2020-07-16(d)

Similarly, defendants' notice of expert exchange was not insufficient such as to warrant his in toto preclusion. The remedy for any alleged failures in specificity could have been handled by limiting his testimony to the subject matters listed in the exchange (CPLR 3101[d]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires an expert disclosure to describe the expected testimony in reasonable detail; a sufficient disclosure does not warrant preclusion of the expert.

M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 2020-10-14(d)(1)(i)

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant's motion which was to preclude the plaintiff's expert from testifying at trial as the plaintiff's expert witness disclosure was sufficient to satisfy the dictates of CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) ( see [*2]Conway v Elite Towing & Flatbedding Corp. , 135 AD3d at 894).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires reasonable detail about an expert's anticipated testimony but does not require every specific fact and opinion the expert will give.

Velez v. Roy · filed 2021-02-18(d)(1)(i)

Plaintiff"s expert disclosure notice disclosed in "reasonable detail" the substance of the expert"s anticipated testimony (CPLR 3101[d][1][i]) by setting forth the evidence on which the expert would base his opinion, including the autopsy report, and that the expert would opine that the decedent experienced conscious pain and suffering before he died ( see also Tate-Mitros v MTA N.Y. City Tr., 144 AD3d 454, 456 [1st Dept 2016]). There is no requirement that an expert set forth the specific facts and opinions that will be encompassed in his or her anticipated testimony ( Conway v Elite Towing & Flatbedding Corp., 135 AD3d 893, 894 [2d Dept 2016]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits preclusion of expert testimony when the disclosure fails to give notice of that testimony and the party shows no good cause for the delay.

Rosen v. Mosby · filed 2020-02-27(d)(1)(i)

Supreme Court did not improperly preclude testimony of Timothy Lynch, plaintiff's expert, regarding the value of the purported damages to the shared roadway; plaintiff's expert disclosure failed to provide notice that Lynch would be offering testimony as to the cost of damages, and plaintiff failed to otherwise demonstrate good cause for such delayed expert disclosure ( see CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; Lasher v Albany Mem. Hosp. , 161 AD3d 1326, 1332 [2018]).

A court may deny a mid-trial request to preclude expert testimony when an objection to the expert disclosure was apparent and could have been raised before trial.

Goldsmith v. Kipnis · filed 2020-08-12(d)(1)(i)

We further agree with the Supreme Court's exercise of its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion, made mid-trial, to preclude the defendants' expert from testifying about theories of causation not specifically referenced in the defendants' CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) expert disclosure statement ( see Rivera v Montefiore Med. Ctr. , 28 NY3d 999, 1002; Bernadis v Town of Islip , 95 AD3d 1050, 1050). The basis of the plaintiffs' objection to the expert disclosure was readily [*2]apparent from the face of the disclosure and could have been raised, and potentially cured, prior to trial ( see Rivera v Montefiore Med. Ctr. , 28 NY3d at 1002).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of a treating physician’s planned testimony about future medical needs and expenses; without disclosure or other notice, the testimony should be precluded.

Gjeka v. Iron Horse Transp., Inc. · filed 2021-02-16(d)(1)(i)

Plaintiff failed to serve a CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) expert disclosure notifying defendants that his treating physician would testify to his future medical needs and associated expenses, and defendants had no other notice of this testimony ( see Hamer v City of New York , 106 AD3d 504, 509 [1st Dept 2013]; Breen v Laric Entertainment Corp. , 2 AD3d 298 [1st Dept 2003]; Ryan v City of New York , 269 AD2d 170 [1st Dept 2000]). Accordingly, testimony on this issue should have been precluded ( see Mulligan v New York Cornell Med. Ctr. , 304 AD2d 492 [1st Dept 2003]).

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to provide demanded expert disclosures and is unprepared to proceed to trial with an expert.

Moody v. Hmoud · filed 2021-03-24(d)(1)(i)

The court therefore providently exercised its discretion in granting the separate applications of George, CRHC, and ORMC to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against each of them for the plaintiffs' failure to serve expert disclosures pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) and to be ready to proceed to trial with an expert ( see Geffner v Mercy Med. Ctr. , 167 AD3d 571, 573; Swezey v Montague Rehab & Pain Mgt., P.C. , 84 AD3d 779, 780; Reid v Rye Ridge Orthopedic Assoc. , 268 AD2d 574, 574).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires a party to identify an expected expert witness upon request; a discovery demand that does not ask for expert witness information creates no notice obligation.

Matter of Pena v. Chadee · filed 2021-06-30(d)(1)(i)

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) provides, in pertinent part, " [u]pon request , each party shall identify each person whom the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial" (emphasis added). Here, the father's demand for discovery that was in effect at the time failed to request any information concerning expert witnesses and, accordingly, the mother had no obligation to provide the father with notice of her expert witness.

Section 3101(d) does not require striking all of an expert's testimony because portions may exceed the expert disclosure when the relevant subject matter was disclosed elsewhere.

Johnson-Hendy v. Mosu · filed 2022-01-26(d)

However, even assuming that portions of the expert's testimony fell outside the CPLR 3101(d) disclosure, it was error to strike all of his testimony concerning Inglis and Shukla. Further, to the extent that portions of the expert's testimony fell outside the CPLR 3101(d) disclosure, the relevant subject matter was raised in the bills of particulars and in the expert's affirmation submitted in opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) governs whether an amended expert witness disclosure is sufficient.

Baden v. Bregy · filed 2022-01-26(d)(1)(i)

In addition, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's decision should have been set aside on the ground that the amended expert witness disclosure for the plaintiff's land title expert was insufficient to satisfy the dictates of CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) ( see M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. , 187 AD3d 884, 885).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) generally requires willful noncompliance or prejudice before an expert is precluded for late disclosure; an expert notice served before a trial date is set is timely even if served after the note of issue.

Louise v. Hampton Jitney, Inc. · filed 2021-04-13(d)(1)(i)

"Preclusion of expert evidence on the ground of failure to give timely disclosure, as called for in CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), is generally unwarranted without a showing that the noncompliance was willful or prejudicial to the party seeking preclusion" ( Martin v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. , 73 AD3d 481, 482 [1st Dept 2010]). Here, defendant served its expert notice after the note of issue, but prior to a trial date being set, and thus it was not untimely ( see Rivera v New York City Hous. Auth., 177 AD3d 499 [1st Dept 2019]; Haynes v City of New York , 145 AD3d 603 [1st Dept 2016]; Ramsen A. v New York City Hous. Auth. , 112 AD3d 439 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires an expert disclosure statement to describe in reasonable detail the expert's qualifications, expected testimony, and the grounds for the expert's opinion.

Speken v. Dental Pyramids, P.C. · filed 2022-06-27(d)(1)(i)

Defendants-respondents' expert disclosure statement disclosed in "reasonable detail" the qualifications of their expert witness, the subject matter and the substance of the facts and opinions on which the expert was expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for the expert's opinion (CPLR 3101[d][1][i]; see Velez v Roy , 191 AD3d 571, 572 [2021]; Conway v Elite Towing & Flatbedding Corp. , 135 AD3d 893, 894 [2016]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires reasonable disclosure of an expert’s expected testimony; preclusion is unwarranted when the disclosure and incorporated bills of particulars adequately signal the opinion without prejudice or surprise.

Owens v. Ascencio · filed 2022-11-02(d)(1)(i)

However, in light of the other allegations in the expert disclosure and the incorporated bills of particulars, including those that addressed the alleged failure to discover a "festering infection" and/or a "surgical site infection" prior to the plaintiff's discharge, "'the expert witness [disclosure] statement was not so inadequate or inconsistent with the expert's [proposed] testimony as to have been misleading, or to have resulted in prejudice or surprise'" ( Rabinowitz v Elimian , 55 AD3d 813, 814, quoting Gagliardotto v Huntington Hosp. , 25 AD3d 758, 759).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires reasonable detail about an expert’s expected testimony and qualifications, but does not require every specific fact and opinion the expert will give.

Jaquin v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2023-02-23(d)(1)(i)

It must be emphasized that the rule governing expert disclosure requires only that a party disclose "in reasonable detail" the subject matter and the substance of the facts and opinions on which the expert is expected to testify, in addition to the qualifications of each expert witness and a "summary" of the grounds for their opinion (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires expert disclosure for a treating physician expected to give expert testimony; counsel’s nonwillful failure to make that disclosure did not justify precluding the physician’s testimony.

Freeman v. State of New York · filed 2022-06-02(d)(1)(i)

The same holds true here, as claimant's attorney revealed that she practices law in a different judicial department and candidly conceded that she was unaware of this Court's interpretation that the statute requires expert disclosure for treating physicians. There is nothing in the record calling into question the veracity of counsel's representations and no basis to conclude that the noncompliance with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) was willful. As such, the court erred in precluding Hopson's testimony as an expert witness.

Section 3101(d)(1) permits parties in medical malpractice actions to withhold their experts' names and allows expert depositions only when all parties accept a written offer; an agreement requiring those depositions violates the section's public policy.

Mercado v. Schwartz · filed 2022-08-17(d)(1)

Contrary to the defendants' contention, the provision at issue directly contradicts CPLR 3101(d)(1), which permits parties in medical malpractice actions to omit the names of expert witnesses from disclosure and provides for expert witness depositions only in the event that a party makes a written offer to make its expert available for depositions and serves the offer upon all other parties and files it with the court, and all other parties accept the offer in writing ( see id. ).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) governs expert witness disclosure; courts may preclude expert testimony for noncompliance, but preclusion is reserved for willful, deliberate and contumacious failures to disclose.

Tardi v. Casler-Bladek · filed 2023-05-11(d)(1)(i)

Although the court has discretion to preclude expert testimony for failure to comply with this statute, "the remedy of preclusion is drastic . . . and is therefore reserved for those instances where the offending party's lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious" ( D.A. Bennett LLC v Cartz , 113 AD3d 945, 946 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Hubbell, Inc. v Lazy Swan Golf & Country Club LLC , 187 AD3d 1448, 1450-1451 [3d Dept 2020]; Seale v Seale , 149 AD3d 1164, 1165 [3d Dept 2017]). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff's failure to disclose was willful, intentional or in bad faith[*3].

Section 3101(d)(1) requires expert disclosures to describe each expert's expected testimony, qualifications, and grounds for opinions in reasonable detail.

M.F. v. Albany Med. Ctr. · filed 2023-07-20(d)(1)

Likewise, plaintiff's second amended expert disclosure regarding the experts in obstetrics and gynecology (labeled as "A"), orthopedics ("B") and pediatric neurology ("C") disclosed, "in reasonable detail[,] the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify, the qualifications of each expert witness and a summary of the grounds for each expert's opinion" (CPLR 3101 [d] [1]; see A.J. v Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist. , 214 AD3d 67, 73-74 [3d Dept 2023]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires requested expert witness disclosure but sets no fixed response time and does not automatically require preclusion for noncompliance.

Giovinazzo-Varela v. Varela · filed 2023-08-30(d)(1)(i)

However, CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) "does not require a response at any particular time or mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute" ( Mazzurco v Gordon , 173 AD3d 1001, 1002 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rowan v Cross County Ski & Skate, Inc. , 42 AD3d 563, 564).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires expert disclosure, and failure to comply can justify precluding testimony about an expert's report.

Romano v. Clove Lakes Health Care & Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc. · filed 2023-12-27(d)(1)(i)

The court did not err in precluding Stanley Freidman from testifying at trial as to the contents of a radiology report that he authored pertaining to the decedent's hip injury since the defendant did not comply with CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) ( see Rocco v Ahmed , 146 AD3d 836; cf. Duman v Scharf , 186 AD3d 672).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires a party, upon request, to disclose its expected expert witnesses and the substance of their anticipated testimony in reasonable detail.

Katz v. Petre Glass & Mirror Corp. · filed 2024-02-21(d)(1)(i)

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to preclude the defendant from offering expert testimony at trial, as the defendant's expert witness disclosure was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CPLR [*2]3101(d)(1)(i) ( see M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. , 187 AD3d at 885; Conway v Elite Towing & Flatbedding Corp. , 135 AD3d at 894).

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(iii)'s limits on disclosure of expected expert testimony do not protect a witness who is not an expert.

M.A. v. Spring · filed 2024-03-21(d)(1)(iii)

Contrary to defendants' contentions, the protections of CPLR 3101(d)(1)(iii) do not extend to O'Brien's expected trial testimony because she is not an expert witness, a fact acknowledged by defendants.

Additional disclosure about an opposing expert requires special circumstances; an assertion that the expert’s testing is novel or flawed does not suffice.

Almonte v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2023-06-01(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii)

Defendant's contention that the MRI with DTI procedure is novel, and the experts' opinions flawed, does not "rise to the level of special circumstances" that would warrant additional disclosure beyond that required by CPLR 3101(d) ( Padro v Pfizer, Inc. , 269 AD2d 129, 129 [1st Dept 2000]).

An objection that CPLR 3101(d) expert exchanges contain unsworn reports needs a legal basis for requiring sworn reports.

Lotrean v. 3M Co. · filed 2024-04-26(d)

To the extent Rust-Oleum complains that the reports in plaintiffs’ CPLR 3101 (d) exchanges are unsworn, it has not cited a statute or caselaw requiring that such exchange must include a sworn report.

Section 3101(d) requires an expert disclosure to describe the scope of anticipated testimony with sufficient specificity.

Cadigan v. Liberty Helicopters, Inc. · filed 2024-05-31(d)

The branch of the motion is granted as to Liberty's expert Michael C. Hurst to the extent of requiring Liberty to serve a supplemental CPLR 3101 (d) notice with more specificity as to the scope of Hurst's anticipated testimony.

Section 3101(d) requires timely and sufficient notice of expert testimony.

Alburquerque v. Bedford Park Deli, Inc. · filed 2024-06-27(d)

It was also not error to permit defendants to call an expert orthopedist to testify as to plaintiff's medical records and to rebut his expert's testimony instead of the physician who conducted plaintiff's medical examination on behalf of defendants, as that physician became unavailable for medical reasons. The CPLR 3101(d) notice was neither untimely nor insufficient.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits the court to consider expert affirmations with the experts' names redacted.

Gobind v. Nercessian · filed 2024-05-09(d)(1)(i)

The motion court was correct to accept the affirmations of plaintiff's experts, which had their names redacted (CPLR 3101[d][1][i]; see Vega v Mount Sinai-NYU Med. Ctr. & Health Sys ., 13 AD3d 62, 63 [1st Dept 2004]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a party at this stage to withhold its experts’ identities from the opposing party and public while providing unredacted affirmations for in camera review.

Collazo v. Gulmatico · filed 2024-09-04(d)(1)(i)

Here, Plaintiffs have submitted the signed, unredacted original copies of the affirmations for in camera inspection, but have redacted the affirmations to the opposing party and public to protect the identity of said experts, as they are permitted not to disclose them at this stage under CPLR 3101 (d)(1)(i) (see Turi v Birk, 118 AD3d 979, 980 [2d Dept 2014]; McCarty v Community Hosp. of Glen Cove, 203 AD2d 432 [2d Dept 1994]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a party to redact a retained medical expert’s name from an electronically filed affirmation when it submits an unredacted copy to the court.

Moss v. Mount Sinai Beth Israel · filed 2024-12-05(d)(1)(i)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, it is perfectly appropriate for the plaintiff to redact the name of her retained medical expert from the copy uploaded to the New York State Court Electronic Filing system, while submitting an unredacted copy to the court, as she did here (see CPLR 3101[d][1][i]; 3121[b]; Gobind v Nercessian, 227 AD3d 464, 465 [1st Dept 2024]; Vega v Mount Sinai-NYU Med. Ctr. & Health Sys., 13 AD3d 62, 63 [1st Dept 2004]; Wilcox v Winter, 282 AD2d 862, 863 [2d Dept 2001]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a court to consider an expert affirmation despite the absence of an unredacted version for in camera review.

Johnson v. Harlem Hosp. · filed 2025-05-01(d)(1)(i)

Furthermore, this expert's affirmation was properly considered. Supreme Court, which was in the best position to evaluate defendants' argument that the affirmation should not be considered because no unredacted version was submitted for in camera review, implicitly rejected this argument ( see CPLR 3101[d][1][i]; Richter v Menocal , 216 AD3d 823, 824 [2d Dept 2023]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires expert disclosure to identify the substance of the expert’s facts and opinions and the grounds for them; a list of source materials without the underlying methodology and principles is insufficient.

Santana v. Peter Thomas Roth Labs LLC · filed 2025-06-13(d)(1)(i)

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) requires that expert disclosure include "the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify . . . and a summary of the grounds for each expert's opinion." ... What Defendants provided are merely the sources from which facts may be derived and not the facts themselves. The disclosure falls short of the standard required under CPLR 3101.

Section 3101(d) permits preclusion of expert testimony on repair costs when that subject falls outside the expert disclosure.

Franco v. Sterling Home Solutions LLC · filed 2025-07-24(d)

When plaintiff asked Iula to estimate the cost to repair the asserted defects, defendant objected on the basis such testimony was outside the scope of Iula's inspection report that had been received into evidence, as well as plaintiff's expert disclosure under CPLR 3101 (d), neither of which spoke to damages. ... In any event, Supreme Court's preclusion decision was well within its discretion, as was its decision declining plaintiff's request to resume the stand because his proffered payment testimony did not speak to actual damages ( see Feldsberg v Nitschke , 49 NY2d 636, 643 [1980]).

Section 3101(d)(1) allows a court to exercise discretion over whether to preclude expert testimony.

Kuznitz v. Funk · filed 2025-09-10(d)(1)

Finally, the court providently exercised its discretion in declining to preclude the plaintiffs from offering expert testimony pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1) ( see Mazzurco v Gordon , 173 AD3d 1001, 1002; EIFS, Inc. v Morie Co. , 298 AD2d 548, 550).

Section 3101(d) expert disclosures did not permit the plaintiff to cross-examine the defendants’ experts with those disclosures.

Muroff v. Heerdt · filed 2025-10-30(d)

The trial court correctly granted defendants' objections to plaintiff's attempts to cross-examine their expert witnesses with defendants' CPLR 3101(d) disclosures ( see Veneski v Queens-Long Island Med. Grp. , 285 AD2d 369, 370 [1st Dept 2001]; Gibson v St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr. , 267 AD2d 136, 137 [1st Dept 1999]; Hageman v Jacobson , 202 AD2d 160, 161 [1st Dept 1994]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of a treating physician who is expected to give expert testimony.

Dewan-Zemko v. Hunter Mtn. Ski Bowl, Inc. · filed 2026-01-29(d)(1)(i)

We decline plaintiffs' invitation to adopt the approaches followed by our Sister Departments and reiterate this Court's continued view that CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) "requir[es] disclosure of any medical professional, even a treating physician or nurse, who is expected to give expert testimony" ( Schmitt v Oneonta City Sch. Dist. , 151 AD3d 1254, 1255 [3d Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Freeman v State of New York , 206 AD3d 1102, 1105 [3d Dept 2022]; see generally David D. Siegel & Patrick M. Connors, New York Practice § 348A [6th ed, Dec. 2024 update]).

Section 3101(d)(1)'s expert witness disclosure requirement does not apply to fact witnesses.

Chiloyan v. Chiloyan · filed 2026-02-18(d)(1)

Since both witnesses were fact witnesses and not expert witnesses, the disclosure requirement of CPLR 3101(d)(1) was inapplicable ( see O'Neil v Klass , 36 AD3d 677, 678; Sheppard v Blitman/Atlas Bldg. Corp. , 288 AD2d 33, 35).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires expert disclosure to give the opposing party a meaningful understanding of the expert’s anticipated testimony.

350 E. Houston St., LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. · filed 2026-04-02(d)(1)(i)

Peterson's expert disclosure was insufficient because plaintiffs were "not . . . enlightened to any appreciable degree about the content of the expert's anticipated testimony" (Chapman v State of New York, 189 AD2d 1075, 1075 [3d Dept 1993]; see CPLR 3101[d][1][i]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) allows expert testimony when the party’s expert disclosure satisfies its requirements.

Nassau Point Prop. Owners Assn., Inc. v. Geroulanos · filed 2026-05-13(d)(1)(i)

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to preclude the plaintiff from offering expert testimony, as the plaintiff's expert witness disclosure was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) (see Katz v Petre Glass & Mirror Corp., 224 AD3d at 826; M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 187 AD3d 884, [*2]885).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure, upon request, of expected expert witnesses, their qualifications, the substance of their expected testimony, and the grounds for their opinions; the court applied this rule to defense psychiatric experts in a criminal case.

People v. Fratt · filed 1989-10-16(d)(1)(i)

When reading CPL 250.10 in conjunction with CPLR 3101 (d), it is clear that the defense must, upon request of the prosecutor, provide the name and qualifications of each person whom the defense expects to call as an expert witness at trial in relation to psychiatric issues and must disclose to the prosecutor in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each defense expert’s opinion.

Section 3101(d) governs notice when a party will testify as an expert.

Zinn v. Jefferson Towers, Inc. · filed 2005-01-18(d)

Plaintiff shall serve notice pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) within 20 days of service of a copy of this order with notice of entry.

An expert affidavit submitted on summary judgment may be considered even if the CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) expert exchange was not furnished beforehand.

Moreland v. Huck · filed 2017-12-22(d)(1)(i)

We write only to address plaintiff’s contention that the court should have granted her cross motion to strike the affidavits of the three subject witnesses because defendants failed to provide timely expert witness disclosure for those witnesses pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i). We reject that contention. Even assuming, arguendo, that each of the three witnesses provided expert testimony in his affidavit, we note that CPLR 3212 (b) provides in relevant part that, “[w]here an expert affidavit is submitted in support of, or opposition to, a motion for summary judgment, the court shall not decline to consider the affidavit because an expert exchange pursuant to [CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i)] was not furnished prior to the submission of the affidavit.”

Section 3101(d) does not require an expert exchange before an expert affidavit may be submitted on summary judgment.

Brown v. 43-25 Hunter, L.L.C. · filed 2019-12-12(d)

However, CPLR 3212(b) expressly permits the submission of expert affidavits in connection with a summary judgment motion, even where an expert exchange pursuant to CPLR § 3101(d) was not furnished prior to the affidavit's submission. Therefore, this Court considered the biomechanical engineer's affidavit in its review of the appeal.

Section 3101(d)(1) requires disclosure of a trial expert’s identity and expected testimony on request and permits further expert disclosures by court order upon a showing of special circumstances.

Nationwide General Insurance Company v. Rael Maintenance Corp. · filed 2024-04-24(d)(1)

To the contrary, New York does permit expert discovery: “Upon request, each party shall identify each person whom the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and shall disclose in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify, the qualifications of each expert witness and a summary of the grounds for each expert’s opinion. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(d)(1)(i); see also id. § 3101(d)(1)(iii) (providing that further expert testimony disclosures may be obtained by court order “upon a showing of special circumstances”). Plaintiffs fail to show how New York’s procedural rules fail to adequately protect their rights.

Section 3101(d) limits a party’s ability to call an opposing party’s retained expert when other expert testimony is available.

Young v. Strong · filed 1986-03-20(d)

Where there is no difficulty in obtaining other expert testimony, one party may not call as a witness another party’s expert (Gugliano v Levi, 24 AD2d 591; cf. CPLR 3101 [d]). Since plaintiffs had their own expert, it would have been improper for them to have called Grady.

Failure to furnish an expert exchange under § 3101(d)(1)(i) before a summary judgment motion does not bar consideration of the expert's affidavit.

Savas v. 557 8th Ave. Corp. · filed 2024-10-15(d)(1)(i)

Defendant's argument that Krongelb's report is inadmissible because Plaintiff failed to comply with CPLR §3101 (d] is misplaced. CPLR § 3212 (b] explicitly states that "[w]here an expert affidavit is submitted in support of or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment, the court shall not decline to consider the affidavit because an expert exchange pursuant to subparagraph (i) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of section 3101 was not furnished prior to the submission of the affidavit".

Section 3101(d)'s expert disclosure requirements do not apply in criminal proceedings because the Criminal Procedure Law provides for disclosure.

People v. Rossakis · filed 1993-10-18(d)

CPLR 3101 (d) is a civil rule of disclosure and relates to the pretrial discovery of the name of an expert witness, the subject matter of the testimony and the expert’s qualifications. Since the CPL already provides for disclosure (CPL art 240), the CPLR is not applicable (see, CPL 60.10).

Section 3101(h) requires a party to supplement a previously complete disclosure when changed circumstances make it incomplete and failure to supplement would be materially misleading.

Green v. Staten Island University Hospital · filed 1994-07-28(h)

The second reason for supplying additional information is that while the original response was correct and complete when submitted, it is no longer correct or complete and a failure to amend or supplement the response would be materially misleading. ... The court finds that the failure to provide the material would not be misleading.

Section 3101(h) requires a party to supplement a disclosure response when previously supplied information is no longer correct and complete and leaving it unchanged would be materially misleading.

Green v. Staten Island Hospital · filed 1995-11-13(h)

Furthermore, a party is only required to amend or supplement its response to disclosure when information previously supplied is no longer correct and complete, if the failure to do so would be materially misleading (see, CPLR 3101 [h]). We agree with the Supreme Court that failure to disclose the additional information requested by the defendants would not materially mislead the defendants.

Section 3101(h) requires a party to supplement a discovery response when new information makes the response materially misleading, without waiting for a new demand.

Dehaney v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1997-03-27(h)

Simply put, CPLR 3101 (h) imposes a “duty”, and requires all parties to “assume the initiative” and correct discovery responses to disclosure requests under certain specified circumstances. ... As plaintiffs concede that there are additional treating doctors, it would be materially misleading not to amend or supplement the previous discovery response and provide additional authorizations for these doctors’ medical records.

Section 3101(h) requires timely exchange of evidence; admitting undisclosed evidence that unfairly surprises a party on a central issue can warrant a new trial.

Ward v. Mehar · filed 1999-08-30(h)

The trial court erred in allowing into evidence the log book maintained by the injured plaintiff’s employer because it was not timely exchanged (see, CPLR 3101 [h]). The log book, in the words of the plaintiffs’ attorney, constituted a “critical piece of evidence” and it went to a central issue in the case. The admission and use of the log book during trial constituted an unfair surprise to the defendant Gurinder Mehar (see, e.g., Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank, 78 NY2d 371). Therefore, a new trial is warranted.

Section 3101(h) requires a party to provide witness addresses as they become available.

Brown v. United Christian Evangelistic Ass'n · filed 2000-03-20(h)

Furthermore, the plaintiff has a continuing obligation to provide such information as it becomes available to him (see, CPLR 3101 [h]).

Section 3101(h) requires a party to update its discovery response after obtaining a witness statement; a statement disclosed too late may be precluded.

Holliday v. Hudson Armored Car & Courier Service, Inc. · filed 2003-01-14(h)

We need not resolve this question since the IAS court expressly disclaimed reliance on this document in denying Hudson’s motion, and, in any event, the McDermon statement should have been precluded on the alternative ground that plaintiffs failed to disclose it until they submitted their opposition to Hudson’s motion in December 2001, many years after submitting a discovery response stating “[p]laintiff has not obtained statements from witnesses” (see CPLR 3101 [h]), and well over a year after the statement was signed by McDermon.

Section 3101(h) permits disclosure concerning previously unclaimed property damage items when feasible and warranted by the circumstances.

Curbean v. Kibel · filed 2004-11-09(h)

Plaintiffs’ list of property damage containing previously unclaimed items, first produced on the eve of trial without a reasonable excuse, should have been precluded (see Ward v Mehar, 264 AD2d 515 [1999]), or, at the least, if feasible and otherwise warranted by the circumstances, defendants given an opportunity to conduct disclosure with respect thereto (see CPLR 3101 [h]).

Section 3101(h) requires parties to disclose information as it becomes available, and a court may preclude testimony from witnesses whose addresses were not disclosed.

Frenk v. Frederick · filed 2007-03-13(h)

Parties have a continuing obligation to provide information as it becomes available to them (see CPLR 3101 [h]), and where the defendants attempt to introduce at trial the testimony of witnesses whose addresses were not disclosed to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs may seek preclusion of that evidence at that time (see Brown v United Christian Evangelistic Assn., 270 AD2d 378, 379 [2000]). Under the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting preclusion.

Section 3101(h) requires a party to amend or supplement a collateral source response when it is incorrect, incomplete, or becomes misleading.

Firmes v. Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp. · filed 2008-01-22(h)

Moreover, plaintiffs are under a continuing obligation to promptly amend or supplement a collateral source response if an initial response is incorrect or incomplete, or if correct and complete when initially made, circumstances are such that the failure to amend or supplement would render the initial response misleading (see CPLR 3101 [h]; Dehaney v New York City Tr. Auth., 180 Misc 2d 695, 698-699 [1997]).

A party may waive supplemental disclosure under CPLR 3101(h) by stipulating that discovery is complete and filing a note of issue and certificate of readiness.

Chichilnisky v. Trustees of Columbia University · filed 2008-06-03(h)

While plaintiff asserts that her expert cannot complete an updated analysis of her damages based on the data that defendant has provided for the 10-year period ending in 2005, by entering into two stipulations agreeing that discovery was complete and thereafter filing the note of issue and certificate of readiness, plaintiff waived any right she may have had to supplemental disclosure (cf. 22 NYCRR 202.21 [d]; see Think Pink, Inc. v Rim, Inc., 19 AD3d 331 [2005]; Green v Staten Is. Hosp., 221 AD2d 416 [1995]).

Section 3101 (h) requires parties to supplement prior discovery responses but does not require them to disclose every document they intend to use at trial.

Theodoli v. 170 East 77th 1 LLC · filed 2009-04-13(h)

Further, the court notes that in 1993, the CPLR was amended to require continuing supplementation of all previously supplied discovery. (CPLR 3101 [h].) Certainly, the legislature could have required that each party produce all documents each intended to introduce at trial during discovery, instead of merely requiring supplementation of prior responses.

Section 3101(h) does not require a motion to amend an interrogatory response that has become incomplete, except when a party obtains information on the eve of trial.

Castor Petroleum, Ltd. v. Petroterminal de Panama, S.A. · filed 2011-12-01(h)

Plaintiff was not required to move to amend its interrogatory responses pursuant to CPLR 3101 (h), where, although the original response was correct and complete when made, defendant’s numerous requests for more detailed calculation of the damages rendered the response incomplete. The statute does not provide for motion practice, except where a party obtains information on the eve of trial, which did not apply here, since no date had been set for trial (see Maddaloni Jewelers, Inc. v Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 73 AD3d 629, 630 [2010]), no depositions had been taken, and the note of issue had not been filed.

Section 3101(h) requires parties to supplement discovery responses promptly when they receive responsive information or materials.

Arpino v. F.J.F. & Sons Electric Co. · filed 2012-12-05(h)

In addition, the record demonstrates that the service of the supplemental discovery responses was not contemporaneous with the defendants’ receipt of the information and photographs disclosed so as to satisfy their continuing disclosure duty under CPLR 3101 (h).

Section 3101(h) requires a party to supplement discovery responses to disclose an omitted excess insurance policy.

Golebiewski v. National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh, Pa. · filed 2012-12-26(h)

Counsel for SBP did not supplement that response to include information regarding the excess policy at issue, the National Union policy, despite counsel’s continuing obligation to supplement discovery responses (see CPLR 3101 [h]).

Section 3101(h) imposes an ongoing obligation to amend or supplement disclosure responses.

Matter of Camara v. Skanska, Inc. · filed 2017-05-18(h)

Although respondents have already largely complied with petitioner’s pre-action disclosure requests, respondents still have an ongoing obligation to “amend or supplement” their responses (CPLR 3101 [h]), and the order imposes additional outstanding disclosure obligations.

Section 3101(h) does not require a party to disclose a witness's new address when the party does not know it.

Onilude v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-12(h)

As defendants did not know her new address, they had no obligation under CPLR 3101(h).

CPLR 3101(h) requires a party to update disclosure when previously provided records and authorizations are no longer correct and complete.

Schleger v. Jurcsak · filed 2020-08-19(h)

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the plaintiff had a duty under CPLR 3101(h) to disclose to the defendants that he resumed treatment with neurologist Itzhak Haimovic in 2013, as the records and authorizations the plaintiff provided to the defendants in 2012 were no longer correct and complete once he resumed treatment with Haimovic in 2013, and his failure to disclose this resumed treatment materially misled the defendants as to the extent of the plaintiff's treatment ( see CPLR 3101[h]; Firmes v Chase Manhattan Auto. Fin. Corp. , 50 AD3d 18, 35-37).

Section 3101(h) permits a party to disclose that it seeks consequential damages in a supplemental response to interrogatories.

R&R Third Props., LLC v. Federal Ins. Co. · filed 2021-02-04(h)

Plaintiffs also disclosed that they were seeking consequential damages in a supplemental response to Federal's interrogatories, as permitted by CPLR 3101(h) ( see Castor Petroleum, 90 AD3d at 424).

Section 3101(a) does not require supplemental responses when defendants have provided the available materials and sufficient affidavits describing a reasonable, diligent search for missing records.

Walsh v. West Gramercy Assoc. LLC · filed 2022-11-17(a)

Defendants have produced multiple deposition witnesses, provided all available items, including the exchange of countless maintenance/work tickets, whose entries duplicate the missing logbook, and provided sufficient Jackson affidavits that described their reasonable and diligent search for the rear elevator maintenance contract and the March 2012 logbook pertaining to the rear elevator that is the subject of plaintiff's negligence action ( see CPLR 3101[a]; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co. , 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; see generally Andon v 302-304Mott St. , 94 NY2d 740, 746 [2000]).

Section 3101(h) requires a party to supplement a discovery production that is no longer complete, even when the additional material is publicly accessible.

Abuzaid v. Almayouf · filed 2024-04-19(h)

The defendant's argument that these posts need not be disclosed because they are publicly accessible is unavailing, as it is the defendant's obligation to provide supplemental production if her initial production is no longer complete. See CPLR 3101 (h).

Section 3101(h) governs when a party must amend or supplement a disclosure response; supplementation need not be compelled without evidence that the response was incomplete or incorrect.

Time Warner Cable Enters. LLC v. Nokia of Am. Corp. · filed 2024-07-25(h)

CPLR 3101[h] governs when amendment or supplementation of responses is required. ... Here, there is no evidence before this court, at this time, that Nokia somehow provided incomplete or incorrect information such that an order directing supplementation would be required.

Section 3101(h) requires a party to supplement a discovery response when later information shows that it was incorrect or incomplete.

Slabakis v. Olympos Trading Corp. · filed 2024-11-20(h)

Here, there is no evidence before this court, at this time, that defendants provided incomplete or incorrect information such that an order directing supplementation would be required.

Section 3101(h) requires parties to promptly amend or supplement their discovery responses.

Ortiz v. Family Baptist Church · filed 2025-01-29(h)

Furthermore, pursuant to 3101 (h) plaintiffs late disclosure violates their duty to promptly amend or supplement their responses to defendant's discovery demand.

An appellate decision clarifying damages law is not a new fact supporting supplemental interrogatory responses under § 3101(h).

Hobish v. AXA Equit. Life Ins. Co. · filed 2025-03-03(h)

Hobish explains that the Supplemental Interrogatory Responses were submitted under CPLR 3101(h) because the Court of Appeals “clarified the law on damages.” (NYSCEF 289, Hobish’s MOL at 2.) This court rejects Hobish’s assertion that the Court of Appeals decision is a new fact.

Section 3101's disclosure rule permits a court to require an affidavit describing a party's search for responsive documents when its limited production leaves the thoroughness of that search in question.

Ferrick v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2025-06-04

Generally, "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action" by agents of a party to litigation (CPLR 3101; see Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank , 78 NY2d 371, 376; Lurie v Lurie , 226 AD3d 992, 994). ... Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the defendants to provide an affidavit from a person with knowledge cataloging the past and present status of the relevant documents; where they were kept; what efforts, if any, were made to preserve them; the circumstances surrounding their disappearance or destruction; and the means and methods used to conduct a search for them ( see M.B. v St. Francis Preparatory Sch. , 219 AD3d at 1402; Donovan v City of New York , 239 AD2d at 461).

Section 3101 permits a court to require an affidavit detailing a party’s search for responsive documents so the court can assess whether the search was thorough and made in good faith.

Doe v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2025-06-04

Generally, "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action" by agents of a party to litigation (CPLR 3101; see Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank , 78 NY2d 371, 376; Lurie v Lurie , 226 AD3d 992, 994). ... Such an affidavit was needed for the court to determine whether the defendant's search for responsive documents had been thorough and conducted in a good-faith effort to locate any relevant documents ( see M.B. v St. Francis Preparatory Sch. , 219 AD3d at 1402; Donovan v City of New York , 239 AD2d at 461).

Section 3101 permits a court to require an affidavit detailing a party’s search for responsive documents when its disclosure and explanation are inadequate.

De Vine v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2025-06-04

Generally, "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action" by agents of a party to litigation (CPLR 3101; see Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank , 78 NY2d 371, 376; Lurie v Lurie , 226 AD3d 992, 994). ... Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the defendants to provide an affidavit from a person with knowledge cataloging the past and present status of the relevant documents; where they were kept; what efforts, if any, were made to preserve them; the circumstances surrounding their disappearance or destruction; and the means and methods used to conduct a search for them ( see M.B. v St. Francis Preparatory Sch. , 219 AD3d at 1402; Donovan v City of New York , 239 AD2d at 461).

Section 3101(f) permits discovery of the existence and contents of insurance agreements, but does not require disclosure of pending claims.

Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hospital · filed 1995-03-15(f)

I conclude that, under CPLR 3101 (f), plaintiff does not have the right to the information he requests. The language of the statute is unambiguous, enabling a plaintiff to discover the existence and contents of the insurance agreements.

Section 3101(f) does not permit discovery of a nonparty’s insurance coverage when that coverage cannot satisfy a judgment in the action.

Rzepecki v. Ciesla Electrical Construction Co. · filed 1995-06-09(f)

Because the insurance of a non-party is not directly available to satisfy a potential judgment against defendants, discovery concerning such coverage does not further the purpose of CPLR 3101 (f).

Section 3101(f) requires defendants to answer discovery requests concerning insurance coverage.

Melius v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1999-12-30(f)

Therefore, we modify the order by directing defendants to disclose the information requested by plaintiffs concerning the flexfans produced, distributed, or sold by defendants from the years 1973 through 1979 inclusive, and, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (f), to answer forthwith plaintiffs’ interrogatories concerning insurance coverage.

Section 3101(f) entitles a party to disclosure of insurance policies that may cover a judgment, including the policies themselves.

Anderson v. House of Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 2003-11-21(f)

Supreme Court erred in denying that part of plaintiffs motion with respect to defendants’ insurance and reinsurance policies. CPLR 3101 (f), entitled “Contents of insurance agreement,” provides that a “party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be hable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.”

Section 3101(f) requires a defendant to respond to a proper demand for insurance information; an insufficient letter does not satisfy that demand.

Lolly v. Brookdale University Hospital & Medical Center · filed 2006-01-24(f)

The plaintiff made a proper demand for insurance information, dated August 12, 2004, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (f) ... The letter of Brookdale’s counsel, dated December 14, 2004, was an insufficient response to the plaintiffs demand.

CPLR 3101(f) entitles a party to copies of applicable reinsurance policies.

Clarendon National Insurance v. Atlantic Risk Management, Inc. · filed 2009-02-19(f)

As to defendant’s request for information relating to reinsurance policies available to Clarendon with respect to the claims at issue in this litigation, CPLR 3101 (f) entitles defendant to copies of the applicable reinsurance policies themselves (see Anderson v House of Good Samaritan Hosp., 1 AD3d 970 [2003]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of a plaintiff's no-fault records when they are material and necessary to defending a personal injury action, even if the plaintiff seeks no unreimbursed special damages.

Cajamarca v. Osatuk · filed 2018-07-11(a)

Accordingly, since the plaintiff's no-fault records are material and necessary to the defense of this action, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff's motion for a protective order ( see Scott v Albord, 289 AD2d 389).

Section 3101(f)'s insurance disclosure requirement can be satisfied by providing a certified copy of the policy.

Burlington Ins. Co. v. Tour Cent. Park, Inc. · filed 2021-05-04(f)

The certified policy included in the record on appeal was sufficient to fulfill Burlington's disclosure requirements (CPLR 3101[f]; Martinez v OEL Realty Corp. , 113 AD3d 418, 419 [1st Dept 2014]; Russo v Rochford , 123 Misc 2d 55, 68-69 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1984]).

Section 3101(f)(1) requires automatic disclosure of reinsurance agreements because they are insurance agreements.

Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Century Indem. Co. · filed 2025-11-20(f)(1)

Reinsurance agreements are subject to automatic disclosure under CPLR 3101(f).

Section 3101(f) requires disclosure of insurance coverage, including excess coverage; a failure to disclose does not warrant striking an answer when it was not willful, contumacious or in bad faith.

SHARKEY, DONALD J. v. CHOW, M.D., JOSEPH LIN-YUN · filed 2011-05-06(f)

In appeal No. 1, plaintiff appeals from an order denying his pretrial motion to strike defendants’ joint answer for failure to comply with his discovery demands pursuant to CPLR 3101 (f), seeking information regarding insurance coverage with respect to Springville. ... With respect to appeal No. 4, we conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the failure to disclose excess coverage was not willful, contumacious or in bad faith and thus refusing to strike the answer (cf. Perry v Town of Geneva, 64 AD3d 1225).

CPLR 3101 requires a party seeking a trade secret in discovery to show that the information appears indispensable to finding the truth and cannot be obtained another way.

Ain Leasing Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. · filed 1995-11-21

It is well established that the scope of discovery under CPLR 3101 is to be construed liberally where discovery of trade secrets is sought. The party seeking disclosure must show that the information demanded appears to be indispensable to the ascertainment of truth and cannot be acquired in any other way.

Section 3101(a) favors liberal disclosure; a conclusory claim that requested customer lists and sales data are trade secrets does not justify a protective order.

Dynamic Medical Communications, Inc. v. Norwest Trade Printers, Inc. · filed 1999-01-26(a)

Defendants’ alternative request for a protective order against the discovery and inspection of their customer lists and sales data was also appropriately denied, their conclusory claim that plaintiff seeks disclosure of trade secrets being insufficient in these circumstances to overcome the well-established preference for liberal discovery (see, CPLR 3101 [a]; Twenty Four Hour Fuel Oil Corp. v Hunter Ambulance, 226 AD2d 175; Matter of New York County DES Litig., 171 AD2d 119, 123).

Section 3101 permits discovery of trade secrets only when the requesting party shows that the information is indispensable to finding the truth and cannot be obtained another way.

Curtis v. Complete Foam Insulation Corp. · filed 1986-01-23

However, due in part to the important public benefits in protecting trade secrets (see, Matter of New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Commn., 56 NY2d 213, 219), the liberal discovery rules are modified when trade secrets are sought to be discovered. In such a case, the party seeking disclosure must show that the information sought appears to be indispensable to the ascertainment of truth and cannot be acquired in any other way (Drake v Herrman, 261 NY 414).

CPLR 3101(b) gives trade secrets limited protection from disclosure; customer lists qualify if their names are not known in the trade or are discoverable only through extraordinary efforts.

New York State Businessmen's Group, Inc. v. Dalton · filed 1989-10-19(b)

CPLR 3101 (b) affords limited disclosure protection to trade secrets (see, Curtis v Complete Foam Insulation Corp., 116 AD2d 907, 909), and customer lists qualify as trade secrets if the names on the list "are not known in the trade or are discoverable only through extraordinary efforts” (Epic Chems. v Gordon, 95 AD2d 820, 821).

CPLR 3101 permits discovery of a trade secret when the requesting party shows that the information is indispensable to determining the truth and cannot be obtained another way; disclosure may be conditioned on confidentiality.

Deas v. Carson Products Co. · filed 1991-04-29

Although it is well established that the scope of discovery under CPLR 3101 is to be construed liberally, where discovery of trade secrets is sought, the party seeking disclosure must show that the information demanded appears to be "indispensable to the ascertainment of truth and cannot be acquired in any other way” (Curtis v Complete Foam Insulation Corp., 116 AD2d 907, 909; see also, Thomas v Soft Sheen Prod. Co., 118 AD2d 493). Upon our review of the record at bar, we find that the plaintiff, who alleges that he sustained serious personal injuries as result of his use of the respondent’s facial depilatory cream, met his burden of establishing that access to the product’s formula is necessary to the preparation of his case.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery of contractors’ bid cost figures relevant to delay damages, even if the figures are trade secrets.

Martin Mechanical Corp. v. City of New York · filed 1979-08-08(a)

CPLR 3101 (subd [a]) requires full disclosure of "all evidence material and necessary” to the defense of the action. ... So that even if, arguendo, the cost figures were trade secrets they would have to be disclosed. ... The motion for discovery and inspection is therefore granted.

Section 3101 permits disclosure of potential trade secrets when the information is indispensable to determining the truth and cannot be acquired another way.

Carecore National, LLC v. New York State Ass'n of Medical Imaging Providers, Inc. · filed 2005-12-12

Although “the scope of discovery under CPLR 3101 is to be construed liberally, where discovery of trade secrets is sought, the party seeking disclosure must show that the information demanded appears to be ‘indispensable to the ascertainment of truth and cannot be acquired in any other way’ ” (Deas v Carson Prods. Co., 172 AD2d 795, 796 [1991], quoting Curtis v Complete Foam Insulation Corp., 116 AD2d 907, 909 [1986]). ... Accordingly, the plaintiff must provide the defendants with copies of the subject contracts.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery of comparable employees’ performance records when they may show whether an employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext, subject to a reasonable time limit.

McMahon v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc. · filed 2016-03-28(a)

Plaintiff’s personnel requests are reasonable. ... Comparing plaintiff’s performance evaluations with those of other transplant coordinators, both terminated and retained, might allow plaintiff to show that other probationary employees with similar performance evaluations were not terminated, thereby countering defendant’s claim that plaintiff was discharged for poor performance. ... Therefore, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion to compel the production of the personnel requests from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2013.

Section 3101(a)(1) permits discovery of records about employees who engaged in similar conduct when the records may show disparate treatment.

Diaz v. Minhas Constr. Corp., LLC · filed 2020-11-12(a)(1)

Since the plaintiff alleges disparate treatment and seeks to raise an inference of discrimination, she is entitled to discovery of documents regarding other employees who engaged in conduct similar to that for which she was terminated, as such documents may indicate that some or all of those employees were not terminated and may have been disciplined less severely or not at all.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery of documents relevant to negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims.

Lisiecki v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. · filed 2023-12-14(a)

After an in camera review, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the two identified documents, letters from RCANY's former employee to Cardinal John O'Connor, were discoverable for plaintiff's claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against the RCANY employee ( see CPLR 3101[a]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of personnel records created after alleged abuse when they are material and necessary to a negligent hiring, retention, or supervision claim.

Holloway v. Orthodox Church in Am. · filed 2024-11-20(a)

The plaintiff demonstrated that discovery of those documents was material and necessary to the prosecution of this action, including to establish whether Sarafian was an employee of the Church defendants, whether Sarafian abused the plaintiff, and whether the Church defendants engaged in negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of Sarafian ( see id. ; J.L. v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. , 222 AD3d 483; Harmon v Diocese of Albany , 204 AD3d 1270; Pisula v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. , 201 AD3d 88; Melfe v Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany N.Y. , 196 AD3d 811; Bigman v Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB , 153 AD2d 912, 914).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of personnel investigation records material to whether an employer had notice of alleged abuse before the plaintiff was harmed.

C.T. v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2025-06-11(a)

The plaintiff established that discovery of those documents was material and necessary to the prosecution of this action, including to establish whether the Diocese had actual or constructive notice of Dwyer's alleged propensity to engage in the sexual abuse of children prior to his alleged abuse of the plaintiff ( see Holloway v Orthodox Church in Am. , 232 AD3d at 774-775; Harmon v Diocese of Albany , 204 AD3d 1270, 1272-1273).

Section 3101 permits disclosure of personnel file material concerning investigations into allegations that postdate the plaintiff’s alleged abuse in a negligent hiring, retention, and supervision action.

A.O. v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2025-12-03(a)

Contrary to the Diocese's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to compel the Diocese to produce certain portions of the personnel files that related to the Diocese's investigation into allegations against the alleged perpetrators that postdated their alleged abuse of the plaintiff and in denying that branch of the Diocese's cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3103(a) for a protective order preventing disclosure of those portions of the personnel files ( see C.T. v Diocese of Brooklyn , 239 AD3d at 786).

Section 3101(d)(2) conditionally protects an insurer’s claim file prepared in anticipation of litigation; disclosure requires a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.

Merchants Preferred Ins. Co. v. Campbell · filed 2022-11-10(d)(2)

Because the materials sought by Charleus and ordered to be disclosed by the court's order were prepared in anticipation of litigation and because Charleus has not made a showing [*2]justifying disclosure ( see generally Teran , 164 AD3d at 1499; Lamberson , 158 AD2d at 944), we modify the order by denying the motion in its entirety and granting the cross motion.

Section 3101(d)(2) protects material prepared solely in anticipation of litigation unless the party seeking disclosure shows substantial need and an inability to obtain it elsewhere without undue hardship.

Rhymes v. Elrac, LLC · filed 2025-03-26(d)(2)

Where, as here, the party seeking to prevent disclosure makes the required showing that the materials were solely prepared in anticipation of litigation, the burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure to establish that there is a substantial need for the materials and that they cannot be obtained elsewhere without undue hardship ( see CPLR 3101[d][2]; Straus v Ambinder , 61 AD3d 672, 673; Volpicelli v Westchester County , 102 AD2d 853).

Section 3101(d) protects material prepared for litigation in New York state discovery, but it does not expand the privileged matter protected from production under federal Rule 34.

Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 1970-01-23(d)

Thus, in the State’s own terms, the matter is one governing procedure in the state courts, a direct counterpart of the federal rules governing us. And while that state classification may not be decisive in itself, it seems clear as a matter of federal law that New York’s regulation of its own discovery practice in subsection (d) of CPLR § 3101 adds nothing to the scope of “privileged” matter protected against production under our Rule 34.

CPLR 3101(d) qualifiedly exempts statements by accident witnesses and a participating defendant from disclosure as material prepared for litigation.

Liang v. Bateman · filed 1979-03-19(d)

It has been held that these statements constitute "Material prepared for litigation” (CPLR 3101, subd [d]) and are qualifiedly exempt from disclosure (see Finegold v Lewis, 22 AD2d 447; Zellman v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 40 AD2d 248, 251; CPLR 3101, subd [d]).

Section 3101(d) does not bar disclosure of an examining physician’s report when CPLR 3121(b) gives a party a right to obtain it.

Moreno v. Greater New York Dental Administrators, Inc. · filed 1986-05-06(d)

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the report constitutes privileged material prepared for litigation and thus is barred from discovery pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d). The Court of . Appeals in Hoenig v Westphal (supra, pp 609-610) specifically rejected this contention as well, stating: "Since such reports, for whomever prepared, could be classified as material prepared for litigation and thus exempt from disclosure under CPLR 3101 (subd [d]), 3121 (subd [b]) gives the plaintiff or another party a right to discovery not otherwise available. Subdivision (b) quite simply makes discoverable from a person requesting an examination material otherwise not discoverable. It cannot be read to restrict the right to discover material generally subject to disclosure.”

Section 3101’s pretrial disclosure standards do not apply to post-judgment subpoenas under CPLR 5223.

Newco Capital Group VI LLC v. La Rubia Rest. Inc · filed 2024-09-13

Defendants misplace their reliance on the standards for pretrial disclosure under CPLR 3101 ( see NYSCEF No. 56 at 3-6), which are inapposite to a CPLR 5223 post-judgment subpoena.

Section 3101 permits a court to limit pretrial examination in a paternity proceeding when the request lacks special circumstances or a need to examine a particular issue.

Tilson v. Bark · filed 1966-11-21

While the CPLR starts with the assumption of full disclosure and a broadening of the scope of examination before trial, the court is still empowered to control pretrial examination more narrowly in the exercise of discretion to prevent abuse in certain kinds of action where judicial experience dictates a policy of limitation. ... The respondent makes no showing of special circumstances in this case or the necessity of examination on a particular matter.

Section 3101 requires disclosure regardless of the burden of proof, but a bill of particulars is not a disclosure device.

Swift v. Swift · filed 1971-02-11

While it is true that disclosure is required of a party regardless of the burden of proof (CPLR 3101), bills of particulars are not considered to be disclosure devices, but rather extensions of the pleadings.

Section 3101(a) requires a party to answer deposition questions about prior criminal convictions when evidence of those convictions may be admissible.

Guarisco v. E. J. Milk Farms · filed 1977-04-11(a)

With respect to questions concerning previous convictions, the court ruled that since evidence of prior convictions might be admissible even if Sandoval were applicable, these questions should be answered in accordance with the broad scope of disclosure set forth in CPLR 3101 (subd [a]) as explained in Allen v Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. (21 NY2d 403, 407). ... Accordingly, plaintiff is now again directed to answer questions concerning any convictions of a crime, the court noting that until he does so his deposition will not be complete.

Objections to CPLR 3101 disclosure demands are waived, except for palpably improper requests, if a party fails to seek a protective order after a stay is lifted.

Pagones v. Maddox · filed 1991-04-29

Although the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 stayed the proceedings with respect to the disclosure demands under CPLR 3101 (see, CPLR 3214 [b]; Blancovitch v City of New York, 131 AD2d 418), the defendants Maddox and Sharp-ton failed to move for a protective order once the stay was lifted. The court therefore did not err in concluding that they had waived objections to all but palpably improper items in these demands as well (see, Spancrete Northeast v Elite Assocs., supra).

CPLR 3101(d)(1) expert disclosure notices drafted by attorneys are inadmissible as prior inconsistent statements of the experts or as judicial admissions.

Veneski v. Queens-Long Island Medical Group, P. C. · filed 2001-07-05(d)(1)

Defendants’ CPLR 3101 (d) (1) expert disclosure notices, which were not drafted by defendants’ experts but by defendants’ attorneys, were not admissible as prior inconsistent statements of the experts (Hageman v Jacobson, 202 AD2d 160; see also, Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-411 [Farrell 11th ed]). Nor were they admissible as judicial admissions since “[s]uch statements are not sworn, as are interrogatory answers, affidavits, trial or pretrial testimony, nor are they in the nature of pleadings, to be used for any purpose against a party” (Gibson v St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 267 AD2d 136, 137, quoting Hageman v Jacobson, supra, at 161).

Section 3101 allows a defendant to compel a plaintiff to undergo testing by a vocational rehabilitation expert.

Edbauer v. Board of Education · filed 2001-09-28

Here, McPherson demonstrated special circumstances by drawing the court’s attention to the Court of Appeals’ then-recent decision in Kavanagh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp. (92 NY2d 952), which held that a defendant may compel a plaintiff to submit to testing by a vocational rehabilitation expert under CPLR 3101. As Kavanagh effected a significant change in the law, McPherson properly relied on that decision to justify its request for additional disclosure.

CPLR 3101(i) does not prevent the Workers’ Compensation Board from withholding surveillance videotapes until after a claimant testifies when fraud is suspected.

Reimers v. American Axle Manufacturing · filed 2003-12-31(i)

We recently held in Matter of De Marco v Millbrook Equestrian Ctr. (287 AD2d 916 [2001]) that the Board is vested with the authority to govern disclosure and may, irrespective of the provisions of CPLR 3101 (i), withhold the production of surveillance videotapes until after the claimant’s testimony, where the claimant is suspected of engaging in fraud.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) does not require preclusion of expert testimony solely because a party failed to comply with its disclosure requirements.

Cade & Saunders, P.C. v. Chicago Insurance · filed 2004-08-25(d)(1)(i)

This is a logical interpretation of § 3101(d)(1)(i), especially because that statute specifically provides that there shall not be preclusion “solely on grounds of non-compliance with [it].”

Section 3101(a)(4) does not require the pre-hearing disclosure the petitioners sought in this license revocation proceeding.

Occhiogrosso v. New York State Office of Children & Family Services · filed 2010-04-27(a)(4)

The petitioners’ demands for pre-hearing disclosure were properly denied (see CPLR 3101 [a] [4]; 18 NYCRR 413.5 [e] [3]; Matter of American Express Prop. Cas. Co. v Vinci, 63 AD3d 1055, 1056 [2009]).

A breakdown in a party’s relationship with its former expert can establish good cause for substituting an expert.

Maddaloni Jewelers, Inc. v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2010-05-25(d)(1)(i)

Furthermore, even assuming that plaintiff was required to show “good cause” (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]), its proffered reason for the substitution of experts, namely, the breakdown in its relationship with its former expert, sufficiently established such “good cause” (compare Lissak v Cerabona, 10 AD3d 308, 309-310 [2004]).

Section 3101(a) permits discovery of an insurer's reserve when it could bear on a claim or defense, even without a bad-faith claim.

Bahnuk v. Countryway Ins. Co. · filed 2024-03-21(a)

Although Bahnuk has not raised a bad-faith claim, the Court does not believe that precludes the discovery of reserve information. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Countryway's reserve information is relevant and discoverable.

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a subpoena seeking disclosure from a nonparty to state why the disclosure is sought.

McGill v. Whitney Museum of Am. Art · filed 2024-09-06(a)(4)

First, as articulated in Kapon, the subpoenas lack the requisite statement of necessity and fail to provide sufficient notice under CPLR § 3120(2).