N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1

Section 56:8-1(c) excludes a retailer agreement from “merchandise” when the opportunity is not offered to the public at large.

Nvl, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA LLC · filed 2024-02-15(c)

The opportunity for a "Volvo Retailer Agreement," which led to the execution of the 2014 LOI and 2016 LOI, was not an opportunity offered to the "public at large."

Section 56:8-1(c) includes calamari sold to a restaurant within the CFA’s definition of merchandise.

CALABRIA RISTORANTE, INC. v. RUGGIERO SEAFOOD, INC. · filed 2023-12-14(c)

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that: (i) it is a consumer because it does “not wholesale or resell the calamari in its original packaging and frozen form”; (ii) calamari is “merchandise” under the CFA; and (iii) Plaintiff “suffered a cognizable ascertainable loss[] [b]ased” on Performance Food’s “manipulation and misrepresentation of the net weight of frozen calamari,” causing Plaintiff to “receive[] less than what was promised.”

Section 56:8-1(c) includes commercially offered notary services within the definition of merchandise, even when the services are performed by notaries who are public officers.

TRIPICCHIO v. THE UPS STORE, INC. · filed 2023-04-30(c)

As noted above, the NJCFA covers commercial practices in connection with “any ... services... offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1(c). ... The fact that individual notaries are technically public officers who derive their authority from the State of New Jersey does not automatically exempt Defendants, which are plainly commercial business entities that employ and control the notaries, from liability under the NJCFA for services for which they charge a fee and collect revenue.

Section 56:8-1(c)’s definition of merchandise can cover specific advertising airtime purchased by an end user.

UNIMED INTERNATIONAL INC. v. FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC · filed 2021-04-06(c)

“Merchandise” is defined as “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” ... When Plaintiff purchased the individual Timeslots, it did not purchase a wholly intangible concept or highly sophisticated “processing system,” cf. Princeton Healthcare System v. Netsmart N.Y., Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011), but rather selected specific airtime during which to broadcast advertisements. ... Thus, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads its NJCFA claim.

Whether a service counts as “merchandise” under § 56:8-1(c) turns on the service’s purpose and nature.

D'agostino v. Ricardo Maldonado (068940) · filed 2013-10-03(c)

Whether a “service” meets the definition of “merchandise” thus turns on the purpose and nature of that “service.”

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise as goods or services offered to the public at large; a heavily negotiated contract for a custom computer system between sophisticated corporations falls outside that definition.

Princeton Healthcare v. Netsmart · filed 2011-10-21(c)

The CFA defines "merchandise" as including "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) (emphasis added). ... This kind of heavily negotiated contract between two sophisticated corporate entities does not constitute a "sale of merchandise" within the intent of the CFA.

Section 56:8-1(c)’s definition of merchandise does not cover the sale of an ongoing motel business, even when the sale includes related real estate.

539 Absecon Boulevard, LLC v. Shan Enterprises Limited P'ship · filed 2009-03-26(c)

Defendants sold plaintiffs a motel business, not "objects, wares, goods, commodities, services," or "anything offered, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale."

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise to include shorthand reporting services and the sale of deposition transcripts.

Quigley v. ESQUIRE DEPOSITION SERV., LLC · filed 2008-05-19(c)

"Merchandise" is defined as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) (emphasis added). Under this expansive definition of "merchandise," the provision of shorthand reporting services and sale of transcripts of depositions is subject to the Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise broadly enough to include insurance sold to the public.

Weiss v. First Unum Life Insurance · filed 2007-04-03(c)

The CFA states that the term “‘merchandise’ shall include any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J. Stat. § 56:8-1(c). ... Here, Weiss has alleged that First Unum embarked on a fraudulent scheme to deny insureds their rightful benefits, clearly an unconscionable commercial practice in connection with the performance of its obligations subsequent to the sale of merchandise, i.e. payment of benefits.

Section 56:8-1(c) includes a franchise offered to the general public as merchandise when the Franchise Practices Act does not cover it.

Kavky v. HERBALIFE INTERNATIONAL · filed 2003-04-22(c)

Putting our conclusion in terms of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a franchise, not otherwise regulated by the Franchise Practices Act, is not merely similar in nature to the items enumerated in Section 8-1(c), but actually consists of those items in that it involves the provision of both services and commodities. Thus, it is covered as something offered to the public for sale.

Section 56:8-1 covers services as merchandise when they are offered to the public, but excludes accounting and reporting functions incidental to a manufacturer–wholesaler contract.

Bracco Diagnostics Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co. · filed 2002-09-30

Although Braceo accurately notes that fraud in connection with the sale of services is actionable under the NJCFA, the challenged services generally must be of the type sold to the general public. ... Bergen does not “sell” those accounting, tracking, and reporting functions to the public, either directly or indirectly. Those functions are incidental to a contract for the sale of products between a manufacturer and a wholesaler.

Section 56:8-1(c) includes goods offered to the public as merchandise even when they are expensive equipment purchased for business use.

Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. American Crane Corp. · filed 2000-02-18(c)

As noted above, the statute defines merchandise to include “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J.SA. § 56:8-l(c). ... Although a crane is a large, expensive piece of machinery, cranes are in use at construction sites across the globe. As the purchaser of the Crane for a business use, Naporano is a “consumer” within the meaning of the NJCFA, and defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is also denied.

Section 56:8-1’s definitions of advertisement and merchandise encompass the sale and marketing of insurance policies.

YOURMAN BY & THROUGH YOURMAN v. People's SEC. Life Ins. Co. · filed 1998-01-28(a), (e)

Because the Court finds that the CFA does apply to the sale and marketing of insurance policies, defendant’s motion is denied.

Section 56:8-1(c) treats consumer goods as merchandise regardless of who buys them or for what purpose.

Marascio v. Campanella · filed 1997-03-20(c)

In short, a consumer transaction occurs when the transaction involves the sale of consumer goods regardless of who purchases those goods and for what purpose.

The Consumer Fraud Act applies to consumer transactions involving goods or services sold to the public, not every transaction in the marketplace.

Cetel v. Kirwan Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2006-08-28

Consequently, because “the entire thrust of the [CFA] is pointed to products and services sold to consumers in the popular sense[,]” id., we cannot conclude that the District Court erred when it dismissed plaintiffs’ claim under the CFA.

Section 56:8-1 treats commercial entities as protected “persons” and looks to whether goods or services are offered to the public, rather than whether they are used personally.

Fresh Start Industries, Inc. v. ATX Telecommunications Services · filed 2003-12-11(d), (c)

The focus of the NJCFA is whether the “merchandise,” i.e. goods or services, is offered either directly or indirectly to the public, ... rather than the purpose for which the merchandise is to be used. ... The New Jersey statute, therefore, reflects a distinct interest in protecting its commercial entities as well as traditional consumers from fraudulent or deceptive practices.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines “merchandise” broadly to include services and anything offered directly or indirectly to the public for sale, but an insurance-agency relationship is not merchandise under the Consumer Fraud Act.

A.H. Meyers & Co. v. CNA Insurance · filed 2004-01-29(c)

We reached that conclusion by holding that the term “merchandise” (which is defined by the CFA to include “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(c), does not encompass the sale of franchises. J & R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1270-74. ... Even without repeating the extensive analysis in J & R Ice Cream, it should be clear that there is no meaningful way to distinguish a franchise arrangement from an agency arrangement.

Section 56:8-1(c) treats a good as “merchandise” under the CFA when a member of the public could purchase it, even if the public at large does not commonly buy it.

Sun Chemical Corp v. Fike Corp · filed 2020-11-27(c)

But the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly rejected this narrow view of the CFA in All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks County International, Inc., 200 A.3d 398 (N.J. 2019). In that case, the seller of specialized tow trucks argued that the trucks were not “merchandise” under the CFA because the “public at large” did not purchase the trucks. Id. at 408. The Court, however, held that the CFA’s applicability “does not turn on whether the public at large purchases” the specific good. Id. Rather, the CFA applies as long as “a member of the public could, if inclined, purchase” that good “regardless of the popularity of the product.” ... At a minimum, this evidence creates a fact issue on whether the suppression system is “merchandise” under the CFA, and Fike is not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.

Section 56:8-1 defines merchandise broadly to include goods, services, and anything offered to the public for sale, but a promotion matching a customer's deposit with bonus money is not merchandise under the NJCFA.

MILLS v. GOLDEN NUGGET ATLANTIC CITY, LLC · filed 2021-08-18

“Merchandise includes “objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1. ... A promotion to match a customer’s deposit in bonus money does not constitute “merchandise” under the NJCFA. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise broadly to include objects, wares, goods, commodities, services, or anything offered directly or indirectly to the public for sale; in business-to-business transactions, whether a transaction involves merchandise depends on the nature of the transaction and a fact-sensitive analysis.

CEM BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, INC v. BHI ENERGY · filed 2022-12-27(c)

Merchandise is defined to include “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(c). ... Thus, “[i]n business-to-business transactions it is the ‘nature of the transaction’ that will determine whether it can fit within the CFA’s definition of merchandise.” ... This is a fact sensitive analysis that is more appropriate for resolution through a motion for summary judgment, not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. ... Consequently, the Court will not dismiss BHI’s NJCFA claim on these grounds at this time.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise broadly to include services or anything offered directly or indirectly to the public for sale, so financial services may support a CFA claim at the pleading stage.

TWIN CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC v. WICKSTROM · filed 2023-02-27(c)

Movants properly set forth the parameters of what constitutes merchandise under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1, specifically “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale.” (See TCP’s Second Moving Br. 11.) In doing so, however, Movants gloss over the applicable clause, “services or anything offered.” (Id. (emphasis added).) ... The Court finds the Andreotta court’s decision persuasive and adopts its reasoning for purposes of this Opinion. The Court, therefore, similarly declines to dismiss the CFA claim.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines “merchandise” to include services, but the NJCFA does not cover specialized franchise or training services that are not generally sold to the public or consumable by the purchaser.

ACHIEVE 24 FITNESS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY v. ALLOY PERSONAL TRAINING SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2023-02-28(c)

The NJCFA prohibits any “act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice ... false promise, [or] misrepresentation ... in connection with the sale or advertisement of any [service].” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(c) (defining “merchandise” to include “service”). ... First, as it pertains to the NJCFA in particular, it is compulsory that the unlawful conduct be made “ ‘in connection’ with the sale or advertisement of a product or service.” ... Indeed, the NJCFA is intended to protect consumers who purchase goods or services generally sold to the public at large. ... Here, although Achieve accurately notes that the NJCFA’s definition of “person” includes business entities and fraud in connection with the sale of services is actionable under the NJCFA, the challenged services, i.e., franchise/training services to gym owners, are not the type generally sold to the general public.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise broadly to include services offered to the public, so consumer savings accounts can qualify as merchandise under the NJCFA.

Savett v. Capital One N.A. and Capital One Financial Corp. · filed 2024-11-12(c)

The Court also has determined that Plaintiffs’ opening of their 360 Savings accounts qualifies as a purchase of a “service,” as they sought out the service of obtaining “high interest” on their funds. ... Thus, the 360 Savings accounts constitute “merchandise” sufficient to trigger this statute. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(c).

The Act protects consumer transactions involving goods or services generally sold to the public at large, and does not cover complex plans marketed only to a discrete class of investors.

Case name unavailable · filed 2006-08-28

The CFA "is intended to protect consumers by eliminating sharp practices and dealings in the marketing of merchandise and real estate." Id. at 554 (internal quotations omitted); see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq. ... However, as New Jersey courts have repeatedly made clear, the CFA seeks to protect consumers who purchase "goods or services generally sold to the public at large." ... Thus, the CFA "is not intended to cover every transaction that occurs in the marketplace[, ]" but, rather, "[i]ts applicability is limited to consumer transactions which are defined both by the status of the parties and the nature of the transaction itself." ... These facts are insufficient to establish that the plans at issue, and the transactions by which they were sold, qualify as "products and services sold to consumers in the popular sense[, ]" such that they fall within the ambit of the CFA.

Section 56:8-1(c) generally includes services within “merchandise,” but professional services are outside the Consumer Fraud Act when provided in a professional capacity.

DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hospital · filed 2008-06-24(c)

The term “merchandise” generally includes services. N.J.S.A. 56:8-l(c). However, the New Jersey courts have consistently held that professionals are not covered by the Consumer Fraud Act. ... In light of these cases, the contention that Defendants’ billing practices are covered by the Consumer Fraud Act is unsupportable, and this Count will be dismissed.

Section 56:8-1 defines “person” under the NJCFA to include partnerships, corporations, companies, trusts, business entities, and associations.

Bonnieview Homeowners Ass'n v. Woodmont Builders, L.L.C. · filed 2009-09-22

Under the NJCFA, the term "person” includes any "partnership, corporation, company, trust, business entity or association ...” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1. Under the NJCFA, Woodmont Court, Woodmont Builders and Associated Sales qualify as "persons."

The NJCFA excludes learned professionals and medical offices providing professional medical services, including advertising related to those services.

P.C. · filed 2026-03-12

However, “learned professionals” who render services to the public are “beyond the reach of the [CFA] so long as they are operating in their professional capacities.” ... Indeed, it is well-established that “advertisements by learned professionals in respect of the rendering of professional services are insulated from the CFA.” ... The corporate Defendants here are medical offices and professionals that provide medical services and thus qualify as learned professionals for the purposes of the NJCFA exemption. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim against all Defendants is barred by the learned professionals exception is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 56:8-1(c) excludes a service from “merchandise” when it is not offered directly or indirectly to the public.

Annunziata v. Millar · filed 1990-02-14(c)

The burial of pets for a fee was a service offered for a fee if requested by clients of the veterinary practice and not refused to outsiders who came to inquire if it were available to them. It was not a service “offered directly or indirectly to the public”.

Section 56:8-1(c) excludes a specialized industrial process and its collateral services from “merchandise” when they are not offered to the public.

BOC GROUP v. Lummus Crest · filed 1990-08-03(c)

The complex petroleum refining process at issue is not a service, nor is it merchandise under N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).

Section 56:8-1’s definition of merchandise excludes a specialized rail car design offered to a narrow class of manufacturers rather than to the public.

R.J. Longo Construction Co. v. Transit America, Inc. · filed 1996-04-10(c)

Even if EPIC was affirmatively misled by Transit America’s efforts to market the rail car, the product sold does not constitute “merchandise” under the statute, and the tripartite relationship between Transit America, Berwick and EPIC was not a “consumer oriented situation”.

Section 56:8-1(c) and (e) includes materials supplied by a custom home builder within the definitions of merchandise and sale.

New Mea Const. Corp. v. Harper · filed 1985-08-06(c), (e)

Against the background of these findings, we conclude that the Consumer Fraud Act is applicable to a custom builder who uses substandard material in the construction of a house. We find that the material used in the house was "merchandise sold" to the owners within the contemplation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) and (e).

Section 56:8-1(c)'s definition of merchandise excludes Parkway toll tokens, which prepay access to a government highway service.

Barry v. NJ STATE HWY. AUTHORITY · filed 1990-04-01(c)

In effect, tokens are simply a prepayment for the right to enjoy a particularized governmental service, in this case, travel on a limited access state highway. My judgment therefore is that tokens do not constitute "merchandise" under this Act.

Section 56:8-1(c) includes goods sold for use in business operations within its definition of merchandise.

Coastal Group v. Dryvit Systems · filed 1994-06-23(c)

"Merchandise" is defined as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c). ... Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Dryvit summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim under the Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 56:8-1 defines merchandise to include services, but hospital services rendered to patients pursuant to medical judgment fall outside the Consumer Fraud Act.

Hampton Hosp. v. Bresan · filed 1996-03-13

The Legislature defined "merchandise" as including not only goods, but services as well. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1. ... Our decision today is limited to an exclusion of hospitals from the purview of the Consumer Fraud Act for services rendered to its patients, pursuant to medical judgment.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise broadly enough to cover the sale and making of loans.

Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management · filed 1996-04-19(c)

"Merchandise" is defined as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) (emphasis added). Because merchandise is defined broadly, and because the Act specifically applies to the advertisement of loans, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended to exclude the sale or making of loans from its scope.

Section 56:8-1(c) includes a broker's services in handling payment for a mutual fund purchase within the definition of merchandise.

Lee v. First Union Nat. Bank · filed 2008-08-27(c)

Because Mack's occupation is not among the class of "learned professionals" exempt from the CFA, his services constitute "merchandise."

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise to include services offered to the public for sale, including financial planning products and services.

Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett · filed 2008-09-09(c)

"Merchandise" as used in this section is defined to include "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c). ... Defendants were selling products and services to plaintiffs purportedly to achieve an overall plan for the corporation and the individuals financial well-being.

Section 56:8-1(c)’s definition of merchandise does not include a debt.

Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, PC · filed 2011-02-10(c)

The Nicholls court reasons that a debtor, such as Plaintiff, is not a “consumer,” a debt transaction is not a “sale,” and a debt is not “merchandise.” I find this reasoning persuasive and consistent with the plain language of the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-1(c) excludes loan administration services tailored to a particular client from the definition of merchandise when those services are not offered to the general consumer public.

City of Atlantic City v. Zemurray Street Capital, LLC · filed 2016-06-14(c)

Under the facts as alleged in the FAC, the services do not fall within the meaning of “merchandise” un-. der the NJCFA, and so the FAC fails to state a claim under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-1(c)'s definition of merchandise covers a product or service that any willing and able member of the public could purchase, even if few people do.

All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cnty. Int'l, Inc. · filed 2019-01-24(c)

To promote consistency in the application of the requirement that a product be offered to the public when evaluating a private individual CFA action, we hold that the availability requirement can be met by showing that any member of the public could purchase the product or service, if willing and able, regardless of whether such a purchase is popular.

Section 56:8-1(c) includes home inspection services in the definition of merchandise.

SHAW VS. BRIAN SHAND (L-0408-16, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-08-15(c)

The CFA defines "merchandise" as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) (emphasis added). The services of a home inspector fall squarely within the definition of merchandise under the act.

Section 56:8-1(c) includes services offered directly or indirectly to the public in its definition of merchandise; for an aseptic processing transaction, the relevant merchandise is the processing service, not the resulting product.

COLD STAR SALES AND LEASING, INC. v. TRU ASEPTICS, LLC · filed 2020-04-17(c)

As set forth above, the term “merchandise” includes “services” offered “directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c). ... That is not the proper focus of the nature of the “merchandise” at issue. Rather, it is Defendant’s aseptic processing services that is the “merchandise” Plaintiff alleges was offered “directly or indirectly to the public,” which Plaintiff alleges constitutes unlawful conduct by Defendant.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise to include services and covers gaming entertainment.

BANDLER VS. LANDRY'S INC., GOLDEN NUGGET ATLANTIC CITY (L-0026-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-22(c)

"Merchandise" is broadly defined to include services, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c), and no doubt covers gaming entertainment.

Section 56:8-1(c)’s definition of merchandise excludes goods and services supplied under this complex commercial construction subcontract.

RDM CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC VS. SURFSIDE CASUAL FURNITURE (L-2182-13, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-08-04(c)

N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) defines "merchandise" to "include any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." ... In sum, none of the All the Way Towing criteria support a finding the goods and services provided by plaintiff constitute merchandise within the protection of the CFA.

Section 56:8-1(c) includes an object marketed to the public within the definition of merchandise.

FLINT GROUP PACKAGING INKS NORTH AMERICA CORP. v. FOX INDUSTRIES INC. · filed 2020-10-20(c)

Here, Flint indicates that, at a minimum, the shot is an object, see TAC ¶ 15, and that Cenotec markets its shot to the public.

Section 56:8-1(c)'s definition of merchandise includes a dealer management software system offered to businesses when the system is available to a variety of customers.

CDK GLOBAL, LLC v. TULLEY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC. · filed 2024-08-16(c)

Having considered the testimony and evidence presented at trial, this Court concludes that Drive is merchandise under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-1(c)'s definition of merchandise does not include tournament prize money.

D'Agostino v. Goichberg · filed 2024-11-14(c)

The awarded prize money was not merchandise to support a cognizable claim under the CFA.

Section 56:8-1(c) excludes specialized hard money financing from its definition of merchandise when the financing is tailored to a borrower’s circumstances rather than sold to the public at large.

Professional Cleaning & Innovative Building Services, Inc. v. Kennedy Funding Inc. · filed 2010-11-29(c)

The District Court concluded the hard money financing offered to Professional did not qualify as ―merchandise‖ in the popular sense. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56: 8-1(c) (defining ―merchandise‖ as ―any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services, or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale‖). It conceptually severed the finely-calibrated, ―unconventional‖ financing in which Kennedy traffics and which requires a lender to place uncommon emphasis on an applicant‘s ―special circumstances‖ from the realm of generic commercial lending, a practice which has been brought within the ambit of the CFA. See Lemelledo, 696 A.2d at 551. This distinction is sensible.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise to include services and anything offered directly or indirectly to the public.

Kugler v. Haitian Tours, Inc. · filed 1972-07-27(c)

By definition, the term "merchandise" includes any services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).

Section 56:8-1(c) includes services offered to the public in its definition of merchandise, including a professional’s commercial activity.

MacEdo v. Dello Russo · filed 2003-03-27(c)

We can find nothing in the Act that suggests the Legislature ever intended to exempt classes of service purveyors from its coverage based on the nature of the service provided.

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise to include services offered, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale.

South Broward Hospital District v. Medquist Inc. · filed 2007-03-30(c)

The NJCFA defines “merchandise” to include “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale. ” Id. at 56: 8-l(c)(emphasis added).

Section 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise to include services offered directly or indirectly to the public, including boat repair services.

Hyland v. Zuback · filed 1976-07-13(c)

Under the act "merchandise" includes goods and services offered directly or indirectly to the public. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).

Section 56:8-1 defines merchandise to include services offered to the public for sale.

Huffmaster v. Robinson · filed 1986-03-30

The term "merchandise" is defined by N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to include "goods ... services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale."

Section 56:8-1(c) includes services as well as goods within the Consumer Fraud Act’s coverage.

International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp North America, Inc. · filed 1990-04-27(c)

The Act, of course, covers the sale of services as well as goods, see N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c), and has been construed to cover transactions in which business entities and not merely ordinary consumers claim to have been defrauded.

Section 56:8-1 includes loans in its definition of advertisement and consumer credit in its definition of merchandise.

Associates Home Eq. Servs. v. Troup · filed 2001-07-25(a), (c)

Loans are included in the definition of "advertisement," N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(a), and the definition of "merchandise," see N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c), has been held to include "the offering, sale, or provision of consumer credit."

Section 56:8-1 encompasses insurance policies sold to consumers as goods and services, but it does not extend the Consumer Fraud Act to an insurer’s refusal to pay benefits.

WATSON v. LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2020-07-16

Fraudulently selling or inducing the sale of an insurance policy is a violation of the CFA. Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 696 A.2d 546, 551 (N.J. 1997); see also N.J. Stat. §§ 56:8-1 and 56:8-2. However, “while the CFA encompasses the sale of insurance policies as goods and services that are marketed to consumers, it was not intended as a vehicle to recover damages for an insurance company’s refusal to pay benefits.” Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 114 A.3d 761, 777 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). For this reason, we will grant the motion of Liberty Mutual for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim for fraudulent denial of benefits under the CFA as pleaded in Count III of the complaint.

Highly specialized and complex services negotiated for a small number of sophisticated purchasers are not services offered to the public within the meaning of the Consumer Fraud Act.

James T. Scatuorchio Racing Stable, LLC v. Walmac Stud Management, LLC · filed 2013-04-19(c)

An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved.

The Consumer Fraud Act’s definitions of “sale,” “advertisement,” and “merchandise” delineate its reach; debt-buying and debt-collection activities by entities that did not participate in extending the underlying consumer credit are outside the Act’s coverage.

GOMEZ v. FORSTER & GARBUS LLP · filed 2019-10-22(a), (c), (e)

The CFA supplies many of the relevant definitions that delineate the Act’s reach. See Lee v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 971 A.2d 1054, 1059 (N.J. 2009) (stating that the remedial construction accorded to the CFA must adhere to “the definitions that control the boundaries of the Act’s reach”). The CFA defines a “sale” as “any sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale, rental or distribution or attempt directly or directly to sell, rent or distribute.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(e). An “advertisement” is defined as “the attempt directly or indirectly by publication, dissemination, solicitation, indorsement or circulation or in any other way to induce directly or indirectly any person to enter or not enter into any obligation or acquire any title or interest in any merchandise or to increase the consumption thereof or to make any loan.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(a). “The term ‘merchandise’ shall include any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale[.]” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56-8:1(c). Based on those definitions, the CFA “appl[ies] to the offering, sale, or provision of consumer credit.” Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 696 A.2d 546, 551 (N.J. 1997). However, it is well-settled that the activities of debt buyers such as LVNV and Resurgent do not fall within the purview of the CFA.

Section 56:8-1's definition of "person" includes business entities, which may invoke the Consumer Fraud Act when acting in a consumer-oriented transaction.

TROCKI v. PENN NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2020-06-24

The NJCFA’s definition of “person” includes business entities, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1, and under New Jersey law, “a corporation may qualify as a person under the Act when it finds itself in a consumer[-]oriented situation.”

The NJCFA protects consumers rather than sellers, so a business that sells services and does not purchase or consume the services lacks standing to sue under the Act.

INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CLEANING GROUP, INC. v. OXFORD ELECTRONICS, INC. · filed 2025-06-30(c), (d)

The Court agrees Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim under the NJCFA. ... Thus, as the seller of services, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under the NJCFA and Count IV fails as a matter of law.

The CFA’s definition of “person” allows individual liability for an actionable affirmative act, even when the individual acts through a corporation.

Sitnikov v. Lebedinsky · filed 2026-05-18(d)

Importantly, "[i]n light of the broad remedial purposes of the CFA and the expansive sweep of the definition of 'person,' it is clear that an individual who commits an affirmative act or a knowing omission that the CFA has made actionable can be liable individually." Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 131 (2011). Thus, "individuals may be independently liable for violations of the CFA, notwithstanding the fact that they were acting through a corporation at the time." Ibid. Here, Vysotski cannot avoid liability under the CFA because he made an affirmative misrepresentation to plaintiff.

Section 56:8-1(d) defines who may be a person under the Consumer Fraud Act, but falling within that definition alone does not establish individual liability.

Vanwagenen v. Fortress Fence, LLC · filed 2024-04-17(d)

The Court further explained that an analysis of individual liability under the CFA "cannot end there, because the definitional section does not itself create the basis for liability." Ibid. Rather, the definition of "person" under the CFA, on which plaintiffs rely here, "merely identifies the universe of actors who may engage in the behavior that the statute defines to be the violation; it does not independently create a basis for their liability." Ibid. Thus, the Court in Allen rejected the precise and singular basis on which plaintiffs' claim against Diane L. Carhart rests.

The CFA’s definition of “person” permits individual liability for someone who personally commits an actionable affirmative act or knowing omission, even while acting through a corporation.

CHEN VS. NORTHEAST MOTOR CARS, INC. (L-7271-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-10-05

Moreover, the judge aptly concluded that Gutierrez, Kopman, and the other individually named defendants were individually liable under the CFA. ... "In light of the broad remedial purposes of the CFA and the expansive sweep of the definition of 'person,' it is clear that an individual who commits an affirmative act or a knowing omission that the CFA has made actionable can be liable individually."

The definition of “person” includes business entities, so the Consumer Fraud Act applies to commercial transactions.

LEVARI ENTERPRISES, LLC v. KENWORTH TRUCK COMPANY · filed 2021-02-22(d)

“[I]t is well established that the CFA is applicable to commercial transactions.” ... N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d) (the definition of “person” includes business entities such as a “partnership, corporation, company . . . , business entity or association”).

Section 56:8-1(d) includes business entities in its definition of “person.”

In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. · filed 2011-12-01(d)

The NJCFA includes business entities in the definition of “person.”

Section 56:8-1(d) includes individuals within the definition of “person,” allowing liability for an individual who personally participates in a Consumer Fraud Act regulatory violation.

Allen v. V and A Brothers, Inc. · filed 2010-06-23(d)

Instead, they have interpreted the CFA, by its use of the term "person" in the liability provisions of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 and the definition of "person" in N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d), as providing sufficient statutory authority for the imposition of individual liability in circumstances in which the individual committed the unconscionable commercial practice or other prohibited act and an ascertainable loss resulted. ... We find no principled basis for distinguishing between the two for purposes of the imposition of individual liability. ... Liability can be imposed only upon proof of personal participation by an individual in a particular regulatory violation.

Section 56:8-1(d) defines persons to include natural persons.

Hyland v. Aquarian Age 2,000, Inc. · filed 1977-02-15(d)

More particularly, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d) includes natural persons within its definition of persons.

Section 56:8-1(d) includes corporations in its definition of “person,” allowing them to qualify as consumers under the Consumer Fraud Act.

Dreier Co., Inc. v. Unitronix Corp. · filed 1986-11-10(d)

The definition of "person" includes a partnership, corporation, company or business entity. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d). Therefore, we are satisfied that corporations were intended to qualify as "consumers" under the act.

Section 56:8-1(d) covers consumer fraud committed by individuals as well as companies.

Fleet v. United States Consumer Council, Inc. (In Re Fleet) · filed 1989-01-11(d)

Indeed, NJ UDAP applies to consumer fraud committed by individuals as well as companies. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d).

Section 56:8-1(d) defines “person” to include a corporation, so corporate status does not itself prevent a plaintiff from qualifying as a consumer.

D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp. · filed 1985-11-21(d)

While the term "consumer" is not defined within the act the definition of "person" includes a corporation, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d), therefore we need not labor as to whether the corporate plaintiff may qualify as a consumer.

Section 56:8-1(d) includes a public authority acting as a consumer within the definition of “person.”

ZORBA CONTRACTORS v. Housing Auth. · filed 1995-06-29(d)

Thus, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, we expansively construe its definition of the term "person" to include a public authority when acting as a consumer.

Section 56:8-1 defines “person” to include corporations and their listed representatives, but does not include an assignee solely because it received an assignment.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC. VS. SILVANA SOTILLO(F-4359-14, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-05

The CFA defines a "person" to include a "corporation" and "any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestuis que trustent thereof." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1. It does not define it to include an assignee. Thus, plaintiff has no direct liability under the CFA for Wells Fargo's alleged unlawful conduct.

Section 56:8-1 defines “merchandise” and “sale”; collecting a purchased debt does not constitute a sale of merchandise.

Yvette McQueen, Etc. v. Razor Capital, LLC · filed 2025-05-06(c), (e)

Under the CFA, "merchandise" is defined as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale" and "sale" as "any sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale, rental or distribution or attempt directly or indirectly to sell, rent or distribute." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c), (e). ... We are satisfied the trial court correctly aligned its decision with our holding in DepoLink, concluding there was no basis for plaintiff's CFA claim because defendant's collection actions did not constitute the sale of merchandise.

The CFA's definitions cover agreements between a mortgage servicer and a non-debtor mortgagor to cure a loan default after foreclosure judgment.

Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp. · filed 2010-02-01(a), (c)

The CFA defines "merchandise" as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c). ... While we would hesitate greatly to hold that most "settlements" are subject to the CFA's strictures, we regard these particular agreements to be so closely allied to the cures of default recognized in N.J.S.A. 2A:50-57 as to warrant coverage. ... We find no principled reason to distinguish the present structurally identical transactions, albeit by a non-debtor mortgagor, executed after a judgment of default had been entered.

Section 56:8-1(e) defines a sale to include an indirect attempt to sell an IUD to a patient through a gynecologist.

Jones v. Sportelli · filed 1979-02-14(e)

The statutory definition of the term "sale" was liberally expanded by the Legislature and it now encompasses any "attempt directly or indirectly to sell." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(e). The provision of an IUD to a gynecologist essentially constitutes, at the very least, an indirect attempt to sell the IUD to a wanting patient with the concomitant expectation of monetary return.

Section 56:8-1(e)’s definition of “sale” does not bring secondary mortgage transactions within the Consumer Fraud Act.

Westervelt v. Gateway Financial Service · filed 1983-06-27(e)

The Act defines "sale" as follows: The term `sale' shall include any sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale, rental or distribution, or attempt directly or indirectly to sell, rent or distribute. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(e). Plaintiffs contend that a second mortgage transaction is a sale of an interest in real estate. ... It is a different matter whether the legislature *625 included mortgages in the Consumer Fraud Act. There are three reasons to believe it did not. The first is that although a second mortgage is a conveyance of sorts, it is more significantly a security transaction that was made the subject of a complete regulatory statute that addressed itself directly and thoroughly to its particular problems.

Section 56:8-1’s definition of sale covers remote suppliers of component parts whose products reach a buyer and whose representations are made to or intended for that buyer.

Perth Amboy Iron Works v. Am. Home · filed 1988-06-30

We have no reason to limit this trend in the application of the Consumer Fraud Act, especially where the Legislature has used the expansive term "indirectly" in defining the scope of the Act's coverage. We therefore interpret the Consumer Fraud Act to encompass the acts of remote suppliers, including suppliers of component parts, whose products are passed on to a buyer and whose representations are made to or intended to be conveyed to the buyer.

Section 56:8-1 defines merchandise to include services and persons to include business entities, bringing public utilities within the Consumer Fraud Act.

Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Company · filed 1977-05-16(c), (d)

To the contrary, the definitional section of the act appears to be inclusive of such enterprises. Thus, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) defines merchandise as any "objects, wares, goods, commodities or services," and N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d) defines persons subject to the act as, among others, any business entity without exception. We can perceive no discernible basis for construing the act as not having been intended to apply either to this or any other regulated industry, profession or other business.

Section 56:8-1 includes goods sold for business use within “merchandise” and corporations and other business entities within “person.”

Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp. · filed 1986-09-11(c), (d)

Nothing in that statutory language suggests that the Act is inapplicable to the sale of merchandise for use in business operations. To the contrary, the language on its face makes the Act applicable to all sales of "merchandise" without regard to its intended use or the nature of the buyer. And a corporation or other business entity is a "person" entitled to sue under the Act.

Section 56:8-1(c)'s definition of merchandise excludes a highly technical lathe sold through a heavily negotiated transaction between sophisticated corporate entities.

MARUKA USA, INC. VS. SPECIALTY LIGHTING INDUSTRIES, INC. VS. MORI SEIKI USA, INC., ETC. (L-2920-13, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-11-04(c)

After a de novo review of the record, we conclude that the transaction involved two sophisticated corporate entities that heavily negotiated a contract over a significant period of time, which involved the sale of a highly technical machine. The motion court properly found the lathe did not qualify as "merchandise" under the CFA when dismissing Specialty Lighting's CFA claims.

Section 56:8-1 does not define “consumer” or “consumer transaction.”

Papergraphics Intern., Inc. v. Correa · filed 2006-11-28

While the clear statutory objective is to protect consumers, neither the term "consumer" nor "consumer transaction" is found within the statute's definitional provisions.