Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120

Section 516.120(5) requires fraud actions to be filed within five years after discovery, subject to a ten-year outside limit from the fraudulent acts; when a fiduciary relationship exists, the period begins on actual discovery.

Lear v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States · filed 1986-09-04(5)

The applicable statute of limitations is Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5) which states that an action for fraud must be brought within five years of the date of discovery which must be within ten years of the acts creating the fraud. The cause of action accrues when a' person discovered or should have discovered the fraud except when a fiduciary relationship exists and then the period begins on the date of actual discovery.

Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for this ERISA disability-benefits action treated as a breach-of-contract claim.

Mason v. Aetna Life Insurance Company · filed 1990-04-12

Thus, Aetna argued, Mason’s lawsuit filed July 13, 1988, was barred by Missouri’s 5-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, Mo.Rev. Stat. § 516.120, which this court applied to the denial of disability benefits under ERISA in Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 850 F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir.1988). ... Upon careful review, we agree with the analysis of the district court that Mason’s suit was untimely filed and no circumstances justified tolling the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court.

Section 516.120 provides the applicable five-year statute of limitations for negligence claims against architects and engineers, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Specialty Restaurants Corporation v. Bucher · filed 1992-06-16

Consequently, we hold that Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 is the statute of limitations applicable to the instant case.

Section 516.120 supplies the applicable state statute of limitations for an action to enforce an arbitration award entered under a collective bargaining agreement.

International Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, And Helpers Of America, Local 245 v. Kansas City Piggy Back · filed 1996-08-09

Whatever impact DelCostello may have on Section 301 actions based upon causes of action different from the one alleged by Union in the present case, we hold that an action to enforce an arbitration award entered pursuant to an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement is governed by the appropriate state statute of limitations, in this case Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 (1993).

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitations period on § 1983 actions.

The Schatz Family v. Gierer · filed 2004-03-24

The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120, which provides for a five-year time limit.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Al-Khaldiya Electronics & Electrical Equipment Co. v. Boeing Co. · filed 2009-07-07

Missouri has a five-year statute of limitations period for breach-of-contract claims. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120. The five-year period commences when the damage resulting from the breach is sustained and capable of ascertainment. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.100. Al-Khaldiya’s claim was capable of ascertainment 30 days after the A-4 transfer in April 1998. True, a written “acknowledgment or promise” restarts the statute of limitations period. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.320. As evidence of a promise or acknowledgment of the debt by Boeing, Al-Khaldiya references an internal e-mail from 1999 and draft renewal documents from 2000. However, the inclusion of the A4 provision in the renewal agreement was subject to Boeing’s approval (as was the entire renewal agreement) — which was not obtained, as clear from the face of the documents. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired in 2003. Al-Khaldiya’s 2005 complaint was untimely.

Section 516.120(4) gives fraud claims a five-year statute of limitations that begins when the fraud was discoverable by the aggrieved party.

Hilyard v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 2014-05-08(4)

In contrast, fraud actions are governed by a five-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when the fraud was discoverable by the aggrieved party. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4). “A plaintiff may not circumvent the two-year statute of limitations by characterizing what is actually a medical malpractice claim as a different type of claim.” Cleveland v. Hand Therapy of Chesterfield, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis. 49774, *6 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2008). Missouri courts look at the “gravamen or gist of the action” in order to determine whether the suit is more appropriately categorized as a medical malpractice action subject to a two-year limitations period or a fraud action subject to a five-year limitations period. Id. at *7 (citing Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029, 1030 (1931)). After careful examination of the instant complaint, the Court finds that the “gravamen or gist” of this action could reasonably be construed as fraud and, thus, subject to. a five year statute of limitations under Missouri state law.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for these Missouri claims, except that continuing nuisance claims have a ten-year period of prescription.

Wilson Road Development Corp. v. Fronabarger Concreters, Inc. · filed 2013-09-11

Under Missouri law, all of these claims are governed by a five-year statute of limitations, except for the claim of continuing nuisance, which is governed by a ten-year period of prescription.

For fraud claims, the five-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known the controlling facts constituting the fraud.

St. Louis Home Insulators, John Hoffman, Paul Hoffman, Gene Whitehead, Robert Gryzmala, David Maddox, D/B/A the Bear Company v. Burroughs Corporation · filed 1986-07-31(5)

The pertinent statute is Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5), which has been construed to mean that plaintiffs must bring suit within five years “from the date they knew or should have known the controlling facts” constituting the fraud.

Section 516.120's five-year limitations period for an abuse of process claim begins when the acts constituting the abuse terminate, rather than when the underlying action ends; applying that rule, the claim was time-barred.

Steinhilber v. Lake Winnebago Home Owner's Ass'n · filed 1992-05-26

Although the district court held that Steinhilber’s abuse of process claim was barred by res judicata, we conclude that the claim was barred by Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 (1986). The statute of limitations on an abuse of process claim “begins to run from the termination of the acts which constitute the abuse complained of, and not from the completion of the action in which the process issued.” Corley v. Jacobs, 820 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Mo.Ct.App.1991). ... Strictly applying Corley, the limitations period for Steinhilber’s abuse of process claim expired in February 1977.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitation does not bar a claim before the claimant has a right to enforce payment.

Zahn v. Estate of Martin · filed 1956-11-12

The facts are admitted and the ultimate issue is one of law, to wit: whether plaintiffs’ rights under the will are barred by the five-year statute of limitations, Section 516.120 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. ... It follows that plaintiffs had no right to enforce distribution of the funds here in question until the death of George L. Martin, and that his death having occurred in June, 1954, this action against his estate for the recovery of the funds realized from the sales of real estate made by him is not barred by limitation, but that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for the amount of proceeds realized from all of such sales with interest on such of said funds as were paid to him during his lifetime from the date of his death and with interest on the proceeds paid to his estate from date of receipt thereof.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period for sewage pollution damage begins when the injury to the land becomes apparent.

Lewis v. City of Potosi · filed 1958-11-05

Authorizing a verdict upon a finding that the creek became polluted at any time during 1950 was error. The suit was not filed until June 24, 1955. Approval of the instruction would have the effect of extending the statute of limitations to five years, five months and twenty-four days. To be proper, the instruction should have been based on plaintiff’s evidence that the stream became polluted at his farm either in December, 1950, or January, 1951.

Section 516.120’s five-year period for collecting city earnings taxes begins when the taxes become delinquent and the collector can sue, even if the taxpayer never filed a return.

State Ex Rel. Collector of Revenue of St. Louis v. Robertson · filed 1967-07-18

We hold that appellant could sue the day following the delinquency, or any other day until the bar of limitations has attached. In the instant case, he could have sued on March 31, of any year from 1956 to 1959, inclusively, for the taxes due for the year from 1955 to 1958, inclusively. So, since he could sue, the statute of limitations commenced; therefore, we hold that this action which was filed April 15, 1965, is barred.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period for enforcing a special tax bill begins when the obligation becomes due and payable.

City of Columbia ex rel. Exchange National Bank v. Johnson Investment & Rental Co. · filed 1970-10-05

It is clear from the foregoing cases that neither Section 516.120 RSMo 1959 nor any other statute of limitations commences to run until the obligation to pay arises. Under the express terms of the ordinance the tax bills in question did not .become “due and payable” until thirty days after their issue.

Section 516.120’s five-year period for a negligent survey claim begins when the resulting damage is capable of ascertainment; homeowners need not independently check a professional’s work without reason to question it.

Martin v. Crowley, Wade & Milstead, Inc. · filed 1985-12-17

The parties agree that § 516.120, RSMo 1978, is the applicable statute, but the question is, when did the running of its five-year limitation period commence? ... We hold, that from the pleadings, involving a layman/expert relationship, nothing indicates plaintiffs knew or should have known of any reason, until May, 1981, to question defendant’s work. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs had no duty to double check defendant’s work. Hence under the facts alleged the damages were not “capable of ascertainment” in October, 1973.

Section 516.120(5) gives a person seeking relief for fraud five years to sue, with the claim accruing when the fraud is discovered within ten years.

Calman v. Calman · filed 1990-09-11(5)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action for relief on the ground of fraud, however, is five years, and the cause of action is “deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.” Section 516.120(5) RSMo 1986.

For loans with no repayment date, the limitations period under § 516.120 begins when each loan is made; no demand for payment is required.

Little v. Fugate · filed 1995-01-25

The obligations here were akin to demand notes. Such notes are payable on the date of execution and no demand is necessary to start the statute of limitations running. ... According to an exhibit presented by respondent, twelve transfers to defendant Fugate, totaling, with credits $62,740.00, are barred by § 516.120.

Section 516.120(5) gives a plaintiff five years to bring a fraud claim and defers accrual until discovery of the facts constituting fraud within ten years.

Tilley v. Franklin Life Insurance Co. · filed 1997-09-30(5)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action for fraud is five years and the cause of action is “deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting fraud.” Section 516.120(5), RSMo (1994).

Section 516.120(5) limits fraud claims to five years after discovery, with an outside deadline of fifteen years after the fraud occurred; it applies to a fraud-based challenge to a trust’s creation.

Mullins v. Estate of Corbin · filed 2001-11-20(5)

Thus, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the aggrieved party’s opportunity to discover the fraud, an action for fraud can be brought, at the latest, fifteen years after its commission. ... Thus, pursuant to § 516.120(5), the appellants had at the very latest until December 31, 1995, to contest the Trust on the basis of fraud in its creation.

For an action based on fraud, the cause of action accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, subject to the statute’s ten-year limit; here, the court held accrual occurred at termination because the plaintiff then felt deceived.

Heideman v. PFL, Inc. · filed 1989-04-11(5)

Plaintiff states, however, that the fraud was not discovered until August 1986 upon receipt of the Hill memo and thus plaintiff may take advantage of Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5): “An action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting fraud.” ... Here, plaintiffs’ argument fails as it has previously failed. This cause of action began to run upon plaintiff’s termination in 1979.

For fraud claims, the cause of action is deemed to accrue when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, and the claim is subject to a five-year limitations period once those facts are known.

Leo HEIDEMAN and Shirley Heideman, Appellants, v. PFL, INC., Appellee · filed 1990-07-31(5)

Heideman had five years to file his claim, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5) (1986), and he failed to meet the deadline. ... Under Missouri law, the cause of action for fraud will be "deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5). Here, Heideman knew "the facts constituting the fraud" when he was discharged, thus subjecting his claim to the five-year limit.

Section 516.120(5) governs fraud actions, with the limitations period accruing when the fraud is discovered.

Nerman v. Alexander Grant & Co. · filed 1991-02-21(5)

An action for relief on the ground of fraud, however, accrues — not when the resulting damage is capable of ascertainment — but when the facts constituting the fraud are discovered. It is governed not by the limitations provisions of § 516.100, but by the limitations provisions of § 516.120(5)....

For a fraud claim, § 516.120(5) uses a discovery rule: the claim accrues when the plaintiff has sufficient facts to inform a reasonable person that fraud was committed.

Nettles v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, a New York Corporation · filed 1995-06-05(5)

The governing limitation provision for determining when a fraud claim accrues is Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5), not section 516.100. ... “Under the fraud discovery standard, the cause of action accrues when [the] plaintiff has ‘sufficient facts to inform a reasonable person that a fraud has been committed.’”

For fraud claims under § 516.120(5), the five-year period does not begin until discovery; when the fraud is committed by a fiduciary, accrual requires the plaintiff’s actual discovery.

Daniel Rademeyer State of Missouri v. Farris · filed 2002-03-13(5)

In Missouri, the limitations period applied to most common-law tort claims is found in the various subsections of Mo. Rev.Stat. § 516.120, which requires that a suit for fraud be brought within five years of the accrual of the cause of action, see Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5). A fraud claim is “deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party,” id., and Missouri courts have held that “discovery” under this section ordinarily occurs when the plaintiff actually discovers “or in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the fraud,” Burr v. Nat’l Life and Accident Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo.Ct.App.1984). Nevertheless, if a fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiffs “actual discovery” of the fraud. Community Title Co. v. U.S. Title Guar. Co., 965 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (emphasis in original). ... Because a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders, see Peterson v. Cont’l Boiler Works, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 896, 904 (Mo.1990), we hold that Mr. Rademeyer’s cause of action for fraud did not accrue until he obtained actual notice of the facts constituting the alleged fraud.

Section 516.120(5) defers the deemed accrual of a fraud claim for limitations purposes; it does not determine when the right to sue actually arises.

State ex rel. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Clymer · filed 1975-04-14(5)

Section 516.120(5), which was the subsection of the statute of limitations applicable in Anderson (and is also the one with which we are concerned),2 did not establish when the cause of action accrued or confer any right to sue.

Section 516.120(5) gives a fraud claim five years from discovery of the fraud; if the fraud remains undiscovered, the five-year period begins ten years after the fraud.

Kueneke v. Jeggle · filed 1983-09-20(5)

Section 516.120(5) RSMo 1978 provides a five-year statute of limitations for “an action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.” The five-year statute does not begin to run, then, until the point of discovery, or if no discovery has occurred, at the end of ten years from the date of the fraud.

Section 516.120(5) starts the limitations period for fraud when the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence, but discovery must occur within ten years of the fraud.

Burr v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co. · filed 1984-01-17(5)

A cause of action for fraud accrues at the time the defrauded party discovered or in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the fraud, ... although by statute discovery must fall within ten years of the alleged fraud, Section 516.120(5).

Section 516.120(5) starts the five-year period for a fraud claim when the aggrieved party discovers, or has the means to discover, the fraud within ten years.

Harris v. Nichols · filed 1986-05-13(5)

Section 516.120(5) provides that the cause of action for fraud is not deemed to have accrued until discovery by the aggrieved party at any time within ten years of the fraud. Here Laura had the means of discovery in her power in January of 1972 and under Harding she is deemed to have known of the fraud at that time.

Section 516.120(5) makes discovery a prerequisite to accrual of a fraud claim; where the parties have a relationship of trust, the claim accrues when the plaintiff has facts sufficient to inform a reasonable person of the fraud, without a duty to investigate further.

Vogel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. · filed 1990-12-31(5)

Thus, to us, the accrual of a claim based upon churning is analogous to the accrual of a cause of action based upon fraud. § 516.120(5). This section makes “discovery” a prerequisite to the accrual of a course of action based upon fraud. ... To us, this simply means the plaintiff had no duty to inquire to find facts or additional facts, but if he has sufficient facts to inform a reasonable person that a fraud has been committed then the cause of action for fraud accrues.

Section 516.120(5) gives a plaintiff five years to bring a fraud claim after the fraud is discoverable; dismissal on the pleadings requires that the claim be untimely as a matter of law.

Brown v. Scheible · filed 1991-08-13(5)

Thus, plaintiff’s petition should have been dismissed only if, as a matter of law, it could be determined from the pleadings that the fraud was capable of ascertainment more than five years prior to the filing of the petition.

Section 516.120(5) provides that a fraud claim accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, rather than when damage occurs or becomes ascertainable.

Lehnig v. Bornhop · filed 1993-08-24(5)

Accordingly, an action for fraud accrues not when the damage occurs or can be ascertained, but when “facts constituting the fraud are discovered.”

Section 516.120(5)’s limitations period for fraud can begin when the injury is ascertainable, even if the claimant has not obtained proof of the fraud.

Cullom v. Crittenton · filed 1998-01-13(5)

Section 516.120(5) governs actions for fraud. ... Ms. Cul-lom’s damages were capable of ascertainment at the time the baby was given up for adoption in 1964. The statute ran on her claim in 1969.

For fraud claims under § 516.120(5), disputed facts about when the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud may prevent summary judgment on limitations grounds.

Birdsong v. Christians · filed 1999-12-10(5)

Our review of the record convinces us that there exists genuine issues of material facts concerning the relevant dates that Appellants would have been able to discover the defects in then-house, particularly latent defects such as wet rot, slow leaking beneath the surface of the roof or located within difficult to access walls, and structural repairs made to the roof.

Section 516.120(5) gives a plaintiff five years to bring a fraud claim, with accrual tied to discovery of the fraud within the statute’s ten-year limit.

Misischia v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center · filed 2000-09-26(5)

Section 516.120(5), RSMo (1994), provides that an action for relief for fraud must be commenced within five years, and that “... the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years of the facts constituting the fraud.”

A fraud action accrues when the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud, subject to the statute's ten-year discovery limit and five-year filing period.

Floyd Hines and Mildred Hines v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. · filed 1989-07-26(5)

We conclude that the question of whether the Hineses’ fraud claims against Harve-store are barred by the statute of limitations presents a material factual dispute concerning the date the Hineses actually discovered or should have discovered the fraud.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period for contract actions runs from accrual, and the court held this claim accrued when the alleged agreement was denied, so the counterclaim was not barred.

Phillips v. Huffman (In Re Huffman) · filed 1994-09-01

Mary asserts that the five-year Statute of Limitations for actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, found in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 (1952) operates to bar Huffinan’s counterclaim. ... According to Mary and Huffman, no time period was established in which the Phillips were required to perform the alleged oral lease purchase agreement. Although Huffman stated that he realized in 1986 or 1987 that the Phillips were not going to perform under the alleged oral agreement, there were no time constraints on the Phillips and, theoretically, they could have performed under the alleged contract at any time. The evidence before the Court shows that Mary did not deny the existence of the alleged oral agreement until November 16, 1993, when she filed her reply to Huffman’s answer to her first motion to lift the automatic stay. It appears to the Court that Huffman’s cause of action for breach of contract accrued at that time. Huffman’s counterclaim is not barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Jackson v. City of Sikeston Police Department · filed 2004-11-30(4)

Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that the instant complaint is time-barred, and we also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because the claims against the additional defendants would have been time-barred as well. ... Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000) (statute of limitations for personal injury action is 5 years).

Section 516.120(5) gives a fraud plaintiff five years to sue from when the plaintiff knew or should have discovered the controlling facts.

Harding v. Modern Income Life Insurance Co. · filed 1979-12-31(5)

The effect of the statutory provision just quoted is to give plaintiffs five years to sue from the date when they knew or should have discovered the controlling facts.

Section 516.120(1) provides a five-year limitations period applicable to a separate action for contribution among tortfeasors.

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown · filed 1982-05-11(1)

Safeway’s suit for contribution was filed within three years and one month of the date of the accident which gave rise to the original cause of action. This is well within the applicable five year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(4) provides the five-year limitations period applicable to a § 1983 claim for personal injury arising from jail conditions.

Nitcher v. Newton County Jail · filed 1988-05-31(4)

Having ruled that Wilson shall apply retroactively in the instant case, we need not determine whether the running of the five-year statute of limitations, § 516.120(4), was tolled during plaintiff’s alleged imprisonment from May 11, 1982, until November 8, 1985, as plaintiff commenced this action June 19,1987, four days short of five years after his final day of incarceration in the Newton County jail. As plaintiffs suit was filed prior to expiration of the applicable five-year period of limitation, the trial court’s order of dismissal must be reversed and the cause must be remanded for further proceedings.

Section 516.120(5) provides a five-year limitation period for common law fraud actions.

Norden v. Friedman · filed 1988-07-26(5)

Common law fraud actions are normally controlled by the 5-year statute of limitations in section 516.120(5), RSMo 1986, which specifically states it is applicable to “an action for relief on the ground of fraud.” Thus the 5-year limitation period is applicable to Count III.

Section 516.120(3) gives a county five years to bring a common law action for trespass on real property.

St. Louis County v. Moore · filed 1991-10-29(3)

Missouri courts have long recognized that a Missouri county has a common law right to sue for trespass on real property. Stoddard County v. Malone, 22 S.W. 469 (Mo.1893). This cause of action is governed by a five year statute of limitations. § 516.120(3) RSMo 1986.

Section 516.120(5) gives a plaintiff up to ten years to discover fraud and five years after discovery to file suit, subject to applicable tolling.

May v. AC & S, INC. · filed 1993-01-29(5)

Missouri courts have construed § 516.120(5) to mean that ten (10) years are provided for the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, and that an action for fraud must be commenced within five (5) years of discovery, but if the fraud is not discovered within ten (10) years, the cause of action is deemed to accrue nevertheless at the end of this ten-year period, and the plaintiff has an additional five years to file his/her action.

Section 516.120(5) gives a plaintiff ten years to discover fraud and five years to sue; if the fraud remains undiscovered after ten years, the claim accrues then and is barred fifteen years after the fraud.

Community Title Co. v. U.S. Title Guaranty Co. · filed 1998-02-10(5)

Section 516.120(5) grants ten years for the discovery of the fraud, and requires that an action for fraud be brought within five years of discovery. If the fraud is not discovered within ten years, then the cause of action is deemed to have accrued at the end of that period and limitations commence to run from that time, so that the action is barred in any event after fifteen years of the commission of the fraud.

Section 516.120(5) supplies a five-year limitations period for fraud claims, while § 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Harbor Insurance v. Essman · filed 1990-11-05(5), (4)

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for fraud applies to the conspiracy claim. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5) (1986). ... The limitation for negligence is five years, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4) (1986), and the claim for breach of professional duties allegedly occurred eleven years before Harbor filed the action.

Section 516.120(5) imposes a five-year limitations period for common-law fraud, running when the plaintiff discovers or, with due diligence, should have discovered the fraud.

Rademeyer v. Farris · filed 2001-05-14(5)

Under Missouri law, the applicable statute of limitations for common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty is five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5); § 516.120(4); see also Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo.1997). ... A cause of action for fraud accrues for limitations purposes when the plaintiff has sufficient facts to inform a reasonable person that a fraud has been committed. ... In a fraud claim, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, "or in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the fraud." ... Therefore, the fraud claim accrued in at least September of 1994, and plaintiff's claim is time-barred unless § 516.280 or § 516.200 tolls the statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for common law fraud claims.

St. Louis U. Tr. Co. v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, ETC. · filed 1976-03-24

The action is clearly within the five-year limitations period for common law fraud under section 516.120, R.S.Mo. (1949), and the three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty under Del.Code Ann., Title 10, § 8106 (1970).

Section 516.120(5) gives a plaintiff five years after discovering the facts constituting fraud to bring suit.

Follmer's Market, Inc. v. Comprehensive Accounting Service Co. · filed 1980-09-23(5)

Certainly, the facts constituting the fraud were discovered by February, 1972. Under § 516.120, plaintiffs had five years thereafter to bring suit. They clearly did not meet that deadline.

Section 516.120 gives negligence claims a five-year limitations period.

Ostermueller v. Potter · filed 1993-12-21

Negligence claims have a five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(5) gives a plaintiff five years to bring a fraud claim, with accrual tied to discovery of the fraud; disputed facts about when the fraud could reasonably have been discovered can preclude summary judgment.

Mallek v. First Banc Insurors Agency · filed 2007-02-06(5)

Because we find genuine issues of material fact exist as to when Mallek discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the alleged fraud, we conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on Section 516.120.

Section 516.120(5)'s five-year period for fraud claims begins on actual discovery of the fraud when a fiduciary relationship exists.

Lester M. Dean, Jr. v. Noble · filed 2015-12-15(5)

Because there was a fiduciary relationship between attorney Noble and his client Dean, Dean's fraud claim would have "accrued" when Dean actually discovered "the facts constituting the fraud."

Section 516.120(5)’s five-year period begins when the facts constituting fraud are discovered or would have been discovered through due diligence.

Tucker v. General Motors LLC · filed 2024-05-09(5)

Under Section 516.120(5), the five-year statute begins to run upon “discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or when the fraud would have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence.” Huffman v. Credit Union of Tex., 758 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Creative Mktg. Assoc., Inc. v. AT&T, 476 F.3d 539, 539 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasis removed)). Here, defendant has not shown that plaintiff was aware of the facts constituting defendant’s fraud, nor that he could have discovered defendant’s fraud, before November 24, 2015.

Section 516.120(5) starts the limitations period for fraud when the claimant discovers the facts constituting it; where a fiduciary relationship exists, actual discovery is required.

Thomas v. Grant Thornton LLP · filed 2015-10-06(5)

While section 516.100 governs when negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action originate or accrue, section 516.120(5) determines when a cause of action for fraud accrues. ... Because a fiduciary relationship existed between Grant Thornton and the Thomases, this claim accrued when the Thomases actually discovered the fraud. ... Upon receipt of the detailed notices of deficiency, the Thomases actually discovered that the tax schemes were not legitimate tax avoidance strategies as allegedly represented by Grant Thornton.

Section 516.120(5)’s five-year limit for fraud claims yields to the more specific limit for fraud connected with a probate proceeding.

Gianella v. Gianella · filed 2007-07-17(5)

While the five-year statute of limitations under section 516.120(5) applies generally to claims of fraud, section 472.013 provides for a more specific limitation applicable to claims of fraud perpetrated in connection with any probate proceeding.

Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for the covered personal-injury-type civil-rights claims, and applying that period can bar an action filed more than five years after the underlying conduct.

Cross v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1985-11-27

Although this Court has not yet had occasion to apply Wilson to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985(3), we have applied Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations, Mo. Rev.Stat. § 516.120, for, inter alia, personal injury actions, to a section 1981 action. ... We need not decide whether, under Wilson, the three- or five-year statute of limitations applies here because even if we apply the longer five-year statute of limitations set forth in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 to both the section 1981 and 1985(3) claims, it is clear that Cross’s present action against the individual defendants was not commenced until well beyond five years after the termination of his employment with GMC and the acts which he alleges to have occurred in support of the alleged conspiracy between GMC and its agents.

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal injury actions, and that period governs a hybrid duty-of-fair-representation/equal-rights claim.

James H. Marshall, II v. Local Union No. 6, Brewers and Maltsters and General Labor Departments · filed 1992-04-01(4)

The sources considered by the Magistrate Judge were state law, here the five-year Missouri limitations period for personal injury actions, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4) (1986), or the much shorter six-month limitations period provided by section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988), ordinarily applicable to the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board. The court held that the five-year state law limitations period applied, so that the complaint of the class was timely filed. ... Therefore we hold as follows: (1) the class claim for Local 6's acts relating to the June 30, 1987, Memorandum of Understanding (the "hybrid" duty of fair representation/equal rights claim) is governed by the five-year Missouri statute of limitations for personal injury actions and thus is not time-barred; and (2) the hybrid class claims alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement (section 301(a)) and breach of the duty of fair representation are governed by the six-month statute of limitations under NLRA section 10(b), but the lawsuit was timely filed as to those claims.

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for Missouri personal-injury claims, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Sulik v. Taney County · filed 2005-01-04(4)

Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to all of Sulik's section 1983 claims.

Section 516.120(2) imposes a five-year limitations period on an action based on liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture, and that period applies to MMPA claims.

Glen v. Fairway Independent Mortgage Corp. · filed 2010-02-22(2)

The five-year limitations period provided by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(2) applies to plaintiffs’ MMPA claim.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract claims governed by Missouri law.

Baker Hughes, Inc. v. S & S Chemical, LLC · filed 2014-10-24

Missouri law applies to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims and provides a five-year statute of limitations. Mo.Rev. Stat. § 516.120.

Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims because they are analogous to personal-injury claims.

Hardiman v. Precythe · filed 2021-05-27(4)

Section § 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. Sulik v. Taney County, Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 766–67 (8th Cir. 2005); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4).

Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for the tort claims at issue.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fiala · filed 1994-10-12

The Court finds that under subparagraph (A), because the five year period of limitations provided by Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120, is longer than the three year period provided in subparagraph (A)(ii)(I), the five year period applies.

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period that does not bar an action filed within five years of the injury.

Devine v. Rook · filed 1958-06-16(4)

Hence the regular Missouri five-year statute of limitations [Section 516.120(4), RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.] does not bar it.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period, measured here from the last payment on the account, made later advice about pursuing the claim futile.

McEntee v. Halloran · filed 1965-06-14

In their petition plaintiffs as minority trustees allege that the action was being filed because of a threat that the claim against the city would become barred by the 5-year statute of limitations (Section 516.120, RSMo 1959, V.A. M.S.). If such was a potential threat at the time the suit was filed in 1960, it is now an actual one because, according to the plaintiffs’ computation, the statute of limitations ran from the time of the last payment on the account on May 8, 1959. More than five years from that date have now elapsed and any advice to the trustees at this time as to procedures would be entirely futile.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for a § 1981 employment-discrimination claim, running from the last discriminatory act.

Mary GREENE, Appellant, v. CARTER CARBURETOR CO., Appellee · filed 1976-04-02

The last discriminatory act, plaintiff’s discharge, occurred on February 6, 1970. Plaintiff’s present suit was filed on February 28,1975, more than five years after the wrongful acts charged, and is thus barred by the applicable five-year Missouri statute of limitations, § 516.120.

Section 516.120(1) supplies a five-year limitations period that applies to these federal employment discrimination claims.

Evans v. Little Flower Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 1977-01-05(1)

Missouri’s five year statue of limitations for contract actions § 516.120(1), R.S.Mo. (1969) has been held to be applicable under these circumstances. ... Plaintiff’s suit was not filed within five years of the discharge and accordingly is barred.

Section 516.120(1) requires actions upon express or implied contracts, obligations, or liabilities to be brought within five years.

Ghertner v. Lipton · filed 1978-02-28(1)

Section 516.120(1) RSMo 1969 requires the bringing of “all actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied,” within five years. Therefore, the petition is barred.

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitations period on claims alleging violations of constitutional rights.

Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Insurance · filed 1978-10-12

The statute of limitations governing plaintiff’s claims of violations of his constitutional rights is set forth in § 516.120, R.S.Mo. (1969). Cf., Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972). That statute sets forth a five-year statute of limitations. The actions which plaintiff claims to constitute a deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred by November, 1971. This suit was not filed until August 9, 1978. Thus, it is clear that the constitutional claims are time-barred.

Section 516.120 supplied the five-year limitations period for claims arising from the manufacture and delivery of modular homes.

Jourdan v. Missouri Valley Investment Co. · filed 1983-03-22

The origin of this action (on May 30, 1975) was within the then applicable five-year statute, § 516.120, RSMo 1978. Appellants’ corporate charter was revoked on January 1, 1976. On June 5,1978, appellants voluntarily dismissed its petition. At this point, the time (five years) under § 516.120 had run.

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for a voting-rights claim against a municipality under § 1983; the claim accrues when the election occurs.

St. Louis County, Mo. v. CITY OF TOWN · filed 1984-06-29(4)

The parties agree that for a voting rights claim against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable statute is § 516.120(4), R.S.Mo.1978, which establishes a five year limitations period for "[a]n action for ... any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated." The alleged constitutional violation here is a denial of the right to vote. Town and Country held its annexation election on April 5, 1977, at which time the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued. More than five years having passed since that date, the plaintiffs' claims against Town and Country are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for a damages claim based on threats causing emotional distress.

Emefiena v. Park College · filed 1984-09-25

The present suit was commenced by filing a petition in Platte County Circuit Court on August 8, 1983, well beyond the five-year statute of limitations, § 516.120, RSMo 1969. The statute of limitations would have run its course on June 24, 1982.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period that bars an action filed after the period runs.

King v. Nashua Corp. · filed 1984-06-21

The five-year limitation period set forth in § 516.120 R.S.Mo. is a bar to this action.

Section 516.120’s five-year period bars a defective-construction claim filed more than five years after the owner first sustained ascertainable damage, even if the damage later worsened.

Hasemeier v. Metro Sales, Inc. · filed 1985-07-23

It remains, then, to determine whether appellants’ petition was filed within the five-year period allowed by § 516.120 RSMo.1978. ... The issue to be decided is whether, given the facts here, the damage was sustained and capable of ascertainment on August 1, 1971 so as to start the running of the five-year statutory period. This court rules that it was. ... The fact that the damage continued and became worse as time went on does not extend the time within which suit may be brought to some indefinite date in the future.

Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for claims seeking unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds under collective bargaining and participation agreements.

CENT. STATES, SOUTHEAST & SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION FUND v. King Dodge, Inc. · filed 1986-07-16

This question has been encountered before in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Court has decided that § 516.120 R.S.Mo. is the statute of limitation to be applied. ... After a careful examination of *1497 the law in this area, the Court concludes that these earlier decisions are sound and that the five-year statute of limitations must apply to the claims in this case.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for a breach of written construction contract claim.

Hebbelen v. Rose · filed 1987-02-10

Both contractor and owner agree owner’s cause of action was governed by a five-year statute of limitations. § 516.120, RSMo (1978). ... This was sufficient for the trial court to determine the damage was first ascertainable in 1977, thus making the filing of the lawsuit in 1980 within the five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for a products liability action.

Ahearn v. Lafayette Pharmacal, Inc. · filed 1987-03-17

Section 516.120 provides for a five year statute of limitations for plaintiff’s action. ... The statute of limitations commenced running in 1975 and expired in 1980. Plaintiffs cause of action, which was initiated in 1984, is therefore barred by § 516.120.

Section 516.120 allows five years from accrual to file an action within its scope.

Britton v. Hamilton · filed 1987-12-01

Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued in January and February of 1980. Thus, the July, 1983 filing was well within the five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120’s five-year period bars a wrongful-demolition claim when the damage was ascertainable at demolition and the proper plaintiff first sued more than five years later.

Harting v. City of Black Jack · filed 1989-03-28

Clearly, damages were capable of ascertainment upon completion of the demolition on October 5,1975, where appellants had prior notice of the commencement date of the demolition. Appellants did not commence their action until October 17, 1980. ... Here, the facts clearly indicate that appellants’ claim is barred by § 516.120 RSMo 1978.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to this intra-union dispute over members’ rights.

Marshall v. Local Union No. 6 · filed 1991-02-04

This action is governed by the five year limitation period provided by Missouri law for personal injury litigation. § 516.120 R.S.Mo.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract and tortious-interference claims.

Rice v. Taylor-Morley-Simon, Inc. · filed 1992-12-15

Plaintiffs’ third amended petition alleged breach of contract and tortious interference by TMS arising in July and October, 1983, and was filed on February 2, 1987. Following voluntary dismissal of these causes of action from case I, plaintiffs' refiled case II within the five-year statute of limitations, § 516.120, RSMo 1978.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period does not apply when an acknowledgment of accrued overtime hours creates neither an accord executory nor an account stated.

Forry v. Department of Natural Resources · filed 1994-10-04

Since we find that the theories of “accord executory” and “account stated” are not applicable here, Forry’s argument is without merit and the five-year statute of limitations under section 516.120, RSMo 1986, does not apply.

Section 516.120 requires a personal-injury action to be filed within five years of the occurrence.

Pataky v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1994-11-08

Section 516.120, RSMo 1986, is the applicable statute of limitations in this cause. Accordingly, suit is required to be filed within five years of the occurrence.

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. · filed 1995-08-22(4)

Additionally, the five year statute of limitations, § 516.120(4) RSMo1986,1986, does not bar the negligence claim alleging a February 3, 1986 injury.

Section 516.120 gives five years to file a negligence claim; the period runs from when the injury is capable of ascertainment, even if its full extent is unknown.

Newton v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc. · filed 1992-06-23

The five-year statute of limitations, § 516.120, would appear a bar to the instant action. June 8, 1990, is more than five years from the date of the shooting, June 14, 1983. ... Mr. Newton’s argument that he did not know the full extent of his damages does not excuse his failure to file suit within five years, as he could have maintained a successful suit dating to the time of the shooting.

Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitations period for claims of legal malpractice, breach of contract, trespass, and conversion.

Jordan v. Willens · filed 1996-11-19

In the present case, the parties agree that a five-year statute of limitations applies to each of Mr. Jordan’s claims. See § 516.120, RSMo 1994. ... As this was more than five years before he filed his Petition, his malpractice claim is time-barred.

Section 516.120(1)’s five-year limit bars an underinsurance claim filed more than five years after the resulting damage became ascertainable.

Polytech, Inc. v. Sedgwick James of Missouri, Inc. · filed 1996-11-26(1)

The five-year statute of limitations, § 516.120(1), bars the instant action.

Section 516.120(1) provides a five-year limitations period for a civil action to enforce an ordinance-created obligation.

City of Chesterfield v. Deshetler Homes, Inc. · filed 1997-02-18(1)

Because this ease is civil in nature, a five-year statute of limitations applies. The ordinance in question creates an obligation on the part of Developer to maintain siltation controls and pay for silt removal if any should occur.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for claims on non-written contracts.

Honigmann v. C & L Restaurant Corp. · filed 1998-02-24

It is facially evident from the petition that the claims accruing after 1991 were improperly dismissed. Both parties agree that the five-year statute of limitations for non-written contracts is applicable. Section 516.120 RSMo (1994). Honigmann filed his petition on November 4, 1996. There are over a dozen transactions alleged to have taken place between November of 1991 and the date of filing the suit. C & L concedes that the court erred in dismissing claims that accrued after November. Therefore, we reverse and remand as to alleged transactions occurring after November 4,1991.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period bars a claim when the petition shows on its face that the period has expired.

Olean Associates, Inc. v. Knights of Columbus · filed 1999-08-03

Because it clearly appears on the face of the petition that the cause of action was time barred by the five-year statute of limitations, the motion to dismiss was properly sustained.

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for the Missouri state-law claims at issue.

Doe v. O'CONNELL · filed 2004-08-24(4)

The applicable limitations period for these claims is five years. Section 516.120(4) RSMo 2000.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period begins when the fact of damage is capable of ascertainment, even if the amount of damage is not yet ascertainable.

Albert v. Thornton · filed 1990-04-20

The statute of limitations begins to run once the fact of damage is capable of ascertainment, even though amount of damage is not yet ascertainable.

Section 516.120's five-year limitations period for a contribution action begins to run at settlement, when the right to contribution becomes clear, rather than at the underlying accident.

Greenstreet v. Rupert · filed 1990-07-24

Rupert further argues that the contribution suit, which has its origin in Mo. Rev.Stat. § 537.065 (1986), is barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Mo.Rev. Stat. § 516.120. The only case cited by respondent is Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown. However, the applicable statute of limitations does not begin to run until the time of settlement because that is when the right to contribution was clearly stated.

Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims, running when damage is sustained and capable of discovery; § 516.120(5) imposes a five-year period for fraud claims, running on discovery or when discovery would have occurred with due diligence.

Creative Marketing Associates, Inc. v. At & T · filed 2007-02-02(4) (5)

Under Missouri law, there is a five-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4). This limitation begins to run when damage is sustained and capable of being discovered and not when the plaintiff learns of the injury or wrongful conduct. ... The statute of limitations for fraud is also five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5). This period begins to run upon discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or when the fraud would have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence.

Section 516.120(1)'s five-year period yields to the three-year period for an action against a recorder of deeds to recover fees collected in her official capacity.

Investors Title Co., Inc. v. Hammonds · filed 2007-03-13(1)

Section 516.120(1) provides that a five-year limitations period applies to “all actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110, and except upon ... judgments or decrees of the court of record, and except where a different time is herein limited [.] ” (emphasis added). ... The trial court did not err in applying the three-year limitation period contained in section 516.130(1).

Section 516.120 gives contract and general tort claims a five-year limitations period that can bar suit when notice of a potentially actionable injury arose more than five years before filing.

Ashford Condominium, Inc. v. Horner & Shifrin, Inc. · filed 2010-11-16(1), (4)

Ashford had notice of a potentially actionable injury toward the end of 2000 and early in 2001 when the project was finally completed, but did not file its lawsuit against Horner or Lamb until 2008. By delaying commencement of its suit, Ashford permitted the five-year limitations period of Section 516.120 to foreclose any remedy it may have had against Horner and Lamb on its claims.

Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitations period for these breach of contract and negligence claims.

Warren County Concrete, L.L.C. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2011-04-12

In this case, WCC’s claims against Bank and Title Company for breach of contract and negligence are governed by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 516.120.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for collecting a debt.

Marriage of Morse v. Morse · filed 2012-04-27

Additionally, under section 516.120 RSMo 2000, the parties made no payments on the alleged debt and the applicable statute of limitation for collecting the debt — five years — had run.

Section 516.120 limits recovery on trespass claims to the five-year limitations period.

Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative · filed 2014-03-31

Based on Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations on trespass claims, § 516.120 RSMo., the Sho-Me Defendants seek partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs for any recovery sought for the period prior to January 21, 2005 (five years before Plaintiffs filed their state court petition against the ShoMe Defendants). ... Because Plaintiffs are not seeking damages outside the statute of limitations period, Sho-Me’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations, [Doc. 298], is GRANTED as to any claim outside the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitations period on claims for abuse of process, trespass, invasion of privacy, personal injury, forcible entry, conversion, conspiracy, and failure to hire, train, and supervise.

Shuler v. Arnott · filed 2022-01-19

The limitations period for each of these counts is five years. §516.120 RSMo.

Section 516.120 does not apply to MIRA reimbursement actions because MIRA has its own time limit.

State Ex Rel. Nixon v. Smith · filed 2008-02-05

Section 516.120 is immaterial to the current action because MIRA contains a specific time limit.

Section 516.120(3) imposes a five-year limitations period on trespass and conversion claims, making the pre-1977 installation trespasses time-barred while a June 1981 trespass fell within the period.

Wolff v. Horizon Communications Corp. · filed 1985-08-22(3)

As both sides recognize, the governing statute of limitations for plaintiffs trespass and conversion claims is Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(3) (1984) which provides for a five year limitations period. Under Mo. Rev.Stat. § 516.100 (1984), this limitation period begins to run “after the causes of actions shall have accrued; ... the causes of actions shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done ..., but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.” ... The trespasses which occurred in connection with these installations are time barred. ... Nevertheless, Count III of plaintiff’s complaint cannot be dismissed because the evidence does establish a possible trespass in June 1981, which is within the limitation period.

Section 516.120(5) supplies Missouri’s five-year limitations period for fraud claims, subject to Missouri’s borrowing rule when a shorter limitations period in the state where the claim originated fully bars it.

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc. · filed 1995-07-27(5)

Under Missouri law, KPERS’ cause of action will be subject to the five-year Missouri limitation period for fraud, Mo.Rev. Stat. § 516.120(5) (1994), unless “fully barred” by a shorter statute in the state where the cause originated, Kansas.7 Mo. RevStat. § 516.190 (1994).

Section 516.120’s five-year limitation period bars a negligence claim against a title company brought more than five years after the omitted easement was discovered.

Janssen v. Guaranty Land Title Co. · filed 1978-08-15

As to count I for damages for failing to report the easement on the certificate of title, General filed a motion for summary judgment raising the five year statute of limitations provided in § 516.120 RSMo. 1969. The trial court correctly granted General’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitation period for personal injury claims of this type.

West v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. · filed 1966-02-11

Section 516.120, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., provides a five-year limitation period for personal injury cases of the type here involved.

Section 516.120 sets a five-year limit for lawsuits based on oral contracts; when the evidence permits conflicting conclusions about whether the limit has run, the issue is for the jury.

Hopkins v. Goose Creek Land Co., Inc. · filed 1984-05-22

The statute of limitations bars lawsuits based upon oral contracts’ after five years. § 516.120 RSMo. 1978. ... Because contradictory conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the running of the statute of limitations was a jury question.

Section 516.120’s five-year limit applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim and begins to run when the resulting damage is capable of ascertainment.

Southern Cross Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Becker · filed 1988-11-29

First, that the trial court erred in overruling Becker’s motion to dismiss because Southern’s cause of action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations, § 516.120, RSMo 1986. We disagree, because Southern filed its suit within five years after its damages were capable of ascertainment.

Section 516.120(1)’s five-year limit bars a pay-and-benefits claim filed more than five years after the last alleged shortfall, even assuming each incorrect payment accrues separately.

Strozewski v. City of Springfield · filed 1994-04-26(1)

Section 516.120(1) imposes a five year limitation period on all “actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities.” ... It follows that he has suffered no injury since 1985, and his claim is clearly barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitations period on claims for unwritten personal loans.

Markley v. Edmiston · filed 1996-05-21

Because the debts were not in writing and more than five years elapsed since the loans were incurred, Don Markley’s claim was barred by the five year statute of limitations, set forth in § 516.120, RSMo 1994.

Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitation period for actions on express or implied contracts, obligations, or liabilities.

Business Men's Assurance Co. of America v. Graham · filed 1999-02-09

A five year limitation on “[a]ll actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied” is prescribed in section 516.120. Thus, under the applicable statute of limitation, BMA was required to file its action against Skidmore within five years of when the damage was sustained and was capable of ascertainment.

A claim subject to § 516.120's five-year limit can survive a motion to dismiss when the plaintiff's tolling arguments are sufficient at the pleading stage.

Johnson v. Berry · filed 2001-06-11

Defendants seek dismissal of Count V on the basis of the five-year statute of limitations set forth in § 516.120 R.S.Mo. In response, plaintiff again asserts his two arguments for tolling the statute of limitations, and in addition offers a theory that the partnership extended until the filing of the lawsuit. The Court need not and does not address the latter theory, as the tolling arguments are sufficient at this time to defeat dismissal on the statute of limitations basis urged in defendants' motion.

Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitation period for actions to recover detained personal property.

Empiregas, Inc. of Palmyra v. Zinn · filed 1992-06-23(4)

The statute of limitation on an action for detaining any goods, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, is five years. § 516.120(4) RSMo 1986.

Section 516.120 gives replevin and conversion claims involving personal property five years, beginning when the damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment.

Hamdan v. Board of Police Commissioners ex rel. City of St. Louis · filed 2001-02-06

The five year statute of limitations period set forth in Section 516.120 applies to replevin and conversion actions for personal property. ... For purposes of replevin and conversion claims regarding personal property, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the damage is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.

Section 516.120 gives five years to bring a conversion claim, beginning when the damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment.

Linn v. Moffitt · filed 2002-01-29

Plaintiffs contend that they demanded return of the property and the trial court ordered the defendants to return the property on May 13, 1996, which was within the five-year statute of limitations for a conversion claim under section 516.120 RSMo (1994). We disagree. The statute of limitations begins to run when the damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment. ... The five-year statute of limitations had run as to property released to Moffitt in July and August 1993.

Section 516.120(4) gives a plaintiff five years to bring an action to recover personal property, starting when the property is taken.

Vahey v. Vahey · filed 2003-11-12(4)

Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not begin to run until the property was taken. Thus, their action was brought within the five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 supplies the five-year limitations period for professional-negligence claims against architects and engineers, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Bucher · filed 1992-06-16

In a recent opinion upholding the constitutionality of section 516.097, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that this section did not conflict with section 516.120. ... Consequently, we hold that Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 is the statute of limitations applicable to the instant case. ... We hold that the earth movement on that date started the running of the statute of limitations. Mo. Rev.Stat. § 516.120. Consequently, SRC’s complaint, filed on October 25, 1990, was untimely.

Section 516.120 supplies the general five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury-based § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Hawley v. Nelson · filed 1997-04-04

Section 1983 has no explicit statute of limitations. However, the Supreme Court has determined that the most analogous state statute of limitations to be applied to § 1983 actions is the one for general personal injuries. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). For § 1983 claims arising in Missouri, that statute is the general five-year statute for personal injuries, Mo. Rev.Stat. § 516.120, not § 516.130 (three year period for actions brought against officials) as argued by defendants. See Lovejoy v. Goodrich, 798 F.2d 1201, 1202 (8th Cir. 1986).

Section 516.120(5) provides a five-year period for common-law fraud claims, but its period does not govern the federal securities claims considered here.

Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. · filed 1977-11-15(5)

Section 516.120(5), R.S.Mo. (1969), provides a five year statute of limitations for claims based upon common law fraud. ... Absent a ruling from the Eighth Circuit on the issue, this Court concludes that the Missouri blue sky statute of limitations should be applied herein.

Section 516.120 allows five years to bring a personal injury action against a tortfeasor; missing that deadline does not bar recovery under an uninsured motorist policy.

Welch v. Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange · filed 1997-07-29

An action for injury to the person, not arising on contract, shall be commenced within five years. Section 516.120, RSMo 1986. ... Under the circumstances of this ease, a failure by plaintiff to bring suit against the tortfeasor within five years does not prevent her recovery under her uninsured motorist policy.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations defense is waived if first raised after the plaintiff presents his case at trial.

Patel v. Pate · filed 2004-03-23

Mr. Pate claims that although he did not plead the five-year statute of limitations of section 516.120 in his answer, the court erred in overruling his “motion to dismiss” filed at the close of plaintiffs case. ... A motion to dismiss filed after the plaintiffs case has been presented at trial that, for the first time, asserts that a statute of limitations is preclusive of the successful filing of plaintiffs claim is untimely, fails to satisfy the provisions of Rule 55.08, and waives the affirmative defense. Thus, Mr. Pate’s failure to properly assert the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense waived it.

Section 516.120(4) gives actions for taking goods or chattels, including recovery of specific personal property, a five-year limitations period; filing the action within that period is sufficient even if service occurs later.

In Re Klaas · filed 2000-01-13(4)

Actions for the taking of any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, have a five year statute of limitations. § 516.120(4), RSMo 1994. The original petition and the order adding Respondents in this case was filed within the five years of the alleged acts. The action was commenced upon the filing of the petition, and therefore within the limitation period.

Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year limit on an intentional failure to supervise claim; repressed memory does not toll that limit when the injury was capable of ascertainment at the time of the abuse.

H.R.B. v. Rigali · filed 2000-03-28(4)

We conclude the evidence will not support a finding that Plaintiffs repression of his memory will toll the statute of limitations in section 516.120 and 516.100.

Section 516.120’s five-year period for personal injury actions does not govern a claim against a dissolved corporation when a corporate survival statute applies.

Wittman v. National Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 2000-11-14

Claimant argues that since her second suit was within the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, the savings statute rescues the second suit as it was filed within the one-year savings period. This argument overlooks our holding in State ex rel. Nat’l Super Markets, Inc. v. Dowd that a corporate survival statute, not a general statute of limitations, is applicable in corporate dissolution cases.

Section 516.120 gives actions upon obligations a five-year limitations period; when an amended petition relates back, the period is measured from the original petition’s filing.

Muehlheausler v. City of St. Louis · filed 2007-01-09

The statute of limitation for “[a]ll actions upon ... obligations” is five years. Section 516.120 RSMo 2000. ... Thus, the statute of limitations is to be measured by the filing of the original petition, not the amended petition.

Section 516.120 does not apply to inverse condemnation claims for taking real property, but subsection (4) gives claims for damage to personal property a five-year limit.

Shade v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 2002-03-05

We find that § 516.120 does not apply to inverse condemnation claims in which compensation is sought for the taking of real property. ... Section 516.120(4) provides that “[a]n action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated” must be brought within five years. This statute would apply to inverse condemnation claims involving personal property.

Section 516.120(4) gives property owners five years to bring an inverse condemnation claim for damage to personal property.

Randolph v. Missouri Highways & Transportation Commission · filed 2007-04-24(4)

Section 516.120(4) requires that “[a]n action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated” was to be brought within five years.