Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.330

Section 452.330 permits an award of all marital property to one party after consideration of relevant factors, but does not apply to a separate partition suit.

Reed v. Reed · filed 1974-11-26

We acknowledge that under § 452.330 and after giving consideration to all relevant factors, including those enumerated in § 452.330, the award of all property to one party could be made. ... Therefore, neither the Divorce Reform Act nor the divorce law in effect at the time the divorce action was filed has application to the partition suit.

Section 452.330(2) includes proceeds from a spouse’s personal injury settlement and increases in their value as marital property when no statutory exception applies.

Nixon v. Nixon · filed 1975-07-08(2)

The difficulty with this contention is that section 2 of § 452.330, RSMo 1969 defines “marital property,” for purposes of the chapter on Dissolution of Marriage, as “all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,” with five specified exceptions, none of which is applicable here. All property in-eludes the property acquired by respondent as a result of the settlement of his personal injury action, and all increases in value thereof.

Section 452.330 permits a bracelet to be included in marital property when sufficient evidence supports that classification.

LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo · filed 1977-02-15

Sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the trial court’s finding that the bracelet was marital property under Section 452.-330 RSMo Supp.1973.

Section 452.330 requires the court to identify which assets are marital property subject to division and which are each spouse’s separate property.

Fields v. Fields · filed 1979-06-29

The court must therefore make specific findings as to each asset or class of assets whether a particular item is marital property subject to division by the court or is non-marital property and is the property of a spouse individually.

Section 452.330 requires the court to determine whether the parties’ property is marital or non-marital and distribute it; a decree that leaves property unresolved is not final and appealable.

In re the Marriage of McSwain · filed 1980-06-24

Further, it fails to ascertain the status of the property of the parties as marital or non-marital and distribute the same as required by § 452.330, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.

Section 452.330 requires the court to classify, value, and allocate all property; omitting a potentially valuable asset prevents a final appealable decree.

Glascock v. Glascock · filed 1980-11-03

The purpose of § 452.330 RSMo 1978 is to effect a complete severance of title and possession to property as between the spouses. ... The failure to consider a potentially valuable asset, evaluate and allocate it requires dismissal of the appeal.

Section 452.330 requires the court to identify marital property before dividing it justly.

Marriage of MacBeth v. MacBeth · filed 1981-07-14

A court cannot make a just division under § 452.330, RSMo 1978 without an antecedent identification of the marital property.

Section 452.330 permits a marital property division that identifies and disposes of the property in a final adjudication separating the spouses’ interests.

Phelps v. Phelps · filed 1981-08-18

The marital property was identified and disposed of by one final adjudication of the property rights between the spouses, thus discouraging continued rancor as to that aspect of the dissolution proceedings.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to set apart separate property, divide all marital property, and make findings about each asset or class of assets.

Weast v. Weast · filed 1983-07-12(1)

The trial court must set apart separate property and divide the marital property. § 452.330.1. It is to divide all of the property, making specific findings as to each asset or class of assets whether a particular item is subject to division by the court or is non-marital property.

Section 452.330 requires the court to classify and dispose of all property before a dissolution judgment is final.

Anspach v. Anspach · filed 1977-08-16

If the issue is not resolved, the judgment in this case cannot become final. Because the status of the interest in all of the property of the parties was not determined and set apart as the separate property of one of the parties, or divided, we reluctantly conclude, that there was no final judgment.

Section 452.330 requires the dissolution court to determine whether each asset or class of assets is separate or marital property.

In Re Marriage of Schulz · filed 1979-05-29

However, the trial court, in a proceeding under the Dissolution of Marriage Act must determine the status of the property of the parties and, as to each asset or class of assets, must make a finding whether a particular item is property of a spouse individually or is marital property.

Section 452.330.1 requires a property division decree to describe, classify as marital or non-marital, and value the property.

Wansing v. Wansing · filed 1981-02-02(1)

The wife attacks this disposition on two grounds, of which the first is that the decree does not describe, classify as marital or non-marital, or value any of the property. That objection must be sustained. Section 452.330.1, RSMo 1978.

Section 452.330 governs the classification of separate and marital property and the distribution of marital property in a dissolution decree.

Hardy v. Hardy · filed 1982-03-30

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the court did not follow § 452.330 RSMo. 1978 in its determination of the separate and marital property, and its distribution of marital property.

Section 452.330 treats crops planted and cultivated during the marriage as marital property, valued as crops in place rather than expected harvest profits.

Doyle v. Doyle · filed 1978-12-27(2)

The values given by Combs clearly related to the crops in place, and were much less than the estimate of potential value at harvest time, also given by him. These crops, planted and cultivated during the marriage, were marital property, and the trial court did not err in so considering them.

Section 452.330 authorizes a dissolution court to dispose of a life insurance policy as a marital asset.

Hudson v. Aetna Life Insurance · filed 1982-07-23

The life insurance policy was a marital asset the court had authority to dispose of under Section 452.330 R.S.Mo.

Section 452.330 requires the court to set aside each party’s separate property before dividing marital property.

Stone v. Stone · filed 1981-02-24

Section 452.330, RSMo 1978 provides that separate property is to be set aside for the respective parties before the division is made of the marital property.

Section 452.330.1 requires a dissolution judgment to set apart a spouse’s non-marital property.

Carter v. Carter · filed 1981-05-041

The court designated to Sue as non-marital property the items owned by Sue at the time of her marriage, and also simply omitted some such items from the decree. They were not specifically set apart to her, as required by § 452.330.1, RSMo 1978, but we will supply that omission by amending the judgment under our powers under Rule 84.14.

Section 452.330 requires findings that identify separate and marital property and permit all marital property to be distributed in one proceeding.

In re the Marriage of Gardner · filed 1982-06-29

Section 452.330 does require a judgment which identifies the parties’ separate and marital property, but the basic requirement is that the findings be sufficient to permit the distribution of all marital property in a single proceeding.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to identify each asset or class of assets as marital or separate property before dividing the marital property.

Bishop v. Bishop · filed 1983-09-20

The trial court must make specific findings as to whether each asset or class of assets is marital property subject to division or non-marital property belonging to a spouse individually.

Section 452.330 permits a dissolution court to exercise discretion over trust property that both spouses’ pleadings treat as divisible marital property.

Hutchings v. Hutchings · filed 1984-09-04

We hold that both the plaintiff’s petition and defendant’s answer treated the relevant property as divisible trust property. ... In Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798[9] (Mo.App.1977) the court ruled that Section 452.330 RSMo. left no doubt the legislature intended a division of marital property “which would effect a complete severance of all unity of possession, as well as unity of title, between the spouses...” ... We uphold the trial court’s taking jurisdiction of the partnership trust, and hold its disposition thereof was within its discretion.

Section 452.330.1 requires a dissolution court to classify all property owned by the spouses as separate or marital and dispose of it in the property division.

Yates v. Yates · filed 1984-10-23(1)

In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court is required to determine the status, either separate or marital, of all property owned by the parties, and to dispose of it in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Section 452.330.1 RSMo (Supp.1983).

Section 452.330.1 requires a residence financed with marital funds to be divided as marital property under its four factors, even when title is in one spouse’s name.

Bashore v. Bashore · filed 1985-01-291

In the present case, applying the controlling authority of Hoffmann, supra, the family residence is marital property and must be divided between the parties based on the four factors set out in § 452.330.1, RSMo.Supp.1983. This follows because appellant’s funds contributed to acquisition of the asset, first by payment from the joint bank account to purchase the building lot and second, by the use of marital funds for mortgage reduction payments. The fact that respondent’s name alone appears on the record title is irrelevant.

Personal injury settlement proceeds received during marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution.

Trapani v. Trapani · filed 1984-12-04(2)(2)

We reaffirm our conclusion in Nixon and hold that monies received in a personal injury action constitute a marital asset subject to equitable distribution in dissolution proceedings.

Section 452.330(2) treats a spouse’s F.E.L.A. personal injury settlement received during marriage as marital property.

Gonzalez v. Gonzalez · filed 1985-04-16(2)

We, therefore, follow the holding in Nixon, supra, and hold the F.E. L.A. award is properly considered marital property.

Section 452.330 treats income from separate property acquired during marriage, and assets purchased with that income, as marital property unless an exclusion applies.

Wilhelm v. Wilhelm · filed 1985-02-05(2), (3)

Income from separate property acquired subsequent to the marriage is presumed to be marital property. § 452.330.3 RSMo Supp.1984. ... The presumption may be overcome only upon proof that the property in question was acquired by gift or inheritance or in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage. § 452.330.2 RSMo Supp.1984. The income from separate property acquired during the marriage does not fall within any of the excluded categories. It is marital property.

Section 452.330(1) requires the court to set apart each spouse’s separate property before dividing marital property.

Ludwig v. Ludwig · filed 1985-05-14(1)

Under § 452.330(1), RSMo Supp. 1984, the trial court must “set apart to each spouse his property” prior to dividing the marital property of the parties.

Section 452.330 treats an uncollected judgment obtained by both spouses during marriage for damage to the marital home as marital property.

Golleher v. Golleher · filed 1985-09-03

By analogy, the judgment in this case falls within the definition of marital property because it, like the settlement in Trapani, was “acquired ... subsequent to the marriage.” § 452.330. The specific circumstances encompassing this judgment clearly justify its designation as marital property.

Section 452.330 allows a business founded during the marriage and its accounts to be classified as marital property when a spouse owns and controls them, even if a child's name appears on the accounts.

Cochran v. Cochran · filed 1986-04-08

The trial court did not err in the application of the law when it designated the auto shop and the business accounts of the auto shop as marital property. The distribution of these assets to the husband as a portion of his award of marital property was proper.

Section 452.330.1 applies to the division of marital property, not the setting apart of separate property.

Winter v. Winter · filed 1986-04-221

Section 452.330.1 clearly applies only to the division of marital, not separate, property.

Income from separate property received during marriage is presumed marital property, and stock bought with that income is marital property.

Bennett v. Bennett · filed 1986-01-21(2), (3)

The case at bar involves reinvested income on non-marital property during the marriage, not an increase in the value of the stock. ... The funds expended for stock purchase were marital property and the stock itself was marital property.

Section 452.330 does not permit a court to award a car titled in both spouses’ names to their child instead of dividing it between the spouses.

Tinger v. Tinger · filed 1986-04-08

The title, being in the names of the husband and wife, establishes that the car was marital property. As marital property, the automobile was subject to division between the husband and wife. ... It is true, as the wife maintains, citing In Re Marriage of Goodding, 677 S.W.2d 332, 339[8] (Mo.App.1984), that trial courts have broad powers under Sec. 452.330 RSMo. Cum.Supp.1984 to divide and distribute marital property. The cases which refer to the courts having broad powers to divide marital property, either between the spouses or with third persons, do not, however, deal with titled automobiles.

Section 452.330 treats professional goodwill acquired during marriage as divisible marital property when its value belongs to the practice rather than the individual practitioner.

Hanson v. Hanson · filed 1987-10-13(2)

With the caveats which follow, we hold that goodwill in a professional practice acquired during a marriage is marital property subject to division in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. We define goodwill within a professional setting to mean the value of the practice which exceeds its tangible assets and which is the result of the tendency of clients/patients to return to and recommend the practice irrespective of the reputation of the individual practitioner.

Section 452.330 treats a premarital residence as presumptively marital when the owner adds a spouse to the deed, subject to evidence rebutting that presumption.

Allen v. Allen · filed 1989-05-23

However, the addition of wife’s name to the deed on the residence created a tenancy by the entirety, the property thereby becoming presumptively marital. ... Here, while husband’s testimony tended to rebut the marital property presumption, wife’s testimony to the contrary and other evidence were sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that $16,000 of the residence’s value represented marital property.

Section 452.330.2 treats paintings acquired during marriage as liquidated damages after a failed stock sale as marital property.

Heineman v. Heineman · filed 1989-01-31(2)

The court held the paintings to be wife’s nonmarital property. In this the court was in error. The paintings were “property acquired ... subsequent to the marriage”, Section 452.330.2, RSMo Supp. 1988.

Section 452.330 treats workers’ compensation and Second Injury Fund awards as separate property to the extent they compensate for earnings lost after dissolution; the portion attributable to the marriage is subject to division.

Pauley v. Pauley · filed 1989-05-23

We reverse and remand the case to the trial court to determine what portion of husband’s awards are marital property subject to equitable distribution in accordance with the analytical approach utilized in Queen and Weisfeld.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to identify and set aside each spouse’s separate property before dividing marital property.

Miller v. Miller · filed 1991-04-04(1)

The language of § 452.330.1 mandates a two-step process by the trial court. ... These are among the factors that make it imperative that the two-step procedure prescribed by § 452.330.1 be followed in this case. ... The judgment merely disposes of all property by awarding it to one party or the other without determining what was separate property and what was marital property.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to set apart each spouse’s nonmarital property before dividing marital property.

Cochran v. Cochran · filed 1992-11-04(1)

Section 452.330.1 directs the trial court to first set apart to each spouse his nonmari-tal property, then divide the marital property. ... Because the trial court erroneously set apart to Sam as his nonmarital property the two-acre tract (actually marital property), and erroneously awarded Sam as marital property the mobile home and gift items (actually nonmarital property), we hold those portions of the decree must be reversed, together with the $15,040 lien on the real estate, and the cause must be remanded.

Section 452.330 treats compensation for a spouse’s post-dissolution economic and noneconomic damages as nonmarital property.

Mistler v. Mistler · filed 1991-08-29

We do not adopt this allocation scheme in its entirety; our disposition requires us to hold only that compensation attributable to the husband’s post-dissolution noneconomic and economic damages is nonmarital property.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to identify marital and nonmarital property before dividing the marital property.

Fletchall v. Fletchall · filed 1995-04-25(1)

Before the trial court can satisfy this mandate, it must find what is and what is not marital property.

Section 452.330 permits land jointly deeded to future spouses to be classified as marital property when the evidence does not justify reforming the deed.

Spidle v. Spidle · filed 1993-04-16

This court holds that the 30-acre tract should have been classified as marital property and not as Alva’s separate property. The deed was in both names and, despite the finding of the trial court to the contrary, Alva’s evidence was not clear and convincing so as to entitle him to reformation of the deed.

Property earned through labor before marriage is separate property even if the award is posted after marriage.

Sanders v. Sanders · filed 1996-11-12

Under the “source of funds” rule, whether property is characterized as marital or separate depends on the source of funds financing the purchase. ... Applying these principles, we conclude that husband’s 489 shares of stock were acquired as a result of his labor for the year October 1, 1981 through September 30, 1982. Wife does not dispute husband’s testimony to this effect. Thus, the trial court correctly deemed the 489 shares of stock separate property.

Section 452.330 requires the court to set aside each spouse’s separate property and divide the marital property.

In re the Marriage of Kirkham · filed 1996-12-10

Under Section 452.330, RSMo 1994, the trial court must set aside to each spouse his or her separate property and divide the marital property.

A passive loss carry-forward generated during the marriage is a marital asset that the court must divide.

Silverstein v. Silverstein · filed 1997-03-25

His testimony establishes that there was passive loss carry-forward generated during the marriage and as such it is a marital asset which the trial court must divide.

Section 452.330.1(2) requires courts dividing marital property to consider a spouse’s separate funds contributed to its acquisition.

In Re the Marriage of Petersen · filed 2000-07-25(1)(2)

One statutory factor to consider in dividing marital property is the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property. § 452.330.1(2). In this case, it was uncontroverted that Wife contributed $17,300 from her inheritance from her grandmother as a down payment on the McGregor residence. The trial court should have taken into consideration these separate funds Wife contributed to marital property when awarding the property to Husband.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to identify marital and nonmarital property before dividing the marital property.

Wilkerson v. Wilkerson · filed 2001-05-07

The trial court’s judgment must be reversed for failure to delineate what is marital property and what is nonmarital property.

Section 452.330 requires the court to identify property as marital or separate before it can determine whether the division of marital property is just.

Oetterer v. Oetterer · filed 2001-11-20

Failure to specifically identify property as marital or non-marital makes it impossible to determine whether a trial court’s division of marital property is “just” under Section 452.330.

Section 452.330 does not permit a court to divide property that neither spouse owns.

Judy v. Judy · filed 1999-06-01(1)

Because neither party in this case has ever owned the Ford Tempo, the court erred in distributing it as marital property. The judgment is therefore modified to exclude the car.

Section 452.330 requires the court to identify property as marital or nonmarital before dividing marital property, with evidence sufficient to determine its value.

In Re Marriage of Below · filed 1999-12-14(1)

The court did not properly designate the property as marital or non-marital before it distributed it. Nor could the court have accurately determined a fair and just distribution because essential evidence regarding the assets’ value was not adduced at trial.

Section 452.330 permits stock options granted during marriage to be treated as marital property even if they are unvested at dissolution.

Warner v. Warner · filed 2001-04-24(3)

The trial court did not err in regard to the stock options in question by treating them as marital property, even though they were unvested and unmatured at the time of the dissolution.

Section 452.330 requires the court to identify property as marital or separate before dividing marital property.

Pruitt v. Pruitt · filed 2003-01-21

It is not enough to apportion all of the property between the parties without first designating it as either separate or marital property, and failure to specifically identify property as marital or separate makes it impossible to determine whether the trial court made a just division of marital property in accordance with Section 452.330.

Section 452.330.2 defines marital property as property acquired after marriage; an ambiguous basis for classifying property in a dissolution judgment requires remand for clarification.

Baldwin v. Baldwin · filed 2003-07-08(2)

When the part of a dissolution judgment that classifies and distributes property as required by statute is ambiguous with respect to the basis for its determination, it must be reversed and remanded to permit the trial court to clarify its award.

Section 452.330.1 requires a court to identify property as marital or separate before dividing marital property.

Waldon v. Waldon · filed 2003-09-09(1)

Section 452.330 governs the disposition of property in dissolution of marriage actions. ... It is a necessary requirement that the trial court make specific findings on whether assets are marital or separate property prior to a subsequent just division of marital property. ... Here, the trial court did not properly designate the parties’ property as marital or separate before distributing it.

Section 452.330 requires a dissolution court to determine whether each asset is marital property to divide, nonmarital property to set aside, or property beyond its control.

Tauk v. Tauk · filed 2003-06-24

Under section 452.330 RSMo 2000, the trial court must make specific findings as to whether each asset before the court is marital property subject to division, is non-marital property to be set aside, or is property over which the dissolution court has no control.

A spouse’s professional degree is not marital property under § 452.330 because dividing it would divide future earning capacity.

Sullivan v. Sullivan · filed 2005-04-12(2)

It is well settled that a professional degree of a spouse is not marital property in that to treat it as such would subject the spouse’s future earning capacity to division, which, as we discuss, supra, is prohibited.

Section 452.330’s marital-property presumption does not give a spouse an individual property interest in the absence of a dissolution proceeding.

Steele v. Premier Capital, L.L.C. (In Re Steele) · filed 2003-08-07(2)

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds and concludes that, in the absence of a dissolution proceeding, the presumption created at Section 452.330 does not create an individual interest in property that would be included in a Bankruptcy estate that is created under Title 11 of the United States Code.

Section 452.330 requires a trial court to identify property as marital or nonmarital before dividing it, and failure to do so requires reversal when the record does not otherwise establish that the distribution is just.

Saettele v. Saettele · filed 2018-11-13

These deficiencies together with the failure to delineate the marital or nonmarital status of much of the remainder of the parties' property represents a failure to satisfy § 452.330 which mandates reversal.

Marital retirement funds remain subject to division when one spouse transfers them into a business IRA and names a third party as beneficiary.

Joy Janelle McVean, Respondent, vs. Anthony David McVean, Appellant. · filed 2025-06-27

His efforts to put the funds into the business IRA and name his partner’s wife as the beneficiary did not magically convert it into his separate property.

Section 452.330.1 requires the dissolution court to classify property and divide marital property and debts, even when the parties say they have divided them without a written settlement agreement.

In Re Marriage of Nardini · filed 2010-03-10(1)

In the absence of such a writing, as in this case, the language of the statute is clear. The trial court is required to classify the property and then divide any marital property and debts.

Section 452.330 does not authorize a dissolution court to divide property owned by neither spouse.

In Re Marriage of Michelson · filed 2011-05-24

Although a court may enter a decree of dissolution of marriage that distributes property owned by either party, a trial court does not have authority to enter a decree dividing property not owned by either husband or wife.

Section 452.330.2’s marital property definition applies only within §§ 452.300–452.415 and does not itself establish ownership of a spouse’s bank accounts in an unrelated contract action.

Montgomery v. Regions Bank, Inc. · filed 2020-08-14(2)

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that even if some accounts list only his wife’s name and not his, he has an ownership interest in accounts under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.330, because all property acquired by either spouse after a marriage is presumed to be marital property. Section 452.330.2 states, “For purposes of sections 452.300 to 452.415 only, ‘marital property’ means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,” subject to certain exceptions. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.330.2 (emphasis added). Sections 452.300 to 452.415 concern dissolution of marriage proceedings and related issues, none of which are at issue here.

Section 452.330 permits a court dividing marital property to consider maintenance and the parties’ ability to earn income.

Plk v. Rjk · filed 1984-12-04

The court was permitted to consider the amount of the maintenance award and the income-producing ability of the parties together with the property division. Section 452.330, RSMo 1978. In light of the evidence regarding the disparity in their present income potential and P.L.K.'s need to provide a home for their children, the award of the Pacific property to her was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property after considering each spouse’s contributions, the property set apart to each, their economic circumstances, and their conduct during marriage.

In Re the Marriage of Neubern · filed 1976-03-09

Under the provisions of § 452.330, RSMo 1969 the court on dissolution of a marriage is obligated to divide the marital property between the spouses in just proportions after considering all relevant factors, including each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker; the value of the property set apart to each spouse; the economic circumstances of each spouse at time the property is divided, and the parties’ conduct during the marriage.

Section 452.330 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contribution, the property set apart to each spouse, their economic circumstances, and their conduct during the marriage; those factors are not exclusive.

Halbrook v. Halbrook · filed 1977-09-13

Section 452.330 RSMo Supp.1976 lists four factors which the trial court must consider in dividing marital property: 1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property; 2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; 3) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the division of the property; 4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage. These factors are not exclusive.

Section 452.330 calls for a just division of marital property after considering relevant factors, including the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse with custody of minor children.

Stamme v. Stamme · filed 1979-09-25

When we consider all the relevant factors set forth in § 452.330 RSMo 1978, including the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse who has custody of the minor children, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in making the division it did.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property after considering relevant factors, including homemaking contributions, economic circumstances, child custody, and marital conduct.

In re Marriage of Carmack · filed 1977-03-15

In light of the factors the court is directed by statute to consider in the division of marital property, and our decision to grant the wife custody of the minor daughter, the trial court’s property division is erroneous.

Section 452.330 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contributions, the property awarded to each, their economic circumstances, and their conduct during the marriage; these factors are not exclusive.

Lockett v. Lockett · filed 1977-10-25

Section 452.330 RSMo Supp.1976 lists four factors which the trial court must consider in dividing marital property: 1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property; 2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; 3) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the division of the property; 4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage. These factors are not exclusive.

Section 452.330’s factors for dividing marital property are not exclusive; a court may also consider the parties’ ages as part of their economic circumstances.

In Re the Marriage of Faulkner · filed 1979-04-24

It must be noted however, that the factors listed in § 452.330 supra are not exclusive of other considerations necessary to the just division of marital property.

Section 452.330 requires the court to consider the parties’ economic circumstances, conduct, and other statutory factors when dividing marital property; an unequal division may fall within its discretion.

In Re the Marriage of Brewer · filed 1979-12-28

When we consider the economic circumstances of the parties, their conduct and the other matters set forth in § 452.330, RSMo 1978, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion or necessarily unduly emphasized appellant’s conduct in his determination. The division of property was based on substantial evidence and was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Section 452.330 allows an unequal division of marital property when the spouses’ incomes, support history, and family responsibilities justify it.

Kaczmarczyk v. Kaczmarczyk · filed 1980-01-02

However, the trial court could well have determined the distribution to her was justifiable considering the present and past disparity of their incomes, her age of 53, the amount of money husband had paid since their separation for maintenance, lack of future maintenance, and the fact that wife had assumed full responsibility for herself and the two children since 1971. All of the above was in evidence and of proper concern to the trial court as factors to be weighed in making its award.

Section 452.330.1(4) makes the parties’ conduct during marriage a factor in dividing marital property, including when awarding the marital home.

Givens v. Givens · filed 1980-04-08(1)(4)

Among the factors to be considered by the court in distributing the marital property is the conduct of the parties during the marriage. § 452.330.1(4) RSMo.1978. ... Our review of the record here convinces us that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the marital home to wife.

Section 452.330 calls for a just division of marital property based on each spouse’s contributions, the property’s value, the parties’ conduct, and their economic circumstances; it does not require an equal division.

Viers v. Viers · filed 1980-06-03

The court shall divide the property as it deems just considering the contribution of each spouse toward the acquisition of the property, the value of the property, the conduct of the parties during the marriage and the economic circumstances of the respective spouses upon dissolution of the marriage. § 452.330, RSMo 1969. ... Our review convinces this court that the trial court’s division of the property was a fair one in light of all the circumstances and we, therefore, deny defendant’s second point.

Section 452.330.1(3) permits an unequal division of marital property after considering the spouses’ economic circumstances and the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse with custody of the child.

In re the Marriage of Meecey · filed 1980-07-15(1)(3)

The parties submitted the entire matter to the trial court for its determination and, when it fashioned its decree, it considered all relevant factors including, but not limited to, the economic circumstances of each spouse and the desirability of awarding the family home to that spouse who has custody of the child. Section 452.330.1(3), RSMo. 1978. Although the distribution was not equal, there was no abuse of discretion.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property that considers each spouse’s contribution, the property set apart to each, their economic circumstances, and their conduct during the marriage.

Rising v. Rising · filed 1980-11-03

The factors under § 452.330, RSMo 1978, as to a just division of the marital property are: (1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker; (2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; (3) the economic circumstances of each spouse; and (4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage. ... In these circumstances, the unequal division of the marital property cannot be justified.

Section 452.330.1 directs courts dividing marital property to consider the spouses’ contributions, economic circumstances, the custodial spouse’s interest in the family home, and conduct during the marriage.

Lantz v. Lantz · filed 1981-02-10(1)

After considering the contributions of both parties to the acquisition of the marital residence, the parties economic circumstances, the desirability of awarding the family home to the custodial parent, and the conduct of the parties during the marriage, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the home sold and the proceeds divided.

Section 452.330 requires the court to divide marital property upon dissolution, even when it is desirable for the custodial spouse to remain in the family home.

In Re Marriage of Buthod · filed 1981-09-15

Section 452.330 provides that the court shall divide the marital property after considering all relevant factors, which includes the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein to the spouse having custody of any children. The holding in Corder applies in this case that the court must divide the marital property even though it is desirable to allow the spouse having custody of the children to live in the real estate which has been divided. All of the evils accruing from persons who have been formerly married remaining as tenants in common in real estate described in Corder apply in this case. For that reason the court should not have declared the parties here to be tenants in common in the real estate, but should have divided the same.

Section 452.330 permits a trial court to divide marital property in just proportions after considering each spouse’s contributions, the property awarded to each, their economic circumstances, and their conduct during the marriage.

Colabianchi v. Colabianchi · filed 1983-02-23(1)

When dividing such property (in such proportions as the court deems just) the trial court must consider “all relevant factors,” including: (1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, as well as the contribution of a spouse as homemaker, (2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse, (3) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children, and (4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage; Section 452.330, RSMo 1978 (applicable at the time of trial). A review of the evidence in light of these factors does not convince us failure to award the family home to the wife constituted an abuse of discretion.

Section 452.330 permits awarding the family home to the custodial parent as part of a just division of marital property, even if the division is unequal.

In re the Marriage of Pender · filed 1979-11-201(3)

Thus, awarding the family home to the wife-mother involved factors not measurable in dollars and award of the home is expressly permitted by Sec. 452.330, subd. 1(3) RSMo. 1969. Courts have acknowledged the desirability of awarding a family home to the custodial parent; this can create a just division, even if it is not an equal one.

Section 452.330 allows a court to award the marital residence to one spouse when the parties’ incomes, benefits, and maintenance award support that division.

Dillingham v. Dillingham · filed 1981-06-23

Wife was awarded the $55,000.00 house and no maintenance. She had $7,685.83 annual income. Husband on the other hand, has no house but has annual income of $26,763.08, insurance benefits and substantial benefits under his pension plan. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the marital residence to wife.

Section 452.330.1(3) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances when the division takes effect.

Calia v. Calia · filed 1981-10-27(1)(3)

In achieving a just division of marital property, the court is to consider all relevant factors, including the “economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective.” § 452.330.1(3), RSMo 1978.

Section 452.330.1(3) directs courts dividing marital property to consider awarding the family home or the right to live there to the spouse with custody of the children.

Scott v. Scott · filed 1982-12-21(1)(3)

That is the policy of § 452.330.1(3), RSMo (Supp.1982), where it is directed that the court consider among other factors “the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children”.

Section 452.330.1(3) requires the court to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances when the property division becomes effective and to hear evidence needed to assess them at that time.

Hartley v. Hartley · filed 1983-01-04(1)(3)

The language of § 452.330.1(3) provides that the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective is among the relevant factors which the court is required to consider. In this case the division of property indeed became effective when the modified judgment was entered on December 2,1981, and the only evidence before the court at that time regarding the economic circumstances of the parties was in fact the evidence received on December 4, 1979. Thus, the modified judgment failed to comply with the statutory requirements, in that it was based on evidence of economic circumstances which was two years old.

Section 452.330.1(3) allows a court dividing marital property to consider each spouse's capacity to work and earn as part of their economic circumstances.

In Re Marriage of Harrison · filed 1983-08-29(1)(3)

Even if it were otherwise the phrase "economic circumstances," which is part of the language of § 452.330.1(3), is broad enough to include the parties' capacity to work and earn.

Section 452.330.1(3) permits courts to consider each spouse’s capacity to work and earn when dividing marital property.

Harrison v. Carter · filed 1983-08-29(1)(3)

Even if it were otherwise the phrase “economic circumstances,” which is part of the language of § 452.330.1(3), is broad enough to include the parties’ capacity to work and earn.

Section 452.330 allows the family home to be awarded for a custodial parent's use while both spouses retain title as tenants in common.

Dutton v. Dutton · filed 1984-03-13

Provisions of separation agreements granting exclusive possession of the family home to a parent having custody of the parties’ children are suggested to Sec. 452.330, RSMo 1978, setting forth as one of the factors to be considered in distributing marital property, “the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.” This can be accomplished by transfer of title to one parent, or as was done in this case, by leaving the parties as tenants in common.

Section 452.330 permits a dissolution decree to divide a marital home into equal tenancy in common interests while delaying its sale and giving one spouse exclusive occupancy until a child turns eighteen.

Buchanan v. Graf · filed 1984-05-15

We conclude that the Graf dissolution decree disposed of the marital home, as marital property, in compliance with § 452.330, RSMo 1978, and that the court erred in concluding that it was without subject matter jurisdiction because it found otherwise.

Section 452.330 permits a division of the marital residence that awards it to one spouse and requires a deferred payment to the other, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Etling v. Etling · filed 1984-05-29

Again, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The net result was to award approximately one-half of the marital residence to each party.

Section 452.330 allows the family home to be awarded to the spouse with custody and does not require an equal division of property.

Ingebritson v. Ingebritson · filed 1984-09-18

Under § 452.330, RSMo.Supp. 1982, among other factors, there is a desirability to leave the family house with the spouse awarded custody. That Kenneth got no share of the equity making the total percentage of the division skewed to Debra does not call for a reversal. A just division of property does not call for an equal division.

Section 452.330 permits spouses to receive percentages of the net proceeds from a future sale of the marital home after appropriate charges, mortgage reductions, and sale expenses.

Marriage of Reynolds v. Reynolds · filed 1984-11-27

The decision to give each party fifty percent (50%) of the net sale price appears fair and reasonable under the law and the evidence. See Section 452.330, RSMo. 1983 Supplement and Ortmann v. Ortmann, 547 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1977). Many factors including inflationary trends make unfair and inequitable a fixed sum payment to the respondent on the future sale of the family home. The parties on such sale should receive a percentage of the net proceeds of the sale after the payment of appropriate charges, mortgage reductions and sale expenses, rather than a fixed sum.

Section 452.330.1(3) directs courts dividing marital property to award the family home, or at least the right to live there, to the parent with custody of a minor child.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1985-06-25(1)(3)

We find no error in the trial court’s award of the family home to respondent recognizing her economic circumstances and fullfilling the legislative mandate set forth in § 452.330.1(3) RSMo Supp.1984 of awarding the family home, or at least a right to live therein, to the party having custody of the minor child.

Section 452.330's factors guide the division of marital property; a division favoring a spouse with lower income and no retirement plan can be within the trial court's discretion.

Marriage of Small v. Small · filed 1986-02-25

Considering the factors enumerated in Section 452.330 RSMo 1978, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property.

Section 452.330.1(3) includes the parties’ income producing abilities among the economic circumstances considered when dividing marital property.

Carter v. Carter · filed 1986-04-25(1)(3)

In addition, the economic circumstances which the trial court is to consider under § 452.330.-1(3) includes the income producing abilities of the parties.

Section 452.330 allows a court to consider a spouse’s spending on children’s education as an economic circumstance when dividing marital property.

In re the Marriage of Dildy · filed 1987-10-06(1)(3)

Educating one’s children creates diminution in assets amounting to an “economic circumstance” to be considered by the court when dividing marital property.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts deciding who receives the marital home to consider custody of children from prior marriages.

Fowler v. Fowler · filed 1987-06-18(1)

The statute does not limit the phrase "custody of any children" to children of the marriage. The custody of any children involved, whether by this marriage or a previous marriage, is a factor which the court should consider in deciding which party should be awarded the marital home.

Section 452.330.1(3) favors allowing the custodial spouse to live in the family home for a reasonable period, so remarriage or cohabitation alone does not require its sale.

Henderson v. Henderson · filed 1988-01-05(1)(3)

Of primary importance is the intent of § 452.330.1(3) which recognizes “the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of any children.” ... The statute focuses not on the interests of the parents, but, rather, on the interests of any children of the marriage. Marriage should not, in and of itself, force the sale of the residence nor payment of the non-custodial spouse’s lien.

Section 452.330.1(1) supports awarding the family home to the spouse awarded custody of the parties’ child.

Giordano v. Giordano · filed 1989-06-271(1)

Further, because wife was awarded custody of the parties’ daughter, it was desirable to award her the family home. See § 452.330.1(1). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the marital home to wife.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to order the marital residence sold within its discretion, even when one spouse has custody of a minor child.

Fairchild v. Fairchild · filed 1988-03-29(1)

We believe the court acted within his allowable discretion in ordering the sale of the house.

A spouse’s ability to work and earn is part of the economic circumstances considered when dividing marital property.

Mueller v. Mueller · filed 1990-01-09(1)(3)

The economic circumstances of the parties, § 452.330.1(3) RSMo.1986, which include each party’s individual capacity to work and to earn, should be considered.

Section 452.330.1 treats a spouse’s enhanced capacity to work and earn as an economic circumstance relevant to dividing marital property.

Cofer v. Price-Cofer · filed 1992-02-27(1)

Although the “economic circumstances” in Mistier and Harrison involved the diminished capacity of a party to work and earn, it is no less an “economic circumstance” that a party has an enhanced capacity to work and earn.

Section 452.330.1(1) favors continuity and stability for children, so a custodial parent’s remarriage or cohabitation does not automatically justify selling the family home.

Bixler v. Bixler · filed 1991-05-281(1)

In listing the parties’ economic circumstances as a factor to consider, the statute governing the disposition of marital property upon dissolution specifically notes the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein to the spouse having custody of the children. § 452.330.1(1), RSMo (Supp.1990). Because the statute’s intent is to provide the children continuity and stability, it is improper for a court to force an automatic sale of the marital home in every case upon remarriage or cohabitation.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires courts to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances when the property division becomes effective and to use valuations reasonably close to that date.

In Re the Marriage of Gustin · filed 1993-07-271(1)

Section 452.330.1 directs the court to divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective. ... If the effective date of the distribution is not reasonably proximate to the date of valuation, the court should hold another hearing to establish a valuation as close to the effective date of the division as possible.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires the court to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances as of the date the property division takes effect.

In Re Marriage of Burns · filed 1995-07-25(1)(1)

After finding that the marriage was irretrievably broken, the trial court properly proceeded to designate and divide the marital property, but in so doing it should have considered evidence of the parties’ economic circumstances as of August 26, 1994 when the marriage was actually dissolved. Its failure to do so is error.

Section 452.330 requires the court to consider awarding the family home to the custodial parent, but does not require it to award that parent the home.

Woolridge v. Woolridge · filed 1996-02-13(1)(1)

Section 452.330 by its clear terms does not mandate the award of the marital home to the custodial parent. It only requires the trial court to consider the desirability of awarding the home to the custodial parent and to weigh it along with the other factors enumerated.

Section 452.330 requires courts to weigh the desirability of awarding the marital residence to the custodial parent, but does not require them to make that award.

David v. David · filed 1997-10-211(1)

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to weigh the desirability of awarding the marital residence to the custodial parent along with the other factors; it does not require that the trial court award the marital residence to the custodial parent.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires courts to consider the spouses’ economic circumstances, including income from marital assets, when the property division takes effect.

Smith v. Smith · filed 1998-12-08(1)(1)

Moreover, while the trial court appears to limit the time frame for its finding on this issue to the date of the interlocutory decree of dissolution, the court was required to consider the economic circumstances of the parties, including the division of joint income from a marital asset, as of September 6, 1996, the effective date of the division of property.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires the court to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances when dividing marital property, including the income-producing potential of property awarded to an economically dependent spouse.

Dowell v. Dowell · filed 2006-10-17(1)

Section 452.330.1(1) requires the trial court to consider in the division of property “[t]he economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effeetive[.]” ... Because the allocation of income-producing property is so important to the determination of whether an economically dependent spouse receives sufficient property for self-support, we remand this issue for the trial court’s further consideration.

Section 452.330.1(1) calls for consideration of a spouse’s economic circumstances when dividing marital property.

Adams v. Adams · filed 2013-11-18(1)(1)

Likewise, Husband cannot direct us to anything in the record to indicate that the trial court did not properly consider Husband’s “economic circumstances” in dividing the marital property. See § 452.330.1(1) RSMo (2000). Under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Husband to make the lump sum payment.

Section 452.330’s factors guide the division of marital property omitted from a dissolution decree.

Moore v. Moore · filed 1983-07-05

On remand, it will be the responsibility of the trial court to make such disposition of the cattle as may appear proper taking into consideration the factors listed in § 452.330, RSMo Supp.1982 and such other evidence as may be presented.

Section 452.330(1) requires the court to divide marital property when the petition or an amended petition requests that relief.

Blessing v. Blessing · filed 1976-07-06(1)

We believe that the requirement of § 452.-330 that the trial court “shall divide the marital property” must be read in conjunction with § 452.310, subsection 2(6). When read together, the trial court is required to divide the marital property when such relief is requested in the petition or in an amended petition.

Section 452.330 requires a dissolution court with jurisdiction to specifically divide marital property even when the petition does not request division.

In Re the Marriage of Bradford · filed 1977-10-25

To the extent it has jurisdiction to divide marital property — and here personal jurisdiction was conferred upon the trial court by waiver — a trial court must specifically decree a division of marital property upon dissolution of a marriage.

Section 452.330 permits a proceeding to divide marital property after dissolution when the court lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property in the original decree.

Chenoweth v. Chenoweth · filed 1978-12-27

The motion filed March 18, 1977, for a division of marital property was a special statutory proceeding specifically contemplated by Sec. 452.330. Under that section, there may be “a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage by a court which, lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property.” This case falls within the quoted category for the reason that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to dispose of the marital property at the time of the original dissolution decree, because the petition did not contain a description of property to be affected or give notice to Doris of that issue.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property even when a dissolution is granted by default.

Green v. Green · filed 1981-09-29

Section 452.330 RSMo 1978 requires the trial court to make a just division of marital property. This statutory obligation is not dependent upon whether the dissolution is contested, uncontested, or as in this case, by default.

Section 452.330 requires the court to set apart each spouse’s property and justly divide marital property, even when the dissolution is by default.

Schulz v. Schulz · filed 1980-12-30

This obligation is not dependent upon whether the dissolution is contested, uncontested or by default. Until the court has set apart the property of each spouse and justly divided the marital property, it has not exhausted its jurisdiction.

Section 452.330.4 bars modification of a final property distribution even when the decree failed to distribute other marital real estate.

Swinford v. Swinford · filed 1984-12-04(4)

The order on distribution of property as it related to the payment of attorney fees was final and not subject to modification. Section 452.330.4, RSMo Supp.1984. The order was an attempt to modify the distribution and is not allowed. This is true even though the court failed to distribute the real estate.

Section 452.330 permits a court dividing overlooked marital assets to consider property already distributed and does not require an equal division of a vested but unmatured pension.

Barker v. Barker · filed 1984-12-04

We held that in making a just division of these assets, the trial court must take into account the marital property already distributed. ... Considering the totality of the property division, we are unable to discern any abuse of judicial discretion.

Section 452.330(4) bars modification of a final property disposition, but a void disposition does not prevent the court from later disposing of the marital asset.

Morovitz v. Morovitz · filed 1985-05-07(4)

It is true as appellant asserts that a trial court has no authority to modify the property disposition provisions of a decree of dissolution after it has become final. ... Inasmuch as the provision relating to the disposition of the marital residence in the initial decree was void, the trial court upon motion and notice had jurisdiction to dispose of this marital asset by its order of July, 1983.

Section 452.330 governs the division of marital property when a dissolution decree is reopened after a separation agreement is rescinded, leaving the trial court latitude to make a just division based on the evidence.

Curtis v. Kays · filed 1984-03-20

Upon the reopening of the dissolution decree, the trial court is to be guided in the division of property by the provisions of § 452.330, RSMo 1978, nothing in this opinion being intended as any restriction on the latitude of the trial court to order a division which appears on the evidence to be just.

Section 452.330 governs the court’s division of property when the parties have no present separation agreement before the court.

O'Neal v. O'Neal · filed 1984-06-29

We hold that without a present agreement before the court the trial judge had a duty to resolve the dispute, dispose of the property in accordance with § 452.330, RSMo Supp. 1982, and determine whether a maintenance award was appropriate under § 452.-335.

A final division of marital property under § 452.330 cannot be modified.

Starrett v. Starrett · filed 1985-12-24(4)

Furthermore, under §§ 452.330.4 RSMo (1981) and 452.360.2 once the division of marital property becomes final it is not subject to modification.

Section 452.330(4) makes a completed division of marital property final and not subject to modification.

Wandfluh v. Wandfluh · filed 1986-08-06(4)

However, once a complete division of property is achieved, the court’s order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final order not subject to modification. Section 452.-330.4, RSMo Supp.1984.

Section 452.330 permits a monetary award to make a just final division of property when an earlier decree left property undisposed.

Edic v. Edic · filed 1987-04-14

This being so, we conclude that the trial court had the authority to enter the $16,000 monetary award to respondent, not as damages, but in order to make a “just” final division of all property as provided in § 452.330, RSMo 1978.

Section 452.330 permits disposition of property after dissolution when the court previously lacked jurisdiction over a spouse or the property and later acquires it; it does not authorize a motion to divide property omitted from a final decree.

Chrun v. Chrun · filed 1988-06-14(1)

That statute does not authorize the use of a motion to distribute property omitted in the original decree. By its own terms, Section 452.330 is applicable only to those instances in which the court lacked personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property and jurisdiction is subsequently acquired.

Section 452.330.5 allows a later qualified domestic relations order to enforce an existing property award by allocating earnings on a spouse’s pension share.

In Re Marriage of Gardner · filed 1998-06-12(5)

John maintains that because the E5 award in the dissolution decree makes no reference to earnings on Beth's share of the Plan, the provisions regarding earnings in QDRO-1, QDRO-2 and the June 26, 1997, judgment constitute an "impermissible modification" of the E5 award in violation of § 452.330.5 (quoted earlier). According to John, the provisions regarding earnings do not fall within either of the exceptions in the statute, i.e., modifications "for the purpose of establishing or maintaining the order as a qualified domestic relations order or to revise or conform its terms so as to effectuate the expressed intent of [the] order." We disagree. We hold QDRO-1, QDRO-2 and the June 26, 1997, judgment merely confirm what Beth was awarded in the E5 award, and that QDRO-1 and QDRO-2 were entered for the purpose of enforcing the E5 award.

Section 452.330.5 permits a court to revise a QDRO to carry out the expressed intent of its property division order.

Wells v. Wells · filed 1999-08-10(5)

Pursuant to § 452.330.5, the circuit court had jurisdiction to revise or to conform the terms of the QDRO “so as to effectuate the expressed intent of the order.” Hence, the circuit court erred in dismissing Stacey Wells’ motion to modify.

Section 452.330.5 permits modification of an order intended to be a qualified domestic relations order to establish its qualification, without a time limit.

Ochoa v. Ochoa · filed 2002-04-09(5)

By statute, an order so intended may be modified in order to “establish” it as a QDRO.

Section 452.330.5 allows a court to modify an order intended as a qualified domestic relations order to establish it as one, even if the judgment does not expressly reserve jurisdiction.

Kolar v. Kolar · filed 2003-09-09(5)

The circuit court, therefore, retained jurisdiction pursuant to § 452.330.5 to modify its order.

Section 452.330.5 permits modification of a final property division decree to establish an intended qualified domestic relations order, but the modification cannot increase the award beyond the original order’s expressed intent.

Young v. Young · filed 2005-01-18(5)

A dissolution decree is not modifiable after it becomes final unless the decree was a qualified domestic relations order. ... The circuit court, however, could not alter its original order to increase the amount payable unless this “effectuate[d] the expressed intent of [the] order.”

Section 452.330.5 permits a court to modify a QDRO to carry out the intended division of marital property.

Bradley v. Bradley · filed 2006-06-30(5)

This court concludes the trial court had jurisdiction under section 452.330.5 to modify the QDROs, and, therefore, Husband’s claim that the trial court erred when it modified the QDROs for the purpose of achieving “equitable results,” will be denied.

Section 452.330.5 permits a court to amend a QDRO to effectuate the expressed intent of the dissolution order.

Royalty v. Royalty · filed 2008-09-30(5)

The unambiguous language of the settlement agreement allows Opal to share in one-half of Samuel’s final benefits, in the proportion of the length of the marriage to the length of Samuel’s service. The trial court did not err in concluding that it has jurisdiction to amend the QDRO in order to effectuate that intent.

Section 452.330.5 permits a QDRO to be modified to conform to the property division in a final dissolution decree.

Wilson v. Lilleston · filed 2009-06-30(5)

A trial court may, however, modify an order intended to be a QDRO in limited circumstances — to establish or maintain the order as qualified under a particular plan or to revise or conform its terms to effectuate the expressed intent of the court’s order regarding distribution of property or, in the case of a property settlement, the parties’ intent.

Section 452.330.5 permits modification of a qualified domestic relations order only to maintain its qualified status or effectuate the order’s expressed intent.

In Re Marriage of Green · filed 2011-05-03(5)

The trial court exceeded its authority by entering QDRO IV because it was not qualified and did not fall within one of the exceptions of section 452.330.5.

Section 452.330.5 permits modification of a qualified domestic relations order to carry out a dissolution decree’s expressed intent, but a later order cannot add military survivor benefits when the decree did not award them.

Kuba v. Kuba · filed 2013-06-18(5)

Because the dissolution decree did not affirmatively require Husband to provide Wife with SBP coverage, such coverage cannot be ordered by a post-judgment QDRO, since a QDRO is authorized only to implement the property division previously ordered, not to substantively alter a dissolution decree’s division of marital property.

Section 452.330.5 permits a court to enter a QDRO after a spouse’s death to enforce a pension division in a dissolution decree, but the QDRO cannot change the decree’s substantive terms.

Frank J. Laenen, and Jennifer R. Laenen v. Laenen · filed 2014-09-16(5)

We hold that Section 452.330.5 RSMo authorized the trial court to enter a QDRO to effectuate the terms of the dissolution decree previously entered. However, when the trial court substantively modified the language of the QDRO from the terms of the dissolution decree previously entered, it did so in violation of Section 452.330.5.

Section 452.330.5 permits a court to modify a property division order through a qualified domestic relations order to effectuate the original decree’s expressed intent.

Roberts v. Roberts · filed 2014-06-03(5)

The trial court‟s judgment adopting the COAP constitutes a “qualified domestic relations order” or “QDRO” within the meaning of § 452.330.5. ... Therefore, even though divisions of marital property are generally non-modifiable, the trial court had the authority to enter the COAP for the purpose of “effectuat[ing] the expressed intent of” the 1990 dissolution decree.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to specifically divide marital property in a dissolution decree.

Lfh v. Rlh · filed 1976-10-05(1)

By using the word "shall", the legislature has indicated that the trial court must specifically decree a division of the marital property upon dissolution of the marriage.

Section 452.330(1) does not require an equal division of marital property.

In Re Marriage of Vanet · filed 1976-10-12(1)

Paragraph 1 of Section 452.330, supra, however does not command parity in the division of marital property, nor does it mandate that it be done with mathematical nicety by means of a stereotyped mathematical formula.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property, not an equal division.

In re the Marriage of Harkins · filed 1977-04-05

Section 452.-330 does not require an equal division of property but a just division.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property, which need not be equal or calculated by a mathematical formula.

Seiner v. Seiner · filed 1977-05-02

In these circumstances, it may not be said that the evidence is insufficient to support the mode of division of the marital property or that, as a matter of law, the division is unjust. The division of marital property within the meaning of Section 452.330, supra, cannot be accomplished by way of a mathematical formula, Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788, 792-793 (Mo.App.1975); nor can the power to apportion be circumscribed by rigid methods or mechanics, Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 805-806[12, 13] (Mo.App.1977).

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property, not an equal division.

Marriage of Prenavo v. Prenavo · filed 1977-09-13

Section 452.330 does not require an equal division but only that it be a just division.

Section 452.330 requires a just distribution of marital property, not an exactly equal division.

Bommarito v. Bommarito · filed 1977-10-25

The law does not require an exact equal division of property but a just distribution of property, e. g., In re Marriage of B.K.S., 535 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. App.1976).

Section 452.330 requires equitable division of marital property before maintenance is considered; maintenance cannot replace a spouse’s share of the property.

Marriage of Spicer v. Spicer · filed 1979-06-15

Clearly it is the duty of the trial court to make an equitable distribution of the marital property before the matter of maintenance is considered. If, after the marital estate is apportioned, a spouse’s future needs cannot be met by his or her property distribution, then a petitioning spouse is entitled to maintenance if he or she fulfills the requirement of § 452.335(1). Such is the plain requirement of §§ 452.330 and 452.335, RSMo (Supp.1975), when the two are read together.

Section 452.330 does not require a just division of marital property to preserve one spouse’s use of a farm when doing so would prevent a fair award to the other spouse.

In Re the Marriage of Kueber · filed 1980-05-12

The concise answer is that the trial court had no means available to make a just award and preserve the status quo for the husband. Nor was it, under these circumstances, under an obligation to do so.

Section 452.330 requires a just and equitable division of marital property, not an equal division.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 1982-06-08

The trial court is only required to divide the marital property in a just fashion. § 452.330 RSMo. 1978. This does not require an equal division of the property but a fair and equitable division.

Section 452.330 allows an unequal division of marital property when sufficient evidence supports a just distribution.

Tygett v. Tygett · filed 1982-08-31

Here we believe there was sufficient evidence before the court for it to make a just decision and said division was supported by substantial evidence. § 452.330 RSMo 1978. Point denied.

Section 452.330.1 provides criteria for dividing marital property in a dissolution decree.

Portell v. Portell · filed 1982-09-14(1)

We have reviewed the record, and find, after applying the requisite statutory criteria ... that the decree is supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence and does not erroneously declare or apply the law.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property.

Ort v. Ort · filed 1983-04-12

Our reading of the transcript convinces us the division of property was just and in accordance with § 452.330, RSMo.1978.

Section 452.330 permits an unequal division of marital property when the division is supported by substantial evidence and falls within the trial court’s discretion.

Tatham v. Tatham · filed 1983-08-16

Husband thus received approximately one-third of the equity in the home. In the circumstances of this case, this did not constitute an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Section 452.330 requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be an equal division.

Marriage of Brown v. Brown · filed 1984-01-17

Section 452.330, RSMo (1978 and Supp.1983) lists four nonexclusive factors the court is to consider in dividing marital property. ... The statute, however, requires an equitable division, not an equal division.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property, but does not require an equal division.

Daniels v. Daniels · filed 1984-06-26

Section 452.330 RSMo 1978 requires only a just division of property, not an equal division.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property; the division need not be equal.

Haun v. Haun · filed 1984-09-24

In deciding whether a trial court’s division of marital property should be disturbed, we are guided by the rule that under § 452.330, RSMo 1978, as amended by Laws 1981, p. 615-16, the trial court is required only to divide the marital property in a just fashion.

Section 452.330 guides the division of marital property, which the appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion.

St. Clair v. St. Clair · filed 1985-06-25

When the correct values are considered, we believe the record indicates the trial court followed the guidelines of § 452.330, RSMo 1978 and did not abuse its discretion in the division of the property.