Mo. Rev. Stat. § 508.010

When defendants include a Missouri resident and a nonresident, § 508.010(3) requires suit in the resident defendant’s county; later dismissing that defendant does not cure service on the nonresident.

Maxwell v. De Long · filed 1952-09-20(3)

Clearly the statute requires suit to be brought in Clay County, the residence of the local defendant, and the fact that plaintiff subsequently voluntarily dismissed as to the co-defendant would not make the service upon the non-resident defendant good.

Section 508.010 permits suit in any Missouri county where a defendant resides when the defendants include both Missouri residents and nonresidents.

Durwood v. Dubinsky · filed 1956-05-14

Section 508.010 provides that when there are several defendants, some residents and others nonresidents of the state, which was the situation here, suit may be brought in any county of this state in which any defendant resides. The objections of the Dubinsky brothers to the venue of the circuit court as to the original petition were correctly overruled.

Section 508.010(4) permits an action against a nonresident defendant in any Missouri county.

Prime, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Transportation (In Re Prime, Inc.) · filed 1984-12-11(4)

Under Missouri law, an action against a non-resident defendant “may be brought in any county in this state”. Section 508.010(4), R.S.Mo.1965. Minimum contact standards are not applicable.

Section 508.010 permits venue in any Missouri county when the defendant is a nonresident of Missouri.

Center Promotion Consultants, Inc. v. Robinson · filed 1990-07-03

Because the defendant was a nonresident of Missouri, venue was proper in Jackson County, or in any other county in this state. Section 508.010, RSMo 1986.

Section 508.010.2(4) allows an action with no tort claim against nonresident defendants to be filed in any Missouri county.

K.M.J. v. M.A.J. · filed 2012-01-31(2)(4)

Therefore, applying Section 508.010.2(4) RSMo Cum. Supp.2010, because Father is a nonresident defendant, Mother’s action could have been brought in any county in Missouri. Thus, the circuit eourt was a proper venue for Mother’s action.

Section 507.080 authorizes third-party practice but does not extend venue under § 508.010; service outside the proper county did not confer personal jurisdiction.

Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. West · filed 1953-09-15

Section 507.080 RSMo 1949, V.A. M.S., which authorizes third-party practice, does not purport to extend the venue statute, Section 508.010, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. It is our opinion, therefore, that the court in the case at bar acquired no jurisdiction over the person of Connie Ehrhardt by virtue of the process issued and served in Oregon County, and that the court should have dismissed said third-party petition before proceeding to trial.

Section 508.010 applies to the venue of a third-party petition seeking indemnity.

State Ex Rel. Carney v. Higgins · filed 1961-12-11

We hold here that the third-party petition was a suit instituted by summons and that it was and is subject to § 508.010.

Section 508.010 permits venue in a county where one defendant resides when defendants from different counties are lawfully joined under § 507.040, even without a joint cause of action.

State ex rel. Campbell v. James · filed 1953-12-14(2)

We *407hold that § 508.010'governs the venue of actions wherein several defendants residing in different counties are lawfully joined under the provisions of § 507.040, regardless of whether they are joint causes of action.

Section 508.010(2) governs venue when defendants, including corporations, reside in different counties and permits suit in a county where one defendant resides.

State Ex Rel. Whiteman v. James · filed 1954-02-08(2)

This particular subdivision has been consistently held to apply to all defendants, including corporations when joined with another [or other] defendant[s], and fixes venue in such instances.

Section 508.010(2) permits venue when several defendants reside in different counties.

State Ex Rel. McCubbin v. McMillian · filed 1961-07-18(2)

We are therefore of the opinion that there are common questions of law or fact and that since both of the requirements of § 507.040, supra, are present, joinder of Houston and American was permissible and it follows that venue was then proper under the provisions of § 508.010, subsection (2), supra, since there were several defendants who lived in different counties.

Section 508.010 permits venue based on defendants in different counties only when they are lawfully joined.

State Ex Rel. Cozean v. Meyer · filed 1969-12-16(2)

The question of venue is to be resolved by the determination of whether or not the defendant insurer was lawfully joined under the foregoing rule.

Section 508.010(2) does not establish venue for a separate claim merely because it is joined with a claim for which venue exists.

State Ex Rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner · filed 1979-11-14(2)

Therefore, assuming, but not deciding, that joinder of Counts I and II was authorized by Rule 52.05(a), that fact would not establish venue as to Count II under the provisions of § 508.010(2).

Section 508.010(2) permits suit in a county where one of several defendants resides when the defendants reside in different counties.

State Ex Rel. Milham v. Rickhoff · filed 1982-05-11(2)

It is a public corporation and is subject to the general venue statute, § 508.010. Because venue is proper under § 508.010 in St. Louis County as that is the residence of one of the defendants, the Board of Curators must be reinstated as defendant in the underlying cause.

Section 508.010 does not make venue proper for separate causes of action merely because they are joined in one petition against different defendants.

Sperry Corp. v. Corcoran · filed 1983-09-20(2)

We reach the following conclusions: this case is controlled by Turnbough, supra, and, because plaintiffs have a separate cause of action against Sperry and a separate cause of action against Prater, E.E. N.T. and Cox, venue in the City of St. Louis is improper.

Section 508.010 requires a properly joined individual defendant to establish venue against a corporate co-defendant; pretensive joinder of a time-barred defendant does not suffice.

State Ex Rel. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Mid-America v. Gaertner · filed 1984-12-18

Although section 508.010 supports venue in St. Louis City, the statute applies only where there are individual as well as corporate defendants, ... Thus its application here depends on proper joinder of McFail. ... Joinder of McFail was thus insufficient to establish venue in the City of St. Louis as to relator.

When defendants reside in different counties, section 508.010(2) permits suit where a defendant resides, but pretensive joinder of a resident defendant does not establish venue.

Birdsong v. Adolf · filed 1987-02-17(2)

There are no facts in the record which can support a good faith belief by plaintiffs that defendant Union Electric may be held liable to them on any reasonable ground or theory. Joinder of Union Electric, therefore, was pretensive and insufficient to establish venue in the City of St. Louis.

Section 508.010(2) permits suit in a corporate defendant’s county of residence when the corporation and individual defendants reside in different counties; the corporation resides where it maintains its registered office.

Crites v. Sho-Me Dragways, Inc. · filed 1987-02-19(2)

Having, we hope, made that clear, we hold that in the instant case — where venue is determined by § 508.010(2), supra —venue lies in Greene County, as it (according to the petition) is where Sho-Me maintains its registered office, and hence is Sho-Me’s county of residence.

When defendants reside in different counties, § 508.010(2) permits suit in any county where a defendant resides.

Meyerkord v. English · filed 1988-04-05(2)

Under § 508.010 RSMo 1986, venue was proper in St. Charles County, because one of the defendants, Dawn Marie Porter, resides there.

Section 508.010(2) governs venue when a corporation and an individual are sued together, and venue is improper in a county where no defendant resides.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ryan · filed 1989-01-31(2)

The applicable venue statute, however, is not § 508.040, but 508.010(2). Neither Mace or State Farm are “residents” of the City of St. Louis. Since no defendant resided in St. Louis City, venue was improper in the City of St. Louis and, thus, the Circuit Court of St. Louis City lacked jurisdiction over the suit.

Section 508.010(2) allows venue where one of several defendants resides, and a later dismissal of that defendant does not undo venue that was proper when the action was filed.

Bottger v. Cheek · filed 1991-07-30(2)

Before addressing defendant’s argument regarding pretensive joinder, we note the original petition, naming several defendants, one of which was a resident of the City of St. Louis, comports with the provision of § 508.010(2) RSMo.1986, establishing venue in any county in which one of several defendants resides. Assuming venue was properly vested in the first instance, the subsequent dismissal of the resident defendant does not divest the court in which the action was filed of venue and jurisdiction over the person of the remaining non-resident defendant.

Section 508.010(2) permits a state agency to be sued in the county where a codefendant resides.

State ex rel. Missouri Department of Natural Resources v. Roper · filed 1992-02-25(2)

As there is a codefendant residing in another county, the provisions of § 508.010(2) RSMo 1986, clearly and un-amiguously state that, as a general rule, either Cole County or the other county — in this case, Boone County — would have venue over this suit.

Section 508.010(2) permits venue where one of several defendants resides, but a resident defendant's pretensive joinder does not establish venue for the others.

State ex rel. Kyger v. Koehr · filed 1992-06-02(2)

Initially, we note that the original petition names Dierbergs, which does business in St. Louis County, and Boykin, who resides in the City of St. Louis and, therefore, it complies with the provision of § 508.010(2), which establishes venue in any county in which one of several defendants resides. ... If relator improperly joined Boykin to gain venue, then venue as to Dierbergs would not be proper. ... Thus, the joinder of Boykin was pretensive and the trial court properly quashed service of process on Boykin.

Section 508.010(2) permits venue in Cole County when DNR resides there and a co-defendant resides in another county.

State Ex Rel. County of St. Charles v. Mehan · filed 1993-04-20(2)

As there is a co-defendant residing in another county, the provisions of § 508.010(2), RSMo 1986, clearly and unambiguously state that, as a general rule, either Cole County or the other county — in this case, Boone County — would have venue over this suit. ... As a result, we find that venue was proper in Cole County, Missouri.

Section 508.010 determines venue when the suit is brought, rather than when a motion challenging venue is decided.

State Ex Rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert · filed 1994-02-22

By the terms of the statute, venue is determined as the case stands when brought, not when a motion challenging venue is decided.

Section 508.010(2) determines venue when the case is brought, even if a defendant is later dismissed.

State ex rel. Santoya v. Edwards · filed 1994-07-19(2)

The fact that plaintiffs dismissed because they later realized they had no cause of action against Hancock is of no consequence. The rule is clear. “Venue is determined as a case stands when brought....” State ex rel. DePaul Health Center, 870 S.W.2d at 822[7]. When this case was brought, Hancock was named as a defendant.

Section 508.010(2) permits a suit against multiple defendants residing in different counties to be brought in any county where one defendant resides.

Threats v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1994-12-06(2)

The City of St. Louis remains a proper venue for this action despite the dismissal of defendant Grix, as venue was apparently proper under § 508.010(2) RSMo 1986 when this suit was brought.

Section 508.010’s general venue rule yields to the special venue rule for suits against corporations, including suits against two corporations.

State Ex Rel. Baker v. Goodman · filed 1954-11-08(2)

Section 508.010 fixes the venue in all suits instituted by summons “except as otherwise provided by law”. By Section 508.040 the General Assembly has provided a different scheme for venue in “suits against corporations” by specifying that such actions shall be brought either in the county where the cause of action accrued, or in the county where the corporation has or usually keeps an office or agent for the transaction of its usual or customary business. It is a special statute designed to take corporations from under the operation of Section 508.010.

For venue under Section 508.010(2), a foreign business corporation resides in the county where its registered office and agent are located when it is joined with an individual defendant.

State Ex Rel. Bowden v. Jensen · filed 1962-08-06(2)

We think the only legally sound, practical and satisfactory construction to be placed upon Sec. 508.010, subd. 2 when considered together with Sec. 351.625 is to *351hold, as we must and do, that a foreign business corporation “resides” in the county where its registered office and registered agent is located under Sec. 3S1.620.

Section 508.010 governs venue when a corporation and individuals are co-defendants.

State ex rel. McHarevo Development Corp v. Lasky · filed 1978-06-06

In truth, the applicable venue statute when the corporation and the individuals were co-defendants was § 508.010, RSMo 1969, whereas § 508.-040, RSMo 1969 controls now that relator is the sole defendant.

Section 508.010(2)'s general venue rule does not govern a suit against two corporate defendants.

State ex rel. Whaley v. Gaertner · filed 1980-04-22(2)

Last, relator points to the general venue provision of Section 508.010(2) RSMo. 1969. ... That case does not control here where both defendants are corporations.

Section 508.010(2) governs venue when corporations and individuals are properly joined as defendants.

State ex rel. Parks v. Corcoran · filed 1981-12-01(2)

The latest case, State ex rel. Allen v. Barker, supra, unequivocally holds that when corporations and individual defendants are properly joined, the general venue statute, § 508.010 RSMo 1978 is applicable. That statute is applicable in this case.

Section 508.010 governs venue when a suit names both a corporation and an individual as defendants.

Sledge v. Town & Country Tire Centers, Inc. · filed 1983-05-10

When suit is brought against a corporation and an individual, Sec. 508.010 RSMo. 1978, the general venue statute rather than Sec. 508.040, the corporation venue statute, is applicable.

Section 508.010 governs venue when corporations and individuals are sued together; when some defendants reside outside Missouri, suit may be brought where any resident defendant resides.

State Ex Rel. Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Gaertner · filed 1984-06-19(3)

However, when one or more corporations are sued along with one or more individuals, the general venue statute, § 508.010, RSMo 1978, is applicable. ... Here, we have two non-resident defendants (Big-Bee and Harp Enterprises) and three resident defendants (Ford because of its registered agent in the City of St. Louis and Proctor Sales and Richard H. Proctor both of St. Louis County). Consequently, venue would be proper in either the City of St. Louis or in St. Louis County by reason of the joinder of individual defendant Richard H. Proctor.

Section 508.010(2) permits venue where a corporate defendant resides; for venue purposes, a corporation resides in the county of its registered office.

Schiles Ex Rel. Schiles v. Schaefer · filed 1986-03-18(2)

There is no question that Dr. Schaefer and Dr. putsch were residents of St. Louis County, where the alleged acts of negligence occurred; however, under § 508.010(2), RSMo 1978, venue in the City of St. Louis was proper if Ernst Radiology Clinic, Inc. resided there. ... At the time of the filing of this suit and service of process Ernst’s registered office was in the City of St. Louis. Thus venue was clearly proper in the City of St. Louis Circuit Court.

Section 508.010 governs venue when corporations and individuals are sued together; a corporation resides in the county of its registered office.

Oney v. Pattison · filed 1988-03-15

“[W]hen one or more corporations are sued along with one or more individuals, the general venue statute, section 508.010, RSMo 1978, is applicable. Under this statute, the county of residence of a corporation is the county in which it maintains its registered office.” Proctor rules the point; it is denied.

Section 508.010 places venue in the county where a defendant who resides in Missouri lives or, in a tort action, where the cause of action accrued.

State ex rel. Steinhorn v. Forder · filed 1990-06-29

Venue in this type of action, wherein an individual and a corporation are defendants, is governed by § 508.010 RSMo. 1986. ... This statute fixes venue in the county in which a defendant resident of this state resides or, in tort actions, where the cause of action accrued. In this case the cause of action accrued in St. Louis County.

Section 508.010 bases venue among multiple defendants on residence; a foreign insurer does not become a resident of Cole County by designating the state insurance director there to receive service.

State ex rel. Riley v. McHenry · filed 1991-01-08

In accordance with § 508.010(2), if Western Surety Company is considered a resident of Cole County, venue is proper in Cole County. However, if Western Surety is not considered a resident of Cole County, then venue would be limited to Stoddard County under the circumstances herein, pursuant to § 508.010(3). ... A foreign insurance company designating the Director of the Division of Insurance in Jefferson City to receive service of process under § 375.906 does not establish Cole County as the residence of the company for venue purposes.

Section 508.010(2) treats a foreign insurance corporation as residing in any county where it has or usually keeps an office or agent for its usual business.

State Ex Rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher · filed 1991-09-10(2)

In keeping with the principles enunciated by the court in Cameron, it is only logical to construe that under § 508.010, “residence” of a foreign insurance corporation is in any county where a foreign insurance corporation has or usually keeps an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business; i.e., the selling of insurance policies.

When an individual is joined with an unregistered foreign corporation, venue may be based on the individual’s residence or where the tort accrued; the corporation’s office is not its residence for venue purposes.

State ex rel. England v. Koehr · filed 1993-02-09(3)

Where individual and corporation are joined, venue may be obtained only at a “residence” of one of the defendants (or at the venue of the tort). An unregistered foreign corporation does not have a “residence” under the statutes.

Section 508.010 permits venue in St. Louis City for a corporate defendant when an individual defendant is also named.

Pataky v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1994-11-08

However, section 508.010, RSMo 1986, is only applicable to corporate defendants where there are individual defendants named as well as corporate defendants. ... Accordingly, John Doe’s joinder was pretensive and, therefore, venue was not proper in the initial suit.

Subsection (3) permits a suit against several defendants, including Missouri residents and non-residents, in any county where any defendant resides.

State ex rel. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Mummert · filed 1994-12-27(3)

However, if there are one or more individual defendants, the general venue statute, § 508.010 RSMo (1986), applies. Subsection (3) specifically provides that when there are several defendants, some Missouri residents and other non-residents, the suit may be brought in any county wherein any defendant resides. § 508.010(3) RSMo (1986). For purposes of the general venue statute, a corporate defendant can reside in the county where its registered agent is maintained. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Mo. banc 1991).

Section 508.010 applies as the general venue statute when a suit names one or more corporations and one or more individuals.

Futrell v. Luhr Bros., Inc. · filed 1996-01-02

When a suit is brought against one or more corporations and one or more individuals, the general venue statute, § 508.010, rather than the corporation venue statute, § 508.040, RSMo (1994), applies.

Section 508.010(3) does not permit venue based on a resident defendant whose joinder is pretensive because the petition fails to state a claim against that defendant.

State Ex Rel. Green v. Neill · filed 2004-02-24(3)

Without a valid claim against Curator Horne, venue is not proper in the City of St. Louis.

Section 508.010(1) permits suit against a defendant found and served in the county where the plaintiff resides, even when other defendants reside elsewhere.

State ex rel. Kissinger v. Allison · filed 1959-09-28(1)

... we find that the trial court had jurisdiction of the defendant who was properly served when found in the county of plaintiffs’ residence, under subsection (1) of § 508.010 RSMo 1949, V.A. M.S.

Section 508.010(1) bars service on a defendant in the county where both defendants reside when the plaintiff resides in another county.

State Ex Rel. McCarter v. Craig · filed 1959-11-09(1)

If both defendants were residents of Dent County, Missouri, and plaintiff was a resident of Scott County, then under the provisions of Sec. 508.010(1) RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., service of summons could not be legally had upon relator in Dent County.

Section 508.010(1) does not treat foster parents as “found” in a city solely because they care for a child under that city's juvenile court jurisdiction.

Kloos v. Corcoran · filed 1982-11-23(1)

Respondent also contends that rela-tors could be “found” in St. Louis City because they made their home available for foster care for children under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. This would require that the minor child plaintiff be considered as “residing” in the City which the record does not show.1 Further respondent has cited us to no case which premises venue on this type of constructive presence, nor does the record reflect any contact between relators and the Juvenile Court of the City.

Section 508.010 makes venue a personal privilege that a defendant may waive by acting in the case before objecting.

Hutchinson v. Steinke · filed 1962-01-16

Furthermore, Section 508.010 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., fixing venue in the county of the defendant’s domicile, confers a mere personal privilege which may be waived by the person entitled to assert it.

A motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue is deemed granted if not denied within ninety days, unless all parties waive the period in writing.

State ex rel. HeplerBroom, LLC, and Glenn E. Davis, Relators v. The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty · filed 2019-01-2910

Hence, the plain language of section 508.010.10 requires this Court to hold the circuit court’s failure to rule upon Relators’ motion to transfer within the ninety-day period resulted in Relators’ motion being deemed granted.

Section 508.010(6) permits a tort suit in the county where the cause of action accrued even if it accrued before the 1965 amendment.

Leneve Ex Rel. LeNeve v. Moore · filed 1966-11-14(6)

We hold that § 508.010(6), RSMo 1959, as amended Laws 1965, V.A.M.S., may operate retrospectively and that Respondent Judges may proceed in the counties where the causes of action accrued.

Section 508.010(6) permits venue in the county where a tort cause of action accrued only when an existing tort claim supports that option.

Clark v. Martin · filed 1983-04-19(6)

There was there no existent tort which would bring into play the option under § 508.010(6) of choosing the venue of Carroll County.

Section 508.010 treats a wrongful death cause of action as accruing, for venue purposes, where the wrongful conduct occurred.

Dzur v. Gaertner · filed 1983-07-05

Therefore, venue is determined by § 508.010 RSMo 1978 and the term “accrued” as used in that statute refers to the place where the wrongful conduct occurred.

Section 508.010 permits venue where the defendant committed a tort; otherwise, venue lies in the defendant’s county of residence or the plaintiff’s county if the defendant can be served there.

Hogan v. Block · filed 1983-10-18

Venue in the City of St. Louis was proper in this case only if niece committed a tort there. See § 508.010 RSMo 1978. Otherwise the cause of action must be brought in the county where the defendant resides or the county where plaintiff resides if the defendant can be served there. Id. Defendant was served in Cole County. ... Lacking evidence of tortious conduct by niece occurring in the City of St. Louis, there was no venue.

Section 508.010(6) permits a tort action for wrongful eviction and conversion to be brought in the county where the cause of action accrued.

Davidson v. Hess · filed 1984-06-26(6)

Defendant was in error in dismissing the cause of action. Under § 508.010(6) venue was proper in Jefferson County.

Section 508.010(6) permits a tort suit in the county where the cause of action accrued; allegations that the wrongful conduct caused injury there can establish venue.

State ex rel. Willman v. Marsh · filed 1986-12-16(6)

Here, though relator’s statement of the ultimate facts dispositive of this issue is perhaps less than text book model, we believe it adequate to provide a basis for venue under § 508.010(6). ... Hence, the import of the petition was that defendants’ actions culminated in Jackson County and it was there that relator’s purported injury occured and the cause of action accrued. We conclude the pleading is sufficient to establish a basis for venue of relator’s cause of action in Jackson County and the preliminary writ in mandamus is therefore made peremptory.

Section 508.010(6) governs venue only when the cause of action accrued in Missouri; if it accrued in another state, other venue provisions govern.

State Ex Rel. Drake Publishers, Inc. v. Baker · filed 1993-08-10(6)

We accordingly construe subsection (6) to govern venue only in those cases in which the cause of action has accrued in Missouri. If the cause of action has accrued in another state, other venue provisions govern.

Section 508.010(6) permits a tort action to be brought in the county where the defendant’s wrongful conduct occurred.

State ex rel. Banta v. Wiesman · filed 1993-10-05(6)

The teaching of Dzur, however, is that it is the place of defendant’s wrongful conduct, not the place where the effect of that conduct is ultimately felt or realized that is controlling for venue purposes.

Section 508.010(6) permits venue for jointly liable tort defendants where the cause of action accrued, based on the good-faith allegations when suit was brought.

Montgomery v. South County Radiologists, Inc. · filed 2005-06-14(6)

Respondents’ petition was sufficient to support an allegation of joint liability. There is no evidence that any allegations of joint liability in the petition were made in bad faith. ... However, venue is determined as the case stands when brought, rather than when a motion challenging venue is decided. ... Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion to transfer venue.

Section 508.010 requires venue in tort actions where the plaintiff was first injured, meaning where the trauma or exposure occurred.

State Ex Rel. Selimanovic v. Dierker · filed 2008-03-18(4), (14)

When read together, sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.14 require a determination of where the plaintiff was “first injured,” which, in turn, requires a determination of where the “trauma or exposure occurred.” Section 508.010 does not define the term “exposure,” but the plain language definition of the term includes the “condition of being subject to some effect” and “the condition of being subject to financial loss.” ... Thus, the injury sought to be redressed by the malpractice action is the financial loss from the lack of an enforceable judgment. That judgment could have been rendered in either the circuit court of the City of St. Louis or in the circuit court of St. Louis County. Under the facts of this case and the plain language of the venue statutes, Plaintiffs were “first injured” in those venues in which the wrongful death action could have been filed.

Section 508.010 requires a suit against a Missouri resident to be filed in the defendant’s county of residence, in the plaintiff’s county of residence if the defendant may be found there, or, for a tort action, where the cause of action accrued.

Guffey v. Mehan · filed 1971-06-02

Section 508.010, R.S.Mo. (1959), requires a suit to be filed, when defendant is a resident of the state, either in the county where the defendant resides or in the county within which plaintiff resides and defendant may be found, or in tort actions, where the cause of action accrues, regardless of the residence of the parties. Plaintiff did not comply with this statute and the motion to quash service was properly sustained.

Section 508.010 permits venue in the trustee’s county of residence for an in personam challenge to the trustee’s administration of a trust.

State ex rel. Hammerstein v. Hess · filed 1971-11-08

Re-lators rely generally on the general venue statute, Section 508.010, RSMo 1969, V.A. M.S., while respondent relies primarily on Section 508.030, which, in part, provides: “Suits for the possession of real estate, or whereby the title thereto may be affected * * * shall be brought in the county where such real estate, or some part thereof, is situated.” ... The actions being in personam, venue in St. Louis County was proper, and with that court having first acquired jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, the second suit involving the same parties and same subject matter should have been dismissed.

Section 508.010 applies to the registration of foreign judgments under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law.

Kohlbusch v. Eberwein · filed 1982-11-09

We find that the general venue statute does apply to the registration of foreign judgments under the Uniform Law and, therefore, proper venue for the registration of the foreign judgment lies only in Gasco-nade County.

Section 508.010(1) makes venue improper for a breach of contract suit filed outside an individual defendant’s county of residence when the defendant is served in that county, absent a valid agreement to change venue.

Maxey v. Wenner · filed 1985-02-13(1)

Absent a written agreement of the parties venue in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis was improper and that court acquired no jurisdiction over defendant-appellant and was powerless to proceed.

Section 508.010(2) permits venue outside the county where a judgment was entered for an equitable suit to set it aside.

Williams v. Williams Paper Co. · filed 1988-05-24(2)

We conclude that plaintiff is in error in his claim that St. Louis County is the only forum in which he may seek to set aside the alleged fraudulently-obtained judgment. It appears to us that venue would be proper elsewhere under Wonderly and § 508.010(2), RSMo 1986.

Section 508.010(6) allows a tort action to be brought where it accrued and does not permit an intrastate forum non conveniens exception for Missouri parties and a Missouri cause of action.

Willman v. McMillen · filed 1989-11-14(6)

Because this Court holds that Missouri’s venue statute does not admit a doctrine of inconvenient forum in a case involving Missouri parties and a Missouri cause of action, it is not necessary to address whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Section 508.010 does not establish venue for a tort claim in a county where none of the defendants reside and the cause of action did not accrue.

State Ex Rel. Jinkerson v. Koehr · filed 1992-03-24(2), (6)

The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis does not have venue over the first accident involving Jinkerson under § 508.010(2) because neither Jinkerson nor Kroeger resided in the City of St. Louis. Similarly, venue cannot be established pursuant to § 508.010(6) because the first accident occurred in St. Louis County, not in the City of St. Louis.

Section 508.010 permits a civil action to be brought in any Missouri county where a defendant resides, with residence-based venue determined when the suit is filed.

State Ex Rel. Breckenridge v. Sweeney · filed 1996-04-23

The statute requires only that challenges to venue based upon a party’s residence must be determined as of the time suit was filed.

Section 508.010 requires a suit against an in-state individual to be brought in the county where the defendant resides or where the plaintiff resides and the defendant may be found.

Kueper v. Murphy Distributing · filed 1992-07-28

Proper venue is governed by § 508.-010, RSMo 1986. Under that statute, a suit against an individual who is a resident of the state, must be brought in the county within which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found. § 508.010, RSMo 1986.

Section 508.010 permits a plaintiff to select any statutorily appropriate Missouri venue, and a trial court may not disturb that choice under forum non conveniens.

Jones v. Overstreet · filed 1993-09-21

When two statutorily appropriate Missouri venues are available to a plaintiff, a trial court has no discretion to disturb the plaintiffs venue selection pursuant to the forum non conveniens doctrine because the Missouri legislature has already determined that neither Missouri forum is seriously inconvenient to the defendant.

Section 508.010 requires civil actions to be filed in the defendant’s county of residence or, under specified conditions, the plaintiff’s county where the defendant can be found, and tort actions where the cause accrued.

Ross v. Strauss (In Re Ross) · filed 1999-03-04(1), (6)

Under Missouri’s general venue statute, a lawsuit must be filed in the county of residence of the defendant or in the county where the plaintiff resides and the defendant can be found, § 508.010(1), RSMo 1994, or, in the case of tort actions, in the county where the cause of action accrued, § 508.010(6).

Section 508.010 sets venue based on the defendant's residence, the plaintiff's residence and the defendant's presence, or where a tort cause of action accrued, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing proper venue when challenged.

State Ex Rel. Harness v. Grady · filed 2006-08-29(1), (4), and (6)

Thus, the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of showing that venue was proper in St. Louis City pursuant to section 508.010(4). ... In these circumstances, venue is proper in Clark County, Missouri pursuant to section 508.010 and is not proper in St. Louis City.

Section 508.010 requires tort cases to be filed in the county where the plaintiff was first injured.

State Ex Rel. Burns v. Whittington · filed 2007-04-17

In the new version of section 508.010, the legislature employs the terms “suit,” “claim,” “civil action,” and “cause of action.” ... The term “cause of action” thus refers to the negligent act or omission, as opposed to the injury which flows from the tortious conduct. Although death is the necessary final event in a wrongful death claim, the cause of action is derivative of the underlying tortious acts that caused the fatal injury. Therefore, even though Relator filed an amended petition alleging wrongful death, her cause of action did not change because the lawsuit had been and still is based upon the same operative facts; namely, Mr. Burns’ harmful exposure to the Defendants’ benzene-containing products.

Section 508.010.4 requires venue in a tort action to be in the Missouri county where the plaintiff was first injured by the alleged wrongful acts or negligent conduct, notwithstanding contrary law.

STATE EX. REL. CITY OF JENNINGS v. Riley · filed 2007-10-30(4)

In fact, there is no conflict because section 508.010.4, by its plain meaning, expressly applies to the exclusion of all laws to the contrary.

Section 508.010.4 places venue for separate, successive automobile accidents occurring in different Missouri counties in the county where the plaintiff was first injured.

State ex rel. Kinsey v. Wilkins · filed 2013-02-26(4)

Thus, the plain language of Section 508.010.4 requires that venue lay only in the county where the plaintiff was “first injured,” notwithstanding any other provision of law, which includes the Permissive Joinder Rule, Rule 52.05(a). There is no ambiguity in Section 508.010.4. Section 508.010.4 confers venue for separate, yet successive automobile accidents occurring in different counties, in the county of first injury.

Section 508.010.15 requires transfer to a proper Missouri county, or dismissal without prejudice if none exists, when the filing county is improper; section 508.010.2(4) makes venue proper where an Iowa corporation is sued because it is a Missouri nonresident.

Peter Loew and Kathy Loew v. Heartland Trophy Properties, Inc. · filed 2023-04-04(15), (2)(4)

Heartland could have challenged venue by filing a motion to dismiss under section 508.010.15 which provides: “[i]f the county where the plaintiff’s claim is filed is not a proper venue, that plaintiff shall be transferred to a county where proper venue can be established. If no such county exists in the state of Missouri, the claim shall be dismissed without prejudice.”

Section 508.010(2) permits a suit against defendants residing in different counties to be brought in any such county.

State Ex Rel. Malone v. Mummert · filed 1994-12-20(2)

Where the defendants are a mix of corporations and individuals, Section 508.010, RSMo 1986, determines venue. Under that statute, “[w]hen there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties, the suit may be brought in any such county.” § 508.010(2).

Section 508.010(1) makes Wright County the only proper venue when the case is not a contested case under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act.

State Ex Rel. Yarber v. McHenry · filed 1995-12-19(1)

The principal issue before us is whether Yarber’s case is a contested ease. If so, then Yarber is correct that venue is proper in Cole County. § 536.110.3, RSMo 1986. Otherwise, the ease can be brought only in Wright County. § 508.010(1), RSMo 1986.

Section 508.010.5(1) places venue in any county where a defendant corporation's registered agent is located when a nonresident plaintiff was first injured outside Missouri.

STATE EX REL. KANSAS CITY S. RY. CO. v. Nixon · filed 2009-05-05(5)(1)

As amended in 2005, the statute provides that, when a non-resident plaintiff is first injured outside of the state and the defendant is a corporation, venue lies "in any county where a defendant corporation's registered *366 agent is located." Section 508.010.5(1), RSMo Supp.2008.

Section 508.010 permits venue where a defendant resides or may be found, or, in a tort action, where the cause of action accrues.

State ex rel. Dennis v. Snodgrass · filed 1973-11-05

Relators urge that the only venue statute applicable is Section 508.010 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., which provides for venue where a defendant resides or may be found or in tort actions where the cause of action accrues. Relators further argue that no such basis for venue exists. Respondents do not urge a basis for venue exists; they urge only that venue was “waived.” Plainly there exists no venue in Moniteau County.

Section 508.010 does not govern venue in attachment suits; Section 508.020 does.

Quick v. Schmidt · filed 1973-07-23(1)

Venue in attachment suits is not governed by Section 508.010 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., (which by its own terms is not exclusive) but is expressly provided for by Section 508.020 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. which provides in part: ... We therefore hold that upon the record before us, the circuit court of Buchanan County was a proper venue for this attachment and acquired jurisdiction of the cause, even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resided there.

Section 508.010’s general venue options do not permit a suit against state executive department heads outside Cole County when their official residences and principal duties are there.

State ex rel. Spradling v. Bondurant · filed 1973-11-05

The fault with respondent’s position is that it stands decided by our State Supreme Court en banc that the venue of actions against executive heads of departments of state government can lie only in Cole County, where their official residences are located and their principal duties performed.

Section 508.010's general venue rule is subject to the specific venue requirement for actions against counties in Section 508.060.

State Ex Rel. City of St. Louis v. Kinder · filed 1985-10-16

In adopting Section 508.060, the General Assembly created a specific venue exception for counties from the general venue statute, Section 508.010.

Section 508.010 governs venue when the special venue rule for contested-case review does not apply; an action against a state agency must be brought in the county where it resides.

Welsch v. Dept. of Elementary & Secondary Education · filed 1987-05-05

Because there was no hearing on a contested case, we hold that the special venue statute § 536.110.3 does not apply. The general venue statute § 508.010 controls. Proper venue against appellant state agency in the present case lies only in Cole County, Missouri.

Section 508.010 supplies venue when no other law establishes it; a special venue provision takes precedence.

State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission v. Patterson · filed 1987-05-05

The underlined section reflects that Sec. 508.010 is the residuum of venue, applicable when no other law establishes venue. Sec. 226.100 as interpreted in Bates is a special venue provision for the Commission which takes precedence over 508.010.

Section 508.010(2) permits a state agency joined with a defendant residing in another county to be sued in that defendant's county.

STATE EX REL. MO. DNR v. Roper · filed 1992-02-25(2)

The only issue is whether a case against a state agency must be brought in the county of its legal residence when there are additional defendant(s) who otherwise could be sued in the county of their residence under § 508.010(2) RSMo 1986, the "general" venue statute. This Court concludes that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that such actions be brought only in the county of residence of the state agency.

Section 508.010(2) allows a suit to be brought in the county where any defendant resides, unless a specific venue provision supersedes it.

State Ex Rel. Dilliard's, Inc. v. Ohmer · filed 2006-05-02(2)

The Missouri Supreme Court has held that Section 213.111(1) is a specific venue provision, superseding Section 508.010(2). ... As such, venue for Count I could only be in St. Louis County, under Section 213.111(1).

Venue under Section 508.010 is not a requirement for a court's jurisdiction.

Bentch v. Collins · filed 2000-10-03

Appellants are correct in their assertion that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the parties and that venue is not a requirement for jurisdiction. See Section 508.010, RSMo 1994; State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. banc 1994).

Section 508.010 requires venue to be reassessed when a plaintiff adds a defendant by amended petition.

State Ex Rel. Linthicum v. Calvin · filed 2001-10-23(3)

For purposes of section 508.010, a suit instituted by summons is “brought” whenever a plaintiff brings a defendant into a lawsuit, whether by original petition or by amended petition.

Section 508.010(4) no longer supplies venue when resident defendants are added to a suit originally filed against a nonresident defendant.

State ex rel. Bierman v. Neill · filed 2002-12-10(4)

After this Court’s holding in Linthi-cum, and the consequence that venue in St. Louis City could no longer be based on subsection (4), respondent should have granted defendants’ motion to reconsider.

Section 508.010 permits venue to be determined using an added defendant when that addition makes the county where the action was filed a proper venue.

State ex rel. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Nixon · filed 2009-05-05.5

The resulting amendment to the pleading — i.e., the addition of McIntosh as a defendant — rendered venue in Jackson County proper. This means that there are two correct venues in this case — Jackson County and St. Louis County.

Under section 508.010(2), a railroad resides in a county through which its line passes and where it has an agent upon whom process can be served.

State ex rel. Kertz v. Neill · filed 2002-12-10(2)

Thus, in the absence of any other definition of the residence of a railroad corporation under section 508.010(2), the pre-1943 “existing laws” control, and St. Louis City, through which BNSF’s line of road passes and where BNSF offices and agents are located, is a residence of the railroad.

For an action with no tort count and multiple defendants, venue may be in any county where a defendant resides.

State ex rel. Ronald Prater, Gwendalyn Gonzales, Deann Thompson and Lucille Curtman, Relators v. The Honorable Jason R. Brown · filed 2019-04-30(2)

In cases with no count alleging a tort and involving multiple resident defendants or multiple resident and non-resident defendants, § 508.010.2, RSMo Supp. 2014, provides venue shall be in any county where any of the defendants reside.

Section 508.010(2) permits venue in any county where a defendant insurance corporation has an agent or office for its usual and customary business.

State Ex Rel. Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Messina · filed 2011-03-01(2)

Except for non-tort actions, venue is to be determined by section 508.010.2, which says only that venue is where any defendant resides without giving a definition of residence. ... Where no tort is alleged, an insurance corporation may be sued in any county where it has an agent or office for the transaction of its usual and customary business.

Section 508.010.5(3) does not require a court to decide venue before ruling on forum non conveniens.

Rabago v. Kansas City Southern, Inc. · filed 2019-10-15(5)(3)

The trial court was not required to consider the issue of venue in determining whether the requested forum was convenient and thus did not abuse its discretion in failing to address Section 508.010.5(3) in its judgment.