Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010

Section 213.010(6) does not make employees, including supervisors and managers, individually liable as employers under the Missouri Human Rights Act.

Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc. · filed 1995-05-16(6)

Looking to analogous federal civil rights statutes, as we believe the Missouri Supreme Court would, we hold that the Missouri Supreme Court would interpret the definition of an employer in the MHRA, Mo. Rev.Stat. § 213.010(6), in a manner consistent with decisions of our sister circuits construing Title VII’s definition of an employer. Every circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII. Thus, we believe the Missouri Supreme Court would hold that the definition of the term employer in the MHRA does not subject employees, including supervisors or managers, to individual liability.

Section 213.010(6) excludes religious corporations from MHRA religion discrimination claims regardless of the particular beliefs they foster.

Wirth v. College of the Ozarks · filed 1998-08-26(6)

The exemptions under Title VII and the MHRA apply, by their terms, to “religious corporations” notwithstanding the particular beliefs which the religious corporations seek to foster. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a); Mo. Rev.Stat. § 213.010(6). The College of the Ozarks clearly meets the definition of a religious corporation and therefore is not subject to Title VII and MHRA claims based upon religion.

Section 213.010(7)’s definition of employer includes political subdivisions, but it does not, even together with the MHRA’s damages provision, specifically authorize punitive damages against municipalities.

Kline v. City of Kansas City · filed 1999-05-05(7)

Ms. Kline and Ms. Taylor argue that the MHRA does in fact specifically provide for punitive damages against municipalities, because the act's definition of "employer" "includes the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof," see Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010(7), and because another section of the act provides that a court may award punitive damages to a prevailing party, see Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.111.2. But the MHRA is a voluminous statute with many provisions and definitions. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010-213.139. We believe that a result cobbled together from different sections of the statute is insufficiently explicit under the Missouri cases to overcome the presumption against punitive damages when a municipality is a defendant that has been found liable. We therefore reject the plaintiffs' contentions in this respect.

Under the former definition of employer in § 213.010(7), a claim against an employee alleged to direct work assignments can have a reasonable basis even if the employee was not the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor.

Ramsey v. Georgia-Pacific LLC · filed 2019-01-07(7)

Prior to the recent amendment, the MHRA applied to “any person directly acting in the interest of an employer.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(7) (2016). This definition includes “employees other than the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, even if that employee is outside of the plaintiff’s direct chain of command.” Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 667 n. 7 (Mo. 2009) (citations omitted). Further, “the plain and unambiguous language . . . imposes individual liability in the event of discriminatory conduct.” Id. at 669 (citation omitted). ... Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude there is no reasonable basis in law and fact for Ramsey’s claim.

Section 213.010(8) excludes individual employees from the MHRA definition of “employer,” so they cannot be liable as employers under the MHRA.

Huskey v. PetSmart, Inc. · filed 2019-01-07(8)

However, the MHRA now expressly excludes from the definition of “employer” individuals employed by an employer. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(8) (“‘Employer’ shall not include . . . an individual employed by an employer . . . .”). ... As such, Huskey cannot state an MHRA claim against Polly.

Section 213.010(8) excludes individuals employed by an employer from the definition of employer, barring MHRA employment discrimination and retaliation claims against them for conduct after August 28, 2017.

Taylor v. Vitamin Cottage Natural Food Markets, Inc. · filed 2019-01-10(8)

But on August 28, 2017, the MHRA was amended to eliminate individual liability for employment discrimination and retaliation claims. S.B. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017) (“Currently, persons acting in the interest of employers are considered employers under the MHRA and are each liable for discriminatory practices. This act modified the definition of employer to exclude such individuals.”). The MHRA now provides that the definition of employer, “… shall not include … (c) An individual employed by an employer.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(8) (2017). Because the complained of retaliation occurred after the amendment took effect, Plaintiff is foreclosed from asserting MHRA employment related claims that accrued after August 28, 2017, against Thebeau and Phillips. Hence, Count II must be dismissed against Thebeau and Phillips.

The 2017 exclusion of individuals from the definition of “employer” does not foreclose a potentially valid MHRA claim against a supervisor for discriminatory acts that occurred before the amendment took effect.

Bernzen v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC · filed 2019-04-22

Missouri amended the MHRA in 2017 to eliminate individual liability. 2017 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 43 (excluding from the definition of “employer” an “individual employed by an employer”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010. The amendment took effect on August 28, 2017, and does not apply retroactively. Bram v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 787, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff states a potentially valid claim against Lynch. ... That an aggrieved party can file suit and later obtain a right-to-sue letter—or, in the case of waiver, never obtain one—indicates that MHRA claims accrue when the alleged discriminatory acts took place.

Section 213.010(8) defines an MHRA employer to include a qualifying person with six or more employees, and a complaint must allege facts establishing that the defendant meets the definition.

Jones v. St. Louis Public School Foundation · filed 2023-07-19(8)

The MHRA’s definition of employer includes as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has six or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and shall include the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, or any person employing six or more persons within the state but does not include corporations and associations owned or operated by religious or sectarian organizations.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(8). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any facts, including the number of employees, to establish Defendant as an “employer” under Title VII and the MHRA, and thus, fails to state a claim.

An entity that did not employ the claimant and did not employ six or more people in Missouri is not an employer under the MHRA.

Alford Ladell, Jr. v. Greenwood Motor Lines · filed 2026-06-09(8)

It defines an Employer as: a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has six or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and shall include the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, or any person employing six or more persons within the state but does not include corporations and associations owned or operated by religious or sectarian organizations. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(8) (emphasis added). There is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant Greenwood was not Plaintiff’s employer nor was it an employer pursuant to the MHRA.

Section 213.010(8)(c) excludes supervisors and fellow employees from individual liability under the Missouri Human Rights Act.

Boyd v. Lowe's Companies, Inc. · filed 2022-04-21(8)(c)

There is no individual liability against supervisors or fellow employees under the MHRA, the Workers’ Compensation Law, or the Service Letter Law.

Section 213.010(8) excludes corporations and associations owned or operated by religious or sectarian organizations from the MHRA definition of employer, leaving the Missouri Commission on Human Rights without jurisdiction over employment discrimination charges against them.

Wertz v. Mercy Health · filed 2024-07-16(8)

Under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), however, the term “employer,” specifically excludes “corporations and associations owned or operated by religious or sectarian organizations.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010(8). ... The 180- day deadline, and not the 300-day deadline applies in this case because the MCHR did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 213.010(6) defines an employer to include Missouri and its political or civil subdivisions.

Green v. City of St. Louis · filed 1994-02-22(6)

Included in the statutory definition of an employer is the State of Missouri and any political or civil subdivision of the State. § 213.010(6), RSMo Supp.1993.

Section 213.010(6) defines an employer under the MHRA; the court reads the Act’s employment protections as applying to employer-employee relationships, not independent contractors.

Sloan v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. · filed 1999-07-20(6)

Under the MHRA, an “employer” is defined as “... any person employing six or more persons within the state, and any person directly acting in the interest of an employer.... ” § 213.010(6), RSMo 1994. ... Although the term “employee” is not expressly defined by the MHRA, we believe that a definition similar to those used in the analogous federal statutes may be implied. ... Because only employees can be hired and discharged, we may assume that the MHRA applies only to employer-employee relationships. ... Without specifically discussing all of the factors mentioned above, we can say the most important factors indicate that Mr. Sloan is an independent contractor.

Section 213.010(7) includes municipal corporations in the definition of employer, making them subject to punitive damages under the MHRA on the same basis as other employers.

Fortner v. CITY OF ARCHIE, MO. · filed 1999-10-07(7)

The MHRA includes among its provisions the definition of “employer” that includes “the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof.” § 213.010(7). ... It is the opinion of this Court, from reading the plain language of the MHRA, that municipal corporations are to be subject to the Act in the same manner as any other employer, including the award of punitive damages.

Section 213.010 excludes individual employees from the definition of employer, so MHRA claims cannot be brought against them.

McBride v. AgXplore · filed 2021-10-15

Notably, claims under the MHRA may only be brought against an employer, which, under the statute, does not include individuals.

Section 213.010(8) requires an employer to directly employ six or more employees in Missouri; its current definition no longer includes a person acting in an employer’s interest.

WILLIAMS v. HUTCHESON ENTERPRISES, INC. and TITLE CASH OF MISSOURI, INC., Defendants-Respondents · filed 2024-09-30(8)

The current version of § 213.010, however, contains no mention of a person acting in the interest of the employer. Instead, the statute now requires an employer to directly employ six or more employees in the state.

Section 213.010’s 2017 definition of employer excludes individual employees, but the change does not apply retroactively to claims arising from earlier discriminatory acts.

Simpson v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC · filed 2019-04-22

Missouri amended the MHRA in 2017 to eliminate individual liability. 2017 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 43 (excluding from the definition of “employer” an “individual employed by an employer”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010. The amendment took effect on August 28, 2017, and does not apply retroactively. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff states a potentially valid claim against Lynch.

Section 213.010(10) treats an impairment as substantially limiting work when it significantly restricts a class or broad range of jobs; difficulty with one position alone is insufficient.

Woods v. Tyler Mountain Co. · filed 1996-01-10(10)

The statute defines handicap as "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities, a condition perceived as such, or a record of having such impairment, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(10) (1994). ... An impairment substantially limits a person's ability to work if it significantly restricts the person's "ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). An impairment that only prevents a person from performing one particular job is not a substantially limiting impairment. ... Given these facts, we agree with the district court that Woods' major life activity of employment has not been substantially limited. Although the manner in which Woods must conduct his work may have been somewhat altered, his impairment has not resulted in a significant barrier to his continued employment as a plant manager.

Section 213.010(10) defines a handicap as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a perceived impairment, or a record of such an impairment, so diverticulitis that does not substantially limit a major life activity does not qualify.

Hopper v. Hallmark Cards · filed 1996-06-28(10)

A handicap is defined as "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities, a condition perceived as such, or a record of having such an impairment, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performance of the job" in question. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(10). Hopper failed to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that his diverticulitis substantially limited his ability to engage in one of life's major activities--either before or after his operation.

Section 213.010(10) requires that a handicap not interfere with performing the job with or without reasonable accommodation; a factual dispute about ability to return to work precludes summary judgment on that basis.

Marks v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. · filed 1996-08-19(10)

Since “handicap” is defined as an impairment “which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job”, defendant argues that Marks is not protected under the MHRA because he certified to Lincoln National that he is incapable of performing his essential job duties. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010(10). Decisions made under the ADA have been held to be applicable and authoritative under the MHRA. See Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir.1994). As a result, it is unnecessary for this Court to repeat the above discussion and analysis in order to deny defendant summary judgment on Count II, as well as Count I.

Section 213.010(10) requires an actual impairment to substantially limit a major life activity for it to count as a handicap under the MHRA.

Welch v. Liberty Machine · filed 1996-10-23(10)

The MHRA defines handicap as "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities, a condition perceived as such, or a record of having such an impairment, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(10). We agree with the district court that Welch was not handicapped under the MHRA because his condition did not "substantially limit" any major life activity.

Section 213.010(10) defines disability in materially the same way as the ADA, so a claimant who does not show a qualifying disability cannot establish a prima facie MHRA claim.

Cody v. Cigna Healthcare · filed 1998-03-16(10)

The definition of disability is the same in all material respects under the ADA and MHRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(10); see also Kramer v. K & S Associates, 942 F. Supp. 444, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1996). ... Since Cody did not make a prima facie showing that she was disabled, the judgment is affirmed.

Section 213.010(10) defines disability in materially the same way as the ADA for purposes of an MHRA employment discrimination claim.

Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc. · filed 1998-03-16(10)

The definition of disability is the same in all material respects under the ADA and MHRA.

Section 213.010(10) requires a perceived-disability claimant to show that the defendant regarded the claimant’s condition as substantially impairing life activities.

Roberts v. District No. 9 · filed 1997-10-06(10)

Similarly, under the MHRA, Roberts must establish that the defendant regarded his condition as substantially impairing his life activities. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(10); Lorenz v. Filtronetics, Inc. (In re Estate of Latimer), 913 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).

Section 213.010(10) requires a perceived-disability claimant to show that the defendant regarded the claimant’s condition as substantially impairing life activities.

Roberts v. Unidynamics Corporation · filed 1997-11-28(10)

Similarly, under the MHRA, Roberts must establish that the defendant regarded his condition as substantially impairing his life activities. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010(10); Lorenz v. Filtronetics, Inc. (In re Estate of Latimer), 913 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo.Ct.App.1995).

Section 213.010(4) requires a disability discrimination claimant to be able to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation; excessive absenteeism can defeat that requirement even if the employer permitted the absences.

Schierhoff v. GlaxoSmithKline · filed 2006-04-14(4)

To prove disability discrimination, he must show that he can perform his job either “with or without reasonable accommodation.” See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4). “[R]egular and reliable attendance is a necessary element of most jobs,” Greer v. Emerson Elec. Co., 185 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted), and an employee who cannot attend work cannot perform the essential functions of his job. This is true even when the absences are with the employer’s permission.

A perceived tendency to suffer injuries does not qualify as a disability under § 213.010(4) absent a substantial limitation of a major life activity.

Morgan v. Plaza Motor Co. · filed 2015-11-20(4)

The comments made by Morgan’s supervisors can be construed — at most — as suggesting that Plaza perceived Morgan as an individual prone to injury. However, Morgan cites no authority — nor is the Court aware of any-supporting the proposition that predisposition to injury is a limitation or impairment falling within the protective ambit of the MHRA.

Section 213.010(4) covers a perceived disability when an employer wrongly believes an employee has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Gilberg v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. · filed 2018-07-27(4)

In order to show that an employer regarded an employee as disabled, the employee must show the employer either “(1) wrongly believed that [the employee] had an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities or (2) wrongly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limited one or more major life activities.” Daughtery, 231 S.W.3d at 821. There is some evidence that would support Plaintiff Stokes’s contention that he was at least regarded as being disabled by AWG.

Allegations that MRSA and its treatment interrupt work and require frequent bathroom breaks sufficiently plead a disability under § 213.010(5).

Lewis v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company · filed 2021-01-22(5)

The MHRA and ADA define disability, in part, as “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life activities,” including “being regarded as having such an impairment[.]” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(5); see also Heuton, 930 F.3d at 1019; accord 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); Moses, 894 F.3d at 923. ... Taken as true, these fact allegations, as well as the reasonable inferences drawn from them, sufficiently demonstrate how Plaintiff’s major life activities, including his employment, are impacted by his condition. See DeWalt v. Davidson Serv./Air, Inc., 398 S.W.3d 491, 499 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (citing MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(E)) (“‘[m]ajor life activities’ are those that affect employability, such as . . . employment . . . or working”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (“major life activities include . . . working” and “the operation of a major bodily function” including “functions of the . . . digestive, bowel, [and] bladder”). Plaintiff has thus pled sufficient facts to survive dismissal and SWB’s motion on this point is denied.

Under § 213.010(5), an impairment must substantially limit a major life activity to be a disability; difficulty using a particular firearm does not establish a substantial limitation in working.

Garner v. VENDTECH-SGI, LLC · filed 2021-05-21(5)

Furthermore, even assuming Plaintiff suffers from the alleged disorder, the Court finds said condition does not constitute a “disability” under the terms of the MHRA or the ADA. As noted above, in order to qualify as a disability, the purported physical or mental impairment must “substantially limit[] one or more major life activities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(5). ... The Court finds this contention insufficient to demonstrate that she is “precluded from a substantial class of jobs” (or regarded as such).

Section 213.010(5) defines disability to include a substantially limiting impairment or perceived impairment; intermittent use of a hearing aid alone did not establish a disability.

Hurt v. MFA Incorporated · filed 2021-09-10(5)

Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown she has a disability under the MHRA. A “disability” means “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life activities, being regarded as having such an impairment, or a record of having such an impairment, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job . . . .” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(5). In this case, Plaintiff’s alleged disability is the inability to hear well out of her left ear which required her to use a hearing aid. However, Plaintiff admits she does not wear her hearing aid every day. Plaintiff sometimes choses not to wear it.

Section 213.010(5) treats an impairment as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity or an employer mistakenly regards it as doing so.

Lewis v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company · filed 2022-03-25(5)

The MHRA and ADA define disability, in relevant part, as “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities,” including “being regarded as having such an impairment[.]” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(5); ... Because Plaintiff’s MRSA does not substantially limit Plaintiff’s major life activities, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA and MHRA.

A person regarded as disabled under the MHRA must show that the employer wrongly believed a physical impairment substantially limited a major life activity.

Heuton v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2019-07-23(5)

Thus, under Heuton’s chosen theory of liability, even if Heuton has shown that he has a physical impairment, see Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(A)(1) (defining physical impairment to include anatomical loss affecting musculoskeletal body system), he must nonetheless show that Ford wrongly believed that physical impairment substantially limited a major life activity.

Section 213.010(5) requires evidence that an employer regarded an employee as disabled; knowledge of a hospitalization and medical appointments alone did not establish a perceived disability.

Sandbach v. Rafco Clean, LLC · filed 2020-01-09(5)

Based on the above analysis, Plaintiffs claim under the MHRA fails for the same reasons as her ADA claim. First, she has failed to show Gerkens or anyone else associated with Defendant regarded her as disabled.

Section 213.010 defines disability to include a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and a claimant relying on that theory must provide medical proof of the disability.

Smith v. AT&T · filed 2020-08-10

“Disability” may be proved in a number of ways, such as showing “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life activities” or by showing that he or she is “regarded” as having such an impairment. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010; Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil), § 38.07. The only theory of disability pled in the Amended Complaint is that Plaintiff “suffers from anxiety and depression, both impairments that substantially limit at least one major-life activity.” (Doc. 28 at 9 ¶ 67.) During the status conference, Defendant stated that it contested the disability issue. Unlike Plaintiff’s allegation of “garden variety” emotional distress, she will need to submit medical proof of her disability to succeed on her claim. As a result, Plaintiff has waived her doctor-patient privilege.

Pregnancy alone is not a disability under the MHRA; pregnancy-related complications may qualify if they meet the statutory disability definition.

Hammond v. 801 Fish STL, LLC · filed 2021-06-15(4)

The Court does not find that the language in this regulation supports Plaintiff’s position, and agrees with Defendants that pregnancy itself is not a disability under the Act, and that Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of allegations that she suffered from any pregnancy-related complications that could have rendered her disabled for purposes of the statute.

Section 213.010(5) covers a substantially limiting physical impairment if the employee can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Dowling v. The Boeing Company · filed 2023-03-27(5)

The statute defines “disability,” in relevant part, as “a physical . . . impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life activities, . . . which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job . . . .” Id. § 213.010(5). “[P]erforming the job,” more specifically, means the employee must be able to perform the “essential functions” of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(F). “In other words, if despite the substantial limitation the physical impairment otherwise causes, the employee can perform the essential functions of his job with or without a reasonable accommodation, then he has a ‘disability’ for purposes of the MHRA” and can claim the statute’s protection. ... Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Dowling could perform the essential functions of an assembly mechanic with reasonable accommodations. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Because the Court cannot conclude, as a threshold matter, that Dowling does or does not have a “disability” for purposes of the MHRA, it cannot proceed in the discrimination analysis. Loerch, 643 S.W.3d at 602 (citing Medley, 173 S.W.3d at 321). The Court denies Boeing’s motion as to Dowling’s disability- discrimination claim.

Section 213.010(5) requires facts showing that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and permits performance of essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation; alleging anxiety and depression alone does not suffice.

McDonald v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2024-07-29(5)

Plaintiff has alleged that he suffers from anxiety and depression. He makes no further factual allegations regarding how his anxiety and depression substantially limit a major life activity, as the MHRA requires. ... Plaintiff has also not alleged whether he can perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation.

Under § 213.010(5), a physical impairment qualifies as a disability only when it substantially limits a major life activity.

McKee · filed 2026-05-12(5)

“The ADA and the MHRA define ‘disability’ nearly identically.” ... Plaintiff does not allege any facts to plausibly show he meets the “disability” based on a physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of his major life activities under either the ADA or the MHRA.

Section 213.010 treats a physical impairment as a handicap only if the person can perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Umphries v. Jones · filed 1991-02-13

A person is not handicapped under the Missouri statute if the physical impairment interferes with performance of the job. Such impairment does not interfere with the job if reasonable accommodations can be made so the employee can perform the job. Missouri unlike the federal law, makes the question of reasonable accommodations a part of the test of whether a handicap exists.

A perceived handicap under § 213.010(8) requires an existing condition that might be perceived as a handicap.

Rose City Oil Co. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights · filed 1992-05-19(8)

The statute requires the existence of a condition which might be perceived to be a handicap. In the absence of evidence that McClanahan in fact had a “condition” the statute was not applicable to him.

Section 213.010 excludes an impairment that interferes with job performance unless reasonable accommodation would enable the employee to perform the job.

Berkowski v. St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1993-06-08

Section 213.010 RSMo 1986 defines “handicap” as a “physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life activities, or a condition perceived as such, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job.” A person is not statutorily handicapped if the physical impairment interferes with performance of the job, unless reasonable accommodations can be made so that the employee can perform the job.

A person whose impairment interferes with job performance is statutorily handicapped only if reasonable accommodation would allow the person to perform the job.

Welshans v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc. · filed 1994-01-18(10)

A person is not statutorily handicapped if the impairment interferes with performance of the job unless the person can perform the job with reasonable accommodation.

A person is not statutorily handicapped if the impairment prevents performance of the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Stratton v. Missouri Department of Corrections & Human Resources · filed 1995-02-07(10)

Since Stratton has not shown that he is capable of performing the essential functions of a corrections officer with or without reasonable accommodation,3 he has failed to demonstrate that he has a statutorily protected handicap.

Section 213.010(10) defines handicap substantially like disability under federal law; a broken leg that heals completely in about six months with little or no lasting effects is not a handicap.

Kramer v. K & S ASSOCIATES · filed 1996-09-20(10)

The MHRA similarly prohibits handicap discrimination, and "handicap" is defined as the substantial equivalent of "disability" under the federal law. § 213.055.1(1)(a) and § 213.010(10) R.S.Mo. ... Bearing in mind that exceptions to this generalization may exist, the Court nonetheless determines as a matter of law that plaintiff's broken leg, which healed completely in approximately six months with little or no long term effects, was a temporary non-chronic impairment which does not constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA nor a handicap within the meaning of the MHRA.

Section 213.010(10) defines a handicap to require that a worker be able to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Devor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City · filed 1997-02-04(10)

The MHRA provides that a worker is handicapped and entitled to protection from handicap discrimination only if the worker can do his or her job with or without reasonable accommodation. It does not protect a worker such as Mr. Devor who has failed to show he can do his job with reasonable accommodation.

Section 213.010(8) defines a handicap by whether an impairment, with or without reasonable accommodation, interferes with performing the job in question.

Snyder v. ICI Explosives USA, Inc. · filed 1997-02-13(8)

Section 213.010(8), RSMo 1986, defines handicap as “a physical ... impairment ... which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job ... in question.” The question of reasonable accommodation is thus a part of the test of whether a handicap exists.

An application for disability benefits does not conclusively exclude an employee from § 213.010’s definition of a handicapped person when evidence indicates the employee could perform the job duties.

Daffron v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. · filed 1994-03-01

Appellant’s statements in the record that he was capable of performing the duties of his job and was performing those duties until the date he was terminated, and his statements that the termination caused him severe depression which is a major aspect to his total disability, indicate that there is a genuine issue as to the material fact of whether appellant was capable of performing his job duties. Thus, summary judgment on the basis that appellant is not a handicapped person under § 213.010 was improper.

The MHRA's definition of handicap is substantially equivalent to the ADA's definition of disability, and a perceived inability to perform one specialized job does not establish a handicap.

Kampouris v. Saint Louis Symphony Soc. · filed 1999-06-10(10)

The MHRA similarly prohibits handicap discrimination, and "handicap" is defined as the substantial equivalent of "disability" under the federal law. § 213.055.1(1)(a) and § 213.010(10) R.S.Mo. ... The Court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff has failed to establish the first element, namely that the Symphony perceived him to be disabled within the meaning of the ADA and MHRA.

Section 213.010(5) requires a person claiming a disability to be able to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Folsom v. Missouri State Highway Patrol and Sarah Eberhard · filed 2019-08-20(5)

The Highway Patrol showed that, on the undisputed facts, Folsom would be unable to prove that he was “disabled,” meaning that he had “a physical or mental impairment . . . which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job . . . .” § 213.010(5), RSMo.

A person with AIDS has a handicap within the meaning of § 213.010(10).

H.S. v. Board of Regents, Southeast Missouri State University · filed 1998-04-14(10)

H.S. suffers from a handicap within the meaning of Section 213.010(10) RSMo (1994) ... and H.S. was discharged.

Section 213.010(10) requires a physical impairment to substantially limit a major life activity to qualify as a disability; temporary recovery restrictions do not suffice.

Heintzelman v. Marvin Runyon, Postmaster General Joseph Fagan, Postmaster Michael Chirco, Supervisor · filed 1997-07-23(10)

To prove she was disabled, Heintzelman had to present evidence that her physical impairment substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. ... Statutory disability requires permanent or long-term limitations.

Section 213.010(5) defines discrimination to include unfair treatment based on age in employment.

Stanley v. JerDen Foods, Inc. · filed 2008-09-23(5)

The MHRA defines discrimination as “any unfair treatment based on race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employment, disability, or familial status as it relates to housing.” Section 213.010(5), RSMo 2000.

Section 213.010(5) defines discrimination to include unfair treatment based on religion as it relates to employment.

Shirrell v. Saint Francis Medical Center · filed 2014-06-04(5)

The MHRA defines “discrimination” as “any unfair treatment based on [¶]... religion, ... ] as it relates to employment.” Section 213.010(5) RSMo.

Section 213.010(14) includes public school districts in its definition of “person” because they are public corporations.

Martin v. North Kansas City School District · filed 2018-01-29(14)

Thus, because public school districts have been defined as public corporations and because the definition of a “person” in the MHRA includes “corporations.” The Court finds that the NKC School District is a person subject to the MHRA.

Section 213.010’s definition of “person” includes former employees for purposes of the Act’s retaliation provision.

Keeney v. Hereford Concrete Products, Inc. · filed 1995-12-19

Section 213.010, RSMo 1994, defines the word “person” as used in the Act to include “one or more individuals.” ... The trial court’s conclusion that Keeney could not prevail on his section 213.070 claim because “no employer-employee relationship existed between plaintiff and Hereford” is erroneous.

The 2017 definition of “because” or “because of” in § 213.010(2) adopts a motivating factor standard, a substantive change that does not apply retrospectively.

Hurley v. VendTech-SGI, LLC · filed 2018-02-06(2)

First, the causation standard was changed from “contributing factor” to “motivating factor.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101.4 (2017) (expressly abrogating the contributing factor standard); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.111.5 (2017) (stating a plaintiff bears the burden of proving the alleged unlawful action “was made or taken because of his or her protected classification and was the direct proximate cause of the claimed damages.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2) (2017) (defining “because” or “because of” “as it relates to the adverse decision or action, the protected criterion was the motivating factor”). ... The Court agrees with the vast majority of courts that have considered this issue, and finds these two particular MHRA amendments are substantive in their operation. Accordingly, the Court will not retrospectively apply these MHRA amendments to Plaintiff’s claims.

The 2017 definition of “because” or “because of” in § 213.010(2) makes a protected criterion a motivating factor and is a substantive change that does not apply retroactively.

Fassett v. VendTech-SGI, LLC · filed 2018-02-06(2)

First, the causation standard was changed from “contributing factor” to “motivating factor.” ... Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2) (2017) (defining “because” or “because of” “as it relates to the adverse decision or action, the protected criterion was the motivating factor”). ... The Court agrees with the vast majority of courts that have considered this issue, and finds these two particular MHRA amendments are substantive in their operation. Accordingly, the Court will not retrospectively apply these MHRA amendments to Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 213.010(2) defines “because” and “because of” as “the motivating factor” for conduct after the August 28, 2017 amendment; earlier conduct remains subject to the contributing-factor standard.

Brown v. Adams and Associates, Inc. · filed 2020-12-15(2)

However, on August 28, 2017, an amended version of the MHRA took effect that changed the standard to the more-demanding “motivating” factor approach, similar to the federal standards under Titles VII. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2) (defining “[b]ecause” or “because of” as “the motivating factor” behind an adverse employment decision); ... As the timing of the events underlying Cross’s claims precede the August 2017 amendment, the Court will apply the “contributing factor” standard here.

The 2017 motivating factor definition in § 213.010(2) does not apply to discrimination claims that accrued before the amendment took effect.

Hembrador v. PruGen, LLC · filed 2021-03-23(2)

Following the 2017 amendments to the MHRA, effective August 28, 2017, an employer violates the MHRA if the employee’s protected status constituted the motivating factor in an adverse employment action. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2) (2017); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101(4) (2017) (amended statute expressly abrogating previous case law relating to the “contributing factor” standard); Bram v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). ... Defendants argue that the 2017 amendments do not apply to this case because Hembrador’s termination occurred before the amendments went into effect in August 2017. Doc. 57 at n.3. The Court agrees. In similar cases, “Missouri courts have consistently applied the version of the law in effect at the time of the claimed discriminatory act.” Brown v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., No. 4:19-CV-01864-MTS, 2020 WL 7360336, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2020) (citing Wiedner v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 607 S.W.3d 231, 237–39 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020); Folsom v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 645, 650 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); Bram v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 787, 794–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018)). Thus, because Hembrador’s cause of action accrued before August 27, 2017, the Court applies the “contributing factor” standard and cases applying the pre-amendment standard.

Section 213.010 defines a motivating factor as one that plays a role in and has a determinative influence on an employment decision; a jury may infer that factor from evidence of pretext and different treatment of comparable employees.

Crossland v. Hy-Vee, Inc. · filed 2019-11-07(19)

A “motivating factor” is one that “actually played a role in and had a determinative influence on plaintiff’s discharge . . . .” Mo. Approved Jury Instr. (Civil) 38.05 (7th ed); see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 (19). ... A reasonable inference could be drawn that Hy-Vee’s decision to focus on log-related violations is pretextual, and that Crossland’s gender was a motivating factor in Hy-Vee’s choice to terminate her employment.

Section 213.010(19) defines a motivating factor as one that actually played a role in and had a determinative influence on the employment decision.

Elmendorf v. Lincare Inc. · filed 2020-12-28(19)

Following the amendment, an employer violates the MHRA if the employee’s protected status was the motivating factor in an adverse employment action. Id.; see also § 213.010(2), Mo. Rev. Stat. 2017. A “motivating factor” is one that “actually played a role in and had a determinative influence on plaintiff’s discharge.” Crossland v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-04215-NKL, 2019 WL 5847844, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2019) (quoting Mo. Approved Jury Instr. (Civil) 38.05 (7th ed); citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 (19)). The new standard is analogous to the one used in employment discrimination claims under federal law and imposes a higher burden upon the employee than the prior “contributing factor” standard.

Section 213.010(2), as amended in 2017, requires protected status to be the motivating factor in an adverse employment action, a higher burden than the former contributing factor standard.

Carmon v. Saks Fifth Avenue LLC · filed 2021-04-08(2)

The parties agree that the MHRA’s 2017 amendment, effective August 28, 2017, applies, such that the standard in this case is whether “the employee’s protected status was the motivating factor in an adverse employment action.” ... see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2) (2017). “This new standard is analogous to the one used in employment discrimination claims under federal law, and imposes a higher burden upon the employee than the prior ‘contributing factor’ standard.” ... Because “[t]he applicable statute is typically the one in effect when the petition was filed,” R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 425 n.3 (Mo. 2019), and Carmon filed her complaint on June 7, 2019, the Court agrees that the 2017 amendment applies to this case.

Section 213.010(19) requires a plaintiff alleging race discrimination to show that race was the motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, with a determinative influence on that decision.

Godfrey v. Clayco, Inc. · filed 2021-07-12(19)

Plaintiff’s race must have been the motivating factor in the decision to terminate his employment and must have had a “determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(19)017. ... In sum, Plaintiff does not allege facts that plausibly show he was discharged because of his race, or that his race was the motivating factor in the decision to terminate his employment.

A protected classification is the motivating factor under § 213.010(19) when it played a role in an adverse employment decision and had a determinative influence on that decision.

Eivins v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2021-10-26(19)

Section 213.010(19) defines “the motivating factor” as: “the employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.”

Section 213.010(19) defines a motivating factor as one that plays a role in an adverse action and has a determinative influence on it; the definition governs MHRA retaliation claims accruing after the 2017 amendment.

O'Toole v. City of St. Louis · filed 2022-03-15(19)

“A ‘motivating factor’ is one that ‘actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.’” Id. at *17 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(19)). ... For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint also meets the lower, motivating factor standard required for a causal connection in a prima facie case of retaliation under the MHRA. See Castellano, 2021 WL 2313407 at *13.

Section 213.010’s motivating-factor standard does not apply retroactively to an MHRA suit filed before the 2017 amendment took effect.

Rhonda Button v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern · filed 2020-06-30

The Missouri Supreme Court has assumed that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010, which now requires application of the motivating factor standard, is not retroactive. ... here, we analyze Button’s claim under the “contributing factor” standard because she filed this suit on May 10, 2017.

Section 213.010(19) defines a motivating factor as one that actually played a role in an adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on it.

Castellano, III v. Betts · filed 2021-06-07(19)

Castellano’s MHRA claim under Count II must meet the “motivating factor” standard. The “motivating factor” standard is also a lower standard than “but-for” causation. See Wright, 730 F.3d at 737. A “motivating factor” is one that “actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” § 213.010(19). ... The Court finds that Castellano created a genuine issue of fact over whether retaliation was a “motivating factor” in Betts’s decision to not promote him in December 2018, for the same reasons as the Court discussed with regard to Castellano’s Title VII claims.

Section 213.010 requires race or gender to actually play a determinative role in an adverse employment decision to be its motivating factor; merely contributing to the decision is insufficient.

Dees v. Iron Mountain Incorporated · filed 2022-09-30(2), (19)

An employer discriminates “because of” race or gender when the individual’s race or gender was “the motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision, § 213.010(2), and race or gender is “the motivating factor” when it “actually played a role in . . . and had a determinative influence on” the decision, § 213.010(19). The MHRA’s “motivating factor” standard requires proof that one’s race or gender was more than a mere contributing factor in the adverse employment decision, and it is comparable to the standard applied in federal Title VII claims.

Section 213.010(2) requires an employee’s protected status to be the motivating factor in an adverse employment action for an MHRA discrimination claim.

Echols v. Courier Express One, Inc. · filed 2022-10-06(2)

Following the MHRA's 2017 amendment, effective August 28, 2017, “an employer violates the MHRA if the employee's protected status was the motivating factor in an adverse employment action.” Bram v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2) (2017); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101(4) (2017) (amended statute expressly abrogating previous case law relating to the “contributing factor” standard).

Section 213.010(19) defines a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision as one that actually played a role in the decision and had a determinative influence on it.

Pina v. Shaman Botanicals, LLC · filed 2023-01-27(19)

To establish causation under the MHRA, Plaintiff must demonstrate she was discharged “because of” her protected activity, meaning her protected activity was the “motivating factor” for Shaman Franchise’s decision to discharge her. . Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010(19), 213.111(5) (2017). A “motivating factor” is one that “actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” Id. at § 213.010(19) (2017).

Section 213.010(2) requires a disability to be a motivating factor in an adverse employment action for a disability discrimination claim.

Morrow v. Guitar Center Stores, Inc. · filed 2023-03-15(2)

To establish a prima facie disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA, Plaintiff must show that (1) he has a disability; (2) Guitar Center took adverse action against him; and (3) his disability was a “motivating factor” in the adverse action. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2); Heuton, 930 F.3d at 1019. ... Second, even if Plaintiff suffered an adverse action, there is no evidence his disability was a motivating factor.

Section 213.010(2) requires an MHRA retaliation plaintiff to show that the protected complaint was the motivating factor for an adverse action.

Brooks v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC · filed 2025-04-14(2)

A plaintiff must show that the complaint was the motivating factor to the adverse action. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2). Given the sequence of events here, Brooks cannot claim that Serta retaliated against him for filing his first charge when Serta did nothing in response to it.

Section 213.010 requires a protected trait to have a determinative influence on an adverse employment decision for it to be the motivating factor; mere contribution is insufficient.

Felton v. Autozone, Inc. · filed 2025-09-17(2), (19)

An employer discriminates “because of” gender when the individual's gender was “the motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision, § 213.010(2), and gender is “the motivating factor” when it “actually played a role in . . . and had a determinative influence on” the decision, § 213.010(19). The MHRA’s “motivating factor” standard requires proof that one’s gender was more than a mere contributing factor in the adverse employment decision, and it is comparable to the standard applied in federal Title VII claims. ... Because Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his gender was the motivating factor in AutoZone’s decision to terminate his employment, AutoZone is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

Section 213.010 supplies the motivating-factor standard for MHRA retaliation: the protected criterion must play a determinative role in the adverse employment action.

Phillips v. AmeriCash Loans of Missouri, LLC · filed 2025-09-24(2), (19)

The requisite causal relationship exists where “the protected criterion was the motivating factor,” meaning “the employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2), (19). ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all permissible inferences respecting retaliatory motive in her favor, summary judgment must be denied as there remains a genuine issue for trial regarding whether plaintiff’s employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting what she believed were gender-based pay disparities among the employees she supervised.

Section 213.010(19) requires proof that age actually played a role in an adverse decision and had a determinative influence on it to qualify as a motivating factor.

Mauldin · filed 2026-04-02(19)

For age to be a “motivating factor,” the employee must show that his age “actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” Johnson v. Midwest Div.-RBH, LLC, 88 F.4th 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(19)).

Section 213.010 defines “because” by whether a protected criterion was a motivating factor and defines a motivating factor as one that played a determinative role in the adverse decision.

Rimson v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2023-01-25(2), (19)

The MHRA has defined “because” to mean, “as it relates to the adverse decision or action, the protected criterion was the motivating factor.” § 213.010(2), RSMo. “Motivating factor” is defined to mean “the employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” § 213.010(19), RSMo.

A motivating factor in an age discrimination claim requires age to play a role in the adverse action and have a determinative influence on it.

Johnson v. Midwest Division - RBH, LLC · filed 2023-12-11(19)

A “motivating factor” requires that age “actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” § 213.010(19), RSMo Supp. 2017.

Section 213.010(2) supplies the motivating-factor causation standard for claims governed by the post-2017 Missouri Human Rights Act.

Marcantonio v. The Board of Curators of Lincoln University A/K/A Lincoln University · filed 2024-10-01(2)

Because Marcantonio alleges that he was constructively discharged in August 2018 in retaliation for his opposition to the University’s discriminatory actions, this claim is subject to the post-2017 provisions of the Missouri Human Rights Act, including the “motivating factor” causation standard contained in § 213.010(2), RSMo.

The 2017 motivating factor standard applies prospectively; claims accruing before August 28, 2017 use the contributing factor standard.

Bram v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC · filed 2018-12-18(2)

Post amendment, an employer violates the MHRA if the employee's protected status was the motivating factor in an adverse employment action. See id. ; see also § 213.010(2), RSMo 2017. ... Because the amendments effected a substantive change in the law, and we find no express legislative intent that the amendments apply retroactively, we find the MHRA amendments apply prospectively only.

Section 213.010 defines discrimination “because of” a protected characteristic to mean that the characteristic actually played a role in the decision and had a determinative influence on it.

West v. MINACT, Inc. · filed 2021-09-30(2), (19)

Section 213.010 defines “because of” in this context as meaning “the protected criterion was the motivating factor” in the adverse action. ... Further, “the motivating factor” means “the employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.”

A school that also confines youths by juvenile court order falls outside the definition of a place of public accommodation.

Moore · filed 2025-12-11(16)

As Bissell Hall serves both functions, the Court finds that Bissell Hall has a unique relationship with its students that places it outside the definition of a public accommodation for the purposes of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.065.

Section 213.010 does not define “sex,” so the term is given its plain and ordinary meaning.

R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District · filed 2025-06-10

Neither MHRA generally, nor section 213.065 specifically, defines the term “sex.” See section 213.010.