Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limit on an action for breach of an obligation to repair premises when the obligation is not a writing for payment of money or property.

Graffigna v. Wire Rope Corp. of America · filed 1984-04-17

The letter of September 8, 1972 was not a writing for the payment of money or property. Therefore, the five year statute of limitations barred lessors’ action. § 516.120 RSMo 1978.

Section 516.120 requires contract claims to be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Dewoskin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Ford Parcel Service, Inc.) · filed 1987-08-04

The applicable statute of limitations is Section 516.120 RSMo 1978, which provides that lawsuits based on contract claims must be brought within five years of the date of accrual of the cause of action. ... The Defendant is not, therefore, entitled to partial summary judgment for any portion of the amounts due on the “unloading services claims” as five years had not passed prior to the filing of the Complaint on March 12, 1985.

Section 516.120’s five-year period for contract actions does not apply to a written guaranty that promises payment of money; the ten-year period in § 516.110 applies.

St. Louis University v. Belleville · filed 1988-06-21(1)

There are two possible statutes of limitations governing the disposition of this case. The first, a five-year statute, relates to contracts generally,1 while the second, a ten-year statute, applies only to those contracts which are in writing and are for the payment of money.2 Since plaintiff’s petition was filed approximately eight years after the document in question was executed, the former statute of limitation would bar the claim, while the latter would not. ... By construing the writing in question as a guarantee, we are bound by our decision in Platzelman, supra, to conclude that the writing contains a promise to pay money and is therefore governed by the ten-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 requires a personal injury plaintiff to commence an action within five years.

Smith v. Overhead Door Corp. · filed 1993-06-29

Section 516.120, RSMo 1986, requires a personal injury plaintiff to commence his action within five years. The Smiths waited five years and three months to commence their action against the defendants. The statute of limitations barred their action.

Section 516.120’s five-year limit does not apply to a loan claim based on a writing that qualifies under § 516.110’s ten-year limit.

Zuvers v. Robertson · filed 1995-09-19(1)

We conclude that the trial court erred in applying the five-year statute of limitations because, as to some of the checks, Zuvers had sued upon a writing within the meaning of § 516.110, the ten-year statute.

Section 516.120 requires a negligence claim over an insurer’s payment of proceeds to a disqualified beneficiary to be brought within five years of the challenged acts.

Curnes v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States · filed 1999-10-27

The applicable statute of limitations is § 516.120. Plaintiff did not bring her action within five years of the acts about which she complained, as that statute requires. It was, therefore, barred.

Section 516.120(1) applies a five-year limitations period to contract claims that are not based on a written promise to pay money.

Johnson v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. Of America · filed 1991-08-21(1)

We conclude that the proper test, that is, the test that harmonizes the holdings in these Missouri cases, is this: if the plaintiffs contract claim is not based upon a written promise to pay money, so that any right to the payment of money must be proved by extrinsic evidence of a breach of contract, then the five-year statute applies. However, if the plaintiffs contract claim is based upon a written promise to pay money, then the ten-year statute applies “although the plaintiff may, to make out his case, be required to go beyond the terms of the writing to show performance on the part of the plaintiff and a breach on the part of the defendant.”

Section 516.120 gives a suit to confirm an arbitration award Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions.

Turner v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMER., LOCAL 812 · filed 2009-09-11

Under Missouri law, a suit to vacate an arbitration award must be filed within ninety days, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 435.405.2, whereas a suit to confirm the award is subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120.

Section 516.120(1) imposes a five-year limit on a claim under a written agreement when payment depends on contingencies and the writing does not acknowledge a present debt.

Van Stratten v. Friesen · filed 1992-10-16(1)

The language of the agreements does not contain a promise to pay money which is an acknowledgment of a then present indebtedness. There is no indebtedness until the conditions outlined above are met. Thus, the five-year statute, § 516.120, applies, barring respondent’s claim.

Section 516.120 gives a party five years to seek damages for breach of contract; for a continuing failure to maintain, damages may be claimed for the five years before suit.

Lake St. Louis Community Ass'n v. Oak Bluff Preserve · filed 1997-09-09(1)

They seek damages for breach, not enforcement. Accordingly, Section 516.120 RSMo 1994 controls, and defendants’ counterclaim is subject to a five year statute of limitations. ... Damages may be claimed for the five year period immediately preceding the filing of the counterclaim.

Section 516.120(1)'s five-year limit does not apply to an action seeking payment of money promised in a written contract; section 516.110(1)'s ten-year limit applies.

Hughes Development Co. v. Omega Realty Co. · filed 1997-09-30(1)

In this case, the contract is in writing. Hughes seeks a judgment against Omega for payment of money as agreed in the contract. Section 516.110(1) applies. The trial court erred in applying the five-year statute of limitations contained in section 516.120(1) and in entering summary judgment for Omega.

Section 516.120(1)’s five-year limit for contract actions did not bar a claim when the full extent of the damage became ascertainable less than five years before suit.

Verbrugge v. ABC Seamless Steel Siding, Inc. · filed 2005-01-31(1)

Under § 516.120, RSMo 2000, among the actions that shall be commenced within five years are those actions “upon contracts!;.]” § 516.120(1), RSMo 2000. ... As a practical matter, the full extent of the damages could not have been ascertained until the collapse of the guttering, which occurred in 1997. ... We hold that on these facts, as a matter of law, Vergrugge’s claim is not time-barred.

Section 516.120(1) sets a five-year limitations period for actions on oral contracts.

E.J. Vitello Plumbing, Inc. v. Wayne M. Roberts, Inc. · filed 1997-10-21(1)

However, actions on oral contracts are limited to the five year statute of limitations. Section 516.120(1) RSMo (1994).

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitation period on quantum meruit actions.

Estate of Cates v. Brown · filed 1998-07-28

Section 516.120...mandates a five-year limitation period on actions brought under a theory of quantum meruit.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period does not govern equitable actions to enforce a contract’s dissolution and accounting provisions.

Armistead v. A.L.W. Group, Ltd. · filed 2001-10-09(1)

Missouri courts uniformly hold that actions in equity for the enforcement of a contract are governed by the ten-year statute of limitations found in Section 516.110.1. Lake St. Louis Community Ass’n v. Oak Bluff Preserve, 956 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Oberle v. Monia, 690 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Mo.App. E.D.1985). In Counts I and II of his petition, Armistead sought to enforce those provisions of the Agreement which provide for dissolution and accounting upon the withdrawal of a partner. Therefore, both Count I and Count II are governed by the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 516.110.1. The trial court’s application of the five-year limitations period in Section 516.120 was in error.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims; a claim filed within five years of the defendant’s refusal to perform a contractual repair obligation is timely.

Loeffler v. City of O'Fallon · filed 2002-02-19

Therefore, the statute of limitations on plaintiffs breach of contract claim began to run, at the earliest, on August 1, 1994, when plaintiff received a letter from defendant’s insurance company denying liability for the “items [plaintiff] alleged,” but allowing plaintiff to submit additional documentation, or, at the latest, on October 4, 1996, when plaintiff was notified by defendant that it declined her “request for payment.” Since plaintiff filed her action on June 8, 1999, it was timely under the five-year statute, Section 516.120, and the ten-year statute, Section 516.110.

Section 516.120(1) gives a plaintiff five years to bring a construction contract claim after damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment; ordinary minor defects do not necessarily make a latent foundation problem ascertainable.

Allen v. Kuehnle · filed 2002-10-08(1)

That statute requires that Allen’s suit for the construction contract related claims be instituted within five years of the date upon which damages were sustained and capable of ascertainment.

Section 516.120’s time bar for a contract claim cannot be evaded by pleading the breach as fraud.

Wages v. Young · filed 2008-09-02

Under the caselaw described above, however, Wages cannot simply recast what is at bottom a contract claim as a fraud claim, and thereby evade the time bar of § 516.120, RSMo.

The five-year limitation period does not apply to an action for payment under a bond contract; the ten-year period governs.

Harris v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2015-03-23(2)

Alternatively, Hartford argues that the five-year statute—for “an action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture”—limits this case. See § 516.120(2) RSMo 2000. However, the Missouri Supreme Court has rejected this statute in favor of the ten-year statute for breaches of bond contracts.

Section 516.120(1) gives five years to bring an implied contract claim, beginning when a reasonable person would be on notice of a potentially actionable injury.

Schaffer v. Mickey J. Howard · filed 2021-05-04(1)

Therefore, to the extent that an implied contract existed between Howard and Schaffer, a reasonable person in Schaffer's position would have been on notice that Howard either breached or attempted to unilaterally terminate that contract when Howard requested Schaffer pick up the vehicle in September or October of 2012. Thus, the statute of limitations started to run at the latest in October of 2012, and because Schaffer did not file his Petition until July 1, 2019, more than five years after the alleged breach, the trial court correctly held that his claims arising from the breach of the implied contract were barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(1) gives contract claims a five-year limitations period when the written obligation does not promise payment of money; a continuing failure to maintain property does not restart that period without an affirmative act.

City of Carthage, Missouri v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2023-03-01(1)

By section 516.120(1): “All actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110” must be brought within five years. ... The five-year statute of limitations, for contracts generally, governs the City’s claim. ... Without more, a failure to act does not justify the continuing wrong rule.

Section 516.120 sets a five-year period for bringing an attorney malpractice action, measured from when the claim accrues.

Bormaster v. Baldridge · filed 1987-01-13(4)

Our inquiry, therefore, is whether the record before us establishes by unassailable proof that appellant’s cause of action, if any, against respondent accrued more than 5 years prior to October 20, 1980. ... These facts, in our opinion, establish that under § 516.100, as construed in Dixon, appellant’s claim against respondent (if indeed he had one) accrued no later than appellant’s payment of the $500 attorney fee July 9, 1975.

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for legal malpractice actions.

Heintz v. Swimmer · filed 1996-03-12(4)

Our research reveals, and attorney concedes, that § 516.120(4) RSMo is the limitations provision applicable to legal malpractice actions. ... This section provides a five year limitations period.

Section 516.120 governs a written contract to provide legal services because it is a contract for professional services rather than for the payment of money.

Carr v. Anding · filed 1990-06-12(4)

Even assuming that there was a written contract between appellant and Anding, the contract is not one for the payment of money as required by § 516.110; rather, it is a contract whereby Anding agreed to supply professional services to appellant, thus governed by § 516.120.

Section 516.120’s five-year period bars a negligent-survey claim when damages are capable of ascertainment and the property owners wait too long to sue.

Baublit v. Barr & Riddle Engineering Co. · filed 1989-04-18

If the Baublits thought something was wrong with the survey they should have taken timely action, and failure to do so after the damages were capable of ascertainment also ran them afoul of the 5 year statute of limitations. ... Here, the Baublits questioned the Barr-Riddle survey from the outset and therefore the trial court was correct in deciding that the statute of limitations had run on the their claim.

Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for legal negligence actions.

Briggs v. King · filed 1986-06-17(4)

This action is not governed by a special statute of limitations such as one for wrongful death, or medical malpractice, but it is one for the tort of legal negligence. The limitation period for bringing that action is set forth in § 516.120(4), RSMo 1978, at five years.

Section 516.120(4) supplies Missouri’s five-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, with accrual determined when resulting damages are sustained and capable of ascertainment under § 516.100.

Joyce v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP · filed 2011-03-29(4)

In Missouri, the limitations period does not begin to run at the time of the wrongdoing, but when the damages from the wrong are incurred and are reasonably capable of being ascertained by the injured party. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100 ("[F]or the purposes of [§ 516.120], the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done . . . but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.").

Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Creative Marketing v. AT&T · filed 2007-02-02(4)

Under Missouri law, there is a five-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).

Section 516.120 provides a five-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims under Missouri law.

Estate of Chad Logan v. Busch · filed 2021-12-06§ 516.120

Generally, Missouri law provides for a five-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims.

Section 516.120(5) supplies a five-year limitations period for legal-malpractice claims, beginning no later than when the injured party learns of possible malpractice and retains independent counsel.

Bob J. Settle v. Fluker · filed 1992-11-03(5)

When considering state law claims, federal courts are required to apply state statutes of limitations. ... In Missouri, a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run no later than the date on which the injured party learns of the attorney’s possible malpractice and retains independent counsel. ... In light of these cases, we agree with the district court that Settle’s .cause of action against Fluker for malpractice accrued no later than September 7, 1982, the date Settle’s motion for a new trial was denied. As a result, any cause of action Settle had against Fluker for malpractice is now barred.

For an indemnity claim based on secondary tort liability, Section 516.120’s limitations period, if applicable, begins when the indemnitee pays or is compelled to pay the injured party’s judgment.

Simon v. Kansas City Rug Company · filed 1970-12-14

Where the indemnitee’s liability for a tort is constructive or secondary the statute of limitations against his right to recover indemnity from the primary wrongdoer “commences to run against him from the time he has paid, or has been compelled to pay a judgment recovered by the injured person, and not from the time of the commission of the tort.” ... Therefore, no matter which party is correct as to which statute of limitations applies (Kansas or Missouri), neither limitation period had commenced to run at the time of the filing of the third party petition, and the court erred in dismissing it on the basis of limitations.

Section 516.120's limitations period for an indemnity claim begins at settlement, rather than at the underlying accident.

Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray · filed 1979-09-04

Finally, defendant's claim that this suit is barred by the statute of limitations is also without merit. The statute began to run at the time of the settlement, not at the time of the original accident. Simon v. Kansas City Rug Co., 460 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1970). This suit was instituted just over a year after the settlement, well within the applicable limitations period, § 516.120, R.S.Mo. (1969).

Section 516.120's five-year limitations period bars a legal-malpractice cross-claim filed more than five years after the clients knew of the mistake and had sustained some damage.

Dixon v. Shafton · filed 1983-04-26

We conclude that the record shows without contradiction the trial court was correct in determining that appellants were in a position to assert and protect their rights at all times after February 14, 1973, and that their cross-claim, filed May 1,1978, was barred by the five-year statute of limitations, See § 516.120, RSMo.

An asbestosis claim is subject to Missouri’s five-year limitation period, which begins when the condition and its cause become ascertainable.

Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. · filed 1984-07-17

It was not until such diagnosis was made that the character of the condition (asbestosis) and its cause (breathing asbestos dust) first “came together” for the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued on May 13, 1976, the date of the diagnosis made by his doctor at her office in Kansas City and was not barred by Missouri’s five-year statute, the appropriate statute of limitations.

Section 516.120 bars a malpractice claim filed more than five years after the damage becomes capable of ascertainment, even if the amount remains uncertain.

Brower v. Davidson, Deckert, Schutter & Glassman, P.C. · filed 1985-02-06

Their lawsuit filed July 18, 1980, was barred by § 516.120, RSMo 1978.

Section 516.120’s five-year period for wrongful demolition begins when the damage is capable of ascertainment, even if its amount is not yet known.

Knipmeyer v. Spirtas · filed 1988-03-15

Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to overcome the bar imposed by the five year statute of limitations. § 516.120, RSMo 1986. ... “The statute of limitations begins to run once the fact of damage is capable of ascertainment, even though the amount of damage is not yet ascertainable.” ... The fact of damage was capable of ascertainment upon demolition of the apartment building, regardless of whether the fence was included in the demolition order.

Section 516.120’s five-year period for an indemnity claim covering multiple kinds of loss begins when all the loss or damage is sustained.

Burns & McDonnell Engineering Co. v. Torson Construction Co. · filed 1992-06-02

Both parties concede the applicable limitations period is five years as prescribed by § 516.120. ... Where the contract is not limited to a single item of liability or loss, but includes any amounts which might be recovered, the statute of limitations for bringing a claim on indemnity does not begin to ran until all the loss or damage is sustained by the indemnitee.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period for an asbestosis claim begins when the condition and its cause become ascertainable.

Hogan v. Armstrong World Industries · filed 1992-12-01

As in Elmore, the condition and its cause did not come together for Mr. Hogan until he was diagnosed in 1985. This is the date that begins the limitations period and thus, this action is not time-barred.

Even under § 516.120’s five-year period, an alter ego claim based on a lease breach accrues when the breach causes ascertainable damage, rather than when the alleged alter ego was incorporated.

Real Estate Investors Four, Inc. v. American Design Group Inc. · filed 2001-04-03

For its second point Group contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing Nusrala Four’s alter ego claim as untimely under Section 516.120 RSMo (1994), because the act on which Nusrala Four bases its claim occurred more than five years ago. ... These claims did not arise until Properties failed to pay the rent due in December, 1998 and thereafter and vacated the premises in damaged condition. A cause of action for breach of contract does not accrue until after the contract is breached. ... The lawsuit filed on March 15, 1999 was clearly within the statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(4) gives claims for breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud a five-year limitations period; the fraud provision in subsection (5) does not cover them.

Klemme v. Best · filed 1997-02-25(4), (5)

Section 516.120(5) does not encompass breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud. Section 516.120(4) does apply to claims of breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud.

Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for negligence-based legal malpractice actions.

Coin Acceptors, Inc. v. Haverstock, Garrett & Roberts, LLP · filed 2013-04-09(4)

Actions for legal malpractice based on negligence are subject to a five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 516.120(4) RSMo.

Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims based on negligence.

McCullen v. O'Grady · filed 2023-04-11(4)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s petition filed on January 20, 2021 was filed within the five-year statute of limitations, and the trial court erred in dismissing Counts I and II.

Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitation period for negligence actions against Florissant; the city's 90-day charter notice requirement conflicts with that period.

Heater v. Burt · filed 1989-04-18

The only statute placing a time limitation on bringing a cause of action against Florissant is the 5-year statute of limitations. § 516.120, RSMo 1986. ... The charter provision places a condition precedent for bringing an action of negligence which was not present at common law and not consistent with the statute of limitations. Therefore, the charter provision violates Mo. Const, art. VI, § 19.

When § 516.120(1) applies to a parent's claim for reimbursement for a child's necessaries, it bars recovery for expenses incurred more than five years before suit.

Babb v. Pfuehler · filed 1997-05-12(1)

Proceeding on the parties’ assumption that § 516.120(1) applies to Dorothy’s claim (but emphasizing we may not have done so had there been an issue about that), we hold that Allen, 270 S.W.2d at 38, should have barred Dorothy from claiming reimbursement from Phillip for expenses incurred for necessaries for Child prior to May 10, 1989.

Section 516.120 gives a city five years to sue to collect unpaid profits taxes.

City of Kansas City, Missouri v. Ross · filed 2017-01-24

The City’s lawsuit to collect unpaid profits taxes was subject to the five-year statute of limitations in § 516.120, RSMo.

Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on requests for declaratory judgment.

Peterson v. Madson · filed 2017-12-29(4)

Under Missouri law, a five-year statute of limitations applies to requests for declaratory judgment. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) supplies Missouri’s default five-year limitations period for a trademark-infringement claim.

A.I.G. Agency, Inc. v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 2020-06-04(4)

the relevant limitations statute for trademark infringement under state law is five years from when the infringement becomes “actionable and provable.”

Section 516.120(5)’s fraud discovery period does not begin merely because a corporate agent knows of a transaction, without knowledge of facts indicating fraud.

Southwest Bank of Polk County v. Hughes · filed 1994-08-08(5)

While there is no genuine issue about Kelley’s knowledge in 1986 that the Woods property was sold from the ORE list to the Cahojs, who thereafter deeded a half interest to the Hugheses, there is nothing in the trial record establishing that Kelley had knowledge of any facts indicating the transaction was, in the words of Plaintiffs petition, “constructively fraudulent” as to Humansville Bank.

When the date of discovering fraud is disputed, whether § 516.120(5)’s limitations period has run is a jury question.

Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Express, Inc. · filed 1994-12-13(5)

The evidence on the dates was far from clear and not beyond dispute, making the running of the statute of limitations a jury question.

Section 516.120(5) treats discovery of fraud as actual or constructive knowledge; fraudulent concealment does not extend the statute’s limits or require actual discovery.

Gilmore v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. · filed 1996-07-09(5)

We have also concluded the legislature intended the word “discovery,” as used in § 516.120(5), means actual or constructive knowledge of the fraud. For these reasons, we hold fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute of limitations for fraud beyond what is provided for in § 516.120(5) and does not require actual discovery of the fraud before the statute begins to run.

Expiration of the five-year limitations period under § 516.120(4) gives a defendant a vested right to be free from suit, so the legislature cannot revive the barred action.

Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City · filed 1993-09-28(4)

There are actually two relevant statutes: for battery, the statute of limitations is two years, § 516.140, RSMo 1986; and for the other tort actions, assuming they are recognized under the law, the statute is five years, § 516.120(4), RSMo 1986. ... In conclusion, we hold that the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for battery and the five-year statute of limitation for the two other tort actions created a vested right in favor of the defendants to be free from suit.

Section 516.120 establishes a five-year limitations period that is not tolled by a plaintiff’s excusable neglect in suing the wrong defendant.

Tyson v. Dixon · filed 1993-06-22

There is no dispute that the five-year limitations period estab*761lished by § 516.120, RSMo 1986 expired on June 25, 1990, more than one year before the amended petition was filed naming George Dixon III. ... However, plaintiff fails to direct this court to any authority supporting her claim that excusable neglect may toll the statute of limitations. Point IV is denied.

A defense under § 516.120 must be pleaded and presented to the trial court to be considered on appeal.

Givens v. Highland Diversified, Inc. · filed 1993-03-16

On appeal, defendant contends plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to § 516.120 RSMo 1986. This point fails because it was not *109properly before the court. Defendant withdrew its motion on June 18, before the court ruled on the motion which in part relied on the allegation that Highland Diversified, Inc. was not before the court. The statute is an affirmative defense which must be pled and presented to the trial court. Rule 84.13(a). Accordingly, we cannot address this point.

Section 516.120 gives inverse condemnation claims five years, beginning when the fact of damage is capable of ascertainment even if its amount is not.

Rose v. City of Riverside · filed 1992-03-10

The five year statute of limitations pursuant to § 516.120 RSMo applies to actions of inverse condemnation. ... Respondent suggests and we agree, that the statute of limitations begins to run once the fact of damage is capable of ascertainment, even though the amount of damage is not yet ascertainable.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period is tolled when the defendant conceals the cause of action until it is discovered or reasonably could be discovered.

Greeson v. Ace Pipe Cleaning, Inc. · filed 1992-02-18

Ace’s final argument is that the Greeson’s lawsuit is barred by the expiration of the five year statute of limitations. § 516.120, RSMo Supp.1990. This argument fails to consider the actions taken by Ace’s president to conceal from the Gree-sons the problems associated with the landfill. The concealment of a cause of action from a party who has a right to bring the action tolls the statute of limitations until the action is discovered or reasonably could be discovered by the owner of the cause of action. ... Therefore, the statute of limitations had not expired, and Ace has failed to show resulting manifest injustice or the miscarriage of justice.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitation applies to an action to pierce the corporate veil to recover an underlying debt.

Peerless Industries, Inc. v. Estes · filed 1989-10-31

Peerless’ petition in the case at bar is the same as in Shockley I in that it seeks judgment against the defendants for the underlying debt by piercing the corporate veil. Peerless’ action to pierce the corporate veil is barred by the five year limitation of § 516.120, RSMo 1986.

Section 516.120(1)'s five-year period bars a claim for construction services when the evidence does not show that services continued within five years of filing, even if the work is treated as an open, running account.

Eckelkamp v. Eckelkamp · filed 1987-12-22(1)

Even assuming the services were rendered and the materials and equipment furnished so as to constitute an open, running account, the trial court’s determination that there was insufficient evidence the services continued on or after October 20, 1978, was supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the five-year statute of limitations bars the claim. § 516.120.1, RSMo 1986.

Section 516.120(1)’s five-year limit does not govern a written continuing guaranty that promises payment of money; section 516.110’s ten-year limit applies.

Mark Twain Bank, N.A. v. Platzelman · filed 1987-11-24(1)

Thus, unless the guaranty from Guarantors to Bank is a writing for the payment of money the five-year limitation imposed by § 516.120 controls. ... The continuing guaranty parallels the language of § 516.110 and explicitly sets out that Guarantors guarantee the payment of money. ... Having determined that § 516.110 controls, the question remains whether the action was brought within the ten-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120’s limitations bar does not apply when a written acknowledgment and tender of payment revive a contract debt under § 516.320.

Williams v. Markt · filed 1987-10-27(1)

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion to dismiss because of the statute of limitations, because the letter and accompanying tender of payment constituted the acknowledgment of the debt by a party, the appellant, who was chargeable thereby. Thus, the letter and tender of payment took the case out of the statute of limitations (§ 516.120) within the meaning of § 516.320.

Under § 516.120, an acknowledgment of a debt or a new promise to pay starts the five-year limitations period on the date it is made, even if payment is promised for later.

Ivey v. Gilliland · filed 1987-09-01

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitation is § 516.120, RSMo 1986. It provides what actions must be filed within five years. ... As the statute of limitations ran from the date of the acknowledgment and promise, plaintiff's claim was barred.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for a breach-of-contract claim seeking damages for failure to perform work.

Harrison v. O'Dell Equipment Co. · filed 1986-03-18

Therefore, like the Lato case, plaintiffs’ action must come within the five years statute of limitations set forth in § 516.120, RSMo 1978, rather than the ten year period of limitations.

Section 516.120(1)'s five-year limit for contract actions applies only when section 516.110 does not.

Oberle v. Monia · filed 1985-05-07(1)

Because § 516.120 only applies when § 516.110 does not, we first look to § 516.-*844110.

Section 516.120(1) provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims brought in Missouri, which a general choice-of-law clause does not displace.

Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Pen. v. Aalco Exp. · filed 1984-09-21(1)

This Court has held that in § 301 suits brought in Missouri the "appropriate state statute of limitations" is the five (5) year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions. § 516.120(1) R.S.Mo. (1969). ... This Court holds only that the general choice-of-law clause herein does not result in the application of a statute of limitations other than that of the forum, Missouri. Accordingly, contractual violations which occurred prior to January 24, 1979, are barred by the five (5) year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120’s five-year limit for personal injury actions does not bar an insured’s contract claim under uninsured motorist coverage.

Edwards v. State Farm Insurance Co. · filed 1978-11-27

The question is whether the tort action limitation of five years applies to bar this suit by an insured against her insurer for injuries received in a collision with an uninsured motorist. Reversed. ... Section 516.120 RSMo requires that an action for injury to the person, not arising on contract, shall be commenced within five years.

Section 516.120’s five-year limit bars an action to recover a debt secured by a chattel mortgage that does not itself promise payment.

Scheele v. Long · filed 1955-09-20

In the chattel mortgage under consideration there is no express covenant or promise on the part of the mortgagors to pay the amount of the debt secured. Nor can any such promise be implied from the language of the instrument. It is true the debt is mentioned, and the terms of payment described, but only for the purpose of identifying the debt as the thing secured. ... Plaintiffs’ action is barred by Section 516.120 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.

Section 516.120(1) provides a five-year limitations period for actions upon express or implied contracts, obligations, or liabilities.

Aaron v. Brown Group, Inc. · filed 1996-04-04(1)

Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for all "actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied," should govern WARN claims.

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitations period on breach-of-contract claims.

Al-Khaldiya Electronics, etc. v. The Boeing Company · filed 2009-07-07§ 516.120

Missouri has a five-year statute of limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Section 516.120 supplies the applicable Missouri statute of limitations for an action to enforce an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Kansas City Piggy Back · filed 1996-07-09§ 516.120

we hold that an action to enforce an arbitration award entered pursuant to an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement is governed by the appropriate state statute of limitations, in this case Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 (1993).

Section 516.120(1) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on breach-of-contract claims, running from accrual.

Vogt v. State Farm Life Insurance Company · filed 2018-04-10(1)

Under Missouri law, a five-year statute of limitations applies to claims for breach of contract, conversion, and requests for declaratory judgment, and the statute begins to run at the time when the action accrues. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 516.120(1), (2), and (4).

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for contract actions except those covered by § 516.110.

Howard v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. · filed 2019-07-23§ 516.120

Section 516.120 creates a five-year statute of limitations for “[a]ll actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110.”

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year statute of limitations on claims for breach of contract, conversion, and declaratory judgment.

Vogt v. State Farm Life Insurance Comp · filed 2020-06-26§ 516.120

Under Missouri law, claims for breach of contract, conversion, and declaratory judgment are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(1) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on actions upon contract.

Howard v. NewRez, LLC · filed 2021-11-22(1)

Under Missouri law, there is a five-year statute of limitations on all “actions upon contract.”

Section 516.120(1) generally requires contract actions to be filed within five years, except for actions covered by § 516.110 or another specifically limited period.

Varney v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2023-06-15(1)

Under Missouri Revised Statute § 516.120(1), “[a]ll actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110 . . . and except where a different time is herein limited” must be filed within five years.

Subsection (4) requires actions for other injuries to a person or another’s rights, when not arising from contract or otherwise enumerated, to be brought within five years.

Brand v. City of Wentzville · filed 2022-02-28(4)

(An action must be brought within five years “for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated.”)

Section 516.120(1) establishes a general five-year limitations period for actions on contracts, obligations, or liabilities, subject to the statute’s stated exceptions.

City of Carthage, Missouri v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2022-05-13(1)

Thus, section 516.120(1)’s five-year statute of limitations applies.

Subsection (4) sets a five-year limitations period for actions for injury to a person or another’s rights that do not arise on contract and are not otherwise enumerated.

Jones v. City of St. Louis · filed 2022-11-21(4)

In Missouri, a plaintiff has five years within which to bring a personal-injury claim. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (An action must be brought within five years “for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated.”).

Section 516.120(4) requires actions for injury to goods or chattels, or other noncontractual injury to a person's rights, to be filed within five years.

Dougherty v. Dormont Manufacturing Company · filed 2023-05-11(4)

“[a]n action for . . . injuring any goods or chattels, … or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated” must be filed within five years.

Section 516.120 makes a suit to confirm an arbitration award subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract actions.

Turner v. United Steelworkers Local 812 · filed 2009-09-11§ 516.120

whereas a suit to confirm the award is subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120.

Section 516.120 makes contractual indemnification actions subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

Western Robidoux, Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Animal Health USA Inc. · filed 2022-01-27§ 516.120

Actions for contractual indemnification are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(4) prescribes a five-year limitations period for any other injury to a person or another’s rights that does not arise from contract and is not otherwise enumerated.

Jordan v. Bell · filed 2025-03-31(4)

“the catchall provision of section 516.120(4) prescribes a five-year statute of limitations for ‘any other injury to the person or rights of others, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated’”

Section 516.120's five-year limitations period governs claims for compensatory damages based on breaches of incidental or implied contract terms.

Lato v. Concord Homes, Inc. · filed 1983-10-11

Here, the object of the suit is to obtain compensatory damages. It is not an action to enforce compliance with the terms of the contract, but one based upon an alleged breach of incidental or implied terms of the contract. As such, it is governed by § 516.120, RSMo 1978, the five year Statute of Limitations.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitation period, and a timely filed action continues to suspend that period only if the plaintiff exercises due diligence in obtaining service.

Miller v. Agathen · filed 1991-03-05

Section 516.100 RSMo and 516.-120 RSMo 1986, the time limitations statutes applicable here, require that all such actions must be commenced within five years after it occurs. ... Continued suspension of the limitation period is conditioned upon due diligence being exercised in obtaining service.

A petition filed within § 516.120's limitations period is not barred because service occurs after the period expires, so long as the plaintiff diligently obtains service.

Abbate v. Tortolano · filed 1990-01-16

This did not affect the validity of service against Min-dermann because a petition is not subject to dismissal upon statute of limitations grounds if it is filed within the statutory limitations period, even though summons is not served upon the defendant until after the expiration of the limitation period, as long as the plaintiff exercises due diligence in obtaining service of summons.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period does not govern an equitable claim to set aside a deed to real property; the ten-year period in section 516.010 governs.

Hayward v. Arnold · filed 1989-11-07

As to the statute of limitations defense, the case is not governed by the five-year statute, section 516.120, RSMo 1986, as claimed in Security Pacific’s motion to dismiss, but is governed by the ten-year statute, section 516.010, RSMo 1986; Coleman v. Alderman, 357 Mo. 758, 210 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1948); Parish v. Casner, 282 S.W. 392, 408-09 (Mo.1926).

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period does not bar claims added by amendment when they relate back to an original petition filed within that period.

K-Smith Truck Lines, Inc. v. Coffman · filed 1989-04-11

We conclude Counts V and VI of the amended petition relate back to the date of the original petition. The original petition was filed well within the five year period of the statute of limitations. The court did not err in overruling defendants’ motion for dismissal of Counts V and VI.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations bar does not defeat a claim by a plaintiff added after the period expires when the amendment relates back to the original petition.

Ingham v. R.W. Beal & Co. · filed 1989-12-12

The question is: did the amended petition adding Fifty-Two South Central Corporation as a party plaintiff relate back to the filing of the original petition so as to save plaintiffs’ cause of action from the bar of the statute of limitations? ... Accordingly, we hold that the court erred in dismissing Fifty-Two South Central Corporation as a party plaintiff because of the bar of limitations.

Section 516.120(4)’s five-year limitation is tolled when suit is filed in a court with personal jurisdiction, even if venue is improper.

Goff v. Schlegel · filed 1988-02-23(4)

Even if there was no venue in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis there was personal jurisdiction over defendant Navistar and the five year statute was tolled by the filing of the suit.

Section 516.120 provides five years from accrual to maintain an action; continued suspension of that period after filing requires due diligence in obtaining service.

U.S. Laminating Corp. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware · filed 1986-08-26

Section 516.120 RSMo (1978) is the applicable statute of limitations and it provides that the appellant has five years from the date the cause of action has accrued in which to maintain its lawsuit. ... However, continued suspension of the limitation period is conditioned upon due diligence being exercised in obtaining service.

Section 516.120(2)’s five-year period excludes statutory actions for penalties or forfeitures; the usury claim under former § 408.050 was subject to the three-year period instead.

Julian v. Burrus · filed 1980-05-05(2)

The conclusion is reached that Section 408.050, supra, basically and primarily involved the imposition of penalties and forfeitures and authorized the aggrieved person to initiate the suit for the imposition of such as the legal vehicle and means whereby they could be imposed. The 3-year statute of limitations, § 516.130(2) was applicable as to defendants Burrus I and Briscoe and the suit against them was barred.

Section 516.120 bars a claim for unpaid occupational license tax filed more than five years after the tax became due.

Kansas City v. Standard Home Improvement Co. · filed 1974-08-05

Standard claims that the statute of limitation, § 516.120, RSMo 1969, V.A.M. S., bars the claim for the 1966 occupational license tax. That is true. According to the ordinance, the tax for that year was due March 1, 1966. The petition was filed December 28, 1971, more than five years after the cause of action arose.

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year statute of limitations on MMPA claims.

Owen v. General Motors Corporation · filed 2008-07-17§ 516.120

The MMPA claim is subject to a five-year statute of limitations and was timely asserted.

Section 516.120(2) imposes a five-year limitations period on actions based on liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture.

Huffman v. Credit Union of Texas · filed 2014-07-11(2)

Section 516.120(2) provides that “[a]n action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture” shall be commenced “ [w]ithin five years.”

Section 516.120(2) provides a five-year statute of limitations for Missouri Merchandising Practices Act claims.

Oetting v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-12-11§ 516.120(2)

Under Missouri law, the limitation period for an MMPA claim is five years.

Section 516.120(2) does not apply when the claim is not based on a liability created by statute; the more specific three-year period in § 516.130(1) governs claims against an individual officer.

Davis v. City of St. Louis, Missouri · filed 2023-07-21(4)

Plaintiff asserts no “liability created by a statute,” and his cause of action is based on alleged wrongs committed by an individual officer, Defendant Figgs, in the scope of his conduct as a police officer. Therefore Cox, like the cases cited by Defendant, supports application of § 516.130(1)’s three-year limitations period to Plaintiff’s state law claims against the City.

Section 516.120(2) imposes a five-year limitations period on actions based on liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture.

Rashaw v. United Consumers Credit Union · filed 2012-07-17(2)

an action “upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture” must be commenced within five years, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(2)

Section 516.120 does not support dismissal on limitations grounds when the petition does not show on its face that the claim is time-barred.

Miller v. Larson · filed 1986-06-24

Conversely, where the petition does not show on its face that it is barred by limitations, a motion to dismiss should not be sustained. It may be that evidence introduced at trial will show that plaintiffs’ action is barred, but at this pretrial stage in this case that matter may not be ruled from the face of the petition.

Section 516.120(4)'s limitation affects the plaintiff’s right to recover, not the trial court’s power to hear the case.

State Ex Rel. Morasch v. Kimberlin · filed 1983-08-16(4)

In our view, the requirement of § 516.120(4), supra, “is one which goes to the elements of the plaintiff’s right to recover rather than to the power of the court.

Section 516.120(4)’s limitation period for the original tort claim does not bar a contribution claim brought during the plaintiff’s timely filed suit, even after that period expires.

State Ex Rel. General Electric Co. v. Gaertner · filed 1984-03-20(4)

The provision in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act being compatible with our Rule 52.11(a) and our prior holdings in Whitehead & Kales and Safeway, we now hold that a tortfeasor may seek to enforce his or her right to obtain a relative apportionment of damages by means of third party practice as authorized by Rule 52.11(a) during the pendency of the original plaintiffs timely filed suit, whether or not the statute of limitations has expired on the original claim of the plaintiff.

Section 516.120’s five-year period bars a personal injury claim against a newly joined defendant when the plaintiff fails to exercise due diligence in obtaining service.

Daniels v. Schierding · filed 1983-04-12(4)

The five month delay in this case when considered in relation to these factors supports the trial court’s finding of lack of due diligence. We will not disturb the trial court’s judgment and we find that plaintiff has failed to prosecute her claim against Monsanto Company without reasonable delay and is now barred by § 516.120, RSMo (1978).

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations defense is unavailable unless the party specifically pleads the statute.

Hartog v. Siegler · filed 1981-04-14

Appellant also raises § 516.120 RSMo 1978 — the five year statute of limitations — as a bar to Haroco’s claim. However, this statute was not pleaded and therefore is not properly before us. Rule 55.08 requires that to interpose the defense of outlawry the particular statute must be alleged with specificity, and the failure of appellant to plead the special statute of limitations upon which he relies deprives him of that defense.

Section 516.120 gives a common law negligence action a five-year limitations period that is not tolled by filing a workmen’s compensation claim.

Langendoerfer v. Hazel · filed 1980-04-15

The issue presented by this appeal is — did the filing of a workmen’s compensation claim toll the five year statute of limitation applicable to common law negligence actions? We hold that the statute was not tolled. ... The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the five year statute of limitations, § 516.120, RSMo 1978. We affirm.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period begins when a claim accrues; a claim subject to a condition precedent does not accrue until that condition occurs.

BACKERS-BEHRENS-GIST LUMBER COMPANY v. Adams · filed 1958-03-04

The accrual of the cause of action, and therefore the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations, would depend upon proof of the occurrence of that condition. ... Since the contingency had not occurred the obligation had not become absolute at the time the claim was filed and the 5-year statute of limitations is no bar.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitation does not bar an action filed within five years of the earliest possible ascertainable damage.

Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. Construction Escrow Service, Inc. · filed 1984-06-29

In any event, April or May 1974 would have been the earliest date in which Minnesota Title would have been in jeopardy of sustaining any damage by virtue of its policy guarantee that CESI had properly performed its obligations under the escrow agreement. Since that time is within the five-year limitation preceding July 5, 1978, when this action was commenced, we need not further prolong this opinion by addressing the complex question of ascertainability of damages as between the date of commencement of foreclosure, completion thereof, or the filing of the New York lawsuit by Leasing Service.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period does not bar a claim in an amended petition that relates back to the timely commencement of the action.

Want v. Leve · filed 1978-10-24

The central issue is whether plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition, filed on March 13, 1975, relates back to the commencement of the cause of action and thereby avoids the limitations bar. For reasons hereinafter stated we hold that it did and the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the cause remanded.

Section 516.120 gives these actions five years from accrual; filing a petition and issuing summons halt that period only if the plaintiff then diligently seeks service.

Votaw v. Schmittgens · filed 1976-06-01

Section 516.120 RSMo. 1969, the limitations statute applicable to this case, requires that all such actions be commenced within five years of the date on which they accrue. This cause of action accrued on June 22, 1968, and was “commenced” on May 16, 1973, within the period of limitations. The filing of a petition with the court constitutes the “commencement of a civil action.” Rule 53.01. However, the filing of a petition with the court and the issuance of summons forthwith by the clerk of the court is but a conditional halting of the statute of limitations and unless the plaintiff thereafter exercises due diligence in obtaining service of process the statute continues to run.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year period for personal-injury actions; filing a petition and issuing summons halts that period only if the plaintiff exercises due diligence in obtaining service.

Allen v. Curry · filed 1978-07-03

The question is whether the court erred in its dismissal of plaintiffs’ petition for damages for personal injuries on the ground it was barred by the 5-year statute of limitations, § 516.120, RSMo 1969. Affirmed. ... The foregoing supports the court’s findings and resultant order and judgment of dismissal, viz.: “... The filing of a petition and issuance of summons is but a conditional halting of the applicable statute of limitations and unless a plaintiff thereafter exercises due diligence in obtaining service of process the statute continues to run. ... The Court finds that by permitting their petition and causes of action to be dormant between August 16,1973 and February 3, 1976, plaintiffs have failed to prosecute their claims without reasonable delay and concludes that therein claims are now barred by Section 516.120, R.S.Mo 1969, V.A.M.S.”

Section 516.120’s five-year limitation period is tolled by a timely petition, but continued tolling requires due diligence in obtaining service.

Blanks v. Cantwell · filed 1979-02-26

The five year limitation applicable to this action was tolled by the filing of the petition within the limitation period which would otherwise have expired some five days thereafter. Continued suspension of the limitation period is, however, conditioned upon due diligence being exercised in obtaining service.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period bars a magistrate-court action when the summons is delivered to the sheriff after the period expires, even if the petition was filed before it expired.

Freesmeier v. Hunt · filed 1975-09-09

The factual situation before us is that the petition was timely filed, but the writ of summons was not delivered to the sheriff for service until twelve days after the five year period of limitations had expired, and the legislature declared, as a matter of public policy, that an action filed in a magistrate court is not to be “deemed commenced” for the purposes of tolling the statute of limitations until the writ of summons was delivered to the sheriff for service. Under these circumstances we are constrained to rule that plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the five year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period bars a claim against a new defendant brought into the case after the period expires, even if a different person was sued and served in time.

Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Lamping · filed 1974-03-05

Plaintiff-appellant appeals from an order sustaining defendant-respondent John D. Lamping’s motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s action was commenced after the running of the five year statute of limitations, § 516.120 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. We affirm. ... The plaintiff sued and served the wrong party within the statutory period and, too late, wants to bring in the right party. This cannot be done.

Section 516.120(2) does not apply to an application for a year’s allowance because that application is not an action.

Guthland v. Reineke · filed 1969-02-03(2)

By its terms paragraph 2 of § 516.120 governs only “actions,” and the question immediately arises whether an application for a year’s allowance is an action within the meaning of that word. We think not.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period does not begin to run against an express trust beneficiary until the trustees openly repudiate the trust in a way the beneficiary can learn of.

Heit v. Bixby · filed 1967-08-07

The statute of limitations is not applicable in the present case. It is well settled that the statute of limitations does not commence to run against a cestui qui trust in the case of an expressed trust until the trustees (the individual defendants) repudiate the trust by some open act of which the cestui que trust can acquire knowledge.

When deciding whether § 516.120 bars a claim requires evidence also needed to decide the merits, the limitations issue cannot be resolved on the pleadings in a prohibition proceeding.

State ex rel. Pontiac Realty Co. v. Nangle · filed 1958-07-14

Plaintiff also relies on the following provision of the five-year statute of limitations, Section 516.120(5): “An action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.” ... We think it appears from the record before us that determination of the issues of limitations and laches depend on much of the same evidence which the referee must hear to determine the merits of the case. Our conclusion is that these matters cannot be determined on the pleadings in this case for prohibition.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitation period did not bar a conspiracy claim on the face of the petition where the alleged damage depended on judgments rendered within that period.

Rippe v. Sutter · filed 1956-07-09

Thus, our conclusion is, under the facts here, that no claim or cause of action accrued to plaintiff until the rendition of the final judgments. ... We may not hold, therefore, that the petition shows on its face that the claim asserted is barred by Section 516.120.

Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period for a shareholder’s challenge to a charter amendment limiting preemptive rights begins when the amendment is adopted.

Saigh v. Busch · filed 1966-05-09

As of the date the amendment was adopted, the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued and they were entitled to undertake to have the amendment declared void and to enjoin the issuance of any of these shares without first offering them proportionately to the present shareholders. ... We hold that the plaintiffs’ right of action in the present case is barred by § 516.120, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.

Section 516.120(1)’s five-year period for a broker’s compensation claim begins when the broker becomes entitled to payment after a contingent sale is completed.

Boyd v. Margolin · filed 1967-12-11(1)

The last point is that Boyd’s claim to relief on his alleged implied contract under Count II is barred by the five-year statute of limitations, § 516.120(1), RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. ... Although the performance by Boyd was more than five years before he filed suit, the statute of limitations has no application under the facts of this case; he was not entitled to a commission until Mr. Knaus received his sale proceeds.

Section 516.120's five-year limitation bars a new cause of action first raised in an amended petition after the period expires.

Coleman v. Ziegler · filed 1952-04-14

The claim for the logs, as pleaded in the amended petition and supported by the evidence at the trial, was barred by the five year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(1) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on a money-had-and-received claim.

Laskey v. Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc. · filed 2024-02-28(1)

Class Count III asserts a claim for money had and received which also has a five-year statute of limitations. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(1); and Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 697, 703 n.5 (Mo. banc 2008).

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period applicable to the claims at issue.

Bell v. State of Missouri · filed 2007-11-05(4)

the five-year limitations period had expired.

Section 516.120(1) provides a five-year limitations period, but the court rejects applying it to this federal action because it frustrates the federal policy favoring rapid resolution of industrial disputes.

Local No. 88 United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Afl-Cio, Clc v. Middendorf Meat Company, a Missouri Corporation · filed 1993-04-05(1)

We reject the application of Missouri's five-year statute of limitations to this action because it tends to frustrate the important federal policy favoring the rapid resolution of industrial disputes.

Section 516.120(2) supplies a five-year limitations period for an action brought under a Missouri statute when no more specifically tailored limitations period applies.

Nangle v. Lauer · filed 1996-10-18§ 516.120(2)

Section 516.120 provides that in the absence of a more narrowly tailored limitations period, any action pursuant to a Missouri statute must be commenced within five years.

Section 516.120(4) is Missouri’s five-year catch-all limitations period for personal actions, but it should not be borrowed for an IDEA claim when doing so would frustrate IDEA’s federal policy of quick resolution.

Strawn v. Missouri State Board of Education · filed 2000-04-26(4)

We reject Lauren's contention because a five-year statute of limitations would frustrate the federal policy embodied in the IDEA.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for the claim, and that period is not subject to a Kansas tolling statute.

Eichenwald v. Small · filed 2003-03-07§ 516.120

the applicable Missouri statute of limitations, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120, is not subject to the Kansas tolling statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3509.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations applicable to the claims at issue.

Graham v. Padda · filed 2021-01-22(4)

the claims against them are barred by the five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(4) requires claims for injury to a person or another’s rights to be brought within five years of the injury.

Starks v. St. Louis County · filed 2022-04-01(4)

“for the recovery of specific personal property, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another . . . must be brought within five years of the date of injury.”

Section 516.120 generally requires most civil claims to be brought within five years after they accrue.

Hanor v. Hanor · filed 2024-01-12§ 516.120

Under Missouri Revised Statute § 516.120, most civil claims must be brought within five years of when the claims accrue.

Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on civil-conspiracy claims.

Cori · filed 2025-12-19(4)

Claims for civil conspiracy are also governed by a five-year statute of limitations.

Section 516.120(5)’s five-year period for fraud claims begins when the plaintiff has reason to suspect fraud and the means to discover it.

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. CURRENT COMPONENTS · filed 1985-09-16(5)

Under Missouri law, suspicion of fraudulent activity commences the running of the statute where the means of discovery exist.

Section 516.120(5) sets a five-year limit for fraud and deceit claims; a claim revived after that period is barred when the pleading that originally asserted it was abandoned.

Welch v. Continental Placement, Inc. · filed 1982-01-12(5)

Plaintiff does not dispute and it appears without question that the limitation upon the action for fraud and deceit set out in Counts I and II of the 1972 and 1977 petitions is that specified in § 516.120(5), RSMo 1978 and is five years. ... For purposes of the relation back doctrine, there was no original pleading which survived the 1975 petition and, thus, when plaintiff attempted to assert the fraud and deceit counts in 1977, the statute of limitations had run and barred recovery.

Section 516.120 allows a fraud claim to be filed within five years of discovering the fraud, if discovery occurs within ten years, for a maximum of fifteen years.

Yeager v. Wittels · filed 1974-12-17

Thus, there is in reality a fifteen-year maximum period to maintain an action. ... The discovery was within the ten year grace period provided in the statute, and the suit was filed within five years from discovery.

Section 516.120(4) gives negligent misrepresentation claims a five-year limitation period; paragraph (5)’s fraud discovery rule does not apply.

Kaufman v. C.R.A., Inc. · filed 1965-07-23(4), (5)

Indeed, we are convinced that a Missouri court would hold that any fair evaluation of plaintiff's new cause of action would require that it be classified as a paragraph (4) tort action not “otherwise enumerated” in Section 516.120 and that it not be classified as “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud” within the meaning of paragraph (5) of that section. We so hold.

Section 516.120(5) bars a fraud action filed more than five years after the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Gruenewaelder v. Wintermann · filed 1962-09-10(5)

It clearly appears that appellant’s cause of action for fraud accrued when she acquired knowledge of the facts constituting the alleged fraud. The pleaded statute of limitations (Section 516.120) barred a fraud action filed more than five years after the discovery of the fraud.

Section 516.120(5) imposes a five-year limitations period for fraud claims, with accrual delayed until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud within ten years.

Mandaville v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company · filed 2021-08-06(5)

“Missouri Revised Statute § 516.120(5) sets a five-year statute of limitations on claims based on fraud. Subsection (5) further provides that a cause of action based on fraud shall be “deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.”

Section 516.120(5) imposes a five-year limitations period for fraud claims, delays accrual until the aggrieved party discovers the fraud within ten years, and therefore creates a fifteen-year maximum period.

Andrews v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company · filed 2021-08-06(5)

“Missouri Revised Statute § 516.120(5) sets a five-year statute of limitations on claims based on fraud. Subsection (5) further provides that a cause of action based on fraud shall be “deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.”

Section 516.120(5) imposes a five-year limitations period for fraud claims, with accrual delayed until the aggrieved party discovers the fraud within ten years, creating a fifteen-year maximum.

Ford v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company · filed 2021-08-11(5)

“Missouri Revised Statute § 516.120(5) sets a five-year statute of limitations on claims based on fraud. Subsection (5) further provides that a cause of action based on fraud shall be “deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.”

Section 516.120(5) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Sonderegger v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2022-01-13§ 516.120(5)

The statute of limitations for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation is five years.

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year statute of limitations on the Missouri claims identified by the court, including implied warranty, fraudulent representation, negligence, and strict product liability.

Davidson v. Ferring Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2023-06-23§ 516.120

The statute of limitations on these actions in Missouri is five years.

Section 516.120 provides Missouri’s general five-year statute of limitations for breach-of-fiduciary-duty or constructive-fraud claims.

Gould v. McCarron · filed 2023-03-14§ 516.120

In the absence of a more analogous state law claim, the Court concurs with the UBC that Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations would apply.

Section 516.120(5) requires fraud claims to be filed within five years, with accrual deferred until actual discovery when the fraud is committed by a fiduciary.

Rademeyer v. Farris · filed 2002-03-13(5)

Mr. Rademeyer's cause of action for fraud did not accrue until he obtained actual notice of the facts constituting the alleged fraud.

Section 516.120(5) delays accrual of an action for relief based on fraud until the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

White v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2017-06-16(5)

“action[s] for relief on the ground of fraud,” which are “deemed not to have accrued until the discovery . . . of the facts constituting the fraud.”

Subsections (4) and (5) impose a five-year statute of limitations for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims.

The General LLC v. Ryder Vehicle Sales, LLC · filed 2020-03-02§ 516.120(4), (5)

In Missouri, the statute of limitations for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation is five years. Mo. Rev. Stat. §516.120 (4), (5).

Section 516.120(5) gives fraudulent misrepresentation claims a five-year statute of limitations.

The General LLC v. Ryder Vehicle Sales, LLC · filed 2020-03-10(5)

In Missouri, the statute of limitations for fraudulent misrepresentation is five years.

Section 516.120(5) sets a fifteen-year maximum for bringing a fraud claim, measured from when the alleged fraud occurred.

Anderson v. Philip Morris USA Inc. · filed 2021-08-11(5)

In other words, under § 516.120(5), the latest a fraud claim may be brought is fifteen years after the alleged fraud took place.

Section 516.120(5) sets a five-year statute of limitations for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Sonderegger v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2021-11-03(5)

The statute of limitations for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation is five years.

Section 516.120(5) requires fraud claims to be filed within five years after accrual, subject to a ten-year outside limit from when the fraud occurred.

Reed v. Angiodynamics, Inc. · filed 2023-12-07(5)

Specifically, subsection (5) states that a claim for fraud must be brought within five years from when the cause of action accrued, which is either when the facts constituting the fraud are discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, but no longer than ten years after the fraud occurred.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for fraud claims, but allows up to ten years when the fraud is actively concealed, running from when the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered.

Tate v. Culver & Cain Production · filed 2025-07-25§ 516.120

in Missouri the statute of limitations for fraud is five years. ... Nonetheless, if fraud is actively concealed, a litigant has up to ten years to file a lawsuit from the date the fraud was discovered, or could have been discovered, to file a lawsuit, not necessarily when the initial damage occurs.

Section 516.120(5) does not extend the limitations period for a claim that is not based on fraud.

Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility v. Travelers Property etc. CA6 · filed 2025-12-12(5)

But the seventh cause of action is plainly not a claim for fraud.

Section 516.120(4) gives a claimant five years from accrual to bring a negligent misrepresentation claim; attorney fees caused by the misrepresentation can establish damage that starts the period.

Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Jackson, Brouillette, Pohl & Kirley, P.C. · filed 1996-07-23(4)

By March of 1987, Commerce Bank knew that it had a claim against Kirley and his law firm and Commerce Bank had incurred damages in the nature of attorney fees that it would not otherwise have incurred but for Earley’s alleged misrepresentation. Nonetheless, Chicago Title did not file its petition until over six years later in July of 1993. The claim was barred by the five year limitation of § 516.120(4).

Section 516.120(5) starts the limitations period for fraud when the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence; a genuine factual dispute about that timing precludes summary judgment.

Taryen Development, Inc. v. Phillips 66 Co. · filed 2000-08-22(5)

Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Taryen discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered, the alleged fraud more than five years prior to the filing of -the petition, based on the record here.

Section 516.120(5) gives fraud claims five years from discovery, subject to a fifteen-year outer limit.

Johnson v. Berry · filed 2002-10-22(5)

Under § 516.120(5) R.S.Mo., "a claim of fraud also has a five-year limit, but it begins to run only upon `the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud.'" Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 497 [quoting § 516.120(5)]. The Court's earlier analysis of the statute of limitations issues is again dispositive, particularly in view of the maximal fifteen-year period applicable to fraud claims under the particular wording of the Missouri statute.