Statute Annotations › Missouri › Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120

Limitations on actions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Missouri
Case notes
426
Cited in passing
138
Citing cases indexed
170
Case dates
1952–2026
Screened through
2026-05-14
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-03
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

564 citing cases reviewed: 426 interpreted the section (annotated below), 138 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-14 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1991-06-20 Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, replaced borrowed state limitations periods for Rule 10b-5 claims with a uniform federal period. Source
  • 2002-07-30 Pub. L. 107-204 added 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), giving covered securities fraud suits two years from discovery or five years from the violation. Source
  • 2004-05-03 Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, held that § 1658(a)'s four-year period governs § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 Civil Rights Act; older § 1981 claims retain borrowed state periods. Source

§ 1983 and civil-rights claims

Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period that limits retroactive seniority relief when applied to analogous federal claims.

Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 788 · filed 1976-05-27

With regards to the granting of seniority rights, as stated above, it is clear that the operation of the analogous State statute, here § 516.120, R.S.Mo., 1969, operates to bar relief to all plaintiffs except Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin from any relief prior to five years from the date of filing this action (July 5, 1974).
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Section 516.120(4) supplies Missouri’s five-year limitations period for Bivens claims based on personal-injury actions.

Goodwin · filed 2026-03-12(4)

In Missouri, that period is five years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims treated as personal-injury claims.

Coburn · filed 2026-03-31(4)

The five-year limitations period on Coburn’s claims expired on October 7, 2024.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.

Simmons v. Chrum · filed 2022-05-04(4)

Based on a five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, Plaintiff’s claims against all named defendants are time-barred.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Keys v. State of Missouri · filed 2023-06-09(4)

This claim, and all other claims that appear to have accrued prior to 2018, are barred by the five-year statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4); Sulik v. Taney Cty., Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for Missouri common-law claims, while accrual is governed by when damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment.

Johnson v. Precythe · filed 2018-08-27(4)

In Missouri, the period is five years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4). Although state law dictates the length of the limitations period, we look to federal common law to determine when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims because those claims are analogous to personal injury claims.

Hall v. City of St. Louis, Missouri · filed 2020-03-16(4)

§ 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Subsection (4) supplies a five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims because those claims are analogous to personal-injury claims.

Williamson v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2019-09-27(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in Missouri.

Bennett v. City of Florissant Police Department · filed 2019-12-03(4)

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to plaintiff's claims.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Carter v. Hillsboro Treatment Center · filed 2020-01-07(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims because they are analogous to personal injury claims.

Rinehart v. Julian · filed 2020-02-20(4)

§ 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) provides Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri.

Davidson v. Sternberg · filed 2020-01-24(4)

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims in Missouri.

Holts v. St. Louis County Public Defender Office · filed 2020-06-04§ 516.120(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) provides Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, which this court treats as analogous to personal-injury claims.

Brodigan v. Swink · filed 2020-08-10(4)

“Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.”
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions that applies to § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Carter v. Hillsboro Treatment Center · filed 2020-07-24(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year personal-injury statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Phillips v. St. Louis Community Credit Union · filed 2020-10-01(4)

For cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims treated as personal-injury claims.

Engel v. Governor of Missouri · filed 2020-12-15(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. Sulik v. Taney County, Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2005); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for general personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims in Missouri.

Mollerus v. St. Louis County Courts · filed 2021-01-07(4)

In Missouri, the applicable limitations period for general personal injury claims is five (5) years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on claims analogous to personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims.

Engel v. Senator for Missouri · filed 2021-03-31(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for claims analogous to personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims.

Hall v. United States · filed 2021-04-14(4)

§ 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions that applies to § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Hester v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2021-05-28(4)

the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury-based § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Huddleston v. City of Byrnes Mill, MO · filed 2021-09-29(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) imposes a five-year limitations period on § 1983 claims because they are analogous to personal-injury claims.

Hall v. United States · filed 2021-10-19(4)

§ 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims because they are analogous to personal-injury claims.

Hardman v. Corizon Medical Services · filed 2020-09-22(4)

§ 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Engel v. ERDCC · filed 2021-05-28(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Stewart v. White · filed 2021-06-22(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Stewart v. Goldfarb · filed 2021-07-02(4)

the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Bell v. Jefferson County Sheriff Department · filed 2021-07-14(4)

the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which governs § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Trammel v. Suydam · filed 2021-08-11(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri.

Davidson v. Stringer · filed 2022-01-10(4)

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri.
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for civil-rights claims.

Aufderheide v. Hacker · filed 2022-06-14(4)

civil rights claims are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for claims analogous to personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims.

Swinson v. 22nd Judicial Circuit Court Officials · filed 2023-11-30(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are therefore subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. Sulik v. Taney Cnty., Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2005); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Jones v. Steele Police · filed 2023-12-13(4)

For cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) provides Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims.

Libertus v. Harris · filed 2023-12-22(4)

In accordance with the prior rulings of this Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Court finds Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims treated as personal-injury claims under Missouri law.

Fugate v. Huff · filed 2022-03-31(4)

personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Under subsection (4), Missouri's five-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims because they are treated as analogous to personal-injury claims.

Jones v. AT&T Inc. · filed 2022-05-23(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which this court applies to § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Clark-El v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2022-05-26(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which this court applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri.

Davidson v. Stringer · filed 2022-08-31(4)

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri.
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Section 516.120(4) provides Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims.

Public Water Supply District No. 1 of Greene Co v. City of Springfield, Missouri · filed 2022-10-24(4)

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies.
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Subsection (4) imposes a five-year limitations period on claims analogous to personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims.

Moon v. Boyd · filed 2023-07-24(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims arising in Missouri.

Mette-Njuldnir v. Hacker · filed 2023-08-11(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies the five-year personal-injury statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

McSean v. Hacker · filed 2023-11-06(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year limitations period on claims analogous to personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims.

Houston v. Hettenbach · filed 2024-01-31(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims, and are subject to Missouri's five-year statute of limitations.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims.

Bey v. Carver · filed 2024-03-12(4)

As such, in accordance with the prior rulings of this Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Court finds Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, and that limitations period applies to § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Estes v. Missouri Court of Appeals · filed 2024-09-11(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions arising in Missouri, including § 1983 claims.

McSean v. Hacker · filed 2024-09-27(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) supplies Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, including for § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Estes v. Missouri Court of Appeals · filed 2024-10-09(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims because they are treated as personal-injury claims.

Shattuck-Knaebel v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2024-10-28(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are therefore subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions that governs § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Keys v. Law Offices of Attorney Mark Kiesewetter · filed 2025-04-14(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Missouri.

Hufft · filed 2025-09-29(4)

In Missouri, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is five years.
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Subsection (4) provides Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims because they are treated as personal-injury claims.

Martin v. State of Missouri · filed 2024-03-29(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Under subsection (4), § 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims because they are treated as personal-injury claims.

Shattuck-Knaebel v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2024-07-16(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are therefore subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies a five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims because Missouri treats those claims as analogous to personal-injury claims.

Holman v. Vincenz · filed 2025-03-27(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are therefore subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including analogous § 1983 claims.

Chapman v. Stanton · filed 2024-04-26(4)

subject to Missouri's five-year statute of limitations.
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Subsection (4) supplies a five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Missouri.

Salazar-Ruiz v. Cox · filed 2024-12-13(4)

would apply Missouri’s five-year limitations period.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Johnson v. Satterfield · filed 2024-11-22(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) sets a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and that limitations period applies to § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Keys v. Law Office of Byron Cohen · filed 2025-03-31(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) supplies Missouri’s five-year personal-injury statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Missouri.

Keys v. Law Offices of Christopher Braeski · filed 2025-03-31(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Subsection (4) sets a five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and that period applies to § 1983 claims arising in Missouri.

Keys v. Law Offices of Attorney David Knieriem · filed 2025-04-03(4)

Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on § 1983 claims treated as analogous to personal-injury claims.

Holman · filed 2025-12-15(4)

Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury claims and are therefore subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120 supplies a five-year statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 claims in Missouri.

Owens · filed 2026-05-14§ 516.120

In Missouri, a five-year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 claims.
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Subsection (4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims treated as analogous to personal-injury claims.

Njogu · filed 2026-01-07(4)

Therefore, by the time Plaintiff initiated this suit, the five-year statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim had already expired.
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Subsection (4) provides Missouri’s five-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Moore · filed 2026-01-28(4)

Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations on personal injury claims.
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Section 516.120’s general five-year period does not govern every § 1981 claim; claims against state officials for official acts are subject to the more specific three-year limit.

Bandlow v. James · filed 1982-06-24

This case clearly demonstrates that all Section 1981 claims are not governed by the generalized five-year period of limitations. If the plaintiff has stated a Section 1981 cause of action against the state officials, the action is nonetheless barred by the three-year period of limitations applicable to acts or omissions of state officials.
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Section 516.120 supplies a five-year statute of limitations for § 1981 claims when the claim is most analogous to a breach of written contract.

Ben ALLEN Et Al., Appellants, v. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 788, Appellee · filed 1977-05-09

We agree with the district court that the applicable statute of limitation governing plaintiffs’ action under § 1981 is the five-year statute provided in Mo.Rev. Stat. § 516.120 (1969), for breach of written contracts, which is most analogous to the claim asserted here.
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Law changed since Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (May 3, 2004) limits this five-year civil-rights rule: § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 amendment use the federal four-year period, while § 1983 and older § 1981 claims may still borrow Missouri’s period.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period applicable to fraud and civil-rights claims, and the period begins when the claim accrues, meaning when the right to sue exists.

Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Insurance Company · filed 1979-07-13

By its terms, section 516.120 applies to Lamb’s claim of fraud. Section 516.120 also was appropriately applied to Lamb’s claim of violation of his civil rights. ... Furthermore, the district court properly applied the statute to the facts of this case. Under Missouri law, the statute of limitations begins to run when a claim for relief accrues; a claim for relief accrues when a right exists to institute a suit for its enjoyment. ... All actions by Amalgamated’s employees which would give rise to civil rights claims or claims of fraud occurred no later than October 27, 1972, when Amalgamated sent Lamb the letter informing him that it refused to assume liability under the contracts of insurance. Consequently, the statute of limitations began running no later than October 27, 1972, and the suit filed on August 9, 1978, was therefore not filed within the statutory period.
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Law changed since Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (May 3, 2004) replaced this blanket five-year rule for § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 amendment with the federal four-year period; claims available under the original statute still borrow state law.

Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Edwards v. Emerson Electric Co. · filed 1979-08-09

The applicable statute of limitations in a § 1981 action is Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 which provides for a five year period within which an action must be brought.
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Section 516.120(1) supplies a five-year limitations period for actions for breach of contract.

Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. · filed 1988-06-27(1)

We hold that an employee action for recovery of benefits under an employee benefits plan regulated by ERISA brought pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), is “most analogous” to an action for breach of contract for statute of limitations purposes. ... In sum, the most analogous state statute of limitations is the five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, Mo.Rev. Stat. § 516.120(1).
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Section 516.120(1)'s five-year limitations period governs WARN claims because they are most closely analogous to actions for breach of an implied contract or statutory obligation to notify employees before termination.

Aaron v. Brown Group, Inc. · filed 1996-05-30(1)

Finally, we believe that the district court correctly concluded that Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for all "actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied," should govern WARN claims. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(1). By enacting WARN, Congress imposed upon certain employers an obligation to notify their employees before laying them off or closing a facility. In a sense, WARN inserts additional terms into covered employment contracts. We therefore conclude that a WARN action is most closely analogous to an action to recover damages for a breach of an implied contract (or breach of an obligation) to notify employees before terminating them.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year limitations period on the tort claims covered by the provision.

Building Erection Services, Inc. v. Jlg, Inc. · filed 2004-07-16(4)

The tort claims are subject to a five-year limitations period under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4), and are clearly timely.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for conversion claims.

InfoDeli, LLC v. Western Robidoux, Inc. · filed 2025-05-05(4)

Instead, CEVA’s counterclaim was based on Missouri state law, and CEVA brought its conversion counterclaim within Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (five-year statute of limitations for tort claims).
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Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1981 employment discrimination claims under one or more of its subdivisions.

Larry DRAKE, Appellant, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1977-05-04

The five-year Missouri statute, § 516.120 Mo.Ann.Stat., however, is analogous and applicable because a proceeding under § 1981 represents an action upon a liability implied, subd. 1; or an “action upon a liability created by a statute,” subd. 2; or an action for “injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated,” subd. 4.
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Section 516.120 gives five years to sue on a contract of indemnity when the obligation to pay cannot be established from the writing alone.

Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Livestock Market Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 1986-03-25(1)

That is to say, resort to extrinsic facts was essential to establish both the existence of the obligation to pay under the indemnity agreement, as well as the amount of the loss, and hence — under all the authorities— the LMIA indemnity was not a promise for the payment of money, and the cause of action was governed by the five-year limitation of § 516.120.
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Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Donnell v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1987-07-28

Drake v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 553 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.1977) holds that the five year statute of limitations provided in § 516.120, RSMo is the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. ... Consequently, plaintiffs allegation that he was denied light duty work, an act that occurred at the latest 6 years and 11 months before this suit was filed, is barred by limitations under both Title VII and the limitations applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitations period for tort claims, including claims arising from a sheriff’s levy and sale of real estate.

Alfred v. Ward · filed 1996-11-05

The Ryders’ petition against Sheriff Ward alleges tortious conduct arising from the levy and sale of real estate. Section 516.120, RSMo 1994, which provides for a five year statute of limitations, is the applicable statute in this case. Because the cause of action accrued nearly ten years before the case was filed, the trial court properly dismissed the case.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress based on conduct independent of a battery claim.

Ridder v. Hibsch · filed 2003-01-24(4)

For intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress, if based on conduct independent of the battery claim, the statute of limitations is five years.
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Section 516.120 supplies a five-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Missouri.

Shuler v. Arnott · filed 2022-01-20

Missouri, § 516.120, RSMo. is the applicable limitations period for general personal injury claims.
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Product and commercial-injury claims

Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limit on conversion claims, including counterclaims seeking affirmative relief.

Eisele v. Meyers · filed 1996-06-04

We conclude that the Meyerses’ counterclaim for conversion was neither a defensive pleading nor a claim for recoupment or set-off. The conversion claim sought affirmative relief and was essentially a new cause of action. Hence, the circuit court erred in not dismissing the Meyerses’ counterclaim. The claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitation provided for in § 516.120.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year period to bring an action for the recovery of specific personal property.

Castelli v. City of Bridgeton · filed 1990-07-17

Respondent correctly invoked § 516.120 RSMo (1986) and filed his petition for the “recovery of specific personal property” within the five year period mandated by the statute.
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Section 516.120(1) gives five years to bring a claim for breach of an implied warranty of fitness in a residence, measured from when the warranty was breached.

Ruhling v. Robert Dawes Construction Co. · filed 1980-12-30(1)

The applicable limitation of actions statute, in these circumstances, is § 516.120, RSMo 1969, requiring that actions shall be brought within five years on “(1) All actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110, and except upon judgments or decrees of a court of record, and except where a different time is herein limited”. Under plaintiffs’ theory, defendants’ “obligation” is to respond in damages upon an implied warranty of fitness for use as applied to their residence constructed by defendants. The cause of action arose when that implied warranty was breached, i. e., when the house was delivered in its alleged defective condition, and plaintiffs moved into it the end of April, 1968, and discovered that the roof was leaking in a matter of a few days after that time.
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Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitations period for claims alleging breach of express or implied warranties in residential construction.

Arst v. Max Barken, Inc. · filed 1983-08-02

In their petition, appellants alleged that respondent expressly and impliedly warranted that the residence it sold to appellants was constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and that respondent breached these warranties when it constructed the residence on a slope which was unstable. Such actions are governed by a five year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120’s five-year period does not bar claims alleging continuing wrongdoing within the limitations period.

Pipeline Productions, Inc. v. S&A Pizza, Inc. · filed 2020-08-26§ 516.120

Because S&A alleges continued wrongdoing, including in the years of 2018 and 2019, the applicable statute of limitations has not run and S&A’s claims are not time-barred.
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Section 516.120(4) establishes a five-year limitations period for a Missouri products-liability cause of action.

Sanders v. Clemco Industries, Ingersoll-Rand, Inc. · filed 1987-07-07(4)

The applicable statute of limitations in a products liability case arising in Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4), sets a five-year period of limitation for bringing such a cause of action.
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Section 516.120 imposes a five-year statute of limitations on conversion and negligence claims.

Weinbach v. The Boeing Company · filed 2020-03-30§ 516.120

Under Missouri law, both conversion and negligence claims fall under a five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, including this products-liability implied-warranty claim.

Burdess v. Cottrell, Inc. · filed 2023-07-10§ 516.120

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies here.
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Personal-injury and tort claims

Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

Kg v. Rtr · filed 1996-03-26(4)

While the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is subject to the general five-year limitation period of § 516.120(4), RSMo 1986, this Court finds only a conclusion in the petition that defendant acted negligently.
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Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limit for other personal injuries; claims alleging assault and battery are subject to the two-year limit in § 516.140.

Sheehan v. Sheehan · filed 1995-06-20(4)

Prior to August 28, 1989, two statutes of limitation controlled claims for childhood sexual abuse by a family member: § 516.140 RSMo 1986, the two-year statute for assault or battery, and § 516.120(4) RSMo 1986, the five-year statute applicable to “any other injury to the person.” ... Which of these two statutes applies depends on the facts alleged. ... Thus, prior to August 28, 1989, her claims were subject to the two-year limitation period of § 516.140 RSMo 1986.
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Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitations period for permanent nuisance claims.

Campbell v. Anderson · filed 1993-11-24

Section 516.120, RSMo 1986, ... establishes a five-year statute of limitations for a cause of action for permanent nuisance.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for alienation-of-affections actions.

Miller v. Neill · filed 1993-09-21

§ 516.120 RSMo 1986 contains the exact language of the previous statute: “Within five years for any other injury to the person or rights of another_” Therefore, the statute of limitations for alienations of affections is five years.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for negligence claims; a defendant asserting the limitations defense must establish when the period began to run.

Nuspl v. Missouri Medical Insurance Co. · filed 1992-12-15

All parties agree the applicable statute of limitations for negligence claims is five years. RSMo § 516.120 (1986). ... We are persuaded by appellants’ contention that the cause accrued when coverage was denied. The record is unclear regarding when this notification occurred, if it occurred at all. It has long been the rule that the burden of establishing the statute of limitations defense lies with the party who asserts it. Southern Cross Lumber, 761 S.W.2d at 271. Because the above date does not appear in the record, respondents’ statute of limitations defense fails for lack of proof.
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Section 516.120(4) gives a plaintiff five years to bring a tort claim; for this asbestos claim, the period began with a certain, non-tentative diagnosis.

Lockett v. Fiberglas · filed 1991-03-26(4)

We interpret our statute of limitations as granting a person five years to get to the courthouse after he receives a diagnosis from his doctor that is certain and not tentative.
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Section 516.120 bars a fraud claim brought more than five years after the plaintiff could no longer have been unaware of the alleged fraud.

Ley v. St. Louis County · filed 1991-05-21

Additionally this suit was brought more than five years after February 16, 1981, the date of plaintiff’s surgery and the latest date on which plaintiff could possibly be unaware of the erroneous or, as he claimed, fraudulent diagnosis. Sec. 516.120 R.S.Mo.1986, bars the claim even if it is characterized as fraud.
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Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitations period for tort claims.

Denny's Inc. v. Avesta Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 1994-07-12

The statute of limitations for tort claims is five years. § 516.120, RSMo 1986. Benedict never filed suit against Sy’s for negligence, however. Winchell’s suit was not filed until August 28, 1991, past the five year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for tort claims; for a person whose claim accrues while under twenty-one, § 516.170 delays the start of that period until age twenty-one.

Swartz v. Swartz · filed 1994-09-20(4)

Under § 516.170, RSMo Cum.Supp.1993, if a person is under the age of twenty-one at the time his or her tort cause of action accrues, the five-year period of § 516.120(4), RSMo 1986, does not commence running until the person reaches the age of majority, twenty-one.
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Section 516.120’s five-year limit allows a temporary private nuisance claim for each separately accrued injury within the limitations period.

Schwartz v. Mills · filed 1985-02-13

Applying these principles we find that plaintiffs alleged, among alternative causes, an action for a temporary private nuisance, separable as to each accrued injury, for which the plaintiff has redress within the period of limitation for each accrual.
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Section 516.120 sets a five-year limitations period for a nuisance action, which begins to run on a temporary nuisance claim when the injury occurs.

Scantlin v. City of Pevely · filed 1987-11-10

Appellant is correct in its assertion that the five year statute of limitations set out in Section 516.120, RSMo 1986, is applicable to the cause at bar. ... In the case at bar, however, respondents proceeded to trial on their claim for a temporary nuisance, and the statute of limitations, therefore, did not begin to run until June 24, 1985. ... The statute of limitation stated in Section 516.120, RSMo 1986, had not run, and respondents action was not time barred.
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Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitations period on parents’ derivative claim for damages arising from their child’s injury.

State Ex Rel. Hamilton v. Dalton · filed 1983-04-26

Further it is barred by the five-year statute of limitations which expired on September 21, 1975. § 516.120 RSMo 1978.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for a permanent nuisance.

Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drainage District of Holt City · filed 1980-07-08(3)

The statute of limitations for a permanent nuisance — by the application of § 516.120, RSMo 1978 — is five years.
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Section 516.120(3) limits recovery for a continuing trespass to damages from acts committed within the five years before the action was filed.

Cacioppo v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1977-05-02(3)

Section 516.120(3), supra, provides that “an action for trespass on real estate” shall be commenced within five years. ... Accordingly, the court erred in permitting Mrs. Cacioppo to recover damages for any acts of trespass occurring prior to May 2, 1967, and the cause must be reversed for trial in which the issue of damages would be limited to damages sustained by plaintiff after May 2, 1967.
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Section 516.120 provides a general five-year limit for contract actions, but hospital care claims governed by § 516.140 do not gain that limit by being pleaded as contract claims.

State Ex Rel. Sisters of St. Mary v. Campbell · filed 1974-06-11

This general statute of limitations relating to such actions is § 516.120. That section requires that all actions “upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110 . . . ” must be brought within five years. ... But a legislative declaration of public policy has been made to carve out of the general statutes of limitations (§ 516.120), specific limitations (§ 516.140) relating to hospitals and to require that actions against such entities be filed within the proscribed time.
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Section 516.120(2) bars a city's claims for unpaid hospital care that are more than ten years old.

State ex rel. Robb v. Poelker · filed 1974-10-15(2)

Relators have made several responses to the foregoing attempt on the part of respondents, one of which is that the claims are more than ten years old and are barred by limitation under the provisions of § 516.120(2) RSMo 1969, V.A.M. S. Since it is clear that the asserted claims are barred by the statute of limitations and are unenforceable, we need not reach or consider the other defenses thereto asserted by relators.
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Section 516.120 gives a plaintiff five years to sue a railroad for flood damage, starting when the flood waters damage the plaintiff’s property.

Buschelberg v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad · filed 1956-04-17

It is true that the five-year statute of limitations, Section 516.120 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., applies to actions against railroads for damages caused by flood. ... It is, however, also true that the statute does not run from the time of the construction of the fill but from the time the plaintiff is damaged by the flood waters unlawfully impounded.
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Section 516.120(4) establishes a five-year limitations period for general personal injury claims in Missouri.

Robert W. Lohman, Sr v. Kempker · filed 2002-05-16(4)

In Missouri, the applicable limitations period for general personal injury claims is five years.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on emotional-distress claims.

Robinson v. City of Sikeston, Missouri · filed 2020-02-06(4)

“The statute of limitations for emotional distress claims is five years.”
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Section 516.120 sets a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Chole v. Boston Scientific Corporation · filed 2020-04-13§ 516.120

In Missouri, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is five years after the cause of action accrues.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on other personal injury actions.

Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Louis · filed 2020-12-08(4)

the statute of limitations for other personal injury actions is five years, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).
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Section 516.120(4) requires a negligence claim to be brought within five years.

Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP · filed 2022-02-22(4)

Pursuant to Missouri statute, a claim of negligence must be made within five years.
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Section 516.120(4) gives a plaintiff five years to bring a personal-injury claim.

Henderson v. Missouri Department of Mental Health · filed 2024-07-09(4)

In Missouri, a plaintiff has five years within which to bring a personal-injury claim.
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Section 516.120 provides Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

Davidson v. Ferring Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2024-07-26§ 516.120

Missouri’s five-year personal injury statute of limitations.
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims arising in Missouri.

Moore v. City of St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2025-08-26(4)

the applicable statute of limitations is five years, as set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4).
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on negligence claims.

Sharp · filed 2025-10-14(4)

In Missouri the statute of limitations for negligence claims is five years.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Troupe · filed 2026-04-20(4)

Missouri law provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal injuries.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.

Reid v. Doe Run Resources Corp. · filed 2015-02-11(4)

Instead, Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury applies to the plaintiffs’ claims.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to a hybrid LMRDA equal-rights and duty-of-fair-representation claim.

Marshall v. Local Union No. 6, Brewers & Malsters & General Labor Departments · filed 1992-04-01(4)

Therefore we hold as follows: (1) the class claim for Local 6’s acts relating to the June 30, 1987, Memorandum of Understanding (the “hybrid” duty of fair representation/equal rights claim) is governed by the five-year Missouri statute of limitations for personal injury actions and thus is not time-barred; and (2) the hybrid class claims alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement (section 301(a)) and breach of the duty of fair representation are governed by the six-month statute of limitations under NLRA section 10(b), but the lawsuit was timely filed as to those claims.
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Section 516.120(1)'s five-year limitations period applies to contract actions other than actions based on a written promise to pay money; a claim enforcing written commission-payment promises instead falls under the ten-year period.

Aerotronics, Inc. v. Pneumo Abex Corporation · filed 1995-08-09(1)

if the plaintiffs contract claim is not based upon a written promise to pay money, so that any right to the payment of money must be proved by extrinsic evidence of a breach of contract, then the five-year statute applies. However, if the plaintiffs contract claim is based upon a written promise to pay money, then the ten-year statute applies ‘although the plaintiff may, to make out his case, be required to go beyond the terms of the writing to show performance on the part of the plaintiff and a breach on the part of the defendant.’ ... Under the test announced in Johnson, the district court correctly determined that the ten-year statute of limitations applies to Aerotronics’ claims. ... Because no extrinsic evidence is necessary to prove the obligation to pay money, the ten-year statute of limitations .is applicable.
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Subsection 516.120(4) supplies a five-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, and Missouri § 1983 claims are governed by that period.

Dowell v. Lincoln County · filed 2013-02-26(4)

As discussed more fully in my June 27, 2012 memorandum and opinion, 2012 WL 2427190, denying defendants’ earlier motion to dismiss raising this same issue, Dowell’s § 1983 claims are governed by Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4); Sulik v. Taney Cnty., Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for personal injury actions, and that period applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri.

Wilson v. Precynthe · filed 2020-01-24(4)

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to § 1983 claims brought in Missouri. Sulik v. Taney County, Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Therefore, to the extent plaintiff attempts to bring claims pursuant to § 1983 that accrued more than five years before the filing of the original complaint, they are time-barred.
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Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1980-11-17(4)

That statute, § 516.120(4), R.S.Mo. (1969), sets a five year statute of limitations. Plaintiff was required to file suit by March 26, 1976 to preserve his cause of action.
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Section 516.120 gives a plaintiff five years to file a personal injury claim.

Stumpf v. Hoerle · filed 1996-04-02

Since her petition was not filed until December 7, 1994, more than five years after the date of the collision, her personal injury claim is barred by the statute of limitations, § 516.120.
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Section 516.120's five-year limitations period for an abuse-of-process claim begins when the acts constituting the abuse end, rather than when the underlying action is completed.

Robert V. Steinhilber v. Lake Winnebago Home Owner's Association · filed 1992-06-17

Although the district court held that Steinhilber's abuse of process claim was barred by res judicata, we conclude that the claim was barred by Missouri's five-year statute of limitations. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 (1986). The statute of limitations on an abuse of process claim "begins to run from the termination of the acts which constitute the abuse complained of, and not from the completion of the action in which the process issued." Corley v. Jacobs, 820 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Mo.Ct.App.1991).
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Section 516.120(2) gives abuse-of-process claims a five-year limitations period that begins when the acts constituting the abuse end.

Corley v. Jacobs · filed 1991-11-26(2)

In Missouri this provision is found in Section 516.120(2) RSMo 1986, a five year statute of limitations. A cause of action for abuse of process generally accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, from the termination of the acts which constitute the abuse complained of, and not from the completion of the action in which the process issued.
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for an action on a claim for personal property or any other injury to a person or the person's rights.

In Re Lauer · filed 1996-12-20(4)

Having concluded that Section 456.630 is not applicable, we must determine what statute of limitations applies. We agree with appellants that under the Missouri scheme the most directly relevant statute of limitations is that in Section 516.120. Section 516.120 provides that in the absence of a more narrowly tailored limitations period, any action pursuant to a Missouri statute must be commenced within five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. 516.120(2). Section 516.120 also provides for a five year limitations period for any action on a claim for personal property or any other injury to a person or his rights. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4). ... Applying the five year statute of limitations, we conclude that plaintiffs' allegations against Mark Twain in Count II were timely.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year limitations period on actions for injury to a person or another's rights, including actions involving goods or chattels.

Viehweg v. Mello · filed 1998-05-26(4)

Missouri, however, provides for a five year statute of limitations for actions "for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another ...," Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4), and for "actions for relief on the ground of fraud...," id. at § 516.120(5). ... Thus, regardless whether Plaintiff characterizes his action against ISI, Barry, and Dultz as one for tortious interference with business relationship,[3] fraud, or for the injury to his work history, the action was governed by the five year statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for an action for injury to a person or another's rights when the action does not arise on contract and is not otherwise enumerated.

Kitchen v. Miller · filed 2004-09-10

Accordingly, the court concludes that the relevant statute of limitations period is five years. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 (2003) ("Within five years... an action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated.") (emphasis added).
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Section 516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for tortious-interference claims, but a claim whose gravamen is defamation is governed by the two-year defamation period.

Cornelius v. Deluca · filed 2010-04-26(4)

Tortious interference with a business expectancy or prospective business relationship has a statute of limitations of five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4); ... The gravamen of SI03’s tortious interference claim is the defamatory nature of the postings. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims applies to Count Two, and bars the claim.
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Section 516.120(4) gives a plaintiff five years after accrual to bring a tortious interference claim.

D'Arcy & Associates, Inc. v. K.P.M.G. Peat Marwick, L.L.P. · filed 2004-03-16(4)

The limitation for asserting a tortious interference action is five years after the cause’s accrual. Section 516.120(4), RSMo 2000.
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Section 516.120 gives a five-year limitations period for trespass claims, including damages from a continuing trespass that accrued within five years before suit.

Cook v. DeSoto Fuels, Inc. · filed 2005-08-02

The Cooks’ trespass claim is governed by the five-year statute of limitations in section 516.120. ... Therefore, the Cooks have adequately presented a continuing trespass claim, which, if proven, would permit them to recover for those damages that accrued within the five-year period preceding this lawsuit.
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Section 516.120(4) sets a five-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

STATE EX REL. RAINWORKS IRRIGATION CO. v. Bresnahan · filed 2009-03-17(4)

The statute of limitations for a personal injury case is five years. Section 516.120(4) RSMo 2000.
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Section 516.120 gives negligence claims a five-year limitations period; a claim filed more than five years after accrual is barred.

City of North Kansas City v. Archer Daniels Midland Company · filed 2019-02-26

As a result, the negligence claim was filed more than five years after the cause of action accrued and it too was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for these injury-related warranty claims, accruing on the date of injury.

Hughes v. Balemaster, Inc. · filed 1987-02-03

East Chicago asserts that the subject machine was sold to Procter & Gamble in 1979 and argues that any claims for breach of express and implied warranties accrued on that date and are time barred by the four year period of limitations prescribed in the Missouri Commercial Code, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 400.2-725. Plaintiffs and Procter & Gamble argue that the warranty claims are governed by the five year limitations period contained in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 and that these claims accrued on the date of the injury, not the date of the sale of the machine. This issue has previously been decided against East Chicago's position in Arst v. Max Barken, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 845 (Mo.Ct.App.1983), and Witherspoon v. General Motors Corp., 535 F.Supp. 432 (W.D.Mo.1982). Accordingly, East Chicago's motion to dismiss the warranty claims due to the statute of limitations is denied.
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Contract and arbitration claims

Section 516.120 gives a claimant five years to sue on an implied contract; when services are continuous and no payment date is fixed, the period begins when the services end.

Machens v. Estate of Machens · filed 1983-04-05

The applicable statute, § 516.120, RSMo (1978), provides that actions upon contracts, express or implied, must be brought within 5 years from the date on which the cause of action accrues. ... In these situations, Missouri courts have held that if the services rendered were continuous, then the statute does not begin to run until termination of the employment. ... Whether the services were continuous was a question of fact. The trial court could not therefore say as a matter of law that any part of plaintiff’s claim was barred.
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Section 516.120.1’s five-year limitation does not govern enforcement of assessment liens arising from recorded restrictive covenants; § 516.010 applies because the covenants are hereditaments.

Kuehnle v. Gray · filed 1993-11-23(1)

In Point II, Owners argue enforcement of the hens is barred by § 516.120.1, RSMo 1986, which states a five-year statute of limitations applies to: All actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 526.110, and except upon judgment or decrees of a court of record, and except where a different time is herein limited. Trustees argue enforcement of the hens is governed by § 516.010, RSMo 1986, which applies to actions for recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments. This court previously stated in Terra Du Lac Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Wideman, “restrictive covenants are easements which run with the land and hence are hereditaments.” 655 S.W.2d 803, 805 n. 1 (Mo.App.1983). Therefore, § 516.-010 apphes to this case.
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Section 516.120(1) requires actions upon contracts to be brought within five years.

Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. · filed 1987-07-28(1)

This Court finds that an action to recover benefits under an employee benefit plan, such as the one sponsored by GE in this case, is not an action upon a contract for the payment of money. ... Accordingly, the five-year limitations period set forth in section 516.120(1) must be applied in the instant case.
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Section 516.120(1) imposes a five-year limitations period on actions upon contracts, and applies when the defendant's promise to pay must be proved by extrinsic evidence.

Carpenters District Council v. Bowlus School Supply, Inc. · filed 1989-06-28(1)

For the following reasons the Court concludes that the five year limitations period of section 516.120(1) is applicable in the present case, thus barring that portion of plaintiffs’ claims which accrued prior to February 1, 1984. ... (2) Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(1) bars that portion of plaintiffs’ claims accruing prior to February 1, 1984.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, which are time-barred when the claim accrued more than five years before suit.

Koester v. American Republic Investments, Inc. · filed 1993-12-14(4)

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty is governed by the five-year statute of limitations found in § 516.120(4). See Lehning v. Bornhop, 859 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Mo.App.1993). ... For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims against Cole are time-barred by the five year statute of limitations as a matter of law.
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Under subsection (4), a § 1983 action is subject to Missouri’s five-year limitations period, and filing the complaint before that period expires makes the action timely even if a required prison account statement is supplied later.

Garrett v. L. Clarke, Sgt. D. Epps, 144 F. West, Maj. 63 Pinelawn Police Department City of Pinelawn · filed 1998-06-26(4)

We conclude that the District Court erred in finding the complaint barred by the statute of limitations. For purposes of the statute of limitations, the filing of a complaint commences a federal cause of action. ... Because Garrett presented his complaint to the District Court clerk for filing before the statute of limitations ran, we conclude his action is timely.
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Section 516.120 requires contract actions to be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Discovery Group LLC v. CHAPEL DEVELOPMENT, LLC · filed 2009-07-27

The parties agree that Missouri’s statute of limitations for “actions upon contracts,” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120, governs the timeliness of the indemnification claim. That statute provides that all actions upon contracts must be brought within five years of when the causes accrue. ... Based on these principles, we conclude that appellants’ cause of action for indemnity had not yet accrued when they filed their third-party complaint against Chapel. ... Because their cause for indemnity had not yet accrued under Missouri law, appellants’ action was not barred by the statute of limitations, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Chapel on the ground that their action was untimely.
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Section 516.120 imposes a five-year limitations period on actions upon contracts, obligations, or liabilities, running from the date of the last payment on the account.

Eckert v. LVNV FUNDING LLC · filed 2009-07-28

Under Missouri law, the appropriate statute of limitations period is five years on "all actions upon contracts, obligations, or liabilities." Mo. Rev.Stat. § 516.120. The statute of limitations period begins to run on the date of the last payment on the account.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for contract actions.

Irwin v. Bertelsmeyer · filed 1987-06-02

Appellant’s petition alleged a breach of the employment contract as of March 23, 1981. The suit was filed on March 18, 1986, which on its face placed it within the applicable five-year statute of limitations for contract actions. § 516.120, RSMo 1986. Dismissal on this ground was erroneous.
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Section 516.120(4)’s five-year period for negligent failure to procure insurance began when a judgment declaring no coverage created recoverable damages.

Wallace v. Helbig · filed 1998-01-06(4)

There is no dispute regarding the appropriate statute of limitations, Section 516.120(4) RSMo 1994. ... However, the judgment declaring no coverage gave Wallace a claim for existing damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and activated the period of limitations. Accordingly, the statute of limitations on Wallace’s claim against Helbig began to run on March 23, 1988, and concluded on March 22, 1993. Rule 44.01. The suit filed on March 22, 1993, was timely.
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Section 516.120(4) gives actions for taking goods or chattels, including recovery of specific personal property, a five-year limitations period; filing the petition commences the action for that purpose.

Bushie v. Brown · filed 2000-01-13(4)

Actions for the taking of any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, have a five year statute of limitations. § 516.120(4), RSMo 1994. The original petition and the order adding Respondents in this case was filed within the five years of the alleged acts. The action was commenced upon the filing of the petition, and therefore within the limitation period.
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Section 516.120(1) imposes a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions, including an ERISA benefits action when that is the most analogous state claim.

Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America · filed 1990-04-18(1)

Accordingly, this Court finds that the most analogous state statute of limitations is the five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(1), and that, because plaintiff brought her suit more than five years after said cause of action accrued, her claim is barred.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for contract-based claims seeking regular or straight-time wages.

Trapp v. O. Lee, LLC · filed 2013-01-16

Although the two-year limitations period in § 516.140 applies to Trapp’s claims seeking overtime pay for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, the five-year statute of § 516.120 applies to the claims insofar as those claims seek recovery of regular or straight time wages. ... Trapp’s common-law claims for straight time wages have their basis in general contract law, and thus are governed by the five-year statute of limitations of § 516.120. ... To the extent that Trapp’s common-law claims seek straight time wages — and only to that extent — those claims are governed by the five-year statute of limitations of § 516.120.
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Section 516.120(4) imposes a five-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

McClurg v. MI Holdings, Inc. · filed 2013-03-27(4)

The Court further concludes that Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4), applies to Plaintiffs’ PAA claims, see, e.g., Corcoran v. N.Y. Power Auth., 202 F.3d 530, 542 (2nd Cir.1999), and Defendants will be free to reassert a statute of limitations argument addressed to any amended complaints that are filed.
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Section 516.120’s five-year limitations period governs an action for damages for breach of contract when the writing does not itself promise payment of money.

Silton v. Kansas City · filed 1969-10-28

We hold that the Trial Court correctly ruled that the cause of action alleged in Count IV of plaintiffs petition was governed by the five-year statute of limitations as set forth in § 516.120 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., and that the action was not governed by the ten-year period of limitations provided in § 516.110(1), RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period applicable to a suit for breach of a written contract.

Ballwin Plaza Corp. v. H. B. Deal Construction Co. · filed 1971-02-08

The parties agree that the five-year statute of limitations set forth in § 516.120, RSMo., 1969, V.A.M.S., is the applicable limitations statute. This section does apply to a suit for breach of a written contract. ... It is thus clear that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on May 1, 1962.
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Section 516.120 gives a plaintiff five years to bring a breach-of-warranty action after the right to sue arises.

Neal v. Laclede Gas Company · filed 1974-12-23

Since plaintiffs’ action was not commenced within five years as required by § 516.120 RSMo 1969, their suit should have been dismissed.
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Section 516.120(1) gives five years to bring an employee compensation claim based on an obligation arising from municipal civil service rules adopted under an ordinance.

Barberi v. University City · filed 1975-01-14(1)

Inasmuch as plaintiffs’ claim for compensation is based on Rule X of defendant’s civil service rules adopted pursuant to an ordinance enacted by defendant, we decide that plaintiffs’ claim is an action upon an obligation as contemplated by § 516.120(1) and is barred by reason of the five year limitation period.
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Section 516.120 provides a five-year limitations period for contract actions, which the court used as a benchmark for assessing delay under laches.

Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. · filed 1978-08-25

Although laches is a flexible concept which is shaped by the needs of equity, courts commonly apply an analogous state statute of limitations in determining what is a reasonable period of time. Ruffing v. United Steel Corporation, 76 L.C. ¶ 10,857 (E.D.Pa.1975). The analogous statute of limitations in Missouri for contract actions is five years. Sec. 516.120, R.S.Mo. Since defendant changed its upgrading policy in the new collective bargaining agreement entered in 1972, it is undisputed that no injury could have occurred after May 15, 1972. Assuming, arguendo, that 1972 is the focal date, plaintiffs still did not file within five years. This is clearly inexcusable delay.
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Section 516.120(1) provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims that require proof of extrinsic facts to establish liability.

Robbins v. Newman · filed 1979-12-26(1)

Therefore, the five year statute of limitations of § 516.120(1), R.S.Mo. (1969) is applicable to all plaintiffs' claims.
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Notes 1–150 of 426, oldest cases first.

138 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, the statute appears only in a dissent’s comparison of state fraud-repose periods; the Court does not construe or apply Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(5). opinion →
Preuit & Mauldin Et Al. v. Jones, the opinion mentions Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 only in a footnote's comparison of state limitation periods; it does not interpret or apply the Missouri provision. opinion →
Owens v. Okure, the opinion mentions § 516.120(1) only in a footnote listing examples of state statutes; it does not construe or apply the Missouri provision. opinion →
Garrett v. Clarke, the opinion cites § 516.120(4) only to identify the statute underlying the District Court's procedural dismissal; the Eighth Circuit's timeliness analysis concerns when a federal complaint is filed and does not construe or apply the meaning of § 516.120 itself. opinion →
Husmann v. TWA, the opinion mentions Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 only in reporting Husmann's argument that Missouri's five-year limitations period governed; the court instead decided the claim was governed by the Warsaw Convention and did not construe or apply § 516.120 as its own holding. opinion →
Echols v. Hayes, the court cites § 516.120(4) alongside § 516.130(2) only as authority for the conclusory statement that the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations; it does not explain, interpret, or specifically apply § 516.120(4). opinion →
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States Ex Rel. Wilson, the opinion mentions Mo. Rev. Stat. §516.120 only in a footnote listing possible analogous state statutes of limitations; it does not construe or apply that Missouri statute. opinion →
Schatz Family v. Franklin County, the opinion only reports that the district court held the five-year statute of limitations in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 barred certain § 1983 claims; the appellate court does not independently construe or apply § 516.120. opinion →
Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Development, the court cites Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) only while reporting that the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted a similar provision to encompass breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims; it does not construe or apply § 516.120 itself. opinion →
Albert Trammell, Sr. v. New Prime, Inc., the opinion cites § 516.120(4) only as part of a list of authorities accompanying its agreement with the district court’s dismissal; it does not explain or apply what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Pollard v. Remington Arms Co., the opinion cites Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 only in a list of state statutes of limitations to support a general observation about the age of claims; it does not interpret, apply, or explain what the Missouri statute means or requires. opinion →
White v. CitiMortgage, Inc., the opinion mentions subsection (5) as a potentially applicable fraud-accrual exception but expressly says it can be ignored and declines to determine which claims it covers; the decision instead applies the usual capable-of-ascertainment standard under § 516.100. opinion →
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Equity Bank, N.A., the opinion cites § 516.120(1) only in a footnote describing Equity's position that the five-year contract limitations period applies; it does not construe or adopt that position. opinion →
Silverberg v. Shan Padda f/k/a Kuldarshan Padda, the opinion cites Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 only in a footnote as the source of Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for fraud; it does not explain what the statute means, requires, authorizes, or how it applies. opinion →
Wegmann v. Ethicon, Inc., the court mentions § 516.120(4) only to identify the undisputed five-year limitations period and analyzes accrual under § 516.100; it does not construe or explain what § 516.120(4) means or requires. opinion →
Christopherson v. Bushner, the opinion mentions § 516.120(5) only in a footnote while assuming the limitations periods have not expired; it does not decide or apply what the statute requires beyond that procedural reference. opinion →
Phillips v. Metro Transit Agency, the court cites § 516.120(4) only to state Missouri's five-year personal-injury limitations period while discussing whether Illinois law burdens the interstate compact; it does not construe or apply the Missouri provision. opinion →
Krupka v. Stifel Nicolaus & Company Incorporated, the opinion mentions § 516.120 only as an authority supporting Plaintiffs’ argument that Missouri’s five-year limitations period applied; the Court does not construe or apply § 516.120 and instead resolves the issue under §§ 516.190 and 516.100. opinion →
Moon v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, the court only identifies § 516.120(1) in a footnote as the presumed five-year statute of limitations referenced by Plaintiff; it does not construe or apply the provision. opinion →
Davis v. Ruble, the court expressly said it need not consider the limitations argument and merely noted the Eighth Circuit’s rule, without construing or applying § 516.120 itself. opinion →
F.B. v. Francis Howell School District, the opinion cites § 516.120 only to identify the parties’ agreed five-year personal-injury limitations period; it does not interpret the statute or independently decide what it means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Johnson v. Satterfield, the opinion mentions § 516.120(4) only in recounting that the plaintiff's earlier claims were found time-barred; it does not itself explain, construe, or apply what the statute requires. opinion →
Dukeman v. Ste. Genevieve County, the opinion mentions § 516.120 only as Plaintiff’s asserted five-year limitations period; the Court analyzes and applies § 516.130 instead and does not construe § 516.120. opinion →
Cope v. Let's Eat Out, Inc., the court cited § 516.120 only to identify the five-year period used to estimate the size of a proposed class in its Rule 23 numerosity analysis; it did not construe or decide any issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Willie Lee BURNS, Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Appellee, the opinion mentions § 516.120(1) only to report the trial court’s selection of a five-year limitations period. The appellate court did not construe or apply that provision; it instead held that Missouri’s borrowing statute required application of Kansas’s three-year limitations period. opinion →
Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the court merely reports that Drake observed § 516.120 could apply to an action on a statutory liability. In this case, the court decides that Arkansas's three-year statute governs the § 1981 claim and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Missouri § 516.120. opinion →
Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the court mentions § 516.120 only in describing the reasoning in Drake and then decides that Arkansas’s three-year statute governs the plaintiff’s § 1981 claim. It does not decide what § 516.120 means or apply it to this case. opinion →
Myrtle Singen v. International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers District Lodge 837, the statute is mentioned only to describe the district court’s basis for summary judgment; the appellate opinion does not construe or independently apply § 516.120 and affirms on the district court’s memorandum. opinion →
Margaret E. KOKE and Anna C. Koke, Appellants, v. STIFEL, NICOLAUS & CO., INC., and Kingsley O. Wright, Sr., Appellees, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 516.120 applied; it dismissed the pendent state fraud claim without resolving the limitations issue. opinion →
Garmon v. Robert Foust Robert Ervin and Charles Cramer, the court's holding applies Iowa Code § 614.1(4), not Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120. The Missouri statute appears only in a parenthetical description of Lamb in a string cite, so this court did not construe or apply it. opinion →
Wilcoxen v. Kroger Food Stores, the court recounts the Eighth Circuit's former reliance on § 516.120 and states that Supreme Court precedent changed that rule; it does not construe or apply § 516.120 as the governing statute in this case. opinion →
Andres v. Local 600, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, section 516.120 appears as the plaintiffs’ rejected argument and in a description of the former rule; the court’s actual timeliness ruling applied the Missouri statute governing vacation of arbitration awards, § 435.120, so the opinion does not construe or apply § 516.120. opinion →
Pauline Mason, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Gerald Wells, an Incompetent Person v. Ford Motor Company, the court cited § 516.120 only to identify the ordinary five-year limitation period; its holding concerned whether § 516.170 tolls the limitations period for an action brought by a guardian of an incompetent. opinion →
Lovejoy v. Michael Goodrich, Charles Johnson, City of Pagedale and Mary Hall, the statute appears only in a footnote discussing an unraised limitations issue; the court expressly says it does not base its opinion on that issue. opinion →
Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., E.W. Bliss Co., Inc., and W.H.B. Co., Inc., the court merely cites § 516.120 to identify the five-year limitations period. It did not interpret or otherwise decide what the statute means or requires; the expiration of limitations was undisputed, and the court's analysis concerned federal Rule 15(c) relation back. opinion →
Sanders v. Clemco Industries and Ingersoll-Rand Company, the opinion does not decide what § 516.120(4) means or how it applies. It only recounts the statute-of-limitations ruling below while deciding the appellate effect of Sanders’ Rule 60(b) motion. opinion →
Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Afl-Cio v. Pevely Sheet Metal Co., Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote recounting Local 36’s alternative argument, and the court expressly declined to decide which statute of limitations applied. opinion →
Fansher v. Kassel, the court mentions § 516.120(5) only as an alternative limitation period assumed by the parties; it does not construe or apply that provision, instead applying Missouri's two-year securities statute of limitations to the claims. opinion →
Great Rivers Cooperative v. Farmland Industries, Inc., the court merely identified Missouri’s five-year limitations period while comparing potentially applicable laws. It did not construe or independently apply § 516.120; the court ultimately applied Iowa’s limitations law under its choice-of-law analysis. opinion →
Ira Malone and Charlotte Malone v. Bankhead Enterprises, Incorporated, section 516.120 is mentioned only as the Missouri five-year limitations period in describing the Malones’ argument; the court applies Illinois law and does not interpret or decide anything about the meaning or application of § 516.120. opinion →
Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the opinion mentions § 516.120 only while recounting Husmann's argument that Missouri's five-year limitations period governed. The court did not construe or apply that statute; it held instead that the Warsaw Convention preempted the state-law claim and alternatively that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2) left the suit untimely. opinion →
Lang v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., the court cites § 516.120 only as authority for the five-year limitations period borrowed for § 1981 claims; it does not interpret or independently decide anything about the Missouri statute, and the citation is incidental to the class-certification numerosity analysis. opinion →
The Schatz Family v. Franklin County, Mo, the Eighth Circuit mentions § 516.120 only while recounting the district court's procedural ruling; the appellate court does not interpret or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Pummill v. McGivern (In Re American Eagle Coatings, Inc.), the opinion only recites the parties’ arguments about § 516.120 and defers the limitations defense for further factual development; it does not decide the statute’s meaning or application. opinion →
Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Development, LLC, the court cites § 516.120(4) only through an Eighth Circuit decision to report Missouri authority while deciding which North Dakota limitations period applies; it does not construe or apply the Missouri statute itself. opinion →
Owen v. General Motors Corp., the court mentioned § 516.120 only in a footnote to note that the MMPA claim was timely; it did not analyze, construe, or otherwise decide an issue about the statute. opinion →
Blankenship v. Chamberlain, the court mentioned § 516.120 only as a possible Missouri limitations period in an alternative accrual analysis; it did not construe or independently decide the statute's meaning or application, and resolved the timeliness issue under ERISA's limitations provision. opinion →
Rikard v. U.S. Auto Protection, LLC, the opinion mentions § 516.120 only in a footnote to identify the five-year limitations period for an unjust-enrichment claim; it does not interpret, analyze, or decide the statute's application, and the recovery period was limited by the parties' agreement. opinion →
Hardiman v. Precythe, the court cites § 516.120(4) as authority for the procedural conclusion that the plaintiff’s 2014 sentencing-related assertions were time-barred, but it does not explain, interpret, or otherwise decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Carr v. Riley, the court assumed that § 516.120(4) applied; it did not decide that section's coverage or rules. opinion →
Muzingo v. Vaught, the court decides Kansas choice-of-law rules, not the rules of § 516.120 itself. opinion →
Yeargans v. The City of Kansas City, Missouri, the cited five-year period is reported as the parties’ agreement; the court’s own accrual analysis applies federal law. opinion →
Thomsen v. Mill, the court reports the plaintiffs’ reliance on § 516.120 but decides that the federal Act governs their claim; it does not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Jenkins v. Thompson, the court decides that § 516.180 and Arkansas limitation periods bar the claims; § 516.120 appears as the Missouri period plaintiff sought to apply and in a description of an earlier case. opinion →
Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, the court expressly declined to decide whether the claim accrued in the twenties; its discussion of the five-year limitation was conditional guidance for retrial. opinion →
Steele v. Cross, the court disregarded the amended petition and mentioned § 516.120 only in a conditional discussion of that claim. opinion →
Jinkins v. City of Jal, the court only reports how a Missouri court treated § 516.120; its own decision concerns New Mexico's limitation period. opinion →
Miller v. Swenson, the cited application of § 516.120 is the defendant’s argument. The court decides that § 516.170’s savings clause applies. opinion →
Miller v. Swenson, the court decided that § 516.170 tolled the limitations period during imprisonment; it did not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Richardson v. Watkins Bros. Memorial Chapels, Inc., the statement about § 516.120 is appellant’s position, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Estate of Seiser v. Lasky, the court cites § 516.120 when describing a separate fraud remedy, but does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Fiandaca v. Niehaus, the court states § 516.120’s fraud period as background; it decides the scope of § 516.180’s one-year rule. opinion →
Senn v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, the opinion discusses when a trust claim accrues, but its final limitations citation assigns § 516.120 a ten-year period and does not clearly decide this section’s rule. opinion →
New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. O'BRIEN, the opinion reports a limitations defense pleaded by respondents; the court decides the release issue without ruling on Section 516.120. opinion →
Singen v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers District Lodge 837, this decision addresses the savings rule in § 516.230; it recounts an earlier ruling applying § 516.120 without deciding that section’s rules here. opinion →
Allen v. City of Fredericktown, the limitations defense was the City’s argument; this court affirmed on a different ground and did not decide it. opinion →
DeRousse v. PPG Industries, Inc., the court mentions § 516.120 in conditional reasoning about the workers’ compensation deadline; it does not decide § 516.120’s own rules. opinion →
Davis v. Laclede Gas Co., the court decides when claims accrue under § 516.100; it does not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Glenn v. Commerce Bank of St. Louis, section 516.120 appears only in the plaintiffs’ points relied on; the court did not decide their limitations argument. opinion →
Ross v. Kansas City General Hospital & Medical Center, the reference to § 516.120 states the plaintiffs’ argument, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
Pennyrich, Inc. v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Insurance Agency, the court decides whether § 516.230 saves the suit; it does not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Opinion No. 129-81 (1981), the opinion only suggests that § 516.120(2) might apply in a hypothetical circumstance; it does not decide that it applies. opinion →
Bras v. First Union Trust Co., the court applied § 516.280’s tolling rule and said the choice between the five-year and ten-year limitations periods was immaterial; it did not decide a rule specific to § 516.120. opinion →
Lincoln v. DIST. 9 OF INTERN. ASS'N OF MACHINISTS, the court decides which limitations period to borrow for a federal § 301 claim; it mentions § 516.120 only as the former rule and does not decide that section's own rules. opinion →
Stahlman v. Kroger Co., the court decides the limitations period for a federal § 301 claim, citing § 516.120 only as the period formerly borrowed under circuit precedent; it does not decide this section's own rules. opinion →
Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., the opinion reports defendants' apparent concession about § 516.120; the court does not decide that section's rule. opinion →
Butler v. Rye, the court rejects the proposed fraud amendment on pleading grounds and calls the plaintiffs’ reference to § 516.120(5) irrelevant; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Nutty v. Universal Engineering Corp., this was a conditional alternative, not the court’s decision; the court applied § 516.105 instead. opinion →
Fox v. Bohemian Savings & Loan Ass'n, the court rejects the limitations defense by deciding whether the refiled claims qualify under the Saving Statute, § 516.230, rather than deciding a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Lewis v. Barnes Hospital, the court decided intervention and preclusion, but did not decide whether § 516.120 applies. opinion →
St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 v. Herald Co., the court expressly assumed without deciding that § 516.120 governed; its severance-pay accrual discussion did not settle this section’s applicability. opinion →
Scott v. Gibbons, the court stated how it would view the fraud discovery issue, but held the challenge unpreserved and did not decide it. opinion →
Don Roth Development Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, the court assumed an inverse-condemnation theory only for discussion and did not decide that § 516.120 governs the actual claim. opinion →
Bolman v. Chapman, this tentative limitations observation is in the attached trial court memorandum; the appellate court did not decide a rule under § 516.120. opinion →
Bohrmann v. Schremp, the court accepted that the suit was filed beyond the limitations period and decided whether defendants could raise the defense through an amended answer or motion. It did not decide a rule of § 516.120(5). opinion →
Rusk Farms, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., the court did not decide which limitations statute applied or construe § 516.120; it decided that the amended petition related back under Rule 55.33(c). opinion →
Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., the court attributes the five-year limitations argument to the appellant but decides that the claim is defamation and is barred by the defamation limitations period; it does not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Opinion No. (1986), this is an Attorney General opinion, not a court's decision. opinion →
Shockley v. Sander, the appellate court decided whether § 516.280 tolled the limitations period; it did not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Chambers v. Nelson, the court expressly declined to decide whether Section 516.120 applied. opinion →
Allen v. Pittman, the court mentions § 516.120(4)’s five-year period but decides that Indiana’s limitation applies under § 516.190; it does not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Spruill v. Barnes Hospital, the citation to § 516.120 appears in the plaintiff’s argument, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
Bourguignon v. Thirteen-Fifty Investment Co., the court mentions the section when recounting the first action’s filing date but decides no rule under it. opinion →
McClain v. Buechner, the court's limitations ruling is conditional; it affirms dismissal because the plaintiffs failed to join all partners under either view. opinion →
Findley v. City of Kansas City, the court decides the constitutionality of Section 82.210; Section 516.120 appears only as a comparison in Findley’s argument. opinion →
Kestner v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, the opinion reports an earlier court’s construction of § 516.120; this court decides when a claim accrued under FELA. opinion →
Opinion No. (1986), this is an Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
Prange v. Prange, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 516.120 was the applicable limitations statute; its recoupment observation is conditional. opinion →
Earls v. King, the quoted limitations observation is conditional on whether plaintiffs had a cause of action before bankruptcy, which the court did not decide. opinion →
Jacobs v. Moore, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction; its limitations comment is a footnote observation, not a decision under this section. opinion →
Shinn v. Bank of Crocker, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 516.120(4) applied. opinion →
United Food & Com. Workers v. Middendorf Meat, the citation appears in the Union's argument, which the court did not adopt; the court applied the federal six-month period. opinion →
Rushing v. Southern Missouri Bank, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 516.120 could be raised as a defense. opinion →
Lea v. Reed, the court decided whether the limitations defense was properly pleaded and tried, not any rule of § 516.120 itself. opinion →
Richardson v. Richardson, the five-year period under § 516.120 was undisputed; the court decided whether the plaintiff could invoke the savings statute, § 516.230. opinion →
McDowell v. Waldron, the court resolved the appeal on the merits of the underlying FCRA claim and did not decide any rule under § 516.120. opinion →
Brandon v. Southeast Missouri Hospital, Inc., the reference to § 516.120 states the plaintiff’s argument; the court decides only that § 516.105 does not bar the claim. opinion →
Reed v. Rope, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 516.120 or § 516.110 governed; the claim was timely under either period. opinion →
Michigan Department of Social Services ex rel. D.H. v. K.S., the majority responded to the dissent’s proposed use of § 516.120 but resolved recovery under paternity law, without deciding a rule of this section. opinion →
Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Karney, the sentence citing § 516.120 reports the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Remmele; this court’s own limitations analysis addresses accrual under § 516.100. opinion →
Venture Stores, Inc. v. Pacific Beach Co., the court declined to use the statute as a guideline for exercising a purchase option; it did not decide the statute’s own rules. opinion →
Kellog v. Kellog, the court decides whether mental incapacity tolls the limitations period under § 516.170; it does not decide a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Halbman v. Pitzer, the court declined to review the dismissal motion and did not decide whether § 516.120 barred the petition. opinion →
Memco, Inc. v. Chronister, the court identifies Defendant’s limitations defense but does not decide any rule under § 516.120. opinion →
Berlin v. Pickett, the limitations defense was Pickett’s argument; this court remanded without deciding whether § 516.120(1) barred any claim. opinion →
Abell v. City of St. Louis, this sentence reports Klemme’s ruling. This court applies that reasoning to the Plan Document, not to § 516.120. opinion →
Armistead v. A.L.W. Group, the court offered a tentative observation about the five-year period; the claims were timely after one year, so it did not decide the issue under § 516.120(4). opinion →
Williams v. Greene County Sheriff's Department, the court held that the argument for applying § 516.120 was not preserved for appeal; it did not decide the section’s rules or applicability. opinion →
Bohac v. Walsh, the court expressly declined to decide the limitations issue, so it did not decide any rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Lurie v. APEX CLAYTON, INC., the order reports Lurie's argument but does not decide any rule of section 516.120. opinion →
Overlap, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., the court decides whether the amendment relates back under Rule 55.33(c), not a rule of § 516.120 itself. opinion →
Dorris v. State, the court cites § 516.120 as an example while deciding the filing rules for post-conviction motions; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Carman v. Wieland, the court decided whether section 516.130(1) applied; it did not decide a rule of section 516.120. opinion →
Daliz v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., the statement about § 516.120 reports the trial court’s conclusion; the appellate court affirms without stating its own decision about the section’s rules. opinion →
Executive Board v. Windermere Baptist Conference Center, the citation appears in the appellate court’s account of the trial court’s ruling; the appellate court did not reach the merits of the limitations issue. opinion →
Executive Board v. Windermere Baptist Conference Center, Inc., the limitations ruling was the trial court’s; this court affirmed because briefing violations left no valid points for review. opinion →
Kingsley v. McDonald, the court treats § 516.120’s five-year period as background and decides whether the amended petition relates back under Rule 55.33(c). opinion →
Kingsley v. McDonald, the court identifies § 516.120’s five-year period, but decides timeliness under Rule 55.33(c)’s relation-back rule rather than deciding a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Robinson v. State of Missouri Department of Economic Development, the court decided whether DED properly pleaded its limitations defense under Rule 55.08; it did not decide a rule of Section 516.120. opinion →
Nelson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc, the section appears in Nelson’s objection, which the bankruptcy court sustained. This court decides the FDCPA claim, not a rule under § 516.120. opinion →
BRENDA K. CYRUS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Maxine Cyrus v. LAKE REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, INC., and JAMES J. JUNGELS, D.O., Defendants-Respondents., the court only identifies section 516.120(4) as a possible source of the five-year period Plaintiff urges; it decides that section 516.105 governs the claims without construing section 516.120. opinion →
Crawford v. Distrib. Operations, Inc., the parties agreed that § 516.120 supplied a five-year period; the court decided when the claims accrued under § 516.100. opinion →
Brown v. VA Second LP., the court decided whether the amended petition related back under Rule 55.33(c); it treated Section 516.120(4)’s five-year period as background rather than deciding that section’s rules. opinion →
Pitman v. City of Columbia, the parties agreed to the five-year period; the court decided accrual and submission to the jury under § 516.100, without deciding a rule of § 516.120. opinion →
Spalding v. Stewart title Guaranty Company, the court expressly left open whether § 516.120 or § 516.110 applies and held the action timely under either period; its accrual analysis did not decide § 516.120’s own rule. opinion →
In re Hood, the court applies Utah law and discusses Missouri § 516.120 only conditionally, as an even-if alternative. opinion →
Troxell v. Welch, the court cites the section for the agreed five-year limitations period while deciding whether amended claims relate back under Rule 55.33(c). opinion →
Thompson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the court cites the section while recounting that Michael Thompson filed his personal injury action within five years. opinion →

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