Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.330

Section 452.330.1 requires courts to divide the marital portion of retirement accounts and set aside the nonmarital portion under the source of funds rule.

Columbo v. Brunkhorst · filed 2007-03-20(1)

Both Wife and Husband concede there were contributions to their individual retirement accounts during their marriage. Accordingly, these accounts should have been denominated as marital property, and the trial court should have used the source of funds rule to determine which portions were separate property.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to divide an unmatured pension between spouses and assign it zero present value when benefits remain contingent.

Landewee v. Landewee · filed 2017-04-25(1)

The trial court fully divided all of Wife and Husband’s marital and non-marital property, including the LAGERS pension. There was no error in assigning the non-matured LAGERS pension a present value of zero dollars because any benefit from that pension was contingent at the time of dissolution.

An agreement to divide property does not exclude it from marital property under section 452.330.2(4) when it is still treated as marital property.

State ex rel. Brewer v. Sheehan · filed 1978-05-02(2)(4)

Nor do we find that the property involved was excluded as marital property by agreement of the parties as provided in Sec. 452.330.2(4) R.S.Mo.Supp.1973. Neither the dissolution court nor the relator indicated it was not marital property.

Section 452.330 excludes property from marital property by agreement only when clear and unequivocal evidence shows both spouses intended that exclusion.

Rogers v. Rogers · filed 1978-10-17(2)(4)

We believe that before any property can be excluded from the term “marital property” by valid agreement of the parties the evidence must clearly and unequivocally show an agreement whereby both parties intend that the property be excluded from their marital property.

Section 452.330, subdivision 2(4), excludes property covered by a valid agreement from the dissolution court's jurisdiction to divide marital property.

Ray v. Ray · filed 1982-02-232(4)

The court did not find it unconscionable and thus the agreement excluded the property from the jurisdiction of the trial court in that action. Section 452.330, subd. 2(4) RSMo Supp.1975.

Section 452.330(2) treats property acquired after marriage as marital property unless a valid agreement excludes it.

Nedblake v. Nedblake · filed 1984-12-11(2)

Under § 452.330.2, RSMo Supp.1984, a finding that property is excluded by valid agreement renders the property separate by rebutting the presumption that property acquired by either party after the marriage is marital property.

Section 452.330.2(4) allows spouses to agree that property will be separate even if it would otherwise be marital property.

Degerinis v. Degerinis · filed 1987-02-17(2)(4)

We believe that under § 452.330.-2(4), the parties to a dissolution proceeding may enter into a valid agreement that certain property is to be considered as separate, even though, as a matter of law, the property is marital.

A party seeking to exclude property from marital property by agreement must prove by clear and convincing evidence that both spouses intended the exclusion.

Marriage of E.L.S. v. F.M.S. · filed 1992-02-18(2)(4)

On this record, we find no clear and convincing evidence of an agreement whereby both parties intended that the property in question be excluded, pursuant to § 452.330.2(4), from the broad purview of the definition of marital property.

Section 452.330.2(4) excludes property covered by a valid antenuptial agreement from marital property in a dissolution proceeding.

Marriage of Gould v. Rafaeli · filed 1991-12-17(2)(4)

By statute, “marital property” in a dissolution proceeding does not include property “excluded by valid agreement of the parties.” § 452.-330.2(4).

Section 452.330.2(4) excludes property covered by a valid agreement from marital property, so the agreement’s terms govern its classification.

Dardick v. Dardick · filed 1997-07-15(2)(4)

Under both Missouri and California law, when there is a premarital agreement, the character of the property as community/marital or separate is not determined by the presumptions set forth by statute or case, but by the terms of the contract.

Section 452.330.2(4) requires a valid written agreement to exclude debts incurred during marriage from division as marital debts.

Rawlings v. Rawlings · filed 2001-02-06(2)(4)

Section 452.330.2 provides that parties may exclude property acquired during the marriage and, by implication, debts incurred during the marriage from division between the parties as marital property and debts by a valid agreement in writing.

A valid written agreement can exclude property acquired during marriage, including income from property the agreement designates as separate, from marital property.

Hanna v. Hanna · filed 2014-11-04(2)(4)

The plain language of the agreement allowed each party to acquire separate property, with separate funds, during the marriage and title that property in their individual names. Moreover, the plain language of the agreement allowed the parties to keep as separate income from those separate properties.

Section 452.330.2(4) allows property acquired during marriage to be treated as separate when a valid written agreement excludes it, which must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Jalesia McQueen, Appellant. v. Gadberry · filed 2016-11-15(2)(4)

Accordingly, McQueen has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Directive is a valid and enforceable agreement under section 452.330.2(4) which renders the frozen pre-embryos separate property to be awarded to McQueen under the circumstances of this case.

Section 452.330.2(4) excludes property from marital property when the parties exclude it by valid written agreement.

Penrod v. Penrod · filed 2021-05-18(2)(4)

Section 452.330.2(4) states marital property does not include property excluded by valid written agreement of the parties. As stated above, we have found the Antenuptial Agreement to be conscionable and valid.

Section 452.330 requires a division of marital property that severs the spouses’ common ownership unless unusual economic circumstances justify a tenancy in common.

In re the Marriage of Crewse · filed 1980-01-17

Here, the trial court’s decree did not sever the relationship attached to the common ownership of property, with the exception of the two motor vehicles, and expressly decreed the parties to be tenants in common of all marital property. As such, the decree did not constitute a division of “marital property” as mandated by § 452.330 and is not a final judgment.

Section 452.330 permits a court to divide marital property by awarding spouses interests as tenants in common.

Murray v. Murray · filed 1981-03-24

We have examined the statute and find no prohibition against an allocation that leaves the parties as tenants in common.

Section 452.330 requires division of marital property in a legal separation, but a decree ordering sale and division of proceeds does not sever a tenancy by the entirety when it leaves title unchanged.

Ronollo v. Jacobs · filed 1989-08-01(1), (5)

On the one hand the legislature recognized the need for a final order as it affects distribution of marital property in a legal separation. § 452.330.5, RSMo Supp.1988. ... Here, the decree did not alter the manner in which Mr. and Mrs. Ronollo held the property. The trial court did not set apart the real estate to either spouse but simply ordered the sale and a division of net proceeds thereafter. The language of the decree does not purport to affect the estate until the parties receive the proceeds. Consequently, absent entry of a decree of dissolution of marriage in this case, Mr. and Mrs. Ronollo remained owners of the real estate as tenants by the entirety.

Section 452.330 uses the source of funds rule: property is acquired as it is paid for, so marital funds used to purchase it can give the marital estate a share of its value.

Hoffmann v. Hoffmann · filed 1984-09-11(2)(5)

Under the source of funds rule, the character of the property is determined by the source of funds financing the purchase. The property is considered to be acquired as it is paid for so that a portion of the property's ultimate value will be marital property. ... Therefore, we reverse the trial court's application of the inception of title rule and adopt the source of funds approach in dividing property at dissolution.

Section 452.330.2 presumes assets acquired during marriage are marital property, and stock received in exchange is marital to the extent those assets were purchased with marital funds.

Sumners v. Sumners · filed 1985-12-17(2)

Under the source of funds rule, these assets were acquired during the marriage. According to § 452.330 it must therefore be presumed that the assets were marital. To the extent it was purchased with marital assets, the stock must also be considered marital.

Property is classified as marital or separate for division according to the source of funds used to purchase it.

Mitchell v. Mitchell · filed 1986-06-03

Under that rule the character of property is determined by the source of funds used for the purchase.

Section 452.330 permits property acquired or improved with both marital and nonmarital funds to be treated as partly marital, with the marital interest subject to equitable division.

Neal v. Neal · filed 1989-08-28

Therefore, under the source of funds rule, property acquired during marriage, including real property, may have a dual character if it is acquired by the expenditure of both marital and nonmarital funds.

Section 452.330.2(5) generally treats appreciation of separate property caused by marital funds or efforts as marital property, while appreciation caused by market forces remains separate property.

In Re Marriage of Schatz · filed 1989-03-20(2)(5)

What is called “active” appreciation is appreciation caused by marital funds or marital efforts, and it generally constitutes marital property. “Passive” appreciation is that increase in value produced by normal inflation or normal market forces, and it generally constitutes separate property.

An increase in the value of property owned before marriage is marital property only to the extent marital assets contributed to that increase.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1991-10-29(2)(5)

The record fails to reveal how much of the gain in value of Gerald’s Direct Account Plan during the marriage was attributable to (a) increase in worth of assets acquired prior to the marriage, or (b) contribution of marital assets. Lacking this information, the trial court could not have determined how much of the increase was marital property. Neither can we.

Section 452.330.2(5) treats an increase in premarital property's value as marital property only to the extent marital assets, including labor, contributed to the increase.

Schneider v. Schneider · filed 1992-02-18(2)(5)

Section 452.330.2(5), RSMo Supp. 1988, provides that the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage is separate property unless marital assets, including labor, have contributed to such increases. In such cases, the property is marital, but only to the extent of the contributions.

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property only in proportion to marital funds or labor that contributed to the increase.

Meservey v. Meservey · filed 1992-09-22(2)(5)

Under Hoffmann, id., and later statutory enactment in § 452.330.2(5), the increase in value of separate property can constitute marital property if marital assets or labor contributed to “acquiring” that increase, but then, only in proportion to the marital contributions.

Calves born during a marriage are property acquired after marriage under § 452.330.2, even when the cattle that produced them are non-marital property.

Elder v. Elder · filed 1992-02-19(2)

Calves born during the course of a marriage to cattle owned by a husband or wife are property acquired subsequent to the marriage. § 452.330.2, RSMo Supp. 1990. This is true even though the increase is from cattle that were non-marital property.

Section 452.330.1 requires a court to set apart each spouse’s non-marital property and does not permit it to give the other spouse a partial interest in that property.

Mabon v. Mabon · filed 1992-07-211

Section 452.330.1, RSMo Supp. 1989 requires the trial court in a dissolution action to “set apart to each spouse his non-marital property.” Consequently, the trial court, acting on its own, does not have the authority to divide non-marital property.

An increase in the value of separate property attributable to marital assets is marital property only to the extent of those contributions.

Felkner v. Felkner · filed 1993-01-28(2)(5)

Any increase in the value of Husband’s interest in 603 East Seventh Street attributable to contribution of marital assets would be marital property, but only to the extent of such contributions. § 452.330.2(5).

Section 452.330.2 leaves passive appreciation of separate property separate; ordinary spousal duties do not make that increase marital property.

Deffenbaugh v. Deffenbaugh · filed 1994-05-31.2

Although he regularly looked at the statements, corresponded with and spoke to the broker, and gave advice to wife, those activities were within the purview of ordinary and usual spousal duties; and as such, did not transform the increased value of the original shares of the mutual fund into joint property.

Section 452.330.2(5) treats an increase in premarital property’s value as marital property to the extent marital assets or labor contributed to it.

In Re Marriage of Gardner · filed 1994-11-08(2)(5)

Under § 452.330.2(5), RSMo Supp.1993, marital property does not include “[t]he increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage ... unless marital assets including labor, have contributed to such increases and then only to the extent of such contributions.” ... Thus, a portion of the value of the stock was properly marital property.

An increase in the value of separate property remains separate unless marital assets contributed to the increase.

Barnes v. Barnes · filed 1995-06-20(2)(5)

An increase in the value of separate property remains separate property unless marital assets contributed to such increase. § 452.330.2(5), RSMo 1994. ... Mrs. Barnes offered no proof at trial that the increase in the equity of the Roeland Park house resulted from contributions by her. All $50,000 of equity in the house, therefore, was Mr. Barnes’s separate, nonmarital property.

An increase in the value of separate property may be marital property to the extent marital funds or efforts caused the increase.

Brooks v. Brooks · filed 1995-10-24(2)(5)

We find that this evidence supports the inference that at least some portion of the increase was produced by the expenditure of marital funds. Under such circumstances, we hold that the case may properly be remanded to permit the parties to introduce evidence of the value of the property at the date of the marriage, which will enable the trial court to recalculate the marital and nonmarital portions of the increase in value as set forth above.

Section 452.330 treats an increase in separate property’s value as marital property to the extent that marital assets contributed to the increase.

Carter v. Carter · filed 1997-02-25(2)(5)

This specifically identifies that the increase in the nonmarital property’s value (the reduction of indebtedness against Russell's farm property) through the application of marital assets (the cash obtained by the sale of marital crops and cattle) is to be designated as a marital asset.

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property only to the extent marital assets or labor contributed to that increase.

Heirigs v. Heirigs · filed 2000-12-18(2)(5)

Under § 452.330.2(5), RSMo Cum.Supp.1998, any increase in the value of Dennis’s farm during the marriage attributable to contribution of marital assets, including labor, constitutes marital property, but only to the extent of such contributions.

Once property is classified as marital, its division is not controlled by which spouse supplied the funds; the court considers the relevant statutory factors.

Shelby v. Shelby · filed 2004-02-19(1)

Once a trial court determines property is marital, its division is not subject to the source of funds rule.

Section 452.330.2(5) gives the marital estate a share of an increase in separate property's value when marital assets or labor contributed to that increase.

Holman v. Holman · filed 2007-07-26(2)(5)

It is clear that in the instant matter the increase in value to the Farmhouse resulted in part from the expenditure of marital assets. Wife was entitled to a marital interest in that increased value.

Under the version of § 452.330.3 applicable before the 1981 amendment, property acquired before dissolution is presumed marital.

Hedgecorth v. Hedgecorth · filed 1985-08-27(3)

Section 452.330.3 RSMo (1978) (Sup.1984), was amended by the legislature in 1981. The amendment established the commencement of an action for dissolution as the cut-off date for common ownership of property acquired during the marriage. The amendment was not in effect on the date of the dissolution in this case and therefore all property acquired by the parties prior to October 8, 1980 is presumed to be marital property.

Filing a dissolution petition does not end the period in which newly acquired property is presumed marital under § 452.330.

Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen · filed 1986-06-17(3)

Given this history we conclude that the 1981 amendment was not intended to change the law that marital property includes any property acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution.

Section 452.330(3) presumes property acquired after marriage but before a decree of legal separation or dissolution is marital property, even if the spouses have separated.

In Re Marriage of Kettler v. Kettler · filed 1994-10-11(3)

The funds at issue were received prior to the decree of dissolution and there was no decree of legal separation. For this reason the presumption arises that the CD was marital property, which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Property acquired after spouses physically separate is marital property if they are not legally separated.

Kauffman v. Kauffman · filed 2003-04-01(3)

Husband and Wife were not legally separated at the time, however, so under § 452.330.3, Husband’s interest in Kauffman Enterprises is marital property.

Section 452.330 cannot be applied retrospectively to divide property from a divorce adjudicated before the Dissolution of Marriage Act took effect.

Kuntzman v. Kuntzman · filed 1987-02-10

The question of whether the trial court did in fact, have jurisdiction over this matter depends upon whether the Dissolution of Marriage Act, specifically § 452.330 RSMo 1986, may be applied to a divorce and property settlement which took place in 1970, even though the Act did not take effect until Jan. 1, 1974. We hold that the Act may not be used retrospectively to compel division of the pension plan.

Section 452.330(1)’s family-home factor does not apply when the parties divide property through a separation agreement the court finds not unconscionable.

Mitchell v. Mitchell · filed 1994-12-06(1)

However, this provision is inapplicable as the property was not divided by the trial court. The parties agreed on how the marital property would be divided in their separation agreement, and the trial court found the agreement was not unconscionable.

Section 452.330.1’s property-division considerations yield to a binding property agreement stipulated to in court when the agreement is not found unconscionable.

Reisenleiter v. Reisenleiter · filed 1996-07-231

Here, Husband and Wife stipulated in court that the terms of the Agreement would control the division of property in the event of a dissolution proceeding, notwithstanding the statutory considerations of § 452.330.1, RSMo 1994. Because the circuit court did not find the Agreement unconscionable, its terms control the resolution of this matter.

Section 452.330’s factors for dividing marital property apply when the parties have no property settlement agreement.

In re the Marriage Thompson · filed 2000-10-04(1)

Furthermore, Wife’s second point incorrectly assumes the trial court was proceeding under § 452.330, RSMo Cum.Supp.1998, and was, therefore, bound by its precepts.

Section 452.330.1 requires a court to divide marital property left out of a separation agreement in proportions it deems just after considering all relevant factors.

Henning v. Henning · filed 2002-04-09(1)

The agreement did not dispose of all the parties’ marital property, and the trial court was, therefore, obligated to divide the remaining marital property according to section 452.330.1.

Section 452.330.1 directs courts to set apart each spouse’s nonmarital property, but it does not prevent enforcement of the spouses’ written agreement to divide that property.

Franken v. Franken · filed 2006-05-23(1)

He relied on Section 452.330.1, RSMo 2000, which mandates that the circuit court “set apart to each spouse such spouse’s nonmarital property.” He overlooks, however, Section 452.325, RSMo 2000, which requires circuit courts to honor parties’ written agreements regarding property division.